

INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
22 March 1984

FOOD PROBLEMS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
PROSPECTS FOR 1984 AND BEYOND

This Interagency Intelligence Assessment was requested by the National Security Council. It was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Africa. The Assessment was coordinated at the working level within the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Army, and the Department of Commerce.

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KEY JUDGMENTS

Food has once again become one of Sub-Saharan Africa's most pressing problems, as at least 24 countries there are now in need of emergency food aid. While food crises have occurred in Africa several times during the last 15 years, the pervasiveness of current food problems makes the present situation more serious than previous emergencies have been. Drought and other extreme weather conditions, political turmoil resulting from guerrilla insurgencies, and the consequent displacement of some 4 million people have exacerbated existing food problems and explain the severity of the present situation. [redacted]

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Underlying these phenomena, however, are more profound, chronic problems. Most Sub-Saharan African countries have long faced declining per capita food production caused by rapid population growth rates and stagnating crop yields as crowding makes traditional shifting cultivation methods less effective. Some of Africa's food problems are due to basic and long-standing constraints of water resources, climate, soil, crop disease, and pestilence. Many others are the direct result of mismanagement, corruption, and specific policies followed by African governments that have reduced incentives for domestic food production and impeded the distribution of both local and imported food supplies. The net sum is that Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region in the world where per capita food production has declined over the past 20 years. [redacted]

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Government pricing policies common to most African states have discouraged domestic production of staple foods by keeping official prices low in order to subsidize urban consumers. These policies have accelerated migration to African cities, causing rural labor shortages and adding to urban food demand. In addition, the marketing and distribution of foodstuffs, agricultural materials, farm equipment, and advanced agricultural technologies are usually handled by government-run corporations, whose performance has been marked by widespread mismanagement, shortages of technical and administrative expertise, insufficient financing, and corruption. Moreover, as a matter of policy, some governments may be withholding food from certain elements of the population. These problems are further compounded by inadequate and frequently deteriorating transportation systems. [redacted]

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To close the widening gap between domestic food production and the food demands of a growing population, most African governments have turned increasingly to imported food to satisfy normal demand as well as emergency needs. Food imports have risen steadily over the last two decades, and paying for those imports--even for those offered on a concessional basis--has proven difficult because of insufficient foreign exchange reserves. The low reserves reflect deterioration of the agricultural export sector, recent declines in many primary commodity prices, and residual effects of the international recession. Moreover, the burden of rising food imports, exacerbated by the costs of domestic drought relief programs, has strained the resources of a number of countries and threatened their ability to comply with existing IMF assistance programs. [redacted]

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The outlook for resolving these food problems in the immediate future is not good. The required policy changes--such as those associated with IMF and other debt rescheduling programs--appear risky to many fragile regimes. They are afraid to boost farmers' price incentives since this would inevitably mean

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are afraid to boost farmers' price incentives since this would inevitably mean either impossible increases in government food subsidies or food price increases unacceptable to city dwellers. These could cost the governments their political support and even trigger civil disorders. Currency devaluations could produce the same effects. Governments are also reluctant to dismantle the parastatal organizations that control food purchasing and distribution because they provide an important source of employment and patronage. [redacted]

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Although food related civil unrest could provide opportunities for exploitation by the Soviet Union and Libya, popular dissatisfaction undermines both pro-Western regimes as well as regimes friendly to the Soviets. Neither the Soviets nor the Libyans are likely to provide Sub-Saharan African countries with necessary food aid. [redacted]

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Over the long term, hopes for increasing the productivity of African agriculture rest not only on changes in pricing, marketing, and distribution policies, but also on the use of improved agricultural technologies to overcome basic deficiencies and on the reduction of high population growth rates. More consistent and widespread application of known "technical packages" of seed types, fertilizers, and cultivation methods would improve yields. However, most African governments have not established the kinds of agricultural extension services necessary to bring these innovations to farmers in the field. In addition, high-yielding grains suitable for the Sub-Saharan climate and resistant to tropical pestilence, as well as methods to control economically devastating problems such as rinderpest and the cassava mealie bug, must still be developed before Africa can experience the agricultural revolution that has transformed food productivity in other parts of the developing world. Research in several areas appears promising, but useable results are still years away and will likely require the investment of technical, financial, and managerial resources beyond the means of even the most prosperous Sub-Saharan African countries. [redacted]

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Because of the persistent nature of many of these obstacles, it is unlikely that the problem of food production in Sub-Saharan Africa can be significantly alleviated in this century. Policy reform is absolutely essential even before longer-term technological advances can make a difference, and is crucial to near-term improvements in agricultural productivity. Unless African governments can be persuaded to make these politically risky policy changes now, and can be convinced that failure to make these changes entails even greater risks, requests for food relief will probably come from throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, as many governments attempt to use aid to postpone hard domestic political decisions. [redacted]

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PRIMARY CAUSES OF FOOD PROBLEMS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

	<u>Paucity of Agri- cultural Resources**</u>	<u>Agricultural Policies</u>	<u>Drought</u>	<u>Warfare/ Refugees</u>
*Angola		x		x
*Benin		x		
*Botswana	x		x	
Cameroon			x	
*Cape Verde	x		x	
*Cent'l Af Rep		x	x	
*Chad	x	x	x	x
*Ethiopia		x	x	x
*Gambia		x	x	
*Ghana		x	x	
*Guinea		x		
*Guinea-Bissau		x		
Ivory Coast			x	
*Lesotho	x		x	
Madagascar		x		
*Mali	x	x	x	
*Mauritania	x	x	x	
*Mozambique		x	x	x
Namibia	x		x	
Niger	x	x		

* Countries on UN/FAO's 1984 emergency food list

**Limited water resources and other especially harsh agricultural conditions prevail normally.

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
	<u>Paucity of Agri- cultural Resources**</u>	<u>Agricultural Policies</u>	<u>Drought</u>	<u>Warfare/ Refugees</u>
Nigeria		x	x	
*Senegal		x	x	
*Somalia	x	x		x
South Africa			x	
Sudan		x		x
*Tanzania		x		
*Togo			x	
Uganda		x		x
*Upper Volta	x	x		
Zaire		x		
*Zambia		x	x	
*Zimbabwe			x	x

* Countries on UN/FAO's 1984 emergency food list

** Limited water resources and other especially harsh agricultural conditions prevail normally.

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Figure 1
AFRICA: Drought and Countries Receiving Food Aid



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DISCUSSION

PART I: AN OVERVIEW

Introduction: The Present Food Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa

1. Twenty-four Sub-Saharan African countries, according to the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization, are in immediate need of emergency food aid.* While food emergencies have occurred periodically in Sub-Saharan Africa during the last 15 years, the pervasiveness of current food problems makes the present situation more serious than previous food crises have been. Unlike earlier emergencies, which were always confined to specific regions or countries, this time countries throughout the African continent are affected. Estimates place the number of people suffering from various degrees of food deficiencies as high as 150 million, or nearly half the continent's population. While that figure--along with most other data on the food situation in Sub-Saharan Africa--is impossible to verify, it does indicate the extent of food problems in the region.

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Difficulties in Estimating Food Deficiencies

The calculations involved in estimating food deficiencies--placing figures on the quantity of available food and comparing it to the population's nutritional requirements--are prone to errors that tend to overstate the extent of food deficiencies.

FOOD SUPPLIES: Food supplies available for human consumption are calculated by summing production, trade, and stock changes, and then subtracting those supplies lost in storage or used for seed and animal feed. The quantity of available food tends to be underestimated because farmers--especially those engaged in subsistence farming as are the majority in Africa--understate their production in order to retain more of it for their own use or private sale. Reliable statistics are virtually impossible to collect because communication systems are poor, much food does not pass through marketing channels where it can be monitored, and mix-planted fields are prevalent and make broad estimates difficult. In most parts of the developing world, the accuracy of statistics on food availabilities has been improving but, in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, reporting systems have deteriorated over the past 20 years.

* This list now includes Angola, Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, The Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Upper Volta, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

NUTRITIONAL REQUIREMENTS: Establishing minimal or desirable levels of food intake remains an imprecise science, although techniques used today yield results that appear more realistic--and significantly lower--than those used in the past. Undernourishment refers to a caloric intake insufficient to maintain activities without losing weight. Malnourishment describes a deficiency in protective nutrients--protein, vitamins, and minerals.

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2. Drought and other extreme weather conditions, political turmoil resulting from guerrilla insurgencies, and the consequent displacement of some 4 million people are among the causes of the current food emergency. Underlying these phenomena, however, are more profound, chronic problems. Most Sub-Saharan African countries have long faced declining per capita food production, concomitant growing dependence on imported food (despite reduced export earnings), and increasing reliance on international food aid. Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region of the developing world where per capita food production has declined over the past 20 years. Many of the food problems are the direct result of mismanagement, corruption, and specific policies followed by African governments. This paper examines the longer-term trends that underlie the present food crisis, and analyzes both the natural and public policy causes of food problems in Sub-Saharan Africa.

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COUNTRIES WITH LONG-STANDING FOOD PROBLEMS

NOTE: This chart lists countries by their average daily per capita caloric intake as a percentage of nutritional requirements as measured in 1976-78.

Less than 70%	70%-79%	80%-89%	90%-99%	100% and over
*Angola	*Botswana	*Ghana	*Benin	Burundi
*Ethiopia	*Cape Verde	*Guinea	*Cent'l Af. Rep.	Cameroon
*Chad	Niger	Congo	*Gambia	*Zimbabwe
*Mali	Nigeria	Kenya	*Guinea-Bissau	
*Mozambique	Rwanda	*Lesotho	Ivory Coast	
*Somalia	*Tanzania	Liberia	Madagascar	
*Upper Volta	Uganda	Malawi	*Senegal	
		Zaire	Namibia	
			Sierra Leone	
			*Swaziland	
			*Togo	
			*Zambia	

 *Countries on the UN/FAO's 1984 emergency food aid list

Long-Term Trends Underlying the Present Food Crisis

Declining Per Capita Food Productivity

3. The growth rate of food production in Sub-Saharan Africa, already the lowest of any region in the developing world, has slipped steadily over the past 20 years. The average annual rate of increase in food production in the 1970s was 1.5 percent--down from about 2 percent during the preceding decade and less than half the rate for all developing countries, according to the World Bank. Per capita food production has dropped even more precipitously as the result of an accelerating population growth rate. By 1982, overall per capita food production in the region had fallen 20 percent below the 1961-65 average level, and this figure masks substantially greater declines during the past decade in several countries.

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PER CAPITA FOOD PRODUCTION (1980-82)
(Index 1969-71 = 100)


Countries Falling Behind		Countries Keeping Pace		Countries Increasing Production	
80	81-95	95-100	101-105	106-110	110
*Angola	*Benin	Burundi	Kenya	Rwanda	Ivory Coast
*Ethiopia	Madagascar	Cameroon	Liberia		South Africa
*Ghana	Niger	*Guinea			
*Mali	Nigeria	Malawi			
*Mozambique	Sierra Leone				
*Senegal	Sudan				
*Togo	*Tanzania				
*Uganda	*Upper Volta				
	Zaire				
	*Zambia				
	*Zimbabwe				

* Countries on UN/FAO's 1984 emergency food aid list

NOTE: The use of 1969-71 as a base period does not imply that food supplies were fully adequate during those years.

