I congratulate all of you on your foresight and commitment to recognizing the importance of the Pacific to our nation's future and acting upon it. Your advice and counsel will be important to our continued effort. Your group includes four Senators, four Members of the House, seven members of the executive, in their unofficial capacity, and I think this demonstrates a bipartisan commitment of both branches. All of us are in your debt for what you're doing and wish you well.

I would like not only to reiterate the President's sentiments but also to assure you of this Administration's encouragement and support. While the committee must remain a private group, we in the executive branch look forward to working with its distinguished members. As you proceed with your work, I would urge you to explore the entire range of possibilities for Pacific cooperation. I have been encouraged by the committee's efforts on a number of critical issues, and I hope that the progress you have made so far is a harbinger of future achievements.

The spirit of Pacific cooperation is also beginning to attract the attention of other governments in the region. Last July, in Jakarta, ASEAN foreign ministers initiated a multilateral dialogue with their Pacific partners—Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Canada, and, of course, the United States. In that "6+5" meeting, we discussed the prospects for Pacific cooperation and agreed to make a review of Pacific-wide developments a continuing feature of these annual ministerial deliberations. The eleven of us also agreed that the governments would work together on the first cooperative project—Human Resources Development, chosen as a focus because it encompasses all nations in the region, big and small. This theme was suggested by Foreign Minister Mochtar of Indonesia, who has spurred us and his ASEAN colleagues to think creatively about the shape of Asia yet to come and the human resources of the region.

At the time, I expressed the view that Pacific cooperation should not be an exclusive process, but that all who are prepared to contribute to wider economic cooperation in the region should be encouraged to do so. The response of the foreign ministers was encouraging, and the progress made to date augurs well for future cooperation in other areas.

In the 7 months since the Jakarta meeting, we have worked to draw together the resources of the U.S. Government to participate in an international inventory of existing human development and training programs in the Pacific. Three weeks ago, senior officials of all the governments met in Indonesia to review the results of that inventory. Participating governments have now moved closer to agreeing on the principles that will guide the Human Resources Development effort and have identified areas for both immediate and long-term cooperative projects. Over the next 4 months, our representatives will meet to work out specific steps for consideration at next July's postministerial Conference on Pacific Cooperation. For our part, we will make every effort to contribute to the success of this promising undertaking.

I am encouraged by the progress made to date in this field, and I look forward to meeting with the foreign ministers again in Kuala Lumpur this July to decide on further actions that all of the countries can take together.

The Hopeful Prospects

The Pacific cooperative process is still in its infancy, and it is too early to predict its ultimate form or direction. Whatever arrangement ultimately evolves is likely to be unique to the Pacific, for the diversity, culture, heritage, and traditions of the Pacific states constitute a unique set of challenges.

As we prepare to mark the 40th anniversary of the end of the Pacific war, it is appropriate to reflect on what we have accomplished and to ponder the future. For if there have been moments of darkness in the history of Asia, there is also light in Asia's philosophical, esthetic, and cultural traditions. The tragedy that befell Angkor Wat symbolizes the ironic juxtaposition of Asia's turbulent history of conflict and its rich heritage of civilization. When we look back 40 years from now, I hope we will see this incipient process of Pacific cooperation as the beginning of a new era—an era of reconciliation, progress, and peace.

[1]Press release 27. ■

America and the Struggle for Freedom

by Secretary Shultz

Address before the Commonwealth Club of California in San Francisco on February 22, 1985.[1]

A revolution is sweeping the world today—a democratic revolution. This should not be a surprise. Yet it is noteworthy because many people in the West lost faith, for a time, in the relevance of the idea of democracy. It was fashionable in some quarters to argue that democracy was culture bound; that it was a luxury only industrial societies could afford; that other institutional structures were needed to meet the challenges of development; that to try to encourage others to adopt our system was ethnocentric and arrogant.

In fact, what began in the United States of America over two centuries ago as a bold new experiment in representative government has today captured the imagination and the passions of peoples on every continent. The Solidarity movement in Poland; resistance forces in Afghanistan, in Cambodia, in Nicaragua, in Ethiopia and Angola; dissidents in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; advocates of peaceful democratic change in South Africa, Chile, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines—all these brave men and women have something in common: they seek independence, freedom, and human rights—ideals which are at the core of democracy and which the United States has always championed.

The American Tradition

All Americans can be proud that the example of our Founding Fathers has helped to inspire millions around the globe. Throughout our own history, we have always believed that freedom is the birthright of all peoples and that we could not be true to ourselves or our principles unless we stood for freedom and democracy not only for ourselves but for others.

And so, time and again in the last 200 years, we have lent our support—moral and otherwise—to those around the world struggling for freedom and independence. In the 19th century Americans smuggled guns and powder to Simon Bolivar, the Great Liberator;

we supported the Polish patriots and others seeking freedom. We well remembered how other nations, like France, had come to our aid during our own revolution.

In the 20th century, as our power as a nation increased, we accepted a greater role in protecting and promoting freedom and democracy around the world. Our commitment to these ideals has been strong and bipartisan in both word and deed. During World War I, the Polish pianist Paderewski and the Czech statesman Masaryk raised funds in the United States; then Woodrow Wilson led the way at war's end in achieving the independence of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other states.

