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Africa Review



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15 November 1985

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Africa Review

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15 November 1985

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*Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
 Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
 Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,* [Redacted]

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Articles

Somalia: Dissident Challengers in Disarray 



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
Somalia's two chief dissident groups—the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF)—will continue to harass, but not mount a serious immediate challenge to the regime of President Siad, in our view. The insurgents' leadership disputes, lack of broad tribal appeal, and resistance to Ethiopian-sponsored merger proposals continue to undercut their political and military strength. Siad consequently has been able to undercut the dissidents with conciliatory gestures toward their disgruntled tribal supporters. 

supported by Ethiopian artillery—against northern Somali border towns in mid-September, and may have been involved in the bombing of a Somali military officers' club in early October. The SDSF, operating alongside Ethiopian units and supported by Ethiopian air and artillery, launched a large-scale attack on Somali Army positions along the central Ogaden border in mid-July. While all of these attacks were repelled by Somali forces, they illustrate that the insurgents can—with Ethiopian assistance—pose problems for the ill-trained and poorly equipped Somali Army. 

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Recent Developments

US Embassy reporting indicates that both dissident groups have experienced internal convulsions over the issue of regaining the initiative from the Siad regime. At a leadership conference in London in late August, the Central Committee of the SNM—composed of Issak tribal leaders who seek autonomy for northern Somalia—decided to change its tactics from attacking Somali Army camps to conducting terrorist raids on Somali towns.  In addition, the Central Committee reportedly urged SNM Chairman Silyano to seek a merger with the SDSF—which draws support from the Majertain tribe of central Somalia—on the condition that its leader, Colonel Yusuf, be deposed. The US Embassy in Addis Ababa reports that Yusuf—long opposed to a merger—was subsequently arrested by Ethiopian military personnel, and his headquarters closed in mid-October. We believe Addis Ababa did this to clear the way for a union of the dissident groups, a move that probably will create further turmoil in SDSF ranks. 

Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu eagerly supports the Somali insurgencies as a counter to Siad's support of Western Somali Liberation Front raids into the Ogaden. The Somali-Libyan rapprochement in April reportedly ended Tripoli's support for the dissidents, leaving, in our judgment, Ethiopia free rein to influence the insurgencies.  Addis Ababa tightly controls the movements of the dissidents, the choice of targets, and the timing of the groups' raids. 

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The Government Approach to the Dissidents

In our view, the fortunes of the dissidents depend in large part on Mogadishu's policies toward their tribal support bases. According to US Embassy reporting, most dissident grievances stem from Siad's policy of tribal favoritism and his continued manipulation of tribal rivalries to maintain power. Recently, however, Siad has also shown himself capable of conciliatory gestures to these groups, including a highly successful government amnesty program that resulted in hundreds of dissident defections. In addition, Siad continues to seek a reconciliation with the Issaks,

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
Despite these signs of internal upheaval, both dissident groups have recently demonstrated an ability to mount effective military operations against Somalia. The SNM launched several raids—

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Distribution of Somali Clan Families



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Background and Objectives of the Insurgencies

The SNM and SDSF trace their origins to the period following the 1977-78 Ogaden War when President Siad turned increasingly to the Marehan and Ogadeni tribes for political support in the wake of the Ethiopian and Cuban defeat of invading Somali forces. Although they evolved along different lines, each group relies on support from tribes alienated by Siad, and both movements are committed to the overthrow of his regime. While tribalism led to the early success of the dissidents, it has also limited their political appeal and caused serious disputes in their ranks. Nevertheless, we believe the dissidents have contributed significantly to the long-term erosion of Siad's support base, and could pose a greater threat should Siad fail to reverse Somalia's military and economic decline. [redacted]

The Somali National Movement

The Somali National Movement—which fields 3,000 fighters and was organized in London in 1981—draws support almost exclusively from the Issak tribe that is predominant in northern Somalia, but is excluded by Siad from political, military, and economic influence in Somalia. The dissidents claim to seek the establishment of an autonomous Issak government in the north, economic liberalization, free elections, and international nonalignment for Somalia. [redacted]

