



Directorate of  
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# Africa Review



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3 October 1986

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**Africa Review**

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**Africa Review**



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**Articles**

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**The OAU: Sassou-Nguesso  
at the Helm**



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Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso probably will try to use his chairmanship of the OAU (Organization of African Unity) to project himself as an arbiter of African disputes and to ease some of the organization's internal tensions, in our view. Sassou, however, is a Marxist who is not as politically acceptable to African moderates or as diplomatically smooth as his predecessor, Senegalese President Diouf. We believe that under Sassou's leadership the OAU probably will become bogged down on the South African issue and will devote less attention to pressing economic concerns focused on by Diouf. There is potential, however, for positive developments during the next year, given Libya's increasing isolation within the OAU and Sassou's efforts to broker the Chadian conflict.

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*Congolese President and Current OAU  
Chairman Denis Sassou-Nguesso*



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
**South Africa**

The OAU summit in July, capitalizing on growing international pressures for sanctions against South Africa, reissued a call for sanctions and condemned nations that maintain relations with Pretoria. Delegates advocated tough measures but failed to adopt mandatory economic sanctions and did not criticize OAU members who retain substantial economic ties to Pretoria. The United States and the United Kingdom both came under fire for failing to enact sanctions, and Washington was criticized for its support of UNITA and its policies toward Namibia.

*About 42 years old . . . President and Chairman of Council of Ministers since 1979, and Minister of Defense since 1977 . . . has moderated his Marxist views in recent years but remains an African nationalist strongly committed to Third World causes . . .*

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The summit surfaced several new proposals for the treatment of South Africa, according to US Embassy reporting:

- African leaders discussed denying air and sea landing rights to traffic bound to or from South Africa, and many states—some of which are used by South Africa for these purposes—are currently considering the feasibility of such denials.

- The concept of an African defense force to train and otherwise assist African National Congress guerrillas was adopted, despite the difficulties posed by ethnic and language diversities, logistic and funding problems, and the vulnerability of the Frontline States to South African retaliation.

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- An ad hoc heads-of-state committee led by the OAU chairman was created to keep the OAU apprised of fast-moving events.
- The heads of state agreed to make antiapartheid campaigns the theme for the 1986/87 school year in Africa. [redacted]

OAU leaders, with support from other Third World statesmen, also managed to make South Africa the prime issue of discussion at the recent Nonaligned Movement meeting in Harare. Although most Nonaligned Movement members have little interest in the South African question, the choice of a Frontline State leader, Zimbabwean Prime Minister Mugabe, as chairman indicates that the organization will pay increasing attention to South Africa in the next year. Mugabe actively pushed for sanctions at the Commonwealth meeting in early August, and the Nonaligned summit echoed the OAU summit's calls. [redacted]

We believe that Sassou will be responsive to OAU member states' demands that South Africa remain the organization's priority issue and will work toward wider support for the OAU's position in other multinational organizations. The OAU is likely to intensify its posturing on sanctions—and criticism of the United States and the United Kingdom, in particular—while at the same time requesting Western aid to alleviate the negative economic repercussions of possible South African countermeasures. [redacted]

**Chad**

Sassou has been unsuccessful thus far in his efforts to broker the Chadian problem, but we believe he will continue to try to bring about a settlement during his tenure as OAU chairman. In our view, Sassou has a realistic grasp of the Chadian situation and is aware that rebel leader Goukouni is strongly influenced by Tripoli. He probably also realizes that Libya must be involved in a solution and thus may try to work outside the OAU framework because the OAU does not publicly acknowledge Libyan aggression in Chad. [redacted]

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*Chadian Rebel Leader Goukouni Oueddei*



Sygma ©

*Leader of Government of National Unity insurgency with longstanding ties to Libya . . . held succession of positions in three Chadian coalition governments in 1979 and was President of Chad from 1979 to 1982 before being toppled by Habre .* [redacted]

[redacted] . a Muslim . . . in his early forties. [redacted]

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[redacted] Goukouni's failure to show up for OAU-sponsored talks in Brazzaville with Chadian President Habre may have tarnished his standing among OAU members. [redacted]