At the height of World War II, Franklin Roosevelt set forth a vision of democracy for the postwar world in the Atlantic Charter and Four Freedoms. The United States actively promoted decolonization. Harry Truman worked hard and successfully at protecting democratic institutions in postwar Western Europe and at helping democracy take root in West Germany and Japan. At the United Nations in 1948 we supported the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—which declares the right of every nation to a free press, free assembly and association, periodic and genuine elections, and free trade unions. John F. Kennedy drew upon the very essence of America with his call to "pay any price . . . to assure the survival and success of liberty."

The March of Democracy

The struggle for liberty is not always successful. But those who once despaired, who saw democracy on the decline, and who argued that we must lower our expectations were, at best, premature. Civilizations decline when they stop believing in themselves; ours has thrived because we have never lost our conviction that our values are worth defending.

When Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister of the world's largest democracy, was assassinated, we were shocked and saddened. But our confidence in the resilience of democracy was renewed as millions of India's people went to the polls freely to elect her successor. As Rajiv Gandhi leads his nation to new greatness, he demonstrates more clearly than any words or abstract scientific models that democracy is neither outmoded nor is it the exclusive possession of a few, rich, Western nations. It has worked for decades in countries as diverse as Costa Rica and Japan.

In the Western Hemisphere, over 90% of the population of Latin America and the Caribbean today live under governments that are either democratic or clearly on the road to democracy—in contrast to only one-third in 1979. In less than 6 years, popularly elected democrats have replaced dictators in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Peru, and Grenada. Brazil and Uruguay will inaugurate civilian presidents in March. After a long twilight of dictatorship, this hemispheric trend toward free elections and representative government is something to be applauded and supported.

The Challenge to the Brezhnev Doctrine

Democracy is an old idea, but today we witness a new phenomenon. For many years we saw our adversaries act without restraint to back insurgencies around the world to spread communist dictatorships. The Soviet Union and its proxies, like Cuba and Vietnam, have consistently supplied money, arms, and training in efforts to destabilize or overthrow noncommunist governments. "Wars of national liberation" became the pretext for subverting any noncommunist country in the name of so-called "socialist internationalism."

At the same time, any victory of communism was held to be irreversible. This was the infamous Brezhnev doctrine, first proclaimed at the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Its meaning is simple and chilling: once you're in the so-called "socialist camp," you're not allowed to leave. Thus the Soviets say to the rest of the world: "What's mine is mine. What's yours is up for grabs."

In recent years, Soviet activities and pretensions have run head on into the democratic revolution. People are insisting on their right to independence, on their right to choose their government free of outside control. Where once the Soviets may have thought that all discontent was ripe for turning into communist insurgencies, today we see a new and different kind of struggle: people around the world risking their lives against communist despotism. We see brave men and women fighting to challenge the Brezhnev doctrine.

In December 1979, the Soviets invaded **Afghanistan** to preserve a communist system installed by force a year and a half earlier. But their invasion met stiff resistance, and the puppet government they installed has proved incapable of commanding popular support. Today, the Soviets have expanded their occupation army and are trying to devastate the population and the nation they cannot subdue. They are demolishing entire Afghan villages and have driven one out of every four Afghans to flee the country. They have threatened neighboring countries like Pakistan and have been unwilling to negotiate seriously for a political solution.

In the face of this Soviet invasion, the Afghans who are fighting and dying for the liberation of their country have made a remarkable stand. Their will has not flagged; indeed, their capacity to resist has grown. The countryside is now largely in the hands of the popular resistance, and not even in the major cities can the Soviets claim complete control. Clearly, the Afghans do not share the belief of some in the West that fighting back is pointless, that the only option is to let one's country be "quietly erased," to use the memorable phrase of the Czech writer, Milan Kundera.

In **Cambodia,** the forces open to democracy, once all but annihilated by the Khmer Rouge, are now waging a similar battle against occupation and a puppet regime imposed by a Soviet ally, communist Vietnam. Although Vietnam is too poor to feed, house, or care for the health of its own population adequately, the Stalinist dictators of Hanoi are bent on imperial domination of Indochina—much as many had predicted before, during, and after the Vietnam war. But 6 years after its invasion, Vietnam does not control Cambodia. Resistance forces total over 50,000; of these, noncommunist forces have grown from zero to over 20,000. The Vietnamese still need an occupation army of 170,000 to keep order in the country; they even had to bring in two new divisions to mount the recent offensive. That offensive, while more brutal than previous attacks, will prove no more conclusive than those before.

In **Africa,** as well, the Brezhnev doctrine is being challenged by the drive for independence and freedom. In Ethiopia, a Soviet-backed Marxist-Leninist dictatorship has shown indifference to the desperate poverty and suffering of its people. The effects of a natural disaster have been compounded by the regime's obsession with ideology and power. In classical Stalinist fashion, it has ruined agricultural production through forced collectivization; denied food to starving people for political reasons; subjected many thousands to forced resettlement; and spent vast sums of money on arms and "revolutionary" spectacles. But the rulers cannot hide the dimensions of the tragedy from their people. Armed insurgencies continue, while the regime persists in relying on military solutions and on expanding the power and scope of the police and security apparatus.