Since 1982 the SNM has maintained its headquarters in Addis Ababa, and [redacted] Ethiopia supplies the SNM with training, small arms, ammunition, and funding. Because of its narrow tribal base—Issaks comprise 90 percent of the movement—the SNM is not as vulnerable to Ethiopian influence as the faction-prone SDSF; consequently, the SNM does not attract as much Ethiopian support as the SDSF, and is forced

[redacted]

to employ a guerrilla strategy of infiltrations and hit-and-run raids. According to the US Embassy in Mogadishu, the SNM receives most of its funding from the Somali expatriate community in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, although we believe some funds also are donated by sympathetic Issaks within Somalia. [redacted]

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The Somali Democratic Salvation Front

The SDSF, with an estimated strength of some 1,500 fighters, was formed with the Ethiopian- and Libyan-sponsored merger of the Somali Salvation Front and two smaller anti-Siad groups. Since its inception and until his recent arrest, the organization was led by Colonel Yusuf, and continues to be dominated by his Majertain clan. According to the US Embassy, Yusuf's authoritarian leadership and close ties to Ethiopia handicapped efforts to expand the SDSF's appeal to other Somali tribes, factors that we believe probably contributed to Ethiopia's decision to arrest him. [redacted]

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In addition to its goal of removing Siad, the SDSF proposes to establish a democratic form of government in Somalia that is free of tribalism, corruption, and international capitalism. The SDSF charter also calls for a nonaligned foreign policy, a rapprochement between Somalia and Ethiopia, and an end to the US military presence in Somalia. To achieve these goals, the SDSF employs a more conventional type of military strategy—made possible by Ethiopian-supplied heavy weapons, including tanks—and often participates in joint operations with Ethiopian Army units stationed along the central Ogaden border. [redacted]

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often sending high-level government delegations to the north with offers of amnesty, compensation, and concessions. [redacted]

We believe Siad may have shifted tactics toward the dissidents with a view to undercutting their strength at a time of internal division. Government treatment of returned dissidents has been very lenient, according to the US Embassy, and many have been taken back into the Army. Siad almost certainly realizes that the harsh government crackdowns in the north in late 1984—which included summary executions—only increased opposition to his regime and swelled dissident numbers. [redacted]

Unless Ethiopia substantially expands its present level of support, however, we believe Somali dissident activities will remain at a low level. In addition, we concur with the [redacted] that the insurgents pose no immediate threat to US military personnel and installations in Somalia. Although the dissidents have penetrated within 65 kilometers of the port at Berbera for sabotage operations, both groups have eschewed attacking US facilities so far. We believe this could change, however, if the rebels came to believe the United States was actively supporting Somali moves against them. [redacted]

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Outlook

The dissidents' continuing internal disarray, lack of wide tribal support, relative military weakness, and inability to unify make them unlikely replacements to the Siad regime. Although both groups will continue to overrun Somali defensive positions on the border, neither movement can occupy territory nor project itself as a viable alternative to the Siad regime, in our judgment. In addition, we see little prospect of a successful merger of these two movements, because of deep-seated tribal differences and the reluctance of both leaderships to share power. Nevertheless, we judge Ethiopia will continue to supply materiel support, training, and bases for both groups, with the aim of further undermining the Siad regime and its territorial claims in the Ogaden. [redacted]

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In our view, the prospects for a peaceful settlement in the north remain dim, in spite of recent signs that Siad may be becoming more flexible with the insurgents and their tribal supporters. Growing internal criticisms of the Somali military and economic decline probably will force Siad to continue playing off tribal rivalries to bolster flagging support for his government. Moreover, we believe the dissidents may increase attempts to capitalize on Siad's political weaknesses through disinformation and propaganda campaigns. In a recent example, a false report of US nuclear waste dumping in Somalia—initiated by the rebels' jointly run, Ethiopian-supplied radio transmitter—forced the Siad regime to issue embarrassing denials, and probably furthered doubts among Siad's critics over Somalia's close ties to Washington. [redacted]

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Ethiopia: Possible New Maritime Facility [redacted]

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Construction has begun on what eventually could be a shipyard on Ethiopia's Haleb Island, near the southern end of the Red Sea. We believe that the long-term project may also include a new port facility intended to relieve congestion in the nearby crowded port of Aseb, and—if it can accommodate oceangoing vessels—that Soviet naval ships might use the facility on occasion. [redacted]