[redacted] Habre found the OAU more favorably disposed toward his government during the recent summit than at any other time. Nevertheless, he is critical of the extension of the OAU's mandate to mediate Chadian national reconciliation and was especially displeased with the summit's brief consideration of an unpassed resolution that appeared to call for the cessation of French military aid to N'Djamena. [redacted]

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**Chadian President Hissene Habre**



*Pictorial Parade*

*President of civil-war-torn Chad since 1982 . . . served in Chadian provisional governments in 1978 and 1979 but withdrew from government to lead opposition in 1980 . . . strong-willed, competent military leader but lacks across-the-board national support despite his accommodation of many opposition groups . . . faces discontent in south and isolated northern region . . . reliant on French military support to maintain position in northern Chad against rebels . . . has offered to meet and reconcile with rebels . . . implacably hostile toward Libya . . . educated in France . . . in his early forties . . . has great courage and physical endurance.* [redacted]

The US Embassy in Brazzaville recently reported that Sassou and other African heads of state have already received letters from Habre asking that the OAU conciliation committee discontinue its efforts. Habre's apparent attempt to cease cooperation with the OAU's mediation efforts will complicate Sassou's task of finding a settlement. The OAU committee, established in 1977, has yet to bring the two parties together for comprehensive negotiations. [redacted]

**Libya: Perennial OAU Troublemaker**

Conflicts between OAU member states often have been intensified by the radical policies of Libyan strongman Qadhafi—as evidenced by Libyan involvement in Chad—but recent events may allow

Sassou to work toward an easing of tensions within the OAU. While Sassou will have to deal with Libya's efforts to draw the OAU into Tripoli's feud with the United States, we believe that Qadhafi is beginning to lose the substantial influence he has had over the organization in the past several years. The contradiction between the OAU's policy of refusing to condemn a member state and Libya's often erratic and disturbing conduct, however, will continue to belie the private anti-Libyan sentiments of many member states. [redacted]

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Since the US bombing raid in April on Tripoli and Banghazi, Libya appears to be increasingly isolated within the OAU [redacted] For the first time, Libyan-supported terrorism was mentioned at the OAU—in a stinging verbal attack by Zaire in the council of ministers' meeting preceeding the summit in July—and criticism of Tripoli was greeted with applause and jokes during the ministerial meeting. Libya's statement at the same meeting received no applause for the first time, according to the US Embassy in Cairo. [redacted]

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Although Libya won approval for a resolution condemning the April raid, a number of OAU members took advantage of new procedures and issued written reservations. We believe that, although the issue was old news by the time of the summit—Qadhafi had failed in previous efforts to convene a special ministerial meeting to condemn the United States—Tripoli was able to push the resolution through by capitalizing on the emotionally charged atmosphere of the South African sanctions discussions and condemnations of Western support for Pretoria. [redacted]

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We believe Qadhafi's derision of the Nonaligned Movement at that organization's summit in Harare in late August also has eroded his popularity with African leaders. The Libyan leader's denunciation of the Nonaligned Movement and the OAU as ineffective and his public intention to establish his own movement of progressive and anti-US countries received wide press coverage. Reaction to his speech

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was almost uniformly negative, particularly among the Frontline States who saw his words as an attempt to shift the summit's attention away from the key South African issue, [redacted]

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**Outlook**

Sassou, pressured by the Frontline States and bolstered by the OAU's success in making South Africa the key issue at the Nonaligned summit, will work to make South Africa an even more internationally visible issue and will probably give less attention to the Africa-wide economic issues that preoccupied his predecessor. Vociferous name-calling against the West is likely to persist under his leadership, and calls for sanctions will not abate as African nations consider their own—albeit limited—options for action against Pretoria. [redacted]

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We believe, however, that the OAU's ineptitude and political infighting will continue to hamper the organization's effectiveness. At the same time, conflict within the OAU may be softened by Qadhafi's loss of influence and Sassou's growing reputation—if he sincerely attempts to deal with the intractable Chadian conflict—as a realistic mediator.

