

23 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Joe Zaring, NIO/WE  
FROM :  OPA/II  
SUBJECT : Notes on the Seminar on Policy Issues  
Between the US and Western Europe

Attached are the notes that I took as rapporteur for three sessions of the seminar. Following your instructions, participants are not identified by name, and the general points made by each speaker are outlined.

UNCLASSIFIED

11:15 Session: The International context--Western Europe's global interests and perspectives in the next decade

First Speaker

I Introduction

- A. Agreed with the analysis of the threat offered by the morning speaker.
- B. Security issues facing Western Europe can only be analyzed in a world-wide context.

II Relations between Western Europe and the Soviet Union

- A. Western Europe has made a deep investment in European detente over the last 10 years or so. Since Afghanistan, they have attempted to protect these gains from erosion due to events in other parts of the world.
- B. Morning speaker said that Europeans should feel increasingly insecure but do not; this speaker argued that Europeans do feel insecure for several reasons.
  - 1. Their exposed geographic position produces nearly permanent sense of insecurity.
  - 2. The Soviet build-up is an increasing source of concern among western publics.
  - 3. The implications of the Soviet use of force in Afghanistan are clear.
  - 4. There is declining confidence in the US connection that transcends the issue of military strength.
    - a. Fear that US political system can no longer provide clear and consistent leadership
    - b. This in part accounts for Western Europe's increased assertiveness and independence in foreign affairs.
  - 5. The breakdown in the tone and direction of US-Soviet relations is worrisome.
    - a. They do not see a US vision of how relations with the Soviets should evolve.
    - b. This accounts in part for the separate initiatives by Schmidt and Giscard towards a dialogue with Moscow.
    - c. Western Europe is pessimistic about the prospects for an improved security situation over the next 1-3 years. This will produce a continuous search in European policies for ways to control or reduce tensions.

1. More independent initiatives worldwide
2. A search for arms control progress in Europe-TNF decision could unravel; CDE likely to be embraced-both mean increased tensions with the US.
3. Pressure on the US to restore some of the pre-Afghanistan climate of negotiations with the Soviet Union. Ironically, US policy will seem even more inconsistent if it shifts course.

### III Relations among West European nations-a European Foreign Policy?

- A. Actual integration of Foreign policies is and will remain very limited
- B. To the extent that policies have become more coordinated or unified, it is in opposition to US policies.
  1. Watered down sanctions towards Iran and Soviet Union.
  2. Ec Mid-east initiative.
- C. Individual nations do show signs of increasing their role outside Europe (France, UK, FRG), but this does not mean a European policy or presence.
- D. The structural or institutional basis for a truly European policy is lacking in these activities.
  1. Should not overemphasize the increasingly close France-FRG consultations in this regard. This special relationship is based heavily on the special rapport between Giscard and Schmidt.
- E. In the area of alliance defenses, the Europeans will remain dependent on the US.

### IV The Role of Western Europe in the Third World (particularly the Persian Gulf)

- A. An historical reminder-it has always been difficult if not impossible to create concerted US-WE policies.
- B. The threat of the oil supply in the Persian Gulf is a far more salient issue of common concern than previous problems like Vietnam, but the difficulties of concerted action remain high.
- C. Europe is generally unwilling to participate in a worldwide, Western political-military policy. They tend to look at problems as regional and local, while the US tends to see them as part of a larger, global, E-W problem.
- D. Invasion of Afghanistan forces Europe to recognize growing Soviet role in Third World, but they will continue to look to the US to provide a counterpoise to Soviet power. Ironically, Europe expects the US to react, but is critical and fearful of over-reaction. On

the other hand, Europe will also be critical of an under-reaction by the US to Soviet challenges.

- E. The division of labor idea
    - 1. Attractive in Europe, but if US carries entire political-military burden outside the alliance, the Europeans are relieved of the need to cooperate politically
    - 2. Europe argues that US tends to be insensitive to local factors and political-economic realities, leading to an overemphasis on military responses
  - F. A structural problem-there is no visible forum for US-WE consultations on Third World issues.
    - 1. Consultations would not eliminate any fundamental differences but could contribute to a greater sense of shared political responsibilities.
    - 2. It is important for consultations to be visible to the attentive public in both the US and Europe to increase the sense of common interests and cohesion of purpose and even action.
- V Conclusion: Generally pessimistic. US and W. Europe likely to diverge more in the next 5 years in their analysis of problems and their policies.

## Second Speaker

### I Introduction

- A. Agreed with the pessimism expressed by the other speakers about the prospects for US-W Europe coordination in dealing with world problems.
- B. Proposes to look at the larger, systemic problems facing the West over the longer term.

