

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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Executive Secretary
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Office of the Vice-President

September 9, 1985

Record

Director
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Dear Sir:

Would someone please send me a copy of the CIA testimony referred to here in this reply by Edward Jay Epstein to criticism of his criticism of the Shevchenko book, in which the agency "itself revealed to the Church Committee" that The Penkovski (sic) Papers, published by Doubleday in 1965, was concocted by the CIA's covert action division"?

Many thanks.

Best,

Samuel S. Vaughan (j)

Samuel S. Vaughan
Editor-in-Chief

SSV:lr
Enc.



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'BREAKING WITH MOSCOW': AN EXCHANGE

Editor's note: In his best-selling memoir, Breaking with Moscow, the former Soviet diplomat Arkady Shevchenko describes a colorful career spying for the United States before his defection from a high United Nations post in April 1978. In our issue of July 15&22, we published an article by Edward Jay Epstein asserting that many of the details in Shevchenko's story are demonstrably false, and casting doubt on Shevchenko's claim to have been a valuable spy for the United States.

In addition to the following letters from Shevchenko's editor and from the producer of a "60 Minutes" presentation of his story, an anonymous representative of the Central Intelligence Agency telephoned TNR and several other news organizations with the following statement: "Shevchenko provided invaluable information to the U.S. government. The CIA had nothing to do with writing the book." Finally, on July 31—a month after the article was released—Shevchenko himself held a press conference at the National Press Club in Washington, denying Epstein's charges.

To the editors:

Edward Jay Epstein's "review" of Arkady Shevchenko's *Breaking with Moscow* is so riddled with errors, misrepresentations, and leaps of judgment that one scarcely knows where to begin a rejoinder. But having talked to the author, as well as to knowledgeable authorities, we are convinced that Shevchenko's memoir is reliable. . . .

The *New York Times* on July 1, 1985, effectively demolished several of Epstein's charges; others of his accusations reflect attempts to strip Shevchenko of his verisimilitude. For example, Epstein writes: "The book details a wealth of espionage coups [Epstein's word] Shev-

chenko accomplished *before* the end of 1975." It is illogical to assume that Shevchenko would not discuss what the Soviets had done in the months before his defection. Epstein further claims: "There is no real evidence that whatever valuable information supplied came before rather than after his defection." But several people in positions of knowledge, including Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Admiral Stansfield Turner, have refuted that allegation,



DRAWING BY MICHAEL C. WITTE FOR THE NEW REPUBLIC

and the CIA has issued a statement that Shevchenko "provided invaluable intelligence to the United States government."

Of Epstein's many charges we have been able to find only two with any validity, both minor confusions in chronology. He is correct that the dinner meeting between Shevchenko, Boris Solomatin, and Georgy Arbatov could not have occurred in 1976, but Shevchenko told me after reading the Epstein article that it did take place in 1975, at a time when Arbatov was certainly pondering the 1976 elections, especially given the political fallout after Watergate. Shev-

chenko now also agrees that he could not have considered approaching John Scali about his defection in late 1975, because by then Scali had been replaced as U.N. ambassador by Moynihan, but that he thought about revealing himself to Scali early in 1975, and not as he had written.

What Epstein omits is equally instructive as to his line of attack. He disregards Moynihan's published and broadcast support of Shevchenko. When asked on "60 Minutes" of his evaluation of Shevchenko, Moynihan said: "For the first time we got an understanding of how Soviet foreign policy is made and how it is operating." Your readers are free to choose the more reliable authority. . . .

It is only fair to ask what Epstein is trying to prove. That the CIA wrote *Breaking with Moscow*? (The agency officers are portrayed as manipulative and sometimes insensitive.) That the book is a piece of CIA disinformation? (The hawks in this administration might not appreciate Shevchenko's conclusion that we must continue "to seek reasonable and practical accommodation" with the Soviets.) That Shevchenko was not a CIA informant for more than two years? (Various American officials whom Epstein apparently didn't interview have attested to Shevchenko's bona fides.) Or is Epstein trying

to connect Shevchenko to his favorite espionage subjects, Yuri Nosenko, Fedora, and Top Hat, all of whom manage their way into his article, and all of whom will presumably people his own book on disinformation that he is writing for Simon and Schuster?

