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**Near East and  
South Asia Review**

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**Israel: Moving to the Right?** [Redacted]

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Recent Israeli public opinion polls indicate growing support for hardline parties to the right of Likud, a trend strongly influenced by the national unity government's perceived failure to deal credibly with pressing foreign and domestic problems. [Redacted]

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**The Palestinian Diaspora: Perspectives on Status and Prospects in the Arab World** [Redacted]

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Palestinians working in Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia were surveyed on the way they were treated by their host governments, their economic prospects and plans, political activities, attitudes toward the PLO, the US role in the Middle East peace process, and the issue of a separate homeland. This article summarizes the results in Jordan and Egypt. [Redacted]

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**Sudanese People's Liberation Army—Looking for African Help** [Redacted]

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The southern Sudanese People's Liberation Army, now in its third year of insurrection against the central government, is seeking aid from Sudan's neighbors to widen its foreign support and diversify its bases of operation, but African leaders so far have not provided the support the SPLA expected. [Redacted]

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**Sudan: Hassan El Turabi and the Muslim Brotherhood** [Redacted] 19

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Hassan El Turabi's faction of the Muslim Brotherhood—the Islamic National Front—is still an important political force in Sudan despite its isolation following the coup on 6 April, and the ruling Military Council will try to keep the front's support as a balance to leftist elements in Sudan. [Redacted]

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**Tamil Identity in Sri Lanka** [Redacted] 23

[Redacted]

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Since Sri Lanka was granted independence in 1948, most Tamils have become more aware of their ethnic identity, especially as the majority Sinhalese have become more assertive in imposing their language and religion as the national norm, but no single group of Tamils has been able to define Tamil identity to the satisfaction of all Tamils. [Redacted]

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*Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items will be designated as noncoordinated views.* [Redacted]

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## Israel: Moving to the Right?

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Recent Israeli public opinion polls indicate growing support for hardline parties to the right of Likud, a trend strongly influenced by the national unity government's perceived failure to deal credibly with pressing foreign and domestic problems. Far-right parties such as the ultranationalist Tehiya-Tzomet and Meir Kahane's Kach are attracting more supporters by offering direct, simplistic solutions particularly attractive to Sephardi voters and younger, native-born Israelis. In the long run, neither party is likely to offer serious competition to Likud, but the increased public support for the far right probably will encourage Likud leaders to limit the Labor Party's greater flexibility on Arab-Israeli issues in hopes of regaining the support of disaffected rightwing voters.

### Polls

Public opinion polls commissioned by the daily newspaper *Maariv* in June suggest that Israelis are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the unity government and its leaders. These polls suggest that the growth in support for far-right parties has come at the expense of Likud:

- According to one such poll, 56 percent of the Israeli public is dissatisfied with the unity government's handling of political issues. This was the first time since last year's parliamentary election that a majority of Israelis expressed dissatisfaction with the government.
- Prime Minister Peres's personal popularity also declined following several months of steady gains.
- Another poll indicates that the far-right parties of Tehiya-Tzomet and Kach are attracting some disenchanted segments of the Israeli public. The poll showed a combined growth of five Knesset seats for these parties if an early election were called, and a stabilization of the Likud's backing after several months of declining popularity. This increased support for the far-right parties means that their strength now approaches 10 percent of the electorate.

- A recent survey by the Van Leer Institute found that 40 percent of Israel's native-born youth—of both Sephardi and Ashkenazi origin—supported Kahane or his ideas, and 11 percent of these would vote for Kach in an election to the Knesset.

### Why a Shift to the Right?

The recent polls show that the far-right parties have attracted more followers even though the overwhelming majority of the Israeli electorate continues to support the mainstream Likud and Labor parties and their allies. We believe the polls demonstrate that the government's credibility has been hurt by its late May agreement to exchange over 1,000 Palestinian prisoners for three Israeli prisoners of war and by ineffective efforts thus far to deal with Israel's economic crisis. Other factors may also account for the far right's gains:

- A deep-seated perception that Labor and Likud are "soft" on key foreign policy and security issues. Tehiya-Tzomet and Kach supporters are convinced Labor would be willing to "surrender" much of the West Bank as part of a peace settlement with Jordan and are concerned that neither Labor nor Likud is prepared to act with sufficient toughness to preserve the security of Israel's northern border. The recent hijacking of TWA flight 847 is widely believed to have been encouraged by the earlier prisoner exchange carried out by the unity government.
- Uncertainties about the longevity of the national unity government and the effectiveness of its leadership. Few Labor or Likud personalities have captured the imagination of Sephardi and younger, native-born Israeli voters, who still see former Prime Minister Menachem Begin as the only leader strong enough to lead the country.

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### ***Tehiya-Tzomet and Kach Constituencies***

***Kach.*** In last year's election, Kahane won 26,000 votes due, in large part, to his popularity among Sephardi Jews, who comprise almost half of the Israeli electorate. The Kach party performed well in Sephardi strongholds including smaller development towns, Jerusalem's poor neighborhoods, and moshav settlements where Sephardi voters are the majority. In addition, Kach received over 3 percent of the votes cast in religious moshavs, 2.5 percent of the military vote, and 5 percent of the West Bank settler vote. Kahane's platform—aggressively trumpeted by the party faithful—maintains that the Arab population of Israel and the West Bank threatens Jewish predominance in the area and that the Arabs should be encouraged to leave or else accept second-class citizenship. [redacted]

***Tehiya-Tzomet.*** Benefited in the election by co-opting former Army Chief of Staff Eitan and his supporters. Although the party has strong ties with leading figures in Herut, particularly Ariel Sharon, Tehiya-Tzomet gained votes at the expense of Likud. The party enjoys particularly strong support among Jewish settlers on the West Bank. [redacted]

- A belief by far-right voters that convicted Jewish underground members should be pardoned by the government and treated as patriots.

### **Response to Kach**

Likud and Labor both perceive Kahane as a threat, although for quite different reasons. Labor sees Kahane as promoting antidemocratic values, and Likud worries that it may be losing voters to him.

Labor and Likud have joined on occasion in publicly condemning Kahane's anti-Arab provocations and worked together to isolate him in the Knesset. With their strong support, the Knesset voted in December to curtail Kahane's freedom of movement to prevent him from entering Arab towns and inciting unrest.

On 9 July, moreover, the Knesset gave preliminary approval to a draft bill that would restrict the political activities of extremist parties by excluding from

Knesset elections parties that incite racism. Most Likud members of the Knesset recognize they are losing supporters to Kahane and are particularly supportive of the proposed legislation.

On 25 July, a Kach-dominated coalition took power in the West Bank local council at Qiryat Arba—pledging to fire all Arab employees—despite efforts by Deputy Prime Minister Levy, a key Likud leader, to prevent the coalition from forming. Labor Defense Minister Rabin stated to the press that the council's pledge to dismiss Arab workers was “a clear expression of discrimination” and contrary to the basic values of the state. On 29 July the Knesset finance committee voted to reduce the allocation of funds to the council to protest the continuation of the Kach-led coalition. On 31 July the council withdrew its pledge to dismiss all Arab employees.

### **Outlook**

Labor and Likud success in limiting the appeal of the far right will be determined by their ability to project a stronger appeal to Sephardi and native-born Israeli supporters of Kach and Tehiya-Tzomet. Because Labor's constituency is composed predominantly of older, middle- and upper-middle class, European-born Ashkenazi Israelis, the party probably will be unable to attract strong voter support from Sephardi and younger Israeli voters, who see Labor as insensitive to their concerns.

Likud, on the other hand, has for a generation been the choice of an ever-growing majority of Sephardi and young Israeli voters. With this in mind, Likud leaders probably consider the increased support for Kach and Tehiya-Tzomet as a passing mood among the voters reflecting recent disappointments. If an early election were called, Likud anticipates—correctly, in our judgment—that most Sephardi voters would regard it as the most credible alternative to Labor.

The growth in support for Kach and Tehiya-Tzomet does not portend a major near-term shift in voter support to far-right parties. But the evidence of

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increased support for these parties probably will feed Likud's already strong inclination to trumpet its hardline foreign policy views and thereby limit Labor's flexibility in the coalition. In so doing, Likud would aim to demonstrate its political clout in hopes of winning back disaffected rightwing voters. Under these circumstances, Labor would find it difficult to press for movement on the peace process, the Tabah dispute with Egypt, and local West Bank issues.



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## The Palestinian Diaspora: Perspectives on Status and Prospects in the Arab World

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An external contractor has surveyed Palestinians working in four Arab countries on the way they are treated by their host governments, their economic prospects and plans, political activities, attitudes toward the PLO, the US role in the Middle East peace process, and the issue of a separate homeland. In all, 299 Palestinians from diverse economic backgrounds were interviewed in 1984 in Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Twenty interviews with Middle East specialists in the United States supplemented the field research. Interview data are fleshed out with descriptions of the host countries' formal policies and informal practices for handling both their Palestinian expatriate populations and the Palestinian question as a political issue. This article summarizes material from interviews with 98 Palestinians in Jordan and 56 Palestinians working in Egypt.

Recent data on the education and occupational status of the approximately 4 million Palestinians living throughout the Arab world are lacking. If past trends persist, however, Palestinians are more highly educated than their host populations. They occupy highly specialized professional and technical jobs, and work in business, commerce, manufacturing, and general labor positions. The Palestinians were invited to these states and remain because they possess skills and experience necessary for the implementation of modern development projects and plans.

### Jordan

Over the past five to 10 years, the Palestinians in Jordan, who comprise over half of the population, have become better integrated not only economically but also socially and politically. Economic integration has proceeded rapidly because of the expansion of the private sector. Palestinian businessmen and professionals took advantage of the relatively unrestricted opportunities to open their own

**Table 1**  
**Distribution of Palestinians**  
**in Selected Arab States, 1980**<sup>a</sup>

*Thousand  
persons*

	Egypt	Jordan	Kuwait	Saudi Arabia
<b>Total</b>	<b>48.5</b> <sup>b</sup>	<b>1,160.8</b>	<b>276.4</b>	<b>127.0</b>
Male	28.7	607.1	147.3	69.2
Female	19.8	553.7	129.1	57.8

<sup>a</sup> Official census data where available or estimates.

<sup>b</sup> Recent interviews with Palestinian sources place this figure at more than 125,000 (1984): 62,000 before and after the 1948 partition; 55,000 after the 1967 war; 3,000 after the Jordanian civil war; and 6,000 in 1982. The official 1976 census reported only 29,162, a number that the *Palestinian Statistical Abstract* also reports. Unless post-1980 migration has been much higher than previously believed, the 1984 figure appears to be inflated.

businesses and contributed significantly to the Jordanian economic boom. Government job opportunities for Palestinians are more limited, especially at higher levels and in security-related positions.

The generations differ in their attitudes to Palestinian integration. Younger Palestinians and Jordanians have enjoyed a common prosperity and lack the sometimes bitter memories of Jordanian-Palestinian clashes that have divided their parents, most recently in 1970-71. Many Palestinian youths regard themselves as members of the economic elite rather than second-class citizens.

There are concerns that economic problems on the horizon will unravel bonds between the Jordanians and Palestinians and once more lead to civil strife.

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**Table 2**  
**Palestinian Occupational Structure**  
**in Selected Arab States by Category <sup>a</sup>**

	Egypt (1976)		Jordan	Kuwait (1975)		Saudi Arabia (1974)	
	<i>Number of Persons</i>	<i>Percent of Total Employed</i>		<i>Number of Persons</i>	<i>Percent of Total Employed</i>	<i>Number of Persons</i>	<i>Percent of Total Employed</i>
Professional/technical	884	16.8	NA	11,449	25.3	12,589	56.1
Administrative/managerial	230	4.4	NA	534	1.2	570	2.5
Clerical/administrative support	769	14.6	NA	7,910	17.5	1,205	5.4
Sales	932	17.7	NA	3,605	8.0	629	2.8
Services	374	7.1	NA	3,881	8.6	722	3.2
Agriculture	197	3.7	NA	848	1.9	881	3.9
Production/transportation/general labor	1,222	23.2	NA	17,041	37.5	5,875	26.1
Miscellaneous	656	12.5	NA				
Employed	5,264	100.0	NA	45,268	100.0	22,471	100.0
Unemployed	14,039 <sup>b</sup>		NA	NA		511	
<b>Total</b>	<b>19,303</b>		<b>NA</b>			<b>22,982</b>	

<sup>a</sup> Based on official census data for years indicated.

<sup>b</sup> Given the rapid growth in the Egyptian economy after 1976 and the sharp increase in employment opportunities elsewhere, this figure was no doubt considerably reduced in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Downward trends in Gulf aid, smudged type prospective declines in remittances from Jordanians working abroad, and a decline in trade with Iraq will imperil the Jordanian economy over the next several years. For many Jordanians, the old tensions remain just below the surface, and economic stresses could trigger them again. Despite this residue of the past, Palestinians in Jordan do not expect a massive return of expatriate labor from abroad and hope that integration will not unravel. [redacted]

The Jordanian Government is following a laissez-faire policy toward the prospect of absorbing thousands of returning Palestinians, based on a belief that the process will not be precipitate, that those returning

can be reintegrated, that their skills will be useful in boosting the Jordanian economy, and that their assets will help fill Jordanian investment needs. In any case, the government apparently believes it can do little ahead of time to deal with problems that might arise. [redacted]

Jordanian Palestinians are grateful to King Hussein and the Jordanian Government for granting them citizenship and providing educational and health benefits as well as economic opportunities. They appreciate Hussein and his effective leadership but avow that "He is not our King." [redacted]

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The 1979 rapprochement between Hussein and Arafat and subsequent close coordination of policy between them produced a climate within which Palestinian integration has become possible. It has also produced a mutual dependency and need for moderation on both sides. Jordanian Palestinians support the PLO and Yasir Arafat's leadership. They would oppose any effort by Arafat to undermine Hussein, however, and assert they would abandon support for Arafat if he were to attempt a more radical course in Jordan. [redacted]

Palestinians in Jordan constitute a moderate public and see themselves as a major stabilizing element. Although they describe themselves as apolitical, the more educated Palestinians support Hussein's efforts to provide for wider political participation in Jordan. "People are tired of taking orders—from the government, the Army, and the police." In these sentiments they do not differ from other educated Jordanians. [redacted]

Expressing more sorrow than anger, Jordanian Palestinians characterize US policies on the peace process as self-destructive. They fear that, unless progress can be made toward a real settlement, moderate Arab governments will not survive the instability that is likely to be triggered by prolonged stalemate. [redacted]

Jordanian Palestinians espouse the cause of a separate homeland, although for the young, this notion is more an abstract concept than an emotional commitment. For now, Jordanian Palestinians believe that there are other alternatives and have successfully made themselves at home in Jordan. The sentiment for a separate state will continue to weaken so long as these other options ensure their political and economic security and provide for improved political participation. [redacted]

#### **Egypt**

Along with Jordan, Egypt has gone the farthest of the Arab states in accommodating homeless Palestinians. Citizenship is possible, few restrictions inhibit Palestinian activities, and all the privileges of native citizens are available with the one exception of

holding public office. (The government has recently broadened the privilege of employment guarantees for native university graduates to include Palestinians.) Egyptian policy has been more consistent than that of Jordan because of the greater perception of threat from Palestinians held by Jordanians. [redacted]

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The goal of full restoration of Palestinian rights is an article of faith in Egypt's domestic political scene. Egypt's commitment to the Camp David process and subsequent political investment in working peacefully for a resolution of the Palestinian problem compel it to continue working in that vein for a satisfactory resolution. Consequently, its policy position reinforces its treatment of its Palestinians. [redacted]

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The Palestinians in Egypt are grateful for their relatively broad opportunities in Egypt. But the opportunities available are decidedly limited. Egyptian living standards are the lowest of the four states in this study and are deteriorating.

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Unemployment among Palestinians is even higher than for native Egyptians. Few are wealthy, most work on government projects, and a few are small businessmen. Only the wealthiest—successful businessmen, professionals, and highly skilled technicians—along with PLO representatives and employees would consider permanent residence a desirable option. [redacted]

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The political behavior of Palestinians living in Egypt differs little from that of native Egyptians—they consider themselves apolitical. They support the PLO and Yasir Arafat's leadership and generally disapprove of Egyptian participation in the Camp David accords, although these views are stated without animosity. They have no intention of translating this sentiment into political action. [redacted]

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As in other Arab states, the quality of expatriate Palestinian support for the PLO seems to be more intellectual than emotional. They accept the notion of a separate Palestinian state and would support such a state should it come about. But they would not necessarily choose to live there, choosing instead to go where better economic opportunities beckon. [redacted]

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Regarding US Middle East policy, Egyptian Palestinians have no expectation that the United States will act to help them. They have a slim hope that Egypt and Jordan acting together might promote a resolution but believe that Egypt would have to put distance between itself and the United States to be effective in this effort. These Palestinians believe that the United States is a necessary participant in any peace process but have lost their idealism about what the United States stands for. [redacted]

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The contractor believes that economic problems may be driving the Egyptian Government to assign lower priority to the Palestinian question. Alternatively, should domestic affairs worsen and a strong rightist trend threaten the regime, President Mubarak might have to consider taking a more radical stand on the Palestinian question if this is the only way he can salvage his political fortunes. The Palestinian issue is a likely one for Mubarak to choose to demonstrate a sharp break with the United States and with Camp David should this scenario occur. [redacted]

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In sum, although assimilation into Egyptian society is available to Palestinians, the prospect of sharing increasing poverty with equity alongside native Egyptians is not attractive. Only a minority would consider Egypt a place in which to reside permanently. Relocation to a new Palestinian state or to another state with favorable economic opportunities is the goal for the majority. In the meantime, Palestinians in Egypt, like those elsewhere, desire to get on with their lives, provide for their families as best they can, and avoid becoming ensnarled in the political debate over their future.

[redacted]

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**Sudanese People's Liberation Army—  
Looking for African Help** [redacted]

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The southern Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), now in its third year of insurrection against the central government, is seeking aid from Sudan's southern neighbors to widen its foreign support and diversify its bases of operation. Decisions by Kenya, Uganda, Zaire, and the Central African Republic (CAR) to back the insurgents would strengthen the SPLA and intensify the civil war. African leaders so far have not provided the support the SPLA expected, however, and we believe they will continue to limit their aid. Those leaders fear a loss of backing for their own governments, are unsure of SPLA intentions, and are reluctant to endorse intervention in another African state. [redacted]

As long as Libyan leader Qadhafi sees advantages in his new rapprochement with Khartoum, he is unlikely to resume aid to the SPLA. [redacted]

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We believe SPLA leader Garang has sought help from Kenya, Uganda, Zaire, and the CAR largely because he is uneasy about his reliance on Ethiopia and wants greater freedom of action. Garang also wants international recognition for his cause that African backing would generate. Such a development would help to legitimize the insurgency and strengthen its hand in future negotiations with the regime in Khartoum. [redacted]

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East and Central African aid would become vital if Ethiopia turned against the southern Sudanese insurgents. Without African cooperation, the Ethiopian-based SPLA has had logistic problems in expanding into western Bahr al Ghazal Province and the strategically important Equatoria Province. African reticence has forced the SPLA to rely on support from Ethiopia and other pro-Soviet states. As a result, the SPLA has become an instrument of Ethiopian policy toward Khartoum and a vehicle for Communist involvement in Sudan. [redacted]

**Sudanese Government Moves**

The Military Council—as did ex-President Nimeiri—wants African leaders to take at least a neutral stand toward the dispute in southern Sudan. The council fears that East and Central African support for the SPLA will prolong the conflict, embolden the rebels, and further weaken the morale of Sudanese forces in the south. As a result, one of the first actions the council took after unseating Nimeiri was to send delegates to Nairobi, Kampala, and Kinshasa, expressing Khartoum's determination to pursue a political, rather than military, solution to the conflict. [redacted]

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**Background**

The 12,000-to-15,000-man SPLA, the largest of Sudan's insurgent groups, depends on Ethiopia for safehaven and as a conduit for arms. To counter Khartoum's alleged support for Ethiopian secessionists, Chairman Mengistu has consistently backed SPLA leader John Garang with logistic support and training. Garang's major base camps are in southwestern Ethiopia. Moreover, Addis Ababa has helped the SPLA obtain weapons from South Yemen, and it almost certainly has facilitated SPLA contacts with Cuba and some East European states. [redacted]

**Options of Sudan's Southern Neighbors**

**Kenya.** The Kenyans have given John Garang enough aid to show sympathy for the SPLA but not enough to appear committed to its cause. [redacted]

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Libya armed and financed the SPLA through Ethiopia, but Tripoli's support dropped after the overthrow of Sudanese President Nimeiri last April.


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### The Southern Provinces



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Several factors explain Kenya's support for the SPLA. [redacted] President Moi, a Christian, blames the guerrilla war on ex-President Nimeiri, who tried to impose Islamic law on southern Sudanese Christians and whose economic policies appeared to discriminate against the black African southerners. Moreover, from Moi's perspective, Khartoum has been more eager to crush the southern rebellion than to address legitimate grievances. In addition, [redacted]

[redacted] If Nimeiri's successors adopt his policies toward the southern Sudanese, Moi might consider giving the SPLA more backing. [redacted]

At the same time, however, foreign pressure could lead Moi to consider reducing—or even ending—Kenyan support for the Sudanese insurgents. Moi apparently is concerned that helping John Garang might result in diminished aid from Western donors who want a cease-fire in southern Sudan and who question Garang's ideological leanings. [redacted]

[redacted] Moi also hopes to avoid pressure from the Arab League—the Saudis in particular—who share Western interest in a stable Sudan. In response to Sudanese complaints last March about Kenya's support for the SPLA, Arab League representatives in Nairobi put the issue on their regional agenda, perhaps as a warning to Moi. If Garang over time appeared both inflexible toward peace proposals and accommodating toward Communist interests in the region, Moi probably would quickly put distance between himself and the SPLA. [redacted]

If President Moi chose to extend his support, it would significantly strengthen the SPLA war effort. Nairobi could permit the SPLA to establish bases in northwestern Kenya and areas of southeastern Sudan that since 1956 have been guarded by Kenyan police. The bases, along with Kenyan money, small arms, and training, could substitute for those in Ethiopia and would even shorten SPLA supply lines to some targets in Equatoria Province. If Moi declared Kenya a safehaven for the insurgents, the SPLA would gain an alternative location from which to attract southern Sudanese recruits, gather intelligence, and contact other potential backers. [redacted]

*Uganda.* Kampala's new government under Gen. Tito Okello, having recently deposed President Milton Obote, will be too distracted with internal problems to address support for the SPLA. In any case, Okello belongs to the Acholi tribe, which strongly opposed Obote's support for the Sudanese rebels. The Acholis are concentrated just below the Uganda-Sudan border. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] after an initial series of victories, the SPLA campaign to seize control of Equatoria Province started to falter last January, and with it prospects for a quick, SPLA-produced solution to Obote's dissident problem in southern Sudan. The recent coup in Uganda probably will weaken any Ethiopian incentive to transfer arms to Kampala in the near term. [redacted]

*Zaire and the CAR.* Zairian President Mobutu and CAR President Kolingba have rejected SPLA requests for aid and basing rights and are likely to

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continue their hands-off policy. Both leaders want a stable Sudan, whose southern population would not burden them as refugees. Both presidents—Mobutu, in particular—do not want to give the SPLA safehaven, because this would undermine their objections to the presence of Zairian dissidents in neighboring states. [redacted]

Both Mobutu and Kolingba fear the Libyan subversive threat to their governments; it especially influences Mobutu's policy toward the SPLA. According to the US Embassy in Kinshasa, Mobutu believes Libyan leader Qadhafi is relentless in seeking his downfall because of Zaire's ties with Israel. As a result, Mobutu saw John Garang's insurgents as Libyan agents when Tripoli—before the overthrow of Nimeiri—openly backed the SPLA. Mobutu might be tempted to open Zairian territory to Garang's rebels, however, if he comes to view Garang as anti-Libyan and Khartoum as willing to support Tripoli's regional policies. [redacted]

President Kolingba, for his part, appears resolute in keeping the SPLA out of the CAR. [redacted]

[redacted]

Bangui's close ties to France and fears of Libyan support to CAR insurgents based in southern Chad will work against Kolingba's supporting the SPLA. [redacted]

[redacted]

**Outlook**

The SPLA probably will not get significant help from East and Central African governments any time soon. Kenyan and Ugandan leaders—who have supported the insurgents in the past and whose bases would most facilitate insurgent operations against key targets in southern Sudan—almost certainly will continue to show little enthusiasm for the rebel cause. The insurgents' flirtation with leftist governments has turned President Moi against John Garang. Uganda will continue to shy away from the SPLA because the new government must devote its resources to its own survival. [redacted]

As a result, the SPLA probably will have to continue to depend on Ethiopia for resources to continue the war. SPLA leader Garang's military moves and political postures toward the new Sudanese regime will remain responsive to Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu's policy toward Khartoum. Given Mengistu's deep suspicions of Sudanese involvement with Ethiopian insurgents, Addis Ababa probably will continue to back SPLA attacks across the Ethiopian border into southern Sudan. [redacted]

If Mengistu and Sudanese leaders agreed to stop supporting each other's insurgents—an event we consider unlikely in the next several months—SPLA operations in the south would drop significantly. Under such circumstances the SPLA's access to Kenyan and Ugandan bases and equipment would become vital, but we believe those African leaders would still withhold it. Garang could offer President Moi little to offset the pressure Kenya would face from its Western friends, moderate Arab states, and Ethiopia to shun the insurgents and thereby help end the civil war. As for Uganda, we doubt that Garang could convince the new government to oppose Acholi officers on behalf of the SPLA. [redacted]

In any case, cool African reception to SPLA aid requests almost certainly will spur Sudanese insurgent efforts to gain more assistance from South Yemen, Cuba, Eastern Europe, and perhaps even the USSR. These overtures will give pro-Soviet elements an opening to influence SPLA policy and help determine the outcome of the Sudanese civil war. [redacted]

[redacted]

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## Sudan: Hassan El Turabi and the Muslim Brotherhood [redacted]

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Hassan El Turabi's faction of the Muslim Brotherhood—the Islamic National Front—is still an important political force in Sudan despite its isolation following the coup on 6 April. Turabi has openly supported the ruling Military Council and its promise to return to civilian rule next year. The council will try to keep the Front's support as a balance to leftist elements in Sudan. If the council rejects the Front's Islamic goals or if a leftist government comes to power, the Brothers would probably revert to their pre-1977 clandestine operations and might use terrorist tactics—seeking support from Libya and Iran—to further their overall goal of a state based on an Islamic order. [redacted]

campaign on the Brotherhood. On 9 March, Nimeiri ordered the arrest of Turabi and virtually every other prominent Muslim Brother. When the Nimeiri regime was overthrown in a bloodless coup on 6 April, the Muslim Brothers were released from prison by Khartoum's new military leadership. [redacted]

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### New Tactics—Domestic

The major aim of the Brotherhood is still the establishment of a state governed by Islamic law. A key concern of the Muslim Brothers since the release of its members has been to erase the taint of association with Nimeiri. [redacted]

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### Background

The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928, spread to Sudan in the late 1940s. The Brotherhood recruited among university and professional groups and within the existing conservative Islamic parties. In 1964, when the movement emerged openly under the leadership of Dr. Hassan El Turabi, it was estimated to have 100,000 or more members. [redacted]

In Turabi's Islamic National Front's version of Islamic law, amputations would be rare, and the Islamic alms tax system would be a form of social security and would not replace current taxes, according to the US Embassy in Khartoum. Sensitive to accusations that the introduction of Islamic law fueled the rebellion in the south, the Front has stated that Islamic law should not apply in the south and is campaigning to promote Islam as a religion of "tolerance and justice for all." [redacted]

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Under the umbrella of the National Front, the Brotherhood joined the Ansar Islamic sect's Umma Party and the Khatmiya sect's National Unionist Party in opposition to the Nimeiri regime from 1973 to 1977. In 1977 the Brotherhood accepted Nimeiri's national reconciliation program, following abortive coup attempts by the National Front in 1975 and 1976. The reconciliation, however, divided the Muslim Brotherhood. The more radical faction is led by Sadiq Abdallah Abd al-Majid, who continued opposition to Nimeiri's regime. Turabi, thereafter, served as Sudan's Attorney General and later as presidential foreign affairs adviser. Some of his followers also were appointed to high government posts. [redacted]

Turabi's faction of the Brotherhood has been trying to attract the Islamic masses, consolidate its internal leadership, and find common cause with other Islamic groups. The Front has been able to organize demonstrations of moderate size against repeal of Islamic legislation, [redacted] but many Sudanese—especially the elite—still blame Turabi for the excesses in Nimeiri's Islamization program. [redacted]

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The Islamic National Front has become increasingly isolated in the freer political climate since Nimeiri's ouster. The Gathering, the major civilian lobby composed of trade unions and political parties, has excluded Turabi's group from membership because of its close relationship with the Nimeiri regime and its refusal to cooperate with the Communists and

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Turabi's position with Nimeiri weakened in late 1984 as Nimeiri succeeded in placing part of the blame for some of the unpopular aspects of his Islamization

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**Hassan Abdallah El Turabi**



*A prominent constitutional lawyer, Hassan El Turabi has served as head of the largest faction of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood since 1969. Turabi, 53, speaks fluent English and French. Turabi visited the United States in 1960 on a Foreign Leader Grant and in June 1982 to lecture at various Islamic centers. He is the son of a shari'a judge and the brother-in-law of Sadiq Al Mahdi, leader of the Ansar Islamic sect.* [redacted]

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Ba'thists. Turabi had hoped to form a coalition with other Islamic parties, the Khatmiya's National Unionist Party and the Ansar's Umma Party, but we believe these parties currently view Abd al-Majid as a more attractive partner in political coalitions preparing for civilian elections next April. [redacted]



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The historically antagonistic relationship between the Muslim Brothers and the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) has worsened as the SCP has become active in the new political environment and in the Gathering. Turabi mistrusts and will lobby hard against the SCP and the Sudanese Ba'th Party because they oppose the continuation of Islamic law. He accuses the SCP of conspiring with Libya to take over Sudan and to bring Sudan under Soviet influence. The Front ripped down SCP banners and placards last May in the Khartoum area, [redacted] and fighting resulted between the two parties at the central mosque in Khartoum and later at an Islamic National Front rally held in Atbara. [redacted]

**International Policy**

We believe that Turabi will seek support from almost any country likely to give him aid. He will probably stress Islamic issues with Iran and Libya while underscoring the Front's moderate stance with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Although he adjusts his rhetoric so that potential donors hear what they want to hear, Turabi is unlikely to compromise the Front's objectives or become a puppet of a foreign country. [redacted]

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Although anti-Communist, the Front favors a nonaligned foreign policy and wants Sudan to normalize ties with the USSR to balance the pro-US line taken by the Nimeiri regime. In an interview Turabi stated that he desires cordial relations with the United States even though he believes that the United States is biased against Islamic fundamentalist groups. Nevertheless, Turabi blames the United States for Nimeiri's purge of the Muslim Brothers and for the arrests that came a few days after the visit to Sudan last March by Vice President Bush. [redacted]

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[redacted] the National Front, similar to the political parties, is taking advantage of the unstable political and security situation in Sudan to infiltrate military and other government organs.



The Front favors close ties with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Turabi has suggested that Egyptian-Sudanese

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**Sadiq Abdallah Abd Al-Majid**

*Sadiq Abd al-Majid joined the Muslim Brotherhood as a student in Cairo. A journalist by profession, he became the editor in chief of The Muslim Brothers and later Al-Mithaq (The Charter), weekly Muslim-oriented newspapers that supported the Brothers. Abd al-Majid preceded Turabi as the guide of the Brotherhood and served on the executive committee of the Islamic Charter Front. Upon his dismissal from the Brotherhood in 1980, Abd al-Majid joined the unified movement of opposition parties. Abd al-Majid has allied himself with the Umma Party, thereby increasing the political support of his faction since the coup. He is employed as a taxi driver in Khartoum.*

relations should not be affected by Nimeiri's residence in Egypt. Nonetheless, Turabi does not realistically expect assistance from Cairo or Egypt's Muslim Brothers. Saudi Arabia has supported both factions of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood in the past, but its present relationship with Turabi is not strong. Saudi Arabia in the past has given refuge to Turabi's rival—Abd al-Majid—and, given his increasing popularity, would probably prefer to back his faction of the Brotherhood. Nevertheless, the Saudis would probably increase support for Turabi if the threat of a leftist government were imminent.

The Islamic National Front supports Sudan's rapprochement with Libya and hopes for improved relations with Iran. In a recent interview, Turabi expressed pro-Libyan views and stressed the advantages of integration between Libya and Sudan as both logical and mutually beneficial. In addition, he claims that Front members have no links with Iran other than religious ties to the Ayatollah Khomeini and that they prefer a French-style presidential democracy to the Islamic regime of mullahs found in Iran.

**Outlook**

Despite the gradual decrease in the influence and popular support of the Islamic National Front over the past four months, Turabi is still an important figure. Turabi will most likely make the Front's

**Brotherhood Objectives**

*The Muslim Brotherhood of Sudan has goals and tactics similar to those of the Brotherhood in other countries. It eschews violence and promotes conversion through education, moral example, and intellectual appeal. Its overall objective is the implementation of an "Islamic order" based on moral and ethical principles. These include:*

- *Substitution of shari'a, or Islamic law, for Western-inspired legal systems.*
- *An economy based on Koranic principles, including the abolition of interest and the replacement of tax codes by the traditional zakat, or alms tax, to help the poor.*
- *The substitution of a system of "Islamic consultation" within a single "party of God" for parliamentary politics.*
- *The relegation of women to the home to fulfill their divinely ordered function of bearing and raising children.*

presence felt through its influence among students and unions and through infiltration of the government and political organizations rather than overt political action. His rigid anti-Communist stand can offset leftist influence, and this probably will induce the Military Council to tolerate many of the Front's activities.

If Turabi finds himself aligned against the ruling Military Council over the issue of Islamic law, the Islamic National Front will probably go underground. The Brothers' proven ability to function as a secret organization suggests that the Front would continue to have influence on Khartoum's political scene. Underground, the Front probably would turn its attention to building a paramilitary organization, possibly even engaging in terrorist activities against the regime with possible support from Libya or Iran. Nevertheless, Turabi is not likely to become a surrogate for them.

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**Tamil Identity in Sri Lanka** 

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Since Sri Lanka was granted independence in 1948, and particularly since the election of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in 1956 and the communal riots of 1958, 1977, and 1983, the definition of identities for most Tamils has changed. Whereas a Tamil might have been a Ceylonese first when confronting the British in the struggle for independence, that same person probably considers his primary identity as Tamil now that he feels threatened by a hostile Sinhalese majority. Indeed, for some people that identity has become so strong and the Sinhalese are perceived as so threatening, that they may no longer even consider themselves Sri Lankans. A key question is who constitutes the Tamil group and by what standards is it defined. Here, there is persistent confusion. Some have argued that Tamils are a linguistic group and, as such, should include the Tamil-speaking Muslims of the country. As the recent killings of Muslims by Tamils have demonstrated, however, at least some Tamils do not consider Muslims members of the Tamil group. In addition, the recent riots in the Eastern Province have shown that neither do the Muslims consider themselves part of the greater Tamil group.

**Traditional Tamil Identity**

In the earliest days, ethnic identity was probably not a problem for most of the Tamils living in Sri Lanka. Distance, culture, caste, and history separated the island's Tamil community from the larger body of Tamils in south India as well as from the mass of Sinhalese in the south of Ceylon. Through interaction with the Dutch and Portuguese colonizers, many Tamils became Catholic but still lived within the Tamil community without friction. Under the influence of a unified British colonial administration beginning in 1815, the term Ceylon Tamil gained popularity both with the northern Tamils and the British authorities. This term was accepted because it differentiated the native-born Tamils of Sri Lanka from both the Indian Tamils of Tamil Nadu and the increasing numbers of low-caste Tamils brought from

south India to work the tea plantations in the central highlands. The term was not meant to differentiate them from the Sinhalese.

A few, mostly upper class, largely English speaking, and often Christian, Tamil families became so "detrribalized" that they perceived their primary identity as Ceylonese, with only a vague secondary identity as Tamils. Although these people were highly visible in the early 20th century and during the independence movement, their numbers were always small. Yet, they never totally lost their identity as Tamils. As independence approached and they were faced with the reality of becoming a permanent minority in the midst of a potentially threatening Sinhalese majority, these same Tamils pushed for equal parliamentary representation with the Sinhalese.

The disfranchisement of the Indian Tamil plantation workers immediately after independence must have had a sobering effect on the Ceylon Tamils and must have heightened their feelings of Tamil identity. The election campaign of 1956 included a call for Sinhala as the only official language of the country and preferential treatment for Buddhism. Both demands could only have heightened Tamil fears. The shift in political parties from the Tamil Congress, devoted to the protection of Tamil interests, to the Federal Party, which called for a federal system with a high degree of self-government and protection of Tamil interests in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, is both proof and a symptom of these developments.

The ethnic riots of 1958 and 1981 added fuel to both these movements. The creation of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) was both a symptom and a cause for heightened Sinhalese fear that the Tamils meant to divide the country into a Sinhalese south and a Tamil north and east to be called Eelam. Calls for separation are nothing more than the logical extension

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of mutual distrust and fear. Indeed, even the creation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and attempts to accomplish separation through violence can be viewed as symptoms that regular political processes have broken down and that for some Tamils, at least, their identity as Sri Lankans has ceased to exist. The TULF leadership has not firmly repudiated the growing call to violence. Their reference to the terrorists as "the boys" and the impression conveyed to Sinhalese and Tamils alike that maybe "the boys" will humiliate the Army and government contribute to both Tamil separatist identity and Sinhalese fear.

The moderate TULF appears to have overplayed its hand in using the violent excesses of "the boys" to force the government to deal with the somewhat less objectionable TULF. Politically it has become increasingly difficult for moderate Tamil politicians to repudiate terrorists. At the same time it has become politically difficult for Sinhalese spokesmen to bargain with Tamil politicians unless moderate Tamils repudiate the militants, their acts of terrorism, and their fervent calls for a separate state.

#### **A Spectrum of Tamil Identity**

What do the Tamils want? Politically, what is their vision of the future? Clearly, a spectrum of Tamil opinion has evolved. Defining that spectrum in terms of right and left is not meant to impose a Western framework, but rather to show how radically different each Tamil image of the future is.

On the extreme right of the spectrum are the Colombo Tamils. Since the riots of July 1983, relatively few of this group are left. The ones who felt the highest degree of Tamil identity, either because of internal conviction or as a result of Sinhalese pressure, probably have already fled. Those who stayed despite the riots are either so integrated as to believe that they will be accepted by the Sinhalese, or else have their escape plans already made in anticipation of the next round of troubles. The Colombo Tamils have always opposed separation and probably still do. Their livelihoods and even their lives depend on the good will of the Sinhalese majority among whom they live. In a sense they are the ones who, despite the hardships and handicaps, have made it in a Sinhalese-dominated system. They would not take any stand that would jeopardize that position. More than anything they

probably want peace, security, and a return to normality. They would gladly accept a unified Sri Lanka, provided they believed that the police and the Army would guarantee their security and that the government would protect their rights. They would have nothing to gain from a federal political system, but they would want their language and culture protected at the national level. Their idealized vision may be a return to the pre-1955 status quo.

Very close to the Colombo Tamils on the spectrum are the Indian Tamils. They, too, have learned to survive in a hostile Sinhalese sea. They have no desire for a separate state in the north and east because they would be excluded and would undoubtedly be punished by their Sinhalese neighbors. Even if they were somehow included, there is no doubt that they would be on the lowest rung of the social and economic ladder in this Tamil state. At best they could expect mass retaliation on the part of the Sinhalese if the northern Tamils actually achieved Eelam. At worst they might be killed or expelled from Sri Lanka. All they want is to secure citizenship for their people and a return to the stability that existed before 1948.

After the Colombo and Indian Tamils on the spectrum and much nearer the center are the Tamil moderates of the north. They, like the Colombo Tamils, want peace, security, and a return to normality. Politically, they envision some form of federal system within a unified Sri Lanka, but with a high degree of local autonomy in which their language and culture will be preserved. On the national level, they seek guarantees against job discrimination in the civil service and university placement for their children. They want a return to normal economic conditions: specifically, a reintegration of their economy with the rest of the country. On the level of personal security, they want the police and Army to protect them from violent elements of the population, whether Sinhalese or Tamil. They also want the national government to care about them and want to be able to participate in future governments, not because they are Tamils but because they share a

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common commitment to free enterprise in Sri Lanka. Although it is difficult to say how large a group these moderates are, they comprise the majority of northern Tamils.

Next on the political spectrum of Tamil opinion are those Tamils who have become convinced that they can no longer share a country with the Sinhalese. These are the Tamil Eelamists, divided into a variety of groups with different visions of just what Eelam would be. On the right of this portion of the spectrum are the bourgeois upper-caste Vellalla Tamils, who want to maintain their privileged social and economic position in an independent Tamil Eelam. These people would not want union with either India or an independent greater Tamil Nadu, in which they would again become a minority. This time they want to be the majority group. [redacted]

[redacted] these people see the new Tamil state as being a kind of Singapore on the Indian Ocean. These separatists believe the new state would have the same factors going for it that Singapore did: a hard-working, well-educated population and a great seaport (Trincomalee). Because they are basically free enterprise capitalists, they see the advantages that Singapore gained by inviting in hundreds of foreign investors on the best possible terms, and they would probably move quickly to do the same. Looking to Israel as another model, they assume that well-placed overseas Sri Lankan Tamils would help the growth of the fledgling state with remittances just as Jews throughout the world support Tel Aviv. These Tamils appear confident in their belief that their lives will improve immediately once they achieve Eelam.

Further to the left come those Eelamists who seek a separate Tamil state, but under a socialist regime. Those who hold this vision are either lower caste or from the lower social and economic groups of Tamil society. They do not want a separate state where Sinhalese domination would be exchanged for that of Vellalla overlords. They believe that in a socialist state they would appropriate the wealth of the richest northern Tamils and would thus achieve parity with them or, better yet, become the leaders of their new country. Substantial numbers of Tamils, including the majority of the militant separatist groups, hold this view.

It is difficult to account for the rise of Marxism in an area of Sri Lanka that has never been a leftist stronghold. The phenomenon is due in part to young, frustrated Tamils who see no future in a country dominated by Sinhalese and who have turned to violence. They have borne the brunt of Sinhalese racism: denied access to universities, civil service, professions, and business. They have become so alienated that they believe that only a violent struggle can help them achieve equity.<sup>1</sup>

### Looking Ahead

Sri Lankans in general expect youngsters to be radical until they finish school and settle down in the arranged marriages and vocational openings their parents have prepared for them. For northern Tamils, however, the paucity of economic opportunity under the Sinhalese-dominated regime in Colombo and the general disruption of Tamil society after nearly 10 years of political instability have frustrated traditional expectations. Young people in the north are growing up increasingly radicalized. They distrust the system and are shocked and embarrassed by the impotence of Tamil leaders to redress the glaring wrongs of society.

By referring to them as "the boys," northern Tamil leaders initially did not show much concern for the increasingly violent demonstrations mounted by Tamil youth. But growing frustration has crystallized the thinking of some of the young militant leaders, and Marxist rhetoric has become a convenient rallying cry for several of the most violent guerrilla bands. Most of the militants fighting today, however, are motivated by ethnic identity rather than ideology. Yet their use of Marxist terminology has unwittingly

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convinced most Sinhalese that the Tamil liberation movement is part of an international Communist conspiracy to take over the entire island and impose a Tamil-dominated Marxist government.

Further to the left on the spectrum are those Tamils who wish to merge the Tamil portions of Sri Lanka with India. This is a fear held by many Sinhalese. Few Tamils, however, would seek to exchange domination by the Sinhalese for domination by the even larger population of India. Further, the largest Tamil caste, the Vellalla, would lose its relatively high status if it were joined to the overpowering Indian caste system. Some guerrilla groups exploit Sinhalese fears of Indian domination of part of the island to provoke military excesses against Tamils in the hopes of winning Indian support.

More appealing to some Tamils and even less probable is the most radical dream that Tamil Nadu will secede from India and merge with the Tamil portion of Sri Lanka to become an independent nation of more than 60 million Tamils. This would have great appeal to those Tamils who hold their ethnic identity above all others. It is the image that is the nightmare of both Indian and Sri Lankan officials. There is a political party in Tamil Nadu that keeps that hope—or nightmare—alive. What the Indian Government cannot afford is to antagonize its own Tamils to the point of militant separatism. So far, India has walked the tightrope carefully. Nonetheless, one ethnic riot aimed at Tamils anywhere in India could be the spark that ignites the separatist vision. With this constraint, India cannot completely cut off its Tamil citizens' aid to their brethren in Sri Lanka.

Two remaining groups of Tamils do not fit neatly on the spectrum. They are the refugees living in India and the wealthy overseas Tamil community. The great diversity within both groups makes them difficult to place. All of the refugees in India probably are pro-Eelam to one degree or another and would probably be afraid to return home until an independent Tamil state was created to protect them. These Tamils could become a major interest group in south India. Some of the local people will support them because of the perceived justice of their cause,

and some will hate them for destabilizing the region. If they were to grow to very large numbers—which could occur if the situation in the north continues to deteriorate—they could become a major issue for New Delhi.

The wealthier overseas Tamils are a different breed entirely. They send money and give vocal support to their brethren on the island, but they do not want to go there themselves. To the degree that they are pro-Eelam, they hope for an independent, capitalist state, but it is also clear that these are the people who are supplying much of the foreign money available to the militants. Generally, the wealthier overseas Tamils support the TULF and whatever position on separation it takes.



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