### II Threat definition.

- A. Agrees with previous speakers that this is the important starting point.
- B. West must decide which of two major threats it will focus on.
  - 1. The Soviet Union, which poses the challenge of a competing empire.
  - 2. The Third World, which can be seen as the "revolting subjects" in the declining western empire.

- C. Argues that the Third World threat is the more important one over the long term to both the West and the Soviet Union.
  - 1. an economic threat resources
  - 2. a threat to the conception the West has of itself as the proponent of values such as justice, equality, democracy and freedom.
  - 3. an area for increasing East-West competition.
- D. Western Europe inclined to emphasize Third World problems for the West.
  - 1. economic dependence
  - 2. cannot deal with Soviet threat independently, but it can develop its own policies for the Third World and thus satisfy the psychological need to have an independent role and to influence their own destiny.
  - 3. Sees the Third World threat not posed by Soviet Union but by LDCs.
- E. US emphasizes Soviet threat in the Third World
  - 1. A basic conflict with Europe.
  - 2. For this reason, NATO cannot act versus problems in the Third World.
  - 3. This is troublesome because the major challenges will come there, and an alliance loses its vitality if it never acts.

### III How to deal with the Soviet threat.

- A. The systemic problem involves the interrelationship between the global strategic triangle (US-SU-PRC) with lesser triangles, such as regional power systems or the maritime triangle (US-WE-Japan).
- B. Two ways to control this threat
  - 1. Mechanical approach-continue to contain Soviet power to the Eurasian continent and even within Soviet borders.
  - 2. Organic approach-coax the Soviets to join other triangles and accept the common interests this would create with other developed nations-an enlarged Sonnenfeldt Doctrine
- C. This speaker's prescription-discard containment and attempt the organic approach.

1. Soviet Union much like other emerging great powers in history; it demands the satisfaction of seeing its influence and power increase in the world.
2. If this drive is frustrated indefinitely, as was the case with Germany until 1945, major wars will have to be fought to make containment succeed.
3. In a nuclear age, this is a blueprint for tremendous cost and sacrifice; West should allow Soviets to supplement its strategic parity with geopolitical parity. Allow Moscow to expand its influence and power into the Third World, joining the maritime triangle in what may become the "recolonization", in practical terms, of the world
4. Advantages of this approach.
  - a. Allows the continued containment of Soviet power in Europe and the Far East without totally frustrating the Soviet demand for expansion, the historical right of all great powers
  - b. an affinity of interest with other maritime powers in controlling events in the Third World will be increased
  - c. would legitimize the Soviet regime internally by producing success. This would lay the groundwork for regime liberalization.
  - d. could resolve the problem of European history, to wit, the periodic drive of a continental power for hegemony there, and the resultant tension this has produced between Eastern and Western Europe.

D. This analysis is meant for a long term policy approach.

#### IV How to deal with the Third World threat.

- A. A design for control is implicit in the approach to the Soviet threat.
- B. Numerous, autonomous developments make this difficult to deal with.
- C. Soviet cooperation must be elicited, and this requires that containment be discarded in this area.
- D. Western Europe more likely to support this long term US approach because it deflects the Soviet threat to them.
- E. The key question for US policymakers is this: where in the third world will we allow the Soviets to expand their influence? The speaker seems to envisage a re-play of the "great game" between Britain and Russia in the 19th Century in Southwest Asia. This time, the Soviets will be allowed to expand if they allow the west to dominate in other areas in the region (e.g. the Iranian oil fields)

Discussion of the Speaker's Presentations

The Second speaker was asked what it meant to give the Soviets geopolitical parity. He responded it means not opposing every Soviet effort at expansion.

First speaker was asked whether Europe would agree with US about where the Soviets should be allowed to expand. He stated that Europeans question whether turbulence in the Third World is in fact the result of Soviet expansionism or due to local developments.

UNCLASSIFIED

-7-

4:15 PM Session: The prospects for "Europe"

First Speaker

This speaker chose to address the questions on the outline of topics to be considered in the NIE.

- I Will the number and importance of interests and problems the Europeans have in common increase or decline in the 1980s?
- A. The two biggest problems are Energy and the Soviet threat.
    - 1. They cannot be solved or dealt with by individual nations. If Europeans are rational they will respond in a supranational way.
    - 2. Other serious problems that demand supranational solutions-terrorism, environmental problems, resource depletion.
  - B. Energy
    - 1. The OPEC cartel can best be balanced by a unified consumer group
    - 2. The long term solution-replacing oil with alternative sources-requires massive investments and rationally suggests a division of labor on a European scale, or best of all, on an OECD scale.
    - 3. In the nuclear power field, chances for an integrative solution are increased by the fact that France is the leader in nuclear power technology. Normally opposed to supranational approaches, France may be amenable to a common approach under French leadership.
    - 4. EC institutions mitigate the possibility of "every man for himself" responses to future energy crises. This constrains fragmentation, although it does not guarantee collaboration.
  - C. The Soviet Threat
    - 1. By this phrase, the speaker means not only a threat of military attack, but also the dangers of political intimidation, the breakdown of West European institutions like the EC and NATO through a process of "Finlandization," and the control of the Soviet Union over Western energy supplies.



