




Directorate of
Intelligence

MASTER FILE COPY
**DO NOT GIVE OUT
OR MARK ON**

~~Top Secret~~

25X1



79

Near East and South Asia Review



25X1

Supplement
28 February 1986

~~Top Secret~~

NESA NESAR 86-006CX

28 February 1986

Copy **260**

25X1

Page Denied

Top Secret



25X1

Near East and South Asia Review



25X1

Supplement

28 February 1986

Page

Articles

Iraq: Morale Continues Downward Trend

1

25X1



Grumbling from military officers about the conduct of the war with Iran, increasing disgruntlement among Iraqi Shias, and fragmentary but mounting evidence that Iraqis perceive a weakening of President Saddam Husayn's grip on power strongly suggest Saddam will face increasing domestic challenges this year.



25X1

25X1

Iran's Defense Industries: Slow Expansion

5

25X1



25X1

Iran is pressing ahead on efforts to produce arms and ammunition because it wants to reduce its dependence on foreign suppliers. It, however, is unlikely to achieve self-sufficiency in the production of significant weapons and military equipment any time soon.



25X1

South Yemen's Military: Picking Up the Pieces

11

25X1



25X1

The South Yemeni armed forces suffered crippling losses of personnel and materiel in the recent civil war and will require substantial time and outside assistance to recover. While rebuilding its armed forces, South Yemen will be forced to adopt a conciliatory policy toward North Yemen.



25X1

Soviet-Afghan Efforts To Destabilize Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province



13

25X1



25X1

The Soviet-Afghan campaign to press Islamabad to curb insurgent movement across the Afghan-Pakistani border has increased in intensity, raising intertribal tensions and strife in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province, but the campaign will not deflect the Pakistani leadership from its support for the Afghan insurgents.



25X1



Top Secret


NESA NESAR 86-006CX

28 February 1986

25X1

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Afghanistan in January

19



25X1

The increased tempo of winter combat operations noted in January 1985 was repeated this year, with the Soviets initiating small-unit ambushes to cut insurgent supply lines and the insurgents staging numerous harassment raids on regime and Soviet garrisons and resupply convoys.



25X1

Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items will be designated as noncoordinated views.



25X1

Top Secret

NESA NESAR 86-006CX

28 February 1986

ii



25X1

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Articles

Iraq: Morale Continues Downward Trend



25X1

Iran's capture of Al Faw on the west bank of the Shatt al Arab—an important defensive and psychological objective—is likely to accelerate the decline in morale of Iraq's war-weary population. Grumbling from military officers about the conduct of the war, increasing disgruntlement among Iraqi Shias, and fragmentary but mounting evidence that Iraqis perceive a weakening of President Saddam Husayn's grip on power, strongly suggest Saddam will face increasing domestic challenges this year unless Iraq's fortunes change dramatically. If battle setbacks continue, officers are likely to conclude that Iraq is certain to lose the war if Saddam stays in power.



Morale in the Military

Morale has fallen among all ranks of the military,

[Redacted] troops stationed at the front believe victory is a distant and perhaps unachievable goal, an attitude that has contributed to increased drunkenness.

[Redacted] because of the continued state of alert since mid-December. The defense attache admits, however, that military morale, while declining, is surprisingly good, considering the length of the war and the high casualties.

Lower morale within the military and the success of Iran's latest offensive have led to further grumbling in the officer corps.

[Redacted] are openly complaining about the war and the need to end it quickly and are blaming the regime for starting the conflict.



25X1




25X1

Government efforts to combat morale problems by rewarding military officers and enlisted men generously and avoiding casualties have hampered the effectiveness of the armed forces.



25X1


[Redacted] the soldiers are well fed and provided good defenses, comparative comforts, and frequent leaves



25X1

25X1

[Redacted] the Army, which only infrequently conducts offensive attacks to keep casualties low, can no longer react swiftly and effectively to Iranian attacks. He claims to have observed a gradual decline in the capability of the Iraqi armed forces over the past two years.



25X1

[Redacted] in the capability of the Iraqi armed forces over the past two years.



25X1

25X1

Civilian Morale


The US Embassy describes the public as profoundly depressed—although not defeatist—by the possibility of an unending war and the prospect that more relatives will be lost. Popular resistance to service at least in the militia is increasing.



25X1

25X1

[Redacted] Because of the war's length, many men have served several six-to-12-month tours in the militia in addition to time in the Army.



