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Africa Review



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Ivory Coast: Lebanese Wearing Out Their Welcome  1725X1
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The government is troubled by the Lebanese community's ties to the Iranian Embassy in Abidjan, its contacts with representatives of military factions involved in the Lebanese civil war, and the popular animosity toward the more well-to-do Lebanese living in the country. 

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Liberia: Politics of the Lebanese Community  1925X1
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The Lebanese in Liberia have generally maintained a low profile, but we believe this relationship may be upset if Lebanese factions transfer their political quarrels from their homeland to Liberia. In particular, the Iranian-backed Hizballah organization may try to stir anti-US activity or carry out terrorist attacks. 


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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis, 

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Africa Review 


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Articles

Zambia-Angola-Zaire: Trying To Help and Not Get Hurt 

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Zambian President Kaunda's strong public support for Angola, acting in his role as the chairman of the Frontline States, has brought him into conflict with UNITA—the Angolan insurgent group—and Zaire. Zambia's unofficial contacts with UNITA have soured over the past few months amid open threats by insurgent leader Jonas Savimbi to retaliate if Zambia allows its territory to be used by Angolan forces to attack UNITA-held areas in southeastern Angola. Lusaka has reacted angrily to the threats, and charged UNITA with planting landmines in Zambia's Northwestern Province. Meanwhile, Kaunda's accusations that Zaire is allowing its territory to be used as a conduit for US aid to UNITA have strained relations with Kinshasa and will hinder his efforts to bring about talks between Luanda and Kinshasa. In the event that Angola's civil war spills into Zambia, we judge Zambian forces would be ill-prepared to respond. 

trying to intimidate Kaunda. UNITA has publicly accused Zambia of having a secret agreement with Angola whereby Angolan or Cuban troops could use Zambian territory to attack UNITA-controlled areas. During a press interview last May, Savimbi stated that he would not hesitate to retaliate if Zambia allowed its territory to be used as a staging point for attack. Zambia responded by calling the threats unwarranted and by labeling Savimbi a dangerous puppet of the South Africans. UNITA then claimed that Zambian police had fired across the border on UNITA trucks in Angola. Zambia subsequently accused UNITA of planting landmines in Zambia's Northwestern Province that killed three people, and of kidnaping seven people. 


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


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Support for Angola

Zambia, despite maintaining informal contacts with UNITA in recent years, has lent diplomatic support to Angola ever since the MPLA government seized power in 1975. Since the repeal of the Clark Amendment and his assumption of the chairmanship of the Frontline States, Kaunda has become more sharply critical of Washington. Kaunda publicly condemned Savimbi's visit to the United States last January, and he has charged that Washington is trying to destabilize the internationally recognized government of Angola. 

 Zambia reportedly has moved some military units from its border with Zaire to its border with Angola in an effort to strengthen border security. In our view, this move was probably taken to reassure Angola that cross-border operations would not be necessary. 

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Trading Accusations

In early May, UNITA leader Savimbi launched the opening salvo in what has become a war of words with Zambia. In our view, Savimbi probably fears Kaunda may give Angola more active support and probably is

UNITA suspects that Angola uses Zambian territory with or without the consent of Lusaka, which we cannot confirm. A top UNITA official told a reporter earlier this year that the insurgents had discovered an Angolan effort to resupply its forces via Zambian territory in the Cazombo area that adjoins the Zairian-Zambian border. Moreover, he claimed that Cuban and Soviet troops had been in Zambia temporarily in

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connection with this resupply effort. This same official told the US Embassy in London that, if Angola's resupply efforts through Zambia continued, UNITA would strike across the border to hit the convoys. [redacted]

Despite the growing bellicosity between UNITA and Lusaka, both sides appear willing to keep up informal lines of communication. [redacted]

[redacted]

In addition, Lusaka has established a working relationship with UNITA elements that control Angola's southeastern border with Zambia. [redacted]

[redacted]

Problems With Zaire

As part of his Frontline leadership to provide diplomatic support to Luanda, Kaunda has publicly accused Zaire of being a transit point for US arms shipments to UNITA. During a televised interview in April, Kaunda said he had been informed by Angolan authorities that the United States was shipping arms to UNITA through Zaire. Mobutu has publicly denied that Zaire is a transit point for arms going to UNITA. [redacted]

[redacted]

Kaunda's accusations have strained relations with Kinshasa. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] We believe Mobutu now would be reluctant to allow Kaunda to play a mediating role between Zaire and Angola. [redacted]

Outlook

We judge that Kaunda's principal concern probably is to keep the civil war from spilling over into Zambia. For this reason, he can be expected to try to stay on reasonably good terms with both Angola and Zaire while maintaining some distance in relations with both of his neighbors. In our view, Kaunda's public support of the Angolan Government probably stems largely from his desire as leader of the Frontline States—of which Angola is a member—to project low-cost support for the Luanda regime. He will probably continue to turn down Luanda's requests to use Zambia as a staging area for operations against UNITA, for fear of UNITA retaliation. [redacted]

If the war does spill over into Zambia, we believe that Zambia's forces are ill prepared to stop it. Should Angola conduct hot pursuit operations despite Lusaka's objections, Zambian forces would be able to put up only token resistance. Zambia's Army is far outclassed by the more experienced and better equipped Angolan forces. Zambia also is poorly equipped to deal with an experienced insurgent group such as UNITA. [redacted]

