



Directorate of  
Intelligence

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**Latin America  
Review** [Redacted]

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17 January 1986

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ALA LAR 86-003  
17 January 1986

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**Latin America  
Review**

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**Articles****Cuba: Changes in the Leadership**

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Younger, more technocratic managers are relieving Politburo members of day-to-day responsibility for running government ministries, reflecting President Castro's desire to insulate the party leadership from public criticism during an expected period of economic and political stress.

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**El Salvador: Strains in the Insurgent Alliance**

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*Central America North Branch*

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Differences between the political wing and the military front in the insurgent alliance may be widening, but a formal break in the alliance is unlikely.

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**Nicaragua: Keeping Labor on a Tight Rein**

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The Sandinistas are focusing on increasing worker productivity and strengthening their control over labor rather than on fulfilling their early promises of a better life for the working man.

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**Eastern Caribbean: Regional Security Update**

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A rudimentary and defensive-oriented Regional Security System among the island governments is designed primarily to counter subversion, but its specific form and functions have not yet been determined.

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**Eastern Caribbean: Growing Narcotics Threat**

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A rise in trafficking, accompanied by increased official corruption and drug abuse, is posing a serious challenge to the limited manpower and material resources of governments in the region.

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<b>Uruguay-USSR: Relations Under Sanguinetti</b> [Redacted]	23	25X1
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Although the Soviets have increased commercial and political overtures to the new civilian government in Uruguay, Moscow is unlikely to gain significant political influence in Montevideo over the next few years. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]		25X1

Although the majority party in the coalition government was weakened by the recent mayoral elections, President Sarney is likely to receive greater cooperation from party leaders in Congress, and he has gained a free hand to reshuffle his Cabinet and staff it with loyalists. [Redacted]

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*Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis, [Redacted]*

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Articles

Cuba: Changes in the Leadership



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The major changes that have been under way in the Cuban hierarchy since last spring reflect President Castro's desire to insulate the leadership of the party from public criticism as the country enters what we believe will be a period of prolonged economic and political stress. Politburo members are being relieved of responsibility for the day-to-day running of government ministries, thus allowing the regime greater freedom to demand strict accountability for administrative performance without damaging the prestige of the party's elite. The trend in government is clearly toward younger, more technocratic managers. The revered guerrilla veterans who have dominated the ministerial ranks for the last 27 years, despite their managerial incompetence, are now giving way to a new, better educated generation.



Perhaps the most significant change thus far has been the removal in December of Interior Minister Ramiro Valdes. A revolutionary hero with a strong reputation for ruthlessness, Valdes was appointed to the job six years ago to demonstrate to criminals and the population in general that the regime was initiating a nationwide crackdown to stem the rapidly increasing crime rate. Despite Valdes's harsh remedial measures, the national police force—itsself weakened by corruption and incompetence—has been unable to reverse the trend. There are now indications that the Interior Ministry's police functions may be transferred to a new ministry-level agency, that perhaps will be created at or shortly after the party congress in early February.



According to Cuban media reports, Valdes has been given an unspecified job in the electronics industry.



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Ramiro Valdes



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Valdes retains his seat on the Politburo—he is a charter member—and will probably oversee a major new effort to develop national expertise in the field of computers, semiconductors, and high-tech electronics. The new Interior Minister, Division Gen. Jose Abrahantes, has been in charge of Cuba's internal security apparatus for more than two decades and previously had served as Valdes's first deputy.

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Other Changes

Similar adjustments have been made with other Politburo members over the past several months. Public Health Minister Sergio del Valle, also a charter member of the Politburo, was replaced by his first deputy in December amid indications that his ministry could not fulfill President Castro's pledge to transform Cuba into a "world power" in the field of medicine. The overall pattern in these changes indicates that they are part of a larger plan to

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
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Armando Hart [redacted]

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Raul Castro [redacted]

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separate top-level party functions from government functions. With the party leadership no longer holding ministerial portfolios, sacking incompetent or corrupt administrators without damaging the prestige of the party or the reputations of the ex-guerrillas that constitute Castro's inner circle will become far easier.

Recent top-level changes in the economic arena reflect a new emphasis on economic efficiency rather than on political considerations. Alternate Politburo member Humberto Perez, for example, was replaced last summer as chief of the Central Planning Board after publicly admitting that he had mishandled his job. He was replaced by an individual described by the US Interests Section as one of a new breed of technocratic managers. A number of other technocrats have been named to important posts in the Construction, Light Industry, and Sugar Industry Ministries, as well as in the State Committee for Economic Cooperation.

The only Politburo members who still oversee government ministries are, Revolutionary Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro and Culture Minister Armando Hart. Hart, [redacted] is expected to step down. His successor most likely will be Alfredo Guevara, who had been Vice Minister of Culture until being assigned to Paris in 1983 as Cuban ambassador to UNESCO. Guevara's relationship with Fidel Castro dates from the late 1940s at Havana University; both he and Fidel were members of a Cuban student

delegation that was in Colombia in 1948 during the Bogotazo riots that swept the Colombian capital.

**New Role for Raul?**

[redacted] Raul Castro will turn his ministry over to one of his deputies to free himself to assume Fidel's duties as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. [redacted] with Raul overseeing the day-to-day operations of the government, Fidel would be able to devote greater attention to foreign policy matters and party affairs. Given his well-known penchant for disruptive micromanagement, Fidel's removal from the Council of Ministers, in our estimation, would be a major plus for the Cuban economy and government efficiency.

Raul is largely an unknown quantity as a public figure. When only 27 years old, he led a group of guerrilla columns that quickly established control over a large area and set up a rudimentary governmental administration to provide law, education, and public health services while the civil war was still in progress. As Armed Forces Minister since 1959, he created an entirely new military establishment that today is one of the largest and most potent in the Third World. Raul has amply demonstrated his organizational talent, courage, discipline, and the ability to communicate effectively with his subordinates.

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For 26 years, Raul has studiously avoided upstaging Fidel, staying instead in the shadow of his older brother and serving as his staunchest supporter. On occasion, however, Raul has shown that he is somewhat uncomfortable in this role—for example, at a reception he stormed angrily away from a tactless diplomat who incorrectly commented that Fidel was the only comandante to emerge from revolution—but he apparently does not see himself as a competitor of Fidel's. Cuban and non-Cuban alike fault Raul for his lack of charisma, and he has a reputation for toughness that some would characterize as ruthlessness. These traits could hamper or even negate his effectiveness as he tries to shift from military to political administration. [redacted]



Carlos Rafael Rodriguez [redacted]

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Nevertheless, a larger role for Raul in internal matters seems highly likely. The ideological report of the 10th Party Plenum in December 1984 hinted as much when it pointedly referred to warnings from "the first and second secretaries of our party" (emphasis added), an allusion usually reserved for Fidel alone, and to "instructions" given by Second Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee and Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces Raul Castro. Last April, Raul went to Moscow in lieu of Fidel for the Chernenko funeral and attended a meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev. Since then, Raul has appeared numerous times in activities throughout Cuba that appear aimed at broadening his public exposure and establishing direct links with the masses. [redacted]

A host of lesser changes are likely as new ministers begin reorganizing the bureaucracy to develop their own managerial teams, to attract and hold administrative talent amid bureaucratic infighting for resources, and to improve the performance of their respective ministries. This process probably will give rise to a new breed of managers who, having no history of participation in the guerrilla struggle that brought Castro to power, will have little political influence to protect themselves against charges of incompetence should they fail to produce. Those who cannot are likely to be replaced quickly—especially if Raul is at the helm—and some probably will be used as scapegoats to deflect popular dissatisfaction caused by increased austerity and lagging economic performance. [redacted]

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**Outlook: More Changes Coming**

Additional personnel shifts are probably in the offing. Although not a minister, 72-year-old Politburo member Carlos Rafael Rodriguez may be relieved of some of his government responsibilities. Rodriguez has long been Fidel's main adviser in both foreign policy and economic matters. Some of his economic responsibilities may be transferred to Havana's current Ambassador to the USSR Lionel Soto. Like Rodriguez, Soto was a member of the pre-Castro Communist party, and reportedly is slated to cede his position in Moscow to Foreign Minister Isidoro Malmierca. [redacted]

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**Table 1**  
**Major Personnel Changes to Date**

	Former Position(s)	Position Change	Comment
Ramiro <i>Valdes</i> Menendez	Politburo member; Vice President of Council of State and Council of Ministers; Minister of Interior.	Replaced as Minister of Interior on 3 December. Retains other positions and has added responsibility in "electronics industry."	A hardliner in Castro's inner circle. The new Minister of Interior, Jose Abrahantes, unlikely to change security and intelligence operations.
Guillermo <i>Garcia</i> Frias	Politburo member; Vice President of Council of State and Council of Ministers; Minister of Transportation.	Replaced as Minister of Transportation in July, but retains his other high-level positions.	An inept administrator in an important Ministry frequently criticized by Moscow. He is, however, a revered revolutionary figure.
Sergio <i>Del Valle</i> Jimenez	Politburo member; Member, Council of State; Minister of Public Health.	Gave up his Public Health portfolio as part of Castro's plan to relieve Politburo members of ministerial jobs.	Replaced by First Deputy in Ministry of Public Health, Julio Tejas Perez.
Humberto <i>Perez</i> Gonzalez	Politburo Alternate member; Vice President, Council of Ministers; Minister-President of Central Planning Board (JUCEPLAN).	Dismissed from JUCEPLAN in July; also lost position on the Council of Ministers. Remains on the Politburo.	Ran the planning board as personal fiefdom and frequently clashed with ministry heads and other economic officials.
Diocles <i>Torralba</i> Gonzalez	Vice President, Council of Minister; Member, Council of State; Minister of Sugar Industry.	Moved from Sugar Industry Ministry to "clean things up" in the Ministry of Transportation. Retains other positions.	Has close ties to Castro; also worked for Raul Castro in the Armed Forces Ministry before moving to the Sugar Industry Ministry in 1972.
Jose Antonio <i>Lopez</i> Moreno	Vice President, Council of Minister; Minister of Construction.	Assigned key position of Minister-President of JUCEPLAN. Relieved as Minister of Construction. Retains other position.	An engineer, with a long career in public works. He is reputed to be dynamic, intelligent, and able to work smoothly with other ministries.