25X1

25X1

Attitudes Among the Shias

We share the view of US diplomats in Baghdad that, while Shias—a majority of both the population and the armed forces—are unenthusiastic about the Sunni-dominated Ba'athist regime, most of them fear

25X1

25X1



Top Secret

NESA NESAR 86-006CX

28 February 1986


25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Iranian domination more than they resent Baghdad's rule [redacted] moderate Iraqi Shia clergy and laity, particularly in the Baghdad area, are disenchanted with Iran and do not wish to see Saddam replaced by a regime sympathetic to Tehran. The US Embassy says the teachings of Ayatollah Khoi of An Najaf, the most respected living Iraqi Shia clergyman, are so low-key that they are not likely to stir up the masses. Moreover, the regime has attempted to ensure Shia loyalty by offering them economic and political benefits. [redacted]



25X1
25X1

Still, there are signs that Shia youth are becoming more disaffected. According to the Embassy, a well-connected Arab Ambassador claims to have evidence of a new generation of Dawa sympathizers in Iraq who are willing to organize if the Ba'th Party's grip on the country weakens. Reporting on Shias in Saudi Arabia, whom the Embassy believes tend to reflect the views of their coreligionists in southern Iraq, supports this belief. Shia contacts of the US Consulate in Dhahran say about 40 percent of the Shias in Qatif oasis support the activist course charted by Ayatollah Khomeini. [redacted] a split is deepening in the oasis between the generally older conservatives and the younger followers of Khomeini and Abdallah Shirazi, leader of the Iraqi dissident group, Jund al-Imam (Soldiers of the Imam). We believe a similar split is occurring in Iraq

The Effect on Saddam


We believe that Iraqis perceive a weakening of Saddam's political strength, a development that, if unchecked, is likely to embolden dissidents and further sap his position. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

- US and other diplomatic observers are detecting signs that political and military leaders increasingly are blaming each other for hampering the war effort.
- The Ba'th Party—Saddam's power base—is showing less enthusiasm for the war, according to the US Embassy. [redacted] that Ba'thist officials turned away laughing when they observed a desecration of Saddam's portrait at a ceremony.

25X1
25X1
25X1



- [redacted] residents of northern Iraq have openly begun to tell jokes at Saddam's expense. The US Embassy relates that similar behavior is evident in Baghdad.
- Senior government officials, who usually present a confident demeanor in conversations with foreign diplomats, are no longer forecasting an early end to the war, according to the US Embassy.
- During Shia holy days last September, the government eased restrictions on religious services, permitted limited self-flagellation, and lifted roadblocks that had prevented Shias from visiting

25X1
25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

their shrines. Although at the time the US Embassy interpreted the moves as a sign of regime confidence, we now believe they reflected efforts to lessen criticism of Saddam. [Redacted]

25X1

Prospects and Indicators

The US Embassy holds that morale has been poor since the early days of the war and that Iraqis are depressed by the prospect of an unending conflict. Against this background, they view the current drop in morale as a short-term effect of recent Iranian offensives [Redacted]

25X1

We acknowledge the cyclical nature of Iraqi morale but believe that Iraqi esprit is experiencing an overall downward trend. Although we agree with the Embassy that attitudes among Iraqi civilians and military personnel are not yet defeatist, we are far less sanguine on the prospects for the coming year. We share the US Embassy's view that the potential for major subversion by Iraqi Shias would increase only if the regime appeared on the verge of losing the war—and we believe this judgment extends to Ba'thists and Sunni military officers as well. [Redacted]

25X1

In our view, any of the following developments would signal a further erosion of Saddam's strength:

- Unrest by university and high school students. Student demonstrations have preceded nearly every coup since the fall of the monarchy.
- More frequent rotation of Army commanders to keep them from developing a following, a practice followed by Saddam since the war began.
- More terrorist incidents by Dawa and other Shia dissident groups.
- The appearance of graffiti and demonstrations against the war and military conscription.
- More frequent reports of assassination and coup attempts against Saddam.
- Reports of secret trials and executions of military officers and Ba'thist officials.
- A significant shakeup of Saddam's Cabinet.
- Shakeups and assassinations in the security services.
- Open criticism of Saddam in the streets. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

25X1


**Iran's Defense Industries:
Slow Expansion**

25X1

Iran is pressing ahead on efforts to produce arms and ammunition because it wants to reduce its dependence on foreign suppliers. It is rebuilding arms industries installed under the Shah and using the assistance of foreign experts when necessary. As a result, although indigenous production is inadequate to meet Iran's wartime needs, it has eased serious shortages of infantry weapons and ammunition. We believe Tehran's efforts to improve production capabilities and its emphasis on self-sufficiency will lead to substantially expanded defense industries after the war.

