


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TAGS: PREL, ASEAN, ID, XC  
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY ~~GROUPS MEETING WITH  
INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MOCHTAR, FEBRUARY 15~~

1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ MET WITH INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MOCHTAR KUSUMAATMADJA IN NEW YORK ON FEBRUARY 15 FOR ONE AND A HALF HOURS. MOCHTAR WAS IN NEW YORK FOR A MEDICAL CHECK-UP AND HAD NO OFFICIAL PROGRAM SCHEDULED. INDONESIAN DEPUTY UN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE, AMBASSADOR POEDJI KOENTARSO, AND EAP/IMBS ACTING DIRECTOR LAPORTA SAT IN ON THE MEETING. CONCERNING CAMBODIA AND THE RECENT ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN BANGKOK, ~~MOCHTAR STRESSED THAT THE MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE WAS~~

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MEANT MORE AS A POLITICAL GESTURE OF SUPPORT FOR THAILAND AND THE KHMER RESISTANCE RATHER THAN AS A SPECIFIC CALL FOR INCREASED MILITARY ASSISTANCE. HE ALSO SAID THAT INDONESIA "FOR THE TIME BEING" WOULD CONTINUE ITS PRESENT POLICY OF PROVIDING ONLY NON-LETHAL ASSISTANCE TO THE NON-COMMUNIST KHMER GROUPS IN THE HOPE OF PRESERVING SOME DEGREE OF ASEAN "FLEXIBILITY" IN DEALING WITH VIETNAM. MOCHTAR ALSO DISCUSSED PLANS FOR HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO HANOI. ON CHINA, MOCHTAR DID NOT SEE PROSPECTS FOR NORMALIZATION BECAUSE OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S STRONG VIEWS ABOUT PRC COMPLICITY IN THE ABORTIVE COMMUNIST COUP IN INDONESIA IN 1965. REGARDING ASEAN PROPOSALS FOR A SOUTHEAST ASIAN ZONE OF PEACE, FREEDOM AND NEUTRALITY (ZOPFAN) AND A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE (NWFZ), MOCHTAR BELIEVED THAT U.S. INTERESTS IN SEALANES PASSAGE FOR NAVAL SHIPS COULD BE MANAGED AND INDICATED THAT ASEAN IS LOOKING CAREFULLY AT THE NEW ZEALAND SITUATION TO SEE IF SOME ACCOMMODATION IN THIS REGARD COULD BE WORKED OUT. OTHER TOPICS INCLUDED THE PHILIPPINES AND PACIFIC COOPERATION. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

3. ~~CAMBODIA AND THE ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS~~ CONFERENCE: MOCHTAR SAID HE WANTED TO PROVIDE ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ WITH THIS INTERPRETATION OF THE FEB. 11'12 ASEAN MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE IN BANGKOK AS RELATED TO DEVELOPMENTS IN CAMBODIA AND TO EXPLAIN THE NUANCES IN THE MINISTERS' COMMUNIQUE. MOCHTAR LED OFF BY OBSERVING THAT THERE IS A FEELING THAT COUNTRIES SHOULD BE APOLOGETIC ABOUT AIDING THE KHMER RESISTANCE BUT, IN PRINCIPLE, THERE IS NO REASON WHY THE RESISTANCE SHOULD NOT BE SUPPORTED, ESPECIALLY AS THE USSR IS OPENLY SUPPORTING VIETNAM. HOWEVER, ~~INDONESIA DID NOT FEEL THAT ALL OF THE ASEAN COUNTRIES SHOULD BE EQUALLY STRIDENT IN ITS APPROACH TOWARD VIETNAM BECAUSE THERE WOULD BE NO ONE LEFT TO BE ABLE TO DEAL WITH THE SRV~~ CONSEQUENTLY, THIS IS WHY THE GOI HAS NOT PROVIDED MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE KHMER RESISTANCE. DESPITE THIS, ~~THE ASEAN MINISTERS MEETING IN BANGKOK NEEDED TO DEMONSTRATE MORAL SUPPORT OF THAILAND~~ SO INDONESIA DECIDED TO TAKE A POSITION "NOT TOO DIFFERENT" FROM THE OTHERS.

4. MOCHTAR CONTINUED THAT ~~THE COMMUNIQUE CALLS ON ALL COUNTRIES TO GIVE SUPPORT TO CAMBODIANS WAGING A POLITICAL AND MILITARY SUPPORT~~. IN POLITICAL TERMS, MOCHTAR SAID, ~~INDONESIAN VIEWS THAT THE CAMBODIAN SITUATION IS NOT GOING TO BE SOLVED OR IMPROVED BY MORE ARMS OR MONEY. HIS BASIC PROBLEM IS THE LACK OF UNITY AND COHESIVENESS AMONG THE THREE KHMER RESISTANCE GROUPS~~. MOCHTAR SAID THERE HAS IN FACT BEEN SOME IMPROVEMENT IN THEIR COHESIVENESS AS A RESULT OF THE MOST RECENT VIETNAMESE ATTACKS AND THAT THE RESISTANCE FIGHTERS HAVE BEEN DEMORALIZED. HOW MUCH OF THIS IS GENUINE, QUESTIONED MOCHTAR, NOBODY KNOWS, AND THERE IS STILL SOME RELUCTANCE ON THE PART OF SON SANN. MOCHTAR

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THEN RECOUNTED DIFFICULTIES WITH SON SANN IN CONNECTION WITH SIHANOUK'S FORTHCOMING TRIP TO AUSTRALIA, NOTING SIHANOUK'S OBSERVATION THAT IT IS "EASIER FOR HIM TO DEAL WITH THE KHMER ROUGE THAN WITH SON SANN." NEVERTHELESS, MOCHTAR THOUGHT THERE IS GROWING COOPERATION AMONG THE SECOND GENERATION OF KHMER LEADERS AND OPINED THAT THEY ARE IMPATIENT WITH SON SANN'S DILATORY TACTICS.

5. REGARDING THE MILITARY SITUATION, ~~MOCHTAR SAID THE~~ ~~KHMER RESISTANCE HAS SUFFICIENT WEAPONS AND THAT THE~~ ~~THAIS ARE CAREFUL IN HANDING THEM OVER TO THE~~ ~~NONCOMMUNIST MILITARY ELEMENTS SO THERE WOULD BE REDUCED~~ ~~RISK OF "LOSING" THEM.~~ ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ, REFERRING TO HIS OWN RECENT DISCUSSIONS IN BANGKOK AND SINGAPORE, NOTED THAT ~~PREM AND SITTHI ASKED FOR U.S.~~ ~~MILITARY SUPPORT OF THE RESISTANCE AND IT SEEMED THEY ARE~~ ~~LOOKING FOR A POLITICALLY SYMBOLIC GESTURE FROM THE U.S.~~ ~~HOWEVER, IN SINGAPORE, LEE KUAN YEW -- WHO HAS PRESSED US~~ ~~BEFORE ON PROVIDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE~~ ~~NON-COMMUNIST KHMER -- GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE IS~~ ~~NO IMMEDIATE NEED FOR SUCH SUPPORT, THOUGH THERE MIGHT BE~~ ~~IN THE FUTURE.~~ MOCHTAR COMMENTED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT SON SANN IS ALWAYS ASKING FOR MORE ASSISTANCE BUT SOME OBSERVERS SAY HIS ACCOUNTING FOR PREVIOUS ASSISTANCE IS NOT GOOD, WHEREAS IN SIHANOUK 'S CASE, DESPITE EARLIER DIFFICULTIES, EVERYTHING IS NOW ACCOUNTED FOR. MOCHTAR AGREED THAT THE NEED NOW IS FOR THE NON-COMMUNIST KHMER GROUPS TO GET THEIR FORCES INTO THE INTERIOR OF CAMBODIA AND TO BUILD UP A GRASSROOTS RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION. THERE IS ALSO A NEED TO COUNTER THE POLITICAL PERCEPTION THAT THE VIETNAMESE ARE FULLY IN CONTROL IN CAMBODIA BUT, MOCHTAR NOTED, THE VIETNAMESE ARE NOT MAKING MUCH HEADWAY AS INDICATED BY THE NEED TO BRING IN TWO NEW DIVISIONS RECENTLY. MOCHTAR THEN OBSERVED THAT THE KHMER ROUGE IS DOING VERY WELL, DESPITE THE RECENT DESTRUCTION OF ITS CAMPS BUT QUESTIONED HOW THE SON SANN GROUP COULD FUNCTION WELL IN A MILITARY SENSE BECAUSE THEY ARE LARGELY TOWN PEOPLE WITH FAMILIES, UNLIKE THE KHMER ROUGE FIGHTERS WHO ARE MAINLY PEASANTS AND YOUNG BOYS. REGARDING INDONESIAN ASSISTANCE, ~~MOCHTAR STATED THAT THE~~ ~~GOI WOULD LIMIT HIS AID TO NON-LETHAL ITEMS, CLOTHING,~~ ~~BOOTS, MEDICINE, (ESPECIALLY QUININE TABLETS), AND THE~~ ~~LIKE.~~ ~~HE SAID THE GOI WOULD NOT CHANGE ITS POLICY OF NOT~~ ~~PROVIDING ARMS "FOR THE TIME BEING."~~

6. ~~MOCHTAR SAID THAT HE POSTPONED HIS VISIT TO~~ ~~HANOI BECAUSE OF THE VIETNAMESE ATTACKS ON THE THAI~~ ~~BORDER BUT THE VIETNAMESE ARE PRESSING HIM TO COME.~~ ~~HE~~ ~~SAID THE INDONESIAN AMBASSADOR IN HANOI RECEIVED VAGUE~~ ~~ASSURANCES THAT THE ATTACKS ON THE BORDER WOULD CEASE IF~~ ~~MOCHTAR VISITED HANOI.~~ ~~MOCHTAR RECOUNTED THAT THE TIMING~~ ~~OF HIS VISIT IS COMPLICATED BY THE ABRUPT REQUEST OF THE~~ ~~VIETNAMESE DEFENSE MINISTER TO RETURN ARMED FORCES CHIEF~~ ~~GEN. MURDANI'S 1984 VISIT TO HANOI BY VISITING INDONESIA.~~

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IN EARLY MARCH AND BY THE CSIS SEMINAR WITH THE VIETNAMESE IN JAKARTA BEGINNING FEB. 18. THE VIETNAMESE, MOCHTAR OPINED, WANT TO SHOW THERE IS SOMETHING SPECIAL IN THE INDONESIAN-SRV RELATIONSHIP AND ARE THUS WILLING TO MAKE THESE GESTURES. MOCHTAR ALSO THOUGHT THAT THE VIETNAMESE MAY SEE THAT THEY ARE BEING ISOLATED IN VIEW OF THE USSR AND U.S. "PLAYING UP" TO THE PRC. ~~AT THE BANGKOK MINISTERIAL, THE ASEAN MINISTERS URGED HIM TO GO TO HANOI BEFORE THE VIETNAMESE DEFENSE MINISTER'S VISIT TO INDONESIA AND BEFORE AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAYDEN'S VISIT TO HANOI SCHEDULED FOR MARCH 8.~~ MOCHTAR SAID HIS PLANS PRESENTLY ARE TO ~~GO TO HANOI, AND POSSIBLY HO CHI MINH CITY, FOR TWO OR THREE DAYS BEGINNING FEB. 27, TRYING INsofar AS POSSIBLE TO MAKE IT A "SOCIAL VISIT" BY BRINGING HIS WIFE.~~ COMMENTING ON OTHER INDONESIAN VIEWS ON VIETNAM, MOCHTAR SAID BENNY MURDANI SEEMS TO HAVE A "SPECIAL WEAKNESS" FOR THE VIETNAMESE, PARTIALLY BECAUSE OF HIS FEAR OF CHINA AND BECAUSE OF HIS ADMIRATION OF THE VIETNAMESE AS MILITARY PEOPLE. MOCHTAR SAID HE HOPES TO MEET WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ IN JAKARTA IN EARLY MARCH TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AFTER HIS VISIT TO VIETNAM.

7. CHINA: RESPONDING TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ' COMMENT THAT PEOPLE LIKE BENNY MURDANI SEEM TO FEEL THAT THE U.S. IS NAIVE IN ITS APPROACH TO CHINA, MOCHTAR SAID THAT SOME MAY THINK THAT, BUT U.S. POLICY IS OPEN FOR ALL TO SEE. ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ SAID THAT WE ARE BUILDING A MORE BALANCED APPROACH TO U.S.-CHINESE RELATIONS BUT MOCHTAR QUESTIONED THE NEED FOR GENERAL VESSEY'S RECENT VISIT TO CHINA. IN THIS RESPECT, MOCHTAR COMMENTED THAT THE CHINESE ARE NOT LOOKING FOR LARGE ARMS PURCHASES FROM THE U.S. AND ONLY WANT MILITARY TECHNOLOGY; CONSEQUENTLY, EVEN AS A GESTURE, THE VESSEY TRIP CREATED A LOT OF MISUNDERSTANDING. ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ REPLIED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT WAS TO ENLARGE UPON OUR FEW CONTACTS WITH THE CHINESE MILITARY AND, ALTHOUGH WE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE CHINESE MILITARY CAPABILITIES, WE CAN TRY TO INFLUENCE HOW CHINESE MILITARY LEADERS VIEW US.

8. MOCHTAR THEN COMMENTED THAT SOME IN THE GOI WANT TO DO MORE IN RELATIONSHIPS WITH CHINA BUT THAT PRESIDENT SOEHARTO IS "IN NO MOOD" TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS. AS A RESULT OF PRC SUPPORT OF THE PKI AND THE ABORTIVE COUP IN 1965, IN WHICH A NUMBER OF SOEHARTO'S CLOSEST FRIENDS WERE KILLED, THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS OF CHINA HAS BECOME AN "EMOTIONAL THING" WITH HIM. ALSO, MOCHTAR CITED THE PAST REFUSAL OF JAVANESE KINGS TO BECOME VASSALS OF CHINA OR TO PAY TRIBUTE TO THE CHINESE EMPERORS, MENTIONING THE RETURN OF ONE CHINESE ENVOY WITH HIS EARS AND NOSE CUT OFF. SOEHARTO'S VIEW IS THAT THE CHINESE SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE TOWARD NORMALIZATION BY SENDING A HIGH LEVEL ENVOY TO INDONESIA.

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9. ~~BANDUNG CONFERENCE COMMEMORATION~~; DESPITE INDONESIA'S PREVAILING VIEW ON NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS, MOCHTAR SAID THAT THE PRC WILL PROBABLY SEND SOMEONE, POSSIBLY FOREIGN MINISTER WU, TO THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE COMMEMORATION IN LATE APRIL; IN FACT, AMB. KOENTARSO HANDED OVER AN OFFICIAL INVITATION TO THE CHINESE UN PERMREP THAT MORNING. REGARDING THE COMMEMORATION PLANS, MOCHTAR SAID THAT SOEHARTO DOES NOT WANT A SPLASHY AFFAIR, THUS COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN INVITED AT THE PLENIPOTENTIARY OR AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL, EXCEPT FOR INDIA'S RAJIV GANDHI WHO HAS BEEN INVITED IN HIS CAPACITY AS NONALIGNED MOVEMENT CHAIRMAN. ALSO, "SURVIVING PARTICIPANTS" OF THE 1955 CONFERENCE -- SIHANOUK, ROMULO AND PHAM VAN DONG -- ARE BEING INVITED. BURMA HAS DECIDED NOT TO ATTEND, HE SAID, BECAUSE IT FEELS ITS POSITION ON THE NAM MIGHT BE COMPROMISED. ~~MOCHTAR SAID HE HOPES THE BANDUNG CONCLAVE WILL PRODUCE A DECLARATION REITERATING THE BANDUNG PRINCIPLES, CITING GENERAL PROBLEMS IN VARIOUS REGIONS OF THE WORLD (OMITTING SPECIFICS SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN AND CAMBODIA IN ORDER TO AVOID CONTENTION), CALLING FOR THE NEED FOR IMPROVED ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPED NATIONS, INCLUDING INCREASED MARKET ACCESS. HE CONTINUED THAT THE DRAFT DECLARATION WOULD BE WORKED OUT CAREFULLY IN ADVANCE SO THAT THERE WOULD BE NO "CONFERENCE ASPECT" TO THE BANDUNG CEREMONIES.~~ MOCHTAR ALSO SAID THAT HE ENTERTAINED THE "VAIN HOPE" THAT A DECLARATION OF 90 OR SO COUNTRIES COULD BE "HELPFUL IN EAST-WEST TERMS" BY FOCUSING WORLD OPINION ON THE NEED FOR AN END TO THE ARMS RACE.

10. ~~CLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE~~ ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ ASKED FOR MOCHTAR'S VIEWS ON ZOPFAN AND THE PROPOSED NWFZ. MOCHTAR REPLIED THAT THE ~~SEAN COUNTRIES WILL ENSURE THAT A SOUTHEAST ASIAN NWFZ WOULD NOT HINDER THE RIGHT OF PASSAGE OF WARSHIPS THROUGH THE STRAITS IN CONSONANCE WITH THE LOS CONVENTION WHICH STATES THAT SUCH PASSAGE SHOULD NOT BE HARMFUL TO THE SECURITY AND WELFARE OF COASTAL STATES.~~ MOCHTAR SAID THAT THE ASEAN COUNTRIES FULLY RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS NO WAY TO "POLICE" THE TRANSIT OF WARSHIPS BUT, UNDER THE LOS TREATY, THERE IS PROVISION FOR ENSURING THE RIGHTS OF TRANSIT AND OF COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGES IN THE EVENT OF A NUCLEAR INCIDENT. MOCHTAR CONTINUED THAT ~~ASEAN IS WATCHING THE SITUATION WITH GREAT INTEREST, POSSIBLY FOR A SOLUTION THAT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN AREA.~~ HE ALSO WONDERED WHETHER PHILIPPINE TERRITORY WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE NWFZ IN VIEW OF THE U.S. BASES THERE. ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ COMMENTED THAT THERE ARE TWO ASPECTS TO THE PROBLEM: FIRST, THE NATURE OF THE ARRANGEMENT ITSELF -- WE WOULD HOPE THAT IT IS ONE WE COULD LIVE WITH ~~IF ASEAN PROCEEDS WITH AN NWFZ, WE WOULD HOPE THAT IT IS ONE WE COULD LIVE WITH.~~ ~~THIS WOULD REQUIRE MUCH MORE THAN ASSURING THE PASSAGE OF STRAITS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE QUESTION OF PORT~~

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ACCESS IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT. SECOND, THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF PUSHING A SOUTHEAST ASIAN NWFZ COULD COMPOUND OUR PROBLEMS IN NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA AND CREATE NEW ONES IN THE PHILIPPINES AND JAPAN. MOCHTAR THEN ASKED RHETORICALLY THAT, IF LATIN AMERICA CAN HAVE A NUCLEAR FREE ZONE, WHY NOT ASEAN?

11. PHILIPPINES: ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ OBSERVED THAT MANY FILIPINOS HAVE A LACK OF AWARENESS OF THE FUNCTION OUR BASES SERVE IN REGIONAL SECURITY TERMS. NOTING THAT THIS IS PARTICULARLY A PROBLEM AMONG OPPOSITION GROUPS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ SAID IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF OPPOSITION ELEMENTS WERE TO HEAR MORE ABOUT THE VALUE OF THE U.S. BASE PRESENCE FROM OUR OTHER FRIENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. MOCHTAR COMMENTED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD KEEP THE PHILIPPINE BASES AS LONG AS THE SOVIETS ARE AT CAM RANH BUT, NEVERTHELESS, THE BASES PRESENTLY ARE NOT AS IMPORTANT AS THEY WERE. MOCHTAR SPECULATED THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO RENEGOTIATE THE BASE AGREEMENTS TO GIVE THE FILIPINOS MORE CONTROL, NOTING THAT THE IMPORTANT THING IS FOR THE U.S. TO HAVE THE USE OF PHILIPPINE TERRITORY. OBSERVING THAT THE BASES ARE MORE A FACTOR IN PHILIPPINE DOMESTIC POLITICS THAN ANYTHING ELSE, MOCHTAR SAID THAT THE FILIPINOS FEEL COMPELLED TO SHOW THEY ARE GOOD PATRIOTS AND GOOD ASIANS, SEEKING TO SHED THEIR COLONIAL PAST. MOCHTAR THEN SAID THE SAME THING IS TRUE OF THE MALAYSIANS, WHO HAD THEIR INDEPENDENCE "GIVEN TO THEM," AND ESPECIALLY PRIME MINISTER MAHATHIR WHO HAS EMBARKED ON A NUMBER OF QUESTIONABLE VENTURES, E.G. THE "LOOK EAST" POLICY, THE MALAYSIAN CAR, ANTARCTICA AND ENCOURAGEMENT OF MALAYSIAN POPULATION GROWTH. MOCHTAR ALSO NOTED THAT MAHATHIR "BERATED" THE ASEAN ECONOMIC MINISTERS AT THEIR RECENT CONFERENCE IN KUALA LUMPUR ON THE SUBJECT OF INTRAASEAN TRADE, REMARKING THAT THE MALAYSIANS ARE PROBABLY LOOKING AT "ALL THOSE CARS LYING UNSOLD."

12. PACIFIC COOPERATION: MOCHTAR SAID HE IS EXTREMELY PLEASED WITH THE RESULTS OF THE 6-PLUS-5 SUBMINISTERIAL MEETING HELD IN JAKARTA JANUARY 27-28. HE SAID ASEAN HAS SUCCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING A "PROCESS" FOR PACIFIC COOPERATION AND ANTICIPATES THAT ASEAN AND ITS PACIFIC DIALOGUE PARTNERS COULD SELECT A NEW THEME EVERY TWO YEARS, GRADUALLY BUILDING UP THE COMPETENCE OF THE ASEAN SECRETARIAT ON A PRAGMATIC AND PROGRAM-ORIENTED BASIS. AMONG NEW THEMES FOR PACIFIC COOPERATION, MOCHTAR THOUGHT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY WAS MOST PROMISING, FOLLOWED BY TRANSPORTATION AND TOURISM, RESERVING ENVIRONMENT FOR THE LAST BECAUSE IT IS SO CONTROVERSIAL. MOCHTAR SAID HE ALSO WANTS THE DISCUSSION OF PACIFIC ECONOMIC TRENDS TO ENCOMPASS SUCH SUBJECTS AS INCREASED MARKET ACCESS AND, IN THIS CONTEXT, THE PRESENT PATTERN OF 6-PLUS-1 DIALOGUES AT THE ANNUAL MINISTERIAL MEETING MIGHT NOT BE NECESSARY. MOCHTAR SAID THAT IT WAS AGREED TO BRING IN

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OTHER PACIFIC COUNTRIES (POSSIBLY EVEN THE SOVIET UNION AND VIETNAM EVENTUALLY) ON AN AD HOC BASIS ON THE PROGRAM LEVEL, BUT HE BELIEVES THAT THE POLICY PROCESS SHOULD REMAIN FIRMLY WITH THE 6-PLUS-5 COUNTRIES CONSTITUTING A "STEERING COMMITTEE," A "VERY SELECT CLUB" IN HIS VIEW.

13. COMMENT: MOCHTAR WAS RELAXED AND EXPANSIVE DURING THE WIDE-RANGING CONVERSATION. IT WAS EVIDENT FROM THE DISCUSSION OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIA NWFZ, HOWEVER, THAT HE NEEDS TO LEARN MORE OF OUR VIEWS ON THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE ASEAN PROPOSAL - CURRENTLY BEING PUSHED BY THE INDONESIANS -- AND THE INHERENT DIFFICULTIES OF PROVIDING FOR AN ADEQUATE STRATEGIC DEFENSE THAT SERVES THE INTERESTS NOT ONLY OF THE U.S. BUT ALSO OF THE ASEAN COUNTRIES THEMSELVES. THESE AND OTHER REGIONAL TOPICS WILL BE PURSUED DURING ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWTZ' FORTHCOMING CONSULTATIONS IN JAKARTA AND KUALA LUMPUR IN EARLY MARCH.

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