We believe the fiery rhetoric between Kaunda and Savimbi threatens to disrupt their otherwise business-like relations. If the cycle of accusations and counter-accusations continues, it could lead Kaunda to suspend the liaison contacts between ZISS and UNITA, and kick out the insurgents' representatives from Lusaka. However, until then, Kaunda probably views those ties as necessary for maintaining some informal communications with the group. [redacted]

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The tensions between Lusaka and Kinshasa resulting from Kaunda's accusations of Zairian support for UNITA has made it more difficult for Kaunda to act as the middleman for meetings between Mobutu and dos Santos. Communications between Zambia and Zaire have already broken down over this matter, and Mobutu is awaiting a conciliatory move from Kaunda. There is some possibility—which we judge to be small at this time—that these tensions could lead to a flareup of border problems. Zambian and Zairian troops occasionally clash over the poorly defined border, but the two countries have so far been able to resolve such conflicts diplomatically. Cross-border smuggling in both directions is the primary cause of periodic border incidents, according to US Embassy reporting.

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**Kenya-Uganda:
Good Relations To Be Tested**



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Relations between Kenya and Uganda are generally good, but sharp differences of policy toward Libyan leader Qadhafi, bilateral economic issues, and the role of Kenyan Foreign Minister Elijah Mwangale are liable to test the relationship soon. The positive basis for current relations dates from the second half of 1985 when Kenyan President Moi brokered peace talks in Nairobi between the government of former Ugandan Head of State Tito Okello and rebel leader Yoweri Museveni. During the five-month talks, Moi tilted increasingly toward Museveni, and he publicly welcomed the overthrow of Okello by Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) in January 1986. 

- Moi hopes that a rebounding Ugandan economy will pay dividends for Kenya in the form of expanded export opportunities, transportation contracts for the movement of goods to and from Uganda, and increased revenues at the Kenyan port of Mombasa.



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Security Cooperation

Security cooperation between the Museveni government and Kenya began in May when Kenyan and Ugandan military forces conducted a joint sweep against armed bands operating in the Mt. Elgon border area. The Ugandan Army captured over 80 armed individuals who were largely remnants of Okello's defeated army, cattle rustlers, and bandits. Although the Kenyans made fewer arrests, Moi was so impressed with the results of the exercise that he proposed that such cooperation become the norm for the entire Kenyan-Ugandan common border,



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
Museveni has worked hard to cultivate regional recognition, respectability, and security in his six months in office, and he has been especially attentive to his relationship with Moi, who is currently East Africa's leading statesman. The Kenyan President helped mend Museveni's fences with Zairian President Mobutu, encouraged other chiefs of state to attend the African minisummit presided over by Museveni in Entebbe on 20 March, and was host to the Ugandan President in Nairobi on 16 June. 

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In our view, Moi has good reasons to cultivate Museveni:

- The Kenyan President wants to encourage Museveni's moderate behavior in hopes of avoiding another despotic Ugandan regime and the resultant disorder in Kenya's backyard.
- Moi wishes to discourage Museveni's deepening relations with Libya. Moi fears that Qadhafi may obtain a foothold in Kampala that can be used to destabilize Uganda's neighbors like Kenya and Zaire.




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
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Outlook


Over the coming months, relations between Kenya and Uganda are likely to become more complicated and less congenial, in our view. Despite Kampala's dire economic straits, Kenya is unlikely to make

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major progress soon in reducing its EAC debt to Uganda, and Museveni is apt to become increasingly unsympathetic to Kenyan excuses, especially because 1986 has been an excellent year for the Kenyan economy as a result of record grain harvests, high coffee prices, and low oil costs.

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
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Angola: Potential Successors to dos Santos



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Since President dos Santos became head of state in 1979, he has moved gradually to consolidate power and to promote those colleagues he views as loyal and competent. The major personnel changes in the hierarchy of the MPLA government that took place at the party congress last December, as well as a subsequent Cabinet reshuffle, marked the culmination of dos Santos's efforts.



two Angolan leaders appear unusually well positioned to replace dos Santos in the unlikely event he passes from the scene.



Lt. Col. Pedro Van-Dunem (Loy)

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Rand Daily Mail

The Angolan Constitution states that in the event of the death or incapacity of the President, the MPLA Central Committee will select a provisional chief of state from among its 90 members. An MPLA party congress—which chooses Angola's president for a five-year term—presumably would be called into extraordinary session to ratify the provisional choice. Because of the unwieldy size of the Central Committee, we suspect that a smaller group of Angolan leaders—possibly the 13-man Politburo—would select dos Santos's successor. The Central Committee almost certainly would rubberstamp his candidacy.

Lt. Col. Pedro Van-Dunem, "Loy"


Lt. Col. Pedro Van-Dunem, who is both the State Minister for Production and Economic Coordination and the Minister of Energy and of Petroleum, is the fastest-rising star in local politics. This vast portfolio of production puts him in effective charge of the ministries of oil, agriculture, industry, transport, public works, and fisheries. In December 1985, Van-Dunem was appointed a member of the MPLA's Politburo. Van-Dunem is one of the most influential members of the moderate faction of the MPLA.

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Officials holding senior positions in the party, government, and military—such as Pedro Van-Dunem (Loy)¹ and Manuel Rodrigues (Kito) are probably the strongest contenders and best representatives of the dominant coalition of black, relatively middle-of-the-road Marxists. Dos Santos recently appointed Van-Dunem as the number-two man in the government with the title of State Minister for Production and Economic Coordination. Rodrigues has retained his prestigious slot as Interior Minister despite the large number of personnel changes.