In Angola, a Marxist regime came into power in 1975 backed and sustained by 30,000 Cuban troops and substantial

numbers of Soviet and East European "advisers." The continuation of this Soviet/Cuban intervention has been a major impediment to the achievement of independence for Namibia under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 435; it is also a continuing challenge to African independence and regional peace and security—thus our sustained diplomatic effort to achieve a regional settlement addressing the issues of both Angola and Namibia. In Angola, UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] has waged an armed struggle against the regime's monopoly of power and in recent years has steadily expanded the territory under its control. Foreign forces, whether Cuban or South African, must leave. At some point there will be an internal political settlement in Angola that reflects Angolan political reality, not external intervention.

Finally, an important struggle is being waged today closer to home in **Central America.** Its countries are in transition, trying to resolve the inequities and tensions of the past through workable reforms and democratic institutions. But violent antidemocratic minorities, tied ideologically and militarily to the Soviet Union and Cuba, are trying to prevent democratic reform and to seize or hold power by force. The outcome of this struggle will affect not only the future of peace and democracy in this hemisphere but our own vital interests.

In Nicaragua, in 1979 the Sandinista leaders pledged to the Organization of American States (OAS) and to their own people to bring freedom to their country after decades of tyranny under Somoza. The Sandinistas have betrayed these pledges and the hopes of the Nicaraguan people; instead, they have imposed a new and brutal tyranny that respects no frontiers. Basing themselves on strong military ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union, the Sandinistas are attempting, as rapidly as they can, to force Nicaragua into a totalitarian mold whose pattern is all too familiar. They are suppressing internal dissent; clamping down on the press; persecuting the church; linking up with the terrorists of Iran, Libya, and the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]; and seeking to undermine the legitimate and increasingly democratic governments of their neighbors.

This betrayal has forced many Nicaraguans who supported the anti-Somoza revolution back into opposition. And while many resist peacefully, thousands now see no choice but to take up arms again, to risk everything so that their hopes for freedom and democracy will not once again be denied.

The Sandinistas denounce their opponents as mercenaries or former National Guardsmen loyal to the memory of Somoza. Some in this country seem all too willing to take these charges at face value, even though they come from the same Sandinista leaders whose word has meant so little up to now. But all you have to do is count the numbers: more people have taken up arms against the Sandinistas than ever belonged to Somoza's National Guard. In fact, most of the leaders of the armed resistance fought in the revolution against Somoza; and some even served in the new government until it became clear that the *comandantes* were bent on communism, not freedom; terror, not reform; and aggression, not peace. The new fighters for freedom include peasants and farmers, shopkeepers and vendors, teachers and professionals. What unites them to each other and to the other thousands of Nicaraguans who resist without arms is disillusionment with Sandinista militarism, corruption, and fanaticism.

Despite uncertain and sporadic support from outside, the resistance in Nicaragua is growing. The Sandinistas have strengthened their Soviet and Cuban military ties, but their popularity at home has declined sharply. The struggle in Nicaragua for democracy and freedom, and against dictatorship, is far from over, and right now may well be a pivotal moment that decides the future.

America's Moral Duty

This new phenomenon we are witnessing around the world—popular insurgencies *against* communist domination—is not an American creation. In every region, the people have made their own decision to stand and fight rather than see their cultures and freedoms "quietly erased." They have made clear their readiness to fight with or without outside support, using every available means and enduring severe hardships, alone if need be.

But America also has a moral responsibility. The lesson of the postwar era is that America must be the leader of the free world: there is no one else to take our place. The nature and extent of our support—whether moral support or something more—necessarily varies from case to case. But there should be no doubt about where our sympathies lie.

It is more than mere coincidence that the last 4 years have been a time of both renewed American strength and leadership and a resurgence of democracy and freedom. As we are the strongest democratic nation on earth, the actions we take—or do not take—have both a direct and an indirect impact on those who share our ideals and hopes all around the globe. If we shrink from leadership, we create a vacuum into which our adversaries can move. Our national security suffers, our global interests suffer, and, yes, the worldwide struggle for democracy suffers.

The Soviets are fond of talking about the "correlation of forces," and for a few years it may have seemed that the correlation of forces favored communist minorities backed by Soviet military power. Today, however, the Soviet empire is weakening under the strain of its own internal problems and external entanglements. And the United States has shown the will and the strength to defend its interests, to resist the spread of Soviet influence, and to protect freedom. Our actions, such as the rescue of Grenada, have again begun to offer inspiration and hope to others.

The importance of American power and leadership to the strength of democracy has not been the only lesson of recent history. In many ways, the reverse has also proven true: the spread of democracy serves American interests.

Historically, there have been times when the failure of democracy in certain parts of the world did not affect our national security. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the failure of democracy to take root elsewhere was unfortunate and even troubling to us, but it did not necessarily pose a threat to our own democracy. In the second half of the 20th century, that is less and less true. In almost every case in the postwar period, the imposition of communist tyrannies has led to an increase in Soviet global power and influence. Promoting insurgencies against noncommunist governments in important strategic areas has become a low-cost way for the Soviets to extend the reach of their power and to weaken their adversaries, whether they be China or the democracies of the West and Japan. This is true in Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, Africa, and Central America.

