




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# **The Major Powers and the Southwest Indian Ocean Islands: Prospects for Change**

**National Intelligence Estimate  
Memorandum to Holders**

**Secret**

*NIE 30/70-82  
April 1985*

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## MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS

NIE 30/70-82

### THE MAJOR POWERS AND THE SOUTHWEST INDIAN OCEAN ISLANDS: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE

Information available as of 3 April 1985 was used in the preparation of this Memorandum to Holders, which was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on that date.

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**THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.**

**THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.**

*The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:*

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## KEY JUDGMENTS

Since the publication of NIE 30/70-82, *The Major Powers and the Southwest Indian Ocean Islands*, the USSR's regional interests in the island nations of Madagascar, Seychelles, Mauritius, and Comoros have remained relatively constant. Moscow seeks improved naval and air access and facilities, supports leftist policies and leaders, and encourages local opposition to the expansion of Western military activity—most notably the buildup on Diego Garcia. We believe that, in the near term, the Soviets will continue to see the island nations as targets of opportunity, but of low priority to Moscow's overall global interests. As such, the area is likely to remain one of low-level but steady competition for influence between East and West.

Moscow's primary instrument for maintaining and expanding its influence in the region is its willingness to provide military equipment and training to local armed forces and security services. Moscow also seeks political influence by appealing to the radical pretensions of leftist leaders—particularly in Madagascar and Seychelles—and highlighting the evils of "Western imperialism" and "capitalist exploitations." In Madagascar the Soviets have pursued their traditional tactic of supporting a Marxist-Leninist party to increase their influence.

The USSR, however, faces a number of serious liabilities that constrain its ability to gain greater influence. First and foremost, even ideologically sympathetic leaders are disappointed in the amount of economic aid provided by Moscow. Moreover, during the two-year period of this Estimate, Soviet military capability in the region will remain well behind that of the West. These factors—coupled with the considerable logistic difficulties—almost certainly will limit the willingness and ability of Moscow to intervene directly in island conflicts.

Although relations have cooled during the past two years, *Madagascar* is likely to remain a prime target for Soviet activity in the region. Moscow will continue to use security assistance to maintain influence with Antananarivo and limit the impact of Ratsiraka's economically inspired "turn to the West," while continuing to press for naval access to facilities at the port of Antsiranana (Diego Suarez). Likewise in *Seychelles*, Moscow's willingness to play to the security fears of leftist President Rene will continue to give the USSR considerable leverage. Prospects for increased Soviet influence in *Mauritius* and *Comoros* are considerably less, and both countries are likely to continue keeping the

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Soviet Union at arm's length. In Mozambique, the recent unprecedented visit of two Soviet IL-38 antisubmarine warfare aircraft—shortly after a Soviet warship, tanker, and two other Soviet vessels made the latest in a longstanding series of port calls at Maputo—suggests that Maputo may have expanded further Soviet military access, albeit to an as-yet-undetermined degree.

Efforts by other hostile powers to expand their influence in the region have met with only limited success in recent years. East European and Cuban roles have remained fundamentally unchanged during the last two years, and continue to be constrained by the small scale and low technical level of their aid efforts. Libyan influence has waned since 1982, when Tripoli was aggressively active in Mauritian domestic affairs and enjoyed promising relations with Seychelles and Madagascar. Qadhafi is not well positioned to gain a firmer foothold in the near term unless he improves on his now-well-established track record in the region of not coming through as expected on aid offers.

*North Korea* has made a bid for expanded regional influence since 1982. P'yongyang has stepped up economic and security assistance to Madagascar and now provides some 150 to 180 military personnel to Seychelles. While North Korea is likely to attempt to take advantage of these new inroads, distance and cost probably would hinder further sizable increases in the North Korean presence in the area.

Western interests in the Indian Ocean island states continue to be driven in part by continuing tensions in the Persian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, and southern Africa. The US military presence at Diego Garcia and the US tracking station in Seychelles will remain Washington's most important equities in the region. Both France's and the United Kingdom's strategic interests in the region closely parallel those of the United States, but budgetary constraints will tend to circumscribe their roles.

How to respond to deteriorating economic conditions will remain a dominant domestic political issue for all island leaders. Prospects for significant economic recovery throughout the region remain poor, and are unlikely to improve in the near term. Although the regimes in Seychelles, Comoros, and Madagascar ultimately are vulnerable to coups, we do not expect sharp ideological breaks and anticipate that trends of recent years will hold. In particular, we believe leftist leaders, such as Malagasy President Ratsiraka and Seychelles President Rene, will continue to balance their search for greater Western economic assistance against their reliance on security assistance from the USSR and its surrogates. The outlook for improved regional cooperation in the next several years or for significant movement on achieving an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace—both rhetorical foreign policy goals of island leaders—will remain dim.

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US relations with the island governments are not likely to change dramatically over the near term. The United States can expect to be engaged constantly in countering and fending off Soviet criticisms of the West's interference in the affairs of the region—particularly with regard to Diego Garcia—and the “unwillingness” of the West to support the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace. While Washington's failure to meet the islands' economic expectations could impose strains on relations, the lack of alternatives for aid from other sources should place limits on expressions of discontent. The United States is unlikely to gain increased air and naval access to the islands, but this will not seriously damage US interests as long as the Soviets—as we believe will be the case—also fail to achieve any exclusive military access over the next two years. Given the US presence on Diego Garcia and limited military access agreements with Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Oman, military access to the islands is not critical to the US strategic position in the region.


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Western Indian Ocean



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## DISCUSSION

### Introduction

1. Since the publication of NIE 30/70-82, *The Major Powers and the Southwest Indian Ocean Islands*, Moscow has continued to seek improved military access, support leftist change in the island nations, and encourage local opposition to the expansion of Western military activity—most notably the buildup on Diego Garcia. In our judgment, the trends noted in the earlier Estimate remain valid, and we believe the area will remain one of relatively low-level East-West competition for influence. While Moscow continues to view the southwest Indian Ocean as a target of opportunity, we believe the region remains a relatively low priority in Moscow's overall global interests. Recent efforts to increase Soviet influence, even among the left-leaning regimes in Madagascar and Seychelles, have met with only mixed success. Moscow's failure to provide significant economic assistance to the financially beleaguered regimes remains the major impediment to greater Soviet leverage. Domestically, the island nations—whether left or right leaning—are likely to face difficult economic times ahead and remain vulnerable to political instability.