[redacted] the Soviets are sponsoring naval-related construction on Haleb Island, and we believe there will be at least some Soviet naval involvement. [redacted]

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According to an Ethiopian press report, the Ethiopians signed a 6 million birr (2.9 million US dollars) loan agreement with North Korea on 8 November in which the North Koreans agreed to provide equipment and material for a shipyard on Haleb. The Ethiopians may anticipate a need for small coastal cargo crafts and lighters. They lack, however, the skilled labor force and support industries necessary to initiate and sustain a shipbuilding facility without large-scale, sustained outside assistance. [redacted]

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Construction Activity

[redacted] a new road and causeway are being built to connect Haleb Island, about 17 kilometers southeast of Aseb, with the mainland. The island is undeveloped except for several small structures, which are new since 1983 and whose purpose is not yet clear. When the road reaches Haleb, it could be used to transport building materials and support equipment for a major construction effort on the island. [redacted]

The projected facility may also ultimately serve as a port for the small, Soviet-assisted Ethiopian Navy and could provide an out-of-the-way transshipment point for delivery of Soviet military equipment to the Ethiopian military forces. These deliveries currently come almost exclusively through Aseb, where port facilities are inadequate and open to Western observers. According to US Embassy reporting, Western aid donors have threatened to suspend famine relief shipments through Aseb if Ethiopian authorities do not expedite the flow of cargo through the port, an indication of Aseb's chronic congestion. Moving Ethiopian naval craft and some Soviet military aid deliveries to Haleb would serve Ethiopian commercial, relief, and security needs. [redacted]

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Haleb Island is located along the eastern channel entrance to Aseb and some 50 kilometers from the Strait of Bab El Mandeb. It is fairly isolated from settled areas. The island is surrounded by coral reefs and shallow water. The coral reefs would require either extensive blasting or the construction of a quay wall to enable large ships to approach the facility. We would also expect to see dredging and pile driving activity before berthing facilities were constructed. Berthing facilities such as piers and quays would be needed before any ships, including naval craft, could operate from Haleb. We would expect to see construction of building ways, an outfitting area, and a component storage area if the Haleb project is a shipbuilding project. [redacted]

For their part, the Soviets do not appear to have a pressing need for new facilities in the area. They extensively use Ethiopia's Dahlak Island, approximately 445 kilometers northwest of Aseb, for crew rest, naval repairs, and support of their Indian Ocean squadron. [redacted]

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Purpose

We estimate that construction of a shipyard or a port facility on Haleb Island would take a minimum of three to five years, and projections of its final configuration, or whether it is intended for military or commercial purposes, are tentative. [redacted]


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prepositioning naval fuel oil or water on Dahlak. They also enjoy naval access to Aden, 200 kilometers east of the Strait of Bab El Mandeb. Nevertheless, their requirements could change, and in view of the possible Soviet involvement on Haleb and the close Moscow-Addis Ababa relationship, we believe the Soviets would make use of future facilities on the island.

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Angola: Oil Boom Amid Economic Decay [redacted]

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The costs of battling the UNITA insurgency probably offset most of the economic benefits of the current oil boom in Angola, in our judgment. Oil production, which accounts for 90 percent of Angolan exports, has roughly doubled since 1982 and is projected by industry experts to double again by about 1990. Every nonoil sector in the economy, however, is suffering from the impact of fighting between the government and the UNITA insurgents. We believe that Luanda has used most of its foreign exchange windfall from oil exports to make hard currency payments to the USSR, Cuba, and other Communist military suppliers and, consequently, has done little to alleviate domestic hardships and spur investment. Even though arms deliveries have declined this year, requirements to service existing military debt will continue to drain foreign exchange reserves. As a result, little economic relief for hardpressed consumers can be expected through 1986, in our judgment. [redacted]

second to oil among Angola's exports. Management and technical deficiencies since the Portuguese exodus following Angola's independence in 1975 and UNITA attacks have cut production sharply in both industries:

- Only about one-fourth of the area planted in coffee when colonial rule ended is in full production, according to a recent press statement by the Angolan Vice Minister of Agriculture for Coffee. Production totaled less than 25,000 tons in 1984—only about 10 percent of preindependence output—and is estimated by the Angolan Minister of Industry to have declined by an additional one-third this year. [redacted]

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
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The Oil Boom

Oil production currently totals almost 250,000 b/d, according to press accounts. Western oil companies are expanding investment in exploration and development of offshore oilfields, and Luanda has set a production target of 500,000 b/d by 1987. The government's optimistic target jibes roughly with press accounts of estimates by private foreign petroleum corporations, which project output of about 550,000 b/d by 1990. [redacted]



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We believe that Angola's prospective volume increases in oil production over the next several years will more than compensate for any income losses from market-induced cuts in oil prices. Any downturn in world oil sales probably would not significantly affect demand for high-quality Angolan "light" crude oil, which is exported mainly to US east coast markets. Prospects appear to be good, therefore, for significant increases in foreign exchange earnings from oil exports over the next few years. [redacted]

Although rising oil exports have more than compensated for the loss of foreign exchange earnings caused by the decline of the coffee and diamond industries, new employment opportunities in oil production have fallen far short of the number lost on coffee plantations and diamond mines. Employment in coffee and diamond production has fallen from more than 325,000 workers before independence to about 50,000 to 60,000 currently, according to press

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Declining Nonoil Exports


In contrast, prospects are poor for any increases in exports of coffee and diamonds, which rank a distant

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Angola: Export Earnings 1974 - 1984



[REDACTED]

reports. In contrast, the oil industry employs only a few thousand workers, and many of these are expatriate technicians and managers. [REDACTED]

Economic Shortages

Production of corn and cassava, the main food staples in Angola, has dropped sharply as a result of the loss of the Portuguese-run transportation and marketing systems that provided ready distribution channels for output by small farmers. In addition, more than 200,000 people have been driven from central and southern food-producing regions by the fighting, according to Red Cross data. These problems have forced Angola, which had exported corn and cassava before independence, to devote up to one-fourth of its export earnings to food imports. Severe food shortages, nonetheless, are widespread in both urban

and rural areas, according to press reports [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The economy-wide shortages of imported parts and raw materials, electric power outages, transportation interruptions, deficiencies in technical and managerial expertise, and the loss of purchasing power in local markets have severely depressed manufacturing output. Sketchy reporting in the press indicates that few factories are operating at more than about 40 percent of capacity. Food-processing plants, which normally account for about one-third of manufacturing output, have suffered from difficulties in acquiring supplies because of transport problems and foreign exchange shortages. Shortages of

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imported raw materials may force the important textile enterprise in Luanda, ENTEX, to close down before the end of the year, according to reporting in the city's major daily and official regime mouthpiece, *Jornal de Angola*. Angola's only tire factory is still in operation but has been forced to shut down for several days on repeated occasions this year because of frequent loss of electric power [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

• [redacted] industry and agriculture were paralyzed and that the exchange of goods between the countryside and urban centers had virtually collapsed.

• [redacted] Luanda is experiencing increased shortages of food, signs of malnutrition, and a dramatic fall in the standard of living.

• [redacted] shortages of medical supplies and equipment and added that most hospitals suffer from neglect in maintenance.

• [redacted] widespread hunger, particularly in the southern regions. [redacted]

The Communist Arms Drain

Payments to Communist suppliers significantly reduce Luanda's ability to alleviate economic shortages, in our judgment. We believe that Angola pays in hard currency for most of its military assistance, including weapons, foreign personnel, and support. [redacted]

Angola also pays hard currency for Cuban combat forces that supplement the Angolan Army in defense of fixed positions. Payments to Communist countries currently total as much as \$1 billion annually—almost one-half of total export earnings in 1984 and 1985—according to our estimates. [redacted]

Government Measures

Public statements by government leaders indicate growing concern about the dismal performance of the economy. Economic problems, for example, were a major theme at the ruling party's first national conference in January 1985. Two newly created commissions were instructed to present reports at the party congress next month on ways to improve the economy's performance. [redacted] speculate

that the congress will call for increased reliance on private enterprise to supplement operations by large state enterprises. [redacted]