Shah's Arms Expansion Disrupted by Revolution

The Shah used Iran's increased petroleum revenues to finance a large buildup of military industries in the mid-1970s aimed at reducing his country's dependence on imports. Iran's defense production capabilities were among the best in the Middle East by 1979, though still modest compared with those of industrialized countries and insufficient to fight a major war. Output consisted of small arms and ammunition, propellants, communications equipment, and selected types of large-caliber rounds of ammunition.



The war with Iraq stimulated Tehran to resume military production in 1981, but the arms industries were slow to recover.

by mid-1982 Iran's defense industries still were in serious disarray:

- Foreign contract arrangements were frequently disrupted by inexperienced Iranian managers.
- Many factories were closed because of shortages of raw materials and of technical and other trained personnel, especially foreign experts.
- Sabotage and industrial accidents reduced output in operating factories.


**Table 1
Iran: Estimated Defense Industry Output
Before the 1979 Revolution**

Weapons	Annual Output
Antitank grenade launchers, 40/85-mm (Iranian version of RPG-7)	2,500
Machineguns, 7.62-mm, MG-3	10,000
Rifles, 7.62-mm, G-3	50,000
Ammunition	
155- and 105-mm howitzers	230,000
35-mm anti-aircraft	100,000
120- and 81-mm mortars	240,000
20-mm aircraft cannon	50,000
40/85-mm rocket-assisted grenades	50,000
7.62-mm (NATO) and small arms, calibers .22, .30, .45, and .50	61,000,000
Antitank and antipersonnel mines	200,000
Handgrenades	100,000
Explosives (tons)	6,000

25X1



25X1




25X1

Tehran Persevering

Despite production problems, Tehran is continuing to rebuild the military production apparatus set up under the Shah.

25X1
25X1



the National Defense Industry Organization (NDIO), subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, probably has ultimate responsibility for output.

25X1

Top Secret


NESA NESAR 86-006CX

28 February 1986

25X1

Top Secret

25X1



SA-7 surface-to-air missile launcher (top) and RPG-7 antitank grenade launcher (bottom). The Iranians are trying to produce their own versions of Soviet SA-7s and RPG-7s.



Iranian Officials attending a ceremony for the opening of a production line for Kalashnikov ammunition.

25X1

Although only fragmentary information on Iran's military industries is available, we believe the NDIO has been able to resume and in some cases even slowly expand military production during the past few years.¹ Tehran announced the opening in late 1985 of a factory at Esfahan—actually begun but never completed under the Shah—to manufacture antiaircraft ammunition and two new production lines for ammunition for Soviet-model rifles and T-55 tanks. In mid-January Tehran claimed it had sent the first consignment of domestically produced 60- and 120-mm mortars to the front.

Tehran may be producing 130-mm artillery rounds, a capability beyond the Shah's factories.

the Iranians have overcome technical problems to increase production of antitank rockets and 122-mm artillery rounds at one plant.

Seeking Foreign Help Slowly

Iran has increased only gradually the level of foreign technical assistance in its arms factories.

several years after the revolution Tehran was reluctant to accept foreign offers of assistance with its arms industries because it feared that such help would be viewed as a

sign of the new regime's inadequacies. Delays in the resumption of foreign assistance also resulted from contract problems and probably from mismanagement by incompetent officials appointed to the NDIO after the revolution. In addition, foreign firms viewed Iran as a poor investment risk in the early 1980s. Some firms demanded payment of large sums of money owed by Iran for work completed prior to 1979 before they would consider providing additional assistance.

25X1

We believe the strain of fighting a long war with Iraq and Iran's inability to make substantial gains in military production on its own have caused Tehran to become more pragmatic about using foreign expertise.

