

Page Denied

STAT

III. 6 Nov 85

U S S R I N T E R N A T I O N A L A F F A I R S
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

AA 1

JSOLAPOV REJECTS REAGAN OFFER TO SHARE SDI

LD052250 Hamburg DPA in German 1824 GMT 5 Nov 85

[Text] Stuttgart, 5 Nov (DPA) -- In the opinion of Richard Kosolapov, member of the CPSU Central Committee, the offer by U.S. President Ronald Reagan to make available to the Soviet Union the space-based missiles defense system (SDI) is clearly designed to have a propagandistic effect. Despite the "great show" this offer is "not radical enough", Kosolapov, who is also editor-in-chief of KOMMUNIST, told journalists in Stuttgart on Tuesday evening. In view of the "global threat" the Soviet Union is opposed in principle to all attempts to deploy weapons in space.

At the same time, Kosolapov noted that the Soviet public expects positive results from the scheduled meeting between Reagan and the Soviet party leader, Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva. [passage indistinct].

MARSHAL SOKOLOV EXAMINES ABM, SALT TREATIES

PM051644 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Nov 85 First Edition p 4

[Article by Defense Minister Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov: "To Preserve What Has Been Achieved in the Sphere of Strategic Arms Limitation"]

[Text] The continuing nuclear arms race is fraught with tremendous dangers to mankind. It leads to the heightening of tension, an increase in the threat of war, and the diversion of tremendous intellectual and material resources from creative purposes.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries do everything in their power to preserve and consolidate peace and stop the nuclear arms race. Our country proposes reaching agreement on the whole complex of questions connected with removing the nuclear threat -- ranging from the freezing to the complete elimination of nuclear arms along with a complete ban on space strike arms.

The USSR's proposals are not mere declarations. We have taken major practical steps recently: Specific proposals on preventing the creation [sozdaniye] and deployment of space strike means and radically reducing nuclear arms have been submitted at the Geneva talks; nuclear explosions have been unilaterally ended; and, in addition to the moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles, the SS-20 missiles that were deployed as countermeasures in the European zone have been withdrawn from combat standby.

The Soviet Union invariably advocates the organization of constructive dialogue with all states, above all with the United States. "Our countries," Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, points out, "simply cannot permit themselves to bring matters to a confrontation. The real interest of both the Soviet and U.S. peoples lies in this. And this must be expressed in the language of real policy. It is necessary to stop the arms race, to get down to disarmament, and to steer Soviet-U.S. relations into a normal channel."

What is ultimately the determining, central factor in Soviet-U.S. relations? The renunciation by each side of encroachments on the other's security, the renunciation of acquiring military superiority over one another. In other words, what is needed is strict compliance by the sides with the principle of equality and identical security.

III. 6 Nov 85

AA 2

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

For more than 10 years, despite the sharp ups and down in Soviet-U.S. relations, a great contribution to this has been made by the unlimited-duration Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Defense Systems, the interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms (both documents were signed 26 May 1972), and, since June 1979, also by the SALT II treaty. Today relations between the USSR and the United States will depend to a great extent on whether it proves possible to preserve the positive elements achieved during the seventies in preventing the creation of space strike arms and limiting nuclear arms.

I.

In the joint Soviet-U.S. communique of 30 May 1972 the sides emphasized that the ABM Treaty and the interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms (SALT I) represent a major step toward containing and ultimately ending the arms race. They accord with the vital interests both of the Soviet and the U.S. peoples and of other peoples of the world.

Time has confirmed the correctness of this conclusion. The ABM Treaty is of fundamental importance for nuclear arms limitation, strategic stability, and international security. It is the foundation and the basis of strategic relations between the USSR and the United States, imposing clear limitations on the quantitative composition, structure, qualitative characteristics, and deployment of our two countries' authorized ABM systems.

In signing the unlimited-duration ABM Treaty, the sides agreed at that time that an indissoluble interconnection exists between strategic offensive and defensive arms. It was recognized at that time that only mutual restraint in the sphere of ABM systems can contain the arms race and make it possible to advance along the road of limiting and reducing strategic offensive weapons. The preamble of the treaty states: "Effective measures to limit antiballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of the outbreak of a war involving nuclear weapons."

All the main provisions of the treaty are devoted to achieving this goal. Article I prohibits the deployment of an ABM system for the defense of the country's territory and the creation of the basis for such a defense. Each side is permitted to have a limited ABM system for a single area with a radius of 150 km (the chosen areas are: in the USSR the capital, Moscow, and in the United States the Grand Forks ICBM base). Within the limits of one area no more than 100 ABM launchers, no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and only a limited quantity of ABM radars may be deployed.

The ABM components must be land-based and stationary. Article V prohibits the development [sozdavat], testing, and deployment of ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

These main provisions are developed and supplemented by other articles and agreed statements. In particular, with a view to strengthening the provisions of the treaty, agreed Statement D prohibits the deployment of ABM systems and components based on other physical principles and capable of substituting for "traditional" ABM components outside the ABM area authorized for each side. The deployment of these ABM systems and components in the authorized area can be carried out only after preliminary consultations between the sides on their specific limitation and the introduction into the text of the treaty of agreed amendments entering into force in accordance with the procedure established by the ABM Treaty.

III. 6 Nov 85

AA 3

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

In short, as a result of the talks the USSR and the United States arrived at a joint understanding of the need to renounce the deployment of any large-scale ABM systems. They officially stated then that the acquisition by one of the sides of ABM means over and above what is authorized by the ABM Treaty will inevitably lead to the disruption of strategic parity and to an increase in the risk of nuclear war. This key idea of the ABM Treaty was correct for the conditions of 1972 and remains even truer and more fundamental for 1985 and the whole foreseeable future.

People in the United States certainly know and remember this joint conclusion. They are perfectly well aware that the deployment of a large-scale ABM system by one side will inevitably prompt retaliatory actions by the other in the form of the quantitative and qualitative growth of strategic offensive weapons and the creation [sozdaniye] of a large-scale ABM defense for the country, which also means the creation [sozdaniye] of means for the neutralization of ABM defenses. Nonetheless, the U.S. side is now making no secret of the fact that it is not suited by the goals and principles forming the basis of the ABM Treaty. In practical terms, the United States has embarked on the path of destroying this treaty.

The White House leaders have on many occasions publicly defined the goal of the work being done under the program for the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) (in other words, the creation [sozdaniye] of space strike arms), [a goal] which they claim is "the creation [sozdaniye] of absolutely reliable means of destroying Soviet nuclear missiles if they are ever launched against us or against our allies." But, this is precisely a de facto undermining of the ABM Treaty. First, because work is being done on the creation [sozdaniye] of an ABM defense system for the country's entire territory and, furthermore, for the territory of U.S. allies, which is banned by Article I of the treaty. Second, because it is a question of a space-based ABM system, which is banned by Article V.

Obviously, in preparation for eroding the content of the ABM Treaty, official Washington has recently been striving to convince the U.S. Congress and public that the treaty is supposedly "full of ambiguity." Therefore, it allows the United States "quite legitimately" to develop [razrabatyvat] test, and deploy ABM means based on other physical principles (lasers, directed energy beams, and so on). In the process they cite agreed Statement D which, they claim, allows the creation [sozdaniye] of such systems. But the Washington officials diligently omit mentioning the main point -- the fact that the possibility of their development [razrabotka] is permitted only with respect to the limited ABM areas allowed by the treaty and only in stationary ground-based systems. The text of Statement D does not allow any other interpretation. This is confirmed by those U.S. officials who participated directly in the elaboration of the ABM Treaty.

Legitimate questions arise in connection with the elaborate game of formulas surrounding this most important document for the entire process of strategic arms limitation. Why are U.S. Administration officials arbitrarily trying to make amendments to the ABM Treaty; amendments which distort its meaning? Why is the U.S. Administration refusing to consult with the Soviet side about this if, as is claimed, it is acting within the treaty's framework? There is no great secret here. Washington's leaders are preparing a "juridical basis" for launching practical work on the SDI program, including the testing and deployment of space strike systems. Practical preparations are in progress for the destruction of the ABM Treaty.