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¹ Names in parentheses were given to individuals during the preindependence guerrilla struggle. Today, many officials are referred to by these and not by their real names.

Van-Dunem was appointed State Minister in February 1986 and has been Minister of Energy since 1980 and of Petroleum since 1981. He was born about

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Lt. Col. Manuel Rodrigues (Kito)

Camera Press

1940 and, like most MPLA leaders, is a member of the Kimbundu tribe and comes from a prominent family in Luanda. The nickname "Loy"—which is the last name of a famous Belgian bicycle racer—was given to him by President dos Santos. Van-Dunem joined the Youth of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola—the MPLA youth movement—in 1961. He studied engineering in Moscow with dos Santos, joined the military wing of the MPLA in 1972, and was appointed to the General Staff two years later. In 1975 he became staff director of the Minister of Defense. Van-Dunem served as Third Deputy Prime Minister from 1976 until 1978 and as Minister of Provincial Coordination from 1979 until he was named Energy Minister. Van-Dunem is widely regarded as a competent technocrat who tries to avoid MPLA political disputes within the party. In December 1985 he joined the Central Committee and was appointed a member of the Politburo. He is one of only four officers to hold the rank of lieutenant colonel, the highest rank in the Angolan armed forces.

[Redacted]

Lt. Col. Manuel Alexandre Rodrigues, "Kito"

Manuel Alexandre Rodrigues has been Interior Minister since July 1980. The Interior Ministry is generally charged with maintaining internal order but has specific responsibilities overseeing the police, prisons, firemen, economic police, and the criminal investigation division. Rodrigues has carried out informal sensitive "special tasks," such as talks with US and South African officials. He has been entrusted with such initiatives largely because of the

special relationship he enjoys with dos Santos and because of his flexible, moderate foreign policy orientation. [Redacted]

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Rodrigues served during 1976-78 as inspector general of the Angolan Army, with concurrent responsibility as chief of the Office of Finance. Before assuming his current position, he worked in what was then the Ministry for Internal Order as secretary of state (1977-79) and deputy minister (1979-80). Born in 1943, Rodrigues is a member of the Kimbundu tribe. Rodrigues, who is often called Kito, his nom de guerre, is both a member of the Central Committee and the Poliburo. Both UN and US State Department officials have described him as candid and reasonable during official discussions. [Redacted]

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Like Van-Dumen, Rodrigues is a lieutenant colonel in the armed forces. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Rodrigues frequently assumes responsibility for the daily affairs of state during the President's absences from the country. [Redacted]

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After the party congress in December, it was rumored that he would be named as one of the three "super-ministers" in dos Santos's new government. But Rodrigues, preferring to play a behind-the-scenes role, retained his previous position of power. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Ghana: Prospects for Libyan Influence

[Redacted]

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Ghanaian Head of State Rawlings

[Redacted]

[Redacted] gave a cool reception to Colonel Qadhafi during his official visit to Accra last December. Nevertheless, Rawlings has tried to maintain good ties to Tripoli to preserve his "revolutionary" credentials and to bolster his regime against what he views as regional threats. Meanwhile, a review of US Embassy reporting indicates that radicals in key security and foreign policy posts—led by Provisional National Defense Council member Kojo Tsikata—are working behind the scenes to press Accra into a much closer alliance with Tripoli and to encourage Ghana's use as a base for subversion against neighboring Togo and Nigeria. [Redacted]

\$2.5 billion loan.

[Redacted]

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Despite frequent assurances, Tripoli has failed to provide long-term supplies of crude oil and has repeatedly rejected Ghana's requests for easy credit terms, according to the Embassy. The Embassy also reports that most Ghanaians—even in the leadership—were offended by Qadhafi's behavior when he visited Accra last December, particularly because his men took over all security arrangements. [Redacted]

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Initial Warmth

Following the coup by Rawlings in December 1981, Ghana and Libya quickly forged close ties. Rawlings initially saw Qadhafi as a radical "soulmate"—he called Libya a "revolutionary dream"—who would assist in his regime's survival. Qadhafi responded in early 1982 by providing Ghana with 500,000 barrels of oil on liberal credit terms, as well as 47 tons of food and drugs, according to US Embassy sources. Moreover, following appeals by the Ghanaian Government, which feared that supporters of the former regime would launch a countercoup, Libya donated substantial quantities of arms and ammunition, including mortars, antiaircraft weapons, and armored cars. [Redacted]

A major irritant in the relationship is Libya's demand for military bases in Ghana and a joint defense pact. According to US Embassy reporting, in 1983 Accra rejected Qadhafi's request for a jungle warfare training center in Ghana because of Tripoli's unwillingness to provide petroleum at discount prices. Moreover, [Redacted] at the time indicated that most Army officers were strongly opposed to the Libyan proposal. According to the Embassy, Qadhafi unsuccessfully pressed for a mutual defense pact during his visit to Accra in December. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] provided some initial security training, particularly in the use of electronic monitoring equipment. [Redacted]

Since Tripoli's initial arms deliveries in 1982, Libya has provided only small arms, ammunition, jeeps, uniforms, and recoilless rifles, failing to meet Ghana's expectations for advanced weapons. According to a variety of Embassy and [Redacted] [Redacted] has repeatedly rejected Ghanaian requests for tanks, helicopters, and MIG-21 aircraft. Although Libya agreed last December to train 15 Air Force pilots, the Western-leaning Ghanaian military is generally wary of Libyan intentions and only accepted the offer because free training was not available elsewhere, according to Embassy and [Redacted]

