



Directorate of  
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**Africa Review**

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18 October 1985

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**Africa Review**

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	Radicals, led by pro-Soviet security and foreign affairs adviser Kojo Tsikata, are working behind the scenes to dampen the moderate, populist policies of Head of State Rawlings. The recent US espionage incident has strengthened the radicals' hand.		25X1

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**West Africa: Burkina-Mali Territorial Dispute** [REDACTED]

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As the International Court of Justice begins to mediate their longstanding border dispute, both Mali and Burkina are trading charges of aggression. Without considerable increases in foreign military assistance to both sides, however, only minor border skirmishes are likely. [REDACTED]

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**Cuba: Outpost in Cape Verde** [REDACTED]

19

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Havana provides military and security advisers, and health, education, and agricultural aid to Cape Verde, reflecting a need to protect the Cuban aerial resupply link to Angola. [REDACTED]

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*Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis, [REDACTED]*

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Articles

South Africa: Moderates  
Seek a Middle Ground



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A group of predominantly white, English-speaking South Africans in alliance with moderate Zulu leaders has agreed to promote the idea of a negotiated future for South Africa. Concerned that the country is becoming increasingly polarized by the advocates of violent revolt and those who favor repression, they will launch a "Convention Alliance" to work for an eventual national convention in which all sides would meet to create a new constitution. Convention Alliance organizers have tried to attract diverse racial and political elements by broadly defining the potential membership as one committed to "a single constitution based on a common citizenship in one undivided country."  25X1

Convention Alliance promoter and leader of the official opposition in the House of Assembly, Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert, notes that, while only the government can call a national convention, the Alliance can pave the way by structuring constitutional debate and organizing nationwide petitions. Slabbert acknowledges that the country probably is not ready for a national convention at this point, but believes that the Alliance can serve to focus debate on the critical issues dividing South Africa.



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Difficult Beginnings

Efforts to attract broad-based support for the Alliance have been unsuccessful thus far. Because the idea of a formal alliance first was put forth by Progressive Federal Party (PFP) leader Slabbert at the Inkatha youth conference on 24 August and immediately endorsed by Kwazulu Chief Minister and Inkatha head Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, the movement is widely regarded as a joint venture between the PFP and Inkatha. This impression has been reinforced by PFP debate and approval of the Alliance at a party congress on 31 August. 

Convention Alliance Steering Committee

*Ibrahim Bawa, Islamic Council*

*Alex Borraine, PFP-MP*

*Colin Elgin, PFP-MP*

*Raymond Ackerman, Businessman*

*Tony Ardington, Businessman*

*Oscar Dhlomo, Kwazulu Education Minister (and right-hand man of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi)*

*Joyce Harris, Black Sash*

*Denys Shreiner, Academic (University of Natal)*

*Jules Browde,<sup>a</sup> Attorney (National Chairman of Lawyers for Human Rights)*

*David Bosch, Theologian*

*M. S. Mogoba, Theologian*

<sup>a</sup> *Steering Committee Chairman*



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An organizational meeting on 22 September attracted about 150 mostly white, liberal South Africans who are prominent representatives of business, church organizations, the law, academics, sports, and politics. However, many of those in attendance cautioned that their presence indicated personal interest in the idea only, rather than a commitment of their organizations to the Convention Alliance, according to the US Consulate in Johannesburg. A reporter who attended the September meeting also noted the absence of Colored participants and the fact that there seemed to be only one Asian present, and the US Embassy reported that only one non-PFP Afrikaner was there and he abstained from voting. Nevertheless, the group did select a Steering Committee, chaired by well-known businessman Jules Browde, who hopes to have a formal launching of the Convention Alliance at the end of October. [ ] 25X1

Suspicious among some that the Alliance is being pushed by the PFP for narrow political reasons may be responsible for the distinct lack of enthusiasm among white liberals, according to US Embassy reporting. A participant in the 22 September meeting told our Consulate in Johannesburg that the PFP imprint on the Alliance was clear—from minor details to major policy statements. Some have seen the Alliance as an effort by the PFP to regain the members it lost by opposing the 1983 constitutional referendum. Slabbert has acknowledged that in order to attract leading Afrikaners and members of the left—particularly the United Democratic Front—both he and Inkatha would have to fade into the background, but most observers think this is unlikely, according to the US Consulate in Johannesburg. [ ]

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**Opposition Holdouts**

Most nonwhite organizations have voiced opposition to the Convention Alliance based either on a rejection of negotiations on principle or because of Inkatha's visible role. The Soweto Civic Association and the Federation of Cape Civic Associations have both rejected invitations to join the Alliance, according to press accounts. The Cape group saw it as another effort to preserve white rule; the Soweto group has said that there can be no negotiations while black leaders are jailed and the townships are occupied by

security forces. At least one group, the Colored Labor Party, has refused to join because of longstanding animosity toward the PFP. [ ]

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**African National Congress (ANC).** Recent press statements by both Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo confirm ANC opposition to negotiations with the white government, calling instead for "mass struggle." Some of the white South African businessmen who met with ANC representatives in Zambia on 13 September came away with the belief that the ANC would not interfere with others joining the Convention Alliance, according to the US Consulate in Durban. However, based on subsequent statements and reporting from our Embassy in Lusaka, we believe that the ANC will work actively against the Alliance. For example, the Azanian Youth Unity National Council and Azanian People's Organization have publicly hailed ANC rejection of the Convention Alliance. [ ]

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**United Democratic Front (UDF).** This anti-government group probably will continue to reject participation in the Convention Alliance because of the key role played by Chief Buthelezi and its bitter and sometimes bloody rivalry with his Inkatha. According to the US Consulate in Johannesburg, the Front's Treasurer, Cassim Saloojie, pointed out to Slabbert that, although some of its affiliates have supported the idea of a national convention in the past, it will be difficult to do so now that the movement has become entangled with an apartheid institution (the Kwazulu homeland). Chief Buthelezi meanwhile has noted that Front unwillingness to participate only proves that it is under orders from the ANC, a charge that he has leveled often. [ ]

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**Outlook**

The Convention Alliance probably cannot attract wide support and achievement of its goal—a national convention—will not come in the short term. Progressive Federal Party and Inkatha leadership limits the Alliance's appeal to both blacks and whites, in our view. As currently formed, the Alliance

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excludes the primary actors. Neither National Party leaders nor militant black groups are likely to think their interests will be served by such an organization, in our judgment. Perhaps most important, a national convention is a dim prospect as long as the Botha government refuses to negotiate with blacks unwilling to renounce violence and these black groups reject talks unless the government accedes to preconditions it finds unacceptable.

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Nevertheless, the prominence and wealth of the individuals involved could generate considerable publicity for the idea of a negotiated future for South Africa. It is possible that, by promoting the idea, the Convention Alliance could plant a seed that would grow to a ground swell of support for a National Convention over time. In order for this to happen, however, we believe that groups with broader representation would have to emerge and include Afrikaners and such black organizations as the UDF. Given the present attitudes of these groups toward mutual discussions, such a scenario seems a long way off.

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**Ethiopia: Mengistu's Sudanese  
Dissident Gambit** [redacted]

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Social and political turbulence in Sudan and its debilitating civil war in the south have prompted Ethiopia to continue its sponsorship of the Sudanese insurgency. In our view, Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu may now believe he holds a powerful card in the southern Sudanese dissidents, and he may increase his demand that Khartoum deny Ethiopia's northern insurgents access to Sudanese territory. Moreover, we believe that Mengistu may have concluded that continued support for the southern Sudanese opposition will eventually provide Ethiopia with opportunities to shift the ideological posture of the Khartoum Government. [redacted]

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**A Legacy of Suspicion**

Ethiopian support for the Sudanese dissidents is based in large part on Mengistu's long-held suspicion of Sudan's role in supporting Eritrean and Tigrean insurgents from northern Ethiopia.<sup>1</sup> Mengistu believes Sudan provides refuge, arms, and logistic support to these groups, and holds Khartoum responsible for his inability to achieve a military solution in the north, according to the US Embassy in Addis Ababa. We do not believe Sudan provides any significant quantity of weapons, ammunition, and supplies to the dissidents, but [redacted] insurgents use Sudan as a base of operations, logistic corridor, sanctuary, recruiting ground, and center of propaganda—all factors which nurture Mengistu's deep mistrust of Sudan. [redacted]

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To retaliate against Khartoum for its help to the northern rebels, Ethiopia in the mid-1970s began cooperating with Libya in supporting the southern Sudanese dissidents, now led by Col. John Garang's Sudanese People's Liberation Army. The extent of

<sup>1</sup> The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), the primary Eritrean fighting force, numbers between 20,000 and 24,000 combatants, with a stated goal of an independent Eritrea organized along Marxist lines. The Tigrean insurgency is led by the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF), with some 15,000 combatants whose stated goal is the transformation of Ethiopia into a civilian-led federation or, failing this, complete internal autonomy or full independence for Tigray Province. [redacted]


Addis Ababa's aid fluctuated, however, and until this year the Mengistu regime allowed Libya to take the lead in arming and funding the group. Garang's army has grown into a formidable force of 12,000 to 15,000 men, operating primarily from western Ethiopia. [redacted]

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**Strained Relations**

Despite vows to improve relations with Sudan following the coup in April that toppled President Nimeiri, Mengistu remains profoundly suspicious of the Transitional Military Council that replaced him, according to the US Embassy in Addis Ababa. Recent Embassy reporting indicates tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan are growing, in spite of Mengistu's pledge that the new government in Khartoum would "not be held responsible" for the strained relations of the past. After several months of taking stock of the new regime, however, we judge that Mengistu believes the new Sudanese leaders intend to continue the policy of Ethiopian destabilization begun by the Nimeiri regime. [redacted]

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[redacted] Although Ethiopia has limited options for direct military reprisals against Sudan, we believe Mengistu will not hesitate to increase aid to the Sudanese rebels, particularly if his efforts to attain a military solution in the north continue to flounder. [redacted]

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Khartoum, for its part, maintains that it provides only humanitarian assistance—food and medicine as

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sanctioned under international law—to Eritrean and Tigrean groups in Sudan. [redacted]

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[redacted]

Khartoum will last, and Mengistu may reason that Garang has the military strength to force an eventual settlement in Sudan favorable to Ethiopia. Further, we believe Mengistu wants a government in Khartoum that will not only shut off assistance to the Ethiopian insurgencies but that will also actively cooperate with Addis Ababa in quelling them. [redacted]

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The Sudanese insurgents have increased their dependence on Ethiopia following Libya's recent rapprochement with Sudan and Tripoli's suspension of economic and military assistance to the rebels. We agree with the US Embassy's view that Ethiopia now exerts considerable control over the rebels and that their goals—a socialist, secular, and unified Sudan—essentially parallel those of Mengistu. Although the full extent of Ethiopian aid is unclear, we believe Addis Ababa's support is considerable and includes advisers, logistic support, and training facilities, as well as undetermined amounts of small arms, ammunition, and funding. In recent months the Garang army has expanded its operations in southern Sudan, a move likely to improve significantly its bargaining position with Khartoum. [redacted]

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[redacted] We agree with the assessment of the US Embassy in Khartoum that Libya's recent courtship of Sudan and Somalia is only likely to increase Mengistu's suspicions of a plot by Muslim states against "Christian" Ethiopia. [redacted]

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**Outlook**

In our judgment, Ethiopia probably will continue to support the Sudanese insurgents and try to keep them a viable fighting force. While Mengistu's goal is to end Sudan's support for Ethiopia's northern insurgents, we also believe he may be convinced that the Sudanese insurgency can help him bring down the current regime in Khartoum, and allow one that is more ideologically compatible with his own to come to power. The US Embassy in Addis Ababa states that Ethiopia does not believe the present regime in

In the short term, we judge there is little prospect of any meaningful Ethiopian-Sudanese agreement that would end assistance to their respective insurgencies. Scant room for negotiation exists, because Mengistu views the insurgencies as incomparable. Mengistu has consistently claimed that Ethiopia's northern insurgents are merely "bandits," while Embassy reporting indicates he views Sudan's civil war as based on deep-seated political, ethnic, and religious animosities. In any event, with Sudan militarily incapable of closing the border and denying the Ethiopian insurgents access to Sudanese territory, Mengistu's mistrust of Khartoum is likely to continue. While occasional Ethiopian military incursions into Sudan are likely, we believe Mengistu will probably remain careful to avoid a serious military confrontation with Sudan, fearing such a flareup could provoke Libya into providing significant military assistance to Khartoum. [redacted]

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In our judgment, Mengistu's leverage with Khartoum has never been greater, and we believe he is unlikely to let his strongest card—Garang and his rebels—out of his grasp. We expect Mengistu to continue to stonewall negotiations between the rebels and Khartoum by denying Sudanese and third-party access to Garang. Mengistu believes he can control Garang, whereas he probably calculates that Khartoum cannot control the Eritrean and Tigrean insurgents. In our view, Mengistu relishes the role of insurgent benefactor, and probably reasons that such activities raise his status in Soviet eyes. For the present, however, we expect Mengistu to bide his time and maintain pressure on Khartoum, while at the same time continuing to exploit the Sudanese rebels as a negotiating lever to end Khartoum's support for the Ethiopian insurgents. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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**Tanzania: Nyerere's Legacy of Economic Decline** [redacted]

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President Julius Nyerere, who steps down as President of Tanzania following elections on 27 October, will bequeath to his successor, Vice President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, a moribund economy created by a combination of external forces and disastrous socialist policies. We concur with US Embassy reporting that the economy is stagnating at a level that is inadequate for self-preservation above subsistence levels. Restoration of economic growth is unforeseeable in the near term because the country has depleted its foreign exchange reserves, relies heavily on foreign assistance, and remains far from an agreement with the IMF. [redacted]

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Although he is likely to try to initiate domestic policy reforms as he did while President of Zanzibar,<sup>1</sup> Mwinyi will be hampered by the near total breakdown of the country's infrastructure, a thriving unofficial economy, low productivity, and 25- to 30-percent inflation. All of these have been firmly ingrained by chronic currency overvaluation, mismanagement of state-run enterprises, and negative real producer returns. [redacted]

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**Roots of Decline**

Most observers agree that Tanzania, which began independence with a diversified agricultural export economy, has suffered reverses from its military intervention in Uganda from 1978-82, droughts in the 1970s that made it a net food importer, and the sharp rise in oil prices at a time when Tanzania's industrial demand for oil was rising. In our view, however, Nyerere's socialist domestic policies, starting with the self-sufficiency concept of Ujamaa, have been the primary causes of the country's economic decay. [redacted]

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**Nyerere's Policy Failures**

The Ujamaa village development program, Nyerere's principal effort to establish a workable social

<sup>1</sup> As President of Zanzibar from 1984 to 1985, Mwinyi also automatically held the position of Vice President of Tanzania. Zanzibar, which comprises the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, merged with mainland Tanganyika in 1964 to form the United Republic of Tanzania. [redacted]

economic model, was launched in 1967. We believe it set in motion the decline in agricultural production initially by uprooting peasants from their traditional homelands and relocating them in unfamiliar and underdeveloped areas. Moreover, the government failed to support the program adequately. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] the government, from start to finish, was unable to provide the transportation to ship crops to market. [redacted]

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[redacted] necessary agricultural equipment was lacking, and pesticides and fertilizers were not supplied in sufficient quantities to allow the villages meaningful profit incentives. [redacted]

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Tanzania's four-year involvement in Uganda diverted manpower and money from the Ujamaa program. [redacted]

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Government interventionist policies have also put a damper on production. Artificially low producer prices—set periodically by the government—are major disincentives for farmers. The low producer prices provide negative real returns to farmers who supply the state-run organizations, thus discouraging production. [redacted]

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shortages of foreign exchange, caused by shrinking output, have restricted expansion in all sectors and have required periodic downward adjustments of the government's budget. Government pricing policies have encouraged black-market activity, and we believe the majority of the population, especially in the cities, are unable to purchase enough amounts from the state-run businesses. [redacted]

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The government-owned enterprises, which control almost all legal trade, have long been one of the biggest drains on the economy. Their ever-spiraling operating costs have traditionally absorbed rising percentages of profit. For example, the Tanzanian





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SELECTED TANZANIAN ECONOMIC INDICATORS; 1980-84



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Sisal Authority, according to US Embassy reporting, has failed to purchase and market goods adequately, and has provided little incentive to workers; at the same time it has allowed production and maintenance to decline sharply. These businesses have frequently not paid farmers at all for their crops, although producer prices are fixed by law. [redacted]

revenue from port activity is often lost because of theft of goods waiting transshipment, or spoilage in warehouses and on wharves, according to press reports. [redacted]

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[redacted] the 90 percent of the population that is engaged in agricultural production is increasingly turning to subsistence farming.

The economic slide has fostered a subculture of corruption, according to press reports. The military, riddled with corruption, loses thousands of dollars yearly from stolen payrolls, weapons, clothing, and food. Peasants take food across the Kenyan border to sell or to barter for soap or cooking oil, which are difficult to get in Tanzania. According to press reports, in Dar es Salaam and other larger cities, meals in restaurants are obtained faster and cheaper by bribing the waiter to steal from the kitchen. We believe the apathetic, defeatist, and cynical attitude that permeates the lower classes will make it difficult to gain their support for economic reform. [redacted]

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[redacted] corruption and graft in the state-run organizations have grown to gigantic proportions and, we believe, may be in part responsible for the oil crisis Tanzania is now experiencing. [redacted]

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An overvalued currency has increased the operating and capital costs for agricultural exporters, and has made Tanzanian commodities considerably less competitive on the world market. Thus, Tanzania finds it difficult to earn hard currency for purchases of oil, chemical, seed, and machinery and is unable to pay debts to oil suppliers and international aid donors. Nyerere's continued resistance to devaluation was the major obstacle to an IMF standby agreement last spring. [redacted]

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**Mwinyi's Prospects**

Pragmatists in the government already are pressing Mwinyi to institute economic reforms when he takes over the presidency. Mwinyi, a lackluster party stalwart who was a compromise choice for president by the country's sole political party, favors the Chinese development model and trade liberalization measures he enacted on Zanzibar. He lacks a solid base of support on the mainland, however, and we believe he will proceed with caution for the first six to 12 months he is in office. [redacted]

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Nyerere's program for recovery in the early 1980s called for mild reorganization of the country's infrastructure and reallocation of some resources. Results fell far short of projections, however, because of foreign exchange shortages, mismanagement, and inadequate planning. [redacted]

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Minister of Finance Msuya, who we believe will be retained in the new government, may help to spearhead effective policies, such as an IMF agreement, devaluation, trade liberalization, producer price increases, and reorganization or privatization of some state-run enterprises. [redacted]

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**Impact on Society**

The economic downturn has severely damaged the country's fragile infrastructure. Even the much vaunted socialist medical and health care services have deteriorated, according to US Embassy reporting, and malaria and other endemic diseases are again on the rise. The transportation sector operates erratically; schedules of the Chinese-built Tazara railroad linking Tanzania and Zambia are determined by fuel supplies, according to press reporting. Road repair and maintenance of the congested facilities at the port of Dar es Salaam are neglected, and potential

Nyerere and like-minded officials have thwarted Msuya's previous attempts at pragmatic fiscal policies. Defeated presidential contender Salim may also prove to be a valuable ally if Mwinyi chooses to press ahead with reforms. Salim has been Prime Minister since 1984 and was previously Foreign Minister but his role in the future government is

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unclear. No Cabinet changes will be made until after the inauguration on 4 November. [redacted]

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The success of any new public policies will hinge to a great extent on the degree of Nyerere's influence over the new president and the political strength of senior party members, who still cling to Nyerere's tenets of African socialism. Nyerere will continue as party chairman, with de jure authority over the President until 1987, when that position will again be combined with the presidency, as under Nyerere. [redacted]

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Meanwhile, Mwinyi will be dealing with party and government bureaucracies formed under his predecessor's long tutelage. Although Nyerere's socialist policies have been disastrous, we believe his philosophy and charisma have earned him many followers who remain loyal to his inspiring, if naive, economic rhetoric. [redacted]

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**Liberia: Potential Rifts  
in the Military** [redacted]

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As the transition to civilian rule approaches, the future role of the military remains uncertain, adding to a growing undercurrent of frustration. In recent months, the combined effects of a deteriorating economy, delinquent salary payments, constant political uncertainty, and a reorganization of the military have contributed to low morale and a lack of discipline in the 6,635-man armed forces. We believe the unity of the military will be strained as it attempts to monitor and control the transition process and to protect its economic and political interests. [redacted]

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The military will remain a central actor throughout the transition and ultimately will determine its success or failure. Despite Head of State Doe's efforts to increase security, the military's preparedness is poor, and its ability to handle a major crisis is in serious doubt. In our view, Doe's ability to control and appease the military over the next several months will be a critical barometer of his support. [redacted]

**Grievances**

Several sources of tension have caused frequent military grumbling and coup plotting. For the past two years, salaries have been almost always two to three months in arrears, deductions have been levied to help finance government projects, and living and working conditions have been of poor quality. A member of the 815-man Executive Mansion Guard responsible for Doe's security says a housing shortage exists for enlisted men, [redacted]

[redacted] Although many in the military view the Executive Guard as preferred duty, Guard members have complained to Embassy officials of long hours and nonexistent logistic support when traveling with Doe. Another source of grumbling is the widespread use of retirements, dismissals, and transfers by military leaders following the assassination attempt on Doe this past April; these tactics were probably designed to lessen the threat of continued plotting. [redacted]

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**Tribalism**

When Doe overthrew former President Tolbert's Americo-Liberian government in 1980, many members of the country's 16 other ethnic groups believed they would finally be given an opportunity to participate in governing Liberia. Members of Doe's Krahn tribe, however, have become a new elite, especially within the military. The US Embassy reports that ethnic jealousies are directed against Krahns, who are believed to have disproportionately benefited from the coup in terms of recruitment, promotion, and assignment to favored units. Although most of the armed forces are still from the Loma and Kpelle tribes of the northwest, Krahns now dominate the officers corps, particularly in the higher ranks. A [redacted]

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in the Executive Guard consider themselves to be the "chosen few" and have little respect for authority. [redacted]

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Doe, who is well aware of festering tribal tensions, appears to believe that he can only trust his fellow Krahns. Since coming to power, he claims to have thwarted 15 military coup attempts motivated at least in part by personal and tribal grievances. The implication of several of Doe's fellow tribesmen in the assassination attempt left in doubt the once-unquestioned loyalty of the military, [redacted]

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[redacted] In our view, after five years in power, Doe is unlikely to change his policy of relying on Krahn tribesmen, especially when it involves his own security. Ethnic tensions have not yet erupted into open conflict; however, they could provide a powerful rallying point for dissent. [redacted]


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Population Density and Ethnic Composition of Liberia



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**The Armed Forces at a Glance**

	Number of persons
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,635</b>
<i>Army</i>	<i>6,105</i>
<i>Coast Guard</i>	<i>442</i>
<i>Air Reconnaissance</i>	<i>88</i>
<i>Of which:</i>	
<i>Enlisted personnel</i>	<i>5,657</i>
<i>Warrant officers</i>	<i>181</i>
<i>Commissioned officers</i>	<i>797</i>

**Organization**


The Armed Forces include the Army and the Coast Guard. The air wing is subordinate to the Army. The Army's major units are six infantry battalions, an armor scout unit, and the Executive Mansion Guard battalion.

The Executive Mansion Guard, which includes a Special Bodyguard unit and a Special Antiterrorist Unit (Israeli trained), and the Military Police have responsibility for presidential security. The Guard is equipped to carry out its responsibilities, but organizational and disciplinary problems still limit its capability.

**Officer Corps**

About 90 percent of all first and second lieutenants were enlisted men before the 1980 coup. Most captains and above were officers before the coup.

**Attitudes Toward Civilian Rule**

 would like the military to get out of the business of running the government and concentrate on improving its capabilities. The US Embassy reports that Allison and Dubar have on several occasions warned soldiers against political activity, indicating their continued reluctance to give up the Army's traditionally apolitical role. Although neither is involved in party

Traditional Americo-Liberian domination of the officer ranks is quickly giving way to more diverse tribal representation. Krahn's—Doe's group—dominate certain units, such as the Executive Mansion Guard.

**Education**

Of the total force, only about 500 have at least a high school education; only nine are college graduates.

**US Training**

About 4 percent have received some formal training in the United States, although about 5,000 have been exposed to US influence through military training teams. In 1985, 96 officers and enlisted men are scheduled to take part in IMET programs, compared with 55 in 1984.

**Israeli Assistance**

Israel provided a six-week training course in basic counterterrorist techniques in 1984-85. Of 150 initial Liberian participants, 85 completed the course. Doe requested further Israeli security assistance following the assassination attempt against him in April 1985.

politics, both enjoy easy access to Doe and discuss a wide variety of issues with him. They have been instrumental in keeping a multiparty process alive to provide a veil of legitimacy for Doe's continued power, according to the US Embassy. Dubar and Allison are strong supporters of close ties to Washington, and they are concerned that Doe's erratic behavior could

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jeopardize much-needed US financial assistance.

[redacted]

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In our view, junior officers and enlisted men appear more concerned about securing additional financial benefits and a prominent role for the military in running the country. Military personnel are conscious of political issues, share many of the same grievances with civilians, and do not unanimously support Doe's party, according to the US Embassy. Although participation in opposition parties is not prohibited, it is discouraged by the government.

[redacted]

The Embassy reports that many in the military, particularly junior officers and enlisted men, see a civilian government as a threat to their interests but will reluctantly turn over power to a civilian government headed by Doe. The military views Doe as a guarantor of their political and economic interests and knows that Doe will depend on their support to guarantee his continued rule. Nevertheless, we believe Doe will find it increasingly difficult to meet increasing demands for benefits to the military. We further believe that junior officers are likely to begin coup plotting if the civilian government is unable to slow economic decline.

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**Preparedness**

The military, facing no external threat, amounts to little more than an armed militia.

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[redacted] much of the Army's ammunition has not been properly maintained and is probably useless.

[redacted] insubordination has increased to disturbing levels, with frequent instances of absence without leave, petty thievery, extortion, and harassment of civilians,

Additional security measures during the transition period are unlikely to improve conditions because officers will be working longer shifts with a minimum amount of rest.

[redacted] the Executive Guard Commander stated that the military is riddled with apathy and incompetence. Even where competent officers can be found, there appears to be a general tendency among commanders to avoid being

too visible, competent, or popular, for fear that Doe will feel threatened, according to the US Embassy. Although we believe the military could probably handle localized demonstrations, it would probably prove unable to plan, coordinate, and support efforts to control major outbreaks of unrest.

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**Outlook**

We believe the military is likely to hold together and permit a civilian government—headed by Doe—to take power. The situation is fragile and volatile, however, and we cannot discount the possibility of a coup by easily radicalized enlisted men that would at the very least delay the transition. We believe the military is poorly equipped to play a stabilizing role during the transition. We expect divisions within the military along ethnic lines and over its future political role to become more intense as the pace of political events increases.

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In our judgment, Doe will have no choice but to spend large portions of Liberia's scarce resources on trying to balance the diverse political and ethnic interests in the military and to meet its most basic economic needs. We believe there is little likelihood that he will be able to placate or control all factions, however, or that he dare take the loyalty of the military for granted.

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If the economic and political situations continue to deteriorate, as we expect they will, disaffected members of the military could attempt a sudden, hastily organized coup similar to the one that brought Doe to power.

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[redacted]

The US Embassy reports that anti-Doe feelings among Gio and Mano troops,

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[redacted] are still strong and growing.

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**Ghana: The Uneasy Calm** [redacted]

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Although radicals, led by pro-Soviet security and foreign affairs adviser Kojo Tsikata, may seek to capitalize on the US espionage incident, moderates recently appointed to the ruling Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC)—including Army Commander Quainoo—may hamper their efforts. Quainoo, headstrong and staunchly anti-Soviet, probably will quietly attempt to limit radical ambitions, and may come into conflict with Tsikata over the regime's direction. In our view, the radical Tsikata will work behind the scenes to dampen the moderate, populist policies that Head of State Jerry Rawlings has pursued since 1983 and try to develop his own base of power that he could eventually use to overthrow Rawlings. [redacted]

portrayed as "US puppets." Moreover, Tsikata probably used the incident to settle old scores and arrest some mid- and low-level regime moderates. According to the Embassy, at least 20 Ghanaians were arrested in July and August for "espionage." [redacted]

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Nevertheless, the appointments of Commander Quainoo and Brigadier Mensah-Wood—pro-Western commandant of the military academy—to the ruling PNDC in September probably stemmed from Rawlings' desire to maintain the support of the Western-trained military. [redacted]

[redacted] retains the support of enlisted men and NCOs, and, since he was appointed Army Commander in 1982, he has emphasized greater discipline and professionalism in the military. In our view, Quainoo could eventually challenge Tsikata's influence within the PNDC. [redacted]

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**The Espionage Incident**

The Ghanaian press, which reflects radical opinion, gave prominent and vitriolic coverage to the arrests in mid-July of a CIA employee and a Ghanaian national, Michael Soussoudis—Rawlings's cousin and possibly an intelligence officer—on espionage charges. No violent anti-American incidents occurred, however, and the PNDC called on Ghanaians not to harass or intimidate Americans, according to the US Embassy and press reports. While some 200 Ghanaians turned out at the Embassy in mid-July ostensibly to protest US policy in Nicaragua, the police prevented some 800 other protesters from reaching the compound, according to the Embassy. In our view, the government probably allowed the press attacks and the demonstration as a safety valve for the more militant Ghanaians to express their anti-US sentiments. So far, Accra has played down the incident, but we believe that anti-American rhetoric is likely to increase when Soussoudis goes on trial in mid-November. [redacted]

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**The Radicals**

In mid-July Tsikata was elevated from his post as "special adviser" to the ruling Provisional National Defense Council, according to press reports. Since then, he has become more vocal, using his platform to attack the West and to press for closer ties to radical states. The US Embassy reports that Tsikata made a one-week visit to Iran in early August; signed an oil agreement; and, in contrast to earlier Ghanaian policy, voiced support for Iran's war with Iraq.

Moreover, [redacted]

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Europe. Tsikata has long sought closer ties to Libya, while Rawlings has preferred to keep Tripoli at arm's length. [redacted]

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**The Moderates**

The US Embassy reports some moderates fear that the espionage incident has weakened their position, and that they must assume a lower profile for a while. One moderate told the Embassy in July that

In our view, the espionage incident probably has convinced Rawlings of Tsikata's importance and cemented their relationship at least for the near term.

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According to Embassy reporting, Tsikata believes he can run Ghana through Rawlings, and that he has a "mesmerizing" effect on the head of state. The Embassy also reports that Rawlings is reluctant to remove or subdue Tsikata because he considers him the only official capable of organizing an effective security apparatus. [redacted] 25X1

We believe Tsikata will try to work behind the scenes to establish his own base of support without Rawlings's knowledge. Tsikata is developing an Eastern Bloc-trained intelligence apparatus under his absolute control, which he may someday use to topple Rawlings. Aware of US concerns about Soviet influence in Ghana, Tsikata dispatches his officers to East European countries and Cuba in relatively small numbers. [redacted]

**Outlook**

The espionage incident has hampered at least temporarily Ghana's improving relations with the West and strengthened the radicals' hand. Tsikata probably will seek to manipulate Rawlings toward a more revolutionary course. Although Rawlings probably hopes that Quainoo will be a moderating force within the PNDC, he may underestimate Tsikata's ambitions and probably assumes Quainoo will be a countervailing force within the PNDC. In our view, Tsikata may not attempt to seize power until the economy has improved sufficiently and adequate numbers of loyal operatives are in key positions within the bureaucracy and the military. Nevertheless, should an opportune moment appear—if Quainoo is out of the country and Rawlings appears vulnerable—Tsikata's newfound influence could prompt him to move. [redacted]

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[redacted] It is also possible that some of the estimated 600 Ghanaian students undergoing training in Cuba may serve eventually as Tsikata's "revolutionary guard." [redacted]

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**Economic Constraints**

Accra's continued reliance on Western economic assistance may complicate Tsikata's quest for more radical policies. Western bankers believe a debt crisis will occur in 1987 without rescheduling and continuing aid from Western donors, according to the US Embassy. Despite economic growth this year estimated at 5.5 percent, Ghana still faces several years of austerity, according to the Embassy. A World Bank official estimates it will take until 1995 before Ghana's per capita income returns to 1972 levels. Moreover, economic growth has not been translated into any obvious benefits for the average Ghanaian. According to the Embassy, under-employment is widespread, wages have not kept pace with inflation—estimated to be 40 percent last year—and the industrial sector is plagued by a shortage of spare parts. [redacted]

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
## West Africa: Burkina-Mali Territorial Dispute

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Relations between Burkina and Mali remain strained as the International Court of Justice begins to mediate their longstanding border dispute.

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Burkinan Head of State Sankara's fears of Malian aggression have been heightened by what he views as growing Malian-French military cooperation, according to the US Embassy. Neither side has moved troops into the disputed area, according to US Embassy reporting. According to press reports, both countries have made preliminary depositions before the Court, although no timetable for a settlement has been announced.

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The border dispute has simmered since the early 1960s. Hostilities over the ill-defined border briefly flared up in 1974 and in June 1975. The Organization of African Unity unsuccessfully sought to mediate the conflict. According to US Embassy reporting, Burkina blocked Mali's reentry into the West African franc zone until 1983, when Bamako agreed to international arbitration of the dispute.

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### Legal Maneuvering

According to US Embassy reporting and press reports, Burkina has a strong legal case based on historic claims to the area that are supported by French colonial maps. According to the joint communique signed in 1983, a court chamber comprised of five jointly proposed judges will settle the dispute. The basis of Mali's claim is that the people in the disputed zone are of Malian origin. According to past Embassy reporting, Burkina argues that territorial claims founded on ethnic homogeneity

would undermine Africa's present boundaries. The US Embassy in Bamako reports that Mali has agreed to accept an unfavorable decision.

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The disputed territory is some 19 kilometers long and 144 kilometers wide, and is nominally administered by Malian authorities, according to the US Embassy. Most of the 3,000 to 5,000 residents are seminomadic tribesmen, with loyalty to neither country. The US Embassy reports that there has been speculation the territory has at least small deposits of phosphate, uranium, and manganese. Nevertheless, much of the region is marshy swampland that would make economic development and mineral exploitation difficult.

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**The Military Balance**

In our view, both countries are incapable of mounting a sustained military attack in the border area.

According to US Embassy and [redacted]

[redacted] while Mali can at best make a limited incursion across the border. Burkina's Army lacks vehicles, communications equipment, ammunition, and experienced officers. About one-third of its 7,000 Army troops—including the best equipped units—is stationed in or near Ouagadougou. [redacted]

[redacted]

Moreover, there are no pilots capable of flying the single MIG-17 and the two SF-260s in the Burkinan Air Force, [redacted]

[redacted]

**Outlook**

Without a considerable increase in foreign military assistance, we believe that only small-scale border skirmishes are possible. While Traore has promised to accept the Court's decision, Mali's slight military advantage and pressures from his military commanders may persuade him to occupy the region if his country loses the case. In the event of Malian intervention, we believe that Sankara would probably look to Libya for assistance. Although Burkina's relations with Libya have been strained in the past year over Tripoli's failure to provide substantial development aid, Qadhafi probably would welcome the opportunity to make new inroads in Burkina and offer limited military aid. [redacted]

[redacted]

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Mali's 7,500-man Army also suffers from a lack of resources, fuel reserves, and equipment necessary to mount a sustained attack. Despite Sankara's fears, France has not provided military aid to Mali. [redacted]

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**Strained Political Ties**

We believe the territorial dispute is another manifestation of long-strained bilateral ties. According to the US Embassy in Bamako, Malian authorities view Sankara as naive and immature, but admit he has appeal to the country's urban youth and some junior officers. The Embassy also reports that President Traore fears Sankara will export his populist "revolution" to Mali. [redacted]

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Sankara regards President Traore as a weak leader who is mismanaging his country's affairs. In the past year ties were strained further after Traore's wife and General Diarra, Traore's second in command, were implicated in a scheme to embezzle some \$12 million in franc zone development agency funds, the US Embassy reports. Sankara, who is the president of the agency, has pledged to recover the money, and we suspect he may have threatened to expose high-level Malian corruption if the funds are not returned. [redacted]

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**Cuba: Outpost in Cape Verde** [redacted]

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Cuban interest in Cape Verde and its influence in the government of this small group of islands off the northwestern coast of Africa have been strong for over a decade [redacted]

1984, some Cubana military flights passing through Sal Island Airfield on Cape Verde were devoted exclusively to arms shipments bound for Angola. [redacted]

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[redacted] Havana, which has cultural and ethnic similarities with Cape Verde and provides health, education, and agricultural aid, exercises far more influence with Praia than Moscow does. [redacted]

We believe Havana probably will continue to cultivate close ties with Praia so long as its commitments on the African continent, particularly in Angola, remain high. Even so, given the small size of the country, the Cubans probably will opt to keep their presence at or near current levels, lest they wear out their welcome with Cape Verdean officials. [redacted]

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Cuban advisers [redacted] are active in nearly every department of the Cape Verdean Government [redacted] the total Cuban contingent in Cape Verde as of August 1985 at 34 to 40 personnel, including as many as 19 military and security advisers. Moreover, most of Cape Verde's government ministers and many of its citizens reportedly have received free education and political and technical training in Cuba. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Cuban influence appears to be heaviest in the military. [redacted]

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[redacted] Cape Verde's 300-man security service has eight Cuban advisers, and three Cuban military advisers assist the 1,500-man Army. [redacted] all Cape Verdean military and police officers go to Cuba for training, and that the security services are closely tailored after the Cuban model. [redacted]

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
In our view, Havana's desire to maintain warm relations with Praia most likely stems from the need to protect its aerial resupply link to Angola, where some 35,000 Cuban troops support the Luanda regime against antigovernment forces. All flights carrying Cuban personnel to and from Angola make their necessary refueling stops in Cape Verde. Although most of the arms, ammunition, and other supplies destined for Angola are now routinely flown or shipped in by the Soviets, limited quantities of supplies—including arms—evidently are still carried aboard Cubana Airlines military flights transiting Cape Verde. According to information recently obtained [redacted] as recently as February [redacted]

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## Africa Briefs

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### Madagascar

#### French Naval Visit

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The visit last month of a French Navy frigate to Diego Suarez suggests that left-leaning President Ratsiraka is working to improve relations with the West, while also attempting to preserve the nonaligned image he has cultivated since he assumed power in 1975. The port call by Madagascar's former colonial power marks the first time in over 10 years that the regime has permitted a naval combatant from a major country to make an official call at Diego Suarez, where Malagasy naval facilities are located. Diego Suarez is one of the largest and best natural deepwater harbors in the world.

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While Malagasy foreign policy proscribes official visits by naval combatants from countries that do not border on the Indian Ocean, the regime apparently has made an exception in the case of France. To justify the action, however, Ratsiraka can claim that France is an Indian Ocean littoral state because Paris administers the neighboring island of Reunion. Ratsiraka otherwise has refused to make exceptions to his policy on ship visits for nonlittoral states, including his principal source of military assistance—the Soviet Union—which long has sought access to Diego Suarez. Ratsiraka, however, did allow a US Navy repair ship to call at Diego Suarez in April 1984 to provide cyclone disaster relief, but emphasized the humanitarian nature of the visit to preempt any Soviet requests for a naval port call and to maintain Madagascar's nonaligned image.

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### Comoros

#### Cabinet Shuffle

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President Abdallah's sudden decision last month to reorganize his Cabinet may have temporarily strengthened his hand over his political rivals but, over the longer term, could add to the growing ranks of the opposition. Abdallah dropped four longtime political opponents and heads of powerful Comoran families and abolished their portfolios. The move came only months after he had appointed them to head newly created ministries of state—known as "superministries." The four—Ali Mroudjae, Said Hassane Said Hachim, Ali Bazi Salim, and Ahmed Abdou—had exercised equal responsibilities and enjoyed equal standing in the Cabinet.

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It is unclear why Abdallah acted so precipitately, but his action is consistent with past maneuvers to strengthen his authority. For example, last December he pushed through the Federal Assembly a constitutional amendment that abolished the post of Prime Minister, then held by Ali Mroudjae, and altered the presidential succession to ensure that another longtime rival, Federal Assembly President

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Mohamed Taki, could not assume power. Abdallah also has not allowed the legislature to vote this month on a constitutional amendment that would permit elections for a vice president. [redacted]

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The US Embassy reports that Comoran political observers are pessimistic about the long-term prospects for the Abdallah regime following the Cabinet shuffle. According to Embassy reporting, the President's decision to sever all political ties to the four ex-ministers could threaten the tradition of oligarchical control that has supported the seven-year rule of the staunchly pro-West Abdallah. In our view, the dismissal of these influential ministers will add to growing popular discontent with the President over the country's dire economic straits and the presence of the European mercenary contingent that installed Abdallah in 1978. The dismissed ministers now are in a position to exploit such discontent, and could decide to join forces with either the pro-right or pro-left illegal opposition. Mohamed Taki, for example, is in France working with a small dissident group based there, according to press reports. For his part, however, Abdallah appears confident that he has weakened his rivals, and that the mercenary-led Presidential Guard can contain unrest, and he since has departed on a four-week visit to France and the United States. [redacted]

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Guinea-Bissau

Pressures on Vieira [redacted]

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[redacted] President Vieira, who seized power in 1980, last month fended off a coup attempt by Vice President Paulo Correia. According to the US Embassy, Correia may have tried to demand more jobs for his majority Balante tribe, which probably has withdrawn its support of Vieira following the unsuccessful challenge. The Balantes, who are believed to be the largest tribe represented in the Army, did the majority of fighting during the independence struggle against the Portuguese and claim they have not benefited from Vieira's rule. The Embassy also reports that Vieira may have replaced his predominantly Balante bodyguard with members of his own Pepel tribe. [redacted]

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Although US Embassy reporting suggests that Vieira still maintains the support of the Soviet-trained and -equipped 6,000-man military, we believe its backing for him may weaken as he expands contacts with the West. Vieira has expressed interest in joining the African franc zone; pursued closer relations with Portugal, France, and the United States; and sought to diversify Bissau's military aid and training over the past year, according to US Embassy reporting. Moreover, during his visit to Pakistan in July, Vieira signed a joint communique calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, and he has pledged to vote at the United Nations against the Soviet occupation, according to Embassy reporting.

[redacted]

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Guinea-Bissau's stagnant economy—which prompted Vieira's overtures to the West—also has eroded his popularity. The US Embassy reports rice shortages and frequent power outages in the capital. His ruling council reportedly is divided over the economic reforms, which include planned reductions in the state sectors, trade

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liberalization, successive devaluations, and the encouragement of foreign investment. According to the Embassy, Vieira argues that meaningful economic improvement depends on substantial Western aid, and that the Soviets are unlikely to match, much less exceed, this funding. [redacted]

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**Swaziland****Power Struggle Continues** [redacted]

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In an effort to reestablish the monarchy as the dominant political force in the country, the Queen Regent has dismissed Prince Mfanasibili and George Msibi—key members of the Supreme Council of State—and has fired the police commissioner. Following the death of King Sobhuza in 1982, Swaziland was plunged into a protracted power struggle in which the Council emerged as the winner over the monarchy. However, the 15-member Council, comprised of senior princes and prominent traditional figures who advise the Queen Regent on state affairs, recently has been racked with infighting, and its leaders have lost grassroots support. [redacted]

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Previous attempts to strip Council leaders of their authority failed, but the Queen Regent now has the backing of a coalition of government and military leaders. A ministerial reshuffle is likely and those Council members with close ties to Mfanasibili—Education, Foreign Affairs, Health, and Agriculture Ministers—will probably be replaced first. According to US Embassy reporting, these changes probably will not take place until after the coronation of the Crown Prince, expected sometime early next year. Swaziland's foreign policy was fixed by the late King and it is not expected to change. [redacted]

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