### External Interests in the Islands

#### The USSR and Its Allies

2. The Soviet Union's regional interests in the southwest Indian Ocean continue to be driven by a combination of military, political, and economic considerations that include strengthening Moscow's ties with leftist island states and limiting Western influence and access in the region. Moscow's primary instrument for maintaining and expanding its influence in the region remains the provision of military equipment and training to local armed forces and security services. Moscow uses its military assistance programs to cultivate national leaders fearful of internal and external threats, to build ties with key military leaders, and to promote dependence of national forces on the USSR for support and spare parts. In addition, Moscow's influence reportedly is strong in the Congress Party for Malagasy Independence, a leftist partner in Madagascar's ruling alliance since the mid-1970s.

3. Moscow has continued in recent years to seek access to air and naval support facilities in the islands—Seychelles and Madagascar—and also in nearby Mozambique. The Soviets see such access as improving their ability to sustain naval forces in these distant areas as a counter to Western military presence in the region and to collect intelligence against the West. Moreover, access would provide the USSR with a presence ashore and a measure of domestic leverage in the host countries. All of the island nations in the region, however, continue to resist Moscow's requests for naval and air facilities. Most notably, Malagasy President Ratsiraka continues to refuse the Soviets naval access to Antsiranana (Diego Suarez) in northern Madagascar.

4. Overall, Moscow's military capabilities in the southwest Indian Ocean remain relatively limited despite the continued presence of the Soviet Indian Ocean Naval Squadron (SOVINDRON), still concentrated in the Arabian Sea. Moreover, for the period of this Estimate, these capabilities are likely to remain well behind those of the West, although Soviet assets there can be reinforced within a week. The Soviet squadron—which has remained fairly constant in size since 1982—nonetheless helps Moscow's image as a global power and serves to “show the flag” in support of such domestically threatened Soviet-backed leaders as President Rene in Seychelles. Moreover, even the routine presence of this small force helps shape regional perceptions of the continuity and legitimacy of the Soviet presence in the area. It also could, should Moscow so decide, give the Soviets the capability to put a limited number of its forces ashore—200 to 300 naval infantry troops—in support of pro-Soviet leaders. Moscow repeatedly has demonstrated its support for the Rene regime with ship visits at the time of perceived threats. We believe that the Soviets are prepared to use their military assets to intimidate opponents of their client regimes up to, but probably not including, actual combat.

5. Moscow also continues to court island governments by providing small amounts of economic and technical assistance and promoting educational and cultural programs in the islands. Scholarships for study in the USSR, for example, are used at relatively low cost to the USSR to build long-term ties with future

island leaders. Overall, however, the Soviet Union's small economic involvement in the islands plays a distinctly secondary role to military and political concerns.

6. We anticipate few major changes in the near term in Moscow's tactics and strategies for gaining influence among the island nations. Moscow most likely will continue to appeal to the radical pretensions of leftist leaders in Madagascar and Seychelles by highlighting "Western imperialism" and "capitalist exploitations." At the same time, the USSR also will probably seek to contrast favorably its own supposed desire for an "Indian Ocean Zone of Peace" (IOZP) with US naval activity at Diego Garcia. As in the past, Moscow will rely on friendship societies and items planted in the press to get its message to a wider audience.

7. Moscow, however, will continue to face a number of serious liabilities that will limit its ability to gain greater influence. First and foremost, even leaders inclined by ideology to look to Moscow will probably continue to be disappointed in the amount of aid provided by the USSR. While relatively small amounts of new assistance have the potential to lead to disproportionate gains if targeted at particularly vulnerable leaders, the magnitude of the economic problems in these nations is such that the long-term impact of such assistance is likely to be limited. Seychelles, for example, is unlikely to break its dependence on tourism and Western aid as long as prospects for Soviet aid remain poor.

8. Finally, longstanding ties to Western nations of history, culture, religion, and economics—although becoming less important in some nations—will work against Moscow. Local residents often see the Soviets as highhanded outsiders with little legitimate interest in the islands. The treatment of island students in the USSR also has received unfavorable public attention. Island leaders—whatever their ideological predilections—are well aware of these sentiments and are likely to attempt to limit, or at least to play down, their relations with the Soviets.

#### Recent Soviet Activities

9. *Madagascar.* Madagascar remains a prime target for Soviet activity in the region, although relations between Moscow and Antananarivo have cooled somewhat during the past two years. Nevertheless, the Soviets remain President Ratsiraka's major supplier of military hardware, and have delivered nearly \$124 million in military equipment since 1976. Soviet military advisers—now numbering 70 to 100, down from a high of over 300 in 1980—provide maintenance and

training on much of the equipment. A total of 35 Malagasy military personnel reportedly went to the Soviet Union for training in 1984.

10. Moscow has used both the carrot and the stick to express its dissatisfaction with Ratsiraka's rapprochement with the West, particularly with the United States. On the one hand, Moscow provided a grant of \$10 million worth of military equipment last November. At roughly the same time, and probably when Moscow became aware of Ratsiraka's intention to dismantle the high-frequency direction-finding (HF/DF) sites, Moscow grounded the VTA An-12/CUB transport aircraft which provides vital logistic support to Ratsiraka's regime. The threat of this action gave new impetus to the President's longstanding request to the United States for a C-130/Hercules aircraft.

11. Ratsiraka—whatever his dependence on Moscow for security help—continues to turn down all Soviet requests for naval access to facilities at Antsir-anana (Diego Suarez). However, he apparently is allowing the USSR to operate a communications facility at Andrakaka airfield, and he permitted the East Germans and Soviets to set up three Soviet-supplied Full House direction-finding sites on the island in 1983. Ratsiraka responded to US pressure and enticements and dismantled all three sites by early 1985. The highly portable equipment, however, remains in Madagascar and could be quickly reassembled.

12. *Seychelles.* Moscow continues to exercise considerable influence with the leftist government of President Rene. At present, the Soviets maintain the largest diplomatic mission in Victoria and provide most of the military hardware and training for the Seychelles Army. Since 1978, the USSR has delivered almost \$15 million in military assistance, nearly 60 percent of the foreign military aid received by Seychelles. Soviet naval units periodically visit the port of Victoria and, on five occasions since 1982, Soviet naval ships have appeared in Seychelles waters during periods of domestic tension. Since early 1983, Soviet VTA transports periodically have stopped over at Seychelles for refueling en route to Mozambique and Angola, and the Soviets recently have requested similar access for combat and reconnaissance aircraft.