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Strains in the Relationship

Since 1983, however, Libyan support for Rawlings's "revolution" has been largely rhetorical, and mutual suspicions permeate the relationship, according to US Embassy reporting. [Redacted]

[Redacted] According to the Embassy, in 1983 Libya turned down a Ghanaian request for a

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The Radical Connection

Despite these differences, Accra and Tripoli maintain outwardly close ties, and radicals in the Ghanaian Government are pressing for an even closer relationship. The US Embassy says that Rawlings has been one of Qadhafi's strongest public supporters, partly to demonstrate his own "revolutionary" credentials and to placate regime leftists. For example, Ghana strongly denounced the US bombing of Libya in April as "state terrorism," and declared one week of mourning for the Libyan casualties. Regime radicals—led by Kojo Tsikata, who is responsible for security and foreign affairs—are committed to an alliance with Tripoli, and, according to Embassy reporting, Tsikata publicly lauds Qadhafi's actions and policies.

[Redacted]

Tripoli—probably in concert with Tsikata—carefully exploits Rawlings's obsession with external threats, and, as a result, is able to use Ghana as a springboard for regional subversion. A survey of US Embassy reporting indicates that, although Rawlings has not actively sought to topple his neighbors, he permits Ghana to serve as a conduit for limited Libyan aid to Nigerian and Togolese dissidents.

[Redacted]

Although we lack hard evidence, we suspect Libya probably provides the Accra-based Togolese dissident group, the Movement for Democracy in Togo, with some financial aid and, possibly, limited training.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Tripoli advertises in the Ghanaian press for employment in the Libyan Army and its Islamic Legion, which comprises some 2,000 lightly armed and poorly trained Third World nationals used to support Libyan military intervention in Africa. Last March five Ghanaians, who were under the

direction of a Libyan intelligence officer, were arrested in Pakistan for bombing the Pak-Lib Holding Company offices, according to US Embassy and press reporting. Embassy reporting suggests that Libyan-trained Ghanaian terrorists appeared in Spain and Portugal earlier this year. We also believe Ghana may serve as a transit point for Libyan arms and assistance to non-African radical groups as a result of Tsikata's close ties to Tripoli.

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Outlook

Although Rawlings distrusts the Libyans, he is likely to maintain close ties to them in an effort to placate the extreme left and ensure his own security. Rawlings, who believes that neighboring Togo and Nigeria are aiding Ghanaian dissidents, almost certainly will allow Libya in turn to funnel aid through Accra to dissidents in these countries. Moreover, we believe Rawlings—vulnerable to Tsikata's advice—will be receptive to Libyan proposals for greater security and intelligence cooperation. However, he is unlikely to give in to Tripoli's demand for a mutual defense pact or allow a permanent Libyan presence in the country for fear that it would undermine his political independence and spur opposition from among moderates in the 12,000-man Army.

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For its part, Libya almost certainly will continue to offer small military and economic packages from time to time, although we doubt that Qadhafi—failing to obtain the concessions he seeks—will offer major financial aid or oil credits to Ghana. Qadhafi will probably focus his efforts on Tsikata, who is building an independent power base, as a means of influencing Ghanaian developments.

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[Redacted]

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Mauritius: Drug Dealing on the Rise

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Escalating domestic drug abuse and narcotics trafficking in Mauritius have tarnished the image of Prime Minister Jugnauth's moderate government. Several prominent politicians belonging to the three-party governing coalition, the Alliance, have been arrested for drug smuggling. Embassy reporting indicates that the majority of the narcotics smuggled into Mauritius—traditionally a small-scale cultivator of marijuana—is consumed in the country.

the island could evolve into an alternative transshipment point for illicit narcotics, primarily from Southwest Asia, destined for mainland African, European, and, to a lesser extent, North American markets.

Local authorities believe that most of these narcotics are brought in from India, Pakistan, and South Africa either on private yachts, cruise ships, or through the VIP lounge at the country's single airport.

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The government's inadequately trained and poorly paid Police Force thus far has been unable to clamp down on the domestic drug trade. Drug enforcement duties are divided between the Criminal Investigation Unit of the Police Force and the Anti-Drug and Smuggling Squad of the customs office. The Embassy reports, however, that the policy of rotating experienced enforcement officials every two years contributes to low morale among officials who feel overwhelmed by the extent of domestic trafficking.

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The authorities also are hamstrung by scarce resources and frugal budgetary allotments. The three police patrol craft cannot adequately patrol the approximately 100-mile-long coastline. The Embassy reports that about 30 customs officials, with little or no specialized drug enforcement training and no trained dogs, process an average of 3,000 tourists at the airport weekly. In addition, checks of private yachts in the local harbor are rare. Despite operational constraints, however, enforcement officials have arrested more than 500 people and confiscated close to \$2 million in narcotics since the beginning of this year, according to the Embassy.

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The Scope of the Domestic Problem

Accurate figures on local drug abuse are not available, but the government estimates that there are about 25,000 users in the population of 1 million, and that drug addiction probably affects one out of every eight teenagers. According to Embassy officials, drug users often resort to petty theft and prostitution to support their habit. The US Embassy reports that the hardships posed by the 20-percent unemployment rate—almost 50 percent for males under the age of 25—has helped to make narcotics trafficking a big business. A government study in 1985 identified over 100 sites where drugs are sold within the capital, and local observers note that drug deals often are made publicly.

High-Level Political Connections?