[redacted]  
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[redacted]  
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## Ethiopia-Somalia: Solution to the Ogaden Issue Unlikely

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Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu and Somali President Siad met in Djibouti last January and agreed to seek a political settlement to the longstanding Ogaden dispute. Mogadishu's irredentist claim to the eastern Ethiopian region has resulted in one major war, several large-scale clashes, and countless border incidents over the last 25 years. Ethiopian and Somali delegations have met twice since January but have been unable to agree on an agenda for the talks. Although additional meetings probably will take place over the next few months, we believe it unlikely that the two sides will make any progress toward solving the border problem.

### Background

The Ogaden issue reflects the continuing clash of ethnic, religious, and political views. In part, it is an outgrowth of centuries of struggle between Ethiopia's Christian highland population and the Muslim lowlanders. Today it has evolved into a conflict in which two nation-states lack the political will to reach a peaceful solution to their differences. Ethiopia stresses the Organization of African Unity (OAU) principle of respect for each state's territorial integrity and considers ethnicity a hindrance to nation building, while Somalia, seeking to obtain Somali-inhabited territory, emphasizes ethnic unity and regards the Ogaden as an integral part of Somalia's economic and social systems. Mogadishu consistently appeals to the principle of self-determination, out of a conviction that the inhabitants of the Ogaden region would prefer political association with Somalia.

The roots of the dispute date back to the late 19th-century expansion of Ethiopia in the region, which up to that time had rarely experienced Ethiopian dominance. Ethiopia's expansion to approximately its present eastern and southern boundaries received international recognition in treaties that the Ethiopians signed during the late 1890s and early 1900s with the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, all of which held territory on the Somali coast. Mogadishu has never accepted the legality of these

treaties and contends they were concluded by the colonial powers without consulting the Somalis. Mogadishu claims the agreements with Ethiopia violated the colonial protectorate treaties signed in the 1880s by the colonial powers and Somali tribes.<sup>1</sup>

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In 1963, at the founding meeting of the OAU, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie strengthened his hold on the Ogaden by using his stature as one of Africa's elder statesmen to win the organization's endorsement of existing national boundaries. This move effectively negated Somalia's claim to the Ogaden region, which Mogadishu had been actively pursuing since gaining its independence in 1960. Mogadishu, while signing the OAU charter, appended a reservation to the portion dealing with the recognition of existing borders, arguing that it did not apply to the Ogaden because Ethiopia had colonized it in much the same manner that European powers had colonized other parts of Africa.

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The revolutionary regime of Chairman Mengistu, which came to power in 1977 following the overthrow of Haile Selassie in 1974, has relentlessly asserted Addis Ababa's claim to the Ogaden. Since repulsing the Somali invasion in 1977 and 1978—with the help of approximately 17,000 Cuban troops and a broad array of Soviet weapons—Ethiopia has established and maintained clear-cut military control in the region.

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### Previous Negotiation Attempts

Various parties have attempted over the years to find a diplomatic solution to the Ogaden issue. The United Kingdom, which was the military administrator of the

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<sup>1</sup> Portions of the border defined in the various treaties are vague and contradictory. For example, the Ethiopian border with the former Italian Somaliland has never been demarcated and remains a provisional administrative line that was drawn in 1948 by the United Kingdom.

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Ogaden from 1941 until 1948, tried on several occasions but was stymied by Haile Selassie's refusal to make any concession on the border. The United States also tried its hand in the 1940s, but the acquisition of access rights to the Kagnev communication complex in northern Ethiopia in 1953 resulted in Washington's supporting Addis Ababa on the issue. In May 1973, the OAU created a Good Offices Committee under the chairmanship of Nigeria to mediate Ethiopian-Somali differences over the Ogaden. The committee, however, reflected the predisposition of the OAU itself by reaffirming the inviolability of frontiers, in effect recognizing the Ogaden as a part of Ethiopia. Finally, at a 1977 meeting in South Yemen, Cuban President Castro failed in an effort to sell a Soviet proposal for creating a federation of socialist states in the region, including Ethiopia, Somalia, South Yemen, and Eritrea. [redacted]

