



Directorate of Intelligence

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Africa Review

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	<p><i>Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,</i></p>		25X1

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Articles

Ethiopia: Villagization

Accelerates

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The Mengistu regime is rapidly expanding its ambitious villagization program despite severe logistic problems, lack of skilled administrative personnel, and potentially negative implications for human rights and food production. Addis Ababa claims to have moved over 2.8 million peasants so far in three key provinces, and the US Embassy reports that the program is now complete or under way in all provinces except war-torn northern Ethiopia. With the smaller but more controversial resettlement scheme in abeyance because of Western human rights criticisms, Chairman Mengistu appears determined to push forward with villagization as quickly as possible in an effort to gain greater control over the country's peasant population and eventually speed the collectivization of agriculture. While the program has met with only limited resistance, we believe Mengistu's commitment to making it countrywide could fuel rural unrest and increase sympathy for insurgencies, especially among the independent-minded peasants in northern Ethiopia.

limit their support for resistance groups and bandits. The success of the Harerge initiative prompted Mengistu to incorporate it into the regime's 10-year development plan, announced last September. Since last fall, the US Embassy reports that villagization has been virtually completed in Harerge and Bale Provinces and is far along in Shewa and Arsi. Although the program differs in size and scope from region to region and the government denies almost all Western access to the villages, recent Embassy reporting indicates that villages are springing up on a smaller scale in Sidamo, Gamo Gofa, Kefa, Ilubabor, Welega, and Gojam Provinces.

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According to the Embassy, the regime's villagization efforts have been most intense in the densely populated, primarily ethnic Oromo-inhabited highlands of Harerge, Shewa, and Arsi Provinces. These provinces comprise about one-third of the country's 44 million people and account for 40 percent of national crop production. As of April, Addis Ababa claimed to have moved over 2.8 million people into 6,500 newly constructed villages in these three provinces alone. poor site selection for the new villages probably will cause food shortages in many areas of the region this year. In addition, some peasants reportedly have been moved from highland areas with rich soil and adequate rainfall to arid lowlands where their traditional crops will not grow. According to the US Embassy in Mogadishu, villagization is the main reason cited by about 40,000 mostly ethnic Oromo peasants for leaving Harerge for refugee camps across the border in northern Somalia. The US Embassy in Addis Ababa reports that the government claims to

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
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Widening Scope of the Program

Villagization originated with the Land Reform Proclamation of 1975, in which it was cited by the new revolutionary government as a principal task of the peasant associations under the mandate to promote rural agricultural production.¹ Implementation did not begin until 1979, however, when party leaders in Harerge Province began gathering scattered peasants into central villages to

¹ Villagization, a relatively new feature of Mengistu's drive to collectivize agriculture, forces peasants to destroy their traditional homes scattered about the countryside and move to newly constructed central villages in the same area.




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The Role of Agriculture in the Revolution

Agriculture is Ethiopia's dominant economic sector. Approximately 85 percent of the population—over 35 million persons—derive their living from farming or agricultural pursuits, and most Ethiopians inhabit land that is widely considered to have the best agricultural potential in northeastern Africa. According to the US Embassy, however, farm production has been constrained over the years by difficult climatic conditions, large variations in geography, inadequate rainfall and irrigation, and self-defeating government policies. Agricultural technology for the most part has remained unchanged since the Middle Ages. Moreover, as the poorest nation in the world and the one fighting the continent's longest running civil war, Ethiopia still lacks the resources necessary to overcome its agricultural backwardness. []

Since assuming full power in 1977, Chairman Mengistu has sought to restructure agriculture along socialist lines with the ultimate goal of collectivizing the entire peasant population. This transformation, which has included the nationalization of all lands and the establishment of cooperative peasant associations, has proceeded slowly because the practical need to raise productivity has often taken priority over ideological considerations. Consequently, the bulk of Ethiopian land is privately cultivated, and the Embassy estimates that only 5 percent of the country's farms are collectives. Despite the slow pace of the drive to socialize, Mengistu remains committed to collectivization as a "fundamental objective" of the Ethiopian revolution and strongly believes it is the only way the nation can overcome its agricultural plight. According to the US Embassy, collective farms—officially called