Figure 2
Indexes of Per Capita Food Production for
Selected Regions, 1972-81

Average: 1969-71 = 100



^a Includes Sudan.

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Growing Dependence on Food Imports

4. During the 1960s, when African cities began to grow rapidly and world grain prices were low, governments found that the food needs of urban populations could be satisfied more easily with imported grains than with locally produced food. Total grain imports--most coming from the United States and the European Community--exceeded 8.6 million tons in 1981, compared with 1.2 million tons in the early 1960s. If production and consumption trends from the 1970s continue, annual requirements for imported food will reach 10 to 12 million tons by 1990, according to the USDA, FAO, and International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

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Dependence on Imported Food (1979-81)

<u>Greater than 70%</u>	<u>50%-69%</u>	<u>30%-49%</u>	<u>10%-29%</u>	<u>Less than 10%</u>
*Cape Verde Congo Gabon Mauritius *Sao Tome/ Principe	*Botswana *Somalia Zaire	*Angola *Gambia *Mozambique *Senegal *Swaziland *Tanzania *Togo *Zambia Liberia Niger Nigeria Rwanda Sierra Leone	*Benin Cameroon *Cent'l Afr Rep. *Ghana *Guinea *Guinea-Bissau Ivory Coast *Lesotho	Burundi *Ethiopia Kenya Madagascar Mali Uganda *Upper Volta *Zimbabwe

* Countries on UN/FAO's 1984 emergency food aid list

NOTE: These figures were calculated by subtracting the percentage of grain self-sufficiency $(=(\text{grain production})/(\text{grain production} + \text{net grain imports}) \times 100)$ from 100.

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Balance of Payments Difficulties

5. Paying for imported food has become a significant burden for the majority of African governments. According to FAO, Africa's annual food import bill averaged \$2.5 billion in 1977-79--the last period for which data are available--compared with \$274 million per year in 1961-63. The cost of food imports for 1982 are estimated at over \$5 billion. These costs are being incurred during a period when the price of importing oil is also high and the export earnings of many Sub-Saharan African states have been depressed because of production problems and residual effects of the international recession.

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6. Because of shortages in foreign exchange earnings, many African countries have been forced to borrow heavily from international financial institutions. Although much of the financing has been granted on a concessional basis, debt servicing has consumed a large and increasing share of many countries' foreign exchange earnings. Several Sub-Saharan countries have not maintained the capital stock in their export sectors and therefore have experienced declining output from these sectors. Even if major investment programs were established immediately in these countries, the payback from these programs is many years away (for example, rubber plantations in Liberia and the clove groves in Madagascar). It is this long payback period that resulted in the postponement of such programs since more immediate needs consumed all the funds available. Domestic export sectors must be revitalized before these countries will have the foreign exchange to pay for imported goods and technology.

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DEBT SERVICING RATIOS FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA--1982

60 and over	Guinea-Bissau Madagascar			
40-59	Ivory Coast Malawi Niger *Tanzania			
20-39	Burundi Cameroon Congo	*Gambia *Guinea Kenya *Mali	*Mauritania *Senegal Sierra Leone Sudan	Uganda Zaire Zambia Zimbabwe
Less than 20	*Benin *Botswana *Cent'l Af. Rep. *Chad Comoros	Djibouti *Ethiopia Gabon *Ghana *Lesotho	Mauritius Nigeria Rwanda *Somalia *Swaziland	*Togo *Upper Volta

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* Countries on UN/FAO's 1984 emergency food aid list
NOTE: Figures are debt service as a percent of exports of goods and services.

Data for countries not listed was unavailable.

Reliance on International Food Aid

7. As a result of their increasingly precarious financial positions, most African nations are compelled to rely on Western donors for food aid in the form of concessional sales or grants to meet normal import requirements as well as emergency needs. Over 40 African nations relied on food aid for about ten percent of their total imported food needs, and received an estimated \$500 million worth of food aid from Western donors in 1981 alone. The United States was the largest single supplier of this assistance, with over 60 percent of the total, according to the US Agency for International Development (AID).*

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DEPENDENCE ON FOOD AID FOR GRAIN IMPORTS (1981)

0%	*Botswana	Ivory Coast	Nigeria
1%-19%	*Benin Cameroon *Cent'l Afr. Rep. Congo	*Gambia Madagascar Malawi Niger	*Swaziland *Togo Zaire
20%-39%	Burundi *Ghana *Guinea Kenya	*Lesotho Liberia *Mali *Senegal	*Zambia
40% and over	Cape Verde *Ethiopia *Guinea-Bissau	Rwanda *Somalia *Tanzania	*Upper Volta *Zimbabwe

* Countries on UN/FAO's 1984 emergency food aid list

NOTE: Food aid (grain) is expressed as a percent of grain imports.

* Communist countries are not an important source of food aid to Africa. China was the main donor over the last decade, although its aid dropped virtually to naught in 1981-82, and Beijing tends to distribute its assistance quite widely. The Soviet Union and Eastern European countries provided less than \$10 million in food aid to Sub-Saharan Africa in 1981, and their assistance has traditionally gone to states with whom they have enjoyed close relations such as Madagascar, Mozambique, Mali, Somalia (before Siad's break with Moscow in 1977), Ethiopia, and Guinea (before Toure's decision in the late 1970s to develop closer ties with the West). China and the Soviet Union have chosen not to make food assistance a more important element in their aid programs in Africa.

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<u>KILOGRAMS OF FOOD AID PER CAPITA 1978-79</u>		<u>CHANGES IN FOOD AID 1977/78--1981/82</u> (thousand tons, grain equivalent)			
			77/78	81/82	
OVER 40	*Cape Verde				
UNDER 40	*Guinea-Bissau		Burundi	16	9
	*Sao Tome & Principe	AID HAS	Congo	4	1
	Seychelles	DECLINED	*Ghana	73	43
			*Lesotho	38	34
UNDER 30	*Gambia		*Togo	8	5
	*Lesotho				
	*Mauritania		*Botswana	9	10
	*Senegal		Cameroon	8	11
	*Somalia		*Chad	23	29
		AID HAS	*Ethiopia	163	190
UNDER 20	*Botswana	INCREASED	*Guinea	28	39
	Comoros	UP TO 50%	Malawi	2	2
	Djibouti		*Mozambique	125	135
	Mauritius		Rwanda	10	13
	*Mozambique		*Senegal	60	83
			*Swaziland	1	1
UNDER 10	*Angola		Zaire	76	98
	*Benin				
	Burundi		*Benin	5	8
	Cameroon		*Cape Verde	31	54
	*Cent'l Af Rep	AID HAS	*Cent'l Af Rep	1	2
	*Chad	INCREASED	Comoros	5	8
	Congo	50%-100%	*Guinea-Bissau	17	30
	Eq Guinea		*Upper Volta	49	81
	*Ethiopia		Zambia	50	100
	Gabon				
	*Ghana		Djibouti	5	11
	*Guinea		*Gambia	7	11
	Kenya	AID HAS	*Mali	22	60
	Liberia	INCREASED	*Mauritania	31	86
	Madagascar	100%-200%	*SaoTome&Princ.	1	3
	Malawi		*Somalia	87	186
	*Mali		Sudan	91	194
	Niger				
	Nigeria		*Angola	11	73
	Rwanda		Kenya	9	27
	Sierra Leone		Liberia	1	42
	Sudan	AID HAS	Madagascar	9	87
	*Swaziland	INCREASED	Mauritius	6	45
	*Tanzania	200 + %	Niger	23	71
	*Togo		Sierra Leone	6	30
	Uganda		*Tanzania	54	304
	Zaire				
	*Zambia				

* Countries on UN/FAO's 1984 emergency food aid list

Causes of Food Problems in Sub-Saharan Africa--An Overview

Natural Causes of Food Problems

8. Adverse Weather and Climatic Conditions: Although some areas have escaped its full effects, most of Sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing the worst drought of this century. The dry period actually started approximately 15 years ago when precipitation began a gradual decline after several years of averaging 15 percent above the long term-mean in southern Africa and 35 to 40 percent above that mean along the Saharan fringe. Drought had spread throughout the Sub-Saharan region by 1968, and for the following six years precipitation ranged 15 to 40 percent below normal. During the worst years of this period--1972 and 1973--the shortfalls exceeded 50 percent of normal in the northern Sahel and 30 to 35 percent in the more humid southern area. Rainfall over the continent increased considerably during 1974 and 1975 leading to speculation that the drought had ended but, in reality, precipitation was still 25 percent below the mean in Sub-Saharan areas north of the Equator and 10 percent below the mean in the south. The shortfalls in 1976-77 and 1982-83 matched or exceeded the severe drought years of the early 1970s. [redacted]

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9. When the current African drought will end is impossible to predict. Most meteorologists believe that they understand the general conditions that lead to drought formation, but the quantitative detail necessary to predict its onset and duration are not known. Because drought has recurred in Africa, numerous analyses of the climate have been undertaken to identify cyclical events that could lead to drought prediction. Some of these so-called time series investigations have revealed a possible cyclical pattern, but the weather and climate data are incomplete. Moreover, population changes, industrial development, agricultural expansion, and other manmade changes in the environment will significantly influence future climate in ways the historical data cannot reflect. [redacted]

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The Drought, South Africa, and Regional Food Trade

One of the most significant consequences of drought in South Africa has been its effect on regional food supplies. South Africa is by far the dominant corn (maize) producer and exporter in the region, with Zimbabwe a distant runner-up. Until last year, large surpluses had been available for annual export. Corn is exported at competitive world prices that are often below those charged to domestic consumers. As a result, South Africa has been successful in contracting deliveries worldwide as well as in black Africa. A total of about 4.3 million tons were exported from the 1982 crop, compared with 5.4 million tons from 1981 and 3.2 million tons from 1980. [redacted] estimates that about one-third of these sales were to black Africa. [redacted]

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Such sales enhance regional economic dependence on South Africa. Pretoria occasionally stresses the nation's role as a food supplier and hints at food as a potential weapon. Our evidence,

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however, indicates that South Africa has not explicitly used the threat of withholding food as a foreign policy weapon, even though a survey of white South Africans in late 1982 revealed that 72 percent favored banning food sales to neighboring countries that support or harbor terrorists. [redacted]

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Because of drought last year, Pretoria was forced to cancel major export contracts for deliveries of corn and wheat outside Africa. Moreover, it suspended sales to traditional customers such as Zambia and Zaire. South Africa has continued to supply corn at market rates to Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, all of which it treats as part of its domestic market for corn. Nevertheless, peasant families without cash for purchases have been hurt and forced to rely on aid programs in their countries. [redacted]