Other U.S. actions also undermine the ABM Treaty. Contrary to the provisions of Article VI, phased array radar stations (Pave Paws) are being constructed in Greenland and Britain. A large radar station -- for whose construction elements of a radar station tested for ABM purposes were used -- has been deployed in breach of Article I on Shemya Island (Aleutian Islands).

III. 6 Nov 85

AA 4

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

The construction on U.S. territory of large new Pave Paws radar stations, whose parameters have been brought up to the level required of ABM radar stations and which provide the basis for radar support of an ABM defense of the country's territory, is another such breach. In violation of the treaty's provisions, work is under way to create [sozdaniye] mobile ABM radar components and systems and multiple-charge nosecones for interceptor missiles. The Minuteman ICBM's are also being tested for the purpose of giving them an antimissile capability. Despite our repeated warnings, the U.S. side has taken no measures to remove the anxiety caused by the actions it is taking.

In order to conceal the facts of the extremely crude violations of the ABM Treaty and to somehow justify itself in the eyes of the world public, the U.S. Administration resorts to unscrupulous methods. It is trying to use fabrications to discredit the USSR's policy and to attribute nonexistent "violations" and "omissions" in treaty compliance to the Soviet side.

For example, people in Washington would like to present the work to create [sozdaniye] space strike weapons that is being done in violation of the ABM Treaty and the implementation of the "star wars" plan as a whole, as a measure in response to the Soviet air defense system, which, they claim, "is packed with active means and is constantly modernized. But we make no complaints on this account since there are no limitations on air defense systems and air defense means themselves have nothing in common with ABM defense. The presence of a reliable Soviet air defense system is explained by the military threat posed by the numerous U.S. military bases situated close to the USSR's borders and the many hundreds of nuclear-capable aircraft [samolet-nositel] at them. These means are targeted on us. Only shortsighted and naive people could close their eyes to such a threat.

The claims and talk that "only the USSR has an operational ABM system" are also hypocritical. Yes, an ABM system is deployed around our capital. We have never denied this; its presence is strictly in accordance with the ABM Treaty. Mobile complexes or multiple-charge launchers are not being created [sozdavatsya] here, nor are there any quantitative limitations violated. The improvement of the Moscow ABM system is implemented strictly within the treaty's limits.

The United States also has an ABM system of similar potential for one region and we have never reproached it for this, since it has the same right to this as the USSR. References to the fact that this U.S. system has been "mothballed" alter nothing, since the phased array radar (PAR) station there remains in operation and the mothballed interceptor missile launchers can be demothballed at any moment. This is exactly why the treaty does not differentiate between ABM components that are in combat service and those that are mothballed.

The U.S. Administration is trying to intimidate the public with the claim that the Soviet Union has already almost created [sozdat] the "space shield" which the United States is still trying [khotet] to create [sozdat]. C. Weinberger recently declared that the USSR supposedly already "is on the threshold" of creating [sozdaniye] an ABM system for the country's territory. But this is a deliberate untruth and an attempt to defame our country. The Soviet Union is not creating [sozdavat] space strike weapons, is not deploying a large-scale ABM defense system, and is not testing weapon types for this purpose. The propaganda statements by Washington leaders about some kind of "covert Soviet SDI" are just another attempt to justify "star wars" and the constructive U.S. stance in Geneva and to avoid talks on the banning of space strike weapons.

As for the Soviet stance on space strike arms, it has been clearly defined by M.S. Gorbachev. It is necessary, he pointed out in his interview with TIME magazine, to ban space strike weapons at all stages of their creation [sozdaniye], including targeted research work.

III. 6 Nov 85

AA 5

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

This, however, does not deny a country the right and possibility to conduct fundamental research in the space sphere. But, it is one thing to conduct investigations and research [izyskaniya i issledovaniya] in laboratory conditions and quite another when mock-ups and prototypes are created [sozdayutsya] and models of space arms are tested. This is always followed by the deployment of arms. This is precisely the line currently being conducted by the U.S. Administrations in the "star wars" program. The USSR considers any work outside the laboratory linked with the development [otrabotka] and testing of mock-ups and experimental models of individual parts and components to be impermissible. Everything done in order to subsequently design and produce corresponding space strike systems must be prohibited.

There are currently no U.S. or Soviet strike weapons in space. The Soviet Union has stated to the entire world that it will not be the first to take strike weapons into space. We will make every effort to convince other countries, above all, the United States, not to take this fatal step which would inevitably increase the threat of nuclear war and give impetus to an uncontrolled arms race in all directions. That is our policy and we are carrying it out conscientiously and responsibly.

The U.S. Administration is making considerable efforts to delude public opinion about the Soviet radar station under construction in the region of the city of Krasnoyarsk. This station is said both to have an ABM capability and to be tasked with providing early warning of a missile attack. However, the Krasnoyarsk radar station will resolve neither of these tasks. Once construction is completed it will be used exclusively for tracking objects in space and monitoring space. Therefore, it has nothing to do with the ABM Treaty.

The Soviet Union strictly abides by its commitments under the ABM Treaty both as a whole and in its parts and observes absolutely the spirit and the letter of this most important document. Strategic stability and trust would undoubtedly be strengthened if the United States adhered in deeds rather than in words to the provisions of the unlimited-duration ABM Treaty.

II.

Another important document that exerts a definite restraining influence on the arms race is the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II). Its significance lies in the fact that it places definite obstacles in the way of the further quantitative growth and qualitative improvement of the sides' most powerful arms. The Soviet Union is profoundly convinced that if the United States had ratified this treaty, real reductions in strategic offensive arms would have started and the road would have been opened for subsequent more large-scale and comprehensive agreements in this sphere.

Elaboration of the SALT II treaty took almost 7 years. Even then, from the very outset of the talks, influential forces in the United States threw "wrenches in the works" and obstructed its elaboration in every possible way. There were periods when -- under pressure from them -- the reaching of any agreement at all was called into question. However, at the time there were other forces in the United States which were advocating agreement. Thanks to the Soviet side's tenacity, patience, and persistence the SALT II treaty was agreed and signed.

The treaty limited with no exceptions all types of strategic offensive arms held by the USSR and the United States at the end of the seventies: intercontinental ballistic missiles (SLBM's), and heavy bombers. Each side was authorized to have not more than 2,400 such delivery vehicles when the treaty came into force (that is, after its ratification) and not more than 2,250 by the end of 1981.

III. 6 Nov 85

AA 6

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Within the limits of this overall total level each side could not have more than 1,320 "multiple warhead" [mnogozaryadnyye] delivery vehicles; that is, ICBM and SLBM launchers with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's) and heavy bombers armed with air-to-surface cruise missiles with a range of over 600 km. In turn, within the limits of the level of 1,320 units, the parties to the treaty could have not more than 1,200 MIRV'ed ICBM and SLBM launchers and within the limits of those 1,200 units, not more than 820 ICBM launchers with such warheads.

Other important qualitative limitations were also introduced on each type of strategic arms. The number of charges [zaryady] on MIRV'ed missiles was limited: not more than 10 warheads for ICBM's and not more than 14 warheads for SLBM's; heavy bombers equipped with air-to-surface cruise missiles could carry not more than 28 such missiles on average. Each side was allowed to create [sozdavat], test, and deploy only one type of light ICBM each in the future and it was forbidden to increase the numbers of existing heavy ground- and sea-launched missiles or to create [sozdavat] new ones. Moreover, other restrictions were also laid down.

The USSR and the United States have pledged not to circumvent the provisions of the treaty through the medium of third countries or in any other way. And the joint statement specified that further talks must be conducted on the basis of obligatory consideration of all the factors determining the strategic situation. A primary factor -- and the Soviet Union stated it when concluding the treaty -- is the presence of a considerable number of forward-based nuclear weapons in direct proximity to our borders, posing a direct threat to our country.

The treaty is effective until 31 December 1985. Certain restrictions on which full agreement was not reached were stated in a special protocol to the treaty of shorter duration (until 31 December 1981), to be returned to at the next stage of the talks. In particular, the protocol prohibited the deployment of mobile ICBM launch installations and the conduct of test launches, the deployment of cruise missiles with a range of over 600 km on sea- and ground-based launch installations, and the test-launching of missiles equipped with multiple, independently targeted warheads.