However much Epstein has tried to damage Shevchenko, he has not made a case. *Breaking with Moscow* stands as an extraordinary memoir, and it will survive Edward Jay Epstein's bizarre fulminations.

ASHBEL GREEN
Editor-in-chief, Alfred A. Knopf

To the editors:

In response to the article by Edward Jay Epstein, I find it interesting that he didn't go to any people who were involved with Mr. Shevchenko at the time he was a double agent. One of these people was Stansfield Turner, former director of the CIA. Another was a deep-cover CIA agent who participated in the Shevchenko operation in New York. A third was Senator Daniel Moynihan, who was briefed by the agency about the entire Shevchenko matter while he was still a member of the intelligence committee. All verified to us the extent and value of Shevchenko's service.

An additional note: One month after doing the "60 Minutes" report on Shevchenko, we profiled President Jimmy Carter. In an off-camera discussion the former president verified and confirmed to us the immeasurable value Shevchenko provided American intelligence.

IRA ROSEN
Producer, "60 Minutes"

Edward Jay Epstein replies:

There are few, if any, precedents for the CIA identifying one of its own alleged agents in a semi-anonymous telephone tip to the media. The Shevchenko affair, however, is hardly settled by this extraordinary phone call. What the CIA avoided saying, even when later pressed, was whether Shevchenko provided "invaluable information" before or after his defection. If before, he was a spy. If after, he was a consultant.

There's no doubt Shevchenko had contacts with American intelligence before his defection, as I stated in my review. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan fixes the date of his initial feeler as December 5, 1975. That doesn't make him an American spy. There were regular contacts with other Soviet diplomats, such as "Fedora" and "Top Hat," who the FBI later decided were dangling disinformation. This is one of the regular occupations of Soviet diplomats at the U.N.

Admiral Stansfield Turner, who was director of central intelligence at the time of Shevchenko's defection, also claims that he furnished "valuable intelligence"—though without specifying when. In his own recent memoir, *Secrecy and Democracy*, Turner makes only a single reference to Shevchenko, in which he gets the first name of this alleged CIA masterspy wrong ("Andrei" instead of Arkady), misspells his sur-

name, and misidentifies his position at the U.N. ("number two man in the Soviet Mission," rather than under secretary general). The only thing Turner claims to have learned from Shevchenko, even after he had defected, was that "even senior Soviet diplomats hesitate to report frankly." While this may have been considered "valuable intelligence," it is not the secrets, coded messages, and missile negotiating positions that Shevchenko claims to have provided.

The CIA's denial that it wrote the book—an allegation I never made—artfully evades the real issue: Did the CIA foist the Shevchenko-supermole story on the American public in order to improve its image? To begin with, the CIA was not an uninterested party. Unlike most other spy books by Soviet defectors that reveal KGB operations, *Breaking with Moscow* divulges what purports to be a major CIA espionage success against the Soviet Union. Every act of espionage involves a double secret. The first part is the stolen information. The second part is the fact that the information has been stolen. The second secret is crucial because once an enemy finds out that it has been the victim of espionage, it can remedy the situation or even turn it to advantage. That is why spies photocopy or memorize documents, rather than remove them. Even years after the fact, spies cannot reveal operations without jeopardizing intelligence services' prized sources and methods.

If Shevchenko published the story of his alleged spying without the express authorization of the CIA, and if it was not fictional, he would be in blatant breach of American laws designed to protect intelligence secrets. And the CIA would hardly endorse such a leak. (The only other book that reveals a major CIA espionage operation, *The Penkovskiy Papers*, published by Doubleday in 1965, was concocted by the CIA's covert action division, as the CIA itself revealed to the Church Committee.)