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Because of the intensified drought in 1984, South Africa is projecting corn imports of well over 4 million tons between now and April 1985--double the level of imports last year--which will strain the offloading capacity of the country's ports and rail lines. As a result, South African will have little margin to handle imports of corn for Zambia, Zaire, and Zimbabwe, all of which have become increasingly dependent on South African ports as facilities in Mozambique and Tanzania have deteriorated. Import requirements for Zimbabwe alone probably will absorb any excess South African port capacity, while Mozambique's ports will be hard-pressed merely to handle that country's own exceptional relief deliveries this year. [redacted]

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Most countries in the region are net food importers even under normal conditions. As a result, formal efforts to promote regional cooperation for long-term food security independent of South Africa are being made by the nine-nation Southern African Development Coordination Conference. These efforts--in which Zimbabwe's role will be crucial--are barely in the planning stage, however, and will require greater technical, financial, and administrative resources than are likely to be available in the foreseeable future. Consequently, regional dependence on imported food--including from South Africa--is unlikely to diminish. [redacted]

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
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10. While much of Africa has suffered from drought for the past three years, the continent has suffered from other climatic extremes that have also impeded food production. The cyclone that tore into Mozambique, Swaziland, and parts of South Africa late in January 1984 is but the latest such episode. Floods have also periodically devastated parts of central Africa, and West Africa's export and food crops have been damaged by brushfires fanned by the Harmattan desert winds. [redacted]

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Figure 3
Percipitation Trend in Sahel, 1950-83

Annual rainfall departure from mean^a




^a The mean is calculated from 1900-83

[Redacted]

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Figure 4
AFRICA: Average Annual Precipitation



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DROUGHT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (1983)Drought Affected Countries

*Botswana
 *Cape Verde
 Cameroon
 *Chad
 *Cent'l Af. Rep.
 *Ethiopia
 *Gambia
 *Ghana
 Ivory Coast
 *Lesotho
 *Mali
 *Mauritania
 *Mozambique

Namibia
 *Nigeria
 *Senegal
 South Africa
 *Swaziland
 *Togo
 *Zambia
 *Zimbabwe

Countries with Normal Precipitation

*Angola
 Benin
 Burundi
 Comoros
 Congo
 Djibouti
 Equatorial Guinea
 Gabon
 *Guinea
 *Guinea-Bissau
 Kenya
 Liberia
 Madagascar

Malawi
 Mauritius
 Niger
 Rwanda
 *Sao Tome/Principe
 Sierra Leone
 *Somalia
 Sudan
 Tanzania
 Uganda
 *Upper Volta
 Zaire

 *Countries on UN/FAO's 1984 emergency food aid list

11. Other Environmental Difficulties: Extreme weather is not the only problem facing African agriculture. Crop diseases, poor soil, infestations of locusts, army worms, and other pests also reduce crop yields. Widespread trypanosomiasis caused by tsetse flies limits livestock raising and the use of draft animals. Technical solutions to some of these problems are known, but most countries lack the resources and agricultural extension services necessary to transmit technological advances to the field.

12. More extensive technical, financial, and managerial resources will likely be required before Africa can experience a true agricultural revolution like the ones that transformed food productivity in Asia, India, and Mexico. High-yielding grains suitable for the Sub-Saharan climate and resistant to tropical pestilence have not yet been developed. The International Institute for Tropical Agriculture in Nigeria has recently released a high-yielding cassava that is resistant to major African pests. Some other areas of research--most notably that concentrating on sorghum--appear promising, but useable results are still several years away. However, more widespread application of existing "technical packages" of seed types, fertilizers, and cultivation methods could substantially improve yields. The problem again is access to these technologies. Most food production is carried out on small plots by farmers who have little access to modern agricultural advances, improved farm machinery, irrigation systems, or extension services. In Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, farmers make a significant contribution to food production.

13. Population Trends: Africa's rapid population growth over the past 20 years has been the primary factor behind the enormous increase in food demand, yet the population density for the continent as a whole is very low, and rural

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labor shortages abound. Demographers believe that Africa's growth rate will stay high because Africans traditionally have placed high value on large families and the desired number of children per family ranges from seven to 10. Governments of 22 countries with growth rates ranging from 2.5 to 3.7 percent see their population growth as being satisfactory or too low. Moreover, politicians are reluctant to promote family planning policies that could upset tribal balances. Some leaders--President Moi of Kenya and former Presidents Ahidjo of Cameroon and Senghor of Senegal--have warned of potential demographic problems, but this awareness has not filtered down to lower levels of their bureaucracies. UN demographers therefore project that Africa's population growth rate will rise from 3 percent to a high of 3.1 percent in 1990 before beginning to decline. Seventeen countries, mostly in East and West Africa, have growth rates well over 3 percent, and Kenya's growth rate of 4.1 percent is now one of the highest in the world. The UN estimates that the area's population of 330 million in 1980 will grow to 612 million by the year 2000. [redacted]

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14. Africa's growing urban population is a particular source of stress on African food supplies. Although today Africa is one of the least urbanized regions of the world--22 percent of its people lived in cities in 1980--its annual urban growth rate from natural increase and rural-urban migration is nearly 6 percent. In 1980, Sub-Saharan Africa had 11 cities of more than 1 million, and if present trends continue for the next 20 years, the region will have 41 such cities--12 of them in Nigeria. UN demographers project that 36 percent of the population will live in urban areas by the year 2000. [redacted]

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URBAN POPULATION TRENDS

Annual average Urban Growth Rates
(1970-80)

Population in Urban Areas
(1980)

Annual average Urban Growth Rates (1970-80)	Population in Urban Areas (1980)
<p>Less than 4%</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Benin Burundi Congo *Senegal 	<p>More than 30%</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cameroon *Cent'l Af. Rep. Congo *Ghana Ivory Coast Liberia *Somalia Zaire *Zambia *Zimbabwe
<p>4%-4.9%</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Central Af. Rep. Nigeria *Upper Volta 	<p>25%-30%</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Senegal Sudan
<p>5%-5.9%</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Angola *Ghana *Guinea Liberia Madagascar *Mali 	<p>20%-24%</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rwanda Sierra Leone *Togo *Angola *Mali Mauritania Niger Sierre Leone
<p>6%-6.9%</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Chad *Ethiopia Kenya Malawi *Mozambique 	<p>10%-19%</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sudan Zaire *Zimbabwe *Benin *Chad *Ethiopia *Guinea Kenya Madagascar Niger
<p>7%-7.9%</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cameroon *Mauritania Uganda 	<p>Less than 10%</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Burundi Malawi *Mozambique Rwanda Uganda *Upper Volta
<p>More than 8%</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ivory Coast *Tanzania 	

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*Countries on UN/FAO's 1984 emergency food aid list

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15. The growing urbanization of the African population and food subsidies have created demands for food that are difficult to supply from local production even under the best of circumstances. Urban incomes are generally higher than rural incomes, and academic studies suggest that as their incomes rise, people purchase greater quantities of food and diversify their diets. Moreover, the taste preferences of Africans change when they move to cities because of the higher status associated with certain foods and the easier preparation and storage of some nontraditional foods. As a result, urban Africans have turned away from local grains, roots, and tubers in favor of such foods as higher quality imported rice and Western-style bread made of wheat flour at recent subsidized prices. In the case of wheat, a crop that is not suited for production in much of Africa, demand has been fueled at least in part by the availability of imported wheat for purchase on concessional terms.

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16. Food problems have been further complicated by the vast numbers of Africans who have fled their traditional areas since the mid-1970's and placed severe strains on the resources of the regions that receive them. The problems of refugees and displaced persons are particularly acute in the Horn and East-Central Africa and are increasing in Southern Africa because internal political conflicts and inadequate transportation systems have added to the difficulties in distributing food equitably.

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Refugees and Displaced Persons

The most serious refugee problems are in the Horn of Africa where Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti shelter over one million persons who have fled their homelands. Sudan faces the worst situation with more than 600,000 refugees from Ethiopia, Uganda, Zaire, and Chad. The influx has been steady as an estimated 35,000 Ethiopians have entered eastern Sudan since August 1983. in Khartoum, the daily flow of 350 to 450 new arrivals dropped to 200 per week in late February.

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The Government of Sudan, along with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international private volunteer organizations, is attempting to resolve its refugee problems through a variety of programs of self-help, assimilation, resettlement, and limited repatriation. Sudanese officials are fearful, however, that potentially violent backlashes could erupt among the local inhabitants. Living standards are rapidly declining as drought conditions persist in the east and refugees draw on the available food, shelter, and services. Private volunteers report that Sudanese security forces are holding thousands of Ethiopians at the border in an effort to stem the tide. Government officials and the UNHCR have developed plans to provide limited assistance for Ethiopia's drought victims, but the refugees will be discouraged from becoming permanent residents of Sudan.

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Somalia continues to shelter approximately half a million Ethiopian Somalis who entered the country during the 1977-78 Ogaden

War. International assistance has eased the government's burden of accommodating the refugees while providing for the needs of the local population. This delicate balance could be threatened, however, by an increasingly severe drought. Contrary to recent reports of masses of refugees returning to Ethiopia, relatively few are known to have done so. Most of those who have departed Somalia are nomads following their normal seasonal livestock movement patterns. [redacted]

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The Ethiopians who entered Djibouti because of the Ogaden War boosted the country's population by more than 10 percent, creating severe stress for a state with inadequate resources for its own inhabitants. A repatriation agreement signed by the governments of Djibouti, Ethiopia, and the UNHCR has made it possible for about a quarter of the refugees to return to Ethiopia. That project was halted in late January 1984, however, because of rebel attacks on the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railroad (the major return route), and because of Ethiopia's inability to provide adequate accommodations for the returnees. [redacted]

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Ethiopia has generated more refugees than any other country in Africa. Since the exodus began in 1974, the war with Somalia, on-going fighting with insurgents, and drought have forced well over one million Ethiopians to leave their country. Another half million potential refugees massed along the border with Sudan are counted among the three million internally displaced Ethiopians. International and private organizations report that available food is difficult to distribute among these people because of continuing fighting, poor roads, lack of vehicles, and adverse seasonal weather conditions. [redacted]

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REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Principal Generating and Asylum Countries 1983*

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Generating Countries

Ethiopia	1,000,000
Uganda	287,000
Angola	273,000
Burundi	160,000
Mozambique	120,000
Rwanda	102,000
Namibia	74,000
Zaire	51,000

Displaced Persons in Country

Ethiopia	3,000,000
Angola	160,000
Chad	70,000
Uganda	40,000

Asylum Countries by Region

Horn of Africa

Sudan	650,000
Somalia	400,000
Djibouti	27,000
Ethiopia	25,000

East Central

Zaire	395,000
Tanzania	170,000
Uganda	116,000
Burundi	58,000
Rwanda	45,000
Kenya	6,000

West

Niger	11,000
Cameroon	10,000
Congo	10,000
Senegal	5,200
Liberia	4,000

Southern

Zimbabwe	120,000
Angola	110,000
Zambia	89,000
Lesotho	12,000
Botswana	6,500

(c)

 *These figures are rough approximations based on asylum country estimates as reported to the UNHCR and US embassies. "Displaced persons in country" refers to people who have been forced from their home areas but who remain in their countries of origin.