When the United States supports those resisting totalitarianism, therefore, we do so not only out of our historical sympathy for democracy and freedom but also, in many cases, in the interests of national security. As President Reagan said in his second inaugural address: "America must remain freedom's staunchest friend, for freedom is our best ally and it is the world's only hope to conquer poverty and preserve peace."

In many parts of the world we have no choice but to act, on both moral and strategic grounds.

How To Respond?

The question is: How should we act? What should America do to further both its security interests and the cause of

freedom and democracy? A prudent strategy must combine different elements, suited to different circumstances.

First, as a matter of fundamental principle, the United States supports human rights and peaceful democratic change throughout the world, including in noncommunist, pro-Western countries. Democratic institutions are the best guarantor of stability and peace, as well as of human rights. Therefore, we have an interest in seeing peaceful progress toward democracy in friendly countries.

Such a transition is often complex and delicate, and it can only come about in a way consistent with a country's history, culture, and political realities. We will not succeed if we fail to recognize positive change when it does occur—whether in South Africa, or the Republic of Korea, or the Philippines. Nor will we achieve our goal if we ignore the even greater threat to the freedom of such countries as South Korea and the Philippines from external or internal forces of totalitarianism. We must heed the cautionary lessons of both Iran and Nicaragua, in which pressures against rightwing authoritarian regimes were not well thought out and helped lead to even more repressive dictatorship.

Our influence with friendly governments is a precious resource; we use it for constructive ends. The President has said that "human rights means working at problems, not walking away from them." Therefore, we stay engaged. We stay in contact with all democratic political forces, in opposition as well as in government. The historic number of transitions from authoritarian regimes to democracy in the last decade, from southern Europe to Latin America, demonstrates the effectiveness of this approach—as well as the essential difference between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. There are no examples of a communist system, once consolidated, evolving into a democracy.

In June 1982, addressing the British Parliament, President Reagan endorsed a new effort—including leaders of business, labor, and both the Democratic and Republican Parties—to enlist the energies of American private citizens in helping to develop the skills, institutions, and practices of democracy around the world. Today, the National Endowment for Democracy, the concrete result of that initiative, is assisting democratic groups in a wide variety of countries. The endowment represents practical American support for people abroad working for our common ideals.

Second, we have a moral obligation to support friendly democratic governments by providing economic and security assistance against a variety of threats. When democratic friends are threatened by externally supported insurgencies, when hostile neighbors try to intimidate them by acquiring offensive arms or sponsor terrorism in an effort to topple their governments, international security is jeopardized. The more we can lend appropriate help to others to protect themselves, the less need will there be for more direct American involvement to keep the peace.

Americans have always responded with courage when overwhelming danger called for an immediate, all-out national effort. But the harder task is to recognize and meet challenges before they erupt into major crises, before they represent an immediate threat, and before they require an all-out effort. We have many possible responses that fall between the extremes of inaction and the direct use of military force—but we must be willing to use them, or else we will inevitably face the agonizing choice between those two extremes.

Economic and security assistance is one of those crucial means of avoiding and deterring bigger threats. It is also vital support to those friendly nations on the front line—like Pakistan, Thailand, or Honduras and Costa Rica—whose security is threatened by Soviet and proxy efforts to export their system.

. . . today we see a new and different kind of struggle: people around the world risking their lives against communist despotism.

Third, we should support the forces of freedom in communist totalitarian states. We must not succumb to the fashionable thinking that democracy has enemies only on the right, that pressures and sanctions are fine against rightwing dictators but not against leftwing totalitarians. We should support the aspirations for freedom of peoples in communist states just as we want freedom for people anywhere else. For example, without raising false hopes, we have a duty to make it clear—especially on the anniversary of the Yalta conference—that the United States will never accept the artificial division of Europe into free and not free. This has nothing to do with boundaries and everything to do with ideas and governance. Our radios will continue to broadcast the truth to people in closed societies.

Fourth, and finally, our moral principles compel us to support those struggling against the imposition of communist tyranny. From the founding of this nation, Americans have believed that a people have the right to seek freedom and independence—and that we have both a legal right and a moral obligation to help them.

In contrast to the Soviets and their allies, the United States is committed to the principles of international law. The UN and OAS Charters reaffirm the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense against aggression—aggression of the kind committed by the Soviets in Afghanistan, by Nicaragua in Central America, and by Vietnam in Cambodia. Material assistance to those opposing such aggression can be a lawful form of collective self-defense. Moral and political support, of course, is a longstanding and honorable American tradition—as is our humanitarian assistance for civilians and refugees in war-torn areas.

Most of what we do to promote freedom is, and should continue to be, entirely open. Equally, there are efforts that are most effective when handled quietly. Our Founding Fathers were sophisticated men who understood the necessity for discreet actions; after the controversies of the 1970s, we now have a set of procedures agreed between the President and Congress for overseeing such special programs. In a democracy, clearly, the people have a right to know and to shape the overall framework and objectives that guide all areas of policy. In those few cases where national security requires that the details are better kept confidential, Congress and the President can work together to ensure that what is done remains consistent with basic American principles.