The SALT II treaty is a document which objectively examines and evaluates Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons. This is its chief merit. It sees the sides' strategic nuclear armaments (ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers) as a single entity. This made it possible to comprehensively regulate the correlation of strategic forces and consolidate strategic parity between the USSR and the United States despite differences in the composition of strategic armaments, in individual types, and in geographical and other factors. During the elaboration of the treaty the sides found and agreed on mutually acceptable solutions which accorded with the principle of equality and identical security and were of a long-term nature.

Assessing the significance of the treaty, President J. Carter stressed that "this treaty is the most important step ever taken in the establishment of nuclear arms control. Rejection of SALT II would be a serious blow to peace and to our country's security." H. Brown, defense secretary at the time, cogently advocated that the "SALT II treaty meets U.S. interests and should be ratified as soon as possible" and that, by doing so, the United States "will not be doing the Soviet Union any favors."

Nevertheless, the United States, as is known, frustrated its ratification. Not daring to openly renounce its pledges and oppose world public opinion, the White House administration announced in May 1982 the U.S. side's intention not to take any action that would undermine the SALT II treaty. The pledges on limiting U.S. strategic armaments were given a kind of semiofficial character.

III. 6 Nov 85

AA 7

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

The purpose of Washington's step was to avoid binding itself to any firm commitments regarding the limitation of strategic armaments, to have the chance to maneuver, and to attempt to implement the strivings for nuclear superiority.

It is well known that the line toward torpedoing the SALT II treaty process had been taken in the United States back in the summer of 1979. It was this deliberate U.S. Administration course and not the "events in Afghanistan," as White House spokesmen are now claiming, that caused the ratification of this vitally important treaty to be wrecked. The U.S. Administration frustrated the ratification of SALT II because it established strategic parity. Its adoption hindered the policy of strong-arm pressure on the USSR, destroyed the claims about a U.S. "strategic lag" and the myths about "windows of vulnerability," and, significantly, prevented the development of anti-Soviet propaganda to the scale on which it is conducted at the moment.

Nor did the treaty accord with the military development plans which the Pentagon had embarked on on the brink of the eighties. It was for these reasons that the United States took the path of gradually wriggling out of the treaty and repudiating one after another the restrictions envisaged by it as they became obstacles to planned programs for the creation and buildup of strategic armaments. The events of recent years fully confirm this. Having frustrated the ratification of the treaty, the United States launched production of long-range ground- and sea-based cruise missiles and embarked on their mass deployment.

In December 1979 the United States, having promised its NATO partners that it would ratify the SALT II treaty (and having deceived them), persuaded them to make a decision on the deployment of new U.S. medium-range missiles in Western Europe. Deployment began in November 1983. From the viewpoint of the SALT II treaty provisions this directly undermines the strategic balance established by it, which the sides had agreed not to violate. In fact, every U.S. medium-range weapon stationed near the Soviet border is essentially a strategic weapon as far as the USSR is concerned.

October 1981 saw the announcement of the U.S. "strategic program" for the eighties, which envisaged a further buildup of its strategic potential. The content of the program also confirmed that Washington is not concerned about keeping the pledges it has made. Take, for instance, the plans to create and deploy Midgetman ICBM's in the next few years. Since the Pentagon has now nearly finished testing the new MX ICBM, the Midgetman will be the second new type of ICBM whose creation and deployment are expressly prohibited by the SALT II treaty.

But while breaking the SALT II treaty the U.S. Administration is reluctant to bear responsibility for doing so. The White House is trying to shift the blame for its subversive actions onto the Soviet Union, stating that the United States will observe only those provisions of the SALT II treaty which the Soviet Union also observes. At the same time fraud is being perpetrated and shameless propaganda is being unleashed claiming that the USSR is failing to fulfill a number of provisions of the SALT II treaty -- those very provisions whose observance the United States itself would like to avoid. But, upon a conscientious examination of the thrust of the matter, nothing remains of all these so-called "accusations."

The thesis that the Soviet Union is failing to display restraint in developing its strategic armaments has received wide currency in the propaganda campaign which the United States is mounting. But the facts say the opposite. By the early seventies the United States had twice as many nuclear charges on its strategic delivery vehicles as the USSR, but it continued to rapidly build up their numbers. As a result, the number of nuclear charges on U.S. strategic delivery vehicles more than trebled. The Soviet Union naturally took steps to eliminate the discrepancy which had arisen and to restore the balance.

III. 6 Nov 85

AA 8

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

In the White House's language these Soviet actions are declared to "exceed the framework of defense requirements."

In the mid-seventies the United States had 550 ICBM's and 496 MIRV'ed SLBM's. The Soviet Union at that time did not have a single missile of this type. In subsequent years the USSR, with a view to eliminating this discrepancy, did of course create [sozdat] and deploy such weapons. Again this step of ours was described by Washington as "a manifestation of a lack of restraint." The selfishness and propagandist orientation of this approach are obvious.

The White House spread the story that the Soviet Union, in contravention of the provisions of the SALT II treaty, is developing two new types of ICBM. They are trying to aver that the Soviet RS-12M missile (what NATO calls the SS-25), which is nothing but a modernized version (modernization within limits specified by the SALT II treaty is not banned) of the RS-12 missile which we already had, is the second "new type" of ICBM. The issue of this missile has been discussed in exhaustive detail between the two sides. The Soviet side cited specific facts showing that the features of the missile's modernization fully comply with the relevant provisions of the SALT II treaty. But the U.S. side, despite the facts, continues to claim that the RS-12M is an ICBM of a new type. The strategem here is simple: accusing the USSR of developing a second new type of ICBM in order to give "the green light" to its own Midgetman missile.

Washington has just as biased an interpretation of the question of encoding telemetric information when carrying out missile flight tests. Matters are portrayed as though the methods of transmitting telemetric information in use in the Soviet Union do not comply with the treaty provisions. These claims are also unfounded. During the SALT II negotiations a mutual understanding was reached. Each side is free to use various means for transmitting telemetric information during ballistic missile flight tests, including its encoding, when it does not make it more difficult to verify the observance of the SALT II treaty provisions.

The Soviet side does not encode those parameters which have a bearing on the verification of the fulfillment of the SALT II treaty provisions. To resolve the question we suggested the U.S. side name the parameters which, in its opinion, should not be encoded, but this was rejected. The U.S. side's refusal to name these parameters is evidence that it is not seeking to resolve this question. Why is the U.S. Administration continuing to cling persistently to this "accusation?" Because the United States is constantly violating the provision on the nonuse of deliberate concealment measures which impede verification. This has almost become its daily practice. And here it is trying to use arguments about the "excessive level" of encoding to distract attention from its own unseemly actions.

One further fabrication is that RS-14 missiles (what NATO terms SS-16 missiles), which are banned under the SALT II treaty, have been deployed in the region of the Plesetskaya testing range. Back during the SALT II talks the Soviet side authoritatively assured the Americans that the USSR had never had SS-16 missiles on combat service [v boyevom sostave]. It does not have them now nor will it have them in the future. Moreover, work connected with testing and/or deploying the SS-16 ICBM is not under way on this or any other testing range. Stories about these missiles are a desire to raise a tally of "accusations" against the Soviet Union.

Those are the facts. They convincingly show the U.S. Administration's line -- to discredit the Soviet Union and thereby justify its own course toward definitively undermining the SALT II treaty.

The USSR's treaty policy and actions are honest and consistent. In the time which has elapsed since the signing of the SALT II treaty the USSR has done nothing to circumvent its provisions. It adheres strictly to the strategic arms levels set by the treaty.

III. 6 Nov 85

AA 9

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

With a view to avoiding exceeding them, the Soviet Union has dismantled about 250 strategic means (182 SLBM launchers and a considerable number of ICBM's and heavy bombers). The sublevels set for MIRV'ed missiles and heavy bombers with air to surface cruise missiles are strictly maintained. The provisions limiting the framework for the qualitative improvement of strategic means are being completely fulfilled.