13. Moscow also appears to be slowly building an infrastructure in Seychelles that could eventually support Soviet military forces, such as the coastal radar system.

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14. *Mauritius.* Moscow's optimism that the election of the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM) in 1982 would give the Soviets greater access has thus far proved to be unfounded. The resignation of leftist members—including Marxist Paul Berenger, who has close relations with the Soviets—from Prime Minister Jugnauth's cabinet in 1983 and Jugnauth's break with the MMM have further curbed Soviet opportunities. With a new, more moderate cabinet in place following the 1983 elections, Jugnauth has moved to limit Soviet-Mauritian ties, canceling an earlier agreement to accept Soviet patrol boats and advisers. At the same time, Jugnauth has actively stepped up requests for increased Western economic aid.

15. Although the Soviet Union does not have any military assistance agreements with Mauritius—and is unlikely to develop any in the near future—Moscow does have some limited access. The Soviet Navy still makes occasional calls to Port Louis, and the USSR continues to enjoy a 1970 Fisheries Agreement that allows it to use harbor facilities and aircraft landing rights to support Moscow's trawlers.

16. *Comoros.* Over the last two years Moscow has sought to improve relations with President Abdallah's government, but Comoros remains a low priority for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Ambassador to Seychelles is accredited to Comoros, and has made four visits to the islands since February 1983. The Comoran Government responded to Moscow's overtures in late 1984 by accepting 13 scholarship offers, but so far has refused Soviet offers to construct a fish processing plant and to fill Comoran POL storage tanks. Given President Abdallah's overwhelming dependence on French and conservative Middle Eastern economic aid, he is likely to remain wary of Soviet largess and to resist Moscow's overtures for closer relations.

17. *Mozambique.* The recent unprecedented visit to Mozambique by two Soviet IL-38 antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft has raised the possibility that the Machel government may have expanded further Soviet military access. Shortly before, a Soviet warship, a tanker, and two other Soviet vessels had called at Maputo, the latest in a longstanding pattern of ship visits. President Machel already has said he is expecting increased deliveries of Soviet arms to combat the growing insurgency, and expanded access to airfield

and port facilities could be the price Moscow is demanding Maputo pay. Faced with an ongoing domestic insurgency and strong Soviet pressure, Machel could reluctantly conclude he has no choice but to pay the price. If future deliveries include aircraft or other sophisticated equipment, more Soviet Bloc advisers probably will be required for training and maintenance.

#### East European Activities

18. East European nations have shown no recent inclination to take a more activist role in the region. The East Germans and Romanians, however, continue to give small amounts of economic and military aid to Madagascar and some economic aid to Seychelles. Any East European influence remains limited in Mauritius and nonexistent in Comoros.

#### Cuba's Role

19. Cuban influence in the region has remained fundamentally unchanged during the last two years. Havana continues to see the island states in the larger "Third World context" and is likely to continue pressing for support for Cuba's positions in nonaligned forums while maintaining limited contact with leftist parties and opposition groups in the area. Havana, for example, continues its nonmilitary technical assistance to Seychelles and Madagascar, but has no influence in Comoros or Mauritius. The Cubans now have some 15 to 29 technicians advising Seychelles Government ministries and providing medical aid. In Madagascar, their presence remains extremely modest, limited to a few agricultural and medical technicians.

20. Any efforts by Havana to expand its influence among the island states will continue to be constrained by the small scale and low technical level of its aid. Moreover, Cuban aid has proved expensive for the host governments, which must bear the costs of the Cuban advisers. Language barriers also hamper Cuban activities, as do perceptions among some southwest Indian Ocean leaders that the Cubans are merely doing Moscow's bidding.

#### North Korean Influence

21. North Korea since 1982 has made a bid for expanded regional influence. In Madagascar—where North Korea has been active since the late 1970s—P'yongyang has increased economic and military assistance. Economic aid has included road construction, the building of an ammunition factory, and agricultural improvement projects. The North Koreans also stepped up security assistance by providing aircraft on

loan and giving, gratis, infantry and artillery weapons and patrol boats valued at \$15 million. In Seychelles, North Koreans function as advisers to the Seychelles military, train and augment the presidential guard, and provide airport security. In April 1983, 56 advisers arrived in country, and in March 1985 the number had increased to between 150 and 180.

22. While we expect North Korea will attempt to take advantage of its new inroads, future moves are likely to be constrained by their limited overall capabilities. Distance and cost will be likely to hinder any significant increase in the North Korean presence in the area. Moreover, P'yongyang's primary motivation for involvement in the region is global competition with Seoul. Once it has attained an advantageous diplomatic presence in a given country, it has little incentive to expand its activities there.

### Libyan Meddling

23. Libyan influence in the island states has waned since 1982, when Tripoli was aggressively active in Mauritian domestic affairs and enjoyed promising relations with Seychelles and Madagascar. Nor, given Tripoli's now firmly established track record of renegeing on aid offers, is Qadhafi well positioned to exert a significant regional influence. Mauritius, for example, expelled all Libyan diplomats in January 1984 in response to clear Libyan meddling. Likewise, repeated Libyan promises of economic assistance to Seychelles have remained unfulfilled, and Tripoli recently reduced its diplomatic presence in Victoria. Madagascar's President Ratsiraka also publicly castigated Libya at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in late 1984 and has virtually severed bilateral relations over the Western Sahara issue.

### The West

24. Western interests in the Indian Ocean island states continue to be driven in part by continuing tensions in the Persian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, and southern Africa. In many respects, Western interests are the obverse of Moscow's, seeking to retain Western access while checking opportunities for an expanded Soviet influence and military presence. As in the past, US, British, and French interests are similar. Although the United States has only limited political and economic influence in the region, the continuing need of the beleaguered islands for economic assistance does give Washington some leverage.

### US Dimension

25. The United States continues to maintain a significant but limited military presence in the region,

most importantly at Diego Garcia. The US military facilities at Diego Garcia have expanded rapidly from the communications station and support airfield established in the early 1970s. International conflicts, the need to protect vital petroleum sources and supply routes, and Soviet activities in south and southwest Asia have upgraded the importance of the base, and it now provides important logistic support for US units operating in the Indian Ocean area.