Do we really have a choice? In the 1970s, a European leader proposed to Brezhnev that peaceful coexistence should extend to the ideological sphere. Brezhnev responded firmly that this was impossible, that the ideological struggle continued even in an era of detente, and

that the Soviet Union would forever support "national liberation" movements. The practical meaning of that is clear. When Soviet Politburo member Gorbachev was in London recently, he affirmed that Nicaragua had gained independence only with the Sandinista takeover. The Soviets and their proxies thus proceed on the theory that any country not Marxist-Leninist is not truly independent, and, therefore, the supply of money, arms, and training to overthrow its government is legitimate.

Again: "What's mine is mine. What's yours is up for grabs." This is the Brezhnev doctrine.

So long as communist dictatorships feel free to aid and abet insurgencies in the name of "socialist internationalism," why must the democracies, the target of this threat, be inhibited from defending their own interests and the cause of democracy itself?

How can we as a country say to a young Afghan, Nicaraguan, or Cambodian: "Learn to live with oppression; only those of us who already have freedom deserve to pass it on to our children." How can we say to those Salvadorans who stood so bravely in line to vote: "We may give you some economic and military aid for self-defense, but we will also give a free hand to the Sandinistas who seek to undermine your new democratic institutions."

Some try to evade this moral issue by the relativistic notion that "one man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist." This is nonsense. There is a self-evident difference between those fighting to impose tyranny and those fighting to resist it. In El Salvador, pro-communist guerrillas backed by the Soviet bloc are waging war against a democratically elected government; in Nicaragua and elsewhere, groups seeking democracy are resisting the tightening grip of totalitarians seeking to suppress democracy. The essence of democracy is to offer means for peaceful change, legitimate political competition, and redress of grievances. Violence directed against democracy is, therefore, fundamentally lacking in legitimacy.

What we should do in such situation must, of necessity, vary. But it must always be clear whose side we are on—the side of those who want to see a world based on respect for national independence, for freedom and the rule of law, and for human rights. Wherever possible, the path to that world should be through peaceful and political means; but where dictatorships use brute power to oppress their own people and threaten their neighbors, the forces of freedom cannot place their trust in declarations alone.

Central America

Nowhere are both the strategic and the moral stakes clearer than in Central America.

The Sandinista leaders in Nicaragua are moving quickly, with Soviet-bloc and Cuban help, to consolidate their totalitarian power. Should they achieve this primary goal, we could confront a second Cuba in this hemisphere, this time on the Central American mainland—with all the strategic dangers that this implies. If history is any guide, the Sandinistas would then intensify their efforts to undermine neighboring governments in the name of their revolutionary principles—principles which Fidel Castro himself flatly reaffirmed on American television a few weeks ago. Needless to say, the first casualty of the consolidation of Sandinista power would be the freedom and hopes for democracy of the Nicaraguan people. The second casualty would be the security of Nicaragua's neighbors and the security of the entire region.

I do not believe anyone in the United States wants to see this dangerous scenario unfold. Yet there are those who would look the other way, imagining that the problem will disappear by itself. There are those who would grant the Sandinistas a peculiar kind of immunity in our legislation—in effect, enacting the Brezhnev doctrine into American law.

The logic of the situation in Central America is inescapable.

- The Sandinistas are committed Marxist-Leninists; it would be foolish of us and insulting to them to imagine that they do not believe in their proclaimed goals. They will not modify or bargain away their position unless there is compelling incentive for them to do so.
- The only incentive that has proved effective thus far comes from the vigorous armed opposition of the many Nicaraguans who seek freedom and democratic government.
- The pressures of the armed resistance have diverted Sandinista energies and resources away from aggression against its neighbor El Salvador, thus helping to disrupt guerrilla plans for a major offensive there last fall.
- If the pressure of the armed resistance is removed, the Sandinistas will have no reason to compromise; all U.S. diplomatic efforts—and those of the Contadora group—will be undermined.

Central America's hopes for peace, security, democracy, and economic progress will not be realized unless there is a fundamental change in Nicaraguan behavior in four areas.

First, Nicaragua must stop playing the role of surrogate for the Soviet Union and Cuba. As long as there are large numbers of Soviet and Cuban security and military personnel in Nicaragua, Central America will be embroiled in the East-West conflict.

Second, Nicaragua must reduce its armed forces, now in excess of 100,000, to a level commensurate with its legitimate security needs—a level comparable to those of its neighbors. The current imbalance is incompatible with regional stability.

Third, Nicaragua must absolutely and definitively stop its support for insurgents and terrorists in the region. All of Nicaragua's neighbors, and particularly El Salvador, have felt the brunt of Sandinista efforts to destabilize their governments. No country in Central America will be secure as long as this continues.

And fourth, the Sandinistas must live up to their commitments to democratic pluralism made to the OAS in 1979. The internal Nicaraguan opposition groups, armed and unarmed, represent a genuine political force that is entitled to participate in the political processes of the country. It is up to the Government of Nicaragua to provide the political opening that will allow their participation.

We will note and welcome such a change in Nicaraguan behavior no matter how it is obtained. Whether it is achieved through the multilateral Contadora negotiations, through unilateral actions taken by the Sandinistas alone or in concert with their domestic opponents, or through the collapse of the Sandinista regime is immaterial to us. But without such a change of behavior, lasting peace in Central America will be impossible.