25X1

Iran is seeking assistance in military production from many foreign companies, and Tehran apparently is willing to offer lucrative contracts to attract them. A calmer domestic situation and changes in leadership in the NDIO to improve management—there have been at least six directors since 1980—may also have smoothed dealings with foreign firms:

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Table 2
Iran: Principal Military Production Facilities,
January 1986

Plant/Location	Materiel Produced	Comments
Tehran Armaments Plant/ Mosalsalsassi, eastern Tehran	Rifles, machineguns, RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers (Iranian designation is Nadar)	The plant was established in 1939 and expanded in the 1970s. Although the factory is operating, its level of production is unknown.
Parchin Complex/Parchin, 30 km southeast of Tehran	RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers (Nader), 122-mm rockets (Iranian designation is Arash), propellant charges and explosives, unidentified acids and chemicals, replacement parts for machinery used at the complex	The complex consists of at least six plants, including explosives and rocket plants and a facility for research [redacted]. [redacted]. Nonetheless, Iran probably is gradually expanding the capabilities of the complex with the assistance of West German technicians. [redacted]
Esfahan Ammunition Plant/Esfahan	35- and 23-mm anti-aircraft ammunition	The factory was begun under the Shah but completed only last year; output level unknown.
Esfahan Explosives Plant/Esfahan	Explosives	Construction of the plant was begun under the Shah. Part of the plant has been completed with Swedish assistance. Although the Iranians plan eventually to produce a variety of explosive powders at Esfahan, we believe the plant currently is producing only nitric acid for explosives.
Tehran Ammunition Plant/ Saltanatabad, northern suburbs of Tehran	Large- and small-caliber ammunition, including 155-, 130-, and 105-mm rounds	Saltanatabad, built in 1939 and expanded in the 1970s, was Iran's primary plant for producing ammunition before the revolution. [redacted] [redacted] Tehran, however, claims to have opened at least two new production lines, probably at Saltanatabad, in November 1985. [redacted] [redacted]
Shiraz Plant/Shiraz	TOW missile launchers, possibly light weapons	The Iranians, with Czechoslovak assistance, probably have completed the plant, begun before the revolution by a US firm. Because of technical problems, the plant may not be producing any TOWs.
Unidentified facility/Aliabad, near Qom	Chemical weapons	The NDIO may be using the facility to manufacture artillery shells and bombs to deliver chemicals. Neither the types of chemicals used nor output of weapons is known, but we believe the number of chemical weapons produced, if any, is small.

25X1
25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1
25X1

25X1

25X1
25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

- In 1984 a Swedish firm resumed construction of an explosives plant at Esfahan contracted for under the Shah, according to a reliable source. Part of the plant may already be operational.

- [Redacted]

Besides expertise from the West, Iran has been seeking and in some cases receiving help from East European countries, North Korea, and China,

[Redacted] Most of the assistance is in the form of parts and raw materials, but Tehran appears to be attempting to use more non-Western technicians in its military factories. Czechoslovaks have been supervising production of TOW missiles since mid-1984 at a plant in Shiraz that was originally built by a US firm for the Shah. In March 1985 they were having problems with the guidance system for the missiles, however, and we are not certain whether the plant can produce the TOW.

[Redacted]

Tehran's defense industries also are benefiting from an increase in foreign-trained Iranian personnel.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] A reliable source reported in March 1985 that the management of Iran's Parchin rocket plant, where production is high compared with previous years, was in the hands of an efficient group of young Army captains who had graduated from the Technical University in [Redacted]

[Redacted] We believe Iran's military factories will benefit further as engineers and managers return from education abroad and as foreign experts train personnel inside Iran.

[Redacted]

Research and Development Efforts

The effort to better equip its forces against Iraq and the problems encountered obtaining foreign military

Iran's "Self-Sufficiency" Goal

Self-sufficiency remains a key goal of Iran's defense industries, [Redacted]

In March 1983 President Khamenei publicly proposed the creation of a deputy for self-sufficiency in the armed forces. We have no confirmation that such a post has been created [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] *At the opening of an ammunition production line in November 1985, Revolutionary Guard Minister Rafiq-Dust gave his support to indigenous efforts:*

The military industries organization has a major role in supplying the needs of the warriors of Islam. . . . We believe that every step we take . . . makes our victory at the fronts more certain, since the bullet that is made in the hands of our compatriots pierces the enemy's heart better than the bullet sold to us by our enemies.

