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Africa Review



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7 March 1986

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7 March 1986

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The combined effects of a worsening insurgency, a deteriorating economy, and a lingering drought have forced tens of thousands of Mozambicans to seek safehaven in neighboring countries. The refugees are not only an economic burden on the host countries, but also threaten to undermine relations between Maputo and several of its neighbors. <input type="checkbox"/>		25X1

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Zambia: Ruling Party Threatens Labor's Independence [Redacted] 13

[Redacted]

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The ruling United National Independence Party is attempting to take control of Zambia's large and well-organized labor movement, one of the few independent trade unions left in black Africa. President Kaunda's tacit approval of the takeover bid may set the stage for a major clash between government and labor. [Redacted]

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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis, [Redacted]

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Articles


Zimbabwe: Dissident Activity Continues

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The continuing high level of antigovernment dissident activity in southwestern Zimbabwe has forced Prime Minister Mugabe's government to undertake new security measures. The regime's reliance on strongarm tactics to suppress the dissidents, however, has increased tensions between the country's Ndebele-speaking minority and the Shona-speaking majority who dominate the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Moreover,  the harsh security crackdown in Matabeleland has alienated nearly the entire Ndebele population. 

Dissident Activity

Since late October, the dissidents have carried out several attacks against isolated farms in northern Matabeleland that have killed five white farmers.  some farmers fear that the attacks are the beginning of an effort to destroy the economy in commercial farming districts. The US Embassy reports the farmers are bitter that the Army and police are not providing adequate protection. Attempts by commercial farmers to improve liaison with local security forces have failed, however, and many believe the government is either unwilling—or unable—to protect them, 

The dissidents also have attacked local ZANU officials and party supporters in Matabeleland and Midlands Provinces, killing at least 32 in the past two months. According to Embassy reporting, the dissidents destroyed five schools in southern Matabeleland last month. Since the beginning of the year, renewed attacks on public and private property, including construction equipment, wells, buses, and stores are estimated to have caused more than \$100,000 in damages. 

The Dissidents: Who Are They?

The "bandits," as the government calls them, are a collection of diverse individuals and groups who have turned to armed dissidence for a variety of political and economic reasons:

• *Ex-ZIPRA cadres.* These are former members of Joshua Nkomo's guerrilla army, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), who were demobilized or deserted from the Zimbabwe National Army. They appear to fall into two categories: those who profess loyalty to Nkomo, although not necessarily under his control, and those more militant ZIPRA members loyal to Nkomo's imprisoned former military commanders.

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• *"Super ZAPU."* This group appears to comprise ex-ZIPRA members, former paramilitary auxiliaries of the Smith government, and disgruntled Ndebele. Government security officials publicly cite interrogation reports and captured weapons as evidence that South Africa recruits and trains these disaffected Zimbabweans, provides them with arms, and infiltrates them back into Zimbabwe.

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• *Local dissidents and bandits.* These individuals, who rarely operate far from home, appear to be part-time criminals who are able to exploit the poor security situation. They often portray themselves as fighting against domination by the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union, but their primary motivation in taking up arms is economic.



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South Africa: Nascent White Backlash

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Eighteen months of black unrest may breathe new life into the long-dormant white supremacist Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB)¹ and add to the conservative political reaction among whites against President Botha's reform program. In our view, gains by rightwing parties in recent byelections, reports of a dramatic increase in firearm purchases by whites, and sporadic incidents of white vigilantism all signal the potential for a strong white backlash.

Revived AWB?

The ultra-right-wing and militant AWB recently has become more active as continued black unrest has fed increased conservative white criticism of the ruling National Party. Renewed contact in February between the rightwing Conservative Party and the AWB led to speculation in the Afrikaans press about a merger between the two groups, and AWB leader Terre-Blanche this month addressed the Conservative's parliamentary caucus. Following Botha's speech to open Parliament in January, Terre-Blanche charged that Botha's call for a unitary state with common citizenship would lead to domination of the Afrikaners by blacks.

Last month the AWB announced it had formed an all-white vigilante force—known as the Brandwag or Sentry—that it claimed will number in the thousands, according to press reports. Members dress in khaki uniforms for meetings and will be trained in handling emergencies, explosions, fires, and communications. Terre-Blanche said the Brandwag will not issue weapons or provide weapons training. It will be strictly defensive, according to Terre-Blanche, acting only in support of the police and Army, or in their absence. Terre-Blanche says the force is being formed because of the government's ineffective handling of the current unrest.

¹ AWB is the Afrikaans acronym for Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging.

