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Africa Review



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*Special Issue: Insurgencies in Sub-Saharan
Africa*



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4 October 1985

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Africa Review [Redacted]

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Special Issue: Insurgencies in Sub-Saharan Africa [Redacted]

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Page

Articles

Overview [Redacted]

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This issue explores several key active insurgencies in Sub-Saharan Africa and assesses their prospects. In view of the area's regional, ethnic, and religious cleavages, its severe economic inequities, and the fragilities of many of the area's governments, we foresee long struggles between weak governments and insurgent challengers, with continued appeals from all sides for external help. [Redacted]

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Angola: New Challenges for UNITA [Redacted]

3

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[Redacted]

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The government—helped by increased use of Soviet-supplied aircraft and closer advisory support from the Soviets and Cubans—has demonstrated significantly improved military performance in this year's dry-season offensive against UNITA. The insurgents probably will have to adjust their strategy, perhaps reverting to more classic guerrilla tactics. [Redacted]

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Mozambique: Evolution of an Insurgency [Redacted]

7

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[Redacted]

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Prospects for a negotiated settlement between the Machel regime and the antigovernment Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) appear to be dim. The insurgents lack the military resources and urban support to threaten the regime's presence in the cities, and they have yet to form a coherent political program for reform. If the survival of the regime is threatened, the government could call on the Soviets to increase their military support. [Redacted]

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ALA AR 85-022
4 October 1985

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Ethiopia: The Northern Insurgencies

13

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Addis Ababa has been unable to defeat the well-organized and determined insurgencies in the northern Provinces of Eritrea and Tigray, despite large commitments of men, material, and money over the years and extensive Soviet military assistance to the Ethiopian armed forces. The insurgent leaders apparently believe that prolonged fighting will eventually lead to the collapse or disintegration of the Army.

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South Africa: The ANC and PAC at a Glance

17

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The African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress are unlikely to become military threats to the government in the foreseeable future. Pretoria's military and economic prowess has discouraged neighboring black states from openly supporting the guerrillas, and its pervasive security apparatus has prevented both groups from establishing effective support networks inside South Africa.

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Uganda: Rebels Hold the High Cards

19

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The effective and disciplined National Resistance Army, led by former Defense Minister Museveni, is on the verge of attaining at least a share of political power in Kampala. Such an outcome, nonetheless, is unlikely to bring peace and stability to Uganda.

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Chad: Insurgency in the South

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Antigovernment rebels in the south are militarily weak and are not a direct threat to President Habre's regime, but they drain the government's military resources needed to counter Libyan and dissident forces in the north, disrupt the economy, and undermine the President's national reconciliation efforts.

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Zaire: Growing Rebel Activity

29

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Dissident activity has increased in the past year in eastern Zaire. Although not a direct threat to the Mobutu regime at this time, the rebel attacks have embarrassed the government, forced it to expend scarce resources on military operations, and slowed economic activity in the area.

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Central African Republic:

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Nascent Insurgency in the North [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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An attack last November by northern tribesmen on a government garrison near the Chadian border signaled the beginning of a low-level insurgency by rebels resentful of the southern-dominated central government. [Redacted]

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Namibia: The SWAPO Insurgents [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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The South-West Africa Peoples's Organization is recognized by the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations as the sole representative of the Namibian people. It probably has the support of most black Namibians, but continued military setbacks at the hands of South Africa and a trend toward political radicalism have led to serious morale problems. [Redacted]

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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis [Redacted]

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Articles

Overview





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Insurgency—broadly defined here as organized, sustained, violent, internal opposition, usually rural based, to established governments—is a widely employed means for contesting and attaining political power in Sub-Saharan Africa. This issue of *Africa Review* explores several key active insurgencies and assesses their prospects. 

In contrast to Soviet aid to counterinsurgency campaigns, Libyan involvement south of the Sahara currently focuses on the side of insurgencies—in southern Chad and Zaire, for example. If it suits Qadhafi's purpose, however, Libya could weigh in on the side of Sudan's new government or a successor northern regime dominated by Muslims against southern Sudanese insurgents. 

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African insurgencies were instrumental in some independence struggles against European rule—in Kenya and in the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, for example—and in ending the white minority regime in Zimbabwe. Insurgencies today, however, are no longer associated almost exclusively with independence, black majority struggles, and radical ideologies. Insurgencies at the heart of regional turmoil in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia are themselves directed against radical Marxist black regimes. 

Uganda offers an example of an insurgency that appears to be on the verge of winning a share in government. This success, should it be achieved, would prove illusory, we believe, because it would lead to full-scale north-south civil war and another cycle of instability and appeals for outside intervention. 


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Several factors ensure that insurgencies will play a prominent part in African politics for the foreseeable future:

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- Regional, ethnic, and religious cleavages within and between countries.
- Severe economic dislocations and inequities.
- The fragility of many African governments.
- The vulnerability of many of those governments to externally supported challenges. 

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Those insurgencies are stalemated, unable to bring down or alter the Soviet-backed governments they oppose, but capable of reverting to flexible guerrilla-style tactics and retreating into the countryside or foreign sanctuary whenever the conventional army goes on the offensive. As a result of the standoffs and their clients' need for long-term, intensified counterinsurgency help, the Soviets are able to entrench themselves more firmly with the beleaguered regimes. 

In these circumstances, the prospects are for long, draining seesaw struggles between weak governments and insurgent challengers in several parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, with continued appeals from all sides for external help. 

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In southern Africa, the insurgencies that seek to end white minority rule in South Africa and Namibia—ANC, PAC, SWAPO—lack the effective support of neighboring black states, which must deal with insurgents at their own doorstep. 




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4 October 1985

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Angola: New Challenges for UNITA []

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Angola's civil war has dragged on for 10 years with no end in sight. Until recently, South African-supported UNITA insurgents enjoyed the initiative as the dos Santos regime retained control of the urban centers but was unable to counter UNITA advances in the countryside. However, this year's dry-season offensive demonstrated significantly improved government military performance—buttressed by increased use of Soviet-supplied aircraft and closer advisory support from the Soviets and Cubans. UNITA has suffered its first significant military reverse since beginning a push in 1982 to expand operations and to secure more territory. []

The regime has received a welcome morale boost and, no matter how temporary present gains may be, probably believes it can repeat its performance in next year's dry-season offensive. UNITA probably will have to adjust its strategy, perhaps reverting to more classic guerrilla tactics. For both UNITA and the Angolan Government, the importance and direct role of their main foreign backers—the USSR and South Africa—seem likely to increase. []

A Different Offensive This Year

The military objectives of this year's offensive were roughly the same as those last year, only this time government forces captured Cazombo—held by UNITA since late 1983—and nearly took Mavinga until driven back by South African airstrikes. Cazombo is important to UNITA because it gave control to the insurgents of a small portion of the border with Zaire and served as a support base for northern operations. Mavinga is important because it was the first town of any size to be captured and was the site of the 1982 UNITA Party Congress as well as a way station on UNITA's supply line to the north. It is unclear whether the government plans to hold the ground it has regained or pull back to its original position with the onset of the rainy season that traditionally has given UNITA a seasonal edge. []

Luanda's Strategy

Luanda [] is pursuing a combined military-political strategy that it hopes will ultimately defeat the insurgents in a protracted conflict. In addition to improving the military's performance, Luanda seeks to revitalize the party and reform the government administration to win the "heart and minds" of the population. We believe the military's improved performance during the recent offensive probably will encourage the government to move ahead with some overdue reforms during a scheduled party congress in December. []

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The government has long refused to enter into a negotiated power-sharing arrangement with UNITA; such an alternative is considered [] only by a small minority, generally when the government has been under extreme military pressure from UNITA. The hostility between the governing Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and UNITA is reinforced by ethnic and racial differences, and by Luanda's fear of UNITA commander Jonas Savimbi's leadership qualities and considerable charisma, both markedly stronger than that of President dos Santos. The government's approach to reconciliation is usually limited to offers of amnesty for UNITA's rank and file but not for its leadership. []

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Growing Government Strength

The government has an armed strength of roughly 100,000 men in the regular Army and other security forces plus another 50,000 or more auxiliaries. There are some 1,200 Soviet advisers. In addition, there is a 35,000-man Cuban military contingent, including some 27,000 combat troops, that backs the Angolan Army, guards rear bases, provides essential support services, and frees an equivalent number of Angolan troops for field operations. []

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4 October 1985

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The recent improvement in the Angolan armed forces represents the culmination of the large Soviet military deliveries that began in August 1983 when UNITA took the town of Cangamba, a loss that shocked Luanda and catalyzed its Soviet backers. In addition to defending well-prepared base areas, the Angolan Army has now shown that it can penetrate UNITA-held territory, meet and overcome UNITA conventional forces in a standing battle, and take positions defended by the insurgents. [redacted]

Angola's better performance is the result of improvements in training and organization as well as more extensive Soviet assistance in planning and directing combat operations. Moreover, the government is now exploiting its advantage in weapons more effectively. Soviet aircraft delivered in 1984 reached the field in significant numbers only in mid-1985, [redacted] and in the offensive this year, Luanda made extensive sustained use of tactical air support. Substantial Soviet arms deliveries have provided the Angolan Army with the full range of conventional weapons, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery in contrast to the lightly armed insurgents, who have only small arms and other light infantry weapons. [redacted]

The government holds most of the conventional military advantages. It has a better than two-to-one advantage in manpower and, although many troops are tied down in defense of fixed positions, Soviet and Cuban-flown transport aircraft allow fairly rapid redeployment and concentration of forces throughout the country. UNITA's troops, in contrast, move primarily on foot, and redeployment for them is normally a matter of weeks or months. [redacted]

UNITA's Forces and Center of Support

[redacted] the insurgents have roughly 20,000 to 25,000 fully armed and trained regular forces organized in battalions, most of whom are deployed in UNITA-held territory. In addition, there reportedly are 30,000 to 35,000 other guerrillas operating in smaller units throughout the country, many of whom are ill armed and ill equipped. In the past, UNITA

has had the advantage in quality of manpower, although this edge may be narrowing as government forces improve their military skills. [redacted]

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Until the recent government offensive, UNITA has held the southeastern quadrant of the country, which it defends with regular forces and administers with a rudimentary but apparently effective civil administration. UNITA-held territory, although sparsely populated and economically unimportant, is significant to UNITA primarily as a sanctuary and support base for supply lines to guerrillas elsewhere in the country. The territory also abuts South African-controlled Namibia, affording the otherwise geographically isolated insurgents easy access to outside support and the protection of South African military forces. [redacted]

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UNITA conducts guerrilla operations throughout most of the remainder of the country but is strongest in the well-populated central highlands centered on Huambo, which is inhabited mainly by the Ovimbundu ethnic group from which UNITA draws its primary support. In the last two years, UNITA has pushed its guerrillas into northern Angola to increase both the military challenge to Luanda and to garner support among Angola's other main ethnic groups. UNITA has succeeded in maintaining operations in this region despite difficulties in supplying these extended forces. [redacted]

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Outlook

The recent government offensive has disabused Savimbi of the idea, expressed frequently earlier this year, that he can achieve a quick win by increasing military pressure on the government and forcing Luanda to the bargaining table. UNITA will have to face the prospect of improving government military performance, the more active use of government superiority in airpower and firepower, and the difficulties of supporting extended guerrilla operations. [redacted]

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Savimbi probably will have to adjust his tactics and strategy, a move we believe he is capable of making. The insurgents may have to cut back on

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semiconventional operations in favor of more purely guerrilla tactics. Moreover, the insurgents may conclude that it is better to give ground than to challenge government forces in fixed battles.

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Although Savimbi for the present may have been knocked off stride, he is far from beaten, and we do not believe he will pull back from operations in northern Angola or elsewhere in the country with the approach of the rainy season in late October. The necessity of challenging the government throughout the country, distracting Luanda from concentrating on his base area, and expanding his area of support and recruitment probably will compel Savimbi to try to keep up the pressure. Savimbi may even increase bombings in cities and redouble his efforts to knock out Angola's oil facilities in Cabinda and in northern coastal regions to cut Luanda's only reliable source of foreign exchange.

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For both UNITA and the government, the importance and role of their main outside backers seems likely to increase. Savimbi probably will seek improved antitank and antiaircraft weapons to compensate for government superiority. South African aircraft intervened at least once on behalf of Savimbi's forces last month, and Pretoria may feel compelled to commit additional forces to defend UNITA's sanctuary and its headquarters at Jamba. The threat of greater South African involvement could prompt new Soviet weapons deliveries and more direct Soviet and Cuban involvement in Angolan air and ground operations.

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Mozambique: Evolution of an Insurgency

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After 10 years of independence, President Machel's self-proclaimed Marxist regime faces the combined challenge of a widespread insurgency, a faltering economy, and a lingering drought. The antigovernment Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), which claims to be pro-Western, numbers between 12,000 and 15,000 guerrillas. They have expanded their military activity in the past year to all 10 provinces of Mozambique, but they still lack a coherent political program for reform. RENAMO has nearly twice as many guerrillas, is active in more than double the territory, and is opposed by substantially fewer government troops than was the case when the now-ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) was at its peak during the preindependence struggle against Portugal.

Prospects for a negotiated solution appear to be dim. The insurgents lack the military resources and urban support to threaten the regime's presence in the cities, but they retain the tactical advantage in the countryside, where their support appears to be growing. The Mozambique Armed Forces—which need more troops, material, and training—are being assisted by some 8,000 to 9,000 Zimbabwean troops. A recent joint Mozambican-Zimbabwean offensive appears to have temporarily disrupted RENAMO, but it probably will not result in any long-term gains. RENAMO is expected to resume the initiative once the rainy season commences in November, and any series of spectacular government military setbacks could spark a coup in Maputo or a rapid collapse of FRELIMO's will to fight. Should the guerrillas appear to threaten the survival of the Machel regime, the USSR could increase its military support substantially and thus deny an insurgent victory.

RENAMO'S Origins and Growth

Shortly after Mozambique became independent in 1975, disparate anti-FRELIMO elements joined together—with the encouragement of Rhodesia's white-ruled government—to form what later became

RENAMO. Included were conservative whites who had fled black-ruled Mozambique, blacks from small political parties that refused absorption into FRELIMO, disenchanting FRELIMO officials, colonial Army veterans, secret police agents, and some tribal leaders. Several academic sources report that Rhodesian intelligence officials used RENAMO in the late 1970s to conduct sabotage and reconnaissance operations against Mozambican-based guerrillas of Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union, which was fighting the white-ruled regime in Rhodesia.

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When Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, South Africa took over sponsorship of RENAMO to discourage Maputo from tolerating the presence of anti-South African guerrillas in Mozambique. Operating from sanctuaries in South Africa and Malawi with a nucleus of a few hundred guerrillas, RENAMO rapidly gained adherents among disaffected rural dwellers, and it expanded operations to nine Mozambican provinces by early 1983 and to distant Cabo Delgado Province last year.

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Military Performance

RENAMO today holds the tactical advantage throughout rural Mozambique, although, in our judgment, it probably cannot defeat the Mozambican Army decisively and has yet to mount a significant attack against any major government urban garrison. Activity is heaviest in the central and northwestern provinces, where the guerrillas are hitting roads and rail lines, other economic facilities, and government forces. In the south, RENAMO seeks to isolate Maputo and gain maximum publicity from incidents such as the explosion of a munitions dump in the capital last month.

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Political Liabilities


In our view, the scope of its activities suggests that RENAMO is overcoming its unsavory origins as a

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Expansion of RENAMO Operations, January 1981-August 1985*



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creation of Rhodesia and South Africa and may enjoy a slightly wider rural following. Even so, the organization still suffers from a narrow tribal base, lack of urban appeal, and an incoherent political program. [redacted]

Tribal Base. Since beginning operations near the then-Rhodesian border, RENAMO has recruited heavily among the rural dwelling Shona-speaking tribes of central Mozambique. Insurgent recruiters were effective in pointing out that FRELIMO is dominated by southern Shanganas and mixed-race city dwellers, and many Shona-speakers volunteered to join the guerrillas. [redacted]

Although tribal appeals fueled RENAMO's early growth, we believe that the group's image of being dominated by Shona speakers hinders its expansion beyond the central region. Tribal divisions also proved a barrier to FRELIMO in the 1960s when it tried to organize among the Maconde in northern Cabo Delgado Province but was resisted by the rival Macua farther south. In our judgment, the independent Maconde probably resist both RENAMO and the government today. In the south, the Shanganas are more likely to support FRELIMO because they are well represented in FRELIMO's senior ranks, and because RENAMO's Shona speakers are traditional rivals. [redacted]

Rural Appeal. RENAMO realizes that it needs to broaden its base of support if it is to evolve into a national movement. The guerrillas, however, appeal primarily to rural dwellers, who harbor a long list of grievances against FRELIMO. The complaints stem from the collapse of the economy at independence in 1975. FRELIMO made matters worse for rural peasants by adopting plans for a rapid transition to a socialist economy. The government not only converted plantations and private farms into Soviet-style state farms, but also imposed collectivization of agriculture and tried to replace tribal leaders and customs with Marxist officials and social values. [redacted]

Structural Weakness. Despite its impressive military expansion and apparent growing support in the rural areas, RENAMO still lacks a grassroots political structure and a well-defined ideology. The insurgents

are heavily reliant on sympathetic tribal leaders to organize recruitment and local support, according to US Embassy reporting. They have failed to establish the modern political organization that we believe is needed to gain support beyond the central provinces. RENAMO's political pronouncements are little more than simplistic slogans in support of anti-Communism, democracy, and a free market economy. [redacted]

RENAMO also is split by ethnic and organizational divisions. [redacted] guerrilla fighters are loyal to RENAMO Commander in Chief Alfonso Jacama, who is a fellow Shona speaker from the central provinces, but that they are suspicious of the group's political wing led by Evo Fernandes, a Mozambican of partial Indian descent who resides in Europe. [redacted]

Mozambican Strategies

Maputo's boldest step to try to end the RENAMO threat was to sign the Nkomati Accord in March 1984 with South Africa. The accord bound both sides to deny military aid and encouragement to each others' opposition movements. Machel appears bitter that RENAMO activities have actually increased significantly since the accord was signed, and many in his government suspect that South African material support for RENAMO never stopped, a belief reinforced by South Africa's recent admission of technical treaty violations. Nevertheless, Embassy reporting suggests that Machel does not seem ready to repudiate Nkomati and invite renewed confrontation with Pretoria. [redacted]

On the economic front, the Machel regime is realizing that unproductive socialist programs have increased support for the insurgents, and it belatedly has begun to revise its strategy. In recent years, Maputo has closed or turned over to the private sector most of the state-owned businesses, deemphasized the collective

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
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Reported RENAMO Incidents, January-August 1985^a



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farms, and in 1983 announced a new emphasis on peasant agriculture and small-scale development projects. Alternating droughts and floods during the past four years and RENAMO's attacks on vital transportation routes, however, have prevented overall economic recovery. [redacted]

Militarily, Maputo is becoming increasingly dependent on the presence of some 8,000 to 9,000 Zimbabwean troops to help contain RENAMO. Described by some Western military attaches as one of the worst armies in Africa, Mozambique's 35,000-man regular military forces are ill trained and critically short of troops and material. Their 4-to-1 manpower advantage over the guerrillas is inadequate, according to most authorities on counterinsurgency, and the ratio probably is declining because of a high rate of desertion and draft avoidance, and RENAMO's continuing growth. Moreover, the Army has not been able to compensate for its insufficient manpower with superior equipment. Much of the nearly \$1 billion in military equipment provided by the Soviet Bloc—FRELIMO's principal supplier—is not only inappropriate for fighting guerrillas but also beyond the capability of the Mozambicans to operate and maintain. [redacted]

The Army is increasingly reluctant to fight on its own, and its options against RENAMO are limited. With RENAMO active throughout the countryside, a strategy of containment is not feasible. [redacted]

The joint offensive by Mozambican and Zimbabwean forces in August has temporarily disrupted RENAMO, according to US Embassy reporting, but Maputo did not score a major victory. The offensive, which owed its modest success largely to the efforts of Zimbabwean troops boosted FRELIMO's morale by overrunning RENAMO's headquarters and capturing some arms and supplies. Few insurgents were found or killed, however, and, when the rainy season begins in November, we believe RENAMO will mount renewed attacks against government forces and transportation targets. [redacted]

Prospects

Although RENAMO probably will retain the military initiative barring the exhaustion of its stockpiles, its

expansion is likely to be slow in the south. Mozambican Army units are concentrated near Maputo, and the civilian populace in the south is likely to resist RENAMO. The Army may put up greater resistance as it withdraws from many rural areas and concentrates around the cities, key transportation arteries, and a few other economically important areas. Moreover, increased RENAMO activity in the coming weeks could delay Zimbabwe's plans to withdraw some of its forces from Mozambique. Spectacular government setbacks could spark a coup or a rapid collapse of FRELIMO's will to fight. If the guerrillas threaten the survival of the regime, the Soviets probably would increase their military support substantially in an attempt to deny an insurgent victory. [redacted]

Machel is capable of bold initiatives and might follow up on the government's recent military offensive by offering unconditional talks with the guerrillas. He probably would refuse to talk with RENAMO's externally based political representatives, whom he condemns as "neocolonialists" interested only in recovering property that they lost at independence.

[redacted]

In the unlikely event that RENAMO came to power soon, the group probably would establish a tribal dictatorship—its claims to prefer a democracy notwithstanding. If the fighting continues over the longer run, as seems probable, RENAMO is likely to try to broaden its ethnic and political base in an effort to undermine the Machel regime. [redacted]

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
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**Ethiopia:
The Northern Insurgencies** [redacted]

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Addis Ababa has been unable to defeat the well-organized and determined insurgencies in the northern Provinces of Eritrea and Tigray, despite large commitments of men, material, and money over the years and extensive Soviet military assistance to the Ethiopian armed forces. The Mengistu government reportedly hopes that the creation of a People's Republic next year—with its plan for regional autonomy—will bring an end to the rebellions. The insurgent leaders, however, are unwilling to settle for autonomy on Mengistu's terms. Although they probably realize that they cannot defeat the regime militarily, they apparently believe that prolonged warfare will eventually lead to the collapse or disintegration of the Ethiopian Army.

[redacted]

Background and Objectives of the Insurgencies

The Eritrean and Tigrean insurgencies have different regimes and goals, although the major rebel groups in each province work closely together and share a common Marxist ideology. The Ethiopian Government—itself engaged in institutionalizing its Marxist revolution—is committed to forming a centralized state and is not inclined to make significant concessions to end the fighting in the north, according to the US Embassy.

Eritrea Province. The beginnings of the Eritrean war date from 1952, when the United Nations joined the former Italian colony of Eritrea and Ethiopia in a federal state. Neither party was pleased with this arrangement: Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie wanted to annex Eritrea outright, and proponents of a political affiliation with Ethiopia were a minority in Eritrea. Over the next decade the Emperor carefully dismantled the federal structure, and, in 1962, the rump Eritrean parliament voted to dissolve the federation, making Eritrea another Ethiopian province.

This move sparked an armed rebellion that was initially led by the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), an umbrella organization that included all religious

groups and political beliefs. The movement split in the early 1970s over religious and ideological issues, and the breakaway faction later became the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). After several years of internecine fighting, the EPLF defeated its rival and became the major Eritrean rebel group.¹

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The EPLF claims it is not a secession movement because it refuses to accept the legality of the former UN-sponsored federation. Its stated goal is the creation of an independent Eritrea organized along Marxist lines.

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Tigray Province. The Tigrean rebellion began in March 1975, when former imperial officials in the province initiated an uprising against the military government that overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie in September 1974. To a great extent, however, the rebellion reflected the centuries-old struggle for domination of Ethiopia between the Tigrean and Amhara ethnic groups, since several of the leaders of the revolt belonged to the royal family of Tigray. Several other smaller groups also took up arms at this time, and one of them, the Marxist-led Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF), soon defeated its rivals and became the dominant force in the province.

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According to a Tigrean spokesman, the TPLF aims to transform the Government of Ethiopia into a civilian-led federation that will provide for the equal participation of the various ethnic and tribal groups in the country. Failing this, he stated that the TPLF would like to acquire nearly complete internal autonomy or full independence for the province. We

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¹ Several other Eritrean factions have offices in Sudan from which they conduct extensive propaganda campaigns. None of them, however, has a military arm of note, and they conduct few operations within Ethiopia.

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4 October 1985

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believe, however, that the Tigrean leadership's primary long-term objective is to supplant the current Amhara-dominated regime with Tigrean hegemony, an objective stemming from the ancient Tigrean-Amhara rivalry.

Government Objectives

The Mengistu government, like the former imperial regime, is deeply committed to maintaining Ethiopia's territorial integrity and creating a centralized state. Addis Ababa claims—erroneously—that Eritrea was a part of Ethiopia until colonized by Italy in 1885 and that the Eritrean rebels have little internal support. Addis Ababa views the Tigrean insurgency as an offshoot of the Eritrean rebellion rather than a reflection of Tigrean nationalism and refuses to regard it as a separate conflict.

The Mengistu government, with strong Soviet military and advisory support, is determined to secure a military settlement to the northern conflicts, and is unwilling, in our view, to make any meaningful political concessions to the rebels. Addis Ababa, for example, continues to table the idea of regional autonomy as a basis for a peace in Eritrea despite the fact that the EPLF has consistently rejected the proposal. We believe the anticipated new constitution for a People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia will continue to pay lipservice to the concept of regional autonomy in a vain attempt to weaken insurgent support.

The Military Balance

The EPLF has an estimated 25,000 regular troops in Eritrea or in camps within Sudan. EPLF regular forces are well organized and possess artillery weapons and armor, giving them a conventional as well as a guerrilla capability.

Eritrean military strategy is designed to exploit Ethiopian weaknesses and to undermine the morale and fighting capabilities of the government's units in the north. The EPLF has used conventional tactics to score several major victories over the regime during the past 18 months, and it conducts highly successful guerrilla operations against Ethiopian supply lines and small, isolated garrisons.

Almost all of the EPLF's weapons are captured from the Ethiopians or are purchased on the international market and smuggled into Eritrea from Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and North Yemen. Because of its Christian and Marxist makeup, the EPLF receives little assistance from the Arab states, which traditionally had supported the Eritrean struggle when Islamic elements were dominant.

The TPLF, with approximately 15,000 troops, is organized along traditional guerrilla lines and rarely conducts conventional-type operations. It has few heavy weapons and depends on mobility and the element of surprise to attack isolated or poorly defended government garrisons. Because of its Christian-Marxist base, it, too, has had little success in acquiring Arab assistance. The TPLF does have close ties to the EPLF, which provides training and a limited amount of weapons to supplement what the Tigrean insurgents themselves capture from the government.

The EPLF and the TPLF use Sudan to infiltrate troops, weapons, and supplies into Ethiopia. The border area is used as a safehaven by the rebels, and they actively recruit among the refugee camps that dot the border area. The Ethiopians are aware of this activity and have made the improvement of relations between Addis Ababa and Khartoum contingent on the Sudanese ending this activity. Sudan, however, lacks the manpower to patrol its borders effectively, and the insurgents have developed several alternative infiltration routes if needed.

The Ethiopian Army is a heavily mechanized force and controls the cities and major towns in Eritrea and Tigray Provinces. Over 100,000 Ethiopian troops are stationed in the north. Using its superior firepower, the regime has been able to contain, but not defeat, the insurgents. Characteristically, government forces launch offenses that temporarily dislodge the insurgents—such as the counterattack that forced the Eritreans recently to withdraw from Barentu and Tessennei—but usually are unable to hold captured territory for any length of time. The capability of the Ethiopian Army is severely weakened, however, by

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low morale, poor leadership, logistic shortcomings, and high casualty rates, especially among junior officers and noncommissioned officers. The military also has had little counterinsurgency training and receives little support from the local population. [redacted]

Prospects for a political settlement also will remain bleak. The Eritreans recently announced the end of their participation in a series of negotiating sessions with the Ethiopians. In fact, however, no progress on any issue was made during the two years of meetings.

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The Ethiopian military effort in the north is supported by the Soviet Union, which provides arms, maintenance support, and advisory assistance to Ethiopian units.² In addition, Soviet officers are involved in planning military operations against both the Eritrean and Tigrean rebels, according to several US Embassy sources. [redacted]

We believe the Tigrean leadership will reject the regime's proposal for regional autonomy as not going far enough in allowing Tigrean participation in governing the country. [redacted]

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In conjunction with its military efforts, the Mengistu regime has tried several political and economic programs in recent years in an effort to undercut local support for the insurgents. Although primarily a military venture, Addis Ababa's ill-fated 1982 "Red Star" campaign included the commitment of economic assistance designed to rebuild the economy of Eritrea. The current resettlement campaign, during which over 500,000 people have been moved from the famine-stricken north to other parts of the country, is also designed in part to weaken the Tigrean insurgency by separating the rebels from their rural supporters. [redacted]

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Outlook

Neither the government nor the insurgents have the capability to decisively defeat the other. We believe the present military status quo will continue for the near term, although both sides will occasionally achieve an isolated victory or initiate offensive operations. Ethiopia will continue to see Sudanese duplicity in Khartoum's inability to end insurgent operations from its territory. Relations between the two will remain strained over this issue and Mengistu's retaliatory measures, such as continuing Ethiopian support to southern Sudanese dissidents.

[redacted]

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² The 2,000 to 2,500 Cuban combat troops in Ethiopia are stationed near Dire Dawa, in the Ogaden region, and are not involved in the northern fighting. [redacted]

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South Africa: The ANC and PAC at a Glance

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The main South African insurgent groups—the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)—are unlikely to become military threats to the government in the foreseeable future. South Africa's military and economic prowess in the region has discouraged neighboring black states from openly supporting the guerrillas of either group. Pretoria's pervasive internal security apparatus—backed by extensive security legislation—has prevented the ANC and PAC from establishing effective support networks inside the country. The antiapartheid activities of both groups, however, will continue to draw international sympathy and create problems for Pretoria.

Profile of the ANC

The ANC, formed in 1912, is the most popular group among South African blacks, but has been unable to transform its popularity into widespread, active support in the townships. The government banned the group in 1960 following the Sharpeville incident. A military wing formed the next year launched a campaign of sabotage bombings against government targets. Mass arrests in 1963-65 crippled the leadership and forced the group into exile. The military wing, "Umkhonto we Sizwe" (Spear of the Nation), recruited thousands of young blacks fleeing the country during the 1976-77 Soweto riots and renewed its bombing campaign in the late 1970s.

A 30-member National Executive Committee oversees the group's political and military wings. The political wing, headquartered in Lusaka, Zambia, has several hundred active members. The military wing, headquartered in Luanda, Angola, consists of 4,000 to 5,000 guerrillas. Most are in camps in central and northeastern Angola. The Soviet Bloc supplies almost all military training and equipment and provides limited funding. Most of the group's financial and nonmilitary support comes from Scandinavian states, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the United Nations.

The ANC officially espouses very broad political views, and its diverse membership reflects this. The leadership, in our judgment, is controlled by black nationalists pursuing mildly socialist goals as outlined in the group's "Freedom Charter" drafted in 1955. The ANC, however, has a long history of ties to the South African Communist Party; pro-Soviet Communists, a minority of whom are whites, are well represented in the ANC leadership and exert considerable influence. The majority of the rank-and-file members are black nonideologues, anti-Communist nationalists, and moderate socialists.

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Since 1981, the ANC has averaged about three bombings per month, mostly directed at government buildings and energy and transportation targets. On occasion, it also has bombed businesses involved in well-publicized labor disputes with black employees. The group generally has avoided inflicting casualties on white civilians. A notable exception was the ANC car bombing of the South African Air Force Headquarters in May 1983 in which 19 people died and 219 were injured, including many white civilians. The group claimed the attack was in retaliation for the South African raid into Lesotho in December 1982 in which 30 ANC members were killed. Following a conference in Zambia in June 1985, ANC Acting President Tambo said that the group would not be as careful in guarding against white civilian casualties when it attacks government targets and that it would begin attacking off-duty white security personnel. There is no evidence that these new directives have influenced ANC operations.

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The ANC's military wing is extremely disciplined but erratic. Its operations range from clumsy efforts in which guerrillas accidentally blow themselves up to highly sophisticated operations such as the bombing

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ALA AR 85-022
4 October 1985

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of the Koeberg nuclear facility in 1982 that delayed its opening for almost a year. The group's standard method of operation is to gather information on a target using an unarmed reconnaissance team, infiltrate a second team to cache explosives and weapons, and send in a third team to unearth the weapons, carry out the attack, and escape. Until Maputo signed a nonaggression pact with Pretoria in March 1984, the group had planned and staged most of its operations from Mozambique. It has not yet fully recovered from the expulsion of its military personnel from Mozambique. ANC efforts to expand its infrastructure in Botswana prompted a South African raid against the group's personnel in Gaborone in June 1985. [redacted]

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PAC Problems

The PAC is the ANC's smaller and more feckless rival. The PAC was formed in 1959 by an antiwhite, anti-Communist faction that broke away from the ANC. Outlawed in 1960, the group formed a military wing—Poqo (Pure)—and began carrying out attacks against the government and white civilians in the early 1960s until a crackdown forced its members to flee the country in the mid-1960s. The PAC's 600-man guerrilla force, trained primarily by the Chinese and Libyans and centered in Tanzania, has been dormant since the mid-1970s. The group has been planning to launch a new military campaign for years but has been unable to overcome a host of problems, foremost being internal dissension. A new PAC campaign probably would be much bloodier than the ANC's bombings to date because the PAC has less qualms about attacking white civilians. [redacted]

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**Uganda: Rebels
the High Cards** [redacted]

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The effective and disciplined National Resistance Army (NRA), led by former Defense Minister Museveni, is on the verge of attaining at least a share of political power in Kampala. Such an outcome, nonetheless, is unlikely to bring peace and stability to Uganda, a country plagued by sharp ethnic and regional animosities that have been aggravated by a series of repressive governments since independence in 1962. [redacted]

northern-dominated governments since independence in 1962. Museveni's central objective is to break northern ethnic domination and to install a more effective government under his leadership. [redacted]

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Background

Former Defense Minister Yoweri Museveni established the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in early 1981 following elections in which both Museveni and his political party, the Uganda Patriotic Movement, had been badly beaten at the polls. Starting in the bush with only a few dozen men, he was able to build an effective and disciplined guerrilla force, now numbering some 3,500 largely Ankole and Baganda tribesmen from the south. Museveni's rebels captured most of their weapons from Ugandan security forces, and through 1982 they also received modest support from Libya. [redacted]

Over the years, Museveni's forces have gained added credibility among significant segments of the Bantu population by ensuring that the NRA's arrival—unlike that of the Army—has not signaled widespread violence and looting. Indeed, in some rural areas Museveni has become a folk hero akin to Robin Hood. According to the US Embassy in Kampala, he has several times led his forces against a government facility, raided its bank and stores, and then distributed a good portion of the booty among the local populace. [redacted]

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Since the coup in July, Museveni's insurgents have refused to lay down their arms and have, in fact, expanded and consolidated areas under their control.

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Weakened by NRM gains and internal tribal strife, the government of Milton Obote fell to dissident northern elements of his own Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) led by Gen. Tito Okello in July. Museveni, however, was abroad at the time, and his forces played no immediate role in Obote's ouster. Museveni, now headquartered in Nairobi, is attempting to marshal regional support for his insurgency as his forces—now holding several towns in southwestern Uganda—exert pressure on the Okello regime to obtain a key role in the post-Obote government. [redacted]

Museveni has effectively used both military action and political propaganda to pressure the Okello government at the fitful August-October peace talks in Nairobi between NRM representatives and Ugandan Government officials. [redacted]

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NRM Objectives and Tactics

Southern Bantu tribesmen comprise roughly two-thirds of Uganda's population of 14.3 million, but the country has been controlled by a series of repressive

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Since the coup, Museveni has also actively and skillfully cultivated regional political leaders. Kenyan President Moi, who has presided over the peace talks in Nairobi, has been won over by Museveni. [redacted] Museveni has visited at least five other African countries in the past two months—Tanzania, Ethiopia, Zaire, Zambia, and Mozambique—and has been received by the head of state in each. [redacted]

National Resistance Army

The NRM's military arm, the NRA, has about 3,500 hardcore members, and its ranks have been bolstered since the coup by an influx of Army deserters, returning refugees from Zaire, and new recruits obtained from rebel-held areas in western Uganda. Before its overthrow, the Obote government estimated NRA strength at 12 battalions, with over half its numbers drawn from the Baganda tribal area northwest of Kampala known as the Luwero Triangle. All of the NRA locations in the Luwero Triangle are near major roads that provide year-round access to Kampala and Entebbe Airport, 20 miles south. [redacted]

Over the past three months, the NRA has expanded and consolidated its control over southwestern Uganda. Starting in June with Bundibugyo, a small town near the Zairian border, the NRA has slowly fanned out over most of Uganda's southwest quadrant and now controls the important towns of Fort Portal, Kasese, and Kabale. Moreover, the insurgents have isolated Army garrisons at the key crossroads cities of Mbarara and Masaka, and they also control most of the countryside. As a result, food deliveries to Kampala have been irregular, and prices for some staples have tripled since mid-September, according to the US Embassy in Kampala. [redacted]

In recent weeks the NRA has expanded its field of operations to include numerous hit-and-run attacks on towns and Army units near Kampala. This tactic has served to keep the capital on edge, increase pressure on government negotiators in Nairobi, and draw the Army out of Kampala, according to US Embassy reporting. [redacted]

We believe Museveni is on good terms with senior NRA commanders. Army chief Elly Tuhinruie-Tumwine, who lost an eye in combat and has been in Nairobi for several months to recover, has worked smoothly with Museveni and other senior NRM officials. [redacted]

NRA firepower consists mostly of small arms and rifles, but also includes a few anti-aircraft guns, some mortars, and communications equipment. NRA strength lies not with its armaments or numbers, but rather in its effective leadership and good discipline. [redacted]

The Okello Government

The government of General Okello suffers from a lack of public support and internal direction, and the 71-year-old Okello [redacted]

[redacted] has tried to broaden its appeal by appointing certain of Obote's political opponents to head various ministries, co-opting minor former anti-Obote insurgent groups, and releasing political detainees from the Obote era. These steps, however, have generally failed to boost the government's standing because they are essentially superficial gestures: political power resides not in the ministries but in the ruling military council, the co-opted minor insurgencies played no role in ousting Obote, and no known Museveni supporters were among the hundreds of detainees released. [redacted]

The Okello government's lack of credibility at home has been repeatedly underscored. On four occasions since August, panics have beset Kampala as unfounded rumors of imminent hostilities or government collapse have inspired short-lived mass exoduses from the capital, according to US Embassy and other reporting. [redacted]

The government's lack of coherence and direction is striking. [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] The military council's decision to recruit hundreds of former Idi Amin supporters to strengthen the Army and to appoint two prominent former Amin backers to the council was similarly ill considered. In a single stroke, Okello managed to anger Museveni, undercut civilian support in the south, increase ethnic animosity in his own Army, and alienate President Nyerere, whose Army had invaded Uganda in 1979 to depose Amin. [redacted]

[redacted]

As the government's lack of ability has become increasingly apparent, Uganda's international ties have withered. In August the Sudanese closed their Embassy in Kampala following the limited evacuation of employees and dependents conducted by various Western countries. In mid-September the United Nations decided to evacuate all dependents and nonessential staff from Uganda. And in late September the British advised their nationals not to travel to Uganda. In short, the credibility of the Okello government is dwindling. [redacted]

Uganda National Liberation Army
 By all accounts, the roughly 15,000-man Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) is an ill-trained, poorly equipped, and badly led force possessing low morale and a high desertion rate. [redacted]

[redacted]

The UNLA is only capable of undertaking operations at the infantry battalion level, and its willingness to stand and fight in the face of NRA attacks is highly suspect. During NRA's steady advance in the southwest, many UNLA soldiers have quietly surrendered their weapons while other units remained in their barracks hoping to avoid contact [redacted]

[redacted]

The UNLA has a well-deserved reputation for brutality toward noncombatants. During Obote's reign, there were [redacted] UNLA rape and pillage throughout the Luwero Triangle, and UNLA performance under the Okello government has been little better. The Army sacked the capital while ousting Obote, and this was accompanied by wide-scale violence against the civilian population in and near Lira, Obote's home tribal area. UNLA looting in the Lira area was continuing in late September. Jinja has also been subjected to widespread UNLA pillaging in August and September. [redacted]

The UNLA's reputation for ill discipline and brutality has recently worsened by the recruitment into its ranks of hundreds of former Idi Amin soldiers from the West Nile, and the ethnic animosity that prevails between these new recruits and Okello's fellow Acholi tribesmen, who comprise about 80 percent of the UNLA, is severe. [redacted] during battles against the NRA, Acholi and West Nile UNLA soldiers have opened fire on each other,

[redacted]

The UNLA is equipped with only a few Soviet anti-aircraft guns used in a ground support role, mortars, light and heavy machineguns, rocket-propelled grenades, and a variety of small arms,

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including AK-47 and G-3 rifles. Five armored personnel carriers equipped with machineguns are the UNLA's heaviest armored vehicles. [redacted]

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Uganda's small Air Force consists of nine helicopters and two fixed-wing trainers. The Air Force has generally not been a factor because of its limited ordnance capabilities, poor maintenance, low pilot skills, and the hit-and-run tactics of the NRA.

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Outlook

The prospects for the fragile Okello government are dim, and we believe Museveni's NRM stands a better-than-even chance of coming to power—either by force of arms or through political talks with the Kampala regime, a government whose credibility seems to melt almost daily. Despite recent government efforts to improve its military position by redeploying troops from the West Nile to Kampala and outlying areas of tactical significance, the UNLA remains an ineffective and unpopular instrument of a weak and narrowly based government. Though Okello's northern Acholi control both the government and the Army, as Uganda's ninth-largest tribe they constitute only 5 percent of the population. We judge that Uganda's large southern Bantu majority is unlikely to be won over by Okello's promises that things will improve, particularly when his UNLA continues to inflict pain and suffering on large segments of the civilian population. [redacted]

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If Museveni's insurgents take over Kampala, we believe the stage will be set for civil war between his predominantly southern forces and northern Ugandans who have dominated since independence. A defeated and largely Acholi UNLA would probably retreat with their weapons to their tribal homeland, and some embittered Acholi leaders would probably set about plotting a return to power. In addition, many former Amin soldiers would probably continue to oppose Museveni by force of arms. In sum, a Museveni victory may herald the end of northern domination, but it is unlikely to bring peace to Uganda. [redacted]

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Chad:
Insurgency in the South

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Rebels in the south are militarily weak and are not a direct threat to President Habre's regime, but they drain the government's military resources needed to counter Libyan and dissident forces in the north, disrupt the economy, and undermine the President's national reconciliation efforts. Libyan support to the southern rebels is designed to exert pressure on Habre on two fronts, and possibly bring down the regime without direct Libyan intervention. French pressure and support have played a key role in forming Habre's successful counterinsurgency strategy, which over the past year has improved the security situation in the south and reduced rebel numbers. We believe divisions among the insurgents and the success of the government's amnesty program will enable Habre's forces to continue to hold the military initiative in the south. Habre's reconciliation efforts, however, will meet with only limited success because of deep-seated southern mistrust of his northern regime and behind-the-scenes Libyan maneuvering. Moreover, Habre will move slowly on ethnic issues to avoid alienating his key northern backers, many of whom oppose any further concessions to the south.

Civil War: A Way of Life

Chad's history has been marked by a bitter struggle for dominance between northern Muslims, led by the fiercely independent Toubous, and southern groups dominated by black Sara tribesmen. Northerners held sway during the precolonial period and terrorized the south with frequent slave raids. After French colonization began in the late 19th century, however, southerners quickly adapted to French culture and exploited opportunities for education and advancement. While the French tried to subdue northern armed resistance to their presence, the stage was set for the south's rise to political dominance shortly before Chad gained independence in 1960.

The facade of national unity established by the French was shattered, however, when a Sara-dominated government cracked down harshly on

Muslim leaders following independence. French troops intervened in 1969 to save the southern-led regime from a Toubou-led alliance of northern factions that threatened to overrun N'Djamena. Successive weak southern regimes, however, and Libyan support to the dissidents finally resulted in northerners regaining control of N'Djamena in 1979, bringing full circle the age-old struggle between north and south. President Hissain Habre, a Toubou factional leader, assumed power in June 1982 when his forces defeated those of the Libyan-backed Transnational Government of National Unity (GUNT)—a coalition government of several northern groups. For the past three years, Habre's regime—while battling Libyan and GUNT forces in the north—has faced a chronic insurgency in the south composed of Sara tribesmen and some northern groups.

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Southern grievances center on the occupation of the south by Habre's northern troops, who do not respect local customs and abuse southern civilians. In addition to the removal of northern troops from the south, southern leaders hope to gain additional representation in Habre's regime and some autonomy in governing local affairs. Although southern insurgents are motivated by longstanding antipathy toward northerners, dismal economic conditions last year in southern Chad led many peasants to join the rebels because this provided them a means to pillage food and other necessities for themselves and their families. Some insurgents operating in the southeast are former members of the GUNT—the coalition of northern groups that Habre defeated to assume power—and are motivated by a hatred of Habre and a desire to see the GUNT regain control of N'Djamena.

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Problems Among the Insurgents

In our view, southern insurgents have become militarily weak and fragmented over the past year.

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ALA AR 85-022
 4 October 1985

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Sara tribesmen have grouped themselves under various commando appellations that operate independently of one another primarily in the southwestern Prefectures of Moyen Chari, Lagone-Oriental, and Logone-Occidental. US Embassy reporting estimates their numbers reached a high of 15,000 in November 1984, but we believe effective counterinsurgency operations have reduced their ranks over the past year by at least a third. Meanwhile, 500 to 1,000 Muslim insurgents operate independently in the southeastern Prefectures of Guera, Salamat, and Ouaddi. All rebel groups in the south are poorly trained and equipped, and their military operations usually consist of ambushing government troops on patrol, pillaging villages, and destroying crops. Ethnic divisions and lack of a strong charismatic leader have obstructed efforts by rebels to merge their armed bands, according to the US Embassy. [redacted]

In addition to their limited military capabilities, the southern insurgents lack a political structure and have made little effort to mobilize the local populace. The rebels operate independently of both exiled southern dissidents and Libyan-backed dissidents in the north, despite unsuccessful efforts by some rebel leaders to form alliances with northern dissidents and oppositionists in Brazzaville and Paris. Dissident abuses of the civilian population often rival those of Habre's troops and have limited their support among the people. Moreover, US Embassy reports indicate that, despite their antipathy for northern troops, most southerners are preoccupied with daily survival and do not support the armed struggle. [redacted]

Libyan Assistance

Libyan support to the southern rebels has been a key element in Tripoli's strategy to overthrow Habre and replace him with a pro-Libyan regime. In our view, Libyan leader Qadhafi hopes that by providing substantial assistance to southern rebels he can eventually put enough military pressure on N'Djamena from two fronts to bring down Habre without direct Libyan intervention. Tripoli's support is designed to keep the rebels in the south active so as to sap Habre's scarce resources that otherwise would be available to confront Libyan forces in the north. According to the US Embassy, Libyan aid includes

large sums of money, small arms and ammunition, and powerful radio equipment to enable the rebels to maintain contact with Libyan military commanders in southern Libya and northern Chad. US Embassy reporting also indicates that Libya has effectively used large sums of cash to encourage dissident intransigence at reconciliation conferences and to prevent armed rebels from rallying to the government.

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[redacted] Libya supplies the southern rebels through Congo, northern Central African Republic, and western Sudan. [redacted]

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[redacted] destined for the southern rebels. [redacted]

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[redacted]—probably built by the Libyans—may have been used to airlift these supplies to the rebels. The US Embassy in Bangui reports that Tripoli has established a logistic network in the Central African Republic that it uses to deliver supplies to Chadian rebel bases in northern Central African Republic. Since the fall of Sudanese President Nimeiri in April, Tripoli has significantly increased its influence and presence in western Sudan through which the US Embassy in N'Djamena believes supplies are now reaching Chadian rebels.

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Habre's Counterinsurgency Strategy

Successful military and political counterinsurgency operations by the Habre regime over the past year are largely responsible for the insurgents' deteriorating position. Rebel attacks reached an unprecedented high in late November 1984, but government troops had by June reduced dissident activity to only isolated and sporadic attacks. Although government troops in the south numbered only about 5,000, giving the rebels a 3-to-1 numerical superiority, their lack of coordination and the Habre forces' superior mobility and firepower proved to be decisive in the seven months between November and June, according to the US Embassy. Joint operations with Central African Republic troops along the northern CAR border, where a number of dissident bases are located,

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probably also disrupted rebel operations. Although rebel activity has increased in the past few months because the rainy season has impeded the mobility of government troops, Habre's forces continue to maintain the initiative and the level of violence is significantly less than last year at this time, according to the US Embassy. [redacted]

Habre's strategy has included efforts to improve his political standing in the south. The improved security situation earlier this year allowed him to tour the region for the first time since assuming power, and, according to the US Embassy, he was well received in principal southern cities. Habre met with local officials and tribal leaders and promised to curb mistreatment by northern officials and troops. According to the US Embassy, Habre followed up on these meetings by replacing a number of the incompetent and corrupt northern officials with southerners. Habre has also made an effort to punish abuses by his troops; [redacted]

Habre's political and military successes have led to significant increases in the number of rebels who have reconciled with the government this year. We estimate that about 4,000 rebels have rallied to the government since January, and talks continue with the leader of the largest rebel faction. Moving ralliers away from their home regions to bases in the north, or to training camps in Zaire, has significantly reduced the number of ralliers who have returned to the rebel ranks. Nevertheless, the government continues to have serious difficulties meeting its payroll obligations and integrating southerners into the armed forces, according to the US Embassy. Ethnic tensions in the Army have resulted in several bloody clashes recently, [redacted]

French pressure and support have played a key role in Habre's counterinsurgency efforts. The US Embassy in Paris reports that France has used its budgetary support—critical to Chad's financial solvency—as leverage to encourage Habre to be more flexible in dealing with the south. According to the US Embassy, the French have provided most of the funds to pay rebels who have rallied to the government. Moreover, we believe Habre's fears earlier this year that Paris was planning to throw its support to a southern leader as part of a deal with Libya also was responsible for Habre's greater efforts to achieve national unity. [redacted]

Prospects

We believe Habre's forces will continue to hold the military initiative in the south because the insurgents are unable to unify under one command and the government's amnesty program is depleting their numbers. In our view, most southerners are tired of the violence and have come to recognize Habre as their best bet for bringing peace to southern Chad. Rebel activity, however, probably will remain high at least until November as the rainy season continues to impede government troops' mobility. The rebel's limited military capabilities, however, will prevent them from attacking major towns or controlling large rural areas. Efforts by Habre's troops, most of whom are northerners, to stem increased rebel activity probably will lead to additional abuses of civilians and may erode Habre's efforts to improve his standing in the south. [redacted]

In our view, Habre's reconciliation efforts will meet with only limited success because of the deep-seated ethnic and regional divisions and behind-the-scenes Libyan machinations. Although Habre has shown a willingness to crack down on abuses by his troops and negotiate with the rebels, he will move slowly on ethnic issues to avoid alienating his key northern backers, many of whom oppose any further concessions to southerners. Longstanding southern distrust of Habre and his regime also complicates the reconciliation process, and Habre's unwillingness to move forcibly to curb northern abuses and increase southern representation in his government is likely to [redacted]

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heighten southern discontent. In addition, Tripoli will continue to obstruct Habre's reconciliation efforts by resupplying rebel forces and using cash payments to encourage intransigence among southern dissident groups that are negotiating with the government.



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**Zaire:
Growing Rebel Activity** [redacted]

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Dissident activity has increased in the past year in eastern Zaire, long a hotbed of government opposition. We believe the rebels are not a direct threat to the regime at this time, but their attacks have embarrassed President Mobutu, slowed economic activity in the area, and forced the government to expend scarce resources on military operations. Tanzanian-based rebels attacked and held the small town of Moba in eastern Shaba Province for two days last November—the first rebel incident since a major invasion from Angola in 1978. Since November, despite numerous search and destroy missions by government troops, rebels have sporadically ambushed government soldiers, committed acts of banditry against the local population, sabotaged economic targets, and again attacked Moba in late June. We believe that the group carrying out the incidents numbers about 50 to 100 men and that most are members of the Popular Revolutionary Party, a local group that has been involved in antigovernment activity, banditry, and gold smuggling since the early 1960s. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] we believe that Tripoli does provide limited amounts of training and financial support. Libyan diplomats in Tanzania, Burundi, and Congo funnel aid and recruit Zairians for training in Libya. [redacted]

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Although we believe Zairian dissidents are not receiving direct support from any neighboring state, Tanzania and Congo are turning a blind eye to dissident activity while allowing Libyan diplomats substantial freedom of movement. [redacted]

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The Angolan-based Front for the Liberation of the Congo (FLNC), at one time Zaire's principal opposition group, has been inactive since it invaded Shaba Province in 1978. Although at least 1,000 FLNC rebels with military experience are spread throughout Angola, their capabilities have significantly deteriorated in the past seven years because of inadequate Angolan support, ethnic divisions, leadership struggles, and UNITA's control of much of Angola's border with Zaire. According to the US Embassy, harsh living conditions in Angola and the return to Zaire of former Prime Minister Nguza—probably Zaire's most prominent dissident—has led several hundred FNLC dissidents to consider returning to Zaire under Mobutu's amnesty program. Despite these problems, however, the FLNC remains a potential threat to Mobutu, particularly if Luanda renews its support in an effort to press Mobutu to end his support for UNITA. [redacted]

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Although geographic, economic, and political conditions in and around eastern Zaire are tailor made for an insurgency, Zairian dissidents have longed lacked the leadership, organization, and resources to conduct effective military operations. In our view, Tripoli over the next few months will marginally increase its support to the rebels while also working to improve communications among the various groups in hopes of establishing a viable insurgency. In addition, Tripoli is likely to continue its efforts to gain influence in neighboring states—particularly Tanzania, Burundi, and Uganda—with the objective of eventually establishing insurgent

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ALA AR 85-022
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bases. In our judgment, however, Tripoli is unlikely to be forthcoming with large amounts of assistance until the rebels show both a willingness and ability to conduct successful operations. We believe that significant Libyan support—primarily arms, money, and training—along with the inability or unwillingness of neighboring states to crack down on dissident activity in their territory probably would lead to an increase in rebel incidents and to a potentially viable insurgency in eastern Zaire.

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**Central African Republic:
Nascent Insurgency
in the North** [redacted]


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An attack last November by some 60 northern tribesmen against a government garrison near the Chadian border signaled the beginning of a nascent insurgency by rebel forces resentful of the southern-dominated central government. The low-level insurgency has been characterized by sporadic attacks designed to intimidate and sometimes kill government officials, acquire arms, and garner local support, recruits, and funding. The US Embassy reports that rebel attacks have been concentrated in the northern border provinces and have been primarily directed against government officials and installations. [redacted]

The government so far has been unable to quell rebel activity or ease northern ethnic tensions. According to the Embassy, a joint CAR/Chad military operation along their common border in April heightened north-south tensions when undisciplined Central African troops burned villages and killed civilians. [redacted]

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The dissidents are few in number, perhaps no more than 100, and are led by Gen. Alphonse Mbaikoua, [redacted] Mbaikoua has been one of the few northerners to hold a ministerial position in President Kolingba's government, but his abortive coup attempt in 1982 forced his flight into exile in Chad. Mbaikoua has publicly criticized the pro-Western Kolingba for not allowing northerners to play a greater role in the central government. [redacted]



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In our view, the insurgency does not yet pose a serious threat to the government, but we believe prospects for a settlement are dim until the government addresses northern grievances. In our estimation, any increase in government military operations in the north is likely to further sap already limited government resources or could precipitate a generalized northern reaction—such as the economic slowdown in 1982 in which northerners refused to plant cotton, resulting in the lowest harvest since independence. Moreover, continuing if not worsening regional and ethnic tensions in the north will offer additional opportunities to Tripoli, already seeking to undermine the Kolingba regime for facilitating French support to Chadian President Habre. [redacted]

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The rebels lack an organized support infrastructure and well-defined political objectives. They receive passive support from the northern population but remain dependent upon the ethnically related dissidents in southern Chad for logistic and material aid. In turn, the seasoned Chadian rebel fighters use the Chadian refugee camps in the Central African Republic as a safehaven and base of operations against Chadian Government troops and occasionally carry out operations with the dissidents in the CAR, according to the US Embassy. The two rebel groups joined forces and robbed a state-run cotton company in the CAR in February. The US Embassy reports there is no evidence to indicate that the Libyans—despite direct aid to the Chadian insurgents—are instigating or directly supporting the CAR insurgency in the north. [redacted]



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Namibia:
The SWAPO Insurgents [redacted]

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The South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) controls no Namibian territory and has had its political and military headquarters in Angola since 1960, but the Organization of Africa Unity and the United Nations nevertheless recognize it as the sole representative of the Namibian people. SWAPO has between 7,000 and 8,000 men under arms. The group is dominated by the Ovambo tribe, the largest in Namibia, and probably has the political support—as it claims—of the majority of black Namibians. SWAPO once represented a variety of political views, but in recent years more radical elements of the Ovambos have come to dominate the movement's leadership. In the process, SWAPO has moved closer to the Soviets and their allies for support, come increasingly under their influence, and has received large amounts of Soviet money, arms, and training—although the exact amount is not known. [redacted]

SWAPO's prospects for coming to power in the near future are dim. South Africa installed an interim government in Windhoek in June and appears intent on pursuing a unilateral solution in Namibia. Moreover, the South African and Namibian territorial forces appear confident that they can contain the remaining guerrilla threat. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Although South Africa has failed so far to undermine substantially SWAPO's political strength, Pretoria has succeeded in containing and reducing its capacity for guerrilla action. Continued military failures and the trend toward political radicalism have contributed to serious morale problems. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] SWAPO, however, has carried out isolated terrorist acts and attempted kidnappings inside Namibia. The South Africans claim that the kidnappings, aimed at abducting villagers to serve as guerrilla fighters, are having a negative effect on SWAPO support inside Namibia, particularly in the group's traditional Ovambo homeland. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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