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Public Policy Causes of Food Problems

17. Pricing and Marketing Policies: While adverse weather explains the sharp drops in food production over the last couple of years, pricing and marketing policies common to most African governments primarily account for most of the longer-run decline. Post-independence African leaders tended to view the agricultural sector as a source of surplus revenue to finance what they perceived as more important industrial development. Consequently, most African governments devoted few resources to the production of food for consumption, preferring to focus their agricultural development programs on export crops which are a major source of foreign exchange.

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18. The governments' food pricing and marketing policies have reflected these priorities. In most African countries, official producer and consumer prices on major staples, crop procurement, and food marketing are regulated through government-controlled boards known as parastatals. However, the operations of the parastatals have been hampered from the start by government decisions to keep producer prices on food crops low in order to subsidize food for the politically volatile urban consumers. Farmers have little incentive to expand their production as the prices offered by these government boards often do not even cover their production costs. [redacted]

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19. Low official producer prices and higher consumer demand have encouraged the development of private marketing structures operating parallel to official marketing channels in much of Africa. The World Bank estimates that private traders, who often offer producer prices two to three times as high as official prices, control over half the marketed production of cereals throughout the region, although their presence varies considerably among countries. [redacted]

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20. Since 1980, several countries have raised producer prices of staple foods above world market levels in order to encourage production. Maize farmers in Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe responded to price increases with substantial increases in production. Zimbabwe's 1981 maize crop was nearly double the previous year's production because farmers reacted positively to record-high preplanting prices and benefitted from good weather as well. Other efforts to stimulate production have been less successful because the attractiveness of higher producer prices was undercut by still higher production costs, lack of necessary materials, bad weather, or domestic inflation. In Zambia, where a 15-percent price increase for maize in 1981 brought about a boost in the acreage planted, USDA analysts warned that price incentives would likely be dampened by shortages of agricultural materials and equipment, transportation problems, and unavailability of credit. Until the present drought, wheat growers in Zimbabwe were being paid more than twice the world market price but did not expand plantings because of the high cost of irrigation. Rising labor costs may be cutting into the incentive of recent price increases for rice growers in West Africa, according to USDA analyses. Nigeria increased official producer prices on staple foods substantially in 1980, with rice prices rising 24 percent, maize 38 percent, sorghum 73 percent--all well above world market prices. Prices have not risen significantly since then, however, while the cost of living has more than doubled. Similar situations have occurred in Tanzania and Senegal. [redacted]

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21. Some governments are trying to stimulate production by liberalizing marketing practices and giving freer rein to these private traders. Senegal has abolished the official cereals marketing board and eliminated government procurement of cereals. In response to IMF insistence on grain marketing liberalization as a precondition for a standby accord, Mali has relinquished its monopoly control on sorghum and millet. Somalia abolished several parastatals in 1981 and turned their functions over to the private sector. Zambia has reduced the role of its agricultural marketing board, allowing cooperatives in some provinces to become the official maize buyers. These kinds of reforms offer some hope of progress in the longer-run, but their immediate impact has been offset by the effects of the drought. [redacted]

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22. Transportation Inadequacies: An inadequate system of transportation and storage facilities further hinders the marketing and distribution of foodstuffs and agricultural materials within many African countries. US agricultural attache reporting has noted, for example, that the major obstacle to improving Zaire's agricultural sector is the country's rapidly deteriorating road system which prevents many farmers from getting their produce to market centers. Improving roads in Zaire, as in other African countries, is made more difficult by high construction and maintenance costs. In addition, austerity measures introduced in conjunction with debt rescheduling have compounded the immediate transportation problem by raising the domestic costs of imported trucks, spare parts, and fuel. [redacted]

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Kilometers of Roads per Square Kilometer of Total Land


less than 1	*Ethiopia	*Mauritania	Niger	Sudan
1-4	*Benin *Botswana *Chad *Cent'l Af. Rep.	Congo Gabon *Gambia *Guinea	Madagascar *Mali *Mozambique *Tanzania	Uganda *Zambia
5-9	*Angola Cameroon	*Guinea-Bissau Kenya	Liberia *Senegal	*Upper Volta Zaire
10-14	*Ghana Ivory Coast	*Lesotho Malawi	Nigeria Sierra Leone	*Togo
15-19	*Swaziland			
20 and over	Burundi	Rwanda	*Zimbabwe	

 *Countries on UN/FAO's 1984 emergency food aid list

NOTE: Figures include all roads and take no account of the great variation in quality of roads. Data for countries not listed was unavailable.

23. State Investments in Food Production: What little government investment in food production occurred during the 1960s and 1970s, the World Bank reports, tended to subsidize large-scale, government-operated agricultural projects in the hope of overcoming the stagnation associated with traditional agricultural methods. The heavy mechanization involved in these schemes also seemed to promise a solution to the seasonal labor shortages arising from the accelerated rural-urban migration. While typically consuming a large proportion of the public investment in agriculture, these projects generally account for only a small proportion of total food production. Their

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disappointing performance is attributed to poor administration, overstaffing, and a failure to maintain equipment and infrastructure. Rice production in Mozambique's state farms, for example, has declined since the farms were established in the late 1970s because of frequent equipment breakdowns and workers have few incentives to improve production. Ethiopia's state farms have suffered from mismanagement by military officers who lack agricultural expertise, and Congolese authorities publicly admit that their state farms are plagued by chronic equipment problems.

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Constrasting Public Policies in Tanzania and Kenya

The dramatic impact of government policies is demonstrated in Kenya and neighboring Tanzania. The two countries have similar agricultural resources, traditions, and population growth rates. While its policies have not always been ideal, Kenya has offered its farmers price incentives and an effective market-oriented infrastructure in most recent years. As a result, food production has risen and, in several recent years, Kenya has exported food surpluses. The drought cut last year's corn crop 15 percent but produced no real food shortages.

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In contrast, Tanzania uprooted its scattered farmers and concentrated them in Ujamaa villages--where they were supposed to receive water projects, machinery, and extension and social services. When the government proved unable to provide the services, the result was a sharp drop in farm output and an increase in soil degradation. Production of export crops plummeted as villages increasingly retreated into subsistence production. The resulting foreign exchange crisis is now so severe that Tanzania cannot import food or fertilizer--nor transport either through its countryside.



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24. Misuse and Corruption of the Food System: The development of large institutional structures responsible for the production, procurement, distribution, and pricing of food has created abundant opportunities for various forms of corruption. Government regulation of crop purchases, transport, and storage, for instance, allows functionaries to exact bribes in return for services rendered. corruption in Senegal's now-defunct grain-marketing board extended from weighers and truckers to senior officials

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marketing officials in Tanzania who control access to relatively scarce subsidized food curry favor by selling in bulk to influential customers who resell the commodities to consumers at higher prices.

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25. The allocation of agricultural materials, equipment, and farm credit often becomes a source of graft for parastatal officials and a means of distributing political patronage in rural areas. Academic studies claim that farm loans made through the Tanzania Rural Development Bank in the 1970's were sometimes used to build peasant support for local politicians. The Nigerian press has frequently charged that agricultural loans are not allocated on the basis of need and that the money often is not invested in farming. According

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to academic observers, the Senegalese Government co-opted rural leaders in the 1970's by giving them access to subsidized agricultural production material.

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26. Food imports also are avenues for graft. The Nigerian press has reported extensively on irregularities in the issuance of rice import licenses, and in 1981 the National Assembly published a list of former President Shagari's supporters and cronies who received licenses. [redacted] widespread rumors that the head of Zaire's largest commercial bakery was using payoffs in late 1982 to circumvent stiff government restrictions on imported wheat flour. [redacted]

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27. Opposition groups are increasingly tempted to point to abuses in food distribution as evidence of government indifference to constituents' welfare. For example, the late Liberian President Tolbert and his family were popularly believed to be among the prime potential beneficiaries of the proposed rice price increases that led to anti-government rioting in Monrovia in 1979. Governments, too, use allegations of corruption to discredit opponents. In 1980, the Zairian Government attempted to damage the reputation of one of President Mobutu's critics by accusing him of diverting rice for his own financial gain [redacted]

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28. There are problems as well with deliveries of food financed by various aid programs, although the extent of these problems is difficult to establish. A former director of UN World Food Program projects in west and central Africa reported that in the late 1970s local project managers frequently diverted or illegally sold donated food. [redacted] Kinshasa have noted numerous instances in recent years of diversion of US Public Law (PL) 480 rice aid by functionaries at all levels of government for illegal resale at inflated prices. [redacted]

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Political Impact of Food Shortages

[redacted] reports document numerous instances of unrest related to food problems in Sub-Saharan Africa in recent years.

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- In April 1979, Liberian dissidents exploited public opposition to government plans to raise the price of rice--an urban dietary staple by organizing an antiregime demonstration. The demonstration escalated into two days of rioting and looting, leaving scores dead, before being suppressed by the army.

- Shortages of staple foods and high food prices during the preharvest "lean season" in Ghana were factors in antigovernment student demonstrations and labor strikes in 1977 and 1978.

- Efforts by Guinean police to confiscate illegally marketed food in 1977 led to demonstrations by market women, resulting in several deaths. Two years earlier, an acute food shortage in the country's second-largest city helped trigger a military protest against President Toure's economic policies.

- Public unhappiness with a six-month rice shortage in Sierra Leone in 1979 led to violence at government-controlled rice distribution centers in Freetown. In 1981, President Stevens declared a state of emergency in response to a general strike called by trade unions seeking economic reforms, including reduced food prices.

- Workers at Zambia's economically strategic copper mines went on strike three times in 1981. Grievances included discontent over high food prices.

