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Africa Review



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24 January 1986

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Africa Review

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Prime Minister Jugnauth's moderate three-party coalition government is suffering from a decisive municipal election loss last month, communalism, personal rivalries, and allegations of corruption and drug involvement by high-ranking officials. [REDACTED]

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Sub-Saharan Africa: New Importance as a Narcotics Transshipment Area [REDACTED]	21	25X1
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Sub-Saharan Africa is becoming an increasingly important transshipment point for narcotics destined for the United States and Europe. One side effect of this activity is escalating drug abuse and increased cultivation of illicit drugs within Africa. The growing dimensions of the problem are attracting high-level concern and emerging in bilateral discussions with US officials. [REDACTED]

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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis, [REDACTED]

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Articles

South Africa: Efforts To Solve the Black Education Crisis

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The decision reached at a national conference of black community leaders in late December to call for the end of nearly 18 months of widespread school boycotts marks a significant effort by blacks to address the education crisis. A suspension of the boycotts probably would reduce tensions in townships, but militant youths are likely to continue to press for boycotts. Moreover, as Pretoria is unlikely to meet other conference demands, including an end to the state of emergency, before the end of a three-month deadline, the credibility of these moderate black groups could suffer irreversible damage, undermining their attempt to end school boycotts this year.

Background to the Crisis

Most blacks regard education as a prime concern and are angered at the overall poor quality of black education. Many black schools, especially those in the homeland and rural areas, are overcrowded, underfunded, and poorly staffed. Recognizing that education is a critical political issue for blacks, Pretoria has expanded efforts to improve black education over the past 10 years. Most black children, however, still do not attend secondary school, and pass rates on high school graduation examinations remain low.

Black children frequently have resorted to school boycotts and violence to protest the poor quality of their education. Over the past decade, education has become an increasingly politicized issue, and township unrest often has been sparked by protests over education issues. During the past 18 months, township unrest has been marked by a growing militancy among youths, and militant youths have focused on school boycotts this year to mark the 10th anniversary of the Soweto riots.

Emergence of Community Groups

The Soweto Parents' Crisis Committee (SPCC)—a coalition of Soweto parents, teachers, and community leaders—has emerged as a driving force behind a national conference and a nationwide call for an end to school boycotts. The SPCC was formed in early October as an adjunct to the Soweto Civic Association to negotiate with Pretoria on issues directly affecting school children, according to US Embassy sources. Negotiations with Department of Education officials in late October resulted in a deferral of Soweto matriculation examinations until 1986. Soweto school principals quickly endorsed the deferral, declaring 1985 a "no exam" year.

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Following these negotiations, the Soweto community gave the SPCC a mandate to negotiate the school boycott issue with the government. According to US Embassy sources, officials from the Ministries of Law and Education were noncommittal when asked to address troop withdrawals, the unbanning of the black student union, the Congress of South African Students (COSAS), and student representative councils. Despite less-than-positive government assurances that demands would be met, the SPCC asked the Soweto community and youth groups to urge students to return to school in January. This "local" decision presaged the national conference and call for an end to the boycott.

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Representatives from 160 black community organizations—and other black leaders, including Bishop Tutu—met in Johannesburg in late December to discuss the education crisis. The conference, held

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under the auspices of the SPCC, called for a nationwide return to school on 28 January, 20 days after the official opening date. The delay was designed to give authorities time to repair damaged schools and to enable community leaders to notify their constituents of the decision, according to press reports. Conference leaders, however, linked their call to other demands and gave the government until 31 March to comply. The demands include: an end to the state of emergency; the unbanning of the COSAS; the withdrawal of defense forces from the townships; the release of all detained parents, teachers, and students, and reinstatement of fired teachers; and government recognition of student representative councils. [redacted]

Pretoria rejected the call to delay the school session until 28 January, but Department of Education officials announced that late registrations would be dealt with flexibly. Reports indicate that the numbers of children returning to school to date have been mixed:

- US Embassy Pretoria sources reported a near 100-percent stayaway in Soweto and Pretoria's townships.
- In other parts of the Transvaal and Natal, attendance reached near 50 percent.
- Department of Education officials confirmed an almost total stayaway at black secondary schools in eastern and western Cape Province.

In some cases, students registered for school but did not attend classes, preferring to start school on 28 January. [redacted]

Other communities have taken the lead from the SPCC and organized community groups to deal with the boycott issue, challenging the rallying cry of militant youths—"liberation before education." Local education crisis committees have gained grassroots support in the western Cape and in some Johannesburg townships, according to press reports. Pretoria, however, has banned meetings of these groups, and, in one Indian township outside Johannesburg, security forces fired tear gas to disrupt a committee meeting. Moreover, some suspended teachers and pupils who have recently been released from detention are still banned from teaching or attending school, according to press reports. Thus far, the government response to the demands made at the

conference has been negative, and black community efforts to deal with the education crisis are unlikely to be enough to encourage blacks to support school attendance this year. [redacted]

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Disingenuous Role of the ANC

The ANC endorsement of the conference decision probably did not come as a surprise to SPCC leaders, who met with ANC officials in Harare on the eve of the conference. The ANC welcomed the national education meeting, announcing that it would abide by the decisions of the conference, according to US Embassy sources. The ANC, which has previously endorsed school boycotts, probably doubts that Pretoria will meet the conference demands by the end of March, thereby freeing it to press for a renewal of a sustained boycott campaign. [redacted]

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Outlook

Early indications are that Pretoria is unlikely to meet any of the demands presented at the national conference. Disenchanted community leaders, who stand to lose their nascent credibility if Pretoria fails to come through on any of the demands, may be forced to support the call from militant youths for a total school boycott. In our view, if community efforts to create a bridge between students and the government are dismissed out of hand, Pretoria will face another year of school boycotts. Furthermore, the ANC will be quick to endorse a resumption of school boycotts this year, in our judgment, as backers of "liberation before education" bring renewed support to their cause. [redacted]

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**Angola:
Party Congress Strengthens
dos Santos's Hand** [redacted]

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President Eduardo dos Santos consolidated his grip on power by removing a number of potential political rivals, including Marxist ideologue Lucio Lara, at a party congress of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) held in Luanda last month. The MPLA now appears more united, in our judgment, than at any time in recent years as dos Santos's military supporters gained increased representation on the party's central committee. Prosecution of the war against UNITA was made the regime's number-one priority, closely followed by emphasis on getting the domestic economy moving. Tribute and thanks were given to Moscow and Havana for their support of the MPLA. The heads of the Soviet and Cuban delegations addressed the congress and expressed their determination to continue support for the dos Santos regime. [redacted]

[redacted] Hermino Escorio, head of the Angolan state oil enterprise, was dropped altogether from the central committee. Escorio's [redacted] abuse of power made him widely unpopular, and dos Santos apparently came to view him as a political liability. [redacted]