The democratic forces in Nicaragua are on the front line in the struggle for progress, security, and freedom in Central America. Our active help for them is the best insurance that their efforts will be directed consistently and effectively toward these objectives.

But the bottom line is this: those who would cut off these freedom fighters from the rest of the democratic world are, in effect, consigning Nicaragua to the endless darkness of communist tyranny. And they are leading the United States down a path of greater danger. For if we do not take the appropriate steps now to pressure the Sandinistas to live up to their past promises—to cease their arms buildup, to stop exporting tyranny across their borders, to open Nicaragua to the competition of freedom and democracy—then we may find later, when we can no

longer avoid acting, that the stakes will be higher and the costs greater.

Whatever options we choose, we must be true to our principles and our history. As President Reagan said recently:

> It behooves all of us who believe in democratic government, in free elections, in the respect for human rights to stand side by side with those who share our ideals, especially in Central America. We must not permit those heavily armed by a far away dictatorship to undermine their neighbors and to stamp out democratic alternatives at home. We must have the same solidarity with those who struggle for democracy, as our adversaries do with those who would impose communist dictatorship.

We must, in short, stand firmly in the defense of our interests and principles and the rights of peoples to live in freedom. The forces of democracy around the world merit our standing with them, to abandon them would be a shameful betrayal—a betrayal not only of brave men and women but of our highest ideals.

[1]Press release 29. ■

Question-and-Answer Session Following Commonwealth Club Address

Secretary Shultz held a question-and-answer session with the audience at the conclusion of his address before the Commonwealth Club of California in San Francisco on February 22, 1985.[1]

Q. In connection with support for the *contras* in Nicaragua, in an effort to destabilize the Sandinista government unless it changes its present direction, how will this plan square with the Boland amendment prohibiting funding?

A. Of course, at the present time, there is no U.S. funding to support the people fighting for freedom in Nicaragua. It has been cut off by the Congress. The Boland amendment applied to a continuing resolution in 1983, and the restrictions that presently apply are of a different sort.

Q. Could you elaborate on the difference between a freedom fighter and a terrorist, in the State Department's view? [Laughter]

A. I tried to do that, and I've tried to do that on many occasions; and I recognize that the question tantalizes people and titillates them as well, I see. [Laughter]

If you have a country that has a democratic form of government, then those who want to have change, of whatever sort, have a legitimatized and proper method of trying to bring it about. So, an effort through violence to bring about change in another way is illegitimate: it is terrorism.

Terrorism is a method of seeking to bring about change that employs an effort to frighten people, to cause them to feel that the situation is out of control. It attacks civilian targets. It hits people who have no connection, necessarily, with whatever it is that the terrorists may think is their true objective.

People who are fighting for freedom are, by definition, in a situation where freedom doesn't exist, where there is a dictatorship—a dictatorship in being, or as in the case of Nicaragua, a dictatorship seeking to impose itself more and more completely. And people are resisting that.

Those are freedom fighters—whether they are in Afghanistan, resisting Soviet direct invasion; in Cambodia, where their country has been decimated by the Vietnamese. Remember in this counry those people who exalted Ho Chi Minh? And they can see what the Vietnamese are doing. The same in Nicaragua; the same in many parts of the world.

So I think that the notion of freedom fighter should be an exalted one, and it's a perversion of our language and a perversion of morality to equate them in any manner with the sort of terrorism that we see operating in many parts of the world. [Applause]

Q. What are the freedom fighters in racist South Africa? Will this Administration ever recognize and aid in any way the victims of apartheid? [Applause]

A. This Administration and the President find apartheid abhorrent. We say so publicly here; we say so publicly in South Africa. We say so privately. We make no ifs, ands, and buts about it.

We also engage with the South African Government on that basis to try to persuade them that there must be a better way, there must be change to a different system—one which recognizes people as people, regardless of their color. We support people in South Africa—the blacks in South Africa—in all sorts of ways. Through educational help, our U.S. firms, businesses, that operate in South Africa have provided a model in employment through the Sullivan principles, among other ways. And I might say the blacks in South Africa want American investment to stay there. They see the positive results and the jobs that it brings.

I met with the Chief of the Zulu tribe, Mr. Buthelezi, the other day. Referring to a Senator who had been traveling in South Africa, he said, "Who is this white man who wants to tell us that we shouldn't have these jobs?" [Laughter and applause]

So we are trying to help people. We recognize their plight; we recognize the justice of their cause. And we feel that the way to help them is to hang in there and be engaged and work at it—not to just throw up our hands and say, "We don't like the situation" and walk away. That's not going to do any good.

And, as a matter of fact, over the past 4 or 5 years, there has been a considerable amount of change. I don't mean to imply at all that the situation is remotely satisfactory, but there has been movement. We welcome it, and we encourage it. [Applause]

Q. When there is a changing of the guard at the Kremlin, do you believe it will remain with the older generation or be passed on to the next generation? If the younger, would it be to our benefit?

A. I don't know. [Laughter and applause]

Q. Please comment on your relations with Mr. Gromyko. [Laughter]

A. I've had a great number of meetings with Mr. Gromyko. He's an able, experienced person. We've had some very stormy meetings, particularly a meeting in Madrid shortly after the Soviet Union shot down a Korean airliner—not only shot it down, but Mr. Gromyko in Madrid said, "We'd do it again." They showed no remorse. And we had, I can assure you, one stormy meeting.