- Several thousand people protesting shortages of food and other commodities rioted in cities in northern Madagascar in March 1982. Rioters attacked government buildings and military bases, and several civilians were killed. [redacted]

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Implications for the United States

29. Few African countries will escape increasing food problems in the next decade, and requests from Sub-Saharan African countries for emergency food aid are likely to grow even after the present drought subsides. Unless African governments can be persuaded to make politically risky policy changes--or can be convinced that failure to make those changes entails even greater risks--requests for food relief will probably come from throughout Africa, as many governments attempt to use aid to postpone hard domestic political decisions. [redacted]

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30. Urban Africans, increasingly beset by rising prices and declining living standards, will be especially hard hit and may be less inclined to tolerate food problems in the future. Even if violence does not erupt, a serious food shortage could become a rallying point for political opposition to government authorities. Although food related unrest could provide opportunities for exploitation by the Soviet Union and Libya, popular dissatisfaction undermines both pro-Western regimes as well as regimes friendly to the Soviets. The West has been able to provide food aid in significant amounts. Neither the Soviets nor the Libyans are likely to provide Sub-Saharan African countries with necessary food aid. [redacted]

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PART II: CASE STUDIES OF FOOD PROBLEMS IN SPECIFIC COUNTRIESThe Sahel*

31. Current Conditions: Few parts of the Sahel escaped the poor and erratic rainfall of 1983, although it is impossible to determine precisely how many of the Sahel's estimated 33 million people have been affected by the drought. Grain production per capita is continuing to decline, cattle herds in some countries are dying from lack of pasture, irrigation capacities are seriously diminished, and seven of the eight Sahelian countries are experiencing a combined food shortage estimated at 1.4 million tons by the US Department of Agriculture.** None of the Sahelian countries can afford to make up these shortfalls with commercial purchases as world prices for imported corn and sorghum have risen almost 50 percent while prices for Sahelian exports have fallen. Pledges of food aid by the Sahel's traditional Western donors have left a gap of between 500 (USDA figures) and 800 thousand (FAO figures) tons of grains,*** and food aid shipments are needed before the onset of the rainy season in May if they are to reach those most seriously affected. [redacted]

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32. Even when sufficient food supplies are available, political turmoil often disrupts its distribution. Transportation of food to Chad through Nigeria, for example, was blocked for weeks following the New Year's coup in Lagos and subsequent closure of borders. Continued fighting in Chad still prevents the distribution of food aid, with the result that only half that country's estimated needs are met. [redacted]

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33. Outlook: The consequences of the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s will persist well beyond the immediate food emergencies, and it is highly unlikely that the Sahel will become self-sufficient in food production at any time in the future. Part of the blame can be attributed to government policies, most notably the general unwillingness to risk urban discontent by allowing controlled food prices to rise in hope of boosting local producer incentives. The inefficiencies of the parastatal corporations in importing seeds and fertilizers and in marketing grains has further compounded the

* The Sahel is a geographic belt that extends along the southern edge of the Sahara from Chad to the Atlantic Ocean. In this paper, we define the Sahel as including Cape Verde, Chad, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta. [redacted]

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** Niger's comparatively favorable statistics disguise drought-related problems--traders in neighboring Nigeria have been smuggling food and livestock into Niger, where they can obtain higher prices in hard currency CFA francs while the future value of the Nigerian naira remains uncertain. [redacted]

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*** Data for the region are notoriously unreliable, and estimates should be viewed only as suggestive. The UN Food and Agricultural Organization, for example, tends to report food needs that are higher than those estimated by the US Department of Agriculture. [redacted]

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situation. In addition, government-imposed rotational grazing schemes that could increase forage are resisted by fiercely independent nomads. [redacted]

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34. Governments that have shown the political will to tackle the economy's structural problems have often found their efforts frustrated. In an attempt to stimulate domestic production, Senegal increased consumer rice prices 30 percent in 1981, increased producer prices for some cereals above world market prices, and abolished its poorly managed cereals marketing board. Yet rainfall in northern Senegal in 1983 was only 30 percent of normal, the worst since 1972, and Dakar has been forced to turn to the United States and other donors to fill its food aid need of 300,000 tons. Upper Volta also reduced consumer subsidies only to find that the early end to the 1983 rainy season resulted in 15 to 40 percent losses in key cereal-producing areas. [redacted]

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35. The Sahel's desperate economic condition has made it one of the largest per capita recipients of foreign assistance in the world. Since the drought of the 1970s, roughly \$7.5 billion has been poured into the region. While 65 percent of aid to the Sahel is in the form of grants, nongrant aid accounts for two-thirds of the Sahel's foreign debt. Servicing such debts further weakens the countries' foreign exchange positions and strengthens government appeals for other forms of food aid as thinly disguised balance of payments support. [redacted]

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36. Despite efforts by both the Sahel and its donors to coordinate aid programs, increasing evidence from the World Bank and other sources indicates that much international aid--which dropped by 20 percent in 1982/83 crop year --is not effective. Sahelian nations lack the skilled manpower and economic institutions needed to support the high recurring costs of aid projects. As a result, projects often are abandoned after expensive startup costs. Efforts to overhaul Sahelian food production are further hampered by unpredictable and uneven rainfall, poor soils, primitive agricultural methods, weak extension and marketing services, high transportation costs, the growing preference of urban dwellers for imported wheat and rice, and government policies that traditionally have encouraged farmers to grow export crops such as cotton and peanuts. [redacted]

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37. The economic and food outlook for the Sahel remains bleak. The after effects of the world recession, severe drought, high energy costs, and growing debt service burdens are straining already fragile economies to the breaking point. The region is more dependent than ever on international financial institutions and Western aid donors, and several years of normal rainfall will be required to rehabilitate agriculture. Moreover, the economic and budgetary problems of France, the region's principal benefactor and former colonizer, limit Paris' ability to bail out Sahelian governments. As a result, Sahelian leaders are likely to turn increasingly to the United States with requests for additional financial and food assistance. [redacted]

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38. Economic hardships and food shortages will contribute to dissatisfaction with Sahelian regimes as entrenched elites, and the older generation of leaders is increasingly faulted for corruption and blamed for deteriorating living standards. Growing frustration will increase the potential for civil disorders and coups as demands for radical change gain ground among lower military ranks, underprivileged urban dwellers, and

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students unable to find jobs. This situation provides opportunities for Libyan and Soviet meddling. [redacted]

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West Africa

Ghana

39. Current Conditions: Ghana's food production--already in decline for several years--has been devastated by the current drought and the Rawlings government has declared a food emergency. Per capita food production is only 56 percent of 1971 levels. The US Department of Agriculture estimates that grain production may have reached only 500 thousand tons for 1983, down from a baseline of 625 thousand tons in 1979-82. Meanwhile, population growth has increased consumption needs to 800 thousand tons. [redacted]

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40. Because of foreign exchange shortages, Ghana will find it difficult to import commercially its remaining consumption needs. Although the world market price of Ghana's major export crop--cocoa--rose in 1983, production has declined substantially in the last few years and has suffered long-term damage from inept government purchasing policies and drought-induced brush fires. The cocoa harvest of 1982/83 was the smallest in 40 years. The government is encouraging new cocoa plantings to restore the country's output, but farmers prefer to grow food crops for home consumption and local sale because they currently obtain better prices on the local markets. Much of Ghana's scarce foreign exchange goes to purchasing oil on the spot market, and prolonged drought has drastically cut hard currency earnings from sales of Volta Dam electricity to neighboring Togo and Benin. [redacted]

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41. The critical shortage of foreign exchange will permit Ghana to import commercially only 80 thousand tons of food this year. As of mid-January, known food aid pledges from primarily Western donors totaled 119 thousand tons, leaving a shortfall of 100 thousand tons.* Ghana's chronic food shortages will become critical during the early harvest which begins in June, and some starvation and urban unrest are growing possibilities. Poorer urban consumers are unable to pay higher prices--induced by IMF programs--for locally produced food. [redacted]

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42. Transport difficulties are a major obstacle to the delivery of the emergency relief. Although major aid donors agreed last December to increase their assistance, Ghana does not have the foreign exchange to pay for tires, spare parts, and fuel for trucks to carry food to stricken areas, which are cut off from urban centers by poor roads. [redacted]

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* International assistance included \$5.9 million from the World Food Program, \$25 million in food and drugs through the UNDR0, and \$40 million from the World Bank to support cocoa and palm oil production and improve the transport sector. [redacted]

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43. The number of Ghanaians affected by the food crisis is difficult to estimate because of uncertainties in arriving at a total population figure for the country. The drought in the northern subsistence agricultural regions is most severe, yet the region had to absorb more than 1 million Ghanaian workers expelled by Nigeria early last year. The Catholic Relief Services reports that 50 to 58 percent of the 250,000 Ghanaian children it regularly surveys are undernourished. Of these, 10 to 15 percent suffer from a severe caloric deficiency, which could translate into 2,500 deaths per month from starvation.

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44. In hopes of obtaining greater Western food and financial aid, Ghana's leaders have quieted their anti-Western rhetoric, which had become so heated in early 1983 that the United States froze its assistance projects. The United States has recently allocated 16.7 thousand tons of supplemental aid and 33.6 thousand tons of emergency food aid. The regime is responding to Western economic counsel and has embarked on an ambitious economic reform program that has qualified Ghana for an IMF standby agreement.

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45. Outlook: A turnaround in Ghana's food situation is unlikely anytime soon. Increased consumption of seed stocks, together with livestock losses, militate against increased food production in the foreseeable future. No immediate relief is in sight apart from Western donor food aid because benefits from the IMF-mandated economic reform program will not be apparent for at least another year and rains are not due until mid-year. Some Ghanaians could soon start dying from food shortages.

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46. Economic decline, drought, and management failures have greatly increased the potential for political instability within Ghana. Fissures within the regime and armed forces pose the most immediate danger to the survival of the Rawlings regime, but civil unrest over food shortages could also become a threat. While the last demonstrations over shortages of staples and high food prices occurred in 1977 and 1978, Rawlings' turning to the West and IMF for help risks a backlash from disgruntled ultra-leftist factions eager to restore Ghana's revolutionary purity. This could cause Rawlings to back off his economic reforms or lead to his overthrow in a radical-led coup that likely could result in closer Ghanaian ties with Libya, Cuba, and the USSR. Such ties would not likely resolve any of Ghana's economic problems.

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Nigeria

47. Current Conditions: Nigeria's northern tier of states--the country's most productive agricultural region--is suffering from serious drought conditions which have resulted in severe shortages of potable water for both human and livestock consumption and greatly reduced irrigation capacity. Food production in these areas has been seriously curtailed in comparison with the usually good performance of 1982. Overall grain output is down 30 percent from 1982 levels, and this may mark a resumption of long-term pattern of declining production. The sorghum crop--one of the principal staples--registered an overall drop of nearly 40 percent. The other key staples, yams and cassava, are estimated to be down 10 and 15 percent, respectively. The remainder of the country has average to slightly below average crop conditions.

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48. Even though severe food deficits this year are expected only in the far north, some 20 million people will be directly affected as will several million city dwellers dependent on northern food production. Nigeria's overall food import bill will increase significantly because an additional 2 to 2.5 million tons of food grains are required. Stocks of grain are low because of drought-reduced harvests prior to 1982. In addition, dryness has increased the susceptibility of cattle to disease. [redacted] disease is largely responsible for the loss of 15 percent of the national cattle herd over the past 18 months. [redacted]

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49. Outlook: Nigeria's current food shortfall, although exacerbated by the drought, is primarily the result of years of neglect. Even before the drought [redacted] agricultural production was 20 percent lower than in 1975. In the years since the 1967-70 civil war, successive Nigerian governments--including the recently deposed Shagari administration--have paid lip service to initiating a "Green Revolution" in Nigeria, but they have made little real effort to stimulate the agricultural sector. Although government-controlled producer prices have been raised from time to time--and agricultural production would probably have increased in 1983 were it not for drought--farm incomes have not risen nearly enough to induce industrious younger families to take up farming instead of seeking higher paying jobs in the cities. Moreover, for those who stayed in the fields, investment credit has been hard to obtain and the distribution of fertilizers and other inputs has been poor because of internal transportation problems. These distribution problems, along with black marketeering of food, will likely hamper the effective allocation of imports purchased to offset the effects of drought.