[Redacted]

supplies have spurred Tehran's interest in developing "Iranian" weapons. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Over the past year Iran has shown particular interest in building surface-to-surface missiles. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

- The public focus on self-sufficiency represents part, an effort to stress Iran's independence w Tehran at the same time looks abroad for mili supplies it considers essential to pursue the wa
- Over the long term, Tehran wants indigenou production to significantly reduce its need for foreign sources of supply. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Despite the efforts of the NDIO, Iran is unlikel achieve self-sufficiency in the production of significant weapons and military equipment any soon. Iran probably will not be able to produce aircraft, armor, and many types of heavy milita equipment and will have to seek replacements f foreign suppliers. If Iran continues to receive ra materials and technical assistance from abroad, within the next three to five years it may be abl produce enough small-caliber weapons and ammunition to supply the peacetime—and perh much of the wartime—requirements of a light infantry army. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

When the war is over, Iran's defense industries probably will devote most of their efforts to the production of relatively less sophisticated infant weapons and equipment. Tehran most likely wi expend only slightly more of its resources to be; acquiring production capabilities for armor and artillery. Missile and chemical weapons develop probably will continue, and perhaps increase significantly, because Tehran believes Baghdad push ahead with similar programs. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

Outlook and Implications

The revitalization and expansion of Iran's defense industries are likely to remain a priority regardless of the status of the war:

- Tehran probably hopes improved output of materiel in the near term will ease shortages at the front and help it continue the war.

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret
[redacted]

25X1

**South Yemen's Military:
Picking Up the Pieces** [redacted]

25X1

The South Yemeni armed forces suffered crippling losses of personnel and materiel in the recent civil war and will require substantial time and outside assistance to recover. Rebuilding efforts will be seriously hampered by counterproductive regime policies—harsh security measures, purges, military pay cuts—and lingering tribal animosities. While rebuilding its armed forces, South Yemen's counterinsurgency capabilities will be seriously diminished, and Aden will be forced to adopt a conciliatory policy toward North Yemen. [redacted]

major ammunition dumps were destroyed in the Aden fighting. Fuel shortages seriously hampered movement of units throughout the country, and many could not move their vehicles out of garrison, probably because of mechanical failures and spare parts shortages. [redacted]

25X1

The Air Force, most of which supported the current government, suffered heavy pilot losses and presumably must rely heavily on Soviet pilots to fly combat sorties. [redacted]

25X1

Heavy Losses in the Fighting

At least four of the Army's 12 brigades, most of which supported the new regime, suffered serious losses in the heavy fighting around Aden and in Abyan province from mid-January to early February.

[redacted]

[redacted]

25X1

The small South Yemeni Navy, which backed Hasani, also suffered heavy personnel and equipment losses and is virtually destroyed as an effective force.

[redacted] the Navy's eight Osa-II missile boats, one or two were probably sunk during the fighting, two are in Aden harbor, probably with heavy damage, one sat out the fighting at Perim Island, two remain in Ethiopia, and one is missing. Two of the Navy's four LSTs were heavily damaged and are presumed out of commission. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

We estimate the Army lost at least 150 of its 400 newer armored vehicles. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Figures outside Aden are not complete, but the armored brigade at Mukayris lost at least 20 of its 30 T54 tanks in one week's fighting last month. [redacted]

The intense fighting sharpened tribal differences among South Yemeni military personnel, and the loyalty of many units to the new regime remains suspect. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

The Army also expended a high percentage of its wartime reserve of fuel and ammunition, and all of its equipment probably is in need of major repairs.

[redacted]

[redacted] during the fighting around Aden and Mukayris, units carelessly expended thousands of [redacted]

[redacted] At least two [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Top Secret
NESASAR 86-006CX
[redacted]
28 February 1986

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Regime Measures Worsen the Situation

Aden's efforts to rebuild the military and cut costs have worsened the serious military manpower situation

[Redacted]

The weakness of South Yemen's armed forces will complicate the regime's efforts to consolidate its control of the country, while forcing it to adopt, at least temporarily, a conciliatory policy toward North Yemen. The Army's counterinsurgency capability is particularly weak in Abyan province, where Army personnel remain sympathetic to ex-President Hasani and where North Yemen focuses most of its support to the insurgents. Nonetheless, Aden may discreetly encourage insurgent activity in North Yemen to force it to stop supporting pro-Hasani insurgents.

25X1

25X1

Regime efforts to ensure the political reliability of the armed forces have further lowered military morale and reliability [Redacted] military leaders who fought for the new regime are unhappy that the government does not include any significant military representation [Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

South Yemen's officer corps has been bracing itself for a purge of suspected Hasani supporters.