The regime is seeking Western economic help. Angola signed the Lome Convention in April 1985, opening the possibility of EC credits and aid. It signed an agreement with France in January 1985 for aid to help restore coffee production. Angola also has called on Western firms—particularly the oil companies—for help on a variety of economic projects, such as road repairs, hotel construction, and agricultural assistance. [redacted]

[redacted]

Prospects

Prospects for increased Western investment outside of oil production, however, are poor because of the civil war and the aversion of potential investors to Angola's socialist economic system. [redacted]

[redacted]

little change in the planned economy is apparent. UNITA leader Savimbi's public threat earlier this year not to release foreign technicians and workers captured by UNITA in Angola has dampened the already marginal enthusiasm of Western firms for further investment. [redacted]

[redacted]. UNITA's recently announced intention to target Angola's petroleum industry also undermines prospects for Western investment. Prospects for achieving an economic turnaround in 1986, therefore, are poor, in our judgment, despite the probability of significant increases in oil production. Major problems such as food shortages, disrupted transport, electric power interruptions, and below-capacity manufacturing will continue. [redacted]

[redacted]

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
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Botswana: Diamonds, Diversification, and Economic Growth

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If it were not for the downturn last year in the international diamond market and a leveling off of diamond output, Botswana's economy might have maintained its impressive 11-percent average growth toted up annually since 1965. As it was, the country's economy recorded a 2-percent growth in 1984,

The economy probably will continue to expand at this slow rate over the next few years because of the weak diamond market.

In addition to the rapid expansion in diamond mining over the past 15 years, Botswana's growth has been helped by sound economic management. The government's conservative policy of building up foreign exchange reserves in good years as a hedge against bad years has kept the level of foreign debt low and allowed stable growth.

Diamonds

Botswana ranks as one of the largest diamond producers in the world. A succession of mining projects rapidly increased Botswana's production, beginning with the Orapa mine in 1970. The opening of the rich Jwaneng mine in 1982 more than doubled the country's total diamond output. Diamonds now account for about 70 percent of Botswana's foreign exchange earnings, 30 percent of its GDP, and 40 percent of government revenues. De Beers Botswana Mining Company, in which South Africa's De Beers Consolidated Mines and the government each hold a 50-percent interest, now operates all of Botswana's diamond mines—at Jwaneng, Orapa, and Letlhakane—and the diamonds are marketed by the De Beers-controlled cartel, the Central Selling Organization in London.

The decline in growth during 1984 was due largely to a slowdown in the expansion of output from the Jwaneng diamond mine as it reached its full productive capacity. The current low diamond prices preclude the development of new diamond mining projects and we expect stagnating production will keep growth to more modest levels over the next few years.

Unsuccessful Diversification Efforts

Gaborone has tried to diversify the economy to reduce dependence on diamonds, but its efforts thus far have been largely ineffective. Two devaluations of the Botswana pula in 1984 totaling about 20 percent were designed in part to promote import substitution and encourage exports in agriculture, mining, and manufacturing, including items such as food, clothing, beef, copper, nickel, and vaccines. The government also has offered incentive packages to attract foreign investment.

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Areas of the economy other than mining have been depressed. Some growth in manufacturing has occurred as a result of government promotion schemes, but the sector, consisting of light manufacturing—paints, chemicals, matches, furniture, and pharmaceuticals remains very small with little prospect of expansion. Agriculture and livestock, the main economic activity of about 70 percent of the population, have been affected adversely by the persistent drought. Grain production remains low, equivalent to about 10 percent of domestic requirements, while the livestock population has been depleted.

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Dependence on South Africa

Botswana's economic well-being is highly reliant on South Africa. Eighty to 90 percent of all imports come either from or through South Africa, including all of the country's oil, most of its food needs, and almost all of the machinery and vehicles needed as production inputs. About 25 percent of Botswana's exports depend on South African rail and port facilities to get to their overseas markets. Gem quality diamonds are shipped by air to London. Jobs in South African mines represent 15 percent of the country's formal sector employment.