Shevchenko, who got paid \$60,000 a year as a consultant by the U.S. government after his defection, was well aware of these restrictions. Indeed, if his arrangement was the same as previous defector-consultants, he had a secrecy obligation that specified: "Your relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency and this contract must be kept secret and you may not discuss

any aspect of this relationship with any person other than the authorized government representative or such other persons as he may specifically approve." In the course of a 1981 lawsuit against his previous publisher, Simon and Schuster, Shevchenko stated under oath that he was not at liberty to discuss any relations he had with U.S. intelligence. His subsequent decision to publish his alleged adventures with the CIA must therefore have been authorized.

We also know that the CIA played more than a passive role in promoting the Shevchenko story. In 1979 a Soviet defector named Stanislav Levchenko, who was in the custody of the CIA after being flown in from Tokyo, told the story of Shevchenko as a supermole to *Reader's Digest* editor John Barron. Barron, in a letter to *The New Republic*, protested that he did not know then or now that Levchenko was under CIA control. Though I have no reason to doubt his sincerity, the fact remains that Levchenko did deliver CIA secrets to Barron (including the identity and recruitment of three CIA clandestine agents) when he was under CIA parole. This means that Levchenko could have been arbitrarily deported, without any redress, if he made a wrong move, or otherwise displeased the CIA. He then very possibly might have faced a Soviet firing squad. In these circumstances, Levchenko delivered the Shevchenko story to Barron for publication and (as Barron acknowledges) reviewed the subsequent *Reader's Digest* story for accuracy before it was published. It is inconceivable that Levchenko would gratuitously violate his parole and divulge CIA secrets to Barron, who was a total stranger to him, unless he had done so at the behest of the CIA. As in other such cases, Levchenko presumably had a "brief" from the CIA specifying exactly what he could say to Barron about Shevchenko. If so, the CIA planted the spy story.

The CIA involvement with the Shevchenko story apparently continued up until its publication. Ira Rosen, the "60 Minutes" producer, asserts that "a deep-cover CIA agent," who purportedly was involved with Shevchenko while he was at the U.N., verified Shevchenko's espionage story. Since CIA deep-cover agents do not (by definition) ordinarily blow their own cover and reveal secret CIA espionage activities just to help hype a book, this alleged agent pre-

sumably told "60 Minutes" whatever it was he told them at the behest of the CIA.

That the CIA went to considerable length to release, plant, and hype this spy story does not, of course, mean that it isn't true. The release of espionage cases does, however, raise a perverse accuracy problem. Admiral Turner, who saw an urgent need to enhance public and congressional support of the CIA under his stewardship, discusses the dilemma in his book: "Clearly it is impossible for the CIA to attempt to raise public confidence by revealing very much about how successful spies are." The alternative would be pseudo-spy stories, which brings us to Ashbel Green's letter and Shevchenko's press conference.

FOR A MONTH after my article appeared, Shevchenko was not to be found. Ashbel Green told reporters on June 28 that Shevchenko was "out of the country" and "unreachable." Shevchenko's lawyer told journalists the same thing. Actually, on June 28 Shevchenko was at his home at 4941 Tilden Avenue Northwest in Washington, D.C. On that day he wrote a check for \$16,850.62 to Simon and Schuster (partial repayment of an advance they'd paid him), and sent it by Express Mail. I have a copy of the signed and dated Express Mail receipt. When he suddenly surfaced at the July 31 press conference, Shevchenko conceded that he had not been out of the country when his spokesmen said he was.

At that press conference, Shevchenko accused me of "terroristic journalism." He called my allegations "ridiculous," asserted that "he didn't read my book," and implied that I was working in cahoots with the Soviet Union to undermine him. He asserted that if his book is a fraud, "then two presidents of the United States are frauds, both Carter and Reagan, who knew about my story." (Neither Carter nor Reagan has verified Shevchenko's story. Reagan, of course, was a private citizen and resident of California at the time of Shevchenko's alleged spying career.)