26. US naval ships regularly make calls at Port Louis, Mauritius, and have resumed infrequent visits to Victoria, Seychelles, since the Rene regime relaxed regulations effectively banning US port calls. Madagascar's President Ratsiraka continues his general policy of denying access to any non-Indian Ocean naval power, but permitted two US naval repair ship visits in 1984-85 to provide assistance after devastating storms struck the island. The British territory of Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago is the base for US naval P-3 reconnaissance aircraft that conduct routine patrols of the area.

27. The United States maintains an Air Force satellite tracking station in Seychelles under a lease agreement that expires in 1990. The tracking station is one of a global network of stations used to track, command, and control US space satellites. It also supports the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in space shuttle flights. Because of its geographic position, the continued operation of the facility remains desirable, even after similar facilities are brought on line in Diego Garcia and the United Kingdom in 1989. President Rene has asked the United States to consider increased annual payments for renewing the lease, but he is aware that the new sites, if necessary, could be used to perform tasks now handled by the Seychelles site.

28. *Madagascar.* US-Malagasy relations have shown some improvement in recent years as President Ratsiraka seeks expanded US economic aid. Ratsiraka is particularly desperate for help in repairing the country's infrastructure, which has badly deteriorated under years of misguided socialist policies. In addition, Ratsiraka also is cultivating US military assistance, and pressed Washington late last year for a C-130 transport aircraft and coastal radar units to help meet security needs. Despite the now-familiar "turn to the West," however, Ratsiraka appears neither willing nor able to dispense with Moscow's assistance in maintaining his Soviet-trained and -equipped military.

29. Ratsiraka clearly hopes his willingness to deal with both superpowers will encourage each to give more aid, although he can draw little encouragement from the USSR's and Eastern Europe's negligible

economic credits and grants to Madagascar since 1975. Nevertheless, Ratsiraka is likely to continue to pursue an independent foreign policy, supporting many Third World causes also embraced by the USSR. At the same time, he will regard any accommodations of Western positions as major concessions for which he deserves compensation.

30. *Seychelles*. The annual rental fee and indirect income from the USAF tracking station, combined with President Rene's domestic need to avoid being seen as overly committed to the Soviets, continue to give the United States limited influence in Seychelles. The tracking station, for example, accounts for about 7 percent of Seychelles's gross domestic product. Moreover, the state of US-Seychelles relations also affects tourism—the main foreign exchange earner—which caters almost exclusively to the Western market.

31. As in Madagascar, however, there are clear limits on Rene's willingness and ability to improve relations with the West. Rene's dependence on Soviet/North Korean security support is unlikely to decrease as long as he is convinced that the West is trying to undermine his rule. In particular, the continuing presence of North Korean security personnel, including presidential guards, will circumscribe efforts to improve relations between Victoria and Washington.

32. *Mauritius*. US political and economic leverage in Mauritius stems in large measure from the US role as a major importer of Mauritian sugar and textiles. US assistance programs, although relatively modest, also have a disproportionate impact, given Mauritius's small population. The imposition of a quota on imports of Mauritian sugar in 1982 and recent negotiations on restrictions on the importation of Mauritian textiles, however, have become politically sensitive issues because of Mauritian interest in expanding its US export market. The Jugnauth regime views US willingness to purchase more Mauritian goods as a reasonable response to its moderate policy stances since mid-1983. US failure to meet Mauritian requests for favorable trade agreements could result in heightened tensions over the issue of Diego Garcia, among others.

33. Mauritius's attempt to follow a genuinely non-aligned policy often has limited its responsiveness to US concerns. On the key issue of Diego Garcia, however, most Mauritian officials appear to have acquiesced to the US presence, in part because of US willingness to utilize Mauritian laborers on the island. While British and Mauritian officials have resolved the question of compensation for the displaced inhabitants of Diego Garcia, future problems could arise if Mauritians—with leftist support—choose to press their claims against the United States.

34. *Comoros*. The United States and other Western powers have, and are likely to continue to have, considerably more political and economic clout in Comoros than Eastern Bloc rivals. President Abdallah, however, will continue to express disappointment over present levels of US economic aid, arguing that—in contrast to his left-leaning neighbors—his pro-Western stance is not being rewarded. In this light, his acceptance of a small Soviet scholarship offer may be an effort to pressure the United States, and the West in general, to be more forthcoming. On balance, however, he is unlikely to jeopardize the scheduled opening of a US embassy in Moroni in 1985. Moreover, he also probably hopes he can pressure Washington to intercede with Paris in support of his claims to Mayotte—an island in the Comoros chain administered by France.

#### French Interests

35. The southwest Indian Ocean region plays an important role in France's strategic considerations. Paris seeks to ensure the security of shipping routes through which a large percentage of its energy supply passes, maintain the security of French citizens and territories in the area, promote French economic interests, and maintain its position as a power with the right to speak in regional disputes.

36. Paris's ability to influence events in the region continues to flow largely from France's continuing military presence and economic ties to the region. French bases and ground forces in the Indian Ocean area—particularly those on the French islands of Reunion and Mayotte, and the recently reinforced French garrison at Djibouti—generally remain unmatched by any nonlittoral nation. Moreover, while budgetary constraints may force Paris to reduce somewhat its military presence and civilian assistance, we believe Paris will not seriously draw down its military commitments to the region.

37. France's apprehensions about its position in its territories of Reunion and Mayotte probably have been heightened by recent events in New Caledonia, where native separatists and European settlers have fought openly over the issue of independence. There is little overt evidence so far, however, of widespread support for independence in the two islands. The principal challenge for Paris will continue to come from Comoran claims of sovereignty over Mayotte.

France probably will maintain its substantial military and economic aid to Abdallah's regime in an effort to prevent further deterioration in Franco-Comoran relations.

38. France also will be anxious in the near term about its credibility with regional francophone states—particularly Madagascar and Comoros—in the wake of reported disaffection among Africans over Mitterrand's withdrawal of French forces from Chad. Paris probably will attempt to reassure regional leaders of its willingness to continue economic and security assistance.

### The British Role

39. After decades of declining influence, the Thatcher government in recent years has moved to reassert a British presence in the Indian Ocean area. Nevertheless, London's regional leverage and interest in the region still lags behind that of Paris, even in former British colonies such as Mauritius and Seychelles. London has only negligible interest and influence in Madagascar and Comoros. Moreover, budget constraints will preclude any extensive financial or political commitments significantly beyond current levels. More likely, London will continue to rely on small, targeted aid programs, military advisers, and a limited military presence in the area.