**The Current Talks**

We believe that the leaders of both countries, given the changed political situations within their borders, may now see it in their interests to maintain a dialogue. Siad probably recognizes that the military balance is clearly in Ethiopia's favor and that Mogadishu is unable to challenge Addis Ababa's dominance over the Ogaden. US Embassy and [redacted] indicates that most senior Somali military leaders now realize that the West—particularly the United States—will not provide sufficient weapons to rebuild the military to its 1977 level. At the same time, many government officials and military officers have grown weary of pursuing the Ogaden cause because the insurgent group that speaks for the Ogadeni—the Western Somali Liberation Front—is reluctant to conduct military operations. According to one US Embassy official, a senior Somali general recently criticized several Ogaden spokesmen for succumbing to the relatively easy life of Mogadishu rather than undergoing the rigors of guerrilla warfare in the harsh Ogaden. Some Somali officials also may believe that Ethiopia's intention to grant autonomy to its ethnic groups, as stated in its draft constitution, can provide the basis for a negotiated settlement. [redacted]

The US Embassy reports that Siad also believes that reconciliation talks will result in a reduction of Ethiopian support to Somali dissidents based in Ethiopia. While the two insurgent groups—the

Somali National Movement and the Somali Democratic Salvation Front—pose little threat to the Siad regime, their cross-border raids point out the Army's weaknesses and exacerbate security problems, especially in northern Somalia. Indeed, there is some evidence that the talks have resulted in Addis Ababa's ending its active support for the insurgents' raids, although Ethiopia continues its logistic support to and training of Somali dissidents. [redacted]

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For his part, Mengistu probably hopes to obtain Somali recognition of the de facto frontier. A border agreement would permit Mengistu to reduce his military forces in the Ogaden and possibly to redeploy troops to engage the more persistent and threatening Eritrean and Tigrean insurgencies in northern Ethiopia. At a minimum, he probably believes there is little risk in meeting with the Somalis, especially because he can increase the pressure on Mogadishu at any time. [redacted]

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Since the Mengistu-Siad meeting last January, the joint ad hoc committee has failed to establish an agenda because the Somalis want to work on confidence-building measures—such as prisoner exchanges and the resumption of diplomatic relations—while Ethiopia insists on tackling the border issue first. Both sides have agreed to meet again in Addis Ababa, although a date has not been set. [redacted]

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**Outlook**

Talks between Ethiopia and Somalia probably will continue but are unlikely to produce any meaningful results over the near term. Siad cannot recognize the border because of strong residual domestic opposition to such a move, although most Somalis appear to support a reduction in tension. Mengistu, for his part, is unlikely to make any real concessions because the Ethiopians hold the political and military advantages. Sporadic meetings probably will continue to take place over the next few months, and some minor arrangements—such as a prisoner exchange—may result. We believe the process will eventually draw to a halt, however, and Addis Ababa, aware of its superior military might, may decide that military pressure is the best way to achieve its goals. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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**Angola: Supplemental Sources of Military Aid** [redacted]

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Luanda has recently negotiated several arms deals with non-Communist suppliers. While they probably are intended to encourage limited competition for the Communist Bloc arms monopoly and to display an image of nonalignment, these transactions are not likely to lessen Angola's military dependence on Moscow. [redacted]

ammunition from Portugal; transport aircraft from Spain; and vehicles from West Germany and Sweden.

[redacted] Angolan officials have expressed an interest in finding Western firms willing to sell military equipment to Angola as an alternative to Soviet Bloc suppliers. [redacted]

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**Leading Non-Communist Suppliers**

Brazil has become Angola's largest non-Communist supplier of military equipment as part of Brasilia's aggressive campaign to expand sales to Third World markets. Earlier this year, an Angolan military and economic delegation visited Brazil to sign credit agreements with the Bank of Brazil and ENGESA, the country's largest military manufacturer. Thus far, Brazil's arms sales to Angola have consisted primarily of military trucks and jeeps worth about \$130 million, [redacted] More recently, Luanda has purchased two maritime patrol aircraft and is expressing interest in buying more sophisticated items such as armored vehicles and patrol boats. [redacted]

**Motives**

[redacted] Angolan [redacted]

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[redacted] military officials believe military equipment provided by the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is more expensive than comparable Western equipment and, with declining oil revenues and resulting hard currency shortages, equipment costs are becoming an increasingly important factor. Second, experience with Soviet Bloc equipment has led to dissatisfaction among the Angolan military with the quality of the hardware. The poor performance of Soviet equipment in Libya against the US military has further pointed out the relative ineffectiveness—in Angolan eyes—of Soviet hardware against modern Western forces. [redacted]

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In addition to providing military hardware, Brazil is making inroads in advisory and technical fields. ENGESA recently negotiated a \$130 million contract to take over Angola's central vehicle repair base near Luanda, previously run by Soviet and Cuban technicians. The repair facility reconditions the Angolan military's trucks and heavy-lift and armored vehicles, including those used predominantly by Cuban troops. [redacted] ENGESA has recommended replacing all Soviet and East European trucks with Brazilian-supplied engines and developing domestic production facilities for many spare parts. [redacted]

Angola also resents its near-total dependence on the Soviets, and Luanda is mindful of the potential for political gain from improving its nonaligned credentials. [redacted]

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In addition to Brazil, Luanda has signed deals with several West European nations, keeping them in the market, albeit as minor players. Purchases include combat and patrol helicopters from France; large quantities of small arms, aviation spare parts, and

[redacted]


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**Outlook**

Despite limited gains by non-Communist countries at Moscow's expense, the Soviet Bloc will probably not face any serious threat to its role as Angola's predominant supplier of military equipment. Few nations could provide the level and timeliness of support offered by Moscow. Angola now receives a full complement of advanced Soviet arms, including MIG-23 fighters, MI-24 attack helicopters, and various air defense and radar systems. During 1984 and 1985, the Soviet Union delivered some \$1.4 billion in arms, and current projections suggest an additional \$500 million may be forthcoming by the end of 1986. Since 1975, Soviet Bloc equipment has been used to outfit some 60 Angolan brigades, as well as the Cuban military contingent estimated at 36,000 men. Soviet, East European, and Cuban technical advisers are present at almost all levels of the Angolan military. Diversification from Soviet Bloc equipment would impose extremely difficult financial, logistic, and training problems.

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Moscow values its arms-supply relationship with Luanda, not only for ideological reasons, but also because Angola is one of the few Third World Soviet clients able to pay for at least a portion of its purchases in hard currency. Although non-Communist arms deals will probably continue at the margins of the Angolan market, the Soviets are not likely to tolerate serious challenges to this relationship.

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**Liberia: Prospects for  
Matthews's Opposition  
Party** [redacted]

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President Doe's move to lift the ban on Liberia's largest and most popular opposition party—the United People's Party (UPP), led by Baccus Matthews—on 23 September is probably part of his effort to divide the opposition. Although the UPP is not a legal party and cannot yet participate in elections, we believe its registration is only a formality. Although Matthews welcomes Doe's conciliatory move, we believe he will work behind the scenes to bolster his influence, while trying to control a small radical faction of the UPP that favors a more confrontational stance toward the regime. According to US Embassy reporting, Matthews says he would accept a government position if Doe made him an offer. We believe, however, that he would use such a post to develop an independent base that he could use to mount a challenge against Doe. [redacted]



Gabriel Baccus Matthews [redacted]

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New Liberia

**Doe's Strategy**

The lifting of the ban on the UPP is probably designed by Doe to ease foreign and domestic pressures to open the political system. According to the US Embassy, Doe hopes the move will improve Liberia's image in the United States and ensure badly needed US financial aid. The Embassy also suspects that Doe acted to demonstrate a conciliatory posture and to undermine any attempts by the weak and ineffective Grand Coalition of three opposition parties to co-opt Matthews. [redacted]

President's main antagonist. On the other hand, Embassy reporting indicates that ruling party chairman Kpoto argued that the UPP's legalization was necessary to maintain Liberia's image as a multiparty state. [redacted]