South Africa: The Afrikaner Resistance Movement— The Rightwing Fringe

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With about 1,200 members, the Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB) is the best organized and largest of South Africa's white paramilitary groups, according to press reporting and academic studies. Organized on paramilitary lines—including a swastika-like emblem and a brownshirt youth movement—its stated goal is the preservation of white supremacy in South Africa by all possible means. Its platform calls for the abolition of all political parties, the restriction of the vote to white Christians deemed eligible by a special court and for a government controlled by an AWB Higher Council, according to press reports. AWB leader Eugene Terre-Blanche wants an Afrikaner state encompassing the Orange Free State, the Transvaal, and Northern Natal.

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The AWB has attacked moderate Afrikaner intellectuals, clergymen, and politicians on several occasions. According to press reports, the AWB was responsible for a number of threats and violent acts against persons advocating racial desegregation. Ten members in 1978 were fined for assaulting a university professor. The AWB's leader and eight members in 1982 were arrested after the security forces uncovered caches of weapons and explosives hidden in metal containers, and in 1983 two AWB members were sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for plotting terrorist raids against multiracial hotels and casinos.

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The President ordered an investigation into AWB activities after it disrupted National Party meetings in 1983, and members of the security forces are prohibited from joining the AWB. Minister of Law and Order Louis Le Grange stated in Parliament in May 1984 that the security police were actively monitoring the AWB.

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The formation of the Brandwag coincides with a recent spate of unprovoked attacks by whites against blacks. In Krugersdorp, near Johannesburg, three white men were charged with murder after beating and then burning a black man to death. Three other white men are awaiting trial for shooting at three blacks in Honeydew, a suburb of Johannesburg, according to press reports. Armed white civilians reportedly observed recent large-scale violence in Alexandra, a black township bordering the white suburbs of Johannesburg. [redacted]

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Meanwhile, the Stallard Foundation—a new vigilante organization with no apparent links to the AWB—has begun a recruitment drive for white members, according to the US Embassy. The foundation, which is headed by a member of Parliament from the Conservative Party, recently issued a statement claiming that Pretoria’s relaxed enforcement of laws controlling the movement of blacks has led to the deterioration of law and order in urban areas. [redacted]

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Growing white concerns about continued black unrest are fertile ground for rightwing groups. According to Embassy reporting, 10,000 white residents of Krugersdorp signed a petition calling for the forced removal of the residents of the nearby black township of Munsieville after unrest spilled over into the white residential area. Moreover, 500 residents registered a vote of no confidence in the town’s National Party Member of Parliament for refusing to support the call for removal. Residents met to discuss civil defense, property values, and the formation of group patrols. [redacted]

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Outlook

The potential for white backlash is likely to increase as the Botha government institutes racial reforms that directly affect white interests or if black unrest continues or spreads into white areas. Pretoria is concerned about the prospect of white backlash, and has warned repeatedly that vigilante action will not be tolerated. However, Botha’s recent rebuke of his Foreign Minister for stating that South Africa eventually may have a black president reflects Pretoria’s own ambivalence over how to respond to growing rightwing pressure. [redacted]

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South Africa: Impediments to Black Business

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Laws and regulations originally established to prevent black entrepreneurs from operating businesses in "white areas" of the country have obstructed the growth of black business in South Africa.

districts. Moreover, the new ruling applies only to downtown areas, not to suburban shopping areas where an increasing number of purchases are made.

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Government recognition that black businesses potentially could provide jobs and help co-opt urban blacks is prompting Pretoria to relax or remove some of these impediments. For example, the government recently announced the opening of free trading zones—areas in which all racial groups are allowed to trade—in central business districts in Johannesburg and Durban. Nonetheless, the legacies of past policies will slow black business development.

Regulations on minimum wages, factory standards, and quality control, which are essentially nonracial in nature, also provide hurdles for black entrepreneurs. Because black businesses are confined to the less developed areas of black townships, they are unable to comply with these laws. Pretoria has recognized this problem, and Parliament recently gave President Botha sweeping powers to eliminate legislation that impedes small business development.

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Black Business Today

Blacks operate between 40,000 and 50,000 businesses, most of which are small shops in black townships, according to US Embassy reporting. Only a very small number of blacks own larger operations such as banks, insurance companies, or contracting services.

Bureaucratic and Political. To operate a business in a black township, a permit for a trading site first must be obtained from the local town council. This process can take up to several months and applicants frequently have to contend with political pressures from existing traders or outright corruption, according to Embassy reporting.

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About 20 percent of the economically active black work force is involved in the informal sector as seamstresses, artisans performing odd jobs as painters, mechanics, builders, or carpenters, according to the Embassy. South African academics disagree on whether the informal sector serves as a training ground for future black entrepreneurs, or is simply a low-income niche for those otherwise unemployable.

When the trading site has been secured, a black entrepreneur must complete as many as 30 additional steps before obtaining a trading license, according to the Embassy. White businessmen also deal with as many bureaucratic problems, but whites generally have more experience, and more financial and educational resources to use in grappling with the bureaucracy.