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The financial connection with South Africa is also important. Receipts from the Southern African

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
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
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Botswana: Economic Indicators


**Composition of Exports
Percent**




**Inflation Rate
1979-84**



**Real GDP Growth
1978-84**



**Balance Of Payments
1978-84**



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Customs Union¹ account for 20 percent of Botswana's total government revenue. South Africa is the major source of capital and investment, and South African companies dominate Botswana mining and manufacturing. [redacted]

service from 5 percent to 10 percent. We believe Gaborone will maintain its currency link to the South African rand, despite a fall in the rand's value, as a means of promoting diversification and import substitution goals. Meanwhile, a likely increase in unemployment and a shortage of imports will lower the current standard of living. [redacted]

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The instability of the South African rand, to which the Botswana pula is linked has led Gaborone to consider severing the connection. If the pula is allowed to fall with the rand against the major currencies, the prices of imported goods not wholly produced in the Southern African Customs Union area could rise enormously. Oil purchased by South Africa for refining and reexport to Botswana would be particularly vulnerable to sharp price rises. [redacted]

[redacted]

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On the other hand, since the pula is not in itself a weak currency, the government could delink it from the rand and let it remain stable against the major currencies. Delinkage, however, would undermine the small businesses trying to compete with South African goods within the Customs Union area, its major market. The effect would be to make Botswana goods more expensive than rand-valued products and thwart the development goal of diversifying the economy through import substitution. If Gaborone were to leave the Customs Union and protect local industry, it would face a loss in customs receipts that could not be replaced by local duties because of the favorable division of receipts offered by South Africa. It would also lose any chance of exporting to the South African market. [redacted]

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Outlook

The prospects for expanding nonmining areas of the economy are bleak. Stagnating diamond production and higher import costs probably will force Gaborone to depend more on foreign borrowing to fund social services and diversification projects. Nevertheless, we expect Gaborone to maintain cautious fiscal policies. Economic planners forecast an increase in debt of \$85 million over the next six years and a rise in debt

¹ Southern African Customs Union—made up of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland—allows for a duty-free flow of goods among member countries. The Union also has a common policy on tariffs and other duties on goods imported into the area. The import duties are collected by South Africa and placed in a common customs pool. These funds are then distributed to the members according to a fixed percentage. [redacted]

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Mali: Search for Military Aid [redacted]

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In recent months Malian President Traore has been unable to secure Western military aid that would help him gradually replace unsatisfactory Soviet equipment, according to US officials in the field. Traore's moves to diversify his military supplies apparently are opposed by some members of the 7,500-man Army, who are closely linked to the Soviet military pipeline to Mali. We see little chance that Mali will be able to make a dramatic break with the Soviets unless alternative aid sources become available. [redacted]

[redacted]

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The Soviets would provide 61 military advisers and technicians in 1985, a reduction of 11 from 1984,

[redacted] the Soviets withdrew an offer to provide an adviser to the Chief of Staff after strong opposition from the Malians [redacted]

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After a review this spring revealed that much Soviet equipment was unusable and unneeded, Traore began to question Mali's long dependence on Soviet supplies and training. [redacted]

Despite these setbacks, the Soviets have continued to seek an active role in the Malian military and among student groups. With construction of a military

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[redacted] the Soviet Union provided \$138 million in military equipment, including T-34 tanks, six MIG-21 and 21 MIG-17 fighter aircraft, and MI-8 helicopters. [redacted]

airfield at Gao with a 3,000-meter runway nearly completed, the Soviets are now making plans for a field near Segou, [redacted]

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[redacted] Mali would continue a Soviet military training program, but [redacted] would seek new sources of equipment to replace the present arsenal gradually. [redacted]

US officials indicate that the Malians have no use for such airstrips, and the Soviets, although currently denied landing rights, may hope to use the fields to transport arms and supplies to southern Africa or even Latin America. In addition to providing military training, Soviet universities have long been attended by Malian students, particularly to study in technical fields. [redacted]

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Military aid from the West has fallen far short of Mali's requests. The US Embassy reports that [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted] making it a distant second to the USSR which has 55 military and 500 economic advisers in Mali.

[redacted] The Soviets have long sought an independent Mali/USSR Friendship Society, according to the US Embassy. [redacted]

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[redacted] South Korea is prepared to provide equipment and technical assistance to Mali—in part as a gift, with the rest for purchase under very generous terms. [redacted]

[redacted] Traore has accepted an invitation to visit the Soviet Union in 1986, and [redacted]

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[redacted] an agreement was reached in early October, marking the first breakthrough in Traore's search. [redacted]

[redacted] Chairman Gorbachev may use such an occasion to push for the Friendship Society [redacted]

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Disappointment over the West's response has not yet made Mali more receptive to new Soviet entanglements. [redacted]

[redacted]

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Africa Briefs

Tanzania

New Prime Minister Is Nyerere's Man

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New Tanzanian President Mwinyi has appointed former Minister of Justice and Attorney General Joseph Warioba as the country's Prime Minister and first Vice President. Warioba is part of the "Butiama Mafia," a small group of trusted confidants who all hail from former President Nyerere's native Musoma region. His appointment, made only hours after Mwinyi's formal inauguration on 5 November, suggests that Nyerere will have a substantial measure of control over the Mwinyi government. US Embassy reporting indicates that Warioba is intelligent, pragmatic, and well-disposed toward the United States.

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. We believe his selection will disappoint those who had hoped for a dynamic leader able to reverse Tanzania's disastrous economic slide, although his appointment may ease tensions among Musoma military officers whose plans for a coup were disrupted before Mwinyi's election.

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Mauritius

Preparing for Municipal Elections

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Mauritians go to the polls next month to vote in municipal elections, the first test of popular sentiment since the general elections in 1983. Prime Minister Jugnauth's moderate three-party governing coalition—the Alliance—and two opposition parties, the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM) and the Mauritian Labor Party (MLP), are fielding candidates for mayor and council members in the five urban municipalities. The Marxist-oriented MMM has controlled the cities since the last municipal elections in 1982. According to the US Embassy, party leaders view the elections as a popular referendum both on Jugnauth's political record and on the MMM administration of the urban centers.

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The Alliance campaign has emphasized government efforts to improve the economy and create job opportunities as contrasted with the MMM's poor city planning and failure to reduce urban crime, drug use, and pollution. The MMM has concentrated on Mauritius's increasing foreign debt, growing rural unemployment, and other national issues. The elections are likely to be close, but the outcome will depend on whether the pro-West, predominantly Hindu MLP attracts a significant number of voters away from the Alliance in the urban Hindu constituencies that in the past have supported the government. Regardless of the outcome, municipal authority will be limited by the federal government's control over the city budgets. In our view, the vigorously contested elections will reaffirm Mauritius's strong democratic tradition since independence from the United Kingdom in 1968.

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Cape Verde

Pereira To Be Reelected

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President Pereira, Cape Verde's only leader since independence in 1975—will be reelected to another five-year term by the National Assembly, after its 83 deputies are chosen in general elections earlier the same day. Although the 61-year-old Pereira probably will make several ministerial and senior level changes, no significant change in his nonaligned foreign policy is likely.

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Although initially associated with West Africa's other leftist leaders, Pereira purged his Cabinet of pro-Soviet radicals in 1981 and since has pursued a more pragmatic foreign policy, according to the US Embassy. Despite Cape Verde's dependence on the Soviet Union for military aid, it has turned to the West for economic and humanitarian assistance, particularly because of chronic drought. The country's needs have enabled Pereira to balance factions within the government that would like to move the country permanently into the East or West bloc.

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According to the US Embassy, Pereira has sought to establish himself as a statesman and to expand his role in international and regional forums. In recent years, the President has helped to arrange talks between Angola and South Africa brokered by the United States, and has become the spokesman for the Lusophone countries on foreign policy matters. Although Pereira allows South Africa aircraft landing rights in Cape Verde—primarily for financial reasons—he has joined with other African leaders in openly denouncing apartheid.

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In our judgment, Pereira's position is secure, despite his inability to reverse Cape Verde's economic decline. The President enjoys the support of the country's 2,200-man Army and the steady emigration of disgruntled Cape Verdeans has provided an important safety valve. Pereira's considerable domestic prestige has kept in check the influence of remaining radicals. Pereira's sudden demise, however, would leave the country vulnerable to a power struggle and external meddling.

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