The evidence to date is fragmentary and often circumstantial, but we believe that it points to official involvement in the drug trade. In late December 1985, four Alliance members of parliament were arrested in Amsterdam for smuggling drugs. Three were released for lack of evidence, but their companion—who was carrying a suitcase full of heroin—remains in detention. Last May, authorities on the nearby French-administered island of Reunion uncovered a drug smuggling network between the islands that allegedly involves several prominent

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Mauritians apparently use a variety of narcotic substances. According to the Embassy, marijuana is the most plentiful, inexpensive, and widely used narcotic. Marijuana crops often are cultivated within sugarcane fields and can easily escape police detection.


the supply of the domestic crop may be falling short of local demand. For example, local officials note that marijuana currently is being imported from Madagascar and India. Other substances, such as opium, cocaine, heroin, and methaqualone—a synthetic depressant—are smuggled in from abroad.

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Mauritians with political connections, according to the arrested dealers. The Embassy reports that a French commission is investigating the drug ring.



Political Fallout

The drug scandals pose a significant threat to the Alliance's ability to hold on to power until the scheduled end of its mandate in 1988.¹ The fractious, proleft Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM)—the leading opposition party—sought to capitalize on Jugnauth's wavering parliamentary support to call for a vote of no confidence, which the government defeated by a slim majority in May. Despite the victory, Embassy reporting indicates that the government's image is still being damaged by the MMM's muckraking campaign. Moreover, we believe that another government crisis could arise should evidence come to light implicating other high-ranking Alliance officials. [redacted]

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To minimize the damage, Jugnauth has toughened his public stand on corruption and narcotics trafficking. After considerable foot-dragging, he has agreed, for example, to establish his own commission of inquiry into alleged high-level involvement in drug dealing, [redacted]

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The government is working with legislators to establish a special court to deal with drug-related cases, and has proposed the death penalty for traffickers, a measure that the Embassy reports is unlikely to pass, however. [redacted]

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The government is launching a multipronged campaign with some assistance from the United States to combat domestic drug abuse and narcotics trafficking. The Prime Minister's wife and the Foreign Minister have traveled to the United States to participate in drug awareness conferences, and are prominently involved in drug education programs and plans to establish drug treatment and rehabilitation centers. The government has approached the United States for help in training customs officials, setting up a regional customs workshop, and identifying the country of origin of confiscated narcotics. Authorities have begun to crack down on corruption in drug enforcement circles and recently arrested several police and customs officials involved in drug trafficking, according to the Embassy. [redacted]

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Secret**Outlook**

Despite the government's tougher stance, the narcotics issue will remain a touchy political problem as long as the high unemployment rate provides economic and psychological incentives favoring drug abuse and trafficking. Jugnauth almost certainly will face some difficult decisions when the results of his drug commission and the French investigative commission are made public. He may be forced to call for early general elections—which he could well lose to the opposition—if the commissions expose corruption and drug dealing at high levels of his government. If only a few low-level officials are indicted, however, we believe that Jugnauth probably will hold on to his position as long as he takes decisive action, such as purging the Alliance and prosecuting those involved.

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Over the longer term, the inability of the authorities to control the borders may encourage international smugglers to use Mauritius as a regional transshipment point for narcotics destined to other markets. Sources of the US Drug Enforcement Agency report that traffickers now are directing some shipments of heroin and methaqualone destined for South Africa through Mauritius because of a crackdown on smuggling in traditional routes through mainland southern African countries, such as Zambia. In our view, the use of Mauritius as an alternative regional transshipment point to Western markets could expand further because of its location and extensive air links to Africa and Europe and with heroin-producing countries in Southwest Asia. On balance, however, we believe that the government's recent willingness to crack down on traffickers, combined with efforts to seek foreign assistance for border control, could help limit the flow of drugs through Mauritius and reduce its potential as a transshipment point.

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Ivory Coast: Lebanese Wearing Out Their Welcome 

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Almost 26 years of political stability, relative economic prosperity, and liberal immigration laws have made Ivory Coast a haven for some 300,000 Lebanese migrants, now the largest community in Sub-Saharan Africa, according to US Embassy reporting. Lebanese ties to the Iranian Embassy in Abidjan have alarmed government officials concerned over expanding Iranian influence and propagation of Islamic fundamentalism among Ivorian Muslims, who compose 25 percent of Ivory Coast's 11 million people. The government is troubled by the Lebanese community's contacts with representatives of military factions involved in the Lebanese civil war and the movement of substantial amounts of illicit money through Abidjan to support them. Moreover, despite some improvement in the Ivorian economy last year, the preceding four years of recession, heavy debt burden, and continuing government austerity have substantially reduced Ivorian living standards and fueled popular animosity toward the prosperous Lebanese community, according to the Embassy.




Iranian Influence

Abidjan has banned the distribution of Islamic fundamentalist propaganda and has threatened to close the Iranian Embassy if it becomes too active in the Lebanese community, according to the Embassy. The Embassy reports that Ivorian authorities ordered Lebanese merchants in March to remove publicly displayed pictures of Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini.




Nevertheless, the Iranian Charge continues actively to seek contacts in the Lebanese community and to recruit Ivorians to study in Iran, according to the Embassy. In February, the Iranian Charge attended a meeting of West African Amal¹ supporters in Sierra Leone, according to the Embassy. In addition, a local Lebanese religious leader discussed with the Iranian Embassy officials the possibility of using diplomatic channels to transport money to Lebanon.