However, neither Shevchenko nor Ashbel Green, in his only slightly more subdued letter, has disproved any of my specific examples of fabrication. In fact, Shevchenko conceded several key falsehoods. ("In some places, I was a little bit mistaken.")

The most important admission of

falsehood (which Green cavalierly dismisses as a "minor confusion in chronology") concerns Shevchenko's purported meeting with Boris Solomatin, the Soviet deputy minister at the U.N., and Georgy Arbatov, the noted Soviet Americanist, in 1976. This meeting, which he describes in great detail, is important because it is the culmination of a year of alleged spying. Shevchenko describes a session with his FBI case officer ("Grogan") and his CIA case officer ("Johnson") just before the meeting, in which they tell him what they'd like him to find out. He positively dates the meeting by writing: "Soon after I described that evening to Johnson, a new resident came to New York to replace Boris Solomatin . . . Drozdov."

The problem, as I pointed out in my article, is that Drozdov replaced Solomatin on July 22, 1975. That means that this entire conversation with Solomatin, set in 1976, and containing verbatim quotes about the imminent American election, could not have taken place as described. Shevchenko now admits he was in error about the date, and claims the meeting occurred in 1975, before Solomatin's departure. Back-dating the meeting, however, compounds rather than solves the contradiction. For if the meeting occurred in 1975, when Solomatin was still in his post, then it occurred before the earliest date anyone claims Shevchenko made his initial contact with American intelligence. Senator Moynihan, who undoubtedly verified the date with the Senate intelligence committee, established that Shevchenko was not a spy until six months after Solomatin left his post. Yet Shevchenko claims that he met with the FBI and CIA in a CIA-supplied "safe house" (a room at the Waldorf-Astoria) before the meeting with Solomatin, and reported the meeting afterward to his CIA contact. The entire intelligence context to this alleged meeting therefore must be a fabrication. So must the entire part of Shevchenko's espionage career that he describes as having occurred before this climactic meeting.

The *New York Times* article of July 1 that Ashbel Green describes as having "effectively demolished several of Epstein's charges" does nothing of the sort. To be sure, Ray Cline, who is identified as "former deputy CIA director" is quoted by the *Times* as saying that Shevchenko's story is "substantially truthful." Actually Cline was deputy director

for intelligence in 1962, when he was responsible for nonlandestine intelligence, not espionage. Since he retired from the CIA in 1969, and had absolutely no connection with the Shevchenko case, he subsequently modified his authentication, explaining to the *Times* that he only intended to endorse Shevchenko's general view of the Soviet Union described in the book. As for Shevchenko's putative espionage career, "I don't have a firm view about whether or not he spied—that was all well after my time."

The *Times* story also challenges my assertion that a vivid car chase scene Shevchenko describes in the book could not have happened. Shevchenko claims that he got a ticket from a Nassau County policeman while speeding to his first rendezvous with the CIA in 1975. But New York State motor vehicle records show that Shevchenko did not get a driver's license until October 1977, and that there was no previous license. The *Times*, acknowledging that it also found no record of Shevchenko's having a license before October 1977, suggested the imaginative theory that he may have had an earlier license, the record of which was expunged before he applied for a new one in 1977. But New York State law requires that driver's license records be maintained for at least two years after the license expires. In addition, the policy of the motor vehicle bureau is not to remove a license from its computer for at least two renewal periods, or eight years. If Shevchenko had a valid license in December 1975 (when he says he got the ticket), the earliest it could have expired would be his next birthday, October 1976, and this record could not possibly have been expunged before Shevchenko applied for a new license in October 1977. In any event, there is no record of any speeding ticket.

In his new career as a professional raconteur, Shevchenko told the American Bar Association in 1980 that in his prior career as a Soviet official he helped to prepare fraudulent books and articles for what he termed the KGB "disinformation apparatus." There is no reason to assume he altered his standards of truthfulness just because he defected. He has now admitted fabricating crucial incidents in *Breaking with Moscow*, and has failed to disprove any of the other charges of fabrication. Why believe anything he writes without some independent substantiation? □