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The new central committee met two days after the party congress and named a new politburo made up almost entirely of dos Santos's close supporters. The most important new politburo members are Foreign Minister van Dunem (Mbinda)¹ and Minister of Energy van Dunem (Loy). Two former alternate members of the politburo, Kundi Paihama and Antonio Jacinto do Amaral Marins, were promoted to full members. [redacted]

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Personnel Changes

Dos Santos made a number of important changes in the makeup of the party's central committee and politburo. [redacted] dos Santos was settling old scores with political rivals, increasing the number of men closely associated with his policies in top party decisionmaking bodies, and jettisoning [redacted] unpopular members of the leadership in an effort to gain greater popular support. In general, mulatto ideologues as well as extreme black nationalists suffered in the shakeup. [redacted]

Lucio Lara, the party's secretary general with responsibility for party organization, and three other longtime politburo members were dropped, although each retains full membership in the central committee:

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- Lucio Lara was a founder of the MPLA in the 1950s and led the mulatto faction of pro-Soviet Marxist ideologues. Lara has long been considered a primary conduit for Soviet influence in Luanda. The demotion of the unpopular Lara—the focal point for black resentment of the disproportionate influence of mulattoes in the MPLA leadership—appears to reflect a trend over the past 18 months which saw him increasingly on the periphery of the decisionmaking process. Dos Santos has moved closer to the Soviets since 1983 in return for increased military assistance to fight UNITA, probably leaving the Kremlin little or no reason to block Lara's downgrading.

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The party central committee was expanded from 55 to 90 members, and a number of military officials from a variety of provinces received seats, apparently to undercut criticism that the party is dominated by a Luanda clique. Former Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge was demoted to alternate central committee member as was Air Force chief Iko Carreira. In Jorge's case, the move had been rumored for some time, but Carreira's sudden drop may have resulted from a combination of the Air Force's poor showing during the 1985 government offensive—especially the failure to challenge the South African air strikes that staved off UNITA's defeat at Mavinga [redacted]

¹ Names in parentheses are ones given to individuals during the preindependence guerrilla struggle. Today many officials are referred to by these and not by their real names. [redacted]

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- Joao Luis Neto (Xietu), a former defense minister, had been on the slide for some time, and his removal appears to reflect dos Santos's call for removing deadwood from positions of authority in the party.

[Redacted]

- Evaristo Domingos (Kimba) [Redacted] had been accused of promoting factionalism within the leadership [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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- Ludy Kissassunda, formerly commissioner from Malange Province, was [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] a potential threat to dos Santos. [Redacted]

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Dos Santos's Speech

In his speech to the congress, dos Santos thanked the Soviet Union and Cuba profusely for their support of the MPLA in its struggle against UNITA. He stated that the prosecution of the war was the number-one priority for the MPLA. Dos Santos admitted the heavy toll the war is taking on the nation's economy and urged the party to redouble its efforts to win the hearts and minds of the people and to get the war-damaged economy moving. [Redacted]

In a candid admission of past mistakes, dos Santos said a reform program is under way to weed out those in the MPLA who are indifferent to the party. Here, the President returned to a theme he emphasized a year ago at a national party conference. His words appear to indicate that more personnel changes can be expected in the not too distant future. [Redacted]

Expanding Military Role?

Dos Santos's determination to press the war against UNITA was reflected in the increased representation of the military. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Dos Santos's efforts to bring the military more directly into the decisionmaking process probably is designed to boost morale and diffuse this potential center of opposition. In our view, however, dos Santos and his closest civilian associates will continue to call the shots in the party and will deny much real power to the newly elevated military officers. [Redacted]

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Ideological Tightening

Throughout much of 1985, [Redacted] [Redacted] rumors that the party congress would adopt significant economic reforms deemphasizing orthodox Communism and stressing the need for greater reliance on private farms and businesses. A team of Hungarian economists was said to be in Angola for several months to draft the reforms. Economic resolutions that emerged from the congress, however, put greater emphasis on discipline, central planning and decisionmaking, and Communist orthodoxy. In our view, the reemphasis on Soviet-style economic orthodoxy may be part of the ideological price dos Santos is paying for stepped-up Soviet and Cuban support of his regime. [Redacted]

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Less than two weeks after the congress closed, the official Angolan news agency carried an authoritative commentary condemning petit bourgeois tendencies in society. The commentary decried the rampant corruption that exists in Angola and left little doubt that there will be no move away from orthodox Communist economic theory and planning. Dos Santos repeated the attack on the petite bourgeoisie in his New Year's address to the nation. [Redacted]

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Outlook

The successful staging of the congress, coupled with the large number of shifts in the party's hierarchy, paves the way for additional personnel reshuffling by dos Santos. In addition, dos Santos's hints that the MPLA's failure to win widespread grassroots support is due to shortcomings at the provincial and local levels suggest that a shakeup at these levels may be in the offing. [Redacted]

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Further personnel changes on dos Santos's part would reinforce his control but probably not signal any major changes in Angola's domestic or international orientation. We believe dos Santos's military dependence on the Soviets and his apparent determination to seek a military victory over UNITA militate against greater flexibility on the issues of a regional settlement and a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.

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**Ethiopia: Donors Divided
Over Resettlement**

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Western aid donors are in a quandary over how to respond to Addis Ababa's attempt to resettle 1.2 million peasants from the drought-stricken north to more fertile land in western and southern Ethiopia. Soviet logistics assistance to the resettlement is adding to the donors' problems. Meanwhile, Addis Ababa is committed to the program despite negative publicity in the West and high mortality rates in some of the camps. Western donors face the dilemma of whether to provide food to the victims or deny relief because of the human rights violations inherent in the program.

human rights abuses in the program, but some may hedge or limit their contributions:

- The Canadians and Australians are sympathetic to resettlement and, while opposing some of its coercive features, plan to assist the program. The Canadians believe the United States is using resettlement as an East-West issue against the Soviets and favor giving more support to the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) in an effort to correct the severe shortcomings in the camps, according to US Embassy reporting.

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Western Donors

The Ethiopian Government and the Marxist political party—The Workers Party of Ethiopia—are unable to provide food, water, housing, tools, medical services, and other bare necessities to support Chairman Mengistu's overly ambitious resettlement goals.¹ The government is allowing Western observers inside some of the least presentable resettlement camps, apparently to try to obtain Western relief and development aid for the program. US Embassy officials report that conditions in the Pawe and Gambella areas are primitive and that mortality rates in Pawe are extremely high. Conditions in other resettlement areas are unknown because Western access to the camps is limited. The government nonetheless maintains that resettlement is the only way to break the cycle of drought and starvation that has afflicted northern Ethiopia.