We've also had many meetings that have been basically nonpolemical, straightforward, and worthwhile. In terms of our personal relationship, I consider it to be perfectly fine.

I can remember the first meeting we had when I was Secretary of State. I had known him from the last time I was

in government. It was in September 1982, and we had two separate meetings on two separate days. And at the end of the first meeting, we agreed that we ought to set ourselves a little agenda for the second one, try to find a few areas where we thought it might be possible to find a common interest and work constructively together. And we did that.

One of the areas we picked out was nonproliferation of nuclear weapon capability. Both of us felt strongly about that. And, as it turned out, as a result of the push that we each gave this subject, there has been a series of very fruitful meetings on that subject between the two governments. I must say that I noticed this morning that the Soviet Union agreed to on-site inspection of at least some of their nonmilitary nuclear facilities, and I think that's progress.

We have had a lot to argue about, and we have argued vigorously, and we have found some points of agreement.

We managed to agree in Geneva on the resumption of negotiations that will start on March 12th. I believe that as we conduct this very important, very difficult relationship with the U.S.S.R. that it's important for us to have decency in our behavior toward our opposite numbers. But it's also important for us always to remember this country as our adversary—always to remember our interests very clearly. When we talk about arms control, we'd like to have an agreement, but a bad agreement is not in our interests. We don't want a bad agreement, we want a good agreement. And also to remember always that our relationship with them is not simply one involving arms control.

We need to remind them continuously, as we all do and I do, that their treatment of many human beings—particularly, Jews in the Soviet Union—is entirely unacceptable to us and to keep probing and asking about that.

We need to keep pointing out to them how detrimental their behavior in many parts of the world—and I've talked about them here today—how disruptive it is to world peace and stability.

And we also need to be working with them on areas of bilateral interest—in terms of trade and space and one thing and another that we historically have been able to work with them on—and try to develop, to the extent we can, a constructive relation with them.

But I think underneath it all, we must remember that the keys are, first, let's always be realistic—never wishful—and be willing to say, squarely and frankly, what we believe the truth to be. And, second, we better be strong. Don't kid yourself; weakness will not get us anywhere with the Soviet Union—not with Mr. Gromyko, not with Mr. Gorbachev, not with Mr Romanov, not with Mr. Chernenko; nor did it with Mr. Brezhnev nor any of the predecessors. [Applause]

Q. To what extent are Russia and its satellites supporting Sandinista covert action in El Salvador and Honduras?

A. The supplies that flow into Nicaragua—some of which find their way into El Salvador and perhaps other countries—come from the Soviet Union or the Soviet bloc. We know that, could take pictures of the ships; we trace them as they go along. It's public information; there isn't any question about it whatever.

For some time the Soviets seemed to have the idea that sending these supplies in ships of other countries, such as Bulgaria, was the way to do it; but lately they've been sending their supplies in Soviet ships directly. So there isn't any ambiguity about the answer to the question.

Q. Why doesn't the U.S. Government withdraw all support from the Government of Chile until they have democratic elections?

A. I don't know exactly what support there is to withdraw. I would say that Chile is being run by a dictatorship. It has had periods in which it seemed that constructive change was underway. It ran for a while one of the most interesting free market economies around that was quite successful for a time.

Right now the regime seems to have slipped back into a disappointingly repressive phase, with a state of siege being maintained. But we will stay engaged with Chile. The Chilean people are a wonderful people with a democratic tradition. We can hope that, even as the present Constitution calls for, at least eventually they may return to a democratic form of government. In any case, we will keep working at that and trying to help bring it about.

Q. Why are private citizens, who are not elected officials or appointed officials and do not represent the United States, permitted to go to Beirut, Cuba, et cetera, and bargain with those respective leaders to let out hostages, et cetera? And what is the State Department doing to get American hostages released in Lebanon?

A. As far as the problem of hostages, Americans held anywhere—and there are now still four that were seized in Lebanon—we work tirelessly in an effort to get them released. And we make it very clear to those we believe are responsible for holding them that if harm comes to them, we will hold those parties responsible, and we will do something about it.

But our efforts, I can assure you, are tireless—some public, mostly private, diplomatic efforts—and we never forget those who have been seized and want to help them in every way that we can.

As far as private citizens and their efforts are concerned, of course private citizens have a right to go. And I think Mrs. Levin, for example, did quite a lot, in collaboration with us, in trying to work for the release of her husband.

I do think, when it comes to broader efforts to represent the U.S. Government, that it is a bad idea for people not operating under the authority of the President to try to represent the United States, because the President is elected to do that and you can only have one President at a time.

It is a problem for us in this country, because I think all 100 Senators, and most of the Congressmen, consider themselves to be candidates for President. [Laughter] And sometimes they think they already are there. [Laughter]

But, on the whole, I think people do understand this point. And I notice, particularly, when it comes, for example, to our dealings with the Soviet Union that on both sides of the aisle there is a great care taken, and when someone is going to go to Moscow, they generally let us know. We tell them what we know of the situation, what we would like to see represented. They without fail debrief and tell us what took place in their conversations. And I think, on the whole, Americans are very responsible about these things.

Q. Do we have a policy that reflects how we want the Israeli-Lebanon conflict to be resolved? And, if so, what is it?

A. We have had clear objectives in Lebanon. We want to see a sovereign, independent Lebanon. We'd like to see it free of all foreign forces. And we would like to see a Lebanon constituted in such a way that activities in southern Lebanon are not a threat to the peace and security of people living in northern Israel.

Those have been our objectives. They've been consistent. And, of course, the condition in Lebanon and the way its relationships develop are part and parcel of the whole Middle East puzzle.

We worked very hard, as we all know here; and we suffered some very heavy losses that leave us very distressed. But those have been our objectives all along.

As far as the current situation, we are glad to see the Israelis withdrawing. We would like to see that withdrawal take place through some form of negotiation, so that a possible role for UNIFIL [UN Interim Force in Lebanon] is defined and the stability that a designated role could add would be put there—and that there would be an orderly process, an understood process, of turning over strong points as the Israeli Army leaves and other forces take up key posts.

Despite a great deal of flexibility on the part of Israel in trying to work these matters out, there has been, I think it's fair to say, great intransigence on the other side in recent weeks and months. And so there isn't in prospect right now—although this may change—any negotiated outcome. The Israelis are simply pulling back unilaterally.

And, of course, in the end, as they draw their forces completely out of the country, if there are no negotiated arrangements to provide security for their northern border, they will have to figure out unilaterally what they will do about the attacks that have historically come from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. That's the reason why we think a negotiated withdrawal program is better than a unilateral one, in that arrangements having to do with security would be put in place. Otherwise I'm afraid there will be security obtained, accompanied by a very great amount of tension and potential for continual outbreaks on the border.

Q. In light of the growing opposition to the Marcos regime in the Philippines, will the United States continue to support Marcos?

A. Yes. Ferdinand Marcos is the legitimate head of the Philippine Government, and we will deal with him.

We will also be working in every way that we can to build up and legitimatize—help the Philippines legitimatize—all manner of processes that are the means of selecting leadership in a country.

So we supported very strongly, the second board that investigated the Aquino murder, feeling that the first was not really an expression of a proper rule of law, and the second was.

We supported the use of arrangements for the elections held some months ago, so that they would be as democratic and open and free as possible. And they turned out to be pretty good elections.

We support having the army be professionalized, not politicized, so that, on the one hand, it can be an effective force in countering the communist insurgency that is gathering in the Philippines, and, on the other hand, as respectful of the democratic process and the importance of civilian rule.

We're working constantly to try to keep these processes alive and help them flourish so that whenever a transition comes, it comes through processes of this kind, and people retain their confidence that there are democratically based procedures through which leadership should be chosen.

Q. How does a hard-working Secretary of State, such as yourself, get such a great tan [laughter and applause], and why don't you have an ulcer? [Laughter]

A. I don't know about the answer to the second, but the answer to the first is, that you got to goof off once in a while. [Laughter and standing applause]

[1] Press release 29A of Feb. 25, 1985. ■

The Importance of the MX Peacekeeper Missile

Secretary Shultz's statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 26, 1985. [1]

I welcome this opportunity to appear before you to speak in support of the President's program of strategic modernization. This subject is of enormous importance to our diplomacy because of the direct impact of strategic modernization on our national security, our arms control objectives, and our most fundamental foreign policy goals.

Strategic Modernization and Foreign Policy

As Secretary of State, I am acutely conscious of the strength or weakness of American power because it directly affects our ability to achieve our most fundamental goals: the defense of our values and our interests and the construction of a safer, freer, and more prosperous world. Power and diplomacy are not separate dimensions of policy; they are inextricably linked together.

That is why I am here today to urge support for strategic modernization and, in particular, for the MX Peacekeeper missile program which is a central pillar of that modernization.

As leader of the democratic nations, we have an inescapable responsibility to maintain the strategic balance—and only we can maintain it. If our determination flags, we shake the confidence of our friends and allies around the world; we weaken the cohesion of our alliances. If we in America are strong and united in our commitment to peace and international security, then those who rely on us, and upon whom we rely, have the confidence to move together with us toward our shared goals.

Modernization of our strategic forces is essential. The Soviet strategic buildup has continued relentlessly. Since we deployed our most modern type of ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile], the Minuteman III, the Soviet Union has deployed *three* new types of ICBMs—the SS-17, -18, and -19—including 360 SS-19s roughly comparable in size to the MX, each with 6 warheads, and 308 of the much larger SS-18, each with 10 warheads. Moreover, within the next 2 years, the Soviets will begin deploying two additional new types—the SS-X-24 and -25. This means five new Soviet ICBMs compared to one—the MX—for the United States.

A credible, flexible American strategic posture is vital to the stable balance of power on which peace and security rest. And the MX is a vital element of that stable balance. It represents the response that four successive administrations—both Democratic and Republican—have believed necessary to offset, at least partially, the formidable Soviet ICBM arsenal. It was permitted by the SALT II Treaty, and, indeed, its contribution to the strategic balance was one of the premises on which that treaty was based. The bipartisan Scowcroft commission concluded, and I am convinced, that the MX remains an essential