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<b>TRANSMITTAL SLIP</b>		<b>DATE</b> 8 Nov 83
<b>TO:</b> A/NIO/AL CHRONO		
<b>ROOM NO.</b>	<b>BUILDING</b>	
<b>REMARKS:</b>		
<b>FROM:</b>		
<b>ROOM NO.</b>	<b>BUILDING</b>	<b>EXTENSION</b>

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 8073-83  
8 November 1983

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing on Nuclear Terrorism for the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC), 8 November 1983

1. Participants. The two and one half-hour briefing was conducted in the HFAC hearing room, Chairman Clement Zablocki presiding. The principals were General Hoover of DNA, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, Dr. Richard Wagner, and myself. I was accompanied by [redacted] OALA, who provided the details of the threat, and by [redacted] OGI, who answered questions about terrorist behavior.

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2. Briefing Substance. My presentation covered the following points:

The possibility that nuclear terrorism will occur is a subject of growing concern given the spread of nuclear facilities and materials throughout the world. Nevertheless, our overall perspective is that would-be nuclear terrorists will face immense technological problems in trying to build nuclear weapons with or without patron country support. The most likely form of terrorist incident involving nuclear materials will not involve the fabrication of a bomb by a sub-national group. Rather, if nuclear materials are involved, we will be dealing with either the risk of radiation exposure or a hoax supported by the presence of nuclear materials. I emphasized that we had no clear-cut examples of the acquisition by a sub-national group of significant nuclear material or technology. But because so many variables were involved, the threat that some foreign terrorist group might attempt a potentially serious nuclear operation could not be entirely discounted.

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3. Transcript and Follow-Up. A transcript of the proceedings was prepared and will be available for review. As the briefing broke up, I was asked by HFAC Staffer Arch Roberts if we could provide him and his chief, Bill Barnds, with an update on Indian nuclear test preparations. I said that we would be happy to do so and that he should make arrangements with [redacted] for this purpose.

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[redacted]  
Assistant National Intelligence Officer at Large

cc: C/NIC  
VC/NIC (C. Waterman)  
[redacted] DDI/CSS/OLL

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