- Italy is heavily involved in construction in the resettlement area of Pawe and plans to provide \$195 million of support for the project. It believes the United States has denounced resettlement prematurely—without considering the positive aspects of the program, according to US Embassy reporting.

- The European Community is delaying its 1986 commitment because of human rights concerns. The European Parliament recently called for a three-month suspension of resettlement and an independent assessment of the program.

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Of the major Western donors, only the United States and the United Kingdom have consistently opposed aid to resettlement camps. France also recently announced that it has no intention of contributing even indirectly to the resettlement program.

- Catholic Church representatives say they feel morally obliged to provide medical assistance for resettlement victims but hope the church's limited medical assistance will not be interpreted as a stamp of approval on the resettlement program.

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According to Embassy reporting, other Western and international donors still plan to extend aid to resettlement victims despite their concern over the

The United Nations has not yet taken a formal position but appears to be leaning toward supporting

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the resettlement program. Reports of human rights violations prompted the UN special representative in Ethiopia to make a demarche to the RRC in November, a move that has raised the subject to the Politburo level in Addis Ababa. In January, however, the UN representative in Addis Ababa declared himself convinced that adequate steps have been taken to alleviate the deficiencies of the resettlement camps, according to US Embassy reporting. He told US diplomats and AID officials that he personally supports resettlement and believes it to be a "100-percent valid option" for Ethiopia. The official UN policy on resettlement is currently under review.

[redacted]

Countering the Criticism

Addis Ababa has not been impervious to criticisms of the resettlement program. The government recently expelled the French emergency medical relief organization, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), for its public allegations of massive deaths and human rights violations in the resettlement camps. The Dutch chapter of MSF, however, has criticized the French doctors for unwise statements about resettlement that could jeopardize the work of the whole organization. Most Western donors believe that MSF's claims are highly exaggerated, according to US Embassy reporting.

To counter growing public criticism of its resettlement drive, the government recently released an official statement emphasizing support for the program from the Italian Government and three nongovernmental relief organizations: The Irish Concern, The Lutheran World Federation, and People for People. The statement pointed out that previous studies by the World Bank and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization recommended resettlement programs that shifted the population in the drought-stricken north to the more fertile areas of the south.

Villagization

The newer and less-publicized villagization program provides another dilemma for Western governments and nongovernment donor groups. The villagization program removes peasants from their traditional rural dwellings and forces them to live in newly constructed central villages and work on collective farms. The

regime has instructed a nongovernment donor group not to undertake any recovery or rehabilitation activities in any areas except those being villagized, according to US Embassy reporting. Party officials maintain that it would be futile to establish services in areas from which the farmers will soon be moved.

[redacted]

The donor group is generally reluctant to support a program it sees as strengthening the party's physical and political control of the people. Most Western donors have not yet decided on their attitude toward villagization.

[redacted]

The Swedish Government intends to cut its aid in 1986 because of the continuing adverse effect of villagization on Ethiopian agriculture, according to the US Embassy.

Soviet Involvement

The Soviets approve of the resettlement program because they wish to encourage government control and administration of Ethiopian agriculture. Moscow has lavished praise on the program in an authoritative Soviet journal and is actively aiding the resettlement effort with helicopters, 12 Antonov-12 cargo aircraft, and more than 300 trucks. The relatively limited Soviet food assistance is provided to resettlement areas—not to the drought-afflicted regions in the north, according to the US Embassy. The Soviets' massive military aid program is a principal means by which the Soviets maintain their dominant influence in Addis Ababa.

We have no evidence that other Bloc nations are following the Soviet example in supporting the resettlement program.

other Bloc nations are critical of the management of Addis Ababa's resettlement scheme and believe it will have little chance of success. The East Germans and Poles, however, have sent a few transport aircraft and helicopters to move food to the famine relief centers in northern Ethiopia.

Outlook

Many official and nongovernment Western donors

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believe that Mengistu will continue to push resettlement forward with or without Western approval. Many donors will continue to be critical of the program but probably will feel they have no choice but to assist the resettled peasants or thousands will face starvation and disease in 1986. Significant levels of Western assistance, on the other hand, would allow Addis Ababa to proceed with its population relocation plans at a faster pace and further its major effort to collectivize agriculture and increase control of the peasants. We believe that Addis Ababa will pursue a calculated campaign to garner increased Western aid for its resettlement and villagization programs and ultimately could acquire some support. Nevertheless, we believe the resettlement scheme is likely to produce disastrous short-term results—unless Mengistu orders a slowdown in the program.

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Zimbabwe: A Limited Regional Role [redacted]

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In the last six months, Prime Minister Mugabe has assumed a more visible role in southern African affairs. Mugabe's greater activism follows his landslide election victory last summer and the consolidation of his internal political base. Moreover, we believe Mugabe is responding to overtures from African and Third World leaders who see him as a man in the forefront of the struggle against apartheid, buttressed by his country's strong economy and military establishment. [redacted]

Rhodesian civil war. More important, in our judgment, the intervention stems from a growing concern over the Mozambican insurgent threat to Zimbabwe's vulnerable transportation routes and oil pipeline through central Mozambique. Harare also would like to avoid becoming dependent on South African railroads. [redacted]

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Despite the appearance of a new foreign policy activism laden with radical rhetoric, Zimbabwe under Mugabe continues to hew to cautious and pragmatic policies that are largely dictated by the country's self-interests and constraints imposed by South Africa—the region's dominant power. Mugabe undoubtedly would like to assume a more assertive role in the region, but we believe he is unwilling to push policies that directly challenge Pretoria's interests. [redacted]

Dealing With Pretoria

Mugabe's strident public attacks against South Africa and its system of apartheid have intensified in recent months. His government nevertheless continues in private to maintain a careful and effective dialogue with Pretoria to avoid jeopardizing extensive economic ties (see table). This two-tracked approach is illustrated by the quiet diplomatic handling of the landmine explosions in South Africa's northern Transvaal Province in November and December that Pretoria blames on anti-South African guerrillas. Despite the hostile rhetoric on both sides, Zimbabwe and South Africa moved effectively to calm the crisis and prevent a further souring of relations. [redacted]

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Aiding Mozambique

Mugabe's decision to provide military assistance to the Mozambican Government best demonstrates Zimbabwe's new activism in the region. The US Embassy reports the decision followed a meeting in mid-1985 with President Machel, who pleaded for help to contain Mozambican insurgents. During the summer of 1985, [redacted] nearly tripled the number of its troops in Mozambique—to about 9,000—and began undertaking joint counterinsurgency operations against antigovernment guerrillas. Despite a drawdown of 3,000 to 4,000 Zimbabwean troops, Mugabe has publicly reaffirmed his support to Maputo, [redacted]

In part, the decision to intervene appears to be an attempt by Mugabe to repay Machel for Mozambican assistance to Zimbabwean guerrillas during the

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Zimbabwe: Regional Trade

Thousand US \$

	1981	1982	1983	1984 ^a
Exports				
Botswana	41,635	33,678	40,361	45,505
Malawi	20,653	16,232	14,966	12,837
Mozambique	16,193	22,718	15,139	5,015
South Africa	279,003	176,703	189,776	190,612
Zambia	51,225	36,767	31,723	32,897
Imports				
Botswana	25,206	45,050	44,350	28,904
Malawi	21,832	13,572	8,093	12,673
Mozambique	27,336	12,518	8,964	102
South Africa	405,999	316,191	257,163	182,366
Zambia	35,765	32,904	22,843	20,803

^a Analyst estimate.