"producers' cooperatives"—get priority for the distribution of seeds, fertilizers, equipment, and credit, and the regime's current 10-year plan aims to place 53 percent of the country's farmers on collectives by 1993. []

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In our view, Mengistu has seized on Ethiopia's drought and famine crisis to speed the collectivization process. In October 1984 the regime launched its controversial resettlement program, which involves the relocation of peasants from drought and insurgency-stricken northern Ethiopia to newly established collective farms in the south and southwest. About 600,000 peasants were relocated several hundred miles—usually against their will—before resettlement was put "under review" and suspended late last year because of severe logistic problems and Western—primarily US—human rights criticisms. Last September Mengistu announced a larger relocation program known as "villagization." This program, which he vows will "change the face of the countryside," forces peasants to destroy their widely scattered traditional homes and move to newly constructed central villages nearby. Addis Ababa claims both programs are designed to help break the cycle of drought and famine by providing better access to government-supplied social services and infrastructure. On the basis of a review of US Embassy reporting, however, we believe both programs probably will disrupt agricultural production and lead to even lower food output. Nevertheless, in his recent May Day speech, Mengistu reasserted his commitment to resettlement and villagization and made it clear he intends to pursue both vigorously. []

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have learned from Harerge's experience with villagization and is constructing higher quality villages on better sites in Shewa Province, one of the most fertile and prosperous areas of Ethiopia. [redacted]

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Problems in Implementation

According to the US Embassy, the villagization program continues to be handicapped by logistic and administrative problems and a lack of resources. In our view, these drawbacks are unlikely to be alleviated any time soon because the Mengistu regime reportedly has not made budget allocations for the necessary infrastructure and social and technical services, and contributes only the minimum staff personnel needed for planning and advice. Building materials reportedly are particularly scarce, and Ethiopian officials in charge of the program have ordered that old, existing housing materials are to be used as much as possible, with the cost for any new materials to be borne by the peasants. The Embassy reports, for example, that those peasants who are required to put a tin roof on their new houses must pay for the tin. Similarly, peasants in western Shewa Province reportedly must pay a fee to the local carpenters who help them build their homes. [redacted]

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Although evidence is spotty, US Embassy reporting also indicates that in some cases the time involved in launching the villagization process has undercut rural agricultural production. For example, in some areas farmers reportedly have been required to spend at least three out of every seven days tearing down their old homes and putting up new ones, which has detracted from their efforts to take advantage of the good rains and prepare their lands for planting. While the regime's policy is to stop work on villages when time is needed for agriculture, local government officials may choose not to observe this. As a result, we judge that agricultural production will suffer while the new villages are being established. Moreover, the past performance of Ethiopia's collective farms suggests to us that the eventual collectivization of the new villages probably will cause agricultural production to stagnate further. [redacted]

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The Leading Role of the Party

According to the US Embassy, the villagization program is now under the overall control of the Workers Party of Ethiopia. The party reportedly has produced written guidelines for site selection, village layout, and answers to most of the questions that arise about the program. On the local level the party implements the program through the peasant association. Established and granted legal status by government proclamation in 1975, peasant associations are accountable to the regional committees of the party and execute the villagization program through sub-committees that are responsible for site selection and surveying, materials procurement, propaganda, security and defense, and construction. Peasant associations—the rural equivalent of the urban neighborhood associations known as *kebeles*—act as the regime's political watchdog in the countryside and handle all local criminal, civil, military, and economic matters for the government. While much of the work in the villagization process falls to the peasants and the local Ministry of Agriculture staff, the Embassy reports that the program would not be possible without the prominent role played by the peasant association. [redacted]

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The Embassy reports that the government has failed to fulfill promises of improved social services—including better education, health care, and water supplies. Although the plans for the new villages designate specific areas for schools, health clinics, and recreational facilities, US Embassy officials who have visited or observed villagization sites have seen no visible improvements or evidence that the services are under construction. Separate facilities for religious activities, an important part of life among the rural peasants, are not even planned. Ethiopian officials have pledged that the services will be supplied as soon as the resources are available, but the Embassy reports that in most cases the new villages use existing schools and health care facilities, most of which are located several kilometers away. For its part, Addis Ababa has acknowledged that "certain problems" have developed but claims that these are caused by "lack of support" from the peasants. [redacted]