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**Table 2**  
**Possible Changes To Come**


	Former Positions	Prospective Change	Comment
Raul <i>Castro</i> Ruz	Second Secretary, Politburo; Second Secretary, Secretariat; First Vice President, Council of State; First Vice President, Council of Ministers; Minister of Armed Forces.	Reported to be in line for either President of the Council of State or the Council of Ministers. He may give up his Armed Forces post.	Considered an excellent administrator and is likely to assume the Council of Ministers presidency where he would oversee day-to-day functioning of all the ministries.
Carlos Rafael <i>Rodriguez</i>	Politburo Member; Vice President, Council of State; Vice President, Council of Ministers.	Rodriguez is expected to retain all his posts, but he may be relieved of some administrative and travel tasks associated with Soviet relations and CEMA.	A pragmatic old-line Communist, Rodriguez is 72 and probably will relinquish some responsibility to younger technocrats. His influence as an adviser to Fidel will remain high.
Armando <i>Hart</i> Davalos	Politburo member; Member, Council of State; Minister of Culture.	Will be relieved of ministerial duties, [redacted] but will keep seat on Politburo.	[redacted] Likely replacement is current Cuban Ambassador to UNESCO, Alfredo Guevara.
Isidoro <i>Malmierca</i> Peoli	Member, Council of Ministers; Foreign Minister.	Reportedly will be named Ambassador to the Soviet Union and relieved of the Foreign Minister post.	As Foreign Minister, Malmierca served primarily as a message bearer and had little political clout.
Lionel <i>Soto</i> Prieto	Member, Party Secretariat; Ambassador to the Soviet Union.	Reportedly will be withdrawn from Moscow to assume an unspecified high-level post in Havana. Could also be named to the Politburo during the February Party Congress.	Has close links to Soviets; also highly regarded economist and could take over some of Carlos Rafael Rodriguez's responsibilities in foreign economic relations.
Hector <i>Rodriguez</i> Llompart	Member, Council of Ministers; Minister-President of the National Bank; Minister-President of the State Committee for Economic Cooperation (CECE).	Could be in line to assume some of Carlos Rafael Rodriguez's duties. Has also been named as a candidate for the Foreign Minister post.	A rising star in the economic sphere. Took over the National Bank position in October and relinquished the Economic Cooperation position.
[redacted]			

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### El Salvador: Organization of the Insurgent Alliance



Mixed  
 Marxist-Leninist (Military)  
 Marxist-Leninist (Political)  
 Democratic Socialist

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**El Salvador: Strains  
in the Insurgent Alliance** [redacted]

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Tensions between the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR)—the political wing of the Salvadoran insurgency—and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)—the five-faction military front—publicly surfaced last month with press reports that a formal split in the insurgent alliance was imminent. Both sides denied the report but [redacted] differences over goals and tactics remain. Most notably, the FDR opposed the killing last June of the US Marines and the kidnaping of President Duarte's daughter in September. [redacted]

were FMLN operations taken without prior consultation with the FDR. Moreover, during negotiations to secure the release of Duarte's daughter, FMLN representatives reportedly told FDR president Guillermo Ungo—who had been asked to involve himself by the Archbishop of San Salvador—that the FDR was not a party to the negotiations. Subsequently, [redacted]

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Although we do not believe a formal break is likely, the gap between the political and military wings may widen as the insurgents rely more heavily on economic sabotage and terrorism. The FDR is likely to continue to seek opportunities to assert its political independence, but, in our judgment, it has few options over the near term other than to attempt to gain influence under the umbrella of the insurgency. In the current political climate, we believe Duarte probably sees few advantages to reopening the dialogue with the weakened FDR. [redacted]

[redacted] the FDR has had little success in persuading the FMLN to abandon terror as a tactic. [redacted] FDR arguments that the kidnaping had alienated supporters and dried up funds from traditionally pro-FMLN governments, political parties, labor organizations, and church groups did not concern rebel military commanders. Moreover, [redacted] the FDR has not been able to convince the FMLN that military operations must respect human life, focus on military targets, and enhance political activity among the "masses." [redacted]

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**Signs of Strain**

Last December's press reports that the FDR was set to break with the FMLN drew public attention to the differences between the political and military wings of the insurgency. According to the reports, the FDR, upset over the the FMLN's increasing reliance on terrorism, was preparing to return exiled opposition figures to El Salvador to compete openly for political power. The rebels' Radio Venceremos was quick to deny the report, claiming that it was a propaganda ploy and reaffirming that all insurgent decisions continued to be reached by "consensus." [redacted]

In mid-November, the FDR reportedly refused to sign the FMLN program for a negotiated settlement—essentially a reiteration of the 1984 Ayagualo proposals—because they believe it condones terrorist operations, [redacted] FDR officials also reportedly were upset that they were asked only to comment on the document's contents rather than coauthor it. [redacted]

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In our judgment, however, these public proclamations belie differences between a weakened political wing and the increasingly assertive military factions. [redacted] the killing of the US Marines in the Zona Rosa and the kidnaping of Duarte's daughter, in September 1985, for example,

[redacted] the FMLN has attempted to expand its influence in the alliance further by claiming that political organizing in El Salvador falls within the exclusive province of the FMLN. [redacted] some

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FMLN leaders also believe the military factions are on the verge of creating a single Marxist-Leninist party that clearly would usurp most of the functions of the FDR. [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

The FDR attempted to close out the year by participating in a propaganda offensive that included a series of "peace forums" held by front groups, culminating in a weeklong "Second Conference for Dialogue and Peace" at the national university. The publicized hopes of FDR leaders Guillermo Ungo and Ruben Zamora to address the conference were dashed by Duarte's vow to arrest any insurgent leader attending the conference. At the same time, the FDR sought to take the lead, [redacted]

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**Trying To Regain the Initiative**

US Embassy [redacted] indicates that the FDR—aware that its room to maneuver is narrowing—is attempting to regain influence by shifting the focus of the war from the military to the political arena. [redacted]

[redacted] in calling a Christmas truce— eventually agreed to by both sides under the auspices of the church. In other moves, the FDR charged—in a two-page ad in a Salvadoran newspaper—that the insurgents had called for a renewal of dialogue four times in 1985, and that the Duarte government had spurned every overture. [redacted]

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[redacted] FDR leaders believe they must convince the Duarte government—particularly the military leadership—that the FDR is the best placed group to act as an interlocutor between the government and the FMLN and that failure to deal with the FDR would result in a strengthening of the FMLN. As a way of encouraging negotiations, [redacted]

[redacted] the FDR is willing to drop many of its preconditions for dialogue with the government and discuss a reduced agenda that focuses first on the creation of a national forum and an "end to repression." [redacted]

**Near-Term Outlook**

Despite the recent flurry of activity and rumors, we do not believe a split between the FDR and the FMLN is imminent. In the near term, we believe a weakened FDR has little choice but to husband what influence it has within the insurgent alliance. Differences between the two groups, in fact, may widen if, as expected, the guerrillas continue to rely on economic sabotage and terrorism, which the FDR has difficulty supporting. [redacted]

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In other moves, [redacted] the FDR is planning the withdrawal of most of its representatives from Europe and that many of these—members of the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR)—are to return to El Salvador in 1986 with the ultimate goal of establishing the MNR as a legitimate party. [redacted]

[redacted] the FDR had plans to establish its headquarters in Mexico City, presumably to organize and monitor political developments in El Salvador more effectively. In our judgment, these moves probably reflect the FDR's reduced economic resources, as well as concern that the establishment in mid-October of a leftist-oriented Social Democratic Party (PSD) by former MNR members could further undercut the FDR's already waning political influence. [redacted]

In response to their narrowed options, we anticipate that the FDR will send periodic signals that its goals do not necessarily parallel those of the military factions. In particular, it is likely to continue using "peace forums" and similar initiatives to portray the Duarte government as intransigent. At the same time, FDR leaders are likely to keep close watch on the government's response to the PSD and other political returnees for signs of new opportunities. We do not expect a large-scale return of opposition figures from exile, however, because of Duarte's promise to prosecute them. [redacted]

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On balance, Duarte probably sees little advantage to responding positively to overtures from a weakened FDR. Instead, he probably will point to opportunities for those who want to return to participate openly under the constitution. By so doing, he probably hopes to encourage further splits in the insurgency. On the dialogue issue, he is likely to argue that insurgent calls for dialogue are merely tactical ploys, and that he is willing to resume the dialogue, but not on guerrilla terms.