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Institutionalized Obstacles Facing Change

Legal. Most observers of the South African economic scene believe that legal obstacles facing black entrepreneurs are probably the most difficult to overcome. Business areas are segregated under so-called group area laws, which until recently prohibited blacks from owning businesses in "white" central business districts, where most consumer purchases occur, including some 80 percent of black expenditures. The recent opening of racially free trading areas does not apply to all central business

Financial. Black businessmen generally have difficulty obtaining financing, and many often lack the collateral required by banks. Several organizations, such as the quasi-governmental Small Business Development Corporation and a few commercial lenders, have made efforts either to find or provide some sources of financing, with limited success. Most money, however, goes to whites.

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Social and Educational. Substandard education combined with the lack of experience with official procedures, prevents many blacks from gaining skills to succeed in business. Despite additional funds allocated for black education, the per capita expenditure for white students is seven times higher than for blacks.

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Attitudes held by some blacks also serve to inhibit black business development. Successful businessmen often are considered collaborators and targets for violent protest. During the unrest in Umlazi and Kwamashu, more than 60 percent of the black businesses operating in the townships were destroyed. Many potential black entrepreneurs, well aware of this social obstacle, are probably deterred from ever attempting to start a business. Moreover, the frustration felt by a growing number of blacks over their inability to be competitive has led many to identify capitalism with apartheid, according to Embassy reporting.

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Infrastructural. Black businesses in the sprawling townships are often less accessible to township residents than shops in the central business districts. The townships generally lack well-defined business districts, and roads and rail links are designed to move people back and forth between townships and white cities, rather than within the townships.

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Outlook

Pretoria so far has voiced a commitment to a gradualist strategy based on opening central business districts, reducing other legislative impediments, and providing a few training programs for black entrepreneurs. It also is reducing health and safety regulations, offering some finance, and boosting expenditures on education. Although the government made good on its longstanding promise to open parts of some central business districts to multiracial trade, it is unlikely, given the high rents in the white urban business areas, that any immediate change in the makeup of the commercial areas will occur. Moreover, as long as the economy remains relatively depressed and black unrest discourages potential entrepreneurs from coming into the market, moves to promote black business will have little effect.

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**Mozambique:
Refugee Update** [redacted]

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Since 1982, the combined effects of a worsening insurgency, deteriorating economy, and a lingering drought have forced tens of thousands of Mozambicans to seek safehaven in neighboring countries. Intense fighting between government and rebel forces in the central and southern provinces since last fall has triggered yet another exodus. The increasing refugee population poses not only an economic burden on the host countries, but also threatens to undermine relations between the Maputo government and several of its neighbors. [redacted]

Malawi

[redacted]

[redacted]

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
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**Mozambicans in Neighboring Countries:
January 1986**

	Refugees		Migrant Workers Illegal Immigrants
	UNHCR Estimate ^a	Government Estimate ^a	
Totals	82,600	114,600	223,000
Malawi	NA	12,000	NEGL
South Africa	50,000	65,000	195,000 ^b
Swaziland	3,600	3,600	5,000
Zambia	9,000	18,000	3,000
Zimbabwe	20,000	16,000	20,000

^a High estimate.

^b Includes some 45,000 contract mine workers.

[redacted]

operations by either the Mozambican Army or RENAMO, [redacted]. Moreover, small groups of Mozambican soldiers recently have begun crossing the border to seek political asylum. In an effort to curb problems, [redacted]

[redacted] Lusaka was planning to establish a permanent refugee camp at Petauke in Eastern Province. [redacted]

Zimbabwe

The Zimbabwe-spearheaded government offensive last summer against RENAMO guerrillas in the central provinces of Mozambique led to a temporary improvement in the security situation there, and the chairman of the Zimbabwean Red Cross subsequently reported that several thousand Mozambican refugees had returned home. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) representatives estimate, however, that 20,000 Mozambican refugees remain in Zimbabwe, and [redacted] the refugee population is once again growing. The majority of the refugees are located in four main camps near the eastern border and are well cared for by the government with assistance from the UNHCR and other voluntary organizations, according to US Embassy reporting. [redacted]

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South Africa and Swaziland

As RENAMO guerrillas escalated attacks in southern Mozambique during the latter half of 1985, large numbers of Mozambicans began crossing the border into South Africa. The US Embassy reported late last year that South African Government officials estimated that 60,000 to 65,000 Mozambican refugees had crossed into South Africa's eastern Transvaal Province. Most of the refugees are ethnically related to the people of the eastern Transvaal and members of the Shangana tribe—whose members dominate the Maputo government—and had been subject to brutal attacks by RENAMO insurgents. Embassy reporting indicates the majority of the refugees, about 40,000, are located in the black homelands of Gazankulu and Kangwane near the Mozambican border. Food and medical aid are distributed by the international Red Cross and other private South African organizations. [redacted] 25X1