¹ Secular-oriented Shia militia. 

The Lebanese Connection

Abidjan's prosperous Lebanese community serves as a major conduit for funds from Lebanese in Ivory Coast and other West African countries to various factions in Lebanon, in our view. The Embassy reports that the Ivorian security service monitors the flow through Abidjan of visitors and large sums of money violating exchange controls. The security service confiscated US \$515,000 last March from a member of Amal leader Nabih Barri's entourage as it traveled through the Abidjan airport. The Embassy reports Barri was on his way to meet with West African Amal supporters in Sierra Leone to discuss plans for systematically collecting money from Lebanese residents in West Africa.



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
Jealous of Lebanese Success

Lebanese migrants, taking advantage of the country's free market policies, have developed extensive real estate and commercial holdings in Ivory Coast, according to press and Embassy reports. Over half the gas stations and a quarter of the grocery stores in Abidjan are owned by Lebanese, and they are responsible for creating about 20 percent of the new companies registered annually in Ivory Coast, according to press reports.

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Mounting Ivorian resentment of Lebanese prosperity has prompted some government officials to consider curbing their immigration and commercial activities. The Ivory Coast Democratic Party—the country's

² Pro-Iranian Shia faction reportedly holding Americans hostage in Lebanon. 

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sole political party—last fall pushed for stricter immigration laws and limits on Lebanese business activities. Aging President Houphouet-Boigny, who has long supported liberal immigration policies, rejected the party's proposals, according to the Embassy. Nevertheless, some Ivorians continue to claim that local banks favor the Lebanese and that they increasingly dominate the economy, according to the Embassy. Press reports note an increase in robberies in Lebanese neighborhoods over the past several years, which the Lebanese attribute to mounting anti-Lebanese sentiment. [redacted]

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Outlook

We believe that the Lebanese community in Ivory Coast will continue to facilitate Iranian efforts to gain influence among the Ivorian Muslim population and to propagate Islamic fundamentalism. In our view, however, Ivory Coast is probably less vulnerable than many other West African states to the destabilizing effects of the fundamentalist movement because of its relative prosperity and political calm. In the not too distant future, Ivorians will be faced with a possibly contentious struggle to succeed Houphouet-Boigny, and Iran will be better positioned to exploit political unrest. Any replacement for Houphouet-Boigny—who has paternalistically ruled the country since independence from France in 1960—will find it more difficult to control Iranian activities. [redacted]

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We also suspect that popular resentment toward the visibly wealthy Lebanese community is likely to grow over the next several years, particularly as living standards gradually deteriorate for the average Ivorian. Ivorians probably will take an increasingly dim view of Lebanese funds—earned in the Ivorian economy—being channeled to Lebanon to support the civil war. A new, less experienced successor regime, which is unlikely to enjoy the former president's unquestioned authority and therefore be more sensitive to popular pressure, may opt for stiffer government controls on Lebanese immigration and opportunities in the economy. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Liberia: Politics of the Lebanese Community [Redacted]

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The Lebanese in Liberia have generally maintained a low political profile, focusing attention on their substantial business interests. According to US Embassy reporting, they have carefully avoided disputes with the central government and have not alienated the Liberians by openly displaying their wealth. Nonetheless, we believe that this relationship may be upset if Lebanese factions—reflecting the bitter divisiveness of their homeland—transfer their political quarrels to Liberia. In particular, the Iranian-backed Hizballah organization may attempt to stir anti-US activity or launch terrorist attacks.

[Redacted]

According to academic studies, the Lebanese—who number some 6,000—began to migrate to Monrovia around the turn of the century. The Lebanese civil war of the 1970s spawned a new exodus to Liberia and to other West African countries. Occasionally, the Lebanese have been singled out by Liberians for their considerable economic influence: in the 1950s then President Tubman blamed a food shortage on some Lebanese merchants and temporarily expelled them from the country. Some residual anti-Lebanese resentment erupted during the rice riots in 1979 in Monrovia, when Lebanese shops were attacked, according to press reports. For the most part, however, the Lebanese have quietly cooperated with the Liberians.

According to the US Embassy and open sources, the Lebanese dominate Monrovia's retail sector and own some 500 firms, including cement and furniture factories, as well as many of the country's restaurants and hotels. The US Embassy reports that Liberians generally do not appear to resent the Lebanese control of the economy, but appreciate their badly needed business expertise. According to the Embassy, the government believes that there is no alternative to the

[Redacted]

expatriate capital, and that a large-scale withdrawal of Lebanese business interests would be disastrous for the economy.

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Relations With the Doe Regime

A variety of Embassy reporting and sources indicate that the Lebanese have carefully cultivated President Doe's support.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Following a failed coup attempt last November, the Lebanese community publicly thanked Doe for protecting their businesses and expressed confidence in his government, press reports indicate.

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[Redacted]

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Factional Politics

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Embassy and press reporting indicates that three groups dominate the Lebanese political spectrum in Liberia: Amal, which was founded in the early 1970s and is now the leading political force in Lebanon's Shi'ite community; the Shi'ite Hizballah (Party of God), which calls for an Islamic state based on the Iranian model in Lebanon, and the mostly Sunni Syrian Socialist National Party, which advocates the union of all greater Syria under a socialist regime. We have no indication that Christian Maronite groups, such as the Phalange, maintain a presence in Liberia.