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50. Nigeria's prospects for avoiding food deficits in the future are poor, despite a relatively favorable agricultural resource base. Like its predecessors, the new Buhari government is unlikely to make effective investments in the agricultural sector. Moreover, Nigeria's severe financial crisis will limit any government development efforts over the next few years. [redacted]

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51. Nigeria does not currently receive any food aid and none is anticipated from Western governments in the immediate future. [redacted] the Buhari regime is aware that adequate food supplies, especially in urban areas, could be crucial to maintaining political stability, and will take steps to prevent critical shortages. Because of its already precarious financial position, Lagos can be expected to look to the West--particularly the United States--for commercial credits to fund its import requirements. Indeed, without foreign credits, Nigeria may not have enough foreign exchange this year to cover both its import needs--including food--and debt servicing costs. Unless the world oil market rebounds substantially over the next year, Nigeria's foreign exchange picture is not likely to improve dramatically over the near term even if the country carries through with debt-rescheduling plans and secures an IMF loan agreement. [redacted]

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East Africa

Ethiopia

52. Current Conditions: Despite reports of a better harvest this year, Ethiopia's domestic food position remains precarious. Although Addis Ababa is unwilling to release crop production figures, impressionistic evidence from foreign diplomats, international organizations, and private voluntary organizations indicates that good rains have led to increased output this year in the traditionally strongest producing regions of central Ethiopia. In addition, some 200,000 metric tons in carry-over stocks from last year's harvest are reportedly being held by the state marketing board, and about 30,000 metric tons of donated grain are being stored by the government's Refugee Rehabilitation Commission (RRC). [redacted]

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53. Nonetheless, harvests are poor again in several areas of the country and food shortages persist. In the strife-torn northern provinces of Eritrea and Tigray, and parts of Welo and Gondar, crops have been hit yet again by drought and civil war. Moreover, two consecutive years of little or no rain and overgrazing of pastoral lands by nomads have limited food production in southern Sidamo. As a result, some 3 to 4 million people in these areas--or about 10 percent of Ethiopia's population--continue to face food shortages, according to the Ethiopian government, and a large proportion--perhaps two-thirds, according to official estimates--are inaccessible because of bad security conditions and poor transportation.* The situation is further complicated by sizable refugee movements, both within country and cross-border. [redacted]

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54. Although donors have been responding to Ethiopia's food problems with substantial shipments of food aid, severe distribution and security problems have sharply limited the effectiveness of this assistance. Once food aid is unloaded at Ethiopia's two ports, Massawa--recently the major receiving point--or Assab, transshipment to inland distribution centers is often delayed. The official agencies responsible for disbursing food aid lack the trucks, funds, spare parts, tires, mechanics, managerial expertise, and--some donors suspect--the commitment to transport food inland effectively. [redacted]

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[redacted] indicated that of 120 trucks, only 10 percent were being utilized for relief efforts. One-third were inoperable, another third lacked proper documentation to move from one area to another, and the rest were involved in commercial transportation. As a result, private contractors are being used to fill some of the gap. Moreover, bad roads exacerbate the situation. [redacted]

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55. The deteriorating security situation in the northern provinces is compounding these problems. The road from Massawa to Asmara, the central distribution point in Eritrea province, often requires convoys, [redacted] as do all roads north, south, and west out of Asmara. Major arteries in Gondar, Welo, and Tigray also are unsafe without convoys, [redacted]

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* We have no independent confirmation of any of these figures. [redacted]

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and food distribution in Tigray is limited to population centers along the main road. [redacted]

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56. The reports of good harvests, the near closing of Assab port to food aid shipments, and the RRC's seeming inability to move grain have led some donors to question both Ethiopia's need for more food aid and the government's commitment to distribute shipments quickly and efficiently. Indeed, the general consensus among donors is that there is sufficient food in government controlled areas of the country and in the donor pipeline to satisfy the country's total needs for the remainder of 1984. In addition, [redacted]

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[redacted] several donors are annoyed by heavy fees for unloading, storage, fumigation, and transport services, and the government's unwillingness to account for its use of subsidies donated to help alleviate the transportation problems. As a result, the British, Dutch, French, West German, and Canadian representatives recently agreed to hold off on further food aid until Addis Ababa organizes its relief program more effectively. If donors become convinced later in the year that Ethiopia needs more food, however, the flows probably will begin again. Moreover, private voluntary organizations, such as Catholic Relief Services, and international organizations, such as the World Food Program, are continuing their relief efforts. [redacted]

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57. Outlook: Ethiopia will likely suffer from insufficient food production for the foreseeable future. Agricultural output will be limited by government efforts to collectivize the agricultural sector and active insurgencies that hamper food growing, harvesting, and distribution activities in the northern provinces. Moreover, severe soil erosion and depletion impair the prospects for a long-term recovery and periodic drought will likely create short-term food crises. [redacted]

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58. Farmers resist the establishment of state farms and peasant collectives. This situation is exacerbated by a lack of trained managers to oversee operations and Addis Ababa's consequent use of military officers--who are reluctant to identify themselves with rural interests and have no agricultural training --to administer farm policy. As a result, state and collective farms, despite being lavished with machinery, fertilizer, seed, and technology, generally have lower productivity than the average peasant holding. [redacted]

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59. Although there are some signs that the government has begun to show some flexibility toward the small individual farmer, Addis Ababa is not likely to provide enough incentives to increase production substantially. Stimulating food production would require some combination of greatly increased credit to the private farmer, sharply higher producer prices, enlarged access to agricultural inputs, improved technology, or expanded individual holdings. This would force the Ethiopian Government to reevaluate its ideologically inspired goals of collectivization and would necessitate greater investment in agriculture, probably at the expense of the military. Such decisions would be all the more difficult because the government stands little chance any time soon of spurring enough growth and diversification in the economy to improve its tight financial position. Moreover, the budgetary

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drain of the government's military campaigns limits the financial and technical support Addis Ababa is able to offer to agriculture. [redacted]

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60. Ethiopia will continue to need imported food, even in years of favorable weather, because the government's agricultural policies will continue to limit food production. Moreover, Ethiopia will probably not be able to afford commercial imports and will remain dependent on food aid. Western governments, private voluntary organizations, and multilateral institutions will continue to be the most important donors because the Soviets and their allies are not likely to furnish substantial amounts of food assistance. Even if food problems lead to increased domestic discontent, active opposition to the regime would be quickly squelched by the government's harsh security apparatus. [redacted]

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Kenya

61. Current Conditions: Despite some pockets of drought in the normally arid and semi-arid parts of the country, there are no reports of serious food shortages in Kenya. Some malnutrition exists in Kenya, but by African standards it is not severe. Major causes of malnourishment include lack of potable water, poor sanitation, poor education of mothers, and high population densities of infants and children. [redacted]

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62. Although some bad weather has cut Kenya's overall grain production moderately this crop year, imports are expected to remain at a fairly low level [redacted] Despite a 15-percent drop from last year's bumper harvest, the 1983/84 maize crop--estimated at about 2.1 million metric tons--is expected to cover domestic requirements as domestic stocks probably will cover any shortfall. Moreover, high stocks of rice (composed primarily of imports from previous years) will more than make up for production that is stagnating at about 20,000 to 27,000 metric tons annually. Indeed, overstocking is considered such a serious problem that the government apparently is thinking of exporting rice. [redacted]

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63. Wheat imports, however, are expected to increase this year because heavy rains during the harvest ruined almost 20 percent of the crop and pushed production to about the 1981/82 level of 210,000 metric tons estimated by USDA. Although much of the 100,000 to 130,000 metric tons of expected wheat purchases will come, at concessional terms, from the United States and the EC, [redacted] some commercial imports. Ironically, wheat imports are necessary in part because rising incomes have enabled Kenyans to shift some of their consumption away from corn toward more expensive wheat. [redacted]

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64. Sharply higher producer prices and generally favorable weather conditions have led to increased food output since 1981, but several constraints to improved production and distribution still exist. Productivity suffers from shortages of needed fuels, agricultural spare parts, seeds, and fertilizers caused by Kenya's foreign exchange crunch and inefficient internal distribution network. Credit shortages have persisted as the government struggles to cover large budget deficits and absorbs much of the available credit itself. Producer payments have been delayed under the bureaucratic parastatal system. This problem has at times been exacerbated by the government's efforts to postpone expenditures and reduce budget deficits in

accordance with IMF guidelines. The lack of adequate storage facilities and restrictive grain marketing procedures--which the government shows no signs of relaxing--have hampered food distribution efforts, while lack of coordination within the government has resulted in export commitments that often fail to take domestic consumption and stock requirements into account. [redacted]

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65. Outlook: Despite this year's fairly comfortable showing, Kenya faces the long-run challenge of trying to match food production with one of the world's highest population growth rates (over 4 percent annually). Because little undeveloped high-quality land remains, agricultural production is expanding onto marginal lands that are more susceptible to drought. Moreover, deforestation and resultant soil erosion are increasingly serious problems. However, the adoption of existing corn hybrids and improved cultivation techniques is far from complete, which offers some hope for higher yields. [redacted]

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66. The widespread Kenyan preference for large families makes population growth an intractable problem. Rural women, who are responsible for cultivation as well as household chores, need children to help with heavy workloads. Many Kenyans believe that having a large number of children increases the chance that one will succeed and bring economic benefits to the entire group. Moreover, a tribe's political power is related to tribal size, and any program to control fertility is likely to be perceived by Kenyans as an effort to weaken their particular group. Kenyan officials are beginning to devote increased attention to developing a family planning program, but it will take many years, at best, before population growth can be reduced significantly. [redacted]

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67. The government apparently has recognized the potential for future food shortages and, pushed by donor countries and multilateral organizations, has started to move toward providing incentives to rectify the problem. In an attempt to reduce subsidies and restrain domestic demand for food, Nairobi recently raised consumer prices for rice and increases for corn and wheat products may also be in the works. Producer prices also are being raised again, by 10 to 140 percent for the 1984/85 marketing year. Continuing budget problems, however, may well constrain the government's ability to make promised payments to farmers. Research efforts to improve food production, especially on marginal land, are being intensified. [redacted]

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68. Nonetheless, poor communication, lack of technical expertise, and a disinterest in long-term planning will interfere with the government's policy responses to Kenya's food challenge. In addition, Nairobi does not possess an adequate early-warning crop forecast system, and appears unable to collect, analyze, and release the important crop information necessary for successful planning exercises. [redacted]

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69. The need for food imports is likely to fluctuate in the near term, primarily in response to weather conditions. During years in which significant shortfalls occur, however, the government is likely to view food imports as critical, in large part to satisfy politically important urban consumers. Over the longer term, food deficits will be likely because of the rising demand from the burgeoning population. As a result, Kenya will be increasingly dependent on imported food and may periodically require food assistance. [redacted]

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Tanzania

70. Current Conditions: Tanzania's agricultural production has been devastated by government policies in the last decade. Production of export crops has fallen about 40 percent, and the quality of those crops has deteriorated sharply. Food production does not come close to meeting requirements even in years with good weather. The government marketing agencies have offered poor prices, and sometimes have failed to pay farmers at all. Black market prices often double or triple official food prices, while government roadblocks have attempted to seize any food moving to market through unofficial channels. Severe malnutrition affects about 5 to 10 percent of the population, according to village surveys. Only massive amounts of foreign aid and food imports have prevented desperate hunger. []