The Soviet Union is not seeking military superiority and it therefore has no incentive to reject the accords elaborated on the basis of parity and identical security. Its positive attitude toward the SALT II treaty has never changed. As a document aimed at limiting nuclear arms and preventing nuclear war, the SALT II treaty is, in our opinion, of positive importance to this day.

The White House is seeking ways of achieving military superiority. Today it seems to it that the United States will achieve it by creating [sozdat] a fundamentally new type of weapon -- space strike weapons. But Washington is making a mistake. The USSR will provide an adequate response to the challenge that they want to issue. There will be no U.S. monopoly in space. Nor will Washington have the military advantages on which the initiators of "star wars" are counting. Seeking to undermine the Soviet Union's security, the United States has in fact embarked on the path of reducing its own security and building up the danger of war for the peoples of the whole world.

An analysis of the ABM and SALT II treaties shows that the links between defensive and offensive armaments are fundamental and principled ones. The treaties must be fulfilled as they are written. That means that only with a total ban on space strike weapons would the way be opened to the process of a radical reduction of nuclear armaments. The USSR advocates an accord on precisely this basis.

The way out of the prevailing situation, Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, points out, is an agreement between the opposing forces on the immediate cessation of the arms race -- primarily the nuclear arms race -- on earth and its prevention in space; an agreement on an honest and equal basis, without attempts to "beat" the other side and dictate one's own conditions to it; an agreement which would help everyone advance toward their desired goal -- the complete elimination of the nuclear threat. The retention of everything positive achieved in the past in the strategic arms limitation field would help to achieve this goal.

III. 1 Nov 85

AA 10

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

All this is always followed by the deployment of arms. That is why everything that is done for the subsequent design [konstruirovaniye] and production of space strike systems must be prohibited.

SOVIET, U.S. OPPOSING VIEWS OF ABM TREATY COMPARED

PM301016 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Oct 85 Second Edition p 3

[Commentary by Captain Second Rank Ye. Nikitin, under "Military Political Review" rubric: "The Threat of War Has Not Receded"]

[Text] Stefan Zweig's historical vignettes contain lines about the "starry hours of mankind." The great writer discusses turning points of history "when a single 'yes' or 'no' settles everything and predetermines everything. Being premature or late preordains the destiny of hundreds of generations and directs the lives of individuals, an entire people, or even all of mankind."

These words by the great Austrian writer spring to mind now. You automatically associate them with the state of affairs in the modern world and the historically important stage through which the world is passing.

Mankind has in fact reached a very crucial point. The fate not only of the present generation, but of subsequent ones too depends on the direction mankind takes from this point on -- whether toward strengthening security or toward the edge of the abyss.

The principle danger looming over our planet is the unceasing arms race unleashed by U.S. imperialism. There exists a real threat that this race may be transferred into outer space. The situation is aggravated by the fact that existing nuclear weapons are being modernized and becoming increasingly powerful and destructive. Nonnuclear means are coming close to nuclear means in terms of their destructive capability. Combat systems based on totally new principles are being developed [razrabatyvatsya]. But this is just one aspect of the matter.

The other aspect is the fact that it is already becoming difficult to begin talks to halt the destructive process of the arms race. But, what will the future hold if the militarization of outer space begins; if space strike arms are created [sozdavatsya]?

It is clear to every sensible person that events could get out of control in the future. That is not at all an exaggeration, but the objective reality. As M.S. Gorbachev observed during his French television appearance: "... we have in reality reached a very crucial stage in the development of the international situation."

But a crucial historical stage, after all, requires the adoption of responsible measures. From this standpoint the Soviet Union and the socialist community countries, as the Warsaw Pact statement "For the Elimination of the Nuclear Threat and a Turn for the Better in European and World Affairs," pointed out, see the key task of our time as halting the arms race, above all the nuclear arms race, and making the transition to disarmament.

The implementation by the Soviet Union and United States of a number of immediate measures would make a major practical contribution to resolving this task. This involves, above all, suspending all work on creating [sozdaniye], testing, and deploying space strike arms, including antisatellite arms; freezing already existing nuclear armaments at their present quantitative level with maximum limitation of their modernization and simultaneous halting of the creation [sozdaniye], testing, and deployment of new kinds and types of these armaments; and stopping the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe.

III. 1 Nov 85

AA 11

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

The Soviet Union maintains a consistent, constructive, and peace-loving line in all these very important areas. This is borne out by the universally known facts, which speak for themselves.

Above all, we are not carrying out work to create [sozdaniye] space strike weapons and are not developing [razrabatyvat] ABM systems for the country. The unfounded charges against the Soviet Union that it is also carrying out the development [razrabotka] of space strike arms are nothing other than malicious lies by the opponents of detente. It is true that our country is carrying out fundamental research work in the sphere of outer space and work to create [sozdaniye] and improve space early warning systems and space systems for prospecting, communications, navigation, and meteorology. But, we do not have a "star wars" program; the USSR punctiliously fulfills the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Defense Systems. A moratorium on the launching of anti-satellite weapons into space has been in force in the Soviet Union since 1983.

Or take the USSR's attitude to another important problem -- freezing existing nuclear arms. The relevance of the problem is shown by the following fact alone. Specialists estimate that there is the equivalent of 4 metric tons of trinitrotoluene, that is to say, conventional explosive, for every man, woman, and child living on our planet. Common sense tells us we must immediately freeze the nuclear arsenals both quantitatively and qualitatively. It would then be possible to start a process of real disarmament.

Specific initiatives on this score were advanced by the Soviet Union back in June 1983 in a Soviet Government appeal to all nuclear states. To break the problem free from deadlock the Soviet Union introduced a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions from 6 August this year through 1 January 1986. It was stated the moratorium will remain in force beyond then if the United States follows our example.

And, finally, there are the new Soviet proposals. They are well-known to everyone. "We propose," Comrade M.S. Gorbachev said in a speech during his visit to Bulgaria, "very simple and clear things: Cutting the respective nuclear armaments of the Soviet Union and the United States by half; shutting fast the door leading to the siting of weapons in outer space; and halting and reversing the buildup of nuclear missiles in Europe."

These new proposals, in combination with earlier ones, comprise a Soviet program of realistic and far-reaching measures whose implementation could lead to the normalization of the complex and dangerous international situation. It is universally recognized that the Soviet Union's new peace-loving initiatives can get the world out of the arms race impasse and eliminate obstacles at the Geneva talks. The Soviet Union is seeking one thing here -- just and honest agreements based on the principles of equality and identical security. It is not seeking any military advantages for itself at all.

How, then does the U.S. side respond to the Soviet Union's open, clear, and irreproachably logical proposals? After some confusion, Washington began falsifying and publicly discrediting our initiatives, endeavoring to misinterpret them, present them in a false light, and belittle their significance. Virtually all senior U.S. Administration spokesmen have actively opposed the Soviet proposals in recent days. The myth of "Soviet military superiority" is being whipped up. The White House has obviously forgotten about or is pretending it is unaware of the relevant conclusions drawn by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who stressed in a report to Congress only this year that there exists "rough nuclear parity" between the two countries at the present time. Yet, it is precisely on the pretext of "Soviet military superiority" that Washington is carrying out its extensive "strategic modernization" program, including the building and deployment of the latest nuclear systems such as the MX and Midgetman missiles, two types of heavy bombers, the Trident missiles-carrying submarine systems, and Pershing-2 and cruise missiles.

III. 1 Nov 85

AA 12

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Washington is casting caution to the wind in its efforts to "prove" the USSR is carrying out its own "Strategic Defense Initiative." They have even gone so far as to claim the "Russians possess the world's only operational antisatellite weapon system." And that, as has already been noted, in a context where for 2 years the Soviet Union has had a moratorium on the deployment [razvertyvaniye] of antisatellite systems. Acting in the spirit of Goebbels' propaganda, they are trying to blame the USSR for all they are doing themselves. They assert, for example, that the Soviet Union "has already gone far beyond scientific research" in developing [sozdaniye] a strategic defense. And, in order to thoroughly intimidate the average U.S. citizen, they are questioning the USSR's commitment to the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Defense Systems.