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In our view, the key role played by the party and the peasant associations in implementing villagization is an important factor limiting potential peasant resistance. The regime expects the peasant association, which has sweeping judicial powers to address violations of its regulations, to achieve full participation, according to the Embassy, [redacted]

[redacted] The party also plays a major role in "educating" and "motivating" the peasants to participate. According to the Embassy, the promise of government-furnished infrastructure, essential social services—including marketing and purchasing for products—and membership in the peasant association gives the farmer little real choice but to participate in the program and move his individual dwelling. In view of these factors and the long history of peasant—especially ethnic Oromo—acceptance of Addis Ababa's authoritarian rule, we agree with the US Embassy assessment that the government and party do not have to employ much physical force to gain peasant compliance. [redacted]

Divided Donor Community

Villagization has not received the same publicity and scrutiny as the resettlement program, but recent Embassy reporting indicates that the Western aid donors and diplomatic missions are increasingly concerned about its hasty implementation and political, ideological, and human rights implications. While most of the donors reportedly recognize the regime's collectivist goals and desire to gain better control over the peasantry, they are split over the long-term impact of villagization on agriculture. Overall, however, the Embassy reports that, as with the case of resettlement, most donor agencies and countries believe that the best way to both monitor and minimize potential human rights violations in the program is to work with the Mengistu regime in improving it. [redacted]

After a rare government-organized trip to six villagization sites in western Shewa Province last April, several representatives of the major Western

aid groups and diplomatic missions expressed additional reservations about the program:

- The lack of social services in the villages and the prospect that the program, if continued, will divert scarce resources from productive farming to unproductive housing construction.
- The inability of the farmers to protect their crops now that they are living away from them.
- The potential for the spread of disease among people and animals as they are gathered into the new villages.
- The likelihood of short-term negative impact on agricultural production.
- Problems with fire control and sanitation in the new villages.

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Despite these criticisms, we believe most of the donors probably will provide limited assistance to villagization while pressuring the regime to slow the program and keep it open to outside observers. For its part, Addis Ababa wants large EEC and World Bank loans for peasant agriculture to finance the construction of needed services in the new villages, but the Embassy reports the regime has balked at adopting the agricultural reforms insisted on by these donors. [redacted]

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Outlook

In our view, the rapid growth of the villagization program, despite the many obstacles it faces, reflects Chairman Mengistu's staunch commitment to expanding his political control over the rural population and furthering his revolution. Because villagization, along with resettlement, is part of his two-pronged approach to collectivize agriculture, we believe he will expand the program with or without Western approval. Although full collectivization of the new villages has not occurred and individual family plots are still a part of each new housing site, the Embassy reports that most peasants expect collectivization to follow. From our perspective, however, continuing logistic problems, lack of resources and administrative personnel, and shortages of infrastructure probably will slow the villagization

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process in some areas and may delay the regime's plans to collectivize. [redacted]

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Over the longer term, we believe Mengistu's determination to develop the program throughout the country is likely to spur greater, and possibly more violent, opposition among the peasantry. In its initial phase, villagization has been concentrated primarily in the ethnic Oromo heartland of southern and eastern Ethiopia, and the Embassy reports that nomads have been left completely out of the process. Although Oromos comprise approximately 40 percent of Ethiopia's population, they are generally viewed as docile and have been dominated by the centrally located Amhara and Tigreans for centuries. In our view, this factor, coupled with subtle co-optation and coercion by the peasant associations and the party, probably accounts for the apparent lack of active resistance among the villagized Oromo. In addition, Embassy reporting indicates that in instances where there has been violent opposition to villagization—for example, in parts of Gojam Province—the government has halted the process until local farmers are deemed "psychologically ready." Nevertheless, we judge villagization probably will meet more determined peasant opposition if it is applied to the independent-minded peasants of Amharic and Tigrean stock in central and northern Ethiopia. [redacted]