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Outlook

The South Yemeni armed forces will require many months and massive Soviet support to rebuild. Aden will look to Moscow to replace equipment lost in the conflict in addition to continuing advisory and maintenance services. The loss of scarce skilled personnel from deaths, desertions, or political purges can only increase South Yemen's reliance on Soviet technical expertise. Soviet pilots and ground force advisers will continue to provide combat support in South Yemeni counterinsurgency operations [Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Soviet-Afghan Efforts To Destabilize Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province

25X1

The Soviet-Afghan campaign to press Islamabad to curb insurgent movement across the Afghan-Pakistani border has increased in intensity, raising intertribal tensions and strife in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). We believe that fear of Kabul's meddling in the tribal territories precipitated Pakistani Government intervention in the Khyber Agency in December, although Islamabad billed the operation as an antinarcotics campaign. We do not believe the Soviet-Afghan campaign will deflect the Pakistani leadership from its support for the Afghan insurgents.

Pakistan's Tribal Areas

Much of the Pakistani-Afghan border area is inhabited by highly independent tribes, many of whom frequently live on both sides of the Durand Line. The Tribal Territories include the Bajaur Agency (inhabited by Utman Khel and Tarkhani tribesmen), Mohmand Agency (Mohmand and Safi), Khyber Agency (Afridi and Shinwari), Orakzai Agency (Orakzai and Gangash), Kurram Agency (Turi, Mengals, and Bangash), and North and South Waziristan (Wazirs and Mahsud).

25X1

25X1

The Campaign Heats Up

[Redacted]

The Soviet-Afghan campaign apparently seeks to pit Pashtun clans against each other, reinforce traditional mistrust among these highly individualistic groups, and divide the Afghan insurgents from the people of the North-West Frontier Province in the hope of limiting insurgent movement of men and supplies across the border into Afghanistan.

The Pakistani Government has followed the British precedent and exercised only loose control of the tribesmen of the North-West Frontier Province. Late-19th-century treaties granted the tribes limited autonomy from the central authorities. Islamabad has allowed the Pashtun tribes to maintain their own tribal assemblies and to cross the frontier relatively unimpeded. The government has been able to maintain peace along the frontier by a judicious use of bribes for good behavior and periodic forays by paramilitary forces.

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

The Durand Line—the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan—cuts deep into the Pashtun tribal area that is the traditional home of the dominant Afghan ethnic group. Pashtun tribesmen since the beginning of this century have sought to create an independent Pashtunistan in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province, where they form a majority; Pashtun-dominated Afghan Governments in Kabul have espoused the cause of their separated brethren. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and Islamabad's subsequent decision to support the anti-Kabul insurgents have riveted official attention on the people of the North-West Frontier Province as major actors in the regional struggle. The influx of nearly 3 million Afghan refugees into 239 camps spread across Pakistan and increased narcotics smuggling have made the situation even more volatile.

25X1

25X1

An official in the Pakistani

Top Secret

NESA NESAR 86-006CX

28 February 1986

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the US Embassy that there were 46 sabotage incidents last year—resulting in 51 dead and 156 wounded—a nearly 20-percent increase in incidents over 1984. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

Afghan-Soviet Inducements

Money. The Soviet-Afghan destabilization program involves buying the loyalty of border tribal groups. Pakistani officials believe that KHAD pays out \$4-6 million a month to the tribes, but we doubt Kabul has been that generous. In exchange, Afghanistan expects the tribal groups to inhibit insurgent transit through their territory when possible. [Redacted]

25X1

The sabotage campaign escalated at the end of 1985 from attacks on insurgent homes and businesses to attacks on Pakistani Government facilities. The bombing of the control room of the Peshawar center of Pakistani television on 16 October and the explosion at the Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) office in Peshawar on 22 January highlighted the saboteurs' ability to strike at conspicuous and well-protected government facilities. The bombing of the PIA office in Peshawar generated a series of protest marches in Peshawar by Pakistani civilians angry at the Afghan refugees for bringing the war to Pakistan and prompted calls in the National Assembly for a review of government policy toward the Afghan insurgents. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

Pakistani politicians and Afghan insurgent leaders are concerned about the impact of the uncontrolled arms traffic on public order in the frontier region. Simple disagreements, authorities believe, have often exploded into major gun battles. According to press accounts, rocket launchers and other advanced weaponry were used in a clash between Pakistani tribes in September and a violent clash between Afghan refugees and Pakistani tribesmen in Bajaur Agency in early November. [Redacted]

