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**THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

**Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment**

25 November 1981

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NOTE FOR:

[REDACTED]  
Chairman, National Intelligence  
Council

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[REDACTED] suggested that I seek  
your reactions to the thoughts expressed  
in the attached Memorandum-for-the-  
record before any decision to proceed.  
I would appreciate having your reactions,  
at your convenience. Thanks.

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Attachment:  
As Stated

[REDACTED]

cc: SA/NPI

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

12 November 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Nunn on the Nonproliferation Angle in Dealing with  
the Soviets for Progress in Arms Control

1. General Perspective. It has been my long-term belief that common Soviet-US nonproliferation policies and interests are a ready-made basis on which to build mutual confidence vital not only for achieving nonproliferation goals, but for making progress on a range of arms control issues.

2. Senator Nunn Strikes a Chord. For this reason, I believe that Senator Sam Nunn has presented a reasonable set of ideas for what is to be done to move forward with an arms control policy that, he says, the US "can live with" (see the details in Nunn's "Arms Control: What We Should Do," Washington Post, 12 November 1981).

3. Prescription: A Crisis Management Group. The centerpiece of Nunn's prescriptions that have to do with increasing stability in nuclear crises (and that would necessitate substantial Soviet-US cooperation) is the creation of a military crisis control center. It is partly described as monitoring and containing the use of nuclear weapons by third parties or terrorist groups. Its purpose is said to provide the mechanism that gives each side more confidence in the facts during a nuclear crisis. US and Soviet leaders thereby would be afforded a better chance to determine the origin and parties responsible for any explosion of nuclear weapons.

4. Role of Intelligence and Proposed Actions. As with all such conceptual arrangements, and should such a crisis control center ever come to pass, intelligence would play the vital role. With this in mind, the following actions are proposed:

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--that we look into an invitation to Senator Nunn,  
and members of his staff, to have discussions in  
the near future with the DCI/DDCI (and selected key  
senior intelligence authorities and analysts)  
focussed on the contents of Post article; and

--in preparation for such discussions, we propose  
that a paper be prepared that would flag in a  
general way the prospective problems in ultimately  
achieving anything like the crisis management center  
described by Nunn (to include the fundamental problems  
of Soviet receptivity and disposition to join with the  
US in such an undertaking\*) and any potential payoffs  
for progress in other areas of arms control.

These would be the necessary and important first steps if the DCI would  
wish to earnestly explore what is a reasonable--and perhaps promising--  
set of ideas (expressed in a "bipartisan spirit"). In the end, the DCI  
could decide whether or not there is merit in the concept for such a  
crisis control center and could make his views known to Secretaries  
Haig and Weinberger and Director Rostow, et.al.

5. Should SA/NPI Take an Initiative? If most of the above is found  
to be congenial, the wheels can start turning with an FYI memo to the DCI  
(via the DD/NFA) calling attention to the article (in the context, inter  
alia, of our ongoing work on nuclear terrorism) and asking if he wished to  
pursue the matter with Nunn along the lines outlined above. It would, of  
course, be pointed out that the bulk of any followup work in the govern-  
ment would have to be done on the policy side--I suppose mostly by the  
ACDA.



Deputy SA/NPI

\*The analysis to be done on these sorts of considerations would  
have to take into account whether or not the Soviets (and the US)  
would be likely to have a stake in the outcome of the kinds of  
crises that are foreseen, i.e., the extent to which vital national  
interests would come into play.

cc:

