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Africa Review



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12 July 1985

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ALA AR 85-016
12 July 1985

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Secret
[Redacted]

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Africa Review [Redacted]

25X1

12 July 1985

Page

Articles

South Africa: Are Blacks Catching Up With Whites? [Redacted]

1

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Analysis of South African data indicates that black economic gains have been mixed at best and that prospects are virtually nonexistent in the 1980s for any significant improvement in some key measures of black welfare, such as unemployment and closing the wide gap in wages between blacks and whites. [Redacted]

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Western Europe-South Africa: Reactions to US Sanctions Legislation [Redacted]

7

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[Redacted]

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Several West European allies that have often condemned apartheid are now sorting out whether they will be willing to emulate the United States if Washington invokes economic sanctions against South Africa. [Redacted]

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South Africa: The Dutch Reformed Church and Racial Reform [Redacted]

11

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As its pivotal general synod approaches next year, the Dutch Reformed Church faces a possible split over racial reform. The most divisive issue will be the revision of the church's social policy, which, as drafted in 1974, provided a theological justification of apartheid. [Redacted]

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Zimbabwe: White Elections [Redacted]

17

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A number of whites have expressed concern that former Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith's surprisingly strong victory in the white elections last month might trigger a government backlash. [Redacted]

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25X1

Brief

Angola-Zaire: Worsening Relations [Redacted]

19

25X1

*Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis [Redacted]*

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Articles

**South Africa:
Are Blacks Catching Up
With Whites?** [Redacted]

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Government and private sector leaders in South Africa contend generally that blacks have made significant economic gains in recent years under apartheid and can look forward to further improvement under the continuation of white rule; they say that these gains would be jeopardized by a switch to black government. According to this argument, these economic benefits should in part offset the white government's unwillingness to grant equal political rights to the black majority. [Redacted]

black advancement, a relatively small number of blacks have established a foothold in business, in our judgment. Similarly, few of the roughly 2 million blacks who earn low wages as farm laborers and as domestic servants earn enough to accumulate substantial savings or develop skills that would enable them to increase their earning potential. The rest of the black work force is unemployed or earns its living through a combination of subsistence farming and part-time work at odd jobs. [Redacted]

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Analysis of South African data on employment and wages, however, indicates that black economic gains have been mixed at best and that prospects are virtually nonexistent in the 1980s for any significant improvement in some key measures of black welfare, such as unemployment and closing the wide gap in wages between blacks and whites. This article sorts out some of the basic facts about employment and wages for the roughly 2.8 million blacks who hold jobs in South African mining, manufacturing, and services (excluding domestic servants in the homes of whites). Future articles will look at other key determinants of black economic progress, such as the availability of housing, electricity, and transportation. [Redacted]

Black Gains and Shortfalls

Black employment in mining, manufacturing, and services increased by more than 640,000 workers during 1971-83¹ (see table 1). Although this exceeded the increase in white employment by almost 300,000 jobs over the same period, we estimate that it fell short of the increase in the black labor force by more than 2 million people and, therefore, that black unemployment increased. [Redacted]

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**Black Employment in Mining,
Manufacturing, and Services**

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Black employment in these sectors constitutes slightly more than one-fourth of the black labor force, according to our estimates, and makes up the largest category of black wage and salary employment in South Africa. Jobs in mining, manufacturing, and services offer the principal opportunities for blacks to rise out of poverty, and blacks employed in these jobs make up the largest segment of the black population that has attained some of the characteristics of lower middle-class living standards. Although self-employment in business is an alternative avenue for

Average black wages in mining, manufacturing, and services—after adjusting for inflation—increased from R1,935² per year in 1970 to R3,740 in 1983. This represented a significant real increase in the purchasing power of blacks and exceeded by one-fourth the growth in average inflation-adjusted white wages. Even so, the purchasing power of black wages in 1983 in constant terms was only about one-fourth that of whites. [Redacted]

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¹ The latest year for which detailed data are available is 1983. We doubt that black employment and wages have increased much during 1984-85 because of the economic downturn in South Africa. [Redacted]

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² We have denominated wage and salary data in South African rand instead of US dollars in order to avoid distortions in measurements of domestic South African purchasing power that would result from taking account of the large devaluations of the rand against the dollar over the past several years. [Redacted]

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Table 1
South Africa: Employment by Industry

Number of workers

	Race	1970	1977	1980	1983
Total	Black	2,181,000	2,677,000	2,776,000	2,824,000
	White	1,103,000	1,294,000	1,360,000	1,451,000
Mining	Black	585,000	635,000	627,000	617,000
	White	62,000	68,000	75,000	79,000
Manufacturing	Black	588,000	726,000	768,000	747,000
	White	264,000	304,000	313,000	361,000
Construction	Black	213,000	297,000	295,000	295,000
	White	50,000	57,000	56,000	56,000
Electricity	Black	14,000	23,000	26,000	33,000
	White	8,000	14,000	16,000	23,000
Trade and accommodations	Black	283,000	329,000	340,000	351,000
	White	238,000	268,000	280,000	270,000
Transport and communications	Black	109,000	143,000	200,000	205,000
	White	147,000	158,000	170,000	170,000
Finance and insurance	Black	10,000	13,000	20,000	19,000
	White	72,000	83,000	90,000	109,000
Government and services	Black	379,000	510,000	500,000	557,000
	White	262,000	341,000	360,000	383,000

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Average current black wages—not adjusted for inflation—increased at a rate of about 17 percent annually during 1971-83, compared with only 12 percent for whites. As a result, the relative gap between average white and black wages narrowed from almost 7 to 1 in 1970 to less than 4 to 1 in 1983 (see table 2). The gap in terms of current rand, nonetheless, widened during the same period from about R2,790 to R10,400 (see figure 1). At these rates, the current gap would not even begin to close until 2008, and average black wages would not surpass those of whites until 2015.

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If one excludes the growth of mine wages during 1971-83, the gap between white and black wages would not close for almost 50 years. Black miners received a series of extraordinary wage increases in the mid-1970s that pulled black mine wages, long the lowest in the economy next to agriculture, roughly into equality with those of blacks in other industries of

the modern urban economy (see figure 2). These one-time wage increases for miners tend to impart an overly optimistic slant, however, to statistical projections for the future growth of black wages.

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The rates of increase in black employment and wages have declined sharply since 1980, reflecting a falloff in the pace of South African economic growth:


- At the low rate of increase in employment since 1980, the number of additional blacks who cannot find employment in mining, manufacturing, or services currently exceeds 200,000 annually, according to our estimates.

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- Almost 91,000 new jobs were filled by whites during 1981-83 compared with only 44,000 by blacks, reflecting employers' preferences based probably on racial bias and on the generally higher educational and training qualifications of whites.
- Average increases in inflation-adjusted black wages and salaries dropped from 5.7 percent annually during 1971-80 to 3.5 percent during 1981-83, while increases for whites rose from 0.4 percent to 2.3 percent (see table 3).


Prospects

We see virtually no chance of a decrease in black unemployment or a narrowing of the current black/white wage gap during the remainder of this decade. Black gains during the 1970s were associated with record 7- to 7.5-percent economic growth in 1974 and 1980 that, in turn, was made possible by extraordinarily high gold prices in those two years. In

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Figure 1
South Africa: Average Wages and Salaries



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Table 2
South Africa: Selected
Indicators of Black Progress

	1970	1980	1983
Ratios of average white to black wages and salaries	6.9:1	4.0:1	3.8:1
Current gap between white and black wages and salaries (current rand)	2,790	7,020	10,400

[Redacted]

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Table 3
South Africa: Wages, Salaries,
and Employment, by Race

Average annual growth in percent

		1971-80	1981-83
Employment	Black	2.4	0.6
	White	2.1	2.2
Wages and salaries ^a	Black	5.7	3.5
	White	0.4	2.3

^a Data are adjusted for inflation.

[Redacted]

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contrast, economic growth averaged only 1.3 percent annually during 1981-84 as a result of drought and austerity measures imposed by the government to cope with foreign exchange shortages resulting from low gold prices. Economic growth in 1985 is likely to be no more than about 1 percent, according to our estimates. Barring further fortuitous gold price surges, we expect that South African economic growth will average less than 3 percent annually during 1986-89 and that this relatively low growth rate will continue to put a damper on gains in black employment and wages. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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**Western Europe-South Africa:
Reactions to US
Sanctions Legislation** [redacted]

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Several West European allies that have often condemned apartheid are now sorting out whether they will be willing to emulate the United States if Washington invokes economic sanctions against South Africa. [redacted]

But Reluctance To Apply Sanctions

While West European governments are willing to censure South Africa, the threat by the US Congress to pass sanctions legislation has forced Allied governments to reexamine their willingness to take stronger action against Pretoria. The allies almost certainly are concerned that their governments will face increased domestic public pressure for sanctions if Washington adopts a tougher policy. Some officials already have expressed their opposition to sanctions during private discussions on the problem with US officials [redacted]

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France appears more interested in rhetoric—perhaps designed to curry favor with nonaligned countries—than in action. The Dutch support sanctions in principle, but so far stop short of imposing them. West Germany so far has not had any role in the debate. Norway, on the other hand, has already implemented action against Pretoria. [redacted]

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Annoyance With South African Actions

Allied leaders, through public statements and private demarches, have expressed irritation with the abortive South African raid against oilfields in Cabinda on 21 May and the attack against African National Congress personnel in Gaborone on 14 June. The British, in particular, believed that this adventurous behavior hurt their efforts at diplomatic dialogue with Mozambique and Angola. In addition, one Canadian official drew the attention of US Embassy officers to the fact that Foreign Minister Clark condemned South African actions twice in an 18 June statement. [redacted]

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West European members of the UN Security Council participated in a 15-0 approval of a resolution condemning the raid on Cabinda, although the British diplomats stated that their government believed calling it an “act of aggression” was too harsh. The British—but not the French—joined Washington in abstaining on another resolution, which passed the previous day 13-0-2, calling for a list of “appropriate voluntary measures,” including “stopping of new investments” and prohibitions of Krugerrand sales. During the debate the Canadian Ambassador criticized South Africa more strongly than his colleagues, causing the British—according to US diplomats at the United Nations—to consider a demarche in Ottawa. [redacted]

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ALA AR 85-016
12 July 1985

Secret

British officials are attempting to reinforce US awareness of the disadvantages of sanctions. For example, London reportedly agreed with Ambassador Walters that disinvestment would hurt South African blacks, damage neighboring states, and enable South African hardliners to block progress toward dismantling apartheid. [redacted] 25X1

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[redacted] **French Diplomacy.** French policy so far has mixed public affirmation of Paris's willingness to consider sanctions with private hope that the issue will go away. Prime Minister Fabius told a Paris human rights rally on 31 May—after Cabinda but before Gaborone—that France stands ready to curtail investment in South Africa if the latter does not ameliorate the apartheid system within 18 months. Fabius also declared—in principle—his willingness to upgrade relations with the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). France had previously agreed to give SWAPO an official status and an office in Paris. [redacted] 25X1

In addition, the French adopted an anti-South African diplomatic posture for the benefit of nonaligned delegations at the United Nations. During the maneuvering that preceded the recent Security Council resolutions, French diplomats told US officials that Paris could accept stronger language on sanctions than Washington or London wanted. US diplomats reported that the French distanced themselves from other Western delegations and gave every indication of trying to “cut their own deal” with nonaligned delegations. The French reportedly did not coordinate their policies or tactics with other Western delegations until the last moment. [redacted]

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Privately, however, the French take a more cautious line. Foreign Ministry officials told Ambassador Walters on 4 June that they considered sanctions unlikely and hoped the issue could be avoided. [redacted]

The Dutch Are Cautious. The Hague has been put in an awkward position because at least one Dutch national reportedly was killed during the South African raid on Gaborone, and the editor of the Dutch newspaper *Trouw* was arrested briefly by South African police on 25 June after spending a morning in a black township. The attack on Gaborone coincided

with the completion of a Dutch Government report supporting in principle multilateral investment sanctions, but rejecting them in practice because they have insufficient international backing. The government, which presented the report to parliament on 18 June, promised to maximize the “stimulating effect” of international investment on the emancipation of black workers. In addition, it called for legislation making it mandatory for Dutch firms to comply with the EC Code of Conduct regarding their investments in South Africa. [redacted] 25X1

The report denied the possibility of immediate unilateral sanctions. Parliament had asked the government to consider restrictions on petroleum exports to, and coal imports from, South Africa, but the report stated that the latter is prevented by legal obligations under the GATT, EC regulations, and a bilateral agreement with Pretoria. The government claimed that it had lobbied hard in the United Nations for a mandatory oil embargo, but complained that Security Council action appeared unlikely. The Dutch implied that they might stiffen their position if the US Congress approved economic sanctions. [redacted] 25X1

So Are the Canadians. Canada announced on 6 July a series of relatively moderate measures, including abrogation of the Canada-South Africa double taxation agreements. According to the US Embassy in Ottawa, these steps are meant to signal Canada's moral position while avoiding stronger economic sanctions. Predictably, at least one opposition spokesman has called Ottawa's action “a joke.” Press commentary also has portrayed it as weak. [redacted] 25X1

Norwegians Preparing To Act. Norway has sanctions in place and, in contrast to its Allies, was preparing for further action even before the Gaborone raid. On 7 June the parliament approved a government white paper toughening the following restrictions:

- An embargo on export of Norwegian oil.
- No nuclear cooperation.
- No bilateral sports contacts.
- No Norwegian Government approval of capital exports for investment in South Africa.

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- Visa requirements for South African nationals seeking to visit Norway.
- Humanitarian aid for some liberation movements and refugees.
- Direct Norwegian funding of projects designed to reduce other countries' dependence on South Africa.

[Redacted]

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In addition, parliament condemned the "politically illegitimate" South African Government and directed the Cabinet to evaluate a wide spectrum of additional sanctions. These include banning exports of South African military equipment into Norway and forbidding the export of materials to South Africa that could be used militarily. While supporting UN trade sanctions against South Africa, parliament recognized that such restrictions lack adequate international support. [Redacted]

The French probably will continue to support sanctions verbally—largely for the benefit of nonaligned countries—but are unlikely to take any direct action until after the debate in Washington clarifies the US stance. The Dutch also will wait for US action, almost certainly pointing to Washington as the necessary element in any future international sanctions regime. No other ally currently appears ready to follow the Norwegian and Danish lead, and all will probably protect their particular economic ties with South Africa unless and until international trade restrictions come into force. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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On 26 June Norway, Sweden, and Denmark announced cancellation of their air traffic agreement with South Africa. Scandinavian Airlines System's flights to South Africa will halt within six months, according to press sources. The Danish parliament—according to the US Embassy in Copenhagen—had already passed legislation banning new investment in South Africa in late May. [Redacted]

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Outlook

Pretoria's military policies and the resulting debate in the US Congress are forcing West European governments to face the contradictions in their policy toward South Africa. Allied governments—and particularly the British—are concerned that they may no longer be able to deflect antiapartheid activists and Third World governments with pleas that West Europeans can do little by themselves to constrain South Africa. [Redacted]

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South Africa: The Dutch Reformed Church and Racial Reform

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Traditionally a strong supporter of South Africa's ruling National Party, the Dutch Reformed Church, commonly known by its Afrikaans acronym, NGK,¹ is often referred to as the "National Party at prayer." The NGK has long been an integral part of Afrikaner culture and is by far the most influential church in the country today; 65 percent of all Afrikaners and 42 percent of all South African whites are members. Most National Party members, government officials, and bureaucrats are members. As its pivotal general synod approaches next year, the NGK faces a possible split over racial reform, reflecting other fissures in Afrikanerdom. The National Party and the Broederbond—the secretive Afrikaner cultural group—have both split in recent years as a result of the divisive debates over racial policies and reform.

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Mounting Pressure

Opposition to the NGK's support of apartheid has grown in recent years. A collection of essays written in 1981 by 24 Afrikaner theologians and laypersons strongly criticized apartheid and made a plea for the multiracial unification of the NGK family of churches. In addition, an open letter by 123 NGK ministers and theologians in 1982 called for greater church efforts to reduce tensions between racial groups in South Africa. The letter stated that apartheid not only promotes alienation and distrust but also is not justified by the scriptures. It emphasized the primacy of the principle of unity among all Christians.

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These internal calls for church reform have been echoed by international Reformed Church groups. In August 1982, the World Alliance of Reformed Churches suspended the NGK, demanding that it end segregated communion and worship, reject apartheid, and assist those suffering from the effects of racial segregation in South Africa. The World Alliance then elected as its president Dr. Alan Boesak, a leading colored minister in the Dutch Reformed Mission Church—the NGSK—who favors merging the

¹ Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk.

NGK Family of Churches

Dutch Reformed Church (NGK):

- Colored Mission Church (NGSK)
- Reformed Church in Africa (Indian)
- Dutch Reformed Church in Africa (African)

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reformed churches into a multiracial Dutch Reformed Church. Boesak led the NGSK in unconditionally rejecting all apartheid laws, and called for a new, nonracial political system in South Africa.

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The synod of the colored NGSK first signaled its displeasure with the NGK "mother church" in 1982 when it declared the NGK guilty of heresy and idolatry for supporting apartheid. The NGSK joined the South African Council of Churches—a liberal, predominantly English-speaking, interdenominational group long opposed to the NGK.

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Despite this growing criticism, the NGK general synod in 1982 did not result in any major shifts in policy. The church body rejected the open letter by 123 ministers and declared the charges of the NGSK unreasonable. The synod decided to stay in the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, largely to retain a communications link with the international body, and to avoid playing into the hands of antiapartheid forces trying to isolate the church, according to press reports. The synod rejected the integration of regular services, but agreed to permit individual churches to decide whether to allow blacks to attend special services. It also continued to condemn mixed marriages and sexual relations between whites and nonwhites.

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ALA AR 85-016
12 July 1985

Secret

More pressure was put on the NGK by the NGSK's decision in March 1983 to put into practice its principle that apartheid is a heresy. The NGSK announced it would perform and recognize interracial marriages and advised its members to resolve church-state dilemmas on the basis of conscience. [redacted]

draft a more enlightened version. The synod will also be reconsidering its membership in the World Alliance of Reformed Churches and the Reformed Ecumenical Synod. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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The most significant break in NGK ranks occurred in late 1983 when the liberal Western Cape synod decided unconditionally to open church services and membership to all races. It also declared that the bans on interracial marriages and relations contradicted the scriptures and ethical principles of marriage. Although it did not join the NGSK in declaring apartheid a heresy, the Western Cape synod said the NGK should disassociate itself from any theological justification of apartheid. [redacted]

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The last international channel of communication open to the NGK was closed earlier this year. The Reformed Ecumenical Synod, a conservative body of orthodox Calvinist churches, last year called for the repeal of South Africa's ban on interracial marriages and relations and asked the NGK to inform it by 1987 of its position on apartheid in light of the Bible. The NGK's executive leadership objected to this demand and preempted next year's general synod by suspending, provisionally, its membership in the organization. [redacted]

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Outlook

Most observers believe that the 1986 general synod of the NGK is likely to divide the church even further. The US Embassy reports that a number of NGK ministers and theologians believe a formal split in the church is possible. One leading South African theological professor told Embassy officials there already are two separate movements within the NGK that differ over biblical interpretations of apartheid, adding that some rural parishes are ignoring rulings of the 1982 general synod. [redacted]

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The most divisive issue before the 1986 synod will be the revision of the church's social policy, which as drafted in 1974 provided a theological justification of apartheid. A committee of NGK ministers and theologians has met since 1982 and probably will

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**Zimbabwe:
White Elections** [redacted]

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Former Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith's Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe captured a majority of parliamentary seats in a surprisingly strong showing in the elections on 27 June for whites. Smith's party won 15 of the 20 seats reserved for whites under the Lancaster House Constitution,¹ easily defeating a loose coalition of independents who had broken with the Conservative Alliance over the past two years. [redacted]

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vowed to scrap the seats reserved for whites immediately, according to press reports. [redacted]

A number of whites have expressed concern to US Embassy officials that Smith's victory might trigger a government backlash. We suspect, along with the US Embassy, that renewed white emigration is likely, reversing a preelection trend. [redacted]

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The triumph by Smith's party followed a campaign that drew little interest among the white electorate, which was widely expected to vote for the independents, according to the US Embassy. Smith's strong personal appeal among the white community, the party's superior organization, and intense campaigning by Smith, in our judgment, contributed to the victory. [redacted]

Other whites, including members of the Commercial Farmers Union, have tried to distance themselves from the Conservative Alliance. Smith has taken a nonconfrontational stance, and he pledged to renew his efforts to communicate with the government. [redacted]

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Prospects

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The victory by the Conservative Alliance will be difficult for Mugabe and his ruling Zimbabwe African National Union to swallow, despite Smith's reassuring statements. Relations between whites—who comprise less than 2 percent of the population but dominate the economy—and blacks undoubtedly will deteriorate, especially if Mugabe uses his landslide victory in early July to move more rapidly toward a more socialist-oriented, single-party state. At a minimum, we expect Mugabe to brush aside constitutional legalities and abolish the reserved seats for whites and move to install a one-party state within the next few years. [redacted]

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Reaction

Prime Minister Mugabe reacted strongly to Smith's victory, describing it as a betrayal by the white electorate and a rejection of his government's conciliatory policies toward whites. [redacted]

[redacted] Mugabe publicly attacked Smith and the white electorate, calling them "the racists of the past" and claiming blacks were deceived by trusting whites. Mugabe said his party would purge the country's white minority and only those whites who were willing to work with his government would remain in Zimbabwe. He called the Lancaster House Constitution a "dirty piece of paper" and

¹ Under the British-mediated Constitution which brought Zimbabwe to independence in 1980, 20 of 100 parliamentary seats are reserved for whites until at least 1987. After 1987 a 70-member vote of parliament is sufficient to abolish the reserved seats. [redacted]

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ALA AR 85-016
12 July 1985

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**Africa
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Angola-Zaire

Worsening Relations

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Relations between Zaire and Angola have deteriorated in the past several months as Luanda has become convinced that Kinshasa is providing significant logistic support to UNITA insurgents. Luanda believes that UNITA's sustained operations in northern Angola—which range from the capital in the northwest to the economically important diamond mining region in the northeast—would not be possible without Zairian support. Angola last May expelled the first secretary of the Zairian Embassy in Luanda on charges of espionage.

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The roots of the often antagonistic relationship stem from President Mobutu's support for Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and Jonas Savimbi's UNITA against Agostino Neto's MPLA during Angola's struggle for independence in the early 1970s. The MPLA retaliated by backing two rebel invasions of Zaire's Shaba Province in the late 1970s by the anti-Mobutu Front for the Liberation of Congo (FLNC), and by allowing some 6,000 FLNC members to reside in Angola. The two, however, did agree during President dos Santos' visit to Zaire last February not to allow their territory to be used to undermine the security of the other.

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In our view, bilateral relations are likely to deteriorate further in the coming months as UNITA increases its activities in northeastern Angola and Cabinda Province, while consolidating its position farther south along the border with Zaire. Luanda would view UNITA's gains as confirmation of Zaire's support for the insurgents and this would lead the MPLA to step up public criticism or perhaps make further expulsions of Zairian diplomats. Moreover, the increased flow of refugees into Zaire in recent months—which has included soldiers fleeing with their weapons and equipment—raises the likelihood of a border incident. Mobutu is likely to continue to conceal his limited support to UNITA because Luanda could retaliate by arming the FLNC. Discovery of Zairian involvement with UNITA also could undermine Kinshasa's efforts to persuade other neighboring countries to crack down on cross-border activity by Libyan-supported dissidents.

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