



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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July 20, 1981

CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM

TO : CIA/SA/NPI -

FROM : INR/PMA - Robert A. Martin CC *for RM*

SUBJECT : Tarapur and IAEA DG

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We have been asked by OES to obtain, on an extremely urgent basis, a CIA assessment on the following:

1. Under what circumstances, if any would the Soviets support or not object to the candidacy of Neils Holm (Denmark) for IAEA Director General. We need to know what could be offered to the Soviets in return for their support of Holm.
2. Where India will likely turn for Tarapur fuel supply and why Sethna appears to favor US supply over any other. Also we need a further elaboration of what Gonsalves' "third course" consists as noted on New Delhi 13493 (attached). This information is needed urgently as the US Delegation will be leaving for India on July 25.

We would appreciate your response by COB, July 22.

Attachment:
New Delhi 13493 (Confidential)

cc: CIA/OSWR -

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Drafted: INR/PMA/NSCCohen

State Dept. review completed

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TELEGRAM

Department of State

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C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 13493

FOR NEA/INS ONLY; THREE COPIES ONLY; FOR SCHAFER FROM
SCHNEIDER

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/17/87 (SCHNEIDER, DAVID T.) OR-M
TAGS: OGEN

SUBJECT: RDP: CIA: INFORMAL INFO: TIS

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AT THE END OF A LONG TALK ON INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH ERIC GONSALVES JULY 17 WE BRIEFLY DISCUSSED TARAPUR. ALTHOUGH I DOUBT ANYTHING WAS SAID WHICH YOU DON'T ALREADY KNOW, I THOUGHT I SHOULD REPORT IT NEVERTHELESS. YOU MAY WISH TO SHARE THIS WITH OES.
3. AT THE OUTSET I POINTED OUT TO GONSALVES THAT I HAD NOT YET BEEN IN WASHINGTON AND THAT I DID NOT KNOW THE POSITIONS OUR DELEGATION TO THE COMING TALKS WOULD TAKE. THEREFORE, I WAS SPEAKING ON MY OWN INITIATIVE AND ENTIRELY PERSONALLY.
4. I FOUND GONSALVES QUITE NEGATIVE ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE TALKS MEETING OUR REQUIREMENTS. HE STUCK ENTIRELY TO THE LINE THAT WE WERE BREAKING A CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION AND ASKING FOR A FURTHER AGREEMENT WITHOUT OFFERING ANYTHING IN RETURN. HE LISTED THE THINGS WE WANTED AND WAS PARTICULARLY EMPHATIC IN SAYING THAT THEY COULD NOT AGREE TO CONTINUED SAFEGUARDS. HE SPOKE OF THEIR PROBLEM WITH PARLIAMENT BUT SAID THAT IT WAS FOR US TO MANAGE OUR PROBLEM WITH THE CONGRESS.
5. AT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION AS I PAUSED BEFORE STARTING TO LEAVE, GONSALVES VOLUNTEERED THAT THERE MAY BE ANOTHER COURSE. THIS HE SAID, WOULD HAVE TO BE ENTIRELY WITHIN THE INDIAN POLITICAL CONTEXT. MEANING, I TOOK IT, THAT IT COULD NOT BE A PART OF ANY AGREEMENT WITH US. I ASKED HIM WHAT HE MEANT. HE REPLIED, WITHOUT ELABORATING THAT THE GOI MIGHT MAKE A STATEMENT BEFORE PARLIAMENT OUTLINING ITS POSITION REGARDING FUEL SUPPLY FOR TARAPUR. AS A RESPONSIBLE MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, HE NOTED THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS NOT TO BE PASSED TO OUR DELEGATION. (I CONSIDER THIS TO MEAN THAT WE CANNOT BE OFFICIALLY AWARE OF THIS UNLESS THE INDIANS RAISE IT IN OUR DISCUSSIONS.) PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF HIS EARLIER REJECTION OF SAFEGUARDS AND AGAIN EMPHASIZING THAT I WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT I DOUBTED THAT WHAT HE HAD IN MIND WOULD MEET OUR NEEDS.
6. INCIDENTALLY, GONSALVES SPOKE OF THE ALTERNATIVE DATES THEY HAD PROPOSED FOR THE COMING TALKS AND SAID HE VERY MUCH HOPED THE TALKS COULD TAKE PLACE SOON AND ON ONE OF THOSE DATES. BLOOD

HRM
Notes!

FYI

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