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**The UPP's Ideological Leanings**

Despite Doe's suspicions, and probably some public wariness of its "socialist" leanings, US Embassy reporting indicates that the UPP is a slightly left-of-center party. It publicly rejects any formal ideology or dogma, and Matthews considers himself a pragmatist. The US Embassy reports that he supports free enterprise—although in the past he charged that foreign companies did not hire enough Liberians for management positions—and failed to reinvest enough of their profits into the country. An articulate spokesman for city dwellers, Matthews believes that Liberian governments must deliver greater benefits to the poor, such as low-cost housing, education, and medical care, but concedes that he must avoid promising anything Liberia cannot afford, according to the US Embassy. Although occasionally critical of the United States and an advocate of a more

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Nevertheless, [redacted] Doe is not convinced of Matthews's good faith and is waiting for him to renounce his "socialist" past. Moreover, some members of the ruling National Democratic Party of Liberia remain highly suspicious of Matthews and may attempt to get the President to reverse his decision. [redacted]

[redacted] Two of Doe's close advisers, Justice Minister Scott and presidential aide Bai Gabali, also strongly opposed the UPP's legalization and believe Matthews remains the

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**Chronology of Activities by Matthews and the United People's Party (UPP)**

1974	<i>The Political Alliance for Liberia (PAL) is formed in New York by Liberian students, including Gabriel Baccus Matthews.</i>	March 1982	<i>Matthews is named Director General of the Cabinet.</i>
December 1977	<i>Matthews returns to Monrovia to register the PAL as an opposition party.</i>	30 April 1983	<i>Matthews resigns in response to Doe's ultimatum to officials to step down if they plan to run for office.</i>
April 1979	<i>PAL serves as the catalyst for the "rice riots." Matthews organizes a demonstration in Monrovia against a proposed increase in the government-controlled price of rice. After jittery security forces fire into the demonstrators, the protest degenerates into a weekend of looting and violence. Some 300 are killed and 400 wounded. Matthews voluntarily surrenders, and he and 31 others are charged with treason.</i>	January 1984	<i>The PPP is renamed the United People's Party.</i>
June 1979	<i>Matthews is freed under general amnesty.</i>	February 1985	<i>The election commission proscribes the UPP from elections because of its role in the 1979 rice riots.</i>
January 1980	<i>PAL registers as the People's Progressive Party (PPP), which Matthews claims is an "African socialist" party. He says he is prepared to serve as a "loyal oppositionist" working under the constitution.</i>	April 1985	<i>Matthews is arrested and briefly held for suspicion in an assassination attempt on Doe.</i>
March 1980	<i>Matthews calls on the President and Vice President to resign. In response, the Senate and House vote to ban the PPP, and Matthews is again charged with treason.</i>	August 1985	<i>The UPP is banned.</i>
April 1980	<i>Matthews joins the Doe government as Foreign Minister.</i>	October 1985	<i>Matthews goes to the United States for medical treatment.</i>
November 1981	<i>Matthews is dismissed for "antigovernment" remarks.</i>	March 1986	<i>The UPP, following a seven-month ban, announces the resumption of public activities, despite the continued ban on politics.</i>
		April 1986	<i>UPP chairman Nelsen, Secretary General Kawah, and 37 members are arrested for holding a political rally. The government charges them with failure to obtain a permit.</i>
		8 July 1986	<i>Matthews returns from the United States.</i>
		14 July 1986	<i>The UPP rejects a merger with Grand Coalition parties.</i>
		22 July 1986	<i>Matthews pays a courtesy visit on Doe.</i>
		22 September 1986	<i>Doe lifts the ban on the UPP.</i>

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nonaligned foreign policy, Matthews admits that Washington is important for Liberia's economic survival. [redacted]

**Matthews's Maneuverings**

In the near term, Matthews will probably work to increase his party's popular support. Despite clandestine efforts to rebuild and expand its infrastructure, the UPP's membership is probably below its strength of over 200,000 members prior to Doe's coup in 1980. Last year the US Embassy reported that the party probably had about 175,000 members and that the charismatic Matthews retained the support of the urban poor, market women, and, probably, a majority of students. [redacted]