40. While London can still claim some influence in Mauritius, relations have declined under the government of Prime Minister Jugnauth. Over the last year, however, the United Kingdom has increased economic aid and kept a few military advisers on the island to instruct a Mauritian mobile security unit in an effort to promote trade links and secure at least minimal political influence.

41. London still administers the largely uninhabited Chagos Archipelago—which includes Diego Garcia, leased to the United States in 1966—under the rubric of the British Indian Ocean Territories. For their part, Mauritian officials continue to claim they were forced to cede Diego Garcia to London without adequate compensation in return for Mauritian independence and British economic aid. While the British usually ignore such complaints and regard them as government attempts to undercut voter support for the leftwing MMM, the issue will remain an irritant—and potential trouble spot—in Anglo-Mauritian relations. Probably of greater concern to London than Mauritian complaints are the increased questioning of US and UK activities and requests to visit Diego Garcia by

Members of Parliament and journalists. From the government's perspective, increased publicity can only draw attention to a politically nettlesome issue.

42. Despite London's role as a principal aid donor and one of President Rene's few Western interlocutors, British ties with Victoria have deteriorated in recent years, in part because of anti-Rene exile activity in the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom, like the United States, was effectively denied naval access to Victoria for several years, and Rene's distrust of the West led him to cancel plans to accept British military aid. While sharing US concern about Rene's dealings with the Soviet Bloc, the British do not believe the West is in a strong position to counter such contacts effectively. While London sees Rene as an unstable leader capable of acting unpredictably against British interests, it probably hopes Seychelles's severe economic problems will continue to limit the ability of the Soviets to gain a stronger foothold in Victoria.

### Other Arab States

43. The more moderate Arab countries near the Indian Ocean region continue to show only slight interest in the island states. Saudi Arabia—in its role as a protector of Islam—has provided small amounts of financial assistance to Mauritius and Comoros. For its part, Algeria is providing limited economic aid to Madagascar, which has supported the Polisario in the OAU and other international forums.

### The Africans

44. Mainland African nations—facing pressing economic and political problems of their own—have only minimal ties with the islands. South Africa is making efforts to improve relations with its island neighbors, but most island leaders are reluctant to establish overt political links with the white minority government. South Africa's comparative economic strength, however, remains a potentially powerful weapon for gaining influence in the region. Pretoria successfully encouraged Mauritius to open a trade mission in South Africa in recent months, has discrete economic and other ties with Comoros, and has conducted tentative negotiations with Seychelles on a broad range of economic and security topics.

45. Kenya—after South Africa—is the islands' largest trading partner, but economic ties have not been translated to close political links. President Rene's belief, for example, that former Kenya Home and Constitutional Affairs Minister Charles Njonjo was involved in the 1981 coup attempt against his regime soured bilateral relations. Njonjo's fall in 1984 has

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somewhat mitigated Rene's fears of a Kenyan-supported coup.

46. The last contingent of Tanzanian troops—sent to help Rene in the wake of the 1981 coup attempt—was withdrawn in August 1984. Financially strapped Dar es Salaam had long been anxious to rid itself of the burden and had extended the troops' stay only at Rene's direct request.

47. Despite Mozambique's proximity to the islands and similarities of ideological views with Madagascar and Seychelles, Maputo's preoccupation with its own insurgency has hindered—and will continue to hinder—the development of closer ties. Although Mozambique has largely ignored its Comoran neighbor, Maputo recently has been concerned by allegations that arms for Mozambican insurgents are being funneled through Comoros. Machel also may have some influence with the politically like-minded Seychelles President Rene.

#### The Asians

48. China continues to provide limited economic and technical assistance in an effort to counter Soviet influence. For example, Beijing continues to cultivate friendly relations with Mauritius—which has a small but influential Chinese minority—despite friction over Prime Minister Jugnauth's recent decision to permit the opening of a Taiwanese commercial mission in Port Louis.

49. The southwest Indian Ocean region is of importance to Japan, if only because of Tokyo's involvement in international shipping. Japan ranks as an important donor of economic and technical assistance, especially to Madagascar and Mauritius.

50. The new Rajiv Gandhi government gives no indication of abandoning Indian efforts to eliminate all nonlittoral military presence in the Indian Ocean and establish Indian political and naval supremacy in the region. In the past, Indian governments have supported the proposed Indian Ocean Zone of Peace concept and have encouraged Mauritius to press sovereignty claims to the Chagos Archipelago.

51. Indian influence will remain strongest in Mauritius, where it is enhanced by traditionally close ties with the majority Hindu population. Indian leaders have carefully cultivated Prime Minister Jugnauth since his election in 1982 with political support and offers of economic assistance to counter Mauritius's growing commercial relations with South Africa.

#### Domestic Political and Economic Pressures

##### Madagascar

52. President Ratsiraka remains the single dominant force in Malagasy politics, and easily defeated a single opponent in November 1982 to win a second seven-year term in office. His official political opposition remains confined within the seven-party National Front umbrella organization, lacks islandwide support, and poses no serious threat to his regime. As recently

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53. In recent years, Madagascar's growing economic problems, coupled with Ratsiraka's recognition of his dependence on Western economic support, have prompted the traditionally left-leaning President to begin moving away from his socialist orientation. Madagascar, for example, is plagued by poorly organized agricultural parastatals that reduce production incentives for cropgrowers and have forced the regime to rely increasingly on imported rice. Growing food imports have been a major contributor to severe hard currency shortages.

54. Evidence now suggests that Ratsiraka—for economic necessity if not philosophic commitment—is bent on working toward less government control of the economy. Nevertheless, we foresee little significant economic progress over the next two years. Inadequate food distribution networks—especially if coupled with poor weather—will continue to contribute to potentially serious food shortages, particularly in rural areas. Ratsiraka has little alternative but to look to the West for continued food imports and vital economic assistance if he hopes to deter outbreaks of economically inspired violence that have brought down earlier Malagasy governments.

55. Ratsiraka probably hopes his balancing act between the West and the USSR will bring him Western economic aid without souring too badly his military relations with Moscow. He recently agreed, for example, to US demarches to dismantle the Soviet high-frequency direction-finding (HF/DF) network, which was emplaced in mid-1983. Ratsiraka claimed he was unaware that the network, consisting of at least three sites and a central communications facility, would have the capability when fully operational to monitor Western aircraft and ships in the region.