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**Nicaragua:  
Keeping Labor on a Tight Rein** [redacted]

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The Sandinistas have made much of the revolution's benefits to workers and have boosted organized labor's ranks enormously, but early promises of a better life for the working man have faded. [redacted]

for fines and the arrest of workers who violate Sandinista laws that promote discipline and productivity. [redacted]

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[redacted] the regime has focused on increasing worker productivity and strengthening its control over labor rather than on bread-and-butter issues. While tolerating the existence of independent labor organizations, Managua has greatly reduced their size and severely limited their ability to recruit, organize, and press for worker benefits. [redacted]

US Embassy reporting indicates that the Labor Ministry, with its power to impose compulsory arbitration, grant legal status to unions, and decide the outcome of union elections, played a key role in establishing Sandinista control. The Ministry frequently delayed certification of independent unions and accepted rump elections by pro-Sandinista factions as a means of controlling union affiliation and leadership selection. [redacted]

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On taking power in mid-1979, the Sandinistas, who had encouraged labor activism during their struggle against former President Somoza, enacted laws to protect jobs and wages and sided with laborers in disputes with employers. This prolabor stance, however, coupled with the regime's anticapitalist rhetoric, quickly sparked a rash of strikes and plant takeovers by workers, according to US Embassy reporting. The Sandinistas, in our view, feared that labor militancy threatened economic recovery and their own consolidation of power, and moved to ensure their dominance of the movement. [redacted]

[redacted] the government has pressured workers to join the CST and other progovernment labor organizations by sending police to union elections, arresting independent labor leaders, and attacking their homes and offices. Not unexpectedly, the CST claims its membership has swelled to over 100,000 since its formation in 1979. [redacted]

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**The Structure of Control**

The Sandinistas created new organizations—the Sandinista Workers' Central (CST) and the Association of Farm Workers (ATC)—to supersede existing labor confederations, enacted new laws to curb labor activism, and strengthened the Labor Ministry's authority. The CST initially advocated traditional labor goals such as wage increases, revision of the labor code, and worker participation in management. By late 1980, however, its focus, along with the regime's, had shifted to concern over inflation and labor's activism. The CST began to back government-mandated wage freezes, oppose strikes, and generally encourage workers to accept their lot, according to US Embassy reporting. Changes in the labor code not only toughened restrictions on businesses' ability to fire employees but also provided

The regime also has resorted to sweeping institutional measures to solidify its control. In mid-1981, for example, Managua announced a get-tough policy to halt work stoppages and wage protests. With CST help, the Labor Ministry mounted a campaign to discourage strikes, and the regime subsequently declared a national "state of economic emergency" that banned strikes and froze wages. When the government temporarily lifted many of these restrictions for several months prior to the elections of November 1984, union leaders took advantage of the opportunity to stage a flurry of work stoppages in an effort to obtain higher wages and other benefits, according to US Embassy and press reporting. After the election, however, the Sandinistas restored the controls and, with the expanded state of emergency decreed in October 1985, tightened the screws. [redacted]

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**Nicaragua's Labor Organizations**

	Political Affiliation/ Association	International Affiliation	Size <sup>a</sup>
<b>Sandinista labor organizations</b>			<b>12,600-13,100 <sup>a</sup></b>
Sandinista Workers' Central	Sandinista	World Federation of Trade Unions	100,000-150,000
Association of Farm Workers	Sandinista		40,000 + seasonal workers
Nicaraguan Health Workers' Federation	Sandinista		5,000-10,000
National Union of Public Employees	Sandinista		45,000
National Teachers' Association	Sandinista		14,000
<b>Non-Sandinista labor organizations</b>			<b>204,000-259,000 <sup>a</sup></b>
Nicaraguan Workers' Central	Social Christian; internal opposition	World Confederation of Labor; Latin American Workers' Central	2,500
Confederation of Labor Unification	Social Democrats; internal opposition	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, American Institute for Free Labor	1,500-2,000
General Confederation of Independent Workers	Nicaragua Socialist Party; generally supports Sandinista policy	World Federation of Trade Unions	6,500
Confederation for Action and Trade Union Unity	Communist Party of Nicaragua		2,000
Workers Front	Trotskyite—ultraleft		100

<sup>a</sup> Membership figures vary widely due to differences between union claims, Labor Ministry statistics, and differing definitions of membership.

**Narrowing Options for Independent Labor**

Although tolerated, non-Sandinista labor organizations have seen their activities sharply limited, and their membership has declined significantly. The Nicaraguan Workers' Central claims that its membership reached 65,000 shortly after the 1979 revolution but now is down to less than 3,000, according to Labor Ministry estimates. Similarly the Confederation of Labor Unification only has about 1,500 members. The Communist unions have generally been co-opted by the regime, according to the US Embassy. [redacted]

Even as they decrease in size, the independent confederations have maintained strong ties to international labor as well as to Social and Christian Democrat groups in Europe, from which they receive funds and with which they exchange visits. We agree with US Embassy reporting that such links to foreign organizations have made the regime hesitant to do away with the democratic labor groups. [redacted]

US Embassy reporting indicates that workers have little say in negotiations over income or working conditions. Wage hikes have not kept pace with the rapidly rising cost of basic goods. With purchasing power only about 50 percent of its 1978 level, the standard of living for most workers has fallen sharply. [redacted]

**Outlook**

In our opinion, independent labor organizations have few possibilities for defying the regime or defending their members' interests. The Nicaraguan Workers' Central and the Confederation of Labor Unification, which remain almost entirely dependent on funding from foreign organizations, will continue to publicize workers' grievances in hopes that international opinion will serve as a check on the Sandinistas. They

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probably will continue to move cautiously, however, to avoid giving Managua a pretext for harsher repression.

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The government is likely to continue tolerating non-Sandinista labor organizations as part of its claim to pluralism, while closely restricting their activities and seeking to take advantage of their internal divisions. The regime's own labor groups, meanwhile, will be used to indoctrinate and control the majority of Nicaraguan workers. The Sandinistas are likely to deal firmly with any wildcat strikes or local protests resulting from deteriorating economic conditions, although on occasion they may choose to grant small concessions.

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**Eastern Caribbean:  
Regional Security Update** 

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Three years after a memorandum of understanding between five Eastern Caribbean states created the Regional Security System (RSS),<sup>1</sup> its form and functions remain uncertain. The present rudimentary and defensive-oriented system is designed primarily to counter subversion, but no country has more than one 80-man Special Service Unit, and no unit is fully trained. Severe economic constraints and the absence of a clear threat since the US-led intervention in Grenada in 1983 are giving some Eastern Caribbean leaders second thoughts about implementing even this modest security system. Eastern Caribbean governments lack the necessary \$10 million annually to cover equipment and training for the Special Service Units and coast guards, according to the US Embassy in Barbados, and are also short of expertise required to undertake an effective in-country training program. Ratification of a draft treaty defining the relationship between the RSS and the United States and United Kingdom is stalled, thus placing a US-UK joint training proposal on hold. The emergence of new leaders in St. Vincent and Barbados, as well as regional suspicion over the dominant role of Barbados and its defense chief, have stymied progress. Without outside support the system probably would founder and could eventually disappear, leaving the islands vulnerable to potential internal and external subversion. No matter what form the RSS takes, we believe that Eastern Caribbean governments will continue to look to Washington for security assistance.

**Slow Progress on the RSS Treaty**

The long-delayed RSS treaty, slated to replace the memorandum of understanding, remains uncoordinated and unratified. US and British officials regard the treaty as necessary to spell out the relationship between the RSS and the United States

<sup>1</sup> Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent established a Regional Security System in 1982 because of their concern about the radical Bishop regime in Grenada. St. Christopher-Nevis joined in 1984, and Grenada followed in March 1985.

and United Kingdom, as well as to commit Eastern Caribbean governments firmly to a collective security agreement. Currently, US and UK funding and training assistance must be conducted through bilateral agreements with individual Caribbean governments. Under a treaty, such support would be channeled through the RSS apparatus, thus streamlining the relationship. RSS security chiefs, who support a treaty, complain that current security training is ad hoc, with little or no input from the RSS as an organization.

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Slow progress on treaty ratification, in our view, partly reflects the Caribbean style of decisionmaking. As in other regional matters, Eastern Caribbean leaders tend to mull over a matter until they feel completely satisfied with it; some have pointed out that the 1982 memorandum of understanding meets their current needs because any country can ask other members for assistance in a security situation, natural disaster, or rescue operation.

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Uncertainty and stalemate over the treaty has put a US-UK joint training proposal for the RSS on hold. Under the proposal, the British would provide basic security training in Barbados while the United States would conduct leadership training in Antigua. This proposal would replace bilateral security training arrangements between the United States, the British, and the Eastern Caribbean states and would assure that each country's Special Service Unit receives equitable, acceptable training.

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25X1**Changing Leadership Perceptions**

Although  all Eastern Caribbean countries are experiencing severe economic constraints and growing complacency about regional security, some leaders have become less enthusiastic about the RSS than others. St. Vincent's Prime Minister Mitchell has become the most hesitant

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**Regional Security Forces <sup>a</sup>**

*Barbados Defense Force:*

- Army includes 36 officers and 429 enlisted personnel, equipped with rifles, machineguns, two mortars, and six grenade launchers.
- Coast Guard, with 78 personnel, has seven boats ranging in size from 41 to 123 feet.
- Police force of 350, of which 60 are in Special Service Unit.