The influx of refugees into Swaziland is taxing the Kingdom's scarce resources, causing overcrowding at refugee camps and heightening tensions with Maputo. By end of January, 3,600 refugees—nearly triple the number last June—were registered with the UNHCR, according to US Embassy reporting. In addition, relief officials estimate at least another 4,000 illegal Mozambicans are in the country. The Embassy reports Swazi officials are under strong pressure from Mozambique to deport all refugees, who Maputo regards as RENAMO sympathizers. Some 200 Mozambicans have been involuntarily repatriated since October. [redacted] 25X1

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Outlook

Until there is a political or military resolution to the war—which we believe unlikely anytime soon—Mozambique’s neighbors will be burdened with refugee populations that ebb and rise with the tide of the insurgency. The large economic costs and accompanying domestic pressures associated with supporting substantial Mozambican refugee populations in Malawi, Zambia, and Swaziland may force these states to unilaterally expel the Mozambicans. The presence of refugees in countries that Maputo suspects are assisting RENAMO—South Africa and Malawi—will be a continual impediment to any improvement in bilateral relations. Moreover, RENAMO may move to exploit refugee dissatisfaction and tribal difference with the Maputo government among Mozambicans in Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in order to gain additional recruits and develop a logistic network for supplying the insurgents [redacted]

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Zambia: Ruling Party Threatens Labor's Independence

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Against the backdrop of sharply declining economic prospects and painful austerity measures, the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) is attempting to take control of Zambia's large and well-organized labor movement, one of the few independent trade unions left in black Africa. The unions, in an effort to fend off this takeover bid without drawing the ire of the party, appear—for now—to be relying on quiet maneuvering to gain support among local government officials. President Kaunda in the past has vetoed efforts by the party to take over the unions. This time, however, he is standing on the sidelines as the takeover bid develops. Kaunda's tacit approval may set the stage for a major clash between government and labor.

economic predicament. The only legal leverage the government now has over the ZCTU is a law requiring employers to deduct union dues from some workers' paychecks. This law can be suspended and the flow of funds cut off if a union is conducting a strike the government considers illegal.

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Reining in Labor

Party loyalists in the Cabinet are centering their efforts on legislation that would make the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) subordinate to UNIP. The legislation would place union leaders and policies under direct party control. The ZCTU is a coalition of unions, and the only organization large enough—it has upwards of 200,000 members—to challenge government policies. It has done so periodically in the past with effective strikes.

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Some government officials have long wanted to gain control over the labor unions. The US Embassy reports that the party called for a takeover last summer, but failed to introduce legislation into Parliament. Instead, Kaunda withdrew a proposal that would have put labor leaders under party control,

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Kaunda was concerned that the timing was not right and that the measure was of questionable legality.

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
Although UNIP has in the past been able to deal effectively with labor's demands for higher wages and benefits, many party members believe more direct control is needed in view of the country's worsening

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Outlook

Party officials and labor leaders are working toward conflicting goals, which over time could force labor leaders to call for strikes to protect union independence. We believe the ZCTU leadership, while preferring a quiet, nonconfrontational strategy, will fiercely resist any legislation that would place it under government control. The ZCTU may protest any restrictive legislation by calling for large-scale work stoppages, although it is uncertain if labor rank and file would heed such a call. Austerity measures have eroded the average worker's income such that even a short strike—and further loss of income—might prove unacceptable to many workers. [redacted]

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Much will depend on how Kaunda decides to handle the party's call for control of the ZCTU. If he follows past practice and vetoes the latest motion to take over the unions, we believe a serious confrontation could be avoided, although some wildcat strikes by individual unions are likely to continue. If Kaunda decides to back the party in its takeover bid, a major—and possibly violent—confrontation could erupt between the government and labor. [redacted]

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


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Africa Briefs



Officials of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) have warned that the potential exists for a widespread grasshopper infestation that could cover several African countries. Warning that spring rains this year may bring about the hatching of eggs laid during an outbreak of grasshoppers in Mali last year, the FAO projects that the infestation could be as serious as the 1978 plague. In that infestation, the desert locust destroyed crops from West Africa to the Arabian Peninsula. The FAO has called for donor nations to fund a comprehensive program, including a survey of egg sites, purchase of pesticides and equipment, and aircraft support. The grasshoppers involved are distinctly different from the desert locust and are likely to pose only a regional problem in and around Mali. Although the United States is supporting egg survey operations, the full array of aid requested seems unnecessary. In addition, the pesticides sought by FAO raise serious environmental concerns, as some of them have been banned from use in the United States.

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