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56. We believe it is unlikely that Ratsiraka will abandon his Soviet military benefactors, and his continuing concerns over the potential for civil unrest stemming from economic dissatisfaction or ethnic rivalries leave the door ajar for the Soviets. Despite the apparent setback on the HF/DF sites, the USSR recently offered, and Madagascar accepted, additional military equipment and associated training by 25 Soviet military advisers, who would augment the approximately 70 military advisers already in the country. Ratsiraka, however, is unlikely to reciprocate Soviet military generosity by granting Moscow access to air and naval facilities as long as he believes his more nonaligned posture will garner further Western economic aid. The December appointments of pro-West Malagasy military officers to key command positions also suggest that Ratsiraka now is attempting to circumscribe Soviet activities, particularly within the Air Force, and limit Soviet influence in the military.

#### Seychelles

57. Despite his landslide victory in the one-candidate 1984 presidential election, Rene's domestic standing has fallen since 1982. Moreover, the Army mutiny in 1982 and subsequent events have thrown into question the reliability and loyalty of his security forces. Power struggles among factions in the cabinet are disrupting policymaking, the country's sole party has become ineffective in rallying support for socialism, and the declining economic situation is undermining popular support for the regime. Furthermore, the aborted coup attempt in September 1984 focused Rene's attention on popular dissatisfaction with the Soviet presence and underscored his concern over the vulnerability of his regime. Rene also is troubled by growing criticism from the influential Catholic Church for his pro-Soviet policies and checkered human rights record.

58. Rene has become increasingly preoccupied with ensuring the security of his regime. The Soviets recently installed a communications network, and Moscow continues to provide military equipment and associated training by military advisers—five to 10 as of March 1985. Rene also has accelerated efforts to establish a large, North Korean-trained civilian militia to help deter internal opposition.

59. Moscow's ability to gain even greater influence in Seychelles is constrained, however, by the country's economic dependence on tourism and Western economic aid. Rene thus far has resisted pressure from more radical government ministers to remove the US tracking station, and he already has indicated to US

Embassy officials that he wants to renew the lease beyond the 1990 expiration date. Rene clearly sees the station's continued presence—as well as his refusal not to allow foreign military bases on Seychelles soil—as public symbols of his commitment to a nonaligned policy. To date, Rene has allowed periodic naval visits and landing rights for military transport aircraft. While he has heretofore refused permission for the transit of combat and reconnaissance aircraft, we do not discount the possibility that Rene could bow to Soviet pressure. He currently is considering such a request.

60. Prospects for economic improvement in Seychelles remain poor. Despite attempts to diversify the economy and promote self-sufficiency in foodstuffs, Seychelles must import virtually all commodities, and the growing current account deficit is becoming a serious problem for the regime. Significant economic growth will be difficult to sustain over the next few years, especially since a series of uncompensated nationalizations and the growth of the cumbersome parastatal infrastructure have alarmed Western investors. Moreover, there are now signs that government interference in the local economy is generating domestic resentment.

#### Mauritius

61. The government of Prime Minister Jugnauth is confronted by a vexing array of political problems. Nine months after its June 1982 electoral victory, the leftist Mauritian Militant Movement government collapsed as a consequence of the power struggle between Jugnauth and then Finance Minister Berenger, founder and leader of the MMM. Jugnauth formed his Militant Socialist Movement and established a three-party coalition that in turn decisively defeated the MMM in the August 1983 elections.

62. Over the longer term, Jugnauth's inability to reduce longstanding communal tensions among the diverse Mauritian ethnic groups could undermine popular support for his predominately Hindu- and Creole-backed governing coalition. Competition within the coalition among ethnic factions headed by Jugnauth's key advisers and internecine personality clashes already have adversely affected the government's ability to formulate coherent policy strategies, particularly on economic issues. Complicating matters, the MMM has played on communal differences and perceived economic discrimination against minority ethnic groups in an effort to gain support for its socialist platform, which already enjoys wide support from trade unions and the working class.

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63. Jugnauth also must contend with Mauritius's sagging economy. The sugar industry, which generally accounts for two-thirds of foreign exchange earnings, has suffered from poor weather conditions and reductions in sugar export quotas under the International Sugar Organization. In response, the regime is attempting to diversify the economy and has embarked on an aggressive campaign abroad to secure greater foreign aid—the principal source of government revenue—and promote investment. The government also has undertaken politically difficult measures prescribed by international financial institutions to adjust the economy and balance the budget. In an effort to alleviate record unemployment—now close to 50 percent for young males under 25—the government is sending laborers abroad to work in Middle Eastern states.

64. By and large, Jugnauth's government has adopted policies which accommodate US interests in the region despite longstanding Mauritian resentment over US acquisition of Diego Garcia. The Prime Minister has softened his rhetoric on the proposed Indian Ocean Zone of Peace concept and allowed naval ships from nonlittoral countries to call at Port Louis. Although he publicly advocates the return of Mauritian sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago—including Diego Garcia—he has soft-pedaled those claims in the interest of maintaining good relations with the United States. Failure to resolve problems with the United States over bilateral trade, however, will put the government under greater pressure from leftist opposition elements and Jugnauth's own ministers to adopt a less accommodating stance toward US regional interests.

65. Already-cool relations with Moscow are unlikely to warm significantly in the near term. Soviet attempts to gain influence in Mauritius have met with little success, in part because of the regime's longstanding political and economic ties to India and, to a lesser extent, the West. Soviet efforts are further hampered by Jugnauth's suspicions about potential Soviet support for leftist elements in the government. Prospects for improving Soviet-Mauritian relations could occur, however, if the governing alliance fragments before its mandate is up in 1988 and the MMM comes to power. Even an MMM government probably would not tilt radically in favor of Moscow, if only for economic reasons. It is more likely that such a government would gradually limit ties to the West and build on existing relations with Communist and nonaligned states.

#### Comoros

66. President Abdallah was elected to a second six-year term in September 1984. Comorans seem to prefer his benign, authoritarian regime to that of the repressive Ali Soileh, whom Abdallah deposed in a mercenary-backed coup in 1978. Reporting indicates, however, that disputes among rival ministers are eroding government unity and, over the longer term, could erode the regime's stability. The President's poor health reportedly also has already spawned political maneuvering among potential successors. A recently uncovered coup plot by 12 members of the presidential guard underscores the fragility of his regime. We believe that, if he does not clearly establish a successor, constitutional provisions for succession might well be ignored, with uncertain prospects for pro-Western moderates in any ensuing power struggle.