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71. The Nyerere government attempted to finance industrialization by taxing away a presumed agricultural surplus. In addition, most of the farmers were moved from their existing locations and collected in large Ujamaa villages--by force when necessary. The new villages were intended to facilitate farm modernization, but the government was unable to provide the projected services and equipment. Most of Tanzania's food production today comes from the individual garden plots of the Ujamaa villagers. Despite normal rainfall throughout most of the country, food production during the 1983/84 crop year is expected to meet only about 85 percent of Tanzania's food needs. []

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72. Because of foreign exchange difficulties, Dar es Salaam will probably depend on donor food aid to cover about 90 percent of the shortfall in production. According to a recent USDA estimate, the Tanzanian government so far in fiscal year 1984 is slated to receive about 234,000 metric tons of food aid (maize, wheat, and rice). Most of Tanzania's food assistance comes from OECD donor countries, particularly Australia, the EC, and Japan. A shortage of about 16,000 tons still exists, according to recent USDA estimates. []

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73. Emergency food distribution is not a major problem in Tanzania at present. Roads are passable and neither internal political or military struggles nor overwhelming problems of corruption impede delivery of emergency food supplies. Recurring gasoline shortages, however, will probably continue to cause transport bottlenecks. Tanzania's internal food distribution problems are largely caused by inappropriate government pricing policies and mismanagement by the major crop-purchasing authorities. []

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74. Outlook: Low agricultural production in the last several years is no reflection of Tanzania's agricultural potential. Population density is only 35 persons per square kilometer of cultivable land and, even though much of Tanzania receives unpredictable rainfall, there are areas of underutilized fertile soil on which a variety of export and food crops could grow. []

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75. Dar es Salaam's prospects for avoiding food shortages in the future depend greatly on the government's ability to provide incentives to farmers to increase commercial food production. Several recent measures taken include the payment of higher prices to farmers and the reestablishment of private cooperatives to take over some of the responsibilities of inefficient national marketing organizations. In addition, the government expects to improve

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internal food distribution by lifting the ban on movement of grain across district lines by local traders. Meanwhile, to boost field crop and livestock production, President Nyerere this year doubled agriculture's share of the country's development budget. []

76. These reforms alone, however, are unlikely to improve performance significantly. Distribution of agricultural equipment and fertilizers is still handled by incompetent government-run boards; potential foreign investors remain skeptical of investments in Tanzanian agriculture; increasing producer prices for maize while keeping ceilings on consumer prices will merely increase budget deficits; and farmers will probably continue to sell their products on the more lucrative black market. []

77. Tanzania's severe financial strains play a major role in dampening growth in the agricultural sector. Foreign currency is so scarce in Tanzania that even though almost 50 percent of the country's export earnings are allocated for purchases of farm machines and equipment, severe shortages still persist. In addition, Dar es Salaam's difficulties in obtaining imported oil and gasoline products at harvest time frequently cause harvesting and delivery of crops to grind to a halt. Moreover, because of a lack of imported insecticides, borer worms annually destroy a large portion of Tanzania's grain crops. []

78. Government efforts to increase foreign exchange revenues available for food imports by boosting and diversifying the output of cash crops are likely to achieve only limited success. Dar es Salaam's continuing emphasis on mechanization in a country where 85 percent of the key export crops-- coffee, cotton, tobacco, sisal, cashews, and cloves--are produced on plots of 10 hectares is unlikely to prove feasible and is seriously constrained by the inability to import machinery and equipment. Further, institutional hurdles inhibit farmers' ability to obtain credit, purchase seeds and other inputs, and market crops. [] the scarcity of qualified personnel in both research and extension services suggests that effective research will require outside technical assistance for at least 10 years. []

79. Dar es Salaam's inability to meet all of its food needs through local production and imports is likely to cause Tanzania to turn to the United States and other Western donors for additional food assistance in the future-- even in years of normal rainfall, such as 1984 appears to be. This dependence on OECD-member food support--as well as other official aid programs--will probably allow the West limited success in pressing Tanzania to make needed reforms. Nyerere's presidency is becoming increasingly threatened as Tanzanians in growing numbers blame him personally for the deteriorating economic situation. As long as Nyerere is president, however, it is unlikely that Tanzania will move far from his commitment to a largely government-run economy. []

Southern Africa

Mozambique

80. Current Conditions: Before typhoon Domoina and subsequent torrential rains struck southern Mozambique in late January/early February,

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causing an unprecedented natural disaster, Mozambique was experiencing its third season of severe drought. According to the FAO, Mozambique is among the worst-hit of African countries with emergency food shortages. Drought in the previous two growing seasons (from November to April)--including an almost complete failure of the March 1983 crop--has already affected about 4 million people, and domestic food stocks had become depleted by last November. [redacted]

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81. About 1.8 million people--primarily in the major southern food producing regions of Gaza and Inhambane Provinces--are dependent on emergency food relief. Sofala, Manica, and Maputo Provinces also have been seriously affected. In addition, the food and health situation is also serious in the cities, where food is rationed by the inefficient, government-controlled distribution system. [redacted]

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82. According to [redacted] reports, 100,000 people may have died in 1982-83 because of drought. Severe malnutrition is prevalent throughout the southern region and deaths, especially of children, continue daily. About 70 percent of the national cattle herd is located in the south where up to 15,000 head may be dying each month. Poor animal condition has sharply curtailed cattle sales, exacerbating already serious nutritional deficiencies. [redacted]

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83. Flooding from the typhoon further devastated cattle herds and destroyed what would have been the first harvest in three years of corn, rice, and sorghum--the main food crops--for over 350,000 people living mostly on private and family farms in the south. The typhoon destroyed dams and pumping stations vital to the limited irrigation system as well as washed out roads and bridges, thereby impeding relief efforts. Moreover, the storm winds did extensive damage to citrus, coconut, and cashew crops in Inhambane province. The recovery of such tree crops will take years which, in the case of an export crop such as cashews, will reduce foreign exchange earnings. [redacted]

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84. Chronic shortages of foreign exchange--exacerbated by drought and storm damage--preclude commercial purchases of seeds and foodgrains and underscore dependence on aid. Effects of the typhoon probably have boosted Mozambique's food aid requirement for the period through April 1985 from about 500,000 tons to as much as 700,000 tons, including nearly 200,000 tons needed by April 1984. In 1984, the United States has committed more emergency food aid to Mozambique than has any other donor nation, and more than it has committed to any other African country. [redacted]

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85. In addition to immediate food assistance, according to the FAO, there is a pressing need for seeds and other inputs for the next planting seasons: corn seeds and fertilizer by October, and vegetable seeds by April for the off-season planting and by November for the main crop. Domestic seed stocks have been depleted as a result of multiple replantings caused by fickle weather over the past two years. After the typhoon it was too late for replanting of major grain crops even if seed had been available, because the rainy season ends in February. [redacted]

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86. Although the Machel regime appears committed to meeting the food emergency, its resources for management and logistical support for famine relief are almost nonexistent, [redacted] thereby limiting the effectiveness of international aid efforts. Mozambican ports will be

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unable to handle an influx of food shipments unless arrivals are scheduled carefully. Although Mozambique has for the first time arranged for the participation of private international relief organizations, few vehicles are available to bring food to rural villages and distribution centers where and when it is needed. Moreover, susceptibility to attack by insurgents of the South African-backed National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO) has necessitated the protection of supply convoys by troops and armored vehicles. Even then they are tempting targets, especially since the guerrillas have specifically targetted government food stocks in order to support themselves, and acquire food for distribution to peasants to win their support. (S)

87. Outlook: Mozambique suffers almost continuously from drought in some areas and floods in others. Nonetheless, although severe weather conditions account for the currently acute food crisis, Mozambique's food problems also are chronic because of deeper causes--the effects of eight years of government mismanagement and policy failure, and a growing insurgency.

88. For the 80 to 90 percent of Mozambique's population engaged in family subsistence farming, the government has continued its policy of "socialization of the countryside" which encourages the formation of communal villages and agricultural cooperatives. Last year, partly in an effort to control urban crime, Maputo announced "Operation Production", a plan for the forced resettlement of the urban unemployed to rural communal villages, especially in the north. Most such villages, however, have been created to house refugees from RENAMO attacks and drought rather than to improve farm output. Moreover, because of declines in production and in world prices for sugar and cashews, the government lacks the resources to support these villages with needed inputs for successful agricultural production, and cooperative farms have taken a backseat to state farms in the allocation of what few resources have been available.

89. The large, state farms, which the regime created as its most important agricultural objective, have been a failure. Even in the period from 1979 to 1981, immediately before the onset of sustained drought, Mozambique was importing over 30 percent of its foodgrain requirement. State farms have come under strong fire from some in the leadership for their mismanagement and failure to meet production targets. As a result, the fourth congress of the ruling FRELIMO party, held in early 1983, supported a shift toward more pragmatic policies and away from antipathy toward private enterprise. [redacted] efforts to revitalize the private commercial and agricultural sectors have been stymied so far by major obstacles, especially the insurgency problem, and little progress has been made.

90. In addition to the effects of natural disasters and policy failure, the Mozambican economy and the food relief effort have been seriously damaged by the RENAMO insurgency which operates in nine of the country's 10 provinces. Guerrilla attacks have disrupted the country's rail and road transport, agricultural production and marketing, and its economic links with neighboring Zimbabwe. The attacks have left the transport infrastructure in almost total disarray, and travel in most of the country is difficult and dangerous.

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91. Poor transport, weak marketing, and insurgent activity have reduced the normal food surplus in the north, [redacted] and guerrilla attacks have transformed the once food abundant central provinces--a traditional insurgent stronghold--into deficit regions. Moreover, Maputo has been unable to move small northern grain surpluses to deficit areas in the south because of poor transport facilities. Ground transport has been so disrupted that the government has had to resort to distributing food aid by sea to small coastal ports where many refugees from the interior have gathered after abandoning their farms because of insurgent attacks, drought, and the recent flooding. In addition, since mid-1983, well over 100,000 other Mozambicans have fled to Zimbabwe seeking food and relief from effects of the insurgency. The number of such refugees is reportedly growing daily. [redacted]

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92. Better weather for the 1984/85 growing season could improve agricultural output significantly, but not enough to eliminate completely Mozambique's food deficit and its dependence on international food aid. Several successive good harvests may be necessary before seed stocks can be rebuilt. [redacted]

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93. Prospects are dim in the near to medium term for overall agricultural recovery because economic mismanagement, the lingering as well as recurring effects of weather damage, and the likely disruptive impact of RENAMO--despite the recently concluded security agreement with South Africa--are all obstacles that the regime has shown itself unable to overcome. Moreover, Maputo's efforts to attract Western assistance to halt agricultural decline are unlikely to enjoy much success as long as the RENAMO insurgency remains active. [redacted]

