




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Near East and South Asia Review



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Supplement
25 October 1985

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Near East and South Asia Review

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Page

Articles

Pakistan: Improved Defenses Along the Afghan Border

[Redacted]

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Islamabad has given its border forces surface-to-air missiles for the first time and increased their artillery and armored personnel carriers in response to increased Soviet and Afghan cross-border attacks against insurgent positions in Pakistan, but the border forces will continue to react cautiously to these attacks. [Redacted]

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Iran: Limited Effectiveness of Ground-Based Air Defenses

[Redacted] 5

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[Redacted]

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Iranian air defenses are likely to remain ineffective against Iraqi airstrikes despite recent efforts to improve them, and growing civilian criticism of Iran's air defense forces could prompt the removal of senior officers and cause a shift in responsibility for air defense from the regular military to the Revolutionary Guard. [Redacted]

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Iran: Civil, Religious, and Revolutionary Law Enforcement Agencies

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Tehran's efforts to consolidate its control nationwide and bring order to the bureaucracy have led to the reinstatement of prerevolutionary law enforcement agencies and the imposition of discipline on new revolutionary organizations. [Redacted]

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Lebanon: Will Nabih Barri Survive?

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Nabih Barri, Lebanon's mainstream Shia leader, is facing increasing challenges and dissent within his Amal organization and from the Shia fundamentalists within the Hizballah movement, but in the near term the Shia community is unlikely to come up with an alternative to Barri. [Redacted]

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Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items will be designated as noncoordinated views. [Redacted]

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Articles

Pakistan: Improved Defenses Along the Afghan Border [Redacted]

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Islamabad has given its border forces surface-to-air missiles for the first time and has increased their artillery and armored personnel carriers in response to increased Soviet and Afghan cross-border attacks against insurgent positions in Pakistan. The Pakistanis have used the missiles cautiously and have refrained from using their artillery. If the Pakistanis use the missiles more aggressively, they might force the Soviets and Afghans to adopt somewhat less effective air tactics against insurgent positions. If the Pakistanis shoot down a Soviet or Afghan aircraft, the two sides probably would try to prevent the incident from leading to greater military escalation. [Redacted]

the province governor, it has reported to Army Corps headquarters in Peshawar and Quetta since cross-border air attacks began in 1980. [Redacted]

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Small Army units have reinforced the Frontier Corps since the Soviet invasion. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Pakistani authorities moved four air defense batteries equipped with six 23-mm guns each and three light artillery regiments equipped with 18 105-mm guns each to four major crossings at Landi Kotal, Chaman, Kuz Tsapparai, and near Parachinar in 1980. Most of the Army units near the Afghan border, however, are still in cantonments back from the border. Some 10,000 troops are in Parachinar about 30 kilometers from the border, and some 20,000 troops are in Quetta about 45 kilometers from the border. [Redacted]

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The Border Forces

Pakistan's Army remains oriented toward India despite the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan almost six years ago [Redacted] only three of Islamabad's 18 divisions face Afghanistan. Pakistani military officers have told US officials that they believe full-scale hostilities are most likely with India, but they expect Moscow to step up its military pressure along the Afghan border. [Redacted]

New Missile Defenses

Frontier Corps and Army border units received their initial surface-to-air missiles during the first half of 1985. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] We believe Islamabad deployed them with the border forces because the number of Soviet and Afghan air attacks against insurgent positions in Pakistan increased in 1984. Islamabad probably hopes that the missiles will deter Soviet and Afghan attacks or at least discourage Moscow and Kabul from intensifying them. [Redacted]

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Primary responsibility for the defense of the Afghan border lies with the paramilitary Frontier Corps. Pakistani authorities have increased the number of Frontier Corps personnel from about 35,000 before the Soviet invasion to approximately 50,000. The Corps is organized into some 70 battalion-size "wings" of 750 men each. Some of these wings are broken down into 10-man squads that occupy posts every 15 to 20 kilometers along much of the border; larger posts are located at major border crossings. Corpsmen are armed with light infantry weapons, heavy machineguns, and 76-mm light artillery. Even though the Frontier Corps is nominally subordinate to the Interior Ministry and has traditionally reported to

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Pakistan's New Surface-to-Air Missiles

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[Redacted]

We doubt that the Frontier Corps' new artillery and armored personnel cars will deter Afghan Army shelling of insurgent positions in Pakistan or prevent a major ground incursion. The Corps' new arms are outmatched by the Afghan Army's armor and heavy field artillery. [Redacted]

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The heat-seeking Redeyes and Stingers also have suffered from technical problems. The Redeye, which was first manufactured in the 1960s, is often deflected from its path by bright clouds, sunlight, hot rocks, flares, or even the contrast between the ground and sky and can only be fired at the rear of an aircraft's exhaust system. The Stinger is less easily deflected from its target because it operates in a portion of the infrared spectrum that is less susceptible to background clutter and is more lethal because it can be fired at any part of an attacking aircraft. But even the Stinger can be deflected from its path, particularly in mountainous areas, such as the Afghan-Pakistani border region. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Pakistani officers have told US officials that they do not want to give the Afghans a pretext to increase their shelling of Pakistani territory. [Redacted]

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Frontier Corps Strengths

We believe that the Frontier Corps with their small arms and light artillery could inflict significant losses on small Soviet and Afghan units in a future ground incursion. [Redacted]

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Frontier Corps members know the local terrain well and are highly motivated because they serve in their native areas. They also receive nearly the same salary and rigorous training as regular Army troops and are superior to them in marksmanship and the use of camouflage. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

We believe that the missiles could cause the Soviets and Afghans to adopt somewhat less effective tactics against the insurgents if the border forces shot down an aircraft or consistently fired more missiles at attacking aircraft. Soviet and Afghan aircraft might bomb from a higher altitude, above the 5-kilometer range of the surface-to-air missiles, or shorten the amount of time over target to avoid the missiles. [Redacted]

Outlook

We believe the Frontier Corps and Army border units will continue to react cautiously to Soviet and Afghan territorial violations. Pakistani officers have told US officials that the border forces are under orders not to shoot at an aircraft unless they believe it will crash in Pakistani territory. The officers also have indicated that they can tolerate the current level of air violations, although the Pakistanis do not want to give the impression that Moscow and Kabul can act with impunity in the border area. [Redacted]

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Marginal Improvements in Artillery and Mobility

Islamabad has increased the Frontier Corps' artillery and mobility. [Redacted]

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If the border forces shot down a hostile aircraft, we believe the two sides would try to prevent the incident from leading to a significantly greater military escalation. In our view, the Soviets would minimize the incident, particularly if a Soviet rather than an Afghan aircraft were involved, to avoid drawing domestic and international attention to a violation of Pakistani airspace. We believe, however, that the Soviets and Afghans would renew air attacks against insurgent supply lines relatively quickly. [Redacted]

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Islamabad also probably would try to contain the damage to its relations with Moscow to prevent Soviet military retaliation. We believe Pakistani officials would turn over quickly any of the crew members who survived the crash; Islamabad returned a Soviet pilot captured by the insurgents in 1981. [Redacted]

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If the Soviets chose to punish Pakistan militarily, we believe they would retaliate against the Pakistani Army posts on the border. The posts are easily visible to Soviet reconnaissance, unlike the smaller Frontier Corps posts. We doubt the Soviets would attack the larger Army cantonments or Air Force airfields farther away from the border because of the diplomatic costs. [Redacted]

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Iran: Limited Effectiveness of Ground-Based Air Defenses

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Iranian air defenses are likely to remain ineffective against Iraqi airstrikes despite recent efforts to improve them. Iran's ability to detect and destroy high-flying targets is limited, and Tehran is having difficulty acquiring new air defense equipment because few countries are willing to act as suppliers. Moreover, the Iranian military is suffering from worsening shortages of equipment useful against low-to-medium-altitude targets and of trained operational, maintenance, and repair personnel. Civilian criticism of Iran's air defense forces is likely to grow in the wake of Iraqi attacks on Khark Island, and this could prompt the removal of senior officers. It could also cause a shift in responsibility for air defense from the regular military to the Revolutionary Guard, a move that would further weaken Iran's capabilities.

Poor Performance Against Iraqi Attacks

Protecting Khark Island—the shipping point for over 85 percent of Iran's oil exports—is a priority concern for Iran's leaders.

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The Shah's Legacy

Iran was only beginning to build its air defenses when the Shah was removed by the revolution. The Shah had counted first on a strong Air Force to engage attacking aircraft and only secondarily on air defense weapons to shoot down enemy aircraft that escaped his Air Force. As a result, Iran suffered from a severe shortage of deployed surface-to-air missiles (SAM) at the start of the Iran-Iraq war. Less than half of the 216 HAWK launchers obtained by the Shah were deployed when the war began, and Iran had only about 30 British Tigercat and 52 Rapier SAM launchers. Gaps in radar coverage, especially at low altitudes, combined with mountainous terrain in the border regions also made air defense difficult.

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Over the last five years, the deterioration of Iran's Air Force and the paucity of ground-based air defenses have allowed the Iraqis to penetrate Iranian airspace easily. Nonetheless, before this year most of the airstrikes were ineffective, and the Iranians displayed comparatively little concern about them. In recent months, however, Iraqi air attacks have become more effective—causing some 5,000 to 10,000 casualties in the cities and threatening Iran's oil exports from Khark Island—and Tehran is stepping up efforts to improve its air defenses.

Flawed Radar Coverage

Iran's few radars are deployed to provide overlapping coverage of the western border and Gulf coast. Shortages of radar equipment leave much of the interior of the country with weak detection capabilities.

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The HAWKs have not been a significant threat to Iraqi aircraft because the Iranians have too few of the systems and cannot use the ones they have effectively.

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[Redacted]

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Personnel cannot perform the necessary maintenance or obtain parts to keep the systems operational, and crew ineptitude apparently results in misfires.

[Redacted]

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Breakdowns and malfunctions aggravated by shortages of spare parts and experienced repair personnel frequently cause serious gaps in radar coverage.

[Redacted]

With few surface-to-air missiles, Iran relies on small-to-medium-caliber antiaircraft artillery to try to protect its combat forces, to supplement missile air defenses at large installations, and to protect smaller facilities throughout the country. Air defense artillery battalions in the infantry and armored divisions are equipped with towed and self-propelled 23-mm or 57-mm antiaircraft guns and SA-7 surface-to-air missiles.

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[Redacted] Early in the war Iraqi pilots crossed the border at very low altitudes to take advantage of terrain masking to defeat Iranian radar. The Iraqis also are now flying high-altitude missions, beyond the range of Iran's air defense capabilities.

Iran has achieved its greatest rate of success against Iraqi aircraft with antiaircraft artillery. The Iranians had about 1,300 towed and just over 120 self-propelled guns on hand in 1980 and have had limited success obtaining Soviet-origin antiaircraft equipment. The guns are easier for the Iranians to operate and maintain than surface-to-air missiles. Antiaircraft personnel have had a considerable amount of experience at the front, and we believe they generally are more capable at utilizing their weapons than surface-to-air missile crews. In addition, although Iraqi pilots usually try to attack from high altitudes, in some cases—for example, attacking point targets or flying ground-support missions at the front—they must sometimes fly at low levels where they are exposed to Iranian antiaircraft fire.

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Missiles and Antiaircraft Artillery

Iran suffers from a chronic shortage of surface-to-air missiles, especially for medium-to-high-altitude air defense, because it cannot find a supplier for the British and US missiles it needs. Most of Iran's surface-to-air missile sites are located around Tehran and other major cities in the west and at important oil, military, and industrial facilities. The Iranians use their Rapier and Tigercat systems for low-altitude point defense of cities and key facilities. They generally use HAWK systems, which can also counter some medium high-altitude airstrikes, to strengthen air defenses in areas threatened by Iraqi airstrikes. Because of shortages, Iran can only provide reasonably effective coverage in some areas by leaving others with little or no protection.

Efforts To Remedy Deficiencies

Tehran has attempted to acquire new air defense systems since early in the war with limited results. More aggressive Iraqi bombing of cities last spring

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
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SA-2 surface-to-air missile

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and Khark Island this fall have caused Tehran to step up its efforts. [Redacted]

Iranians have recently obtained [Redacted] Soviet-manufactured SA-2 surface-to-air missile launchers [Redacted] but we doubt that they will quickly or significantly improve Iran's ability to shoot down Iraqi or other sophisticated aircraft. The SA-2, designed to shoot down targets flying at medium to high altitudes, is not effective against aircraft flying at low altitudes. The system is difficult to move quickly and is vulnerable to electronic countermeasures aboard Iraqi aircraft. In addition, Iran will be unable to effectively use the SA-2s until it obtains the accompanying radar for the system.

[Redacted]

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Iranian personnel will have to be trained to operate and maintain them. Iranian personnel in the past have been unable to adequately master Iran's other surface-to-air missile systems. [Redacted]

Tehran's desperation to overcome shortages of surface-to-air missiles and to acquire supplies from foreign sources has resulted in ineffective attempts to use naval missiles to fill gaps in its air defense net.

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Other efforts to upgrade Iran's air defense capabilities have also met with little success. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Outlook

Supplier-imposed constraints probably will prevent Iran from obtaining enough weapon systems in the near term to improve significantly its air defense capabilities. We believe that even a doubling of Iran's current operational stock of air defense systems would not have a dramatic impact in the short to medium

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term because Tehran would still suffer from a shortage of adequately trained personnel to operate and maintain them. Iran probably will have to continue to rely on its most effective air defense—the hours of darkness when Iraqi pilots seldom fly—to launch its attacks or supply and move its forces.

Rising civilian criticism of the air defense forces could prompt changes in command and responsibilities that probably would harm rather than improve their effectiveness.

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Iran's shortage of fighter aircraft will continue to magnify the weakness of its ground-based air defenses. We doubt that Iran will be able to stop or inflict significant losses on Iraqi aircraft conducting determined, intensive strikes on its cities or important economic facilities.

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Khark Island or alternative oil loading facilities will remain particularly vulnerable. The single-point mooring terminals that Iran is constructing between Khark and the mainland will be open to attack because Iranian air defenses in the area are weak. Although the mooring terminals will slightly increase Iraqi targeting problems, Iranian air defenses would be no better able to defend the new facilities than they can defend Khark.

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In the event that Saudi or other forces launched retaliatory strikes in response to Iranian attacks against shipping or oil facilities in the Persian Gulf, Iranian air defenses probably would present little threat. The Saudis, with relatively well-trained pilots, probably could effectively exploit gaps in Iranian air defense coverage. Although the Iranians might be able to shoot down a few Saudi aircraft making low-to-medium-altitude attacks, their record suggests that their ability to do so would be governed more by luck than skill.

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**Iran: Civil, Religious, and
Revolutionary Law
Enforcement Agencies** [redacted]

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Tehran's efforts to consolidate its control nationwide and bring order to the bureaucracy have led to the reinstatement of prerevolutionary law enforcement agencies and the imposition of discipline on new revolutionary organizations. This is causing a gradual reduction in the continual turf battles among the wide variety of religious, revolutionary, and civil law enforcement agencies with overlapping mandates that operate in Iran. One of the most important results of the consolidation process is that the Revolutionary Guard has been steadily losing clout in domestic law enforcement. [redacted]

[redacted] There were often conflicts between them and revolutionary or religious law enforcement personnel, especially when the populace complained to one group about the actions of another. Conflicts also occurred over Revolutionary Guard resentment that other forces played only minor roles at the warfront or enjoyed higher pay and perquisites. [redacted]

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Civil Law Enforcement

Civil law enforcement agencies have gradually recovered from their collapse at the end of the revolution and are being fully integrated into the bureaucracy. In late 1978 and early 1979, police and gendarmerie installations and the homes of their men were being threatened or attacked by revolutionaries seeking weapons and revenge. Many law enforcement personnel simply abandoned their posts. [redacted]

More recently, as the heavyhanded methods of the Islamic security forces have antagonized the populace, the police and gendarmerie have regained many of their former responsibilities. Their gains have been largely at the expense of the Revolutionary Guard. [redacted]

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[redacted] In the early months of the new regime, pro-Khomeini technocrats tried to maintain the police and gendarmerie as the primary law enforcement agencies. They probably hoped to limit the power of their rivals who controlled the Revolutionary Guard and komitehs—the parallel Islamic power centers that sprang up throughout the Iranian social and governmental structure after the revolution. They failed, however, and many policemen and gendarmes were arrested or killed, and most of their installations and equipment were seized by komiteh or Guard forces. [redacted]

Police. Iranian police forces—now numbering about 70,000 [redacted] are divided into two forces and are subordinate to the Interior Ministry, as they were under the Shah:

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- The city police (Shahribani) are responsible for dealing with urban criminal activity but have no jurisdiction over religious or revolutionary law enforcement groups.
- The traffic police (Rahnamai) are used for urban traffic control. [redacted]

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According to an agreement between national-level police and komiteh leaders announced in August 1985, the police have regained most of the traditional duties they had under the Shah. The new accord takes the police out of activities that could have a political connotation—a move that may further increase popular respect for them. According to the agreement, the police are responsible for traffic control; liaison with foreign police forces; operation of police stations; provision of security for railroads, airports, banks, hotels, embassies, municipal services, public places, official guests of the government, and international conferences; and patrolling at official ceremonies and demonstrations that have been approved by the

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In 1980 the central government declared an amnesty for former civil law enforcement personnel, and rebuilding of the 40,000-man police and 70,000-man gendarmerie began. Nonetheless, radicals demanded further purges, and the police and gendarmes were given only mundane responsibilities [redacted]

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Interior Ministry. Iranian press reports also indicate that police duties will include urban fingerprinting services, detective work, and pursuing and arresting suspects [Redacted]

[Redacted]

The force uses a number of specialized units, most of which were formed under the Shah. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

The gendarmerie air unit was reactivated last month and will take on most of the logistic support for gendarme units in the warfront areas of northwest and southwest Iran. A gendarmerie coast guard unit patrols coastal waters in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman and navigable rivers in southern Iran. Five gendarmerie brigades have recently been established along the border with Afghanistan and the USSR to try to halt drug smuggling. They probably are part of a gendarme unit formed in late 1983 called *Jondollah* (Army of God) that patrols border areas for smugglers, deserters, and draft dodgers. [Redacted]

Police now undergo strict background investigations and training designed not only to ensure at least a minimal commitment to the regime, but also to instill discipline and foster professionalism. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] an average of 300 police recruits are chosen each year from about 10,000 applicants, all of whom must have completed military service and be recommended by a cleric. Most are given three-to-six-month courses at the police "university" in Tehran; officer candidates attend a three-year program there. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Gendarmerie. Like the police, the gendarmerie has been regaining the responsibilities it lost after the revolution. According to the Iranian press, the regime plans soon to negotiate a similar agreement between the gendarmerie and the komitehs that will cover criminal and traffic law enforcement outside urban areas, and border patrols. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Gendarmerie personnel are as closely monitored by the regime as are the police. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Religious and Revolutionary Law Enforcement

The komitehs and qazi police stand out among the religious and revolutionary law enforcement agencies created after the revolution, for their organization, nearly nationwide mandate, and sponsorship by the central government. [Redacted]

Komitehs. This autonomous, national, mosque-centered network was put under the control of the Interior Ministry in 1984 as part of the regime's rationalization program, and komiteh security forces became subject to central discipline. Early this year, the central government announced that the komiteh forces—known as komiteh guards (Komiteh Pasdaran), not to be confused with the Revolutionary Guard (Sepah-e Pasdaran)—should develop working relationships with the police rather than the Revolutionary Guard. These efforts apparently led to the agreement between the komitehs and police announced in August. [Redacted]

When told that the komitehs should work with the police, komiteh leaders tried unsuccessfully to absorb the police. They managed only to assume officially some of the most important police functions. Under the agreement, the komiteh guard network—composed of 28,000 men under the age of 35—will be

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considered a law, order, and security enforcement agency alongside the police. Komitehs will be responsible for the security of major political figures and public places; combating narcotics, antireligious, and counterrevolutionary activities; and controlling disturbances, unauthorized demonstrations, and strikes. Another duty, according to the Iranian press, is forming special-purpose patrols—which in Tehran, at least, early last year were “too numerous to name or count.” The Interior Ministry, which took over the previously autonomous komiteh network in mid-1984, plans to set up komitehs under its control in all towns and villages. [redacted]

Qazi (Judicial) Police. This agency, which began to operate in early 1982, is similar to West European judicial police and the US Marshal’s office. Its mandate is based on the Shia emphasis on correctly implementing religious law as a means of providing universal social justice. The qazi police is administered by the Justice Ministry, but it is ultimately under the control of the Supreme Judicial Council. [redacted]

The qazi police has been responsible for significant increases in the speed and efficiency of the court system, according to the Iranian press. After a crime is committed, the qazi police follows cases to their conclusion. It investigates and files the case; pursues, interrogates, and arrests suspects; collects and preserves documents, including the prior record of the accused; serves judicial papers; escorts the accused to and from the court; and quickly carries out verdicts. The qazi police also oversees work done at criminal investigation offices, identification offices, coroners’ offices, gendarmerie, and police posts. It keeps an eye on the entire judicial system, according to the Justice Minister. He says it “prevents the interference of incompetent and impious individuals” in the judicial process. [redacted]

Reflecting its importance to the regime, the qazi police has expanded within a year from 20 stations in Tehran to forces in all or part of six provinces, with at least token representation in 30 cities. Despite rapid expansion, the selection of qazi police has remained closely controlled, and its personnel receive detailed training. Standards are so high that only 75 of the

first 1,500 applicants were selected, and only 650 were hired in the first year of operations. The first complement of qazi policemen were required to have a “high moral commitment,” have completed secondary school, or been known as reliable police, gendarmerie, komiteh, or Revolutionary Guard members. Subsequent recruits had to be college graduates. Members of the qazi police take a shortened version of the Tehran police “university” curriculum dating from the Shah’s era as well as a new program run by the Justice Ministry. According to the Iranian press, the Revolutionary Guard also provides some training. [redacted]

National Political Security Committee (Komiteh-e Amniyat-e Siasi-e Melli). This unit was created within the Interior Ministry around 1983 to deal with security problems caused by the influx of Afghan and Iraqi refugees. [redacted] The committee relies on cooperation with the police, Revolutionary Guard, and komiteh personnel to carry out its duties. [redacted]

Tehran Security Nucleus or Islamic Guard. This group is a 100-man riot control unit under the Prime Minister. Once a part of the intelligence and security apparatus attached to the Prime Minister’s office, the unit remained there when other sections were absorbed into the new Intelligence Ministry last year. It may become the nucleus of a planned 6,000-man national riot control force under the Interior Ministry. This unit was charged earlier this year with preventing antiregime demonstrations among crowds that collected at the scene of Iraqi bombings. [redacted]

Joint Security Patrols. These armed teams of police and intelligence officers search for evidence of Revolutionary Guard and judicial corruption or malfeasance. They were largely responsible for collecting the evidence against the former director of Evin Prison. Similar anticorruption, antihoarding, and antiprofitteering patrols are called *Ansarollah* (Supporters of God). [redacted]

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Rabble in Arms

Most other Iranian revolutionary/religious law enforcement groups are far less organized than the komiteh and qazi police. More important, they have not received central government approval through formal inclusion in the bureaucracy. The Iranian press has accurately noted that at any given time there are so many independent patrols operating under a variety of sponsors throughout Iran that they cannot be counted and often are not named.

One result is that members of one group have been ordered to eliminate "illegal" activities that have been authorized by another group.

Among the best known are:

- *Hezbollahi* (Party of God). These are ill-defined bands that exist throughout Iran but have no known national leadership or organized structure. They seem to be made up of hired mobs or the private armies traditionally attached to influential bazaaris and clerics. They are used by individuals trying to influence government policies and by the government to intimidate the populace. Turf battles and conflicting mandates have led to particularly acrimonious relations between the hezbollahi and the Revolutionary Guard.
- *Jondollah* (Army of God). Almost all of these forces—composed of Army, gendarmerie, Revolutionary Guard, and Basij personnel—are now active along the warfront, primarily in northwest Iran. Formed in 1983 to seek out draft dodgers, the Jondollah units were gradually pulled out of the cities in 1984 at the same time that the Revolutionary Guard lost its civil law enforcement powers. In Yazd, Jondollah patrols were banned by the senior local cleric who preferred the gendarmerie and police. In Esfahan, on the other hand, a Jondollah force is used by the senior cleric to offset the local Revolutionary Guard, which is not under his control. Other Jondollah groups are attached to the gendarmerie and komitehs.

- *Sarollah* (Revenge of God). These all-male religious morality police, controlled by the Revolutionary Guard, quickly developed a reputation for brutality after the revolution. They were particularly known for atrocities on females arrested for wearing un-Islamic attire and for their humiliating interrogation of fathers and brothers walking with female relatives on the streets.

The Sarollah is still being used in some capacity because Iranian press reports indicate that as recently as October 1985 the Guard was recruiting youths over 17 for the Sarollah from among conscripts and those who have already served at the front.

- *Sisters of Zahra* (*Khahari-ye Zahra*). Composed of armed females who patrol cities in vehicles, the Sisterhood probably was formed because of protests against the Sarollah. In Tehran, the Zahra was controlled by the prosecutor-general who was also director of Evin Prison. A controversial character, he was ousted by moderates in 1985 after prolonged efforts. In Tehran and some other cities, the Zahra may have been absorbed this year into the Ershad patrols.
- *Sisters of Zaineb* (*Khahari-ye Zaineb*). This organization may also have been formed in response to complaints of misconduct by Sarollah patrols. Its personnel patrolled in vehicles with two men and two women, and it quickly developed a nasty reputation. In Tehran, Zaineb had been supervised by the former prosecutor-general and director of Evin Prison; it may have been absorbed into the Ershad patrols after his ouster.

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- *Ershad (Guidance) Patrols.* These mixed male-female patrols are controlled by the office of the Tehran prosecutor-general or by the komitehs. According to the Iranian press, Ershad patrols "control debauchery." Some patrols use vehicles marked with the insignia of the Islamic courts. [Redacted]
[Redacted]

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Lebanon: Will Nabih Barri Survive? [Redacted]

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Nabih Barri, Lebanon's mainstream Shia leader, is facing increasing challenges and dissent within his Amal organization and from the Shia fundamentalists within the Hizballah movement. To retain power, Barri must prevent Hizballah from further infiltrating Amal's lower and middle ranks and maintain Syrian military and political support. We believe Barri has lost control of the Bekaa Valley to Hizballah, and his control over southern Lebanon and South Beirut is slowly eroding. [Redacted]



Nabih Barri . . . must prevent radicalization of Amal if he is to remain in power. [Redacted]

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Barri continues to control Amal's bureaus and cells. He allocates supplies to militia commanders who demonstrate their loyalty and allegiance to him. According to the US Embassy in Beirut, however, his movement is fraught with factionalism, and disagreements on key issues within the leadership are common. [Redacted]

Mahmud al-Fayih, military commander for southern Lebanon; and Aqil Hamiyah, military chief for Beirut. [Redacted]

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Barri is having difficulty controlling the activities of Amal militia commanders who are sympathetic to Hizballah. These include Mustafa Dirani, security chief for South Beirut; Zakaria Hamzah, military commander for the Bekaa Valley; and Daud Daud, one of Amal's two top military officials in southern Lebanon. [Redacted]

Barri's archrival and the key contender for power within Amal is Hasan Hashem, chairman of the Executive Committee. Hashem has close ties to several of Amal's militia commanders and often challenges Barri's right to interfere in militia activities. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] He has been unable to muster enough support to get rid of Barri, however, and we have seen nothing to suggest that he could fill Barri's shoes. [Redacted]

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Vulnerabilities

Barri is vulnerable on several issues. He is often accused by his opponents of lacking charisma, religious conviction, and the credentials necessary for leadership of the Lebanese Shia community. He is often accused by Hizballah of subverting the original

Most of the support for Barri comes from inside Amal's political command structure. Key loyalists include Rabab Sadr Sharaff al-Din, the sister of Musa Sadr (the founder of Amal); Hasan al-Masri, a spokesman for Amal; and Ghassan Siblani, a key aide. Barri's supporters in the militia include Qabalan Qabalan, chief of military security for Beirut;

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
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*Hasan Hashem . . . key contender for power within Amal.*

deal with Amal but realize that Barri is under pressure from the more extreme Shia organizations to maintain his Shia credentials by continuing to confront Israel.

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Barri is vulnerable to the charge that he often pursues his own interests at the expense of the Shia community. Moderate and extremist clerical opponents of Barri accuse him of serving Syrian not Lebanese Shia interests in Lebanon. They argue that his militia's attacks on the Sunnis and their Palestinian allies in West Beirut last spring is a case in point. They point out that his alliance with the leftist forces of Walid Jumblatt, although shaky and unpredictable at times, reinforces the secular image and direction of Amal under his leadership.

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teachings of Imam Musa Sadr. Barri is also vulnerable on his policy toward Israel. He has advocated a militant stance only to achieve the full liberation of Lebanon's southern territories. Unlike Hizballah, Barri has shown little interest in carrying the struggle into Israel. He realizes this would bring Israeli military retaliation against southern Shia villages, which would prompt additional flows of Shia refugees to overcrowded South Beirut.

The threat of assassination by Hizballah elements has forced Barri to become extremely conscious of security in the past year. He is known to have barricaded himself in his residence for fear of being assassinated. This did not prevent him, however, from showing up in Baalabakk, deep in Hizballah's heartland, in early September to deliver a speech commemorating the disappearance of Musa Sadr and to criticize openly Iran's role in Lebanon.

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Barri argues that the problem of the south would not exist had it not been for the Palestinians. He insists on eliminating the incentive for Israeli retaliation by denying the Palestinians or the Hizballah freedom to operate there. But sensing an erosion in support for his policy toward Israel, Barri has adopted more militant rhetoric over the past year to recoup his political losses and maintain credibility as a paramount Shia leader. These setbacks include:

Barri's Political Background

Barri's ascendance to power was not coincidental. He was a protege and confidant of Imam Musa Sadr. Barri quickly rose through Amal's ranks following his appointment as the movement's attorney, a position that introduced him to the inner workings of Amal's various cells and bureaus as well as to its financial and legal transactions.

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- His inability to extract more concessions from President Amin Gemayel and the Christian Lebanese Forces militia.
- His failure to transform the victory of his Amal militia over the Lebanese Army in February 1984 into concrete political gains for the Shia community.
- His inability to force Israel to relinquish its security zone in southern Lebanon.

Two years after the disappearance of Musa Sadr, Barri succeeded, with Syrian complicity, in seizing the reins of power of Amal from Husayn Husayni, a traditional Shia notable from the Bekaa Valley. The election of Barri, a southerner, to the leadership of Amal was a consequence of the movement's development out of the economic, political, and social ills in southern Lebanon. It also signified the triumph of southern Lebanese over their traditional political rivals in the Bekaa. Barri's current role as Minister of

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Barri is frustrated over his failure to bring about the demise of the Israeli-supported Army of South Lebanon and Amal's lack of control over all of the south. The Israelis will not give up their security zone until they are satisfied that they will not be threatened from the north. They would like to strike a

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State for the South and Reconstruction gives him an opportunity to strengthen his position among skeptics in the Shia community who accuse him of transforming Amal into a modern, urban-oriented political institution. [redacted]

Barri is first and foremost a politician. He insists that Amal is primarily a people's movement and that the military wing is secondary to the political, informational, educational, cultural, social, economic, and labor wings. As if to emphasize the nonsectarian nature of Amal under his leadership, Barri insists that there is no difference between a deprived Shiite and a deprived Maronite. Barri's wife is involved in philanthropic activities helping the muhajjreen, the rural emigres from southern Lebanon. [redacted]

Political Style and Attitudes

For now Barri is viewed as the legitimate leader of Amal by both his foes and his supporters. Despite his shortcomings, he retains power because he is seen as the only leader capable of keeping the organization intact, and no one has been able to build a strong enough coalition to pose a serious challenge to his authority. Outside Amal, the Iranians and the Hizballah supporters have failed to produce an alternative to Barri. His ability to deal with a variety of political forces and personalities on the Lebanese and international scenes appears to be central to his survival. [redacted]

Last summer's TWA hijacking indicates some of the limits of Barri's influence. He succeeded in voicing the Shia community's grievances about Israel's detention of Shias from southern Lebanon, but he appeared incapable of extricating himself from the controversial political position that he took regarding the hostages. In the end, he was forced to rely on Syrian assistance to resolve the crisis. [redacted]

Barri's political style is dictatorial. He uses his position as the Shia warlord to co-opt, sideline, and punish opponents. Barri believes that achieving a political consensus within the Lebanese Shia community is unnecessary so long as he addresses the material and security needs of its members. Barri often employs coercion, manipulation, and arm twisting to get his adherents to abide by his decisions. [redacted]

Barri prides himself on being instrumental in the expulsion of the Christian-dominated Lebanese Army from West Beirut in February 1984 and often praises his tactical alliance with Druze militia leader Walid Jumblatt as necessary and proper. Although Jumblatt supported Barri's efforts to contain the power of the Sunni Nasirite militia in West Beirut, he played a neutral role in the Amal militia attacks on the Palestinian camps in the capital. [redacted]

In Amal and the Shia community, Barri has consistently supported the secularization of the Lebanese state, has called for a larger Shia share of the political pie, and has opposed the role of religious leaders in the political future of the country. He rejects the idea of an Islamic state for Lebanon, a position that has put him on a collision course with the Hizballah. On this important issue he has drawn the wrath of moderate Shia religious leaders such as Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams-al-Din, vice president of the Higher Shia Council, and Shaykh Abd al-Amir Qabalan, the Ja'afari Mufti of Sidon:

- Shams-al-Din on one occasion accused Barri of collusion with the United States and called upon Barri to be more accommodating toward both the Palestinians and the West Beirut Sunni population.
- Press reports indicate that Mufti Qabalan has implied that Barri may have violated the spirit of Amal's compact when he ordered the attack on the Palestinians. Article 7 of the compact alludes to the special relationship between the Palestinians and Amal.

[redacted]

Barri maintains links to the United States and is considered friendly toward the West. Barri comes from humble origins and prefers a secular, Western lifestyle. He is reported to have told Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, the Hizballah

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[Redacted]

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Abd al-Amir Qabalan ... claims Barri violated Amal compact when his militia attacked Palestinian camps in Beirut. [Redacted]



Iran for its part continues to accuse Barri's loyalists of harassing the Lebanese Shia clergy, especially in the south. It is demanding that Amal declare itself a political rather than an Islamic Shia movement.

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spiritual leader, that he prefers Beirut to maintain its cosmopolitan, Western-oriented flavor. Barri has visited the United States and maintains some contact with his former wife and six children in Dearborn, Michigan. Barri has resident alien status but has not met the residency requirement as prescribed by US law. [Redacted]

Relations With Syria and Iran

Barri believes his Syrian link is necessary to continue Amal's military struggle in Lebanon and urges a more aggressive political role for Syria in solving his country's problems. Barri has become increasingly dependent on Syrian arms shipments as evidenced by the delivery of T-54 tanks to the Amal militia in late August. The Syrians want Barri to remain strong enough to carry out their policies in Lebanon, but weak enough to keep him under their direct control. [Redacted]

Barri's close relations with Syria make him a target of severe criticism from Hizballah sympathizers within Amal, who accuse him of being hostile toward Iran.

[Redacted]

Barri claims that Iran has ignored Libyan culpability in the disappearance of Musa Sadr. He has warned Iran that, if it does not stand by him now, it may not have a chance to do so when Amal seizes power in Lebanon. [Redacted]

Outlook

Barri must continue to rely on Syrian support if he is to retain his leadership post. Barri will have difficulty maintaining control of Amal because it is a movement composed of many different groups and factions. His reliance on persuasion, coercion, co-optation, or force to get Amal adherents to support his decisions will be increasingly challenged by Hizballah. Monetary rewards and outright bribes given by Barri to individual militias and rank-and-file members ultimately may prove insufficient to maintain their allegiance to him. [Redacted]

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In the near term, however, the Shia community is unlikely to come up with an alternative to Barri. Since the early 1970s, Amal has become identified with the Lebanese Shiite community. Barri benefits from and exploits Amal's historical background as the only broad-based Shia movement, its spiritual connection with Imam Musa Sadr, and the material and military needs of the individual members. [Redacted]

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Barri's proven skills as a manager and coordinator probably make him indispensable in the short run, despite the growing strength of Hizballah. He will probably retain leadership if his claim to moral legitimacy as Sadr's successor continues to be accepted by the mainstream Shia community. Material support from middle- and upper-class Shiites who resent the encroachment of Hizballah's fundamentalist practices will buttress Barri's popularity and staying power. [Redacted]

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