[Redacted]

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Amal, the best organized and most active Lebanese organization in Liberia, consists of about 100 members who focus on fund raising for its parent organization and the distribution of propaganda,

[Redacted]

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Amal opened an information office in Monrovia last August to recruit supporters within the Lebanese expatriate community. According to the US Embassy

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[Redacted] Amal is opposed to any type of

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terrorist activity in Liberia for fear of jeopardizing its business interests. Amal leader Fawwaz believes that the survival of the Lebanese community would be threatened if Hizballah launched terrorist operations.

[redacted]

source, party leader Kamal Ezedine strongly opposes any political or military activities in Liberia so that its extensive business holdings are not threatened, and like Amal, he fears that Hizballah activities may prove counterproductive.

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Hizballah, although a relatively small organization of about 30 active supporters, has the greatest potential to cause trouble in Liberia, in our view. Hizballah receives some funds from Iran,

[redacted]

Prospects

In our view, the Lebanese expatriate community and the Liberian people will continue to coexist peacefully in the near term. The Lebanese, however, run the risk of isolation should they identify themselves too closely with the Doe regime and risk retribution—such as the confiscation of their property—from a post-Doe government. We suspect, nonetheless, that the Lebanese could be hedging their bets, and quietly providing funds to elements of Doe's political opposition.

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We believe that Hizballah is a potential threat to the Liberian Government and the 650-strong US diplomatic community. Liberia, which is staunchly pro-American and pro-Israeli, would be an inviting target should Iran and Hizballah decide to launch activities in Sub-Saharan Africa. We believe the Liberian security apparatus would be ill equipped to handle terrorist activities, such as an attack on the US Embassy or military installations or the hijacking of an airplane at the airport in Monrovia.

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We have no evidence that Hizballah has sought to recruit within the 400,000-strong Liberian Muslim community,² and believe it is unlikely to make significant gains in the near term, should it decide to step up its activities. According to US Embassy reporting, all Liberian Muslims are Sunnis, are generally apolitical, and receive limited funding and religious training from conservative Gulf states,

[redacted]

[redacted]

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The *Syrian Social Nationalist Party* is the most affluent and largest Lebanese organization in Liberia with more than 200 members, according to the US Embassy.

[redacted]

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According to a US Embassy

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² About 75 percent of Vai and 90 percent of the Mandingo tribes are Muslim. Small numbers of several northwestern-based tribes—the Kissi, Gola, Gbande, and Mende—are also Muslim, according to open sources.

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Africa Briefs

Kenya	Calling the Envoys Home [redacted]	25X1
	<p>President Moi, angry over foreign press coverage of Kenya's internal problems, has ordered Kenya's ambassadors and high commissioners to return to Nairobi on short notice for crisis meetings [redacted].</p> <p>[redacted] Moi has become increasingly sensitive to criticism in the Western media of Kenya's one-party political system, rumored unrest in the military, and the Marxist antiregime movement, Mwakenya. [redacted]</p> <p>[redacted]</p> <p>[redacted] Moi was especially angered in mid-April when the Paris-based <i>Indian Ocean Newsletter</i> highlighted an outburst of ethnic tensions in Parliament. He has since banned the French publication, along with the 9 April issue of Britain's <i>Africa Confidential</i>, which made detailed charges of government corruption in Nairobi, and criticized the British Broadcasting Corporation's coverage of Kenyan affairs. [redacted]</p> <p>We believe Moi's ambassadorial conference also may reflect concern over low morale and poor performance in Kenya's ministry of foreign affairs. [redacted]</p> <p>[redacted] Foreign Minister Elijah Mwangale's emotive and often inaccurate statements have embarrassed Moi, [redacted]</p> <p>[redacted]</p> <p>Furthermore, Moi may suspect that some of his envoys are somehow involved in foreign support for Mwakenya, or are engaged in financial mismanagement abroad. [redacted]</p>	<p>25X1</p> <p>25X1</p> <p>25X1</p> <p>25X1</p> <p>25X1</p> <p>25X1</p> <p>25X1</p> <p>25X1</p>
Angola-Brazil	Closer Relations [redacted]	25X1
	<p>Recent diplomatic and commercial developments indicate that Angola and Brazil are strengthening their bilateral ties. In May, Angola designated an ambassador to Brazil, and became the first Portuguese-speaking country in Africa to exchange ambassadors with Brazil. Brazilian President Sarney marked the occasion by calling for increased support for the Angolan Government and the cessation of foreign assistance to the UNITA insurgents. He plans to visit Angola on a tour of several other African countries next year. Angola has also expanded its commercial relationship with Brazil, most notably in the area of military sales. Earlier this year, an Angolan military and economic delegation visited Brazil to sign credit agreements with the Bank of Brazil and Brazil's largest military manufacturer, ENGESA. Thus far, Brazil's arms sales to Angola have been limited to military trucks and jeeps. Meanwhile, Brazilian oil firms seek to expand their interests in Angola, [redacted] A consortium</p>	25X1

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of Brazilian and Belgian companies operates an exploration program in Angolan coastal waters, and Brazil annually purchases about 10 percent of Angola's oil exports. [redacted]

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The two countries are advancing their separate interests under the rubric of enhanced Lusophone solidarity. Brazil wants to expand its influence in the region and is aggressively seeking additional Third World markets for its burgeoning arms export industry. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] Luanda, despite its political and military dependence on Moscow, probably wants to encourage limited competition for the Communist Bloc arms monopoly and serve notice that Moscow should not take Angola for granted. [redacted]