Across the Atlantic they have, so to speak, invented a "new interpretation" of the ABM Treaty whereby it is apparently permitted to develop [razrabatyvat], test, and create [sozdavat] antisatellite weapons based on different physical principles, that is to say, laser, beam, and other kinds of both land-based and space-based weapons. R. McFarlane, assistant to the President for national security affairs, for example, claims without batting an eyelid that the treaty "sanctions the testing of any ABM system provided they are based on other physical principles." How can such an interpretation be described as anything other than flagrant cheating?

After all, Article I of the ABM Treaty records in black and white that the sides undertook "not to deploy [razvertyvat] ABM systems for the defense of the territory of their country and not to create a base for such a defense." And, according to Article V of the treaty they undertook "not to develop [sozdavat] test, or deploy [razvertyvat] ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based." As we can see, the "star wars" program stands in flagrant contradiction to the ABM Treaty on two counts. First, because work is being carried out to create [sozdavat] an ABM system for the whole territory of the United States, which is banned under Article I of the treaty. And second, because a space-based ABM system is involved, which is banned under Article V.

In their attempts to obscure an extremely clear issue some people in Washington cite an agreed statement appended to the treaty -- so-called Statement D, which, it is said, allows the creation [sozdaniye] of ABM means based on other physical principles (lasers, directed energy beams, and so forth). But the whole point is that the possibility of the emergence of such means is allowed only with regard to the limited ABM defense areas permitted by the treaty and with regard to land-based stationary systems. Each side is permitted to have just one such area covered by an ABM system. No other interpretation of the text of Statement D is possible. The point of this disgraceful ballyhoo created by the U.S. Administration around the ABM Treaty was expressed by the Pentagon chief, who stated without any subterfuge: "We must examine the possibility of actually breaking the ABM Treaty."

No matter what they say across the Atlantic to mislead the public, Washington's practical deeds show that the United States is seeking to provide itself with the capability of a nuclear first strike against the USSR and to escape retaliation by creating [sozdat] an ABM system.

The threat of world nuclear war has not receded. In these conditions there must be no weakening or slackening of vigilance. History has placed special responsibility on the USSR and the other socialist countries, since there is no other such powerful force capable of restraining the aggressive forces of imperialism and preventing them from toppling the world into the abyss of nuclear war.

The "starry hour of mankind" has struck. There now exists, it can be said, a unique opportunity to achieve a mutually acceptable accord. It is up to the U.S. Administration. The peoples of the world expect that it will approach the matter responsibly.

III. 22 Oct 85

AA 6

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

The power-drunk secretary says what the U.S. military-industrial complex thinks. "We must examine the possibility of a real breach of the ABM Treaty," he said, without beating about the bush or grimacing.

And they are examining this possibility. But yet again, their "ungrateful" allies and friends have failed to understand or value the impulse of Reagan and those who think like him. They assert that some officials within the administration itself have been wondering whether the time has not come to engage in something more serious than white-washing. As a result a "compromise" has been born. The public has been told: "The President has examined the recommendations and reassessment of the (ABM) treaty. We believe that a broad interpretation is the correct one. But the President has decided that the United States must remain within the present framework of the treaty, within the framework of the present interpretation of the treaty, in accordance with which there is no need to use the expanded version to achieve our aims."

McFarlane was not disowned. According to a White House deputy press secretary, McFarlane reflected "a new and important understanding of how the treaty can be objectively interpreted." The aide was in a bit of a hurry and anticipated the President and the secretary of state, revealing a position which was being kept in reserve. But, in principle he was correct; even if G. Shultz, the head of the diplomatic department, is considered to be more correct. The United States is voluntarily limiting itself in the expectation that the public will become accustomed to the worst that is to befall it.

Popular wisdom has it that you learn from every setback. Obviously not every setback, and it does not apply to everyone. How many occasions and reason Washington has had to see sense! On the basis of its own errors and other people's. But it does not want to. It does not want to consider the fact that other people's interests, no less important than U.S. interests, exist, and that these interests are guarded by weapons no less formidable than U.S. weapons. As for the resolve to defend freedom and honor, here too the Americans do not have a monopoly. It is not worth being deluded. In general, if a person is obstinate that does not mean he is strong.

CHERNYSHEV CHARGES U.S. WITH 'DISTORTION' OF TREATY

PM181013 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Oct 85 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Candidate of Technical Sciences Reserve Colonel V. Chernyshev: "Criminal Actions; Washington Tries to Distort the ABM Treaty"]

[Text] The Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems, concluded in May 1972, has now been in effect for more than 13 years and is one of the foundations on which the sides' relations are built. Its signing denoted recognition by the Soviet Union and the United States of the objective interconnection between offensive and defensive systems and of the dangerous role which attempts to create a large-scale ABM system would play in provoking an arms race. The preamble to the treaty clearly states that "effective measures to limit ABM systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the arms race and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons."

Its conclusion also marked recognition of the fact that only mutual restraint in the sphere of ABM systems can make possible progress along the path of limiting and reducing nuclear arms. Thus, the ABM Treaty, according to the design of the sides which signed it, is meant to fulfill two extremely important functions: first, to be a kind of brake and a restraining factor on the arms race and, second, to serve as the principal foundation and basis for the whole process of limiting and reducing arms.

III. 22 Oct 85

AA 7

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

During the validation of the ABM Treaty, the USSR and the United States have twice -- in 1977 and 1982 -- examined it jointly, we emphasize jointly, and have agreed unanimously that it continues to meet their interests, operates effectively, and does not require changes or amendments. Essentially, this assessment of the treaty by both sides has confirmed over and over again that the interconnection between offensive and defensive arms is of a lasting nature, regardless of the technical level that their development has reached.

But in March 1983 the United States proclaimed the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" and began intensive work on the "star wars" program -- a program for the creation [sozdaniye] of a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements and the development [razrabotka] of space strike arms. It is quite natural that such actions conflict with the principles on which the ABM Treaty is based. For this important document prohibits the deployment of ABM systems in the interests of defending the entire territory of the United States and the USSR (that is, large-scale ABM systems) and the creation [sozdaniye] of a basis for such defense.

Rejection of the ABM Treaty under conditions whereby its tremendous international significance is clearly recognized throughout the world would mean a frank admission for Washington that its aims are by no means those of curbing the arms race and proceeding to arms reductions. This was why the U.S. Administration did not venture to follow the persistent appeals of figures such as Assistant Defense Secretary R. Perle, for example, to get out of the treaty. A different path was chosen -- the path of maneuvers, of seeking "loopholes" in the formulas of the treaty itself, and of one-sided "reinterpretation" and "revised" interpretation of its articles.

At first the U.S. leadership "contented" itself with claims that the United States was just conducting "research," which the ABM Treaty supposedly does not prevent. Later, however, the premises of laboratories and scientific establishments became too "cramped" for this "harmless research." There arose an ever greater need to perfect and test assemblies, components, models, and prototypes of space strike arms and they needed to "step out" onto firing ranges and, what is more, into near-earth space.

The scale of work assumed such a nature that it became clear even to official Washington that it had to seek more "serious" explanations for this. A new step was taken on the path of destroying the ABM Treaty: Interviewed on U.S. television during the NBC program "Meet the Press," R. McFarlane, assistant to the U.S. President for national security affairs, declared that the ABM Treaty "sanctions and approves" tests which are "an inalienable part of the development [razrabotka] of systems. According to him, the agreed statement accompanying the treaty "permits" the testing and creation [sozdaniye] of ABM components based on "different physical principles" to antimissile missiles, that is, such "exotic" antimissile means as laser and beam weapons, and so forth.

Thus, we see here an attempt to totally distort the essence of the ABM Treaty and to justify Washington's antitreaty actions by means of a "new interpretation" of it. For article V of the ABM Treaty quite unambiguously prohibits the creation [sozdavat] and testing of ABM systems or components which are space-based. The claims that the treaty's provisions apply only to those ABM systems and components which existed at the time it was signed are designed for manifestly uninformed people.

In actual fact, the treaty's provisions -- and any specialists can confirm this -- apply to any systems designed, as defined in article II, to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectories.