*Antigua-Barbuda Defense Force:*

- Army of 72 with few reserves.
- Coast Guard, with 24 personnel, has one 65-foot and three 27-foot patrol boats.
- Police force of 350; 80 (77) in Special Service Unit.

*Dominica:*

- Coast Guard with 24 personnel and one 65-foot patrol boat.
- Police force of 374; 80 (66) in Special Service Unit.

*Grenada:*

- Coast Guard, with 30 personnel, has one 106-foot patrol boat and two 30-foot boats.
- Police force of 550; 80 (75) in Special Service Unit.

*St. Lucia:*

- Coast Guard with 24 personnel and one 65-foot patrol boat.
- Police force of 485; 80 (72) in Special Service Unit.

*St. Christopher-Nevis:*

- Coast Guard with 24 personnel, one 110-foot patrol boat and two 27-foot boats.
- Police force 301; 80 (70) in Special Service Unit.

*St. Vincent:*

- Coast Guard with 12 personnel and one 75-foot patrol boat.
- Police force of 503, 80 (31) in Special Service Unit.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Eastern Caribbean leader regarding the RSS. Elected nearly two years ago on a platform opposing increased defense expenditures, Mitchell, according to the US Embassy in Grenada, believes that economic development and job creation will provide greater security than small paramilitary units. The Embassy in Barbados reports that Mitchell seems especially concerned about the possibility of fully trained Special Service Units overthrowing a government.

[Redacted]

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Despite Mitchell's misgivings, he remains a proponent—in theory at least—of the regional security concept, according to the Embassy in Grenada [Redacted]. Bucking domestic criticism, he allowed some of St. Vincent's security personnel to receive training in Grenada by US instructors during the peacekeeping operations there. However, St. Vincent's security contingent—the only intact unit in the islands prior to Mitchell's election—has been largely disbanded.

[Redacted] less than half of St. Vincent's

unit is fully trained. St. Vincent was the only RSS member not participating in the "Exotic Palm" exercise in St. Lucia last September. Mitchell has been at odds with RSS Coordinator Lewis since his election, and some Barbadian officials blame Mitchell's foot-dragging for complicating final ratification of the RSS treaty.

[Redacted]

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Other Eastern Caribbean leaders are concerned over their ability to fund Special Service Units. Even Dominica's Prime Minister Charles, a strong advocate of an RSS, has expressed concern about the costs involved.

[Redacted]

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The death last March of Barbados's Prime Minister, Tom Adams, eliminated the region's major proponent of the system, and unlike his predecessor, Prime Minister St. John has failed to emerge as a forceful

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**US-Caribbean Exercises**

Last year marked the first unified exercise between RSS contingents and US forces in the Caribbean. The "Exotic Palm" exercise last September in and around St. Lucia also included troops from the United Kingdom and Jamaica. The United States funded the \$1 million cost of the exercise, which involved approximately 200 Special Service Unit personnel and several hundred US troops. "Exotic Palm" was followed last November by "Upward Key," a bilateral exercise in and around Antigua between US and Antigua Defense Force personnel. Next May, the second unified effort between the US and RSS forces—codenamed "Ocean Venture"—will occur in and around Grenada. [redacted]

The purpose of the exercises, according to US officials, is to assess and improved the ability of the RSS to organize, mobilize, and deploy its ground, air, and naval assets in response to urgent requests for help from member states. The "Upward Key" exercise emphasized the interdiction and capture of drug and arms smugglers. In both cases, post mortems pointed to problems in field communications, a breakdown in Special Service Unit discipline and performance. [redacted]

One charter member of the RSS—St. Vincent—did not participate in "Exotic Palm," although it sent

observers. [redacted] Prime Minister Mitchell vetoed St. Vincent's participation primarily because he views such exercises as militarizing the region. The US Embassy in Bridgetown reports that Mitchell may not participate in future RSS exercises until the RSS treaty is ratified, a move that probably will preclude St. Vincent's participation in "Ocean Venture" this spring. [redacted]

Publicity surrounding the exercises has highlighted the awkward relationship between the RSS members and the United States without a treaty. According to the Embassy, opposition elements in the region tried to make US "imperialism" an issue in relation to the exercises. Leading leftists in Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent, for example, heavily criticized "Exotic Palm." Moreover, the regional press played up seemingly different perceptions of RSS functions held by Caribbean leaders and [redacted] It quoted several Caribbean leaders as publicly emphasizing the potential role of the RSS in disaster relief and providing for the region's own security. In contrast, the press alleged a stress by [redacted] on how the RSS could help to suppress a potential leftist insurgency and serve as a "tripwire" for US intervention. [redacted]

RSS proponent. [redacted] St. John wants to prevent the RSS from becoming an issue in national elections to be held later this year and has adopted a low profile on military matters. Opposition parties in Barbados, and Eastern Caribbean leftists in general, however, appear poised to make the RSS and defense spending priority domestic issues, according to the Embassy in Bridgetown. [redacted]

**"Big Brother" Barbados**

According to the US Embassy in Bridgetown, much of the distrust over the RSS among Eastern Caribbean leaders stems from the location of its headquarters in Barbados. Traditionally in the

Eastern Caribbean, Barbados has been referred to derisively as the "Big Brother," whose influence is to be resisted by the ministates. Concerned about Barbadian influence over the RSS and Brigadier Lewis's leadership, Eastern Caribbean leaders are considering the appointment of a civilian secretary to assist the Coordinator in operating the system. Since Coordinator Lewis is from Barbados, the secretary would be required to be non-Barbadian, effectively circumscribing some of the former's power. [redacted]

The addition of Trinidad and Tobago to the system could relieve concern over—and pressure on—Barbados, but Trinidad's participation seems unlikely

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Rudyard Lewis [redacted]

Sunday Sun

*Brig. Rudyard E. C. Lewis, Chief of Staff of the Barbados Defense Force since 1980 and RSS Coordinator since 1983 . . . most influential and controversial military leader in the Caribbean . . . former Deputy Chief of Staff in the Jamaican Defense Force . . . second native-born Barbadian to acquire the highest military position in Barbados . . . generally regarded as competent and professional but unpopular outside of Barbados . . .* [redacted]

*. . . feud with St. Vincent's Mitchell since July 1984, when Lewis led a Barbadian contingent to Union Island to quell an "uprising". . . has criticized joint US-UK training proposal . . . prefers single regional training facility in Barbados under his control . . . may be losing favor with political leadership in Barbados, which reportedly fears that his controversial nature will delay approval of RSS treaty . . . St. John to exert closer control through his defense secretary.* [redacted]

at this juncture. The US Embassy in Port of Spain reports that the leaders of Trinidad's Defense Force favor a role in Eastern Caribbean security and have studied the RSS with interest. During the 1970s, Trinidad helped to establish the defense forces of Barbados and Antigua. Strains between Trinidad and other Eastern Caribbean countries over economic

policies and the fallout from Trinidad's criticism of the Grenada intervention, however, work against Trinidad's joining the system in the foreseeable future. [redacted]

**Prospects**

We believe that upgrading the memorandum of understanding to treaty status would be an important demonstration of Eastern Caribbean commitment to regional security needs. Considering the current snail's pace of negotiations, however, we doubt that the treaty or the US-UK training proposal will be approved by the Eastern Caribbean governments until late this year at the earliest. We believe that, under the training proposal, the Special Service Units and coast guards would represent a major improvement over what existed five years ago and would be effective for internal and collective security. Given the present lack of a serious subversive threat in the Eastern Caribbean, we judge that the most important benefit of the RSS and the coast guard system ultimately might be their role in search-and-rescue, disaster relief, and narcotics interdiction. Distrust and uncertainty among Eastern Caribbean leaders may be overcome by further exercises such as "Exotic Palm" and the coming "Ocean Venture"—programs that will point out RSS deficiencies as well as promote professionalism and integration of forces. [redacted]

No matter what shape the RSS finally takes, we believe the Eastern Caribbean islands will continue to call on Washington for security assistance. At a minimum, requests for support will center on funding and training. We believe that constabularies in the ministates, despite RSS training, can deal with only minor and sporadic incidents. Widespread and prolonged internal unrest or external aggression could strain the capabilities of even a regional quick-reaction security force. Should the RSS collapse altogether, it would become more likely that Washington would be called on to take unilateral action to restore order. [redacted]

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**Eastern Caribbean:  
Growing Narcotics Threat**

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Growing US and local interdiction efforts directed against customary Caribbean drug trafficking routes over the past year apparently have prompted narcotics dealers to seek alternative routes in the Eastern Caribbean. The rise in trafficking and its expected side effects—official corruption and drug abuse—will present a serious challenge to the limited manpower and material resources of governments in the region.

**Production and Trafficking**

Local drug production and international trafficking so far have not had a significant economic or social impact in the Eastern Caribbean, according to the US Embassy in Antigua. Marijuana—grown in small quantities on virtually all the islands—is the only illegal drug produced in the region. Marijuana is used mostly by local youth, particularly members of the Rastafarian cult, who claim it is essential to their religious practices. Although no statistics are available on drug abuse in the islands, local officials believe that marijuana use is rising. Officials in Dominica, for example, estimate that up to 50 percent of the population occasionally use it. According to local authorities, cocaine use in the islands is limited mainly to affluent visitors.

US Embassy reporting indicates that increased interdiction operations have curtailed drug traffic along customary routes, encouraging traffickers to shift to the Eastern Caribbean to avoid enforcement efforts. Traditionally considered a smugglers' paradise because of their many isolated bays and coves, the Eastern Caribbean islands provide an ideal operating area for traffickers. Embassy reporting indicates that loosely organized small-time traffickers—local and foreign—operate in all the

<sup>1</sup> For the purpose of this article, the Eastern Caribbean includes Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Christopher-Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

islands. Local authorities doubt, however, that any major international drug figures are operating in the area yet. They believe that international airports and cruise ships are the principle conduits for marijuana and cocaine targeted for the US market. Yachts and small interisland cargo ships often transport drugs to lightly patrolled coastal points for reshipment to major markets.

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**Barbados.** According to the Embassy, local police believe that Jamaica is the main supplier of drugs intercepted in Barbados—a principal transshipment point in the area—but that Guyana and Trinidad are emerging as secondary sources. Marijuana apparently is shipped to Barbados for domestic consumption, sale to tourists, and transshipment. In mid-1985, following the seizure of some \$250,000 worth of marijuana at Grantley Adams Airport, Barbadian customs officials estimated that they had confiscated nearly \$1 million worth of illegal drugs at the island's sea and air ports during the first half of 1985. Since then, varying amounts of marijuana have been discovered on flights originating in Jamaica. Of even greater concern to local officials, according to the Embassy, is the recent influx of cocaine into the country, which local police believe comes from Trinidad and Guyana. In September, while investigating a murder, police discovered \$500,000 worth of cocaine in the home of a wealthy Barbadian businessman. Police believe the cocaine is imported mainly to be sold to foreign tourists, according to the US Embassy.

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**Antigua.** Recent seizures of drugs reveal that Antigua is being used by Colombian traffickers as an increasingly important transshipment point for narcotics destined for the United States and Canada. Last October, Antiguan police discovered 17,400 pounds of marijuana stored in a house in the capital city of St. Johns, by far the largest drug seizure ever made in that country. A longtime Antiguan resident,


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### New Drug Trafficking Route



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Mike Tyrell turned himself in to police as owner of the drugs. Tyrell—with a record of several convictions for similar offenses in Guadeloupe and the United Kingdom—was fined the maximum penalty of \$5,580 but sentenced to only six weeks of hard labor, a sentence he has yet to begin serving.

[redacted] that Tyrell is the main contact for Colombian traffickers who use the island for marijuana and cocaine transshipment. Police believe that Antigua's busy international airport and its considerable yacht trade—the Embassy estimates that 500 boats anchor in St. John's harbor on any given day during the December-April tourist season—make the island particularly attractive to traffickers.

**Elsewhere.** Local police believe that St. Lucia and Dominica are used for the movement of narcotics to the nearby French Departments of Martinique and Guadeloupe. Dominica's police commissioner has complained to US officials about the lack of French cooperation on drug control issues on neighboring islands and of the absence of formal security arrangements. The US Consul in Martinique reports an upsurge of narcotics trafficking through the French Departments but notes that French officials believe that smuggling operations between St. Lucia and Martinique are insignificant and dismiss allegations of air shipments to Paris originating in Dominica or St. Lucia. Similarly, St. Vincent and the Grenadines Prime Minister Mitchell, in conversations with Embassy officials, minimizes reports of increasing drug smuggling activities in the Grenadines, implying that the sources of such reports are self-serving senior police officers.

**Drug-Related Official Corruption**

Official corruption in many Caribbean countries,

[redacted] probably has increased in response to expanded drug activities. Low wages and other meager perquisites available in the ministates are conducive to the offer and solicitation of bribes to police, customs officers, and other government officials. According to the Embassy, police in Barbados believe that customs officials allow traffickers to operate there in exchange for bribes of \$5,000 to \$10,000. They suspect that high-level Barbadian officials may be involved

because of the lack of progress in recent efforts by police to conduct investigations into official

wrongdoing. In Antigua, [redacted] several government officials,

[redacted] are involved in narcotics trafficking, [redacted]

[redacted] The Embassy reports that high-ranking police officials also may be involved,

[redacted]

Police commissioners in St. Lucia and St. Vincent were suspended from duty last year while under investigation for corruption, but no credible evidence has been produced to indicate their direct involvement in narcotics trafficking.

**Government Antidrug Efforts**

Police on all the Eastern Caribbean islands periodically undertake special operations to disrupt cultivation of marijuana and its trade, although in general their governments are poorly prepared to deal with increasing drug activities. Local police forces already are stretched thin and only a few police officers from Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, and St. Vincent have participated in DEA detection or related training courses. The two largest discoveries of drugs by Barbadian police last year apparently were accidental—in one case during the course of a murder investigation and in the other during a routine examination of unclaimed cargo at the local airport.

[redacted]

Moreover, local officials have told Embassy officers that their governments have increased antidrug efforts but are hampered by their inability to patrol coastal areas adequately and by their difficulty in obtaining hard evidence needed to arrest and convict suspected traffickers. In addition to

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manpower shortages, limited equipment restricts the effectiveness of antidrug operations. None of the smaller islands' security forces, for example, has airplanes or helicopters. Existing legislation is inadequate to discourage narcotics offenders; penalties generally are light and laws vary from island to island. Although regional leaders agreed in November that efforts should be made to coordinate narcotics legislation, apparently nothing concrete has resulted so far. [redacted]

The well-publicized seizures of marijuana and cocaine in Barbados and Antigua have made local governments more aware of narcotics activities and prompted appeals for US assistance. Government leaders in Grenada, St. Lucia, Barbados, and Antigua have publicly labeled narcotics activities a serious problem for their countries. Last March Prime Minister Blaize of Grenada announced the creation of a high-level security task force in trafficking on drugs and contraband. Concerned by the apparent movement of trafficking eastward in the Caribbean, Barbadian officials have requested US aid in forming a narcotics coordinating committee. Antiguan Deputy Prime Minister Bird announced plans in October to establish a narcotics squad and requested US help in organizing it. [redacted]

consequences, they remain reluctant to deal with the problem aggressively. They fear endangering their vital tourist sectors by instituting strict customs searches or raids on hotels and nightspots despite evidence that tourists are bringing in drugs or purchasing them locally. [redacted]

Similar to the pattern in Jamaica and The Bahamas, increased trafficking activity in the Eastern Caribbean almost certainly will prompt a rise in local drug consumption and official corruption. The lure of drug dollars will be especially difficult to combat because the ministates already are facing high unemployment and other economic problems. Limited economic opportunities, especially for young people, suggest that illegal drugs—whether as a means of profit or escape—will pose a long-term problem for the region. [redacted]

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**Outlook**

Despite increased local awareness and antidrug efforts, we see little chance of stemming the flow of illegal drugs and accompanying problems into the Eastern Caribbean anytime soon. Continued crackdowns on drug activities in Jamaica and The Bahamas will encourage traffickers to expand their operations further in the Eastern Caribbean. US-trained police special service units in each island may develop a greater counternarcotics role that could produce a pool of trained personnel to improve US-supported antinarcotics programs. Nevertheless, although local officials express concern about rising trafficking and its potentially serious social

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**Uruguay-USSR:  
Relations Under  
Sanguinetti** [redacted]

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The Soviet Union has significantly increased its commercial and political overtures to Uruguay since the latter's return to civilian rule last March. Moscow has agreed to purchase a variety of Uruguayan products and has promoted several exchanges of commercial delegations. In addition, the USSR is cultivating contacts with leaders of Uruguay's political parties, especially within the leftist Broad Front coalition. Moscow exerts the greatest influence over the Communist Party—a Broad Front member—to which it clandestinely channels funds.

[redacted]

While relations between Moscow and Montevideo are improving, we do not believe that the USSR is likely to gain significant political influence in Uruguay over the next few years. Moscow will probably refrain from promoting revolutionary violence in Uruguay during this period because it wants to develop positive state-to-state relations and to avoid provoking the anti-Communist military.

**Increased Economic Ties**

President Sanguinetti, needing to revive Uruguay's ailing economy, has publicly emphasized the importance of trade expansion in overcoming high unemployment and the burdensome foreign debt. Moscow has taken advantage of this by increasing commercial dealings with Uruguay, probably calculating that small economic investments would eventually produce relatively big political payoffs. The USSR appears eager to exploit Sanguinetti's openness to trade and is increasing purchases of Uruguayan goods—even though it already runs a modest trade deficit with Montevideo. The increased trade contacts between the two countries, which began during the final months of military rule in Uruguay, have included:

- In July 1984 Moscow agreed to sell Montevideo 5,000 barrels a day of oil for six months at concessionary prices.

[redacted]

- In September 1984 Uruguay granted Moscow full trade representation and, in return, the USSR agreed to purchase \$120 million of Uruguayan exports in 1985, up from an annual average of approximately \$70 million.
- The USSR offered preferential trade credits in 1985 for purchases of Soviet machinery and equipment, according to the US Embassy.
- In June 1985, the Soviets pledged to increase purchases of Uruguayan products by 12 percent by the end of 1985, especially in nontraditional exports. In July, Moscow made its first purchase of Uruguayan citrus fruit.

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Several other projected Soviet trade initiatives could enhance Uruguayan-Soviet economic ties in 1986. Moscow plans to create mixed commissions and to sponsor more commercial contacts between the two countries. Last August, a deputy from the ruling Colorado Party traveled to the USSR to discuss a possible trade agreement to cover the next Soviet Five-Year Plan (1986-91). In addition, it is possible that Aeroflot could open an office in Montevideo within the next six months.