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[redacted] Angolan military officers have long complained about the quality and endurance of Soviet military equipment and would like to develop supplemental sources of arms for use in the war against UNITA. In addition, Angola probably sees Brazil as a credible intermediary with nonaligned credentials that can provide support on Namibia and other key issues. We expect the warming trend to continue as Angola, facing diminished oil earnings and growing credit difficulties, looks increasingly to Brazil for expanded trade relations and more advanced arms such as armored vehicles and aircraft. [redacted]

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Africa

Threat of Insect Plagues Rises [redacted]

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Good rainfall in 1985 and 1986 has provided excellent breeding conditions for grasshoppers and locusts in Africa—posing the most serious insect threat to Africa in 60 years. The major threat is in Sudan, where the US Ambassador has declared an emergency because of an infestation of African migratory locusts spreading east and south of Sudan and desert locusts ranging east and west. Despite earlier control efforts in Sudan, migratory locusts have spread to Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia, as well as to South Africa—the first sighted there in 45 years. Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique have reported sightings of red locusts, as has Kenya, for the first time in 50 years. [redacted]

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The US Embassy in Burkina has warned of a potential calamity resulting from the Senegalese grasshopper. Niger, Mali, Senegal, and Mauritania are also threatened. Although the West African problem is under control, favorable rains could cause the insect populations to increase quickly. Brown locusts are at a 20-year high in both South Africa and Botswana. Despite extensive spraying efforts, control has been poor. Major agricultural areas have thus far been spared, but with favorable rains, locust populations could increase and spread to Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Zambia, and Angola next year. [redacted]

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International control efforts seem coordinated in West Africa, but countermeasures in East Africa are moving slowly. We believe that, unless control

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measures start in Sudan by August, the continued spread of the migratory and desert locusts is highly probable. Damage in surrounding countries could be significant, and in Sudan the loss could approach that of past plagues—as much as one-third of the first year’s crop and more in subsequent years. If uncontrolled, a locust plague could last nearly 15 years and could cause greater hunger and food shortages than the recent famine. [redacted]

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Sierra Leone

The Politics of Rice [redacted]

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President Momoh, who reluctantly eliminated rice subsidies last month to accommodate some of the IMF’s recommendations for a standby agreement, is facing increasing public unhappiness over the spiraling rice price and hoarding by merchants. [redacted] military personnel—which until recently have been Momoh’s principal source of support—have refused to pay the new price, and are insisting that traders accept the former rate. [redacted]

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Rice production in Sierra Leone has declined steadily in the past decade, and the US Embassy believes the drop will continue in the next few years. Since 1975, imports have increased fourfold; last year Sierra Leone imported more than one-third of its rice needs—some 111,000 metric tons— according to international economists. Although the government has raised producer prices over the past two years, the official price is roughly equal to production costs, offering farmers little incentive to increase output or sell to the government. Significant smuggling continues to neighboring Guinea, where the French franc is available, and to Liberia, which uses the US dollar, according to the Embassy. [redacted]

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Rice has been a volatile political issue in West Africa in recent years. Almost all governments in the region heavily subsidize rice—a staple food—in order to ease the burden of rising food costs on the urban population. In 1979 in Liberia more than 100 people died in riots ignited by a proposal to increase the price of rice. The coup in Guinea-Bissau in 1980 was dubbed by some foreign observers as the “rice coup” because it came at the peak of chronic shortages in main towns. Within hours after Nigerian head of state Babangida announced a ban on rice imports last year, there was a massive run on remaining stocks, and traders doubled and trebled their prices, according to press reports. [redacted]

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Angola Chronology

June 1986

- | | | |
|----------------|--|--------------|
| <i>1 June</i> | Foreign Minister Van-Dunem Mbinda states publicly that Luanda will no longer negotiate regional settlement initiatives with the United States and rejects any linkage to Cuban troop withdrawal. [redacted] | 25X1
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| <i>5 June</i> | Press reports South Africa attacked the southern Angolan port of Namibe. [redacted] damage to one Cuban and two Soviet ships and to oil storage tanks. The raid probably is attempt at disrupting preparations for expected Angolan offensive. [redacted] | 25X1
25X1 |
| <i>9 June</i> | Soviet statement terms 5 June attack on two Soviet merchant ships an act of terrorism by Pretoria. Moscow declares such actions cannot be left unpunished, later explained as reference to economic sanctions. [redacted] | 25X1 |
| <i>10 June</i> | UNITA claims downing of MIG-23 and two helicopters in central Angola with surface-to-air missiles. Insurgents air defense successes are likely to auger more cautious Angolan air tactics. [redacted] | 25X1 |
| | UNITA insurgents attack government buildings in the provincial capital of Cabinda, according to press reports. Increased security around important oil facilities probably forced UNITA to attack softer targets. [redacted] | 25X1 |
| <i>19 June</i> | [redacted] government forces have occupied the UNITA-held town of Munhango in central Angola. Munhango, Savimbi's birthplace, lies astride important logistics routes for both sides. UNITA forces remain in area, and fighting probably continues. [redacted] | 25X1
25X1 |
| <i>23 June</i> | Angolan press reports President dos Santos receives Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in Luanda for four day official visit. Details of visit limited to standard confirmations of friendship and cooperation. [redacted] | 25X1 |
| <i>25 June</i> | Unconfirmed press and UNITA reports indicate senior UNITA and Angolan Government representatives recently met in Europe. Previous intermittent contacts have been fruitless. Luanda probably keeping options open, but not ready to pursue serious negotiations soon. [redacted] | 25X1 |
| | [redacted] | 25X1 |

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