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At a minimum, we believe government failure to provide the promised social services to the new villages could lead to widespread disaffection in the villages and to significantly reduced agricultural production. This in turn probably will result in increased calls for aid to the United States and other donors to relieve potentially major food shortages in the Ethiopian countryside. [redacted]

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Ghana: Pressures on Rawlings

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Jerry Rawlings, who seized power in December 1981 promising to represent the interests of the "common man," faces increasing difficulties in balancing the demands of moderate and radical factions who say he no longer represents their respective concerns. In recent months Rawlings's popularity has waned, particularly among the middle class that has grown weary of his three-year-old economic austerity program. Other moderates are tired of his anti-Western rhetoric, according to the US Embassy. For their part, radicals accuse Rawlings of betraying the regime's original "revolutionary" goals, and many are working behind the scenes to gain control of key institutions necessary to launch a successful coup, Embassy sources indicate. [redacted]



Jerry Rawlings addressing crowd [redacted]

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For over three years Rawlings was able to chart a populist course, carefully balancing the demands and expectations of both moderates and radicals. A survey of US Embassy and open-source reporting demonstrates that in the foreign policy arena, Rawlings generally pursued a leftist course, almost always supporting Libya and the USSR in international forums. On the other hand, his regime implemented tough IMF-designed austerity measures, encouraged foreign investment, and retained moderate Army officers in key command positions. Moreover, Rawlings did not challenge tribal influences—tribal chiefs still control land tenure—and he forged close ties to the moderate, politically powerful Ashanti chief.¹ [redacted]

Graduates for Action, two leftist groups composed primarily of students and urban intellectuals that helped Rawlings seize power in 1979 and again in 1981, accused him of aligning Ghana with the West, called on workers to prepare for a "bitter and protracted struggle," and compared Rawlings to pro-Western Liberian Head of State Doe. Last September, the 1,000-strong Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards, a hardcore Marxist group that also supported the 1981 coup, publicly called on Rawlings to introduce "scientific socialism" and to halt economic austerity measures, according to open sources. [redacted]

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Pressures From the Left

Since last year, Rawlings has come under mounting criticism from leftist political organizations for allegedly betraying the original "revolutionary" goals of his regime. Last year the US Embassy reported that the New Democratic Movement and the Catholic

We agree with the US Embassy's assessment that Marxist Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) member and security chief Kojo Tsikata is building a separate power base that he hopes to use to seize power.² [redacted] Tsikata

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¹ Although Ghana faces far fewer tribal tensions than most West African countries, the Ashanti chief historically has been one of the most influential and respected men in the country. Most key government officials, including Rawlings, are from the coastal Ewe tribe. [redacted]



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is dissatisfied with Rawlings's performance [redacted]

The US Embassy reports that Tsikata is placing handpicked loyalists—trained in Cuba, East Germany, and Bulgaria in 1984 and 1985—in key positions in the bureaucracy, militia, and internal security apparatus. According to unconfirmed Embassy and [redacted]

[redacted]—which is responsible for Rawlings's safety. Moderate elements in the military have yet to react strongly to his maneuvering. A variety of US Embassy reporting suggests, however, that many are increasingly offended by the regime's anti-Western rhetoric and close ties to Libya. [redacted]

The Economic Scene

The tough IMF-supported adjustment program that Accra implemented in 1983 has been relatively successful. The package included several devaluations, a reduction in the public-budget deficit, reduced urban consumer subsidies, and the reorganization of the most inefficient state enterprises. Inflation, which reached 123 percent in 1983, now stands at about 12 percent. The US Embassy reports that the once-empty markets in Accra are now full of goods, Ghana is self-sufficient in rice production, and hoarding and smuggling of food and other basic goods have been sharply reduced. The Embassy also reports that the regime has centered its efforts on increasing agricultural and commodity output with modest success. Cocoa production—the mainstay of the economy, accounting for about 60 percent of export earnings—is expected to reach 212,000 metric tons this year. The Embassy notes that this level, the highest in the last four years, is largely the result of higher producer prices for farmers. Moreover, economists report that the gross domestic product grew by 7.6 percent last year and should grow by more than 5 percent this year. [redacted]

Despite these gains, Ghanaians—mainly the urban middle class—are increasingly unhappy with the austerity policies, and Rawlings finds it difficult to convince the public that further belt-tightening measures are necessary, according to the US

Embassy. Wages have failed to keep pace with inflation, and earlier this year the usually passive trade unions staged some work stoppages and a series of one-day strikes to demonstrate their unhappiness. The US Embassy and Western economists report that the regime must impose stiff austerity measures for several more years, including further devaluations, if the country is to attain sustained economic growth. These observers also note that Ghana's debt service ratio—some 67 percent of this year's export earnings—will continue to rise until the early 1990s. [redacted]

Institutionalizing the Revolution?

According to US Embassy and press reports, Rawlings may “institutionalize” the largely ad hoc political system later this year. He may feel that by creating a single ruling party he will be in a better position to control the various factions. Since 1984 Ghanaians have increasingly debated what form of political system should be adopted. While some moderate journalists have called for a return to a multiparty democracy, Dan Annan, chairman of the National Commission for Democracy—a committee appointed by Rawlings two years ago to examine the options—reportedly believes an “African democracy” is the solution. We suspect that Rawlings, who rejects both Western democracy and Marxist models, may opt for a Tanzanian-style political system, which he reportedly admires. According to unconfirmed press reports, Rawlings plans to transform the June 4th Movement, a student/worker group he created in 1980, into the sole and ruling political party. [redacted]

On the other hand, should Rawlings opt to transform the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) into the sole ruling political party—a move he seems unlikely to make—it would facilitate the radicals' control of the government. Established shortly after he took power to channel citizen concerns to the regime and to serve as a transmission belt for the government, the CDRs largely serve as the regime's “eyes and ears.” According to the US Embassy, Rawlings may believe that CDR involvement in the political process would fulfill his

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Key Figures To Watch

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Jerry Rawlings

Embassy reporting suggests he is weary of ruling . . . angry that corruption and graft have reappeared and doubts the "moral fiber" of Ghanaians . . . may not recognize Tsikata's ambitions and independent political base . . . [redacted]

[redacted]

Courage Quashigah

Commands Force Reserve Unit, which is responsible for Rawlings's protection . . . exceptionally ambitious, charismatic, self-assured . . . key role in defeating 1983 and 1984 coup attempts . . . privately critical of Moscow but impressed with Cuba . . . [redacted]

[redacted]

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Kojo Tsikata

Embassy sources depict him as calculating, brilliant . . . this year he toured the country to develop a public image . . . admires Castro, Mengistu . . . served as an officer with the MPLA in Angola during the 1970s . . . maintains contacts with several East Bloc embassies. [redacted]

P. V. Obeng

Key PNDC moderate . . . has not challenged Tsikata's ambitions . . . Embassy believes he is the regime's "troubleshooter" . . . generally runs day-to-day operations of the PNDC . . . may head a caretaker government if Rawlings resigns. [redacted]

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Fui and Tsatsu Tsikata

Cousins of Kojo . . . both are Marxists and lecturers in law at University of Ghana, Legon . . . reportedly have good access to Rawlings but privately believe he has betrayed the revolution . . . neither has a public role . . . Tsatsu reportedly is one of the leading behind-the-scenes ideologues. [redacted]

Alhaji Idrissu

PNDC member responsible for local government and chieftancy matters . . . a non-Marxist leftist . . . highly respected by Rawlings . . . professional banker and accountant . . . has assumed a higher profile in past year representing Ghana abroad. [redacted]

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Arnold Quainoo

Army commander, PNDC member . . . seeks control of Force Reserve Unit, which may bring him into conflict with regime radicals . . . staunchly pro-United States . . . loyal to Rawlings . . . no apparent political ambitions . . . a "soldier's soldier." [redacted]

David Klutse

Commands key 1st Brigade in Accra . . . 48 years old . . . trained in the United States in the 1970s . . . thought to be pro-Western . . . apparently loyal to Rawlings but has not revealed political intentions or views on Force Reserve Unit and regime radicals. [redacted]

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promise for "grassroots" participation in decisionmaking. Although Rawlings purged the CDRs of leftists in December 1984, [redacted]

[redacted] Marxists are working behind the scenes to regain their influence. [redacted]

[redacted] may have infiltrated CDRs to reestablish their authority. [redacted]

Wither Rawlings?

We suspect Rawlings may be tired of trying to maintain the balance between the factions within the ruling PNDC. According to the US Embassy, Rawlings may decide to step aside from day-to-day

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decisionmaking later this year and perhaps become Ghana's titular head. Embassy sources indicate that Rawlings is frustrated by the lack of "revolutionary fabric" among the populace and publicly complains that corruption and dishonesty are again seeping into the government and society. [redacted]

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Should he retire, we believe the radicals would probably consolidate their grip on the security apparatus and the bureaucracy. A variety of US Embassy and [redacted]

[redacted]—lack the leadership skills and the organizational backing necessary to balance the factionalized political system successfully and to fend off pressures from Tsikata and his allies. Moreover, radicals dominate the PNDC bureaucracy—the Secretariat—and could undermine the efforts of moderates to introduce major reforms or to launch Ghana on a more pro-Western foreign policy course.

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[redacted]

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South Africa: The Pan Africanist Congress [redacted]

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The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) has had little success moving out from under the shadow of its better known and militarily active rival, the African National Congress (ANC). Although the PAC has garnered external financial and military support from diverse sources, including Zimbabwe, China, Libya, Iran, and Yugoslavia, the group has yet to carry out major military operations inside South Africa. In the near term, we believe the group's actions will continue to be hampered by internal divisions and ineffective military planning. Nevertheless, the possibility that the PAC could launch a limited terrorist attack, particularly against a civilian target, cannot be ruled out. [redacted]

Background

The PAC was established in 1959 by an antiwhite, anti-Communist breakaway group within the ANC. It broke with the ANC over objections to links to leftwing Indian and white organizations and rejected multiracial cooperation out of concern that this would protect white interests. PAC members also rejected the ANC's links to the South African Communist Party and ties to the USSR. Johnson Mlambo, the current PAC chairman, has carried on his predecessors' task of building up the group's image and securing financial assistance from various sources. [redacted]

Banned in 1960 along with the ANC following the Sharpeville incident, the group formed an underground military wing, Poqo (Pure), to conduct terrorist activities in South Africa. PAC campaigns in the early 1960s included sporadic attacks on government facilities, white civilians, and black government collaborators. In 1963 the PAC's external headquarters in Lesotho was the staging ground for a major offensive into South Africa. The attack was preempted, however, and a subsequent South African crackdown effectively halted activities inside South Africa. In 1978 the PAC reportedly reemerged on the South African scene when 18 alleged members were arrested and accused of recruiting blacks in South

Africa. Political infighting and funding problems, however, have plagued the group since its inception and have severely hampered its ability to carry out any effective military operations. [redacted]

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Military Activity and Planning

The PAC clearly is eager to establish itself as a player in the internal South African liberation struggle and to gain ground against the ANC. In our judgment, the PAC feels under considerable pressure to launch a military campaign, partly out of fear of becoming irrelevant to unrest in the black townships, violence which neither insurgent group controls. While complaints over lack of funds and equipment to support a successful military campaign continue, [redacted] a new sense of urgency fuels the PAC's military planning. Activities under consideration reportedly include attacking police stations in black townships, and rail lines, and sparking violent demonstrations that would spill over into white areas. [redacted]

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Recently the group has floated numerous plans of action, almost all of which appear to have been postponed or scrapped. An attack on South African security facilities in Natal Province and outside Johannesburg originally scheduled for early April, for example, has been postponed numerous times. [redacted]

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[redacted] the arrests last March in Botswana of insurgents with weapons, and in May of a former PAC director of operations in South Africa, probably have delayed operations until at least mid-June. [redacted]

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[redacted] the PAC reportedly has withdrawn the cadre in South Africa scheduled to carry out the operation and is examining new targets in Cape and Transvaal Provinces. [redacted]

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External Support

Despite internal problems and a lack of military activity that have disillusioned many PAC supporters,

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the group continues to receive funds from a number of African sources, including the OAU Liberation Committee, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe. Tanzania maintains military training facilities for its guerrilla force, which has about 600 men, and PAC headquarters is located in Dar es Salaam. Nigeria has continued to supply an undetermined amount of money and other aid, despite its apparent disappointment with lack of PAC activity. The PAC enjoys a special relationship with Zimbabwe and Prime Minister Mugabe's ruling ZANU party.

in May to convince the Chinese that the group would act on its long-promised military campaign [redacted]

[redacted] PAC attempts to develop relations with Iran and Libya. PAC chairman Johnson Mlambo visited Libya last year, and,

[redacted] the group received \$25,000 from Tripoli to cover operating expenses. [redacted]

64 PAC members completed a six-month military training course in Libya in late April. Recent Embassy reports from Maseru indicated that Libyan-trained PAC guerrillas were in Lesotho preparing to launch military activities against South Africa and also against US facilities. In late April Mlambo also headed a delegation to Iran seeking military and financial assistance, [redacted]

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Outlook

In our judgment, the PAC is unlikely in the near term to match the ANC's ability to operate in South Africa. Despite some success in garnering support, we see little likelihood that the PAC can overcome longstanding internal problems to the point where it can launch and sustain operations against targets such as South African defense or police facilities, its avowed primary targets. South Africa's recent clampdown, marked by the declaration of a state of emergency, and Pretoria's proven willingness to carry out raids against insurgent groups in neighboring countries will make it even more difficult for the PAC to develop the network necessary for major military operations inside South Africa. [redacted]

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The fear of becoming irrelevant to internal developments in South Africa and pressure from external backers probably will continue to fuel a sense of urgency within the PAC to launch a military campaign. Therefore, the possibility of a terrorist attack on a civilian target cannot be dismissed. Pretoria cannot prevent all infiltration attempts, and the group may have already successfully hidden weapons inside South Africa. [redacted]

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The PAC continues to maintain a small presence in both Botswana and Lesotho. Lesotho traditionally has been a refuge for PAC cadre and a transit route into South Africa, but, since the coup last January, [redacted] Maseru has evicted about 39 PAC members. Lesotho also has cracked down even harder on South African insurgents since Pretoria's coordinated raids on Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Zambia last May, and [redacted] additional PAC members have been asked to leave. Press reports indicate that the PAC decided to withdraw voluntarily from Botswana last March, but we believe a few PAC members remain. [redacted]

[redacted] over the past few years the PAC has tried to gain additional foreign assistance, soliciting funds and military training from Yugoslavia, North Korea, and China. About 50 PAC guerrillas returned in March from six months of military training in Yugoslavia, [redacted] [redacted] and reportedly are in Tanzania receiving further military instruction. The PAC also reportedly is reestablishing ties to China, its oldest major ally. Despite frustration with the group's military inactivity, the Chinese reportedly offered to train PAC cadres in China, [redacted]

[redacted] Senior PAC officials reportedly visited Beijing

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**Africa
Briefs**

South Africa

Negative Immigration Trends


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Almost two years of unrest and political uncertainty appear to be influencing South Africa's immigration-emigration trends. In all of 1985 the net gain of immigrants was only 5,883, compared with a gain of 20,243 in 1984. This trend appears to have accelerated in the first quarter of this year, when emigration exceeded immigration by 1,726. The last time the government reported net losses was in 1977 and 1978, also a period of political uncertainty following the Soweto riots of 1976. Business leaders have expressed concern about the number of highly skilled technical and managerial personnel leaving South Africa, according to press reports. Although government data show there was still a net gain of engineers during 1985, for example, 774 engineers have left the country in the last two years, and the Engineering Society of South Africa, basing its estimates on the number of inquiries about overseas positions, expects a larger number to leave this year.