Training. Pakistani authorities believe that the Afghan Government provides training bases in Afghanistan for dissident Pakistani tribesmen to instruct them in sabotage and terrorism. Islamabad believes that the kidnaping in Baluchistan of an Australian couple working for the World Bank and four Chinese coal technicians in the summer of 1985 was directed by Kabul and intended to embarrass Islamabad by exposing the government's vulnerability to cross-border activity. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

We believe Afghan and Soviet authorities are increasing direct military pressure on Pakistan as part of the destabilization campaign. [Redacted]

Narcotics. We believe that Kabul has acquiesced to traditional tribal smuggling activity—including narcotics production and distribution—to curry tribal favor and to disrupt Pakistani security and antinarcotics efforts in the border regions. According to a reliable source of the US Embassy in Islamabad, major Pashtun narcotics traffickers have for several

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret
UMBRA

The Destabilization Campaign: A Chronology

<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Event</i>	
<i>August 1984</i>	<i>Khyber Agency</i>	<i>Pakistani authorities note an upsurge in sabotage and terrorist incidents in the Khyber Agency. According to press reports, they attribute the increase to Afghan instigation.</i>	
<i>Early March 1985</i>	<i>Khyber Agency</i>	<i>Elements of the Pakistani Frontier Corps conduct military sweep through Khyber Agency searching for Afridi leaders who are believed to be cooperating with the Afghan Government, according to press reports.</i>	
			25X1
<i>16 October 1985</i>	<i>Peshawar</i>	<i>Bombing of control room of Peshawar center of Pakistani television.</i>	
<i>1 December 1985</i>	<i>Khyber Agency Kurram Agency</i>	<i>A 3,000-man Frontier Corps sweep the Khyber and Kurram Agency begins ostensibly to control drug smuggling along the border.</i>	25X1
<i>1 January 1986</i>	<i>Khyber Agency Kurram Agency</i>	<i>Dissident Afghan tribesmen are bottled up; very little fighting occurred after first two weeks of the Frontier Corps' operation.</i>	25X1
<i>14 January 1986</i>	<i>Kurram Agency</i>	<i>Pakistani officials claim to have shot down intruding Afghan MIG-21 aircraft using Stinger surface-to-air missiles.</i>	25X1
<i>18 January 1986</i>	<i>Kurram Agency</i>	<i>Pakistanis claim to have fired—and probably hit—a second Afghan fighter aircraft using Stinger missiles.</i>	25X1
			25X1

Top Secret
SC 00397/86

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

years received the backing of the Afghan Government and have been provided with refuge from Pakistani security personnel. Press accounts report that poppy production has increased in the border region because poppy fields are rarely disturbed by combat operations. [Redacted]

Pakistan Responds

Pakistan has reacted to the destabilization campaign by upgrading its air defense capabilities, launching military operations against errant tribesmen, and trying to reassure the skittish civilian population that Islamabad is prepared to protect them. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

The pre-positioning of antiaircraft gun and missile batteries and the placement of forward observer posts with secure communication lines indicate that since at least early November the Pakistanis have been prepared to fire upon intruding Afghan aircraft. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Islamabad also launched operations against Wali Khan Kukikhel—leader of a fractious clan of the Afridi tribe who has had longstanding ties to Kabul. The Frontier Corps sent 3,000 men to subdue the Afridi and Shinwari tribes in the Khyber Agency. This operation followed a security sweep last March in which the fortified home of Wali Khan was destroyed. While publicly aimed at capturing Wali Khan and curbing narcotics smuggling, the December campaign was intended to signal to the tribes that challenging Islamabad's authority in the NWFP and cooperating with Kabul would not go unpunished. [Redacted]

[Redacted]



Wali Khan Kukikhel . . . age 74 . . . presides over Afridi clan of about 70,000 . . . biggest landlord of the Khyber Agency . . . close ties to the Kabul regime . . . speaks Dari and Urdu. [Redacted]

Reuters

25X1
25X1

We believe the forceful Pakistani response to Wali Khan's challenge has successfully undermined the support he had from other border tribe leaders:

- The fate of Wali Khan—bottled up for two months between insurgent forces and the Pakistani Frontier Corps in a remote, inhospitable region of the NWFP—will probably discourage other tribal leaders from following his example.
- Many tribesmen blame Wali Khan for inciting the Pakistani military response through his abuse of Pakistani provincial leaders and his acceptance of money and arms from Kabul.
- The increased presence of the paramilitary Frontier Corps in the Khyber and Kurram Agencies has created economic hardship and loss of traditional freedom of movement for all of the tribal groups.
- Prominent Muslim religious leaders have reacted negatively to the apparent alliance of Wali Khan with the atheistic, Communist government in Kabul. [Redacted]

25X1
25X1

Outlook

Many tribal groups find it expedient to accept bribes without abandoning their tacit support to the Afghan resistance. The Soviet effort to flood the border

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

regions with arms is likely to be counterproductive because many of those weapons will probably be turned against the Soviets and their Afghan colleagues. Nevertheless, the Soviets and the Afghan Government will probably find the opportunities for splitting the insurgency from its supporters sufficiently enticing to continue the effort. [redacted]

25X1

If the border situation in the North-West Frontier Province were to deteriorate rapidly, civilian criticism of the lack of security along the border would probably push the issue to the top of the government's foreign policy agenda. Civilian authorities will continue to be apprehensive about the potential for sophisticated arms spilling over into the troubled Sind and Baluchistan provinces. Although President Zia and Prime Minister Junejo would face increased domestic demands to alter Islamabad's support for the insurgents to gain a respite from Soviet pressure, we do not believe they would back away from their support for the insurgents. Pakistan's leaders, however, are likely to use any deterioration in the border situation to justify its requests for increased US military assistance. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Afghanistan in January

[Redacted]

25X1

The increased tempo of winter combat operations noted in January 1985 was repeated this year. Although concerned about the effects of bad weather and extreme cold on troops, Soviet and Afghan forces launched operations in Nangarhar, Ghazni, Qandahar, and Herat Provinces. Soviet Spetsnaz forces initiated small-unit ambushes through eastern and southern Afghanistan in an effort to cut insurgent supply lines. The insurgents have not stood down this winter, staging numerous harassment raids on Afghan and Soviet garrisons and resupply convoys. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

In the capital itself, insurgents intermittently rocketed the airport, Soviet Embassy, and Darulaman Palace. The US Embassy reports that nighttime small-arms fire was infrequent. Afghan security patrols within the city appeared relatively active because of the presence of several invited Western journalists [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Soviet-Afghan Forces Stay Active

[Redacted]

The US Embassy in Kabul reports an increase in flights of Soviet IL-76 transports into the capital in an apparent effort to bring in supplies and equipment not getting through by surface vehicles. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

NESA NESAR 86-006CX

[Redacted]
28 February 1986

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Insurgent Activity

Insurgents remained active throughout Afghanistan, staging guerrilla attacks upon isolated border posts and resupply convoys. The intensity of attacks ranged from harassment fire of Afghan and Soviet garrisons to attacks upon convoys, which killed scores of government troops

at least 10 Soviet officers and soldiers defected or surrendered to insurgent forces during the Ghazni campaign

25X1

Pakistani-Afghan Border. In response to an increase in Afghan air operations along the Pakistani-Afghan border, Pakistani Army air defense units fired Stinger surface-to-air missiles at intruding aircraft on 14 and 18 January,

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Pakistani authorities claim to have hit and downed one aircraft during each engagement. (TS U NF)

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Other Developments

Discipline Problems. The state of discipline and morale in the Afghan Army continued to decline despite the optimistic facade presented by Kabul authorities. Quarrels among Afghan soldiers frequently occur, and there is general discontent about delays in receiving replacement troops. The number of Afghan defections remains high, casting doubt upon the ability of the Afghan Government to raise the strength of the armed forces to its stated goal of 200,000.

Outlook

We believe the Soviets will focus on cutting insurgent supply lines during the late winter months. They increasingly appear to be prepared to use Spetsnaz forces for small-unit operations and ambushes. Harsh weather in the mountains will tend to limit Soviet air support for the convoys traveling the main supply artery between Kabul and Termez. The Soviets will probably conduct quick sweep operations along this vital transportation link in the hope of preempting insurgent ambushes, but, in our view, insurgent forces will continue to be able to hit the vulnerable convoys, particularly in the Salang Pass region.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Soviet forces in Afghanistan have also suffered from discipline problems. A drunken Soviet soldier damaged a parked MI-24 helicopter gunship by driving an armored personnel carrier into it

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

25X1



Top Secret