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South Africa

94. Current Conditions: The return of good and widespread rains in late 1983 appeared to signal the end of what had become South Africa's worst drought of the century, and marked a promising beginning to the 1983/84 crop year. By late January, however, a recurrence of midseason drought began to wither crops in the principal corn areas in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Official projections of the corn harvest that begins in April have been revised progressively downward in recent weeks as rains have failed during key stages of crop development. Estimates that had been as high as 9.5 million tons in early January have now dropped as low as 2.7 million tons, marking an agricultural disaster of unprecedented proportions. Substantial imports of corn--perhaps exceeding 4 million tons--will be necessary as South African enters the current harvest without carry-over stocks from last year. Moreover, imports at this level will clog South African ports and inhibit its ability to transship food destined for other countries in the region, most of which are heavily dependent on South African transportation facilities. [redacted]

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95. The recent recurrence of drought marks South Africa's third successive year of failing rains and declining agricultural output since the record corn harvest in 1981 of 14.6 million tons. Moderate drought conditions reduced the output of corn--the dietary staple of South Africa's 22 million blacks--to 8.4 million tons in 1982. This was still well above the roughly 7.3 million tons usually needed for annual domestic consumption, about 50 percent of which is for animal feed. [redacted]

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96. Drought worsened dramatically in 1982/83, however, depressing the corn harvest to the lowest level since 1973. At about 4 million tons, the crop was well below domestic requirements. Over 1 million tons of reserve stocks were depleted and about 2.3 million tons of corn had to be imported--the first time in 31 years that South Africa was a net importer of corn. Wheat, which relies on irrigation, was also hard-hit as dams and boreholes dried up, leading to the first major wheat imports in a decade. Oilseed crops--peanuts, sunflowerseed, and cottonseed--failed badly and would have caused a serious protein shortfall except for substantial imports. The drought was blamed for over half of the more than 3-percent decline in real GDP experienced by South Africa. [redacted]

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97. Despite a second successive year of food deficit, South Africa has had sufficient foreign exchange for commercial imports to ensure that no aggregate food shortage occurs. South Africa's blacks, however, bear a disproportionate share of the localized food shortages that do occur. Moreover, tight food supplies aggravated double digit inflation last year and are likely to do the same this year. Even though blacks are able to purchase corn meal and bread at subsidized prices, those prices have risen recently and blacks spend a higher proportion of their incomes on food. [redacted]

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98. Conditions in South Africa's black homelands--squalid and poverty-stricken regions under the best of conditions--are deteriorating further from drought. [redacted] peasant subsistence crops failed last year and livestock losses were massive--probably over 700,000 head. In addition to the immediate consequences of drought, the long-term effects may be even more serious. The substantial loss of animals has a double effect in the homelands where cattle are used not only for food but a source of farm power. Recovery of livestock herds and grazing land will take years. [redacted]

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99. Drought has also deprived many rural blacks of their usual source of cash income from casual labor on white farms, and caused malnutrition and disease to rise sharply. The forced return of millions of urban blacks to their homelands in recent years--exacerbated by a recession-induced increase in unemployment--has further curtailed cash remittances that many homeland residents rely upon for the purchase of food and other necessities, as well as causing overcrowding on the land. The full extent of drought-induced malnutrition is not known, however, as there are no reliable countrywide statistics. The government is perceived, probably correctly, as being insensitive to the food situation in the black homelands. No official data are kept on food production in the homelands, and therefore the extent of food shortfall in subsistence agriculture is not known. [redacted]

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100. Although the government imported food last year to bridge the gap in commercial production, no such effort was made to make up the shortfall in subsistence output. Since most observers in South Africa estimate that one-third of the homeland population of 12 million feeds itself with subsistence crops, it is possible that up to 4 million blacks have been without their normal source of nutrition since last year's crops failed. Pretoria provided over \$18 million last year in emergency relief funds to nonindependent homelands, but most of the aid was used for water projects rather than food relief. Some aid was also given to so-called independent homelands, such as Ciskei. The major food relief effort, however, has been mounted by a variety

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of domestic and international private voluntary organizations whose work is continuing. [redacted]

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101. Outlook: South Africa's high levels of corn output before 1983 have been the result of favorable weather and government agricultural policies that combine price incentives and subsidized inputs for domestic production and subsidies for exports. These policies reflect the political importance of the conservative white farmers who grow the corn, but also have been part of a deliberate attempt to sustain, for security reasons, a white presence in economically marginal farming areas bordered by South Africa's black neighbors. [redacted]

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102. Drought has called some of these policies into question. Even though commercial farmers in South Africa are resilient and able to take advantage of improved weather to sharply increase output, a recovery of production and export capacity faces other key obstacles:

- Following the disastrous harvest in 1983, South Africa's white commercial farmers were left with a daunting debt burden--well over \$1 billion, according to press reports--that caused the government to intervene with a variety of assistance measures. These included stretching of loan repayments and the extension of substantial new credit at subsidized rates. Many farms have, nevertheless, gone out of business, and the return of drought this year is prompting official concern about the long-term impact on white farming in the main growing areas.
- Drought has reduced surface and ground water levels so severely that irrigation capacity is likely to take at least another season to recover, assuming reasonable rainfall.
- Even South Africa has barely been able to expand production to keep pace with rapid population growth. Per capita food production increased by only 2 percent for the whole of the 1970s, according to the FAO. [redacted]

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103. Because of the severity of drought this year, South Africa's commercial farmers face an unprecedented financial squeeze that many will be unable to survive. The government will be forced to import record amounts of corn, and perhaps wheat--much of both from the United States--and will be hard-pressed to minimize the wider damage that is inevitable as the effects of agricultural collapse ripple through the economy. There is little that Pretoria will be able to do, except to hope for the return of normal rains again in October and November for the next planting season. [redacted]

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104. Crop failure this year also means no South African corn exports to other African states.* Moreover, any future surplus over domestic consumption needs, perhaps up 2 million tons, probably would be retained in any event in an effort to rebuild domestic reserve stocks. Even after exportable surpluses become available, few countries in the region will be able to pay for

*See the boxed insert following paragraph 9.

commercial imports, and South Africa will not likely provide food aid on a grant basis. [redacted]

105. South Africa's black homelands will be another claimant on tight food supplies. Even if drought subsides, pockets of hunger and malnutrition will persist there, and conditions will not improve much without a sustained recovery in the South African economy. There is severe overcrowding on the little land that is suitable for cultivation in the homelands, and the residents--mostly women, children, and the elderly--will continue to depend heavily on remittances from men working in white South Africa. [redacted]

Zimbabwe

106. Current Conditions: Zimbabwe is among the countries hardest hit by drought in the region this year. Three successive years of drought--with a countrywide incidence this year and last year--have sharply reduced the output of corn (the dietary staple), depleted carry-over stocks, killed over 300,000 cattle, destroyed grass cover on grazing land, and seriously lowered surface and ground water levels. As a result, food shortages emerged in several areas last year, forcing the government to begin an emergency food and drought relief program--supplied out of domestic grain stocks--for about 1 million people. The number dependent on such relief already approaches 3 million. Domestic corn stocks will run out in April. The relief program has thus far cost Harare \$118 million, much of which has had to be taken from the government's development programs. Demands for relief have become so great that rationing of corn was introduced in October 1983 for the first time. [redacted]

107. Crop failures have been most severe in the normally food self-sufficient areas of the country, including the commercial growing areas of the north. Unirrigated peasant crops are the most susceptible to damage. About 80 percent of Zimbabwe's normal corn output of about 2.5 million tons is usually produced by white commercial farmers, with the rest coming from black subsistence farmers who retain most of their crop for their own consumption. Both types of producers have been responsive to strong price incentives provided by the government-controlled grain marketing board to induce market deliveries. Moreover, Harare has taken steps over the last two years to remove or in some cases eliminate altogether subsidies on domestic food consumption in order to rationalize production and consumption decisions. This year the government has announced early delivery incentive payments for corn in an effort to accelerate the harvest as stocks run out in April, but such incentives have no effect on production levels. [redacted]

108. The effects of drought, however, have overwhelmed these price incentives. The farmers' cash crunch--already severe last year--is likely to require liberalization of credit policy and rescheduling of debts. Drought conditions have been most prolonged and severe in the normally low rainfall, livestock raising areas in the south and west, including all of dissident-plagued Matabeleland. Peasant farmers are losing thousands of cattle each month, depriving them of an important source of power as well as income, while white commercial ranchers also face losses because of insufficient water and feedstock. In addition to drought and financial problems, white farmers in Matabeleland--the backbone of commercial livestock production--face repeated armed attacks at the hands of antigovernment dissidents that the authorities have been unable to control. As a result, many farms have been abandoned and

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others are less than fully operational because they are run by absentee owners who have moved away for safety. Additionally, there are indications that the government has withheld food aid to Matabeland as part of its program to suppress dissident activity. [redacted]

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109. Meanwhile, Mozambicans seeking refuge from the insurgency and drought in their own country are placing additional strains on Zimbabwean food supplies. There are currently between 120,000 and 180,000 Mozambicans in eastern Zimbabwe, [redacted] a number that has risen dramatically in recent months and is expected to grow. [redacted]

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110. Outlook: Despite record plantings last November in response to the government's guaranteed minimum preplanting producer prices, prospects for the harvest in April are extremely poor. The rains--which came late for planting --began to fail again in January and overall have been less than half of normal. The most optimistic of recent official projections call for a wheat crop about half its normal level and a total corn crop--including subsistence production--of one million tons. Although this matches last year's crop, 1 million tons of carryover stocks were available then. No more than about 650,000 tons of corn are expected to be delivered to market this year, with the rest retained on-farm. Market demand, however, is normally about 1.2 million tons and will be higher this year because of the government's food relief program. Thus, Zimbabwe faces a shortfall that will almost certainly exceed 550,000 tons and may reach 750,000 tons between now and the harvest in April 1985. This year's corn crop is likely to be used up by October. [redacted]

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111. Until last year, Zimbabwe had large surpluses of commercial corn available for export. This has enabled it to sell corn to 12 black African countries, with substantial amounts going to Zambia and Zaire. Export sales totaled 238,000 tons in 1981 and 348,000 tons in 1982, according to official statistics. Although production last year was below domestic demand, some exports were possible because of 1 million tons of carry-over stocks from 1982. Zimbabwe provided over 159,000 tons of corn to its neighbors in 1983, including grants of 25,000 tons each to Tanzania and Mozambique. This year, however, no exports will be possible, but significant amounts of Zimbabwean corn are reportedly being smuggled into Mozambique. [redacted]

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112. For the next year at least, Zimbabwe will be critically dependent on Western and multilateral food aid. The greatest need will begin to be felt by October as domestic stocks from this year's expected poor harvest are exhausted. Harare is likely to look to the United States as a principal donor of food assistance. [redacted]

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113. Even if adequate rains occur for the next planting season beginning in November 1984, other factors will affect the extent of recovery in food production and export capacity. Zimbabwe's large commercial farms are capable of a rapid recovery but will require relief from their credit squeeze and debt burden. In addition, shortages of foreign exchange will inhibit the purchase of imported inputs such as fertilizer and machinery. Harare probably will also want to rebuild food reserves before undertaking exports. Zimbabwe's export potential is, in any event, dwarfed by that of South Africa and insufficient by itself to satisfy the level of regional food requirements that is likely to prevail even if the drought ends. [redacted]

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