[redacted] Matthews has several unnamed sympathizers serving at the Executive Mansion, while the government is convinced that he is popular among some segments of the army, [redacted]

[redacted]

For his part, we believe that Matthews will move cautiously in the coming months in order to avoid giving the regime a pretext for banning his party again. A review of US Embassy reporting indicates that he is aware that he must win the support of key army elements if he is to present the UPP as an alternative to Doe. We believe Matthews would probably use a position in the regime to ensure access to government officials and military officers as part of his effort to garner additional support. [redacted]

[redacted]

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As a result of the legalization, Matthews is likely to reject offers to merge the UPP with the other opposition parties, US Embassy reporting indicates. According to the Embassy, he does not believe that Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf's Liberian Action Party is a viable organization because of its internal frictions, and thinks the leaders of the Grand Coalition are interested only in maintaining their wealth and influence. The Embassy also reports that Matthews is critical of the Grand Coalition parties for not uniting and coming to terms with Doe. [redacted]

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**Outlook**

In our view, Doe almost certainly expects the UPP to participate in byelections scheduled for December, to take its legislative seats, and to become a "loyal" opposition that does not openly challenge his policies. He also probably believes that legalization of the UPP will appease his critics in the United States and undercut the influence of the other opposition parties. Doe may even offer Matthews a Cabinet position and attempt to make the UPP a coalition partner, probably to ensure Matthews's loyalty and to make the party share responsibility for Liberia's ills. [redacted]

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## Africa Brief

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**Mauritius-United States**    **Disappointment Over Textile Talks** [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] moderate Prime Minister Jugnauth is reassessing relations with the United States after bilateral trade negotiations in Port Louis last month resulted in unexpectedly low quotas for Mauritian textile exports. The government in recent years has attempted to expand markets for the growing textile industry in order to lessen dependence on the traditionally predominant sugar sector and reduce the country's 20-percent unemployment rate. US Embassy reporting indicates that the Prime Minister believed that Mauritius's pro-US voting record in the United Nations—the highest among African states—and his refusal to press a claim of sovereignty over UK-administered Diego Garcia, where a US military facility is located, would result in more favorable textile quotas. [redacted] 25X1

Jugnauth was closely involved in the negotiations and almost certainly believes his failure to obtain generous quotas could weaken his popular standing. He probably will express his disappointment openly in order to deflect criticism by the proleft opposition party, which for some time has challenged his acceptance of US access to Diego Garcia. Over the longer term, however, we agree with the US Embassy assessment that Jugnauth will continue to back US objectives in the region, arguing that such support is in his country's long-term interest. [redacted] 25X1



Secret

**Chronology of Islamic Activities in Senegal** <sup>1</sup> [redacted]

25X1

1 January-31 August 1986



[redacted]

25X1

*January*

The Muride Khalif General breaks ties to the Federation of Young Morides and plans to sponsor three other youth groups with the intention of attracting a large portion of the Federation's membership. [redacted] Muridiya leaders plan to cut off funds for the movement and discredit its leaders.

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

*27 February*

Seydi Moustapha Sy, the Tidjaniya's most active youth organizer, denounces President Diouf and Senegal's religious leaders for their immorality and their concentration on profanity and unreligious matters during public meetings and conferences. [redacted] Sy has widely circulated a cassette tape calling for the religious leaders to withhold their political support for Diouf during the presidential election in 1988 unless he transforms Senegal into an Islamic republic. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

*5 March*

Latiffe Gueye, a prominent Senegalese Islamic fundamentalist and cofounder, with Sidy Lamine Niassé, of the radical group Djamra, states bitterly that Niassé took his place as the primary contact of the Iranian Government, [redacted] Niassé, as editor in chief of the publication *Wal Fadjiri*, receives monthly payments from Iran to promote Islam in Senegal. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