III. 22 Oct 85

AA 8

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Since the ABM components being created [sozdavat] within the framework of the "star wars" program -- including laser and beam weapons, and so forth -- are designed for precisely this purpose, that is, they are meant to replace (or complement) the antimissile missiles mentioned in the treaty, then all the treaty's provisions apply in full to them. And, above all, the ban on the creation [sozdaniye], testing, and deployment of space-based ABM systems or components.

As for the references to the agreed statement, here too we see a blatant juggling of facts. The said statement really does not rule out the possibility of the sides' acquiring antimissile means "based on different physical principles," but only within the framework of the restrictions envisaged by the treaty as a whole, that is, for each side in one permitted region (each side is permitted to have just a limited ABM system in one region -- the capital or an ICBM base -- V. Ch.). But the large-scale ABM system with space-based elements envisaged by the "Strategic Defense Initiative" is a territorial and even a global system, totally prohibited by the treaty. Consequently, the creation [sozdaniye], testing, and deployment for it of laser, beam, and other destructive components "based on different physical principles" is a direct violation of the treaty.

It was not for nothing that THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote in connection with R. McFarlane's "new interpretation" of the ABM Treaty that for 13 years the treaty has everywhere been understood the way it was formulated: That any ABM system placed in space is prohibited. Now it is maintained this treaty means the opposite. That "not permitted" and that "from below" means "from above." All this, the newspaper concludes, must put even the most arch-jurist in Washington in an awkward position.

Something else is also noteworthy. The present U.S. Administration has "revised" not only the legal interpretation of the ABM Treaty by previous U.S. Administrations, but also its own earlier statements. Thus, for example, reports submitted to the U.S. Congress by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1983 and 1984 set forth a position according to which the ABM Treaty imposes restrictions on ABM programs based on the "use of directed energy" or other "nontraditional technologies."

What tasks have those persons in the U.S. Administrations of the ABM Treaty made both by previous administrations and by the present administration, are producing a "new interpretation" of it now set themselves? It is perfectly clear they are pursuing the aim, first, of "freeing" themselves of the fetters which do not give the "star wars" strategists any "freedom" and, second, of removing all obstacles and all factors which still curb the arms race in any way.

All this must undoubtedly arouse and does arouse serious concern in sober minded specialists and politicians, including in the United States itself. As C. Smith, one of the most authoritative U.S. experts on questions of arms limitation and former head of the U.S. delegation at the Soviet-American talks on strategic arms limitation (SALT I), declared recently, a "new reading" would make the ABM Treaty a "dead letter" and create doubts as to the advisability of concluding any other agreements in the arms control sphere with the United States. According to him, the present U.S. Administration's attitude to the ABM Treaty "reminds us of a number of cases in history when treaties have been treated like scraps of paper."

D. Fascell, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. Congress, condemned the "new interpretation" of the treaty as "not inspiring confidence." He emphasized that such a decision will have "serious and far-reaching consequences" and will "jeopardize arms control."

III. 22 Oct 85

AA 9

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

It is possible to agree fully with this opinion. Indeed, how would it be possible to speak of limitations and reductions in nuclear arms if the United States has, in point of fact, denounced the chief existing agreement in the sphere of limiting the arms race? The transfer of the arms race into space, the Soviet Union has declared repeatedly at a most authoritative level, would make the reduction of nuclear arsenals objectively impossible.

Evidently, some people in Washington are too worried by the program advanced by the Soviet Union for improving the dangerously explosive international situation and fear the very possibility of this program's realization. The "new interpretation" of the ABM Treaty has been thought up by those "strategists" in the U.S. Administration who are seeking to abolish all measures in the sphere of limiting and reducing arms and to preserve tension in the world and who wish to lead the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms into an impasse and to secure the failure of the Soviet-American summit meeting.

SPACE RESEARCH DIRECTOR INTERVIEWED ON SDI

AU211427 Vienna NEUE AZ in German 19/20 Oct 85 p 5

[Text] In the competition between offensive and defensive weapons, the offensive ones always win, because the offensive weapon that overcomes a new defensive weapon of the other side costs only a fraction of what the defensive weapon costs. This is the basic position from which Roald Sagdeyev, director of the Moscow Space Research Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, assesses the U.S.-pushed space defensive arms program as a project that will drastically accelerate the arms race.

Sagdeyev, with whom NEUE AZ had a talk in Vienna, was a member of the Soviet delegation at the Socialist International's disarmament conference [held in Vienna 16 and 17 October]. The view of McNamara (U.S. defense secretary under Johnson) back in the 1960's that the development of defensive weapons brings more offensive weapons, is still valid, according to Sagdeyev. Even Alfred Teller, father of the hydrogen bomb and propagator of Reagan's "star wars" program -- says the Soviet scientist -- has admitted that SDI cannot ward off 100 percent of enemy missiles, as Reagan had originally asserted.

Why, then, are Americans doing this? Quite in the cool, little propagandistic Gorbachev style, Sagdeyev analyzes: First, the United States is again -- as it has done in the past -- seeking to win strategic supremacy by an advance in a technological field. Second, according to Sagdeyev, the SDI program is an answer to the "freeze" movement in the United States: A defense system appears to be more acceptable and "more peaceful." Third, economic pressure is to be exerted on the Soviet Union.

What is Sagdeyev's opinion about the charge that the Soviet Union is farther advanced than the United States? Both powers are not very far advanced in their research. The Soviet Union lags behind a bit. But that is only laboratory research, he says. The point where it becomes dangerous will be reached only when it gets out of the laboratory.

III. 21 Oct 85 U S S R I N T E R N A T I O N A L A F F A I R S
 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

AA 1

AKHROMEYEV COMPARES U.S., SOVIET STANDS ON ARMS

PM211335 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Oct 85 First Edition p 4

[Article by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Akhromeyev entitled: "Washington's Claims and the Real Facts"]

[Text] The Soviet Union has advanced concrete proposals at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva on the complex of problems related to space and nuclear (strategic and medium-range) armaments. These proposals are being examined by the delegations. Their essence was set forth by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev in his statements in Paris. Thus, they are known to the entire world.

These are the proposals for a total ban on space strike weapons and a radical, by 50 per cent, reduction of the nuclear armaments of the USSR and the United States capable of reaching each others territories; for concluding agreements on nuclear medium-range systems in Europe and direct talks with France and Britain on the European balance of nuclear forces; for working out an agreement on a range of interim measures designed to facilitate the early and successful completion of the talks in Geneva

Combined with the earlier advanced proposals, these new proposals constitute the Soviet program of realistic and far-reaching measures whose implementation may bring about normalization of the complicated and dangerous international situation. Implementing this program would ensure a substantial advance toward the goal considered most important by all peoples -- that of preventing the militarization of outer space, prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons, and saving mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

The Soviet initiatives have received broad support from peace-loving public opinion, including Western Europe and the United States. It is recognized everywhere that the program put forward by the Soviet Union contains proposals which may bring the world out of the arms race deadlock and remove the obstacles on the path of achieving accords at the Geneva talks.

Having received the Soviet proposals, the United States now has the opportunity to move forward and try to bring the positions of the sides at the talks closer together. After all, Washington makes daily statements about its readiness and desire for a radical cut in nuclear weapons. The Soviet proposals go out to meet those desires.

But how does the U.S. react to the Soviet proposals? After making an initial assessment (it is impossible to study deeply and evaluate such fundamental proposals in a brief period), many officials from the White House administration, as is now evident, embarked on a path of falsifying and publicly discrediting our initiatives, trying to misinterpret them, presenting them in a spurious light, and belittling their significance. Realizing that it is impossible to reject the Soviet proposals as a whole, they say in Washington that they recognize they "warrant further discussion" and could be accepted as "a starting point at the talks." However, this is said just as a disguise. In actual fact, something quite different is taking place. High-ranking U.S. Administration representatives have in the past few days actively come out against the Soviet proposals. They are letting it be known that such proposals are unacceptable to them and are attempting to discredit and reject, not the details, but the essence, the foundations of the Soviet Union's proposals.