2. Obviously, individual nations lack the capacity to protect themselves against Soviet power
3. Argued that W. Europe alone cannot and will not provide for its own defense in the next few years, although in the long run this is a possibility.

II Will these interests and problems be perceived by the Europeans to be shared?

- A. Public opinion polls were used to deduce European perceptions.
- B. On some issues, they do see the necessity for European solutions.
  1. Some evidence of a trend back towards a supranational approach.
  2. Since Afghanistan, some shift in perspective back towards an Atlantic viewpoint.
- C. Until 1979, there had been an appalling decline in support for NATO at the elite and public levels in all nations to varying degrees. Since then, a re-birth of sorts in support, although gradually
- D. The same trends are true in opinion towards the EC.
  1. Within the original 6 members, support is very solid in all parties, even the communist parties
  2. Support for unity less strong in the 3 newest members.
- E. At elite level, a sample of candidates for the European parliament suggest these conclusions.
  1. Fairly high levels of support for European approaches to economic problems, including the energy problem
  2. On defense and foreign policy matters, opinion is less supportive and more divided across the party spectrum. Only 37% show full support for NATO.

Second Speaker

I Introduction

- A. The prospects for European unity.
  1. In 50's, the growth of institutions gave reason for optimism.

2. In 60's and early 70's the personalities involved gave reason for optimism
  3. In 80's there are positive prospects in neither area.
- B. There is a relatively high level of disorganization and decentralization in European integration.
1. An image of Europe-a convoy of trucks, driving in line but with many independent steering mechanisms.
  2. This complexity does not mean that Europe is becoming less integrated or unified than before; the ambiguity should be tolerated by analysts
- C. Two major issues for the next five years
1. Potential for conflict between the EC and Japan
  2. European monetary integration.

## II The Questions under "Prospects for Europe" on the outline.

- A. Will the number and importance of common interests and problems perceived by Europeans increase or decline?
1. Diversity of approach will persist on economic issues because each nation's situation is different.
  2. On security affairs, a common problem of US-Soviet relations must be dealt with, but diverse responses will also occur
  3. Because each state is organized differently in its welfare structure, there will be no common approach to recalibrating their welfare programs in the face of similar economic challenges
- B. What domestic political groups are most likely to favor "Europe-building"
1. A homogenous Europe ruled by center-right parties is the most committed to unity for electoral purposes, but is the least likely to pursue it once in office-once in power there is less need to actually achieve progress.
  2. If the left ruled in Europe, they would be the least committed to unity but more likely to pursue it when in power because this could help them stay in power.

3. FRG has economic status to serve as core for economic integration, but it has a security deficit and is more tied to the US than to European unity to solve this problem. Bonn also sees itself as an island of economic stability surrounded by growing instability and this is a source of tensions with other states.
- C. The role of personalities and leadership. The new generation of leaders have no sense of commitment to European institutions. Instead, they are pragmatists coping with national problems as they arise. This is not conducive to increased unity.
- D. The influence of the international context.
1. Afghanistan has highlighted fact that Europe perceives interests that diverge from US
  2. Role of Japan will be important-possibility of United efforts to block Japanese penetration of European markets.
- E. How is Europe likely to move towards more effective consensus-building?
1. Most likely source for movement, a crisis that forces unity if Europe is to survive.
  2. If there is no crisis, it can only evolve through a process of consultation and coordination. Ironically, this process can blunt the application of power and influence by particular European states in the world.
  3. Future developments will be influenced most by domestic politics in each nation
- F. European attitudes towards US leadership.
1. Just as confusion exists in US minds, it also exists among Europeans
  2. They simultaneously complain that there is too much and too little US leadership on different issues, and sometimes on the same one.
  3. At times, they measure US performance against old standard of 1950's, when US was the imperial power. At other times, they measure the current US performance against their 1970's expectations of weak and declining US leadership.

Discussion of the presentations

Second speaker was asked why we should take comfort in the confusion that exists in Europe over its future role. He argued that Europe's caution about its role in the world is a positive development historically. Prior to 1945, Europeans sought to control events in and out of their region with their power, and this was destabilizing for the world. The questioner then asked whether this was good, as the rest of the world is not at the same sophisticated stage of development. Another participant suggested Europe's caution could also be seen as a sign of decadence and lost vitality.

Commenting on the polls cited by the first speaker that show increasing but still modest support for NATO, another participant asked why no parties have run on an anto-NATO platform. He suggested that despite what polls say, there is a real consensus in Europe for NATO and the US security connection. When compared to previous historical periods, Europeans believe that a relative increase in security has been obtained.

Another participant followed this comment up by asking why should the US want to push Europe back into the role of a great power. The payoffs in the past were mixed, at best, and US pressure runs counter to the habit of depending on the US that now exists in Europe. This participant also suggested that the questions on the prospects for Europe are not relevant to a study of the policy differences between the US and Europe.

One participant agreed, and argued that European integration in the 80's is very unlikely. Even the Benelux nations cannot integrate, and to hope for more ignores the forces of nationalism. There are other ways to encourage Europe to be more active in the world than by encouraging integration first.

The first speaker disagreed in part. He agreed that supra-national action by Europe is a meaningful goal that many Europeans also hold. Considerable integration has occurred, and we should not minimize it. Just as there is a habit of depending on the US in the security area, there is also a habit in Europe of working together. This should be encouraged by the US.

## 7 PM Session: General Discussion

Participant 5 stressed the important role of institutions in minimizing conflict between the US and Europe. There are institutions available for consultation, and a failure to use them will cause problems. On both sides of the Atlantic, there is a questioning of the capacity of leaders and institutions to provide leadership, and this must be overcome

Participant 9 commented that the type of leadership needed is not the command style, but a style like that of the president of a university. Given the disparate interests and domestic constituencies of each nation, leadership involves listening to the various viewpoints and then attempting to synthesize the ideas obtained. Achieve consensus when it is possible, but accept and understand divergence in Europe if that is the result. Agrees with #5 that a lack of visible collective institutions for consultations and decision-making on issues outside Europe is a major problem.

Participant 5 added that summitry is not the answer. In particular, economic summits cannot be converted into the locus of political consultation and decision-making. The wrong group of leaders and working groups participate. The NATO structure can be made to work, even on out-of-area issues. This requires replacing the current Secretary General, who is now considered to be a disaster by all, and improving the mediocre staff of the permanent secretariat.

Participant 13 disagreed with this emphasis on institutions. No institutions can resolve the differences in perspective that exist. All nations are now preoccupied with domestic problems and this exacerbates difficulty of defining common foreign policies. Only if common international threats become the priority issue for leaders will policy differences among the allies decline.

Participant 11 agreed that domestic political problems complicate the situation. Institutions cannot resolve conflict caused by domestic coalitions in one nation facing off with domestic coalitions in another.

Participant 1 asked how domestic issues can dominate the scene when all agree that security threats are on the rise.

Participant 13 said that the problem is a disbelief among western publics that security threats are increasing.

Participant 9 argued that domestic issues were a major distraction in the past, too. We should not overemphasize their new importance, although they have become somewhat more important.

Participant 5 asserted that blaming domestic factors for conflict among allies is too facile. Pure stupidity and ineptness on the part of leaders is at least as important, especially in the US.

Participant 13 reiterated that domestic influences will pale if the international environment becomes an arena of high tension.

One participant asked whether Europe was willing to go to war over anything.

Participant 12 wondered whether they would if Saudi Arabian oil was threatened. However, a Soviet move against an oil producer would change Europe's state of mind diplomatically back to a cold war outlook.

Participant 13 asserted that Europe doesn't worry about this because they correctly do not believe that Moscow's intention is to take over the oil fields.

Participant 1 asked whether Europe's economic troubles will produce political instability, and cause regime changes towards the left.

Participant 11 stated that from 1973 to 1980 Europe has faced economic troubles, and yet political trends are not the left. We must look for the adaptive mechanisms that are preventing instability.

Participant 5 warned that we should not jump to optimistic conclusions. The real, cumulative impact of economic problems will only be felt in the next five years. Straight line projections are dangerous.

Participant 12 suggested that the politics of inflation are confusing; there are no clear winners or losers. This mitigates the potential for political instability. The cumulative cost of the "oil tax" will have its greatest impact on secondary labor markets (Foreign or guest workers) and the middle class supporters of ruling conservative/center parties. These effects are not likely to be a problem in the next five years but will be after that.

Participant 1 expressed interest in the experimentation idea of speaker 14. How can the Atlantic community accommodate numerous national experiments in coping with economic problems?

Participant 5 said that in dealing with complex economic problems, experimentation has merit. However, if this is the approach towards vital interests, it will threaten western cohesion and US interests.

Participant 1 asked what would happen if experimentation meant economic nationalism and political intervention in markets on the Japanese model.

Participant 12 expressed optimism, asserting that in the long run tolerance of national divergence will reduce tensions.