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**SOUTH AFRICA
Immigration and Emigration Trends
1984 - 1985**



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We expect that the overall negative migration trend, and particularly the emigration of professional workers, will continue as long as South Africa is marked by widespread unrest and high levels of violence. [] the business community is uncertain about the government's ability to resolve racial problems and revive a flagging economy, and that business confidence is at an alltime low. High inflation—18.6 percent in April—and low levels of business investment increasingly add to the incentives for highly skilled workers to seek opportunities elsewhere, in our judgment. Although the number of workers leaving is still relatively low, the emigration of professional workers, over time, will compound South Africa's difficult economic situation by depriving Pretoria of much needed technical expertise. []

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Botswana**Heightened Concerns About South Africa** []

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The Government of Botswana appears increasingly apprehensive about what it sees as deteriorating relations with South Africa. President Masire told the US Embassy in Gaborone that he has information that Pretoria will respond to international economic sanctions, which he sees as inevitable, by imposing a border blockade on Botswana. Masire has asked the United States to intervene with Pretoria to head off such action, while at the same time seeking help to shift the country's trade routes to the north. About 25 percent of Botswana's exports depend on South African rail and port facilities, and 80 to 90 percent of all imports, including food and oil, come either through or from South Africa. []

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Gaborone also expects that South African security forces will carry out more cross-border operations. It publicly blamed Pretoria for the 14 June attack on a house in central Gaborone in which one Botswana citizen was killed and two injured. The attack followed by less than a month Pretoria's coordinated raids on alleged African National Congress (ANC) targets in Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Pretoria has denied involvement in the 14 June incident, implying that it was a result of internal Botswana frictions. Although the woman killed in the most recent attack had no known involvement with the ANC, the owner of the house is the widow of a member of the armed wing of the ANC, who, the US Embassy reports, maintains ties to other ANC members. Pretoria's recent declaration of a state of emergency as well as its more activist regional policy indicate, in our judgment, that Pretoria will not hesitate to strike hard against ANC targets in Botswana and elsewhere, using whatever force it believes necessary to try to quash unrest in South Africa. []

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Tanzania-USSR**Military Relations** []

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The chief of Tanzania's Defense Force will visit the Soviet Union in mid-July, [] to discuss problems in the military relationship between the two countries, but he is unlikely to request more equipment. Moscow has planned an extensive round of tours and briefings for the Tanzanian delegation, including meetings with Soviet Minister of Defense Sokolov and the

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Chief of Staff of the Soviet armed forces, [redacted] In our view, Moscow may be hoping to assuage Tanzanian disgruntlement—which led former President Nyerere to reduce the number of Soviet military advisers from 92 in 1984 to 74 in 1985 and cut off Soviet access to Tanzanian defense headquarters. Prospects for improving strained relations are poor because the Soviets are probably unprepared to increase their commitment beyond small quantities of spare parts and perhaps short-term concessions on Dar es Salaam's military debt. We believe Tanzania's discontent with the poor quality of Soviet training was given fresh impetus by the crash of a MIG aircraft into Lake Victoria in May that killed both the Tanzanian student pilot and a Soviet flight instructor. The Tanzanian Army needs spare parts and repair services for a wide range of Soviet-supplied equipment, however, and may renew efforts to obtain Chinese military aid if Moscow will not agree to meet its needs. [redacted]

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The Gambia**Scraping By** [redacted]

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The Gambia's recent agreement with the IMF for short-term credit will temporarily avert an economic crisis, although the austerity program carries large political risks for President Jawara. Raising the tax on basic foods, such as rice, and further layoffs will test popular support for government policies. The US Embassy reports that Banjul had to promise increases in prices paid to peanut growers and a rise in petroleum prices to the same levels as those in Senegal in an effort to reduce the illegal flow of both commodities across the border. According to press reports, the government will lay off 1,500 more civil servants, in addition to the 3,000 fired last October in the first year of a four-year economic improvement program. [redacted]

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Economic pressures could precipitate domestic violence and prompt foreign intervention by Senegal should another threat of a coup arise. The Embassy reports that Libya may add to The Gambia's problem by sponsoring an attack against a US or British installation—a move that would embarrass Jawara, focus attention on the government's political vulnerabilities, and possibly speed up the planned union with Senegal in a Senegambia federation. Moreover, we suspect that Libya may try to take advantage of the frustrations generated by belt-tightening measures to gain influence with the country's two opposition political parties. [redacted]

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