<sup>1</sup> The Islamic community in Senegal is the most highly organized Islamic grouping in West Africa and accounts for 92 percent of Senegal's 6.8 million population. It is dominated by traditional Sufi brotherhoods, the two largest of which are the Tidjaniya, with a membership of about 1.3 million, and the Muridiya, with an estimated 1.5 million members. [redacted]

25X1

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25X1

28 March

Ahmed Khalifa Niasse and Sidy Lamine Niasse, often described as flamboyant Islamic fundamentalists, reach a truce with the Senegalese Government, [redacted]. The Niasses agree to tone down the *Wal Fadjiri* articles and to limit criticism of the government in their speeches. In exchange, Dakar offered favors such as letters of introduction to heads of Islamic countries, assistance in obtaining duty-free goods, and turning a "blind eye" to the Niasses' acceptance of funds from foreign countries, such as Iran and Libya. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

27 April

The Lebanese Shia Imam, based in Dakar, hosts a meeting of about 60 Lebanese and Senegalese Islamic leaders to discuss what they perceive to be the anti-Islamic attitudes of Western nations, [redacted]. This is the first time in recent memory that Senegalese Islamic leaders have been invited to a meeting at the Lebanese Social Center. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X6

1 May

An assailant attacks the Imam of Touba, brother of the Muride Khalif General, [redacted]. The Muridiya leadership in Touba believes the attack was in response to the Khalif General's support for the government's antismuggling campaign. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

5 May

President Diouf visits the Muride Khalif General in Touba, focusing on complaints by the Muride Marabouts over the Khalif General's hoarding of government subsidies, [redacted]. Diouf states that if the problem continues he will consider distributing the subsidies to the Murides himself even though this would be unsatisfactory to him as well as to the Khalif General. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

21 May

The leader of the opposition Party of Liberation of the People (PLP) states plans to gain the political support of the major Islamic groups, [redacted]. His campaign will focus mainly on the government's inability to deal effectively with domestic economic problems. The PLP leader is also pursuing the backing of Moustafa Sy, religious leader of a Tidjani offshoot with about 100,000 members and considered to be a growing force in Senegal. The PLP leader claims to have an excellent relationship with both the Tidjani and Muride Khalif Generals, [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

12 July

The Tidjani Khalif General tours northern Senegal, including Dakar, from 12 to 29 July, discussing with religious leaders the widespread unrest among the Tidjaniya caused by the government's austerity measures and new agricultural policy. Tidjani have voiced their growing concern that increased government controls on customs and transport would cut further into their already rapidly shrinking share of the Senegalese economy, [redacted]. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

13 July

The Senegalese Armed Forces Minister calls on the Imam of Touba to discuss the killing of a Senegalese soldier by followers of the Imam [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] The Imam declares that his followers are blameless because they were acting in his defense. The Army Minister advises the Imam that the government intends to investigate the killing and bring the responsible Murides to justice. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] The Army is pressuring the Ministry of Justice to prosecute those Murides responsible for the killing, [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

21 July

The Tidjani Khalif General tells approximately 6,000 followers that the government's economic policies are dangerous to the health of Islam, and calls for all Tidjani to unite and prevent the erosion of the brotherhood's power. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

30 July

The former Senegalese Ambassador to Egypt submits a request to the Senegalese Government to register a political party called Islamic Obedience Party, [redacted] 25X1

8 August

The Tidjani Khalif General encourages the Muride Khalif General to distance himself from Diouf and his policies. [redacted] Tidjani members believe the Muride Khalif General is being used as an instrument of the Senegalese authorities, particularly in the areas of commerce and agriculture, to weaken the overall strength of Islamic groups in Senegal. [redacted] 25X1

13 August

The Tidjani Khalif General summons the director of the Senegalese Chemical Industries Company to discuss the scheduled layoff on 30 August of approximately 150 of its 400 workers at the Darou and Mbao chemical plants, [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] The Khalif General said that the workers should not lose their jobs because the reduction in factory sales is caused by the company's mismanagement and is not the fault of the workers. The Darou plant employs approximately 200 people, all Tidjani members. The Khalif General assured the director that he would see to it that the director lost his position if the scheduled firing takes place. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

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**Secret**