67. Comoros remains one of the world's least developed countries, and is heavily dependent on foreign economic development assistance—provided largely by France—to cover chronic current account deficits. Economic prospects appear bleak. Abdallah looks to the moderate Arab states and West European donors for increased economic aid.

68. Given current political and economic realities, Abdallah is unlikely to deviate significantly from the moderate political course he has charted over the past six years. His commitment to integrate French-administered Mayotte into Comoros is his most pressing foreign policy concern and has long strained otherwise good relations with France, but he cannot afford to jeopardize relations with his leading bilateral aid donor over the issue.

69. Nevertheless, faced with growing domestic criticism of his failure to expedite the island's return, Abdallah could be tempted to respond favorably to Soviet offers of assistance for his campaign. The Soviets may have been encouraged by his recent acceptance of a small scholarship offer, although he continues to rebuff most Soviet overtures. On balance, we believe he is unlikely to accept substantial Soviet offers of economic and military assistance, both for ideological reasons and for fear of jeopardizing assistance from France and the United States.

70. External opposition to Abdallah is small, fragmented, and has little internal support. Nevertheless, without French assistance the Comoran security forces probably would be unable to protect the regime against a well-organized attack. In an effort to deter external coup plotting, Abdallah undoubtedly will continue to press the West—particularly the United

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States and France—to accept his longstanding offer to establish military facilities on the islands.

### Prospects for Regional Cooperation

#### Indian Ocean Zone of Peace

71. Island governments continue to endorse the concept of an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace which calls for the removal of the great powers' naval forces and military facilities. Beyond mere rhetoric, we foresee little concrete progress on the IOZP in the next several years, and continuing divisions over tactics alone probably will preclude effective joint action. Moreover, given Moscow's commitments in Afghanistan, moderate island leaders probably see the US presence at Diego Garcia as a counter to the continuing threat of Soviet expansionism.

#### Indian Ocean Commission

72. Mauritius, Madagascar, and Seychelles established the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) in December 1982 following the election of the MMM government in Mauritius. The Commission was designed to foster economic cooperation, although Mauritian ardor has dimmed since the advent of the second Jugnauth government in 1983. The IOC, however, did add Comoros as its fourth member in early 1985, and has granted provisional membership to Reunion. Any future impact on regional issues will be seriously limited by the political differences among members and by institutional and budgetary constraints.

#### Implications for the United States

73. US relations with the island governments are not likely to change dramatically over the near term. All of the islands harbor hopes of garnering additional US economic support, and have modified policies to some degree to achieve this end. The failure of Washington's aid levels to meet the islands' economic expectations could impose some strains, but the lack of alternatives for aid from other sources should place limits on expressions of discontent. The United States is unlikely to gain increased air and naval access to the islands, but this will not seriously damage US interests as long as the Soviets also fail to achieve any exclusive military access.

74. Given the US presence on Diego Garcia and limited military access agreements with Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Oman, military access to the islands is not critical to the US strategic position in the region. With the exception of the tracking station

established in Seychelles under a lease agreement that expires in 1990, military access to the islands is limited to an occasional ship visit or P-3 maritime patrol aircraft stopover. In most cases, the number of visits the United States conducts is less than the number the host government has indicated that it would be willing—and anxious, due to economic benefits—to accept. Nevertheless, the loss of even limited US access would be interpreted by the Soviets as a victory for Moscow.

75. The level of US economic assistance will remain the major focus of US-islands relations in the near term. Left-leaning Madagascar and Seychelles are likely to press Washington for more economic aid, realizing that the USSR will not provide significant amounts of economic assistance. The overwhelming and longstanding dependence on the Soviet Union for security assistance and military hardware, however, makes it highly unlikely that either Rene or Ratsiraka will feel politically secure enough to sever their ties to Moscow. Moreover, moves either to the East or the West are likely to be transitory and subject to sudden change.

76. Over the next two years, Washington can expect the Soviets to continue efforts to increase their influence at the expense of the United States and the West. Criticism of the Diego Garcia base, charges of US-South African collusion, and allegations of Western support for dissidents are likely to be major propaganda elements used by Moscow in an effort to play on the already-existing fears of the leaders of the island nations. Simultaneously, Moscow is likely to stress its own ability to provide protection through military assistance agreements and, when necessary, provide overt demonstrations of Soviet support. Moscow's well-documented failure to provide significant economic assistance will continue to work against its ability to develop stable patron-client relations with even left-leaning leaders.

77. Three of the four governments covered in this Estimate—those of Seychelles, Comoros, and Madagascar—are based on personality rather than institutional leadership and thus must be considered somewhat fragile. Although the current leaders appear relatively secure, there are possibilities for coup attempts in each of these states. Successor leaders might well be more pro-Soviet in orientation, but we believe that the need for economic assistance from the West will constrain their actions so that important Western interests will not be seriously jeopardized.

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## ANNEX

**Mauritius:  
Selected Economic Indicators**

Per capita GDP, FY 1983/84 (US \$)	1,073	
Real GDP growth, FY 1983/84 (percent)	1.2	
	1980/81 July-June (million US \$)	1983/84 July-June (provisional) (million US \$)
Current account balance	-180	-28
Trade balance	-171	-21
Exports, f.o.b.	362	363
Imports, f.o.b.	-533	-384
Net services and transfers	-9	-7
Gross foreign exchange reserves, end-June	26.7	38.0
External public debt, disbursed	494	541
Debt service ratio (percent)	9	18
<b>Major trading partners, 1983 <sup>a</sup></b>	<i>(percent)</i>	
United Kingdom	27.7	
France	17.2	
Bahrain	9.8	
United States	5.4	
South Africa	5.1	

<sup>a</sup> Based on total trade.

Note: Sources: IMF Recent Economic Developments, 31 August 1984  
Dec IFS  
IMF Direction of Trade Yearbook, 1984

**Comoros:  
Selected Economic Indicators**

Per capita GDP, 1982 (US \$)	331
Real GDP growth, 1982 (percent)	5.0
	1982 (million US \$)
Current account balance	-10.8
Trade balance	-0.6
Exports, f.o.b.	18.3
Imports, f.o.b.	-18.9
Net services and transfers	-10.2
Gross foreign exchange reserves, yearend	8.2
External public debt, disbursed	49.3
Debt service ratio (percent)	2.5
<b>Major trading partners, 1979 <sup>a</sup></b>	<i>(percent)</i>
France	63.4
Madagascar	4.4
West Germany	3.6
United States	1.8

<sup>a</sup> Based on total trade.