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**Seeking Increased Political and Cultural Influence**

Moscow is also seeking to strengthen its ties to Montevideo through various cultural exchanges. The Soviet-Uruguayan Cultural Center in Montevideo (ICUS)—dormant since the 1973 coup—reopened in early November. This year ICUS plans to offer Russian-language classes, a variety of theatrical and cultural events, and scholarships for Uruguayan students to study in Moscow.

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Montevideo expelled two former directors of the institute for alleged espionage activities during the 1950s and 1960s.

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The Soviets, in our view, also hope to enhance their political influence by courting politicians from Uruguay's two "traditional" political parties, the generally centrist Blancos and Colorados. Most important, [redacted] Moscow has invited Sanguinetti for an official visit in 1986 to mark 60 years of diplomatic relations between the two countries. [redacted]

US Embassy and other reports indicate the Soviets are courting Blanco Party members, especially Juan Raul Ferreira, son of Blanco president, Wilson Ferreira, and leader of his own left-of-center Blanco faction. According to the Embassy, Juan Raul traveled to Moscow in February 1985 and later attended a private dinner at the Soviet Embassy in Montevideo. While Juan Raul's leftist views make him a logical candidate for Soviet attention, we suspect that Moscow is also seeking out more moderate—and more influential—Blanco leaders. [redacted]

We believe, however, that the Soviets' best hopes for long-term political influence in Uruguay lie with the Broad Front (FAU), a coalition of leftwing opposition parties. Currently, the FAU ranks a poor third after the Colorados and Blancos, but, over the long term, we believe the party has the potential to become a major force in Uruguayan politics. FAU leader Liber Seregni—a well-known former general and independent leftist—is [redacted] well disposed toward Moscow. [redacted]

[redacted] Moscow is assiduously cultivating Seregni and urged him to visit several Communist capitals during 1985 to enhance his domestic political standing and international exposure. In addition, the Soviets already exert control over the strongest party within the FAU—the Uruguayan Communist Party (PCU). [redacted]

**Soviet-PCU Relations**

The Soviets have maintained longstanding ties to the Uruguayan Communists. Many PCU leaders—including party Secretary General Rodney Arismendi—were in exile in Moscow during the last period of military rule in Uruguay. Under democracy, Moscow continues to invite PCU leaders to the USSR for relaxation and ideological training. [redacted]

One of the most effective means used by Moscow to influence PCU policy is the party's daily newspaper, *La Hora*. [redacted]

In addition, the Soviets channel considerable financial aid directly to the Communist Party. Legal Uruguayan export-import companies owned by the PCU, and the Moscow-based International Bank of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA), are used for cover purposes. [redacted]

We believe that one of the Soviets' chief objectives is to rein in ultraleftist elements within the PCU and the Broad Front that have tried to destabilize Sanguinetti through constant labor and political agitation.

Moscow, in our view, believes that at present there is little revolutionary potential in the country and views that such actions could jeopardize its current emphasis on good state-to-state relations and lead, in the long run, to the return of an anti-Soviet military regime. In a similar vein, [redacted]

[redacted] Moscow has avoided contacts with leftist Tupamaro ex-guerrillas because it is concerned that publicity resulting from such activities could tarnish the PCU's reputation and diminish the electoral prospects of the FAU. [redacted]

[redacted] the PCU has established a link to a dissident Tupamaro faction that advocates prompt return to

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armed struggle. Although we suspect that these contacts are independent of either the PCU or any of its factions, it is possible that Moscow—ever willing to keep open the option of an eventual return to revolutionary violence—has tacitly sanctioned them.

[redacted]

**Outlook**

We believe the Soviets will make modest economic and cultural gains in Uruguay over the next year. The USSR is starting from a position of very slight influence, however, and progress will result primarily from the demise of the aggressively anti-Soviet ethos fostered by past military regimes. We judge that it will be difficult for Moscow to translate its successes into political influence. Both Sanguinetti's relatively strong political standing and Uruguay's basically liberal-democratic political culture militate against extensive Soviet inroads.

Sanguinetti himself is dealing very cautiously with Moscow.

[redacted]

Moreover, Sanguinetti has not yet responded to Moscow's persistent offers of an official state visit.

[redacted]

We also believe that in the next few years the Soviets will continue to oppose terrorism and destabilizing labor agitation by ultraleftists as unwise provocations of the military and detrimental to their efforts to improve relations with the Sanguinetti government.

[redacted]

Longer run prospects for Soviet penetration will hinge largely on internal Uruguayan politics. We doubt that Moscow will be able to increase significantly its leverage with the Blanco and Colorado Parties. Only under a Broad Front government, in our view, could Moscow potentially wield considerable political influence. Opposition from the military, moderate views of the majority of Uruguayans, and the Front's internal disarray, however, will probably keep the FAU on the political sidelines over the next several years. Nevertheless, Moscow's rapport with Liber Serengi and close ties to the PCU would stand it in good stead in the unlikely event that the Front achieved power.

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**Brazil: Implications  
of the Mayoral Elections** [redacted]

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The outcome of the nationwide municipal elections on 15 November left the majority party in President Sarney's uneasy coalition government weakened, but the President's position probably will be strengthened. We believe Sarney will receive greater cooperation from party leaders in Congress and will now have a free hand to reshuffle the Cabinet and staff it with loyalists. The elections also enhanced the stature and future presidential prospects of populist leaders on the right and the left, whose campaigns exploited working-class dissatisfaction with the pace of social reform. In the aftermath of the vote, we expect political parties and their leaders to show increasing responsiveness to popular demands, auguring difficulty for economic stabilization. With the elections confirming new strength of political factions on the left and right, we believe it is possible that Brazilian political groups could polarize around extreme positions in the future. [redacted]

spark infighting within the party and Sarney probably will exploit this by making alliances with leaders outside the coalition, according to the US Embassy. Such a strategy could prove effective in securing support for social reform legislation in the PMDB-controlled Congress, but will require Sarney to fashion alliances on an issue-by-issue basis, a politically risky proposition. [redacted]

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**Winners and Losers**

The Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), the senior partner in Sarney's governing coalition, was hurt in the election. The PMDB, the only party organized throughout the country, maintained its strength in the interior of the country, capturing 116 out of the 160 contested municipalities, but it lost in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Sarney, who did not campaign on behalf of the PMDB, believed the results weakened the party's often uncooperative leadership headed by Sao Paulo delegate Ulysses Guimares, [redacted]. Moreover, we believe the PMDB's electoral setbacks will permit Sarney to reshuffle his cabinet, stacking it with loyalists as he sees fit. Most of the cabinet has publicly indicated intentions to resign in early February. [redacted]

Ex-President Janio Quadros, the new mayor of Sao Paulo, defeated the PMDB on its home turf. According to the US Consulate, Quadros's support came from the conservative business elite, the working class, young voters, and the poor, who were drawn to his promises to attack government inefficiency and restore law and order. Over the near term, Sarney will benefit from Quadros's return to the national scene.

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[redacted] Quadros has promised to support the President, and in fact is in the debt of Sarney's Liberal Front Party (PFL), which endorsed his campaign. Nonetheless, some Brazilian political commentators speculate that Quadros may want to succeed Sarney, and we believe his connections with the conservative business community, grassroots support, and charisma make him a force to be reckoned with in the coming months. [redacted]

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Meanwhile, the charismatic Leonel Brizola—the prominent governor of Rio de Janeiro—probably enhanced his prospects to succeed Sarney. Wherever he campaigned on behalf of his Democratic Workers Party candidates, Brizola's personality and his record in office were the primary issues and often helped the candidates he supported, according to the US Consulate. He probably will try to expand his national organization in preparation for direct presidential elections by striking alliances with leaders across the political spectrum, in our view. Brizola—who makes no secret of his presidential ambitions—has already attempted an alliance with his longstanding rival on

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We believe the PMDB, whose standard bearer—Fernando Henrique Cardoso—was defeated in Sao Paulo, will be casting about for new presidential timber in the coming year, as well as regrouping for the Congressional and gubernatorial elections scheduled for November. Its setbacks are likely to

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the left, Lula da Silva of the Workers Party, to push for presidential elections before 1988, according to the US Embassy. [redacted]

**New Political Concerns**

The mayoral elections surfaced a range of issues that the government will need to act on to retain popular support. Brazilian press reports indicate, for example, that the campaigns in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro showed widespread sentiment for greater municipal action against street crime. Voters also signaled their impatience with government redtape, corruption, and inefficiency by rejecting incumbents in many major cities, according to local political commentators. These same commentators also noted a stronger voter preference for candidates who promised to deliver more city services and increase social spending. [redacted]

We believe that the prominent emphasis given to issues of social reform and honest government augur changes in Brazil's patrimonial political system. Under civilian rule, Brazil's Congress is still drawing criticism as an "elitist organization" in the media. We believe incumbents facing reelection in November will probably become more assertive about political reform. Congress is already slated to consider legislation transferring many federal powers back to the states, according to the US Embassy. Labor reform and new social welfare programs are also likely to receive greater congressional scrutiny in the months ahead. [redacted]

Simultaneously, voters indicated the need for a stronger party system. Although 25 parties sponsored candidates, only six showed significant strength among voters. We believe that most smaller parties will now disappear, strengthening the base for representative government. [redacted]

**Signs To Watch**

Some Brazilian political pundits [redacted]—drawing on lessons from Brazilian history—suggest there is potential for trouble should political reforms fail to materialize. Although their evidence is tenuous and their assessments preliminary, we share some of their concerns. Populist leaders, like Quadros and Brizola, could capitalize on any popular dissatisfaction with the pace of political reform to

boost their influence in national policymaking. Such a shift could have adverse consequences for future economic stability, as populists with more organized public support demand greater wage increases and social spending, and the creation of jobs for an ever-expanding work force. [redacted]

Moreover, the elections confirm the growing strength of leftist forces in Brazil. Representatives of the left-of-center Democratic Workers Party and the Workers Party won races in Rio de Janeiro, Porto Alegre and Fortaleza, as well as 15 interior cities. These groups could provide fertile ground for Soviet Bloc interference. The Cubans, East Germans, and Soviets have increased their contacts and offers of political training to members of the Workers Party in the past year. [redacted] We believe the Cubans may also target this party as having the potential to become a significant leftist force in the future. [redacted]

These commentators also believe that Quadros could become a political troublemaker. US Embassy reporting indicates he is an erratic person—he resigned the presidency under mysterious circumstances 24 years ago—but he also possesses charisma, especially among conservatives. Should Quadros be willing and able to mold these forces into a coordinated opposition to the left, it is possible that politics could polarize, a development that led to major political upheavals in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1960s. This scenario could occur if weakened centrist parties are unable to recover from their recent electoral setbacks, steadily lose influence, and leave the political moderates without a representative base. [redacted]

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## Latin America Briefs

<b>Cuba</b>	<b>Attorney General Sacked</b> [redacted]	25X1
	<p>Havana announced on 8 January that Idalberto Ladron de Guevara had been removed from his post as Attorney General and that Vice Minister of Justice Dr. Ramon de la Cruz Ochoa would replace him. Ladron de Guevara had held the position since 1980, when his predecessor was removed as a result of the government's initiation of a "get-tough" policy aimed at stemming the sharply increasing crime rate. Although no reason was given for the Attorney General's dismissal, it most likely is unrelated to the series of top-level reassignments and personnel changes in the Cuban leadership that have occurred over the past year in preparation for the Third Party Congress in February. [redacted]</p>	25X1
	<p>Ladron de Guevara has actually been out of circulation for more than a year. In mid-1984, President Castro personally ordered formal charges brought against him for shooting a young Cuban. [redacted]</p>	25X1 25X1
	<p>Ladron de Guevara was in jail but attributed his arrest to unspecified charges related to corruption. Since 1983, Cuba's legal system has been rocked by a sweeping bribery investigation that has resulted in the arrests of dozens of lawyers and judges—including five of the Supreme Court's seven judges, [redacted]—who reportedly accepted payoffs for acquittal verdicts or light sentences. [redacted]</p>	25X1 25X1 25X1
<b>Trinidad and Tobago</b>	<b>Efforts To Revamp Oil-Based Economy</b> [redacted]	25X1
	<p>Port of Spain's recent devaluation of the local dollar and proposed new investment code will help to revitalize the country's economy over the long term, but the devaluation is causing problems for its Caribbean trading partners. In response to the weakening world oil market, Trinidad and Tobago has been attempting to diversify away from the dominant petroleum sector, which presently contributes 25 percent of GDP—compared with 43 percent in 1980. To lay the foundations for future growth, the government is seeking to lure foreign investors to the fledgling manufacturing sector. An overvalued exchange rate, high local wages, and restrictive government policies traditionally have limited foreign investment in Trinidad's manufacturing sector, which currently contributes only 7 percent of the country's GDP. The proposed liberalization of the investment code would permit full foreign ownership of assets, thereby canceling the required joint ventureship that has previously been a major barrier to investment. [redacted]</p>	25X1
	<p>The 33-percent devaluation will help stem heavy losses in foreign exchange reserves, which dropped 65 percent to an estimated \$500 million in 1985. Although the devaluation exempts essential foodstuffs and a few other imports, inflation in</p>	

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this highly import-dependent economy probably will exceed in 1986 the moderate 7-percent rate of 1985. Moreover, based on their recent successes in liberalizing severance pay, we believe Trinidad's influential labor unions will win wage increases that partially offset improved international wage competitiveness caused by the devaluation. [redacted]

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The devaluation already is putting pressure on other Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries dependent on Trinidad and Tobago—the largest economy in the English-speaking Caribbean—as an export market. Difficulties are most pronounced in Barbados, Port of Spain's largest CARICOM trading partner, which is struggling to resist a similar devaluation. The floating currency thus far has held steady in Jamaica, Trinidad's second-largest regional trading partner, but slippage could further imperil negotiations with the IMF. The Seaga government's resistance to another devaluation of the Jamaican dollar is a major sticking point in the IMF's expected consideration in late January of whether to continue the present \$118 million standby program. [redacted]

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**Panama****Military Reassignments** [redacted]

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Defense Chief Noriega recently reinforced his control over the military through reassignments to the General Staff and other key commands. Intelligence Chief Ow Young, for example, was transferred to a minor base command. [redacted] was implicated in plotting against the Defense Chief at the time of the Spadafora murder scandal last September. His replacement—Colonel Barrera, a staunch Noriega loyalist—is an ineffectual leader, [redacted] probably will be controlled by his deputy Major Samudio, another favorite of Noriega. The Defense Chief chose a trusted family member as commander of the key Battalion 2000, which has a large concentration of troops headquartered near the capital. [redacted]

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**Chile****Student Elections** [redacted]

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Chile's universities are becoming a focus of political protest and will probably fuel anti-Pinochet agitation when classes resume in March. The Christian Democrat-led centrist coalition narrowly outpolled the Communist slate in student federation elections at the University of Chile last October. The contests—only the second elections at the country's largest university since the military took power—saw the centrist ticket capture 32.6 percent of the vote compared with 32.1 percent for the Communist-dominated and violence-prone Popular Democratic Movement (MDP), according to US Embassy reports. A runoff between the top two slates was avoided when the MDP conceded defeat and was then offered key positions on the federation's executive board by the Christian Democrats, provoking charges of collusion from the right. Pressure from moderate sectors in the Christian Democratic Party proper and from participants in the National Accord prevented the formation of another combined Christian Democrat/MDP student slate, which had won the 1984 election with two-thirds of the vote. [redacted]

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The elections reflect student opinion in universities throughout the country, and, in our view, are also interpreted by the public and the regime as a measure of the general political climate in the absence of national elections. Most Chilean observers probably will conclude that the far left—one-third of the student electorate—is making gains despite government efforts to reduce radical influence on campus. Also, even the modest postelectoral cooperation between the Christian Democratic youth and the MDP will, in our view, fuel government suspicions that centrists are forming coalitions with Communists, making President Pinochet less willing to deal with the moderate opposition. [redacted]

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**Belize**

**Leftist Maneuvers Prior to Party Convention** [redacted]

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The small but growing leftist faction in the opposition People's United Party (PUP) is positioning itself to try to take control of key party posts at the party convention scheduled for this month, [redacted]. Assad Shoman, Said Musa, and V. H. Courtenay—former leftist ministers in the PUP government that ruled from 1964 to 1984—hope to unseat the party's centrist leadership by acquiring control of an expanded executive committee. Musa reportedly is seeking the party chairmanship while Courtenay is angling to become deputy party leader. Although Shoman is not vying for a key post himself—he will probably become youth organizer—he reportedly would like to help a leftist replace moderate Florencio Marin as PUP leader of the opposition in the House of Representatives. [redacted]

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The PUP has become increasingly polarized between conservative and leftist factions since its decisive electoral defeat in December 1984. Each faction blames the other for losses that resulted in the return of only six incumbents to the 28-member House. Since then the leftists have tried to discredit the moderate wing with charges of corruption, while former Prime Minister and party leader George Price has attempted to portray Shoman and his supporters as Communists. In our judgment, the party convention is unlikely to resolve the internal conflicts or result in a major ideological realignment. Although the leftists probably will increase their representation in party councils, we believe Price has sufficient political strength to engineer his reelection and prevent leftists from taking control of the party. [redacted]

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## Cuba Chronology

December 1985

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### 1 December

East Germany's Foreign Trade Minister, Horst Soelle, arrives in Havana. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez welcomes him at Jose Marti International Airport.

Ecuadorean President Febres-Cordero sends Fidel Castro a message expressing concern over the damage caused in Cuba by Hurricane Kate.

The second meeting of Intellectuals for the Sovereignty of Latin America is held in Havana. Fidel Castro and Armando Hart host a reception for delegates attending the meeting.

### 2 December

Raul Castro presides over a ceremony commemorating the 29th anniversary of the landing of the *Granma* and the Revolutionary Armed Forces. Division General Sixto Batista Santana speaks at the ceremony.

Secretary General of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, Kaysone Phomvihane, meets with Juan Almeida in Vientiane.

People crowd bookstores in Havana to obtain *Fidel and Religion*, a book about Castro written by Brazilian theologian Frei Betto.

### 3 December

*Granma* announces that Commander of the Revolution, Ramiro Valdez, has been dismissed from his post as Interior Minister and is being replaced by Gen. Jose Abrantes Fernandez.

Panamanian Foreign Minister, Jorge Abadia Arias, says that his country's relations with Cuba are excellent, very "cordial, and get closer day by day."

Politburo member Jorge Risquet transmits greetings from Cuba to the Second Congress of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola and states that in both war and peace Cuba will stand next to Angola.

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez attends the 13th session of cooperation between East Germany and Cuba. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and East Germany's Horst Soelle discuss economic activities of the two countries and a protocol to establish cooperation in the sugar, citrus, and construction industries.

The first Cuban communications specialists arrive in Vietnam to assess the assembly and operation of a microwave network that will link the north and south of the country.

At the 14th session of the OAS in Cartagena, Colombia proposes that Cuba rejoin the OAS. Secretary of State Shultz says there is no reason for Cuba to return to the organization.

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Cuban Labor leader Jesus Escandel arrives in Lima and meets with Peruvian labor leader Isidoro Gamarra to discuss the regional labor movement. Escandel attends the Latin American workers' meeting on debt.

**4 December**

Vice President of the Council of Ministers, Juan Almeida, arrives in Hanoi and is decorated with the Ho Chi Minh Order by Truong Chinh.

Ramiro Valdez will continue to be a "heavyweight" in Cuba and that his removal as Interior Minister was planned some eight months ago.

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Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso and Jorge Risquet meet in Luanda to discuss the struggle of the South African people against the apartheid regime.

Raul Castro visits the East German Embassy in Havana to sign the book of condolences following the death of East German Defense Minister Heinz Hoffmann.

Ricardo Cabrizas meets with the new President of the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations Konstantin Katushev to discuss Soviet aid to repair damages caused by Hurricane Kate.

**5 December**

In Mexico City, Flavio Bravo says that Cuba has studied the foreign debt problem and has shown with figures that it is unpayable from a moral, economic, and political point of view.

In an interview on Argentine television, Peruvian President Alan Garcia expresses sympathy and admiration for Fidel Castro saying Fidel has done a lot for his people.

At the United Nations, Cuban Ambassador Oscar Oramas accuses the United States of being principally responsible for human rights violations worldwide.

Uruguayan Foreign Minister Iglesias tells Prensa Latina that his country's relations with Cuba are very good, are being normalized with extraordinary speed, and are navigating under full sail.

**6 December**

US consular officials have started interviewing about 75 political prisoners Castro has allowed to leave Cuba following an appeal by American Catholic churchmen.

Ricardo Cabrizas and Soviet official Boris Aristov sign an agreement by which the Soviet Union will provide Cuba substantial donations to repair damages caused by Hurricane Kate.

Zimbabwean Education Minister Mutumbuka announces in Harare that more than 1,000 Zimbabwean students will travel to Cuba next year to study in a teacher-training school.

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Jorge Risquet reiterates Cuba's solidarity with the Namibian cause for independence to the President of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma, during a meeting in Luanda.

**7 December**

According to documents prepared by Cuba's leaders, the growth of exports, by at least 5 percent per year, is the Cuban economy's first priority for 1986-90.

In Caracas, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez says US economic policy is leading the international economy to greater recessions and that per capita income in Latin America has dropped to the level of 1976.

**8 December**

Juan Almeida arrives in Phnom Penh and is welcomed by Say Phuthang, member of the Cambodian ruling party Central Committee Political Bureau.

**9 December**

Juan Almeida meets with Hun Sen, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Cambodia, and reiterates Cuba's support for the party, government, and people of Cambodia.

Jorge Risquet meets with Soviet official Geydar Aliyev in Luanda and affirms that both Cuba and the USSR will continue providing decisive support to Angola.

In an interview in El Pais, the president of Cuba's Episcopal Conference, Monsignor Adolfo Rodriguez, acknowledges that there has been a thaw in relations between the church and the government.

**10 December**

In Mexico City, Flavio Bravo says that Nicaragua did the right thing when it refused to sign the Contadora peace document because the document was making more and more concessions to the United States.

**11 December**

Jorge Risquet meets with Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos, who accepts an invitation transmitted by Risquet to participate in the Third Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba.

The Uruguayan Senate approves the appointment of retired Navy Cap. Bernardo Pinura as Ambassador to Cuba.

**12 December**

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez arrives in Italy and delivers a letter from Fidel Castro to Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti inviting Italian Chief of State Francesco Cossiga to visit Cuba.

In a press conference, the president of the USSR's Petroleum and Gas Workers Labor Union, Vladimir Sedenko, says that during the next five years 2 million metric tons of oil will be produced in Cuba, and Cuban technicians will be trained in the USSR in gas and oil specialties.

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**13 December**

Cuba and Hungary sign a five-year cooperation agreement. Cuba will receive a zero-strength reactor from the Institute of Nuclear Energy, and the two countries will exchange specialists and conduct joint scientific research.

Cuba asks Spain to extradite Manuel Antonio Sanchez Perez, a former high-ranking Cuban official, claiming Perez tried to embezzle \$499,000 in Cuban Government funds.

The Spanish Government orders the expulsion of Cuban Embassy officials Angel Alberto Leon Cervantes Abelardo Lopez Hernandez, Ramon Burroto Chavez, and Ventura Corrientes.

**15 December**

Diplomatic sources in Madrid report that Perez, who escaped a kidnap attempt by Cuban Embassy officials, could provide the West with valuable information on Cuban activities in Angola.

Havana press reports that Cuba's first heart transplant patient is in satisfactory condition seven days after the operation.

**16 December**

Fidel Castro makes the closing remarks at the Seventh International New Latin American Film Festival, claiming that Latin American cinema has been a victim of imperialist rule for many years.

Ricardo Alarcon and Hubert Wieland sign the final documents of the fourth joint Cuban-Peruvian Economic Intergovernmental Commission, approving cooperation for 1986 in eight areas.

Paris press reports that Mobuto Sese Seko, President of Zaire, received Vice Minister of External Relations, Jorge Bolanos Suarez.

**17 December**

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez arrives in Moscow to attend the 41st extraordinary CEMA meeting. Discussions are held on scientific-technical programs through the year 2000.

Havana press reports that there are over 1,500 Cuban women in Hungary working as textile technicians and that another group works in the Icaruz bus factory.

**18 December**

Raul Taladrid, Vice President of the State Committee for Economic Cooperation, meets with high-level officials of Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland, West Germany, to discuss strengthening ties.

In Angola, President Eduardo dos Santos and Levi Farah discuss economic cooperation in housing construction, the manufacture of furniture, and forestry work.

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Vice Foreign Minister Giraldo Mazola and Swedish Ambassador Jan Stahl sign an agreement in Havana to renegotiate debt.

*Granma* announces that the Council of State has appointed Julio Tejas Perez as Public Health Minister to replace Sergio del Valle.

Peruvian Senators Armando Villanueva and Guillermo Larco make a brief stopover in Havana en route to Moscow. Villanueva delivers a greeting from the Peruvian Government to Fidel Castro.

Cuba and Angola sign a five-year trade agreement for cooperation in the sugar industry and the export of Cuban salt to Angola for consumption or reexport.

**19 December**

In an interview with *El Pais*, Perez says that Cuban Embassy officials tried to kidnap him for fear that he would hand over or sell confidential information about Cuba's economy that was in his possession.

Cuban Ambassador to Uruguay Joaguin Mas presents his credentials to Uruguayan President Julio Maria Sanguinetti.

**20 December**

In a draft of the "Economic and Social Guidelines for the 1986-90 Five-Year Plan" to be approved by the Third Party Congress in February, Cuba plans to extract 2 million tons of crude oil by 1990.

**21 December**

Levi Farah visits Libya for discussions with Libyan officials of bilateral relations and international issues.

**22 December**

Deputy Transportation Minister Otto Roca and Argentine Under Secretary of Transportation, Pedro Agustin Trucco, sign a maritime transportation agreement in Havana.

**23 December**

In an interview on Brazilian TV, Fidel Castro says US Treasury Secretary James Baker's proposal on debt will perpetuate the debt of Third World countries.

Argentine President Raul Alfonsin meets in Buenos Aires with Cuban National Bank President Hector Rodriguez Llompert to discuss Latin American topics and bilateral relations.

**24 December**

Fidel Castro and Kurt Hager, Socialist Unity Party of Germany Politburo member, attend the ceremony opening the "Tinima" beer factory in Camaguey, built with East German cooperation.

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The crew and passengers of an Angolan Armed Forces transport aircraft that made an emergency landing in Zaire on 1 December are returned to Luanda. The plane was carrying 40 Cubans and four other foreign soldiers.

EFE reports that Cuban authorities have provided them with an interview conducted in jail with Jose Garcia Pena, former Vice President of Cuba's National Bank, disproving allegations by Manuel Sanchez Perez that Pena was dead.

**25 December**

The Yugoslav Chamber of Economy assesses that Yugoslav-Cuban trade reached \$58.6 million in 1985, twice as much as the \$24.9 million reached in 1984.

**29 December**

Peruvian Prime Minister Luis Alva Castro arrives in Havana at the invitation of Fidel Castro, who receives him at the airport. Fisheries Minister Jose Palomino accompanies the Prime Minister.

**30 December**

*Granma* reports that Fidel Castro told the National Assembly that "Imperialism is crazy and obsessive in its efforts to make our economic progress more difficult."

Castro also tells the National Assembly that Washington is trying to hinder Cuban medical development by discouraging visits by doctors between the two countries.



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