Source: Government of Zimbabwe trade data.

We believe Mugabe is hoping to revitalize the PAC as an effective counterweight to ANC domination of the South African liberation movement, rather than trying to escalate the level of violence against Pretoria in the near term. Mugabe is deeply suspicious of Moscow's close ties to the ANC and to his political opposition at home. Moreover, by all accounts, Harare continues to refuse to allow its territory to be used as a springboard for attacks against South Africa by either the PAC or the ANC. [redacted]

A Venue for Antiapartheid Meetings

Zimbabwe is becoming the scene for a growing number of antiapartheid meetings. In early December, South African students and clergy met with ANC and PAC representatives in Harare following an emergency session of the World Council of Churches, according to US Embassy reporting. Later that same month, several members of a Soweto parents' group also held talks with the ANC in Harare, according to press reports. Moreover,

Zimbabwe is scheduled to play host to the next summit meeting of the Nonaligned Movement in August, and we believe Mugabe is likely to use the conference to castigate Pretoria as the main cause of instability in the region. [redacted]

Outlook

In our view, the increased attention paid by Mugabe to regional affairs does not signify a major policy watershed. Appearances to the contrary, we believe Harare's regional policies are limited in scope and are firmly rooted in its own perception of narrowly defined self-interests. Mugabe's more active role is in large part reflective of the government's growing confidence at having successfully resolved pressing domestic problems. In addition, Mugabe probably is trying to enhance his exposure before assuming chairmanship of the Nonaligned Movement at the summit meeting in August. [redacted]

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Mugabe is aware of his country's extreme vulnerability—both economic and military—to South African retaliation should his policies be seen as posing too great a threat to Pretoria's interests. Zimbabwe lacks the necessary diplomatic, economic, and military resources to challenge effectively South African hegemony in the region. With this in mind, Zimbabwe is likely to continue to provide limited support to South African liberation groups but deny them the use of its territory for launching military operations. Mugabe's verbal attacks against Pretoria nevertheless will not only continue, but his rhetoric is likely to intensify as the date of the summit approaches. [redacted]

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Harare is likely to continue to provide troops to safeguard its transportation routes and the oil pipeline through central Mozambique. It may begin to reduce the scope of its operations and play a less aggressive counterinsurgency role, however, in order to avoid becoming entangled in a protracted conflict that threatens to sap scarce resources. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Zambia: Keeping a Watchful Eye on the Army [redacted]

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[redacted]

the Army's combat capabilities. Economic difficulties probably will force Zambia to delay the purchase of needed spare parts and are likely to undermine maintenance of existing equipment. [redacted]

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[redacted] Kaunda has governed Zambia since independence in 1964 and to date the country has never experienced a coup attempt. Grumbling within the ranks over economic reforms has grown, but few open protests have been reported. In our view, more serious and politically oriented opposition would be difficult to organize because of [redacted]

Austerity's Impact on the Military

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Military personnel, especially the enlisted ranks, have been hard hit by budget cuts over the past several months. These austerity measures—which include reductions in food and fuel subsidies and a sharp currency devaluation—have led to complaints about pay and living conditions from enlisted personnel and some junior officers. [redacted]

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[redacted] the inability of the force's different tribal groups to cooperate effectively. While a coup attempt cannot be ruled out, we believe that isolated outbursts by small pockets of soldiers are more likely to occur and that Kaunda's rule will not be threatened over the near term. [redacted]

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[redacted] Although the military has had some morale and discipline problems for years, the government has become more sensitive to the grumbling since the economic reform measures were implemented. At worst, civilian officials fear violent protests by the population in general and the military in particular.

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Overview of the Army

Of the two principal services—the Army and the Air Force—the Army is by far the most important and the only force capable of toppling the government. The mission of the Army is to defend Zambia from outside attack and to assist the police in maintaining internal security and public order. The Army's some 14,000 men are divided into five regular infantry battalions, one artillery regiment, and one armored regiment. Major tribal groups appear to be fairly evenly represented among midlevel, junior, and noncommissioned officers, as well as in the enlisted ranks. [redacted]

[redacted]

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The infantry battalions are based strategically in Lusaka, Kabwe, and Ndola in central Zambia, as well as in Chipata in the east and Kaoma in the west. The artillery and armored regiments are based in Lusaka. [redacted]

[redacted] We believe Kaunda himself is still favorably regarded by the majority of his troops, who probably blame the need for austerity measures on the mismanagement and corruption of other government officials. Kaunda seems to have forestalled more outspoken criticism by appointing officers to positions traditionally held by civilians. According to the US Embassy in Lusaka, [redacted]

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The Army is equipped with a variety of international arms and equipment, but its major supplier since the late 1970s has been the Soviet Union. [redacted]

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[redacted] that the diversification of arms over the years has created a logistic nightmare, made maintenance extremely difficult, and impaired

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the President has made several Army commanders district governors and promoted Gen. Malimba Masheke from Commander of the Army to Minister of Defense, a position previously held by a civilian.

[Redacted]

Tightening Command and Control

Rumors of military coup plotting in 1980 led Kaunda, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, to restructure the military command to ensure civilian authority and independent monitoring of the Army.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] The military chain of command extends from the President through the Secretary of State for Defense and Security Alex Shapi, then to Minister of Defense Gen. Malimba Masheke, to the Commander of the Army, Lt. Gen. Christian Tembo, and finally to the commanders of the field brigades. In order to prevent any one tribal group from dominating the Army, Kaunda has appointed members of different tribes to the top security positions. Shapi is a member of the Ushi tribe, Masheke is a Lozi, and Tembo is an Ngoni. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Outlook

While we judge that a well-organized coup attempt over the near term is probably remote, we believe that spontaneous and isolated demonstrations are likely to continue as austerity cuts deeper into the standard of living of the troops. Despite some grievances with the Kaunda government, there does not appear to be a significant organized opposition within the military at this time. Any bid for a takeover from the military would require the cooperation of members of several different tribal groups, which we judge would be

difficult to obtain. Moreover, we believe Kaunda's intelligence service is loyal and effective enough to uncover any meaningful coup plotting. [Redacted]