Note: Sources: IMF Recent Economic Developments, November 1982  
IMF 1982 Consultation, February 1983

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**Seychelles:**  
**Selected Economic Indicators**

Per capita GDP, 1982 (US \$)	2,027	
Real GDP growth, 1982 (percent)	-0.5	
	1981 (million US \$)	1983 (million US \$)
Current account balance	-22.8	-44.6
Trade balance	-64.9	-78.1
Exports, f.o.b.	4.1	2.8
Imports, f.o.b.	-69.0	-80.9
Net services and transfers	42.1	33.5
Gross foreign exchange reserves, yearend	13.09	4.26 (October 1984)
External public debt, disbursed (1980)	24.8	50.2 (1982)
Debt service ratio (percent) (1980)	0.6	2.0 (1982)

Major trading partners, 1983 <sup>a</sup>	(percent)
United Kingdom	14.5
Italy	12.7
Bahrain	9.3
Japan	6.0
France	5.7
India	4.2
United States	4.0

<sup>a</sup> Based on total trade.

Note: Sources: Dec IFS (per capita GDP, foreign exchange reserves)  
 IMF Recent Economic Developments, 15 August  
 1983  
 IMF Direction of Trade Yearbook, 1984

**Madagascar:**  
**Selected Economic Indicators**

Per capita GDP, 1982 (US \$)	306	
Real GDP growth, 1984 (percent)	1.6	
	1981 (million US \$)	1984 (projected) (million US \$)
Current account balance	-362	-204
Trade balance	-179	-28
Exports, f.o.b.	332	328
Imports, f.o.b.	-511	-356
Net services and transfers (official and private)	-183	-176
Gross foreign exchange reserves, yearend	25.8	43.6 (September 1984)
External public debt, disbursed	1,572	2,200
Debt service ratio, after rescheduling (percent)	25.1	31.3

Major trading partners, 1983 <sup>a</sup>	(percent)
France	28.2
United States	10.5
Saudi Arabia	8.9
Japan	8.3
West Germany	4.6
Italy	3.5

<sup>a</sup> Based on total trade.

Note: Sources: IMF Third Review of Standby Arrangement,  
 27 November 1984  
 IMF Recent Economic Developments,  
 25 September 1984  
 Dec IFS (foreign exchange reserves)  
 IMF Direction of Trade Yearbook, 1984

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USSR and Eastern Europe: Economic and Military Deliveries  
to Selected African Countries

Million US \$

	1979		1980		1981		1982		1983	
	USSR	EE	USSR	EE	USSR	EE	USSR	EE	USSR	EE
<b>Economic</b>										
Comoros	— <sup>a</sup>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar	—	0.2	1.3	—	5.0	—	4.1	0.6	2.0	1.1
Mauritius	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Seychelles	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3.5	—
<b>Military</b>										
Comoros	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar	11	—	24	—	39	1	—	—	14	—
Mauritius	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Seychelles	1	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	2	—

<sup>a</sup> Dash indicates none known; presumed to be zero.

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**Official Gross Disbursements  
From Western Countries  
to Selected African LDCs**

*Million US \$*

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
<b>Comoros</b>	15.1	27.4	44.8	31.7	35.6
Of which:					
France	6.0	12.3	19.4	12.2	10.5
United Kingdom	— <sup>a</sup>	—	—	—	—
United States	—	—	—	—	—
<b>Madagascar</b>	142.9	204.8	225.1	332.7	246.9
Of which:					
France	38.4	58.1	60.9	153.8	89.7
United Kingdom	0.2	1.3	0.6	1.0	0.3
United States	3.0	—	12.0	15.0	10.0
<b>Mauritius</b>	44.4	52.5	86.0	59.9	54.6
Of which:					
France	12.7	13.1	38.7	15.8	17.4
United Kingdom	5.5	6.2	5.8	2.9	2.0
United States	3.0	3.0	3.0	7.0	3.0
<b>Seychelles</b>	24.6	27.1	17.5	22.1	17.8
Of which:					
France	9.5	6.5	2.9	4.3	5.1
United Kingdom	10.2	11.4	8.0	6.2	4.8
United States	—	1.0	1.0	2.0	3.0

<sup>a</sup> Dash indicates none known; presumed to be zero.

**Cuba and North Korea:  
Economic and Military  
Technicians in Selected  
African LDCs**

Number of persons

	1979		1983	
	Cuba	NK	Cuba	NK
<b>Economic technicians</b>				
Comoros	— <sup>a</sup>	—	—	—
Madagascar	25	125	35	100
Mauritius	—	—	—	—
Seychelles	—	5	30	—
<b>Military technicians</b>				
Comoros	—	—	—	—
Madagascar	15	75	—	50
Mauritius	—	—	—	—
Seychelles	—	—	NA	50

<sup>a</sup> Dash indicates none known; presumed to be zero.

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**USSR and Eastern Europe:  
Personnel Flows to/From  
Selected African LDCs**

*Number of Persons*

	1979		1983	
	USSR	EE	USSR	EE
<b>Economic technicians in LDCs</b>				
Comoros	— <sup>a</sup>	—	—	—
Madagascar	70	40	150	40
Mauritius	—	—	—	—
Seychelles	5	—	5	—
<b>Military technicians in LDCs</b>				
Comoros	—	—	—	—
Madagascar	30	—	150	50
Mauritius	—	—	—	—
Seychelles	—	—	5	—
<b>Academic students to USSR and Eastern Europe from LDCs</b>				
Comoros	25	—	30	—
Madagascar	1,000	165	2,110	215
Mauritius	150	35	190	30
Seychelles	—	—	15	—

<sup>a</sup> Dash indicates none known; presumed to be zero.**Soviet Port Visits, 1982-84**

	1982	1983	1984
<b>Seychelles (Port Victoria)</b>			
Combatants	6	6	3
Auxiliary	3	1	2
Submarines	0	0	0
Hydrographic	0	1	0
<b>Madagascar</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Mauritius</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
Combatants	2	0	2
Auxiliary	0	0	1
Submarines	1	0	0
Hydrographic	1	1	0
Space events support ships	1	0	0
<b>Mozambique</b>			
Combatants	1	4	3
Auxiliary	1	1	4
Submarines	1	0	0
Hydrographic	21	19	17
<b>Comoros</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

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