III. 21 Oct 85

AA 2

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

U.S. Administration officials, considering the people's fear of nuclear weapons, declare the U.S. "star wars" program may, allegedly, rid the world of nuclear weapons. They in Washington flatly reject the idea of banning the development [sozdaniye] and deployment [razvertyvaniye] of space strike weapons, while in order to cover up their aggressive designs, they have worked out a false concept of gradual transition from the deployment of nuclear offensive systems to the development and deployment of non-nuclear, so-called "defensive" systems. Its authors' line of argument is as follows: It is necessary to continue the deployment of strategic nuclear armaments, constantly threatening the Soviet Union with their use. Simultaneously, it is necessary to develop a "multitiered ABM" defence." This is how they describe space strike armaments. After the system is developed, "probably, in a few decades," it will be, purportedly, possible to come to an agreement on the reduction and even elimination of nuclear armaments.

It turns out that in order to eliminate nuclear weapons it is necessary to plunge mankind into an arms race that is hard to even imagine today. The road to nuclear disarmament, according to this inside-out logic, lies in the buildup of nuclear offensive armaments and the militarization of space. It will take tens of years and the cost of innumerable material and other resources of mankind to accumulate the huge piles of weapons. There is no other way, nor can there be any, claims the U.S. Administration.

Why all this is being done is understood in the Soviet Union. Deceiving peoples, diverting them from immediate measures for the reduction of nuclear arsenals are the aims of these manipulations. Washington transforms, turns upside-down, the objective need for a total elimination of nuclear weapons in order to gain an opportunity for an uncontrolled buildup of nuclear armaments. The United States is implementing this in practice. It is developing first-strike weapons; five new types of strategic delivery vehicles -- two types of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), two types of heavy bombers -- and is also deploying long-range cruise missiles of various basing modes and other systems of nuclear armaments.

If the propaganda is cast aside and the essence of the U.S. "star wars" program is revealed, it pursues the treacherous aim of giving the United States the potential to make a first nuclear strike at the Soviet Union with impunity and deprive it, by creating a national anti-missile defence, of the opportunity to make a retaliatory strike.

The Soviet Union suggested to the U.S. Administration a ban on the development of the two sides' space strike weapons. We are against the spread of the arms race into outer space. If that happens, mankind may find itself facing an unpredictable situation. The risk of war will grow many times. In order to prevent this, the USSR proposes renouncing, once and for all, the development and deployment of space strike armaments.

That is why an accord banning the development of space strike weapons is a key, fundamental question. If no ban exists, an unchecked arms race will start, both of strategic offensive and space weapons. Such is the objective reality. There should be no misunderstanding on this point. The Soviet Union is far from naive and cannot count only on peaceful assurances by U.S. leaders, which serve as a cover for developing strike weapons in space. If that is continued, nothing will remain for us, but to adopt countermeasures in the field of both offensive and other, not excluding defensive, armaments, including those based in space.

The White House wants to present the Soviet Union with a fait accompli of the deployment of space strike systems which are aimed at it. But Washington underestimates the potentialities of the Soviet Union.

III. 21 Oct 85

AA 3

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

There will be no U.S. monopoly in outer space. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev has declared this with all clarity.

In order to justify the militarization of outer space, Washington alleges that U.S. work on the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI), in fact a "star wars" program is "something quite legitimate" and even almost allowed by the 1972 Soviet-American treaty limiting antiballistic missile defences. A "new interpretation" of the treaty has been offered, according to which, it allows, purportedly, the development [razrabatyvet], testing, and creation [sozdavat] of anti-missile weapon systems on the basis of "other physical principles," that is laser, particle-beam, and other types of weaponry, both land- and space-based.

Thus, the presidential assistant for national security affairs R. McFarlane, when appearing on an NBC television program on October 6, distorted the essence of the ABM Treaty. Trying to substantiate the "lawfulness of experiments" within the framework of the ill-famed "Strategic Defense Initiative," he contended that the treaty sanctions tests of any ABM system as long as they are based on other principles of physics." The ABM Treaty is also falsified by the "new confidential study" prepared by the Pentagon and concerning limitations envisaged by the treaty. It is contended in the study that provisions of the treaty supposedly can be applied only to radars and anti-missiles, but not to the development [razrabotka] and testing of "exotic" ABM systems (lasers, beam weapons).

Such "interpretations" of the ABM Treaty, to put it mildly, are deliberate deceit. They contradict reality. Article 5 of the treaty absolutely unambiguously bans the development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems or components of space or mobile ground basing and, moreover, regardless of whether these systems are based on existing or "future" technologies.

In accordance with the agreed-upon statement "D" appended to the treaty, to which the administration now refers so often, the conduct of research, development, and testing of ABM systems or their components, based on other physical principles, is allowed in areas that are strictly limited by the treaty, clearly defined by it and use only fixed ground ABM systems (as they are defined in Article 3 of the treaty). Moreover, if either side wants to deploy its new systems in these limited areas, it cannot do so without preliminary consultations with the more side and without introducing the appropriate agreed-upon amendments in the treaty.

Only such and no other interpretation of the key provisions of the ABM Treaty, that was initiated by the United States itself, was worked out and adopted by the two sides in the course of talks on this treaty. The present aim of the U.S. Administration is clear: To prepare a "legal base" for carrying out all stages of practical work within the framework of the SDI program, that is the development [razrabotka] testing, and deployment [razvertyvaniye] of space strike systems.

The ABM Treaty is becoming an obstacle to the United States in the fulfillment of "star wars" plans. In striving to clear the road for the militarization of outer space, the head of the Pentagon Caspar Weinberger, when speaking at the National Press Club in Washington, threw aside the subterfuges of McFarland and others and bluntly stated, "We should study the possibility of really breaking with the ABM Treaty." Such is the actual position of the United States.

The Soviet Union is of a diametrically opposite opinion. The open-ended ABM Treaty is fundamentally important for the entire process of nuclear arms limitation; even more, it is the basis on which strategic stability and international security rest. We are convinced that everybody, including the United States, will stand to lose from a violation of this treaty.

III. 21 Oct 85

AA 4

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

The USSR is strictly observing all commitments under the treaty and is not doing anything that would contradict its provisions.

The Soviet stand on space strike arms was clearly formulated by Mikhail Gorbachev. It is necessary, he stated in the interview for TIME magazine, for a ban to embrace every phase of the inception of this new class of arms. This, however, does not deny the right and possibility of conducting basic research in outer space. But, it is one thing to conduct research and studies in laboratory conditions and quite another when models and prototypes are created and samples of space arms are tested. This is always followed by the deployment [razvertyvaniye] of arms. It is precisely such a line, backing it up accordingly with propaganda, that the U.S. Administration is pursuing as regards the "star wars" program. The USSR views as impermissible any out-of-laboratory work connected with the development and testing of models, pilot samples, separate assemblies, and components. Everything that is being done for the subsequent design and production of space strike systems should be banned.

The Soviet Union's approach is substantiated and realistic also from the point of view that out-of-laboratory work can be verified by national technical means. If this process is cut short at the initial stage of research, the possibility of developing [razrabotka] space strike arms will vanish.

The United States representatives pile up false arguments and distort the Soviet proposal on a very radical cut, by 50 percent, of the nuclear arms of the USSR and the United States capable of reaching each other's territory.

Flowing from Washington is a large stream of contentions that the Soviet proposal puts the United States in an unequal position because it will have to reduce not only the strategic "triad," but also its forward-based systems in Europe and Asia and medium-range missiles that are being deployed in Western Europe. As for the Soviet Union, it is contended account is only taken of strategic nuclear arms while the SS-20 missiles, deployed in the European zone and creating a threat to the West European allies of the United States, are supposedly ignored (taken out of the bracket of reductions).

The United States uses such arguments as a means of avoiding the main issue -- the genuine fact that apart from the strategic nuclear force, the Soviet Union does not have other nuclear systems capable of reaching the territory of the United States. However, the territory of the Soviet Union is under a dual threat from the U.S. strategic offensive force and U.S. medium-range missiles and forward-based systems deployed around the Soviet Union. We have never held an unconcerned attitude toward this dual threat, nor will we do so.

As for the Soviet SS-20 missiles in the European zone, our proposal is long known: The USSR is prepared to reduce them and leave no more than the number of corresponding missiles in the possession of Britain and France (counting by warheads). If the United States withdraws its medium-range missiles from Europe, the Soviet Union will immediately carry out such a reduction.

On the event of an accord in Europe, the USSR does not intend to deploy additional SS-20 missiles in the east of the country on the understanding that there will be no substantial changes in the strategic situation there and no additional U.S. nuclear systems capable of reaching the territory of the Soviet Union will be deployed.

Further, the U.S. Administration is trying to present matters as though, according to our proposal, the U.S. side, unlike, the Soviet side, will have to reduce its "triad" by more than 50 percent because, in view of its "allies commitments," the United States, supposedly, cannot renounce its medium-range missiles and forward-based systems.

III. 21 Oct 85

AA 5

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

But the USSR also has allies and corresponding obligations have also been signed between them and the Soviet Union that are being strictly observed. Why, after all, should the United States leave intact its medium-range missiles and forward-based systems that threaten the USSR and its allies? The United States wants to entrench itself with its first-strike systems near the borders of the Warsaw Pact states and thereby secure for itself strategic superiority. This is the crux of the matter.

A version is spreading within U.S. ruling circles, according to which the USSR, after the reduction, will preserve its "most dangerous" and "destabilizing" strategic armaments -- land-based ICBM's. The U.S. Administration has a rule of its own: The systems which are most developed in the USSR and which make up the backbone of its military might are designated as "destabilizing", while those which make up the strength of the United States, for instance, SLBM's, and heavy bombers, each with 20-28 long-range cruise missiles on board are systems of "stability and security". The Soviet Union does not agree with this.

Strategic offensive weapons are now approaching one another in their destructive capabilities. There is no difference as far as combat effectiveness is concerned, between the Soviet ICBM's and the American Trident SLBM's. That is why strategic armaments should be regarded and assessed in their entirety, as a single whole. This has always been the basic principle of negotiations. The new Soviet proposal proceeds from this as well. It stipulates that none of the elements of the strategic triad of each side -- either Soviet ICBM's or American SLBM's -- account for more than 60 percent of the sum total of warheads (6,000 units) remaining after the reduction. This means that, under implementation of our proposal, the reduction would apply to each of the elements of the triad, including the Soviet ICBM's.

In a bid to justify the escalation of war preparations and the Washington-instigated arms race, U.S. leaders are seeking to convince the public that no rough military strategic balance currently exists between the USSR and the United States; that the United States is allegedly "lagging behind" the USSR in strategic offensive armaments. Lately, they have been asserting that the USSR also allegedly leaped forward in the field of developing [sozdaniye] an anti-missile defense of the country's territory. The anti-Soviet propaganda about "Soviet military superiority" is continuing. The arguments are not new. Every thesis they contain is false.

The truth is that a rough balance in strategic armaments does exist between the USSR and the United States. This was verified during the seven years of work on the SALT II Treaty and was officially endorsed by Leonid Brezhnev and Jimmy Carter in 1979 during the signing of the treaty. At the present time, the number of strategic delivery vehicles on both sides has not changed in comparison with 1979. The USSR has somewhat more of them than the United States (2,504:2,210), but the United States still has a greater quantity of warheads on them. But, on the whole, there is a rough equality. This is confirmed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Armed Forces.

Its report to Congress (1984) notes: "In the present period, there exists an approximate nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union."

The approximate balance will still be preserved after 50 percent reductions in the corresponding nuclear armaments, though of course, at a substantially lower level. Although the number of delivery vehicles possessed by the United States will be somewhat greater than those of the USSR (1,680 and 1,250 respectively), the sides will be left with an identical quantity of warheads -- 6,000 units each, which will ensure approximate strategic equilibrium.

The statements by Washington officials about the USSR's purported three-time super superiority in ICBM's (warheads and their destruct capabilities) are one-sided.

III. 21 Oct 85

AA 6

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

As a matter of fact, the United States has roughly the same superiority in warheads on its SLBM's.

The United States' desire to "rectify" the nuclear armaments balance is aimed, in fact, at altering the rough equality in strategic systems in favour of the United States. It is very indicative that they want to "rectify" the nuclear balance. According to the Pentagon, a nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union existed twenty years ago when the United States had in service more than 1,000 ICBM's, 656 SLBM's, more than 600 heavy bombers, and a considerable number of forward-based nuclear weapon delivery vehicles close to Soviet territory, while the USSR had only 600 strategic delivery vehicles.

In the opinion of the U.S. side, the "imbalance" appeared when the USSR acquired an equivalent capability of replying to a strike against its territory with a strike at the potential aggressor's territory. We got this capability mostly with the development [razvitiye] of Soviet inter-continental ballistic missiles. That is why the United States views our ICBM's as the "main source of the problem".

But we do not think the ability to respond equally with a blow to a blow against our territory is an imbalance. On the contrary, this is the foundation of supporting equilibrium in nuclear forces, an important factor of maintaining peace and stability. Rough equality is also the necessary basis for the process of nuclear arms limitation. We know that in the United States some people are still dreaming about returning to the state when the invulnerable "fortress North America" could threaten any state with nuclear annihilation. There is no returning to the past. Neither will there be any unilateral disarmament of the USSR.

It is not difficult to understand what is concealed behind the inventions of the Pentagon and the United States Department of State that the Soviet Union supposedly has all but created an ABM system for the defense of the territory of the country: This is deception of the public. The Soviet Union is not engaged in the development [razrabotka] and, consequently, testing of any models of space arms whatsoever; we do not have programs for creating space strike systems nor plans of "star wars" analogous to the U.S. ones. The USSR is strictly fulfilling the indefinite ABM Treaty of 1972. We suggest that the United States should also join us in this and give up plans of militarizing outer space before it is too late. There are no strike arms in outer space now, and there should be none.

With an eye to the forthcoming Soviet-American summit, the question is being asked throughout the world: What are the Soviet Union and the United States taking to that meeting? The USSR is seriously and thoroughly preparing for it. Having made the proposals on space and nuclear arms it actually covered its half of the road. Moreover, the Soviet Union proceeds from the broad interests of European and international security. It is not seeking any military advantages whatsoever for itself and is pressing only for one thing -- just and honest agreements. Its proposals are a good basis for the talks in Geneva. The USSR is going to the summit with a firm desire to reach agreement on joint measures to eliminate the threat of nuclear war and strengthen security and stability.

What about the other side? There are no signs yet of businesslike and constructive preparations for the meeting on its part. On the contrary, the Soviet position is being distorted, real facts are being presented wrongly and attempts are being made to spread doubts in the world about the sincerity of the Soviet Union's intentions. At the same time, the United States has not made a single positive step, has not made a single constructive proposal. All this intensifies the growing concern of the peaceloving public.

III. 21 Oct 85

AA 7

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

The truth is that there can be no more marking time. Stressing the dangerous processes threatening the very existence of mankind, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Comrade M.S. Gorbachev said: "As a result, international developments have approached a line which cannot be overcome without making decisions of the highest level of responsibility in order to limit the arms race and halt the slide toward war". The time has come to adopt these decisions. And the world is awaiting these decisions.

GRINEVSKIY SEES RESULTS OF SESSION AS 'POSITIVE'

LD181234 Moscow TASS in English 1132 GMT 18 Oct 85

[Text] Stockholm, October 18 TASS -- TASS correspondent Nikolay Vukolov reports:

A regular session of the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe has closed in the Swedish capital today.

The results of the conference, Oleg Grinevskiy, the leader of the Soviet delegation, has stated, can be considered positive. The new peace initiatives put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, during his visit to France have had a positive effect on the proceedings of the Stockholm forum. Agreement has been reached at the conference on a transition to concrete talks on a range of questions, which could draw up outlines of a future accord.

Guidelines for the proceedings of the Stockholm conference have been defined by the joint initiatives of socialist countries. Their proposal on the conclusion of a treaty on the non-use of armed force has become part and parcel of the fabric of the talks. Discussion is proceeding energetically on measures proposed by them with regard to notification of major exercises of land, naval and air forces, troop movements, and also with regard to invitation of observers, which amount to safeguards against misinterpretation of actions taken by the other side.

The Soviet Union's readiness to reach agreement on mutual exchanges of annual plans for military activities that are subject to notification has opened fresