




Directorate of
Intelligence

MASTER FILE COPY
DO NOT GIVE OUT
OR MARK ON

Top Secret

25X1



**Near East and
South Asia Review**



25X1

Supplement
27 September 1985

Top Secret

NESA NESAR 85-021JX

27 September 1985

25X1

Copy 260

Page Denied

Top Secret



25X1

Near East and South Asia Review 


25X1

Supplement

27 September 1985


Page

Articles




1

25X1



5

25X1

Growing domestic discontent with Qadhafi's political and economic policies strengthens the chance that a lone gunman will assassinate him, and, if he is succeeded by members of his tribe, they could turn to the West for economic assistance and, in return, could curtail Libyan support for subversion against Western interests. 

25X1


Israel-Syria: Cautious Warriors 

9

25X1



25X1

The chances of an intentional major outbreak of fighting between Israeli and Syrian forces in Lebanon or elsewhere are slight for at least the next year, but the potential for limited conflict clearly exists because of the volatile situation in Lebanon. 

25X1


Syria's Offensive Chemical Warfare Capability 

15

25X1



25X1

Syria has developed a chemical weapons stockpile of significant size since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, but it views use of chemical weapons as a last resort either in an all-out war with Israel if defeat appears imminent, or if it believes an enemy is about to launch a chemical warfare attack. 

25X1



25X1

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Iran: Acquiring a Chemical Warfare Capability

19


25X1



25X1

Spurred by the demands of the war with Iraq, Iran has intensified its development of a chemical weapons program. Iran's threat to retaliate for any Iraqi use of chemical weapons will not deter Baghdad, but will instead increase the likelihood of a chemical exchange.

25X1



25X1

Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items will be designated as noncoordinated views. Comments may be directed to the authors,

25X1

Top Secret

NESA NESAR 85-021JX

27 September 1985



25X1

25X1

Page Denied

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied


Top Secret




25X1



25X1


Growing domestic discontent with Qadhafi's political and economic policies strengthens the chance that a lone gunman will assassinate him. In our view, Qadhafi's removal would be followed by a period of intense and possibly bloody political maneuvering for control. Qadhafi's departure also would have significant implications for US interests. In the likely event that Qadhafi is succeeded by members of his tribe, we believe that the new regime's initial concern will be to ease widespread grumbling over deteriorating economic conditions. In support of this objective, Libya's new leaders could turn to the West for increased imports of consumer goods and other economic assistance. Qadhafi's successors might offer to reciprocate Western assistance by curtailing costly Libyan support for subversion against Western interests worldwide. In our view, however, Libyan foreign policies would continue to emphasize Tripoli's arms supply relationship with the Soviet Union as well as an anti-US bias on regional issues. 

would have widespread popular support in Libya. Other motivations might include:

- A personal sense of grievance emanating from the killing of a relative or close friend by Qadhafi's security forces or by extremists in the Revolutionary Committees.
- Outrage over Qadhafi's unorthodox interpretation of Islam, his abuse of the pilgrimage to Mecca over the past two years to smuggle arms and explosives into Saudi Arabia and to stage violent demonstrations there, and last year's hanging of students on television during Ramadan, the Muslim holy month. 



25X1

Members of Qadhafi's tribe, in our view, are best placed to take power immediately following his



25X1
25X1

Background

We judge that Qadhafi's prospects for survival are poorer now than at any time since he came to power 16 years ago.  mismanaged socialist economic policies, economic constraints imposed by the soft oil market, and wasteful spending in support of radical causes worldwide are seriously eroding the relatively high standard of living that was regarded by most Libyans as one of the principal fruits of Qadhafi's revolution. These developments, in our view, combined with widely resented abuses of power by Qadhafi's extremist supporters, are creating a political climate that encourages plotting by Qadhafi's many opponents and increases their chances of penetrating his elaborate security network. 

Although Hunaysh is Qadhafi's choice as his successor, we believe several other tribesmen would challenge any effort he made to consolidate power. Two tribesmen who are particularly ambitious are Qadhafi's cousins Ahmad Qadhaf al-Dam, who serves as the Libyan leader's most trusted diplomatic envoy, and Col. Hasan Ashkal, who is assigned to some of

25X1

25X1

Who Takes Power?

In our judgment, Qadhafi's ouster might be accomplished by a lone assassin believing his action

Top Secret

NESA NESAR 85-021JX


27 September 1985

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Libya's most sensitive security posts. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

A darkhorse candidate might be another Qadhafi cousin, Mas'ud Abd al-Hafiz, a career military officer. In our view, he could try to use contacts developed during prestige command assignments to gain support from other senior officers. [Redacted]

In addition, prestigious members of the 11-man Free Officers' group that participated in the 1969 coup that brought Qadhafi to power might regard Qadhafi's assassination as an opportunity to assume power. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Challenge From Outsiders

Sustained political infighting among members of the Qadhafi tribe would lessen their chances for retaining power, in our view. Reporting from unclassified sources indicates the Qadhafi tribe is a relatively small one whose status in Libya is based almost entirely on Qadhafi's leadership. We believe a divisive internal power struggle would increase the Qadhafi tribe's vulnerability to criticism by domestic opponents, weaken its control over the security forces, and encourage plotters to try to remove them. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

In our view, Qadhafi's principal deputy, Abd al-Salam Jallud, is the strongest single opponent.

[Redacted] Qadhafi has permitted Jallud to sprinkle supporters in various ministries and the military, apparently to try to buy the loyalty of Jallud's tribe, the Maghara. [Redacted]

Could the Qadhafi Tribesmen Survive?

The ability of Qadhafi's fellow tribesmen, including Hunaysh, to weather the challenges from outside the family would depend in part on their ability to co-opt their opponents. In our view, the Qadhafi tribesmen would have to choose between the Revolutionary Committees or the armed forces, [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted] We believe that a failure by the Qadhafi tribesmen to take into account the interests of Revolutionary Committee leaders could lead to armed opposition by the fanatics, who have been given authority by Qadhafi to cache some arms and munitions. It might also push the Revolutionary Committees to cement their alliance with Abd al-Salam Jallud and his supporters. On the other hand, senior officers are unlikely to tolerate a Qadhafi-dominated regime that assigned important positions to the extremists, in our view. Qadhafi's insertion of the Revolutionary Committees into the armed forces as political watchdogs, his involving the Revolutionary Committees in the People's Militia to

25X1

25X1

We believe that Libyan military officers might also try to remove the Qadhafi tribesmen. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] Another senior officer who might try to engineer a coup is Armed Forces Director General Abd al-Rahman al-Sayyid. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] al-Sayyid is popular in military circles

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret
[redacted]

25X1

build them up as a counterweight to the regular armed forces, and his reliance on the Committees to support revolutionary causes unrelated to Libyan national interests are behind the officers' opposition.

[redacted]

We believe that a protracted power struggle could prompt the Qadhafi tribesmen to try to broaden their support by inviting the return of exiled Libyan dissidents. The Qadhafi tribesmen might focus on former Free Officer Abd al-Munim al-Huni, whose refusal to participate openly in organized opposition activity has helped him maintain contacts with Libyan officials and military officers as well as popular support.

[redacted] The position of Muhammad al-Muqaryaf as leader of the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, Libya's largest and most active exile organization, makes him the other exile leader most likely to be co-opted, in our view.

There are other options open to Qadhafi tribesmen that would discourage further plotting. High on the list would be an increased emphasis on consumer welfare and backtracking on Qadhafi's disruptive economic socialization policies that have caused serious shortages of foodstuffs and consumer goods.

[redacted] at least important members of the Qadhafi tribe would reject revolution in favor of pragmatic economic reforms.

[redacted]

Implications for the United States

The focus of a government composed primarily of Qadhafi tribesmen would be a reduction of Libyan support for revolutionary causes worldwide, a domestic issue that has become troublesome even for Qadhafi. [redacted] New economic priorities would require the regime to try to improve its tarnished international reputation to facilitate increased access to Western consumer goods, foodstuffs, technology, managerial expertise, and education. This, in our judgment, would offer opportunities for the United States to reestablish full diplomatic relations and promote trade ties.

We believe, however, that the prospects for improved relations would at least initially be tempered by suspicions in Tripoli that the United States orchestrated Qadhafi's assassination. Such suspicions would reinforce the regime's fierce determination to reaffirm its nonaligned credentials and to resist strongly any temptation to move quickly toward rapprochement with Washington. The regime's anti-Western posture also would be a continuing reaction to Libya's experience as an Italian colony earlier this century.

25X1

25X1

The nonaligned posture of the new regime would mean no change in Libyan reliance on the Soviet Union for military training, advisory assistance, and advanced weaponry, in our view. The USSR's ability to influence the new regime would be reduced, however, if, as we anticipate, West European governments were willing to substantially increase arms supplies. Tripoli could cut back or even end Soviet naval visits and periodic use of Libyan facilities by Soviet reconnaissance aircraft to encourage West Europeans and the United States to offer sophisticated arms and technology previously denied Libya.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

A less likely scenario involving an alliance of the Qadhafi tribe and Revolutionary Committees probably would result in a more radical and unstable government. In our view, a continuing emphasis on unpopular revolutionary programs would prevent the new government from winning firm domestic support. In addition, participation by the revolutionaries would increase pressure on the regime to support the use of terrorism and subversion as foreign policy instruments. Although the radicals reject Soviet ideology, any US attempt to counter Libyan aggression would risk pushing Tripoli closer to Moscow. In our view, this might open up opportunities for Moscow to promote a pragmatic Libyan foreign policy that would use moderate tactics to undermine US interests in the region.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

25X1

Top Secret
[redacted]

25X1

Top Secret
[Redacted]

25X1

**Israel-Syria:
Cautious Warriors** [Redacted]

25X1

We believe the chances of an intentional major outbreak of fighting between Israeli and Syrian forces in Lebanon or elsewhere are slight for at least the next year. The Syrians will concentrate on gaining control over Lebanese factions, while the Israelis will seek to consolidate their control over their security zone in southern Lebanon and prevent Shia and Palestinian terrorist attacks across the border into northern Israel. The potential for limited conflict between the two adversaries clearly exists, however, because of the volatile situation in Lebanon. [Redacted]

The Lebanese Arena

Syria continues to strive for preeminence in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Although President Assad probably believes that time is on the Arabs' side in their struggle with Israel, he almost certainly realizes Syria alone cannot inflict a decisive military defeat on the Israelis. Instead, he appears convinced that the Arabs must strive to restrain Israel primarily through political means and sees himself as the leader in this effort. [Redacted]

Lebanon figures prominently in Assad's campaign against Israel. [Redacted]

[Redacted] he wants to ensure that Syria, not Israel, controls the situation in Lebanon—a country that historically has been linked with Damascus and is, in Assad's view, vital to Syria's security. [Redacted]

[Redacted] and possibly limited attacks against targets in northern Israel. Suicide car bombings in the Israeli security zone carried out under the banner of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party are the most recent examples of this aggressive policy. [Redacted]

Before he can turn his full attention to the struggle with Israel, Assad must bring events in Lebanon under greater Syrian control. Ultimately, he would like to reform the Lebanese confessional political

system and restore at least a semblance of stability while preserving Syrian influence there. His more immediate objectives include:

- Rooting out and destroying remaining pro-Arafat Palestinian elements in Lebanon and preventing the return of pro-Arafat contingents.
- Strengthening the hand of the Shia Amal movement vis-a-vis the radical Hizballah.
- Forcing Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, who has been cautiously pursuing independent relations with the USSR, to be more supportive of Syrian policies.¹
- Driving the Army of South Lebanon out of the Jazzin area.
- Reducing intercommunal violence, especially in Beirut. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Assad has made little progress in pursuing his objectives. The latest round of violence in Beirut in August was one of the worst in years. Damascus has been working behind the scenes to prevent a major flareup among Shia, Palestinian, and Sunni militias in Sidon, but tensions remain. All of the ingredients exist there for another "war of the camps." Observers believe that an outbreak of violence in Sidon would encourage General Lahad's Army of South Lebanon to attempt to recapture Christian villages east of Sidon that were vacated last spring. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Assad will attempt to reassert his control over his Palestinian clients. He will also strive to prevent a permanent reconciliation among pro- and anti-Arafat elements. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Near-Term Prospects for Syrian-Israeli Conflict

Assad wants to avoid a war with Israel that would result in a humiliating defeat and domestic

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Top Secret
NESAR NESAR 85-021JX
[Redacted]
27 September 1985

25X1

Page Denied

Top Secret
[redacted]

25X1

Syrian Troop Withdrawal

Despite the continuing factional violence, Assad has begun to pull troops out of Lebanon. In June there were nearly 60,000 Syrian troops in the country or on the border, but the withdrawal of the 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions, major elements of the 11th Armored Division, and several combat support units reduced this figure to about 30,000. According to

[redacted] units of the new 14th Airborne Division have entered Lebanon to offset the removal of regular ground force units. Damascus could quickly reinforce its troops in Lebanon if the need arose because Syrian units are constantly manned at a relatively high level and many are stationed near the Lebanese border.

[redacted]

This troop reduction is driven by several factors. It mirrors Assad's determination not to become entangled in Lebanon by using Syrian soldiers to quell sectarian violence. The partial withdrawal also reflects the fact that Israel has removed most of its

troops from Lebanon—less than 2,000 remain in the security zone Israel maintains in southern Lebanon—thereby somewhat allaying Syrian fears.

Furthermore, the return of these troops provides Assad with more forces for use in intimidating Jordan if King Hussein pursues peace with Israel too vigorously. [redacted]

25X1
25X1

Syria can now concentrate on improving the readiness and combat efficiency of its ground forces. [redacted]

25X1
25X1

[redacted]

25X1

[redacted] The withdrawal also will save Syria money and facilitate the reorganization and modernization of Syrian ground forces. [redacted]

25X1
25X1

recriminations. Ever since Egypt decided to make peace with Israel, the Israelis have been free to concentrate most of their formidable combat power against Syria. We believe only an unexpected breakthrough in peace negotiations between Israel on the one hand and Arafat and King Hussein on the other might cause Assad to initiate even limited hostilities against Israel. [redacted]

The Peres government will not seek to embroil Syria in any direct confrontation but will concentrate on helping the Israeli armed forces to recover from the ravages of three years of war in Lebanon. Israel, however, would counter any major Syrian movement southward in Lebanon, any major attack on Israeli troops in the security zone, or any attack on northern Israel that is directly traceable to the Syrians. [redacted]

Over the next several months, Israel will concentrate on strengthening the Army of South Lebanon and preventing attacks on northern Israel. The Israelis

have stated repeatedly that they have no intention of reentering Lebanon with major units, but they will not hesitate to mount ground or air operations north of the security zone to head off guerrilla operations or retaliate for attacks. [redacted]

25X1

The volatile situation in Lebanon could still spark limited clashes between the two antagonists. Syrian-backed attacks by Shia and Palestinian guerrillas on Israeli and Army of South Lebanon troops in the security zone or possibly on settlements in northern Israel risk punitive Israeli strikes that could lead to limited conflict. Nevertheless, Assad probably will feel compelled to sponsor attacks to maintain Syria's credibility as the premier Arab confrontation state.

[redacted]

25X1

25X1

Top Secret
[redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Danger of Miscalculation

If Damascus were to underwrite a guerrilla raid that resulted in a major loss of life and Israel traced the attack to Syria, Israel would retaliate against Syrian targets in Lebanon and might also attack targets in Syria. In response Syria would probably move to defend its units and facilities in Lebanon against retaliatory strikes and would certainly do so if the strikes were aimed at targets in Syria.² We believe Syria recognizes that Israeli retaliation would be swift and that Damascus will take great pains to mask its support of major guerrilla operations. [Redacted]

There also is a modest but continual danger of air clashes. The Israelis continue to assert their right to operate in the skies over Lebanon, conducting aerial reconnaissance operations there—including many along the Lebanese-Syrian border—almost on a daily basis. Each reconnaissance aircraft is accompanied by a combat air patrol that guards against would-be attackers. If a reconnaissance aircraft entered Syrian airspace in any substantial way, the Syrians would attempt to shoot it down. The Israelis would almost certainly retaliate for a shootdown by attacking military targets in Syria, and Syria would be obliged to defend itself. [Redacted]

The Syrians also are considering limited military operations in Lebanon that might elicit an Israeli military response. For months Damascus has wanted the Israeli-backed Army of South Lebanon to withdraw from Jazzin—the last Christian stronghold in central Lebanon. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Assad may have to use Syrian forces to secure Jazzin. The Syrians probably could displace the lightly armed Army of South Lebanon without too much trouble if they committed several heavily armed battalions to the task. [Redacted]

² Israel has warned Syria that it would not tolerate the reintroduction of such tactical air defense missiles into Lebanon as the SA-6 and SA-8 that can defend major ground force units. By and large, Syria has heeded this warning, although on occasion it has stationed SA-8s just across the border in Lebanon. It has never deployed them south of the Beirut-Damascus highway. Syrian units in Lebanon rely mainly on short-range weapons—SA-7s, SA-9s, and ZSU-23-4 self-propelled air defense guns—for protection against enemy aircraft. [Redacted]

An assault on Jazzin, however, might be misinterpreted by Israel and provoke a military response. Jazzin is protected to the east by the Jabal al Baruk ridge. If Syria sent troops around the eastern flank of the ridge to swing north for an attack on Jazzin, Israel might perceive the movement as being directed at Israel and attack the units as they moved south in the valley. Knowing that this sort of misunderstanding could arise, the Syrians might choose instead to attack Jazzin from the north using ground units. A surprise helicopter-borne assault might dislodge Lahad's forces quickly, but such an operation might also be misinterpreted by the Israelis as being directed at them, even if the units involved staged through the Beirut area. [Redacted]

Another Syrian operation in Lebanon that might result in a clash with the Israelis involves military construction in the Bekaa Valley. In any future general war between Syria and Israel, Damascus probably expects the Israelis to attempt to drive northward up the Bekaa and turn toward Damascus. The ease with which Israeli armored columns moved up the valley in 1982 and threatened to cut the Beirut-Damascus highway probably left Assad determined to prevent a recurrence. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

The Israelis razed most fortifications and facilities of military value when they withdrew from their northernmost positions in the valley last spring, and a Syrian program to construct major fortifications or obstacles could trigger an Israeli attack. If the Syrians limit their activities to the construction of modest obstacles in the area they occupied before June 1982, the Israelis may tolerate the situation for the time being, believing that they could overcome the obstacles fairly easily during a campaign. [Redacted]

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Derailing the Peace Process

If peace negotiations between Israel on the one hand and Jordan and the Palestinians on the other were to gain substantial momentum, Assad would attempt to derail them. He probably would first choose to step up substantially terrorist attacks in the Israeli security zone and possibly limited rocket attacks into northern Israel—using Lebanese client forces. Such attacks would strengthen the hand of Israeli hardliners who oppose peace negotiations. Assad also could pursue other more direct, but riskier, options by initiating an open confrontation with the Israelis in Lebanon using ground or air forces, or by seriously violating the force limitation agreement on the Golan Heights. [redacted]

Assad, in our view, would hope that the resulting tension or clashes would disrupt or derail any negotiations. At a minimum, neither Hussein nor Arafat could muster moderate Arab support while an Arab state was engaged in open conflict with Israel. [redacted]

Alternatively, Assad might choose to intimidate Jordan into withdrawing from the negotiations by threatening to invade, as he did in November 1980, or by undertaking a terrorist campaign aimed at the royal family and Hussein's supporters. He might also move against Arafat and his lieutenants. [redacted]

Longer Range Prospects for Conflict

As long as Israel's southern border is secure, we do not believe Assad would initiate a major military confrontation with Israel. He is much more likely to continue using terrorists recruited from Lebanese client groups. Syria will continue to pursue military parity with Israel because the Syrians almost certainly believe redressing the present imbalance of forces would restrain Israeli aggression and afford Syria a wider range of foreign policy options in the region. [redacted]

Syria cannot hope to achieve parity during this century. As Syrian force expansion and modernization progresses, the probability increases that Damascus might miscalculate the balance of forces and prematurely attempt military demonstrations or operations against Israel, thus precipitating a conflict. In the next couple of years Syria might believe that its air defense forces had



25X1

25X1



25X1

25X1

The continuing introduction into Syrian forces of late-model Soviet weapons such as the improved T-72 tank and the improved MIG-23 Flogger G (both shown here with Soviet markings) could eventually make Syria overconfident of its improving military capabilities. [redacted]

25X1


Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret




25X6

improved to the point that it could openly take credit for a major terrorist attack on Israel and still deter an Israeli retaliatory strike. We believe that the Israelis would retaliate, despite improvements in Syrian air defense forces. The risk of such a miscalculation would probably rise if Assad were removed from the scene. 

25X1

25X6



Top Secret



25X1

Top Secret
[Redacted]

25X1

Syria's Offensive Chemical Warfare Capability [Redacted]

25X1

Syria has developed a chemical weapons stockpile of significant size since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. We believe Syria has produced indigenously some binary-type chemical munitions, principally aerial bombs and SCUD warheads, to be filled with the nerve agent sarin if a decision were made to use them. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

initially on the military expertise of a small number of senior Syrian military officers who led ostensibly defensive chemical warfare units. In 1973, for example, Brig. Gen. A'dib Trabzali—an expert on Soviet chemical warfare doctrine and head of the Syrian Army's Chemical Administration Branch—was charged with the responsibility of developing an offensive chemical warfare capability for Syria. Trabzali and others may have helped identify suitable delivery systems for lethal chemical agents and may have been charged with training Syrian chemical warfare units to handle such agents. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Origin of Syrian CW Capability

Syrian resolve to develop an indigenous chemical warfare (CW) production capability intensified in the final days of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, when the Syrians believed that the fall of Damascus to advancing Israeli forces was imminent. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Syria's chemical munitions inventory then consisted of aerial bombs and artillery rounds, which probably were provided by Egypt in 1973. [Redacted]

Syria's suspicions that Egypt and Israel were engaged in CW research may have spurred its own CW program. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Syria's CW Research Center

The chemistry department of the Centre d'Etude et Recherche Scientifique (CERS), headquartered in Damascus, is responsible for Syria's chemical weapons research. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

CERS is subordinate to the Syrian Ministry of Defense and functions as Syria's authority for weapon systems research and development [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] The center hides its chemical warfare research activities in agricultural and medical research programs. The small CERS staff is involved in many projects that probably have no direct connection with chemical weapons research, such as nuclear technology, aviation (particularly drone) technology, surface-to-surface missiles, electronics, optics, and explosives. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

Development of the CW Program

Syria's chemical weapons development program, although a closely guarded secret, probably relied

Top Secret
NESAR NESAR 85-021JX
[Redacted]
27 September 1985

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

The Syrian Army's Defensive Chemical Warfare Capabilities

Syria has considered the prospect of chemical warfare a serious threat for more than 20 years, and the measures it has taken during that time to provide its troops with defensive training and equipment laid the foundation for subsequent development of an offensive capability. The Syrian Army has, since the 1960s, worked closely with Soviet military advisers to train and equip defensive chemical units, which are assigned to all of its major elements. As a result, most Syrian military personnel probably have at least a basic understanding of the uses and effects of chemical weapons and how to protect themselves.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Units of the Army's 28th Chemical Regiment are assigned to the Army General Headquarters, the divisions, and maneuver brigades. These elements are officially charged with providing smoke concealment for maneuvering forces, and with destroying enemy forces and materiel with flamethrowers. Below the brigade level, chemical units are assigned as needed by the brigade commander. [Redacted]

Chemical Agent Production Process

[Redacted]

Each of these precursors is relatively nontoxic and can be stored without the elaborate safety precautions needed for lethal chemical agents. [Redacted]

[Redacted] In contrast, traditional unitary chemical weapons are filled directly with the actual chemical agent and stored until the weapon is used. Unitary weapons are dangerous because they frequently develop leaks over time and require elaborate handling and alarm systems, as well as frequent inspection. In addition to being safer, binary weapons allow more political control over their use, since the chemicals must be mixed before a weapon can be fired. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1
25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

Top Secret


[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret



25X1




2525X1

25X1

25X1



25X1

We estimate that Syria was ready to begin full-scale production of the DF precursor to sarin, and ultimately the nerve agent itself, by the beginning of the 1980s. 


25X1

25X1

25X1



25X1

In the years since Syria began its CW program, some Syrian military personnel have heard rumors of chemical weapons, but few apparently have detailed knowledge. 

25X1




25X1



25X1

25X1:1



25X1

25X1

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Syria probably selected the SCUD missile as its primary means of launching a chemical attack because it has a much greater range than the FROG or SS-21, the only other surface-to-surface missiles in Syria. Israeli cities and military installations—probably the primary targets of Syria's CW program—are well within the SCUD-B missile's 300-kilometer maximum effective range. [Redacted]

We believe President Assad controls the development, testing, storage, and use of all chemical weapons in Syria. As long as he is in power, there probably is little chance that Syria would try to surprise Israel by using chemical weapons early in a war because of the threat of Israeli retaliation. In the event of Assad's death or removal from power, a successor regime—eager to establish its legitimacy—probably would seek to prevent chemical weapons from falling into the hands of potential opponents. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

Syria's intentions regarding its surplus chemical weapons are unclear. Assad probably considers the extra weapons as a safeguard against more effective international trade restrictions on the sale of chemicals and materiel with CW-related uses to Syria. [Redacted]

25X1

Future Developments

Syria probably will apply its chemical weapons research to conventional artillery systems within the next five years. CERS probably already has done this with the Soviet-made BM-21 rocket, which has twice the range (20.5 kilometers) of other rockets in Syria. The BM-21 would be a particularly suitable delivery system for sarin because it has excellent mobility, its rockets spin during flight thereby mixing the nerve agent, and its 40 rounds can quickly disperse the nerve agent over a large area. [Redacted]

Outlook

Syria's capability to wage chemical warfare will be a factor in the next major Middle East war involving Syria—regardless of whether Damascus uses this weapon. In evaluating their respective military strengths and weaknesses, parties to the conflict cannot afford to forget this new factor. Countries concerned about Syria's CW capability may decide that their only recourse is to develop a retaliatory chemical capability themselves or, at least, to strengthen their defensive CW capabilities. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Syria may also develop a persistent chemical agent because Assad probably wants the flexibility it would provide. A persistent agent, unlike sarin, can be used to neutralize enemy rear areas that the attackers do not plan to occupy immediately. If it does undertake this project, Syria probably will develop the persistent agent soman or VX as a binary weapon. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Intentions

We believe Syria views the use of chemical weapons as a last resort either in an all-out war with Israel if its own defeat appeared imminent or if it believed an enemy was about to launch a chemical warfare attack. The prospect of chemical warfare almost certainly remains abhorrent to Syria, despite the possibility that Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Iran may have lowered the threshold for chemical warfare in future Middle East conflicts. [Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Iran: Acquiring a Chemical Warfare Capability [Redacted]

25X1

Spurred by the demands of the war with Iraq, Iran has intensified its development of a chemical weapons program. Tehran's initial emphasis was on defensive equipment, but it now has a growing interest in offensive chemical weapons. Moreover, the Iranian regime's reluctance to use chemical weapons on the battlefield may be diminishing. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

In the mid-1970s, Iran placed little emphasis on chemical warfare, although some steps were taken to improve the protective posture of the Iranian military. The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war and Iraq's sporadic use of riot-control agents during the first two years of the fighting led Iran to increase its defensive chemical warfare capability. Tehran began purchasing additional protective equipment, including gas masks, decontamination equipment, and medical supplies. Iraq's subsequent use of lethal chemical agents beginning in 1983 was a major impetus behind the initiation of an Iranian chemical weapons program. [Redacted]

25X1

Iranian CW Production

[Redacted]

[Redacted] we believe that Iran has acquired a limited capability and is making a major effort to develop and expand its chemical warfare program. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] Iran has Western-trained chemists and engineers from its domestic petroleum industry capable of installing and operating facilities to produce chemical warfare agents. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

NESA NESAR 85-021JX

[Redacted]
27 September 1985

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

The Iranians lack experience in producing chemical weapons, but this deficiency could be eased through an exchange of technical information with friendly nations, such as North Korea and Syria, or by contracting with foreign chemical weapons experts.

[Redacted]

Iranian use of chemical warfare would still be reluctant and against only a few targets. Tehran would lose the propaganda advantage it now possesses for having abstained from the use of chemical weapons. The regime may also believe that it would be more severely condemned than Iraq has been for resorting to chemical warfare. Moreover, the Iranian stockpile and delivery capabilities are probably insufficient for extensive tactical use. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Outlook

Tehran's mounting frustrations over the muted international response to Iraq's use of chemical weapons may be leading Iran to decide to use them as well, at least in retaliation. In April, Iranian spokesmen publicly reiterated their threat to retaliate for any Iraqi use of chemical weapons. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Iran's threat to retaliate with chemical weapons is unlikely to deter Iraq from engaging in chemical warfare. Instead, Tehran's possession of such weapons increases the likelihood of a chemical exchange on the frontlines. There is a lesser, but significant, possibility that such an exchange might involve civilian targets as well. [Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

Top Secret

25X1



Top Secret