THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

19 June 1981

NOTE FOR: Deputy Director for National

Foreign Assessment

SUBJECT: Conference - Nuclear Proliferation

Intelligence Through the 1980s

This notebook contains background materials for next week's proliferation conference—I hope the planes will be flying. Please let me know if you would like to discuss the talking points prepared for your use (Tab B). I met with Admiral Inman this morning to discuss conference preparations and his talking points (Tab E). I also thanked him for his participation. He underscored the importance of the topic and noted his agreement to keynote the conference

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Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

19 June 1981

NOTE FOR: Deputy Director of Central

Intelligence

FROM:

Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence

SUBJECT: Nuclear Proliferation Conference

The attached notebook contains background materials for the subject conference. $% \begin{center} \end{center} \begin{center} \begin{center}$

Suggested Talking Points for DD/NFA Presentation, "National Foreign Assessment: Organization, Priorities, and Trends" (0930 hours, Thursday, 25 June 1981)

concern about the spread of nuclear capabilities and weapons to additional countries, particularly those in volatile areas of the Third World.

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- --This problem and other highly complex Third World issues are receiving greater attention and emphasis within the Intelligence Community. And the relevant research and analysis <u>capabilities</u> of the National Foreign Assessment Center are being upgraded. We attach a high priority to this effort.
- -- The results should be evident in not too distant future.
- --Concerning the treatment of proliferation-related issues, I believe that the intelligence process can only benefit from a close working relationship between you-the policy officials-and intelligence analysts and managers.
- --Feedback from the policy side as part of a close policy-intelligence interchange inevitably will carry the benefit of improving what we call "national foreign assessment" in this vital area.
- --Our collective efforts will increase in importance as we move through this decade--a decade that carries the potential for the emergence of additional nuclear-armed states, as well as more countries that will be in the international market selling their nuclear materials and facilities.
- --In conjunction with your work in the area of proliferation policy, I invite you to call on me when you have needs for intelligence support that are not being met. I hope, of course, that we will be able to anticipate your needs in many instances.

 will tell you more about how we are set up to
support you in the proliferation area. In his capacity as
my special assistant for nuclear proliferation intelligence
his functions and responsibilities are quite like those of
the National Intelligence Officers.

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Suggested Talking Points for DDCI Presentation, "Nuclear Proliferation: The Role of the Intelligence Community" (0900 hours, Thursday, 25 June)

the potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional countries, a subject that has received considerable attention by the Intelligence Community in recent years.

- --It is an issue whose priority is formally recognized by intelligence to be of <u>critical importance</u> to US political, economic, and military interests.
- --A number of agencies of the NFIB have either initiated or participate in a diverse set of collection programs tailored to produce information pertaining to the motivations of countries and their nuclear progress and goals. Some are quite innovative and are paying off now. We must wait a while to see the fruits of others.
- --You will later receive detailed briefings concerning the status of the most important of these collection efforts. You will get a better sense for their payoff in the discussions of particular countries of concern that are on your agenda for today.
- --On the <u>analysis</u> and <u>assessments</u> side of our business we have been giving increasing attention to the decisionmaking process and political determinants that underlie a national, weapons-oriented, nuclear development effort.
- --Unfortunately, the information needed for this purpose is the <u>weakest component of our intelligence base</u>. And this, of course, is a consequence of the great secrecy typically surrounding the handling of these matters by national authorities.

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question with which you will be grappling—the spread of nuclear capabilities to Third World countries—and the chaotic political conditions of the Middle East.

- --The discussions that take place here are sure to contribute to the course being followed or set for dealing with the principal countries of current concern-India, Pakistan, Libya, Iraq, Israel, and South Africa. In this connection, we should hope to come away with a better understanding of the phenomena stimulating these countries to build nuclear explosives.
- --The Administration in its recent review of its nuclear proliferation and cooperation policies committed itself to a continuing strong intelligence effort. It also has stated that improvements will be made as needed. I trust that you will be able to identify such needs as one outcome of the deliberations that will take place over the next two days.
- --In the meantime, the DCI and I will do our part to ensure that intelligence in this area will be the best available.