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However, should disgruntled military units overcome hurdles and muster sufficient support to launch a coup attempt, we believe it would probably come from the junior officer or noncommissioned officer level. Faced with such a prospect, there is a chance that relatively moderate and pro-Western senior officers might seize power to forestall the unwelcome possibility of a takeover by junior officers. [Redacted]

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Mauritius: Moderate Government in Trouble [redacted]

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At the halfway mark of its five-year term, Prime Minister Aneerood Jugnauth's moderate three-party coalition—the Alliance—may fail to complete its mandate. In addition to the Alliance's decisive loss to the leftist opposition Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM) in municipal elections last month, communalism, personal rivalries, and allegations of corruption and drug involvement by high-ranking officials are fragmenting the coalition's unity and eroding its popular support. The recent arrest of four Alliance parliamentarians for drug smuggling and the resignations of several influential ministers further weaken the government and may encourage the opposition to call for early general elections. [redacted]

have the full backing of the Hindu community. MLP Hindu supporters, for example, probably cost the Alliance at least one victory out of five in last month's municipal elections. The Alliance also alienated potential supporters by appealing only to Hindus, according to Embassy reporting. [redacted]

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Background

The Mauritian democratic process has been lively and often tempestuous since independence from the United Kingdom in 1968. With a population of 1 million, the island nation's politics are highly personalized, revolving around figures who appeal to specific ethnic, economic, or interest groups. Of the coalition partners, for example, Jugnauth's Militant Socialist Movement (MSM) and Beergoonath Ghurburrun's smaller Mauritian Workers Assembly (RTM) are supported by the majority Hindu ethnic community, and Deputy Prime Minister Gaetan Duval's Mauritian Social Democratic Party (PMSD) appeals largely to the Creoles, who make up 30 percent of the population. Of the opposition parties, the small, pro-West Mauritian Labor Party (MLP), led by Satcam Boolell, also has Hindu support, and the larger MMM, led by Paul Berenger, a white, draws leftwing support from various ethnic communities as well as from most trade unions and labor groups. [redacted]

Seeking the Hindu Vote. The Alliance must come to an accommodation with the MLP, in our view, if it is to avoid splitting the Hindu vote and strengthening the position of the MMM. The Alliance, however, has little to offer MLP leader Boolell in return for political unity. According to Embassy reporting, the ambitious Boolell may believe his chances of becoming prime minister are better if he allies his smaller party with the MMM, which needs a well-known Hindu candidate for the prime minister's post, traditionally held by a Hindu. [redacted]

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Another obstacle to political accommodation is the rivalry between Jugnauth and Boolell dating from early 1984. Boolell was finance minister and a member of the coalition but broke away from the government over personal and policy differences with Jugnauth and led the MLP into joint opposition with the MMM. The death last month of independence leader and first Prime Minister Seewoosagar Ramgoolam, in our view, also affects prospects for Hindu unity. The widely revered and influential Ramgoolam had worked to reconcile Jugnauth and Boolell to ensure a united Hindu governing party, and without his influence reconciliation will be difficult to achieve. [redacted]

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Communalism

We believe that the Alliance's inability or reluctance to overcome the communal nature of Mauritian politics and expand beyond its traditional Hindu constituency will reduce its chances of retaining power. Although Hindus comprise slightly over one-half of the population, the Alliance probably does not

Political Wild Card. The entry of Ramgoolam's son Nuvin, a British-trained physician, into the political fray will affect prospects for Hindu unity. Nuvin

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
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Mauritian Leaders



Anerood Jugnauth
Prime Minister since June 1982 ... lacks a dedicated personal following ... has not proved his leadership ability, [redacted] ... self-proclaimed, self-styled socialist but has made determined steps toward openly pro-Western policies ... soft peddles Mauritian claims to Diego Garcia, where a US military facility is located. [redacted]




Sir Satcam Boolell
MLP leader ... currently being wooed both by ruling and opposition parties ... has held several Cabinet portfolios, most recently Minister of Economic Planning and Development under Jugnauth during 1982-84 ... stripped of that post for his independence, criticism of the Alliance, and alleged secret meetings with the opposition ... 65 ... Brahmin Hindu. [redacted]

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Beergoonath Ghurburrin
Appointed Minister of Trade and Shipping in recent Cabinet shuffle ... had served as Minister of Economic Planning and Development since 1984 ... leader of RTM, which is composed of MLP members who stayed with the Alliance after other MLP members followed Boolell into opposition ... of Indian origin, leader of island's low-caste Hindus ... 57 ... physician ... brother, Rabindrath, a former Cabinet minister, [redacted]



Paul Berenger
Founder and leader of MMM ... member of Parliament, suspended until Jugnauth calls a new session ... would like to become prime minister but his white, Franco-Mauritian heritage is a liability with the predominately Hindu electorate ... strong support from labor organizations ... pro-leftist orientation and charismatic personality appeal to Mauritian youth ... Minister of Finance and Economy under 1982-83 Jugnauth administration ... 41. [redacted]

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Sir Charles Gaetan Duval
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Tourism and Employment ... had served as Attorney General and held Justice portfolio from 1983 until recent Cabinet shuffle ... leader of PMSD ... openly contemptuous of Jugnauth, disregards instructions and preempts official announcements ... active in foreign affairs, effectively attracts foreign investment to Mauritius ... openly bisexual ... close ties to drug traffickers, [redacted] ... 56. [redacted]

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returned to Mauritius from the United Kingdom last year and announced his intention to enter politics in the next general election campaign. The Alliance, MLP, and MMM solicited his endorsement during the municipal election campaign, but Nuvin remained aloof. [redacted]

[redacted]

Tarnished Government Image

Political infighting among Alliance leaders and within the MSM, aggravated by the opposition's continual muckraking, has undercut Jugnauth's efforts to project an image of a united and honest government. Influential Alliance officials have been increasingly critical of Jugnauth for ignoring other ethnic groups and for retaining the flamboyant Duval, whom they regard as an embarrassment, as Deputy Prime Minister. US Embassy reporting indicates that recently resigned Foreign Minister Gayan resented Duval's interference in foreign policy through the Deputy Prime Minister's largely successful efforts to attract foreign investment to Mauritius. [redacted]

Rumors of drug dealing and corruption by high-ranking officials, if proved, could precipitate the government's downfall. The arrest late last month of four Alliance parliamentarians in the Netherlands for smuggling heroin may lead to the implication of other leading Alliance officials involved in the narcotics trade, according to the US Embassy. [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] The Embassy also reports widely circulating rumors that both the conservative former Chief Whip Harish Boodhoo and RTM leader Ghurburrun are involved in narcotics and corruption. [redacted]

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Resignations. In our view, the resignations this month of four Alliance ministers—including Foreign Minister Gayan—and Jugnauth's top aide, Boodhoo, are highly damaging to Jugnauth. The officials stepped down in protest against government policies, especially the Prime Minister's failure to clean up

corruption. In addition, the Alliance's majority over the opposition in the Legislative Assembly has dropped to 12 seats following the four arrests. This majority would be diminished further should the ex-ministers ally with the opposition in a vote of no confidence. [redacted]

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[redacted]

The MMM further plans to broaden support beyond its traditional urban strongholds into the rural areas that back the Alliance. For its part, the MLP probably has not ruled out an eventual merger with the Alliance but first may wait and assess its ability to stand alone in elections if Nuvin Ramgoolam joins the party. [redacted]

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Outlook

The coming weeks will test Jugnauth's leadership skills as he attempts to balance competing factions in his government and retain popular support. According to the Embassy, he has shuffled his Cabinet and introduced four new ministers with what he believes are unblemished reputations in an effort to clean up the government's image. He also has adopted a tough posture on prosecuting narcotics traffickers. Barring additional defections from the Alliance, or proven allegations of corruption and drug trafficking by high-ranking officials, Jugnauth may recoup much of his lost popular support by mid-March. In addition, the MMM may lack the strength to force a no-confidence vote because five MMM parliamentarians, including Berenger, have been suspended from the Legislative Assembly. The MMM has the option of boycotting parliament, however, a move that almost certainly would precipitate the government's collapse. [redacted]

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**Sub-Saharan Africa: New
Importance as a Narcotics
Transshipment Area**

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Sub-Saharan Africa's historic role as a small-scale exporter of marijuana to Europe is expanding to include transshipping Southwest Asian heroin and South American cocaine. Increased shipments of hard drugs through Africa en route to the United States are a marked departure from concentrated use of European channels and underscore the traffickers' determination to extend and diversify operations. One result of this heightened trafficking is escalating drug abuse and increased cultivation of illicit drugs within Africa. Another is the potential for increased tensions in US-African diplomatic relations as the drug issue begins to surface in bilateral discussions.

susceptible to recruitment as couriers and to perform other kinds of tasks for traffickers. In many countries the overall political environment is easily exploited by drug smugglers.

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Expanding Trafficking Center

We believe that the transshipment of Southwest Asian *heroin and opium* through Africa poses an immediate threat to US drug interdiction efforts. US Customs officials report that the amount of Golden Crescent heroin transiting African nations, particularly Nigeria and Ghana, is steadily increasing. The number of Nigerian heroin smugglers arrested at US airports increased sixfold from 1983 to 1984.

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Why Africa?

The immediate cause for Sub-Saharan Africa's emergence as a transshipment zone and trafficking center is most likely the increased law enforcement pressure on traditional smuggling routes into the United States and Europe. The strategic location of the African continent with airline connections between Southwest Asia and US and European distribution points makes it a likely transshipment zone. In many cases, Southwest Asian and Middle Eastern expatriates living in Africa provide the initial links between smugglers, sources of supply, and the consumer. Muslim African nationals also have some advantages in gaining access to normally closely held drug networks in Islamic Pakistan. Communities of African expatriates in the United States and Europe, particularly Nigerians, often provide contacts for home-country drug traffickers seeking to establish markets. We judge that the abundant supply of cocaine out of South America will encourage traffickers not only to develop the African market but also to explore new smuggling routes through Africa into the United States.

Nigeria is the most highly developed, large-scale drug-smuggling center in Sub-Saharan Africa. Murtala Muhammed Airport—the air hub of West Africa—is considered to be a key transit point. Recent DEA evidence suggests that to counter greater US interdiction and enforcement efforts, Nigerian traffickers are expanding centers of operation to cities throughout the United States, Canada, Latin America, Europe, Southwest Asia, and East Asia. One report indicates that some Nigerian couriers travel through Mexico into the southwestern United States, and others from Europe to Tokyo and on to the United States. The increasing sophistication of Nigerian traffickers—mobilizing hundreds of couriers often of different nationalities with multiple passports—suggests that they will pose an even greater problem for law enforcement in the future.

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Heroin shipments also move along the coastal highway linking Nigeria and neighboring Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Ivory Coast. DEA reports suggest that Lebanese, Indian, Pakistani, and Syrian expatriates use this route for hashish and heroin destined for the United States.

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In addition to these external factors, Africa's widespread economic and political problems facilitate illicit narcotic activities. An underpaid, corrupt bureaucracy makes it easy for drug traffickers to strike lucrative deals with government officials. At the same time, economic hardships make many people

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Recent Embassy reporting suggests that Kenya and Mauritius are developing as transshipment centers comparable to Nigeria. Kenyan Customs officials express concern over the increasing flow of illicit narcotics through Mombasa—first port of call for ships originating in Southwest Asia—and Nairobi. Less than 1 percent of all containerized cargo in Mombasa is examined, and there is ample opportunity to offload contraband prior to docking. In Mauritius, [] imports of opium and heroin from the Golden Crescent are increasing. Brown Sugar—a liquid heroin and caffeine mixture whose fumes are inhaled after being burned on a piece of paper—has become a local drug abuse problem of particular concern to law enforcement officials. []

We have only limited information on heroin and opium trafficking groups and routes elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa. According to DEA sources, however, large-scale trafficking groups smuggle unknown quantities of heroin from Pakistan through Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana for sale in South Africa. It is possible that some of this heroin is also shipped on to the United States. []

Evidence of *cocaine* transshipment through Sub-Saharan Africa is less extensive than that for heroin. We believe, however, that recent developments indicate the emergence of a cocaine network between South America and Sub-Saharan Africa that probably has links to US markets:

- [] an increased number of cocaine seizures at Murtala Muhammed Airport over the last two years. In each case, the cocaine arrived from Brazil for onward shipment to European and African destinations. One route allegedly used by traffickers runs from Bolivia to Brazil to Lagos.
- A Ghanaian trafficking group—known to import Peruvian cocaine for export to Europe and the United States—is examining additional smuggling routes to increase volume of shipments to the United States, according to Embassy officials.
- [] attribute the increased availability of cocaine in West Africa to the growing number of airline flights and routes

between Brazil and Nigeria, Senegal, and Ivory Coast.

- DEA reports that cocaine traffickers in South Africa are selling discounted, trial-size “lines” of cocaine to expand their market. One international trafficking group is said to smuggle cocaine into South Africa through Cape Town. []

Trafficking and use of *marijuana* occur throughout Africa. Kenya, Malawi, Uganda, South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, and the West African countries are major suppliers of marijuana products to European and, to a lesser extent, US illicit markets. Marijuana trafficking from all Sub-Saharan African countries to Europe showed an increase in 1984—13 tons or 12.5 percent of all marijuana seized—according to Interpol and DEA statistics. We judge that much of the marijuana trafficking follows trading lines established with Europe during the colonial period. Sub-Saharan Africa’s European orientation does not, however, preclude the development of US routes. According to US Embassy officials, in early 1985 Nigerian and Ghanaian trafficking groups tested a route to North America via The Gambia and London. In addition, there are recorded incidents of Malawian-produced marijuana—usually smuggled through seaports in South Africa and Mozambique—as well as marijuana from Swaziland and Madagascar being imported into the United States. []

A growing drug control problem in Africa is the influx of *mandrax* (methaqualone) from India and West Germany. Mandrax, a synthetic sedative, is generally smuggled through Kenya, Malawi, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Zaire, and Swaziland for final sale in South Africa. []

[] Pakistani and Indian nationals appear to control the traffic between Southwest Asia and eastern Africa. Recent allegations implicating Zambian officials and prominent businessmen in mandrax smuggling, however, imply more direct local involvement. Future use of these smuggling channels for other drugs is a distinct possibility should efforts by mandrax traffickers continue unimpeded. []

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There is no credible evidence to suggest the transshipment of mandrax to the United States and Europe. The political and social implications of mandrax trafficking in Africa are of concern, however. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] The high profits available from trafficking mandrax to South Africa will make this a continuing problem for many African countries. [redacted]

A Tradition of Drug Cultivation

Marijuana cultivation has existed for many years, but some evidence suggests that the cultivation of marijuana is becoming increasingly commercial, supplying the international trafficking networks operating in Africa rather than the traditional domestic market. As far back as 1983, US Embassy officials in Kenya—a key source for high-grade marijuana for international drug traffickers supplying Europe—reported the presence of British drug syndicates recruiting local farmers to cultivate marijuana for export. Other evidence suggests that foreign nationals control large segments of the Kenyan illicit drug business. DEA sources allude to suspected Indian and Italian—with alleged ties to organized crime in Italy—expatriate involvement in drug trafficking and marijuana production. [redacted]

[redacted]

Climatic conditions are suitable for *opium poppy* and *coca plant* cultivation in Sub-Saharan Africa. We have sporadic reports but no evidence of extensive production. Embassy officials in Burkina reported poppy cultivation in the southeastern part of the country in 1984. DEA sources detected opium poppy cultivation in Rwanda, Kenya, and Uganda and coca farms in the highlands of Guinea. A 1980 DEA report alleges that traffickers promoted coca production in

Nigeria, Ghana, and Ivory Coast in order to supply the cocaine market in Europe and Asia. [redacted]

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Local Drug Problems and Enforcement

Sub-Saharan Africa's growing drug abuse problem is an outgrowth of its increased use as a trafficking area. Drugs diverted while in transit support a burgeoning addict population. Mounting evidence of hard drug use among Ghanaian, Nigerian, Kenyan, Ivorian, and Mauritanian nationals has aroused government concern over the debilitating effect of drug abuse on society. US Embassy officials in Kenya, Nigeria, and Ghana report that high-level concern is prompting requests for US aid and technical assistance to combat the drug problem. We judge that the continued economic recession and social tensions will contribute to higher levels of drug abuse. [redacted]

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Extensive marijuana cultivation in Africa and imported mandrax support a large user population. Traditionally, marijuana use was restricted to the aged for the reduction of pain. [redacted] [redacted] point to the appearance of marijuana abuse in urban centers and among the youth. Although South Africa is still the leading center of mandrax abuse worldwide, there is evidence to suggest growing user populations in the transit countries of Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Botswana. [redacted]

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Regional and local drug enforcement capabilities have not kept pace with the rapidly expanding narcotics business in Sub-Saharan Africa. Official efforts are limited by insufficient funds, manpower, and training; by widespread corruption; and by low government priority for the drug problem. Stiff penalties for the cultivation, trafficking, sale, and use of illicit narcotics exist but are rarely implemented. In some cases, fear of tribal reprisal inhibits governments from strenuously prosecuting offenders. The thrust of government enforcement activities is to crack down on low-level couriers, but this has little or no impact on the drug trade. [redacted]

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We believe official concern over the growing problem of drug abuse and smuggling within Africa will prompt greater government emphasis on drug law

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enforcement. West and East African governments are supporting stricter laws, such as the death penalty, and waiving diplomatic immunity and privileges for officials involved in drug smuggling. [redacted]



The expanding nature of drug smuggling operations is prompting greater regional cooperation among African nations. Last June, government officials from Benin and Togo assisted in a French-initiated effort to curb the traffic of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana to France and the United States via Cotonou, Lome, and Accra. Attempts to curb trafficking networks based in Lagos from extending into other West African countries led Burkina and Ghana to conclude an agreement to curb trafficking and cooperate on drug abuse. Similar agreements, including joint marijuana eradication efforts, are under consideration between South Africa and Swaziland. We believe that, in addition to enhancing regional efforts, Sub-Saharan African countries may begin looking to the United States for funding and technical assistance. [redacted]

Future Trends

Cultivation and trafficking of illicit narcotics occur throughout Africa, but we judge that several more countries are likely to become involved on the same scale as Kenya and Nigeria:

- Ghana, Benin, Togo, Ivory Coast, Senegal, The Gambia, Liberia, Mali, Mauritius, Seychelles, and South Africa are developing extensive opium-, heroin-, and cocaine-trafficking networks within Africa as well as between Southwest Asian and South American sources and US and European markets. We expect narcotics operations to strengthen amid continuing economic and political problems.

- Marijuana cultivation in Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Swaziland, and Lesotho reportedly exceeds estimated local demand. We believe exports of marijuana products to Europe will continue to increase and may lead to onward shipment to the United States.

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- Increased mandrax imports to Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mozambique, and South Africa suggest a growing addict population in these countries. Moreover, we judge that smuggling routes may eventually be used for other drugs. [redacted]

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We judge that the narcotics issue will take on greater importance in US-African bilateral relations.

Embassy officials in Kenya report US interests are being directly affected by Kenya's enhanced role as an international distribution center for illicit narcotics. The port of Mombasa is a major liberty station for the US Navy, raising concern about drug use by US personnel. According to Embassy officials in Nigeria, the number and intensity of the searches of Nigerians entering the United States have elicited threats of reciprocal treatment of US nationals entering Nigeria. The Embassy expressed concern about the potential spillover effect on other issues being discussed by Nigerian and US officials. [redacted]

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Africa Briefs

Zimbabwe-Mozambique **Honeymoon Over** 25X1

The Zimbabwean Army, after providing extensive support to the Mozambican Government in central Mozambique for six months, is becoming increasingly critical of its ally's lackluster performance in fighting antigovernment rebels.

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Despite grumbling by the Zimbabwean Army, as well as the substantial financial and material cost of maintaining a large number of troops in Mozambique, Prime Minister Mugabe is unlikely to abandon his commitment to Maputo. Mugabe probably feels indebted to President Machel for his assistance during the Rhodesian civil war and also would like to avoid becoming dependent entirely on South African transportation routes. If the situation fails to improve, however, Mugabe may again limit his support to the more defensive role of guarding Zimbabwe's vital transportation and communication lines through central Mozambique, which Zimbabwe has done since 1982.

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South Africa **Miners Fired** 25X1

The world's second-largest platinum mine, located in the nominally independent black South African homeland of Bophuthatswana, shut down on 6 January after its South African owner, Impala Platinum Holding Ltd., fired 20,000 miners. The miners were dismissed after a wildcat strike over increased wages and better working conditions. Platinum futures prices for April delivery have since soared. The mine closure also has renewed concern over the possibility that tensions in southern Africa might disrupt future metal supplies, even though it is unlikely that the closure will be prolonged or have much impact on supply. Replacement workers can readily be drawn from the vast pool of unemployed blacks in Bophuthatswana and South Africa, and mine officials claim that platinum stockpiles will prevent any break in consumer supplies.

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Uganda**The Economy Suffers**

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The seizure of power by Gen. Tito Okello in July has not stemmed the economic downturn that began under President Obote in 1984. Civil strife, rebel activity in the southwest, ill-advised economic policies, and reduced aid flows have slowed the economic progress achieved in the early 1980s. Market agriculture growth fell to an annual rate of 3 percent in 1985-86 from 10 percent during the period 1982-84. According to US Embassy reporting, inflation jumped to 160 percent in late 1985 from 30 percent over the first half of 1984. The increase was prompted by higher defense expenditures, a substantial rise in civil service wages in June 1984, and lower domestic production. Debt service consumes about 70 percent of export earnings, up from 38 percent in 1983-84, according to a press report.

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Continuing rebel rule in southwestern Uganda, where the insurgents control about 50 percent of the coffee crop, will seriously undermine coffee exports. Coffee accounts for almost all of Uganda's exports and is a principal source of government revenue. Substantial shortfalls in exports will further dampen economic activity, force expenditure cuts or inflationary borrowing, and aggravate the critical foreign exchange shortage. The recent increase in coffee prices is only minimally benefiting the Ugandan economy because the unsettled security situation has created processing and marketing problems. The government has devalued the Ugandan shilling by about 67 percent since the coup and increased petroleum prices, but we believe that further adjustments, along with domestic reconciliation, will be required to stem economic decline.

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Ivory Coast**Renewed Diplomatic Ties to Israel**

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President Houphouet-Boigny and Israeli Prime Minister Peres announced the re-establishment of diplomatic relations after secret meetings in Geneva last month, according to the US Embassy in Abidjan. Ivory Coast becomes the first black African state—after Zaire and Liberia in 1982 and 1983 respectively—to resume relations and only the fourth since Israel's expulsion from most of black Africa following the 1973 Middle East war. Abidjan has permitted Israel an Interest Section and has maintained unofficial security and technical assistance ties since the mid-1970s.

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Tunisia and Algeria already have threatened to withdraw their ambassadors from Ivory Coast in response to the move, according to the Embassy. Although the Arab League denounced the renewal of ties between the two countries, the Arab Bank of African Development has not funded any development projects in Ivory Coast since 1983. Leaders representing Ivory Coast's 30,000 Lebanese, who have extensive commercial interests in the country, have assured the President of their passive support following the resumption of ties, according to the Embassy. In our view, however, Libya may attempt to exploit Ivory Coast's large Muslim sector, which makes up 25 percent of the population, to undermine the Abidjan government and dissuade Cameroon and other moderate West African states from following suit.

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Equatorial Guinea	Continuing Economic Crisis <input type="text"/>	25X1
	<p>Equatorial Guinea's inability to increase cocoa, timber, and coffee exports, which World Bank officials predict could fall short of 1984's levels, are hampering efforts to revive the country's declining economy. A shortage of foreign exchange and a local liquidity crisis have made it difficult to meet the IMF's expenditure restrictions and have delayed payment of military salaries. The government's inability to meet limitations on credit ceilings and external debt, stipulated in the IMF standby agreement, could force new negotiations. Plans to host a Central African Customs and Economic Union Conference in December 1986 probably will further drain the economy and will not be welcomed by the IMF. <input type="text"/></p>	25X1
	<p>Poor salaries and consistently late pay have led to grumbling throughout the military, and the government has heightened security and is monitoring activities of the Defense Ministry, according to the US Embassy. Presidential security concerns prompted the ouster of 60 military officers and enlisted men last month and more are expected to follow soon. The government's insecurity is likely to grow as economic problems deepen and the potential for unrest within the military and general public mounts. <input type="text"/></p>	25X1
Central African Republic	Steps Toward Representational Government <input type="text"/>	25X1
	<p>The US Embassy in Bangui reports that President Kolingba plans to create a one-party state, form a new political party, and schedule presidential and national assembly elections, possibly by 1987. The President has called for a constitutional committee to produce a constitution by the end of the year, according to the Embassy. The President wants the former constitution, which he suspended when he assumed power in the military coup in 1981, rewritten because it provides for multiparty democracy. He believes such a government is unworkable at this point in the country's development, according to the Embassy. The creation of the committee fulfills Kolingba's pledge, made during his National Day address in December, to return the country to civilian rule. <input type="text"/></p>	25X1
	<p>The President last month also outlined an amnesty program for dissidents and released 89 political prisoners. <input type="text"/></p>	25X1
	<p><input type="text"/></p>	25X1
	<p><input type="text"/> The release of political prisoners and the possible rallying of dissidents reflect an increase in Kolingba's popularity and probably will help him to broaden his political base before he forms the new national party. <input type="text"/></p>	25X1

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Preferential Trade Area **Little Accomplished at Summit** 25X1

According to US Embassy reporting, the mid-December summit meeting of the Preferential Trade Agreement for Eastern and Southern African states (PTA) in Lusaka, Zambia, was poorly attended by heads of government and yielded few results. Only four leaders of the 15 PTA member countries—Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe—participated and, as a result, no decisions were taken on outstanding major issues such as a proposed reduction in the minimum level of local ownership for firms benefiting from preferential tariffs and the development of a framework for the reduction of nontariff barriers. Members did agree, however, to establish a PTA Trade and Development Bank, effective this month. We believe only slow progress toward economic integration is likely, because the political links between PTA members are fragile at best.

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Botswana **Trade Surplus** 25X1

Botswana recorded its first trade surplus last year, according to press reports. Exports totaled \$652 million, exceeding imports by \$185 million. Diamonds remain Botswana's largest export, contributing over 70 percent of total export earnings. Government officials expect an increase in both imports and exports in 1986 as a fifth consecutive year of drought forces Botswana to increase food imports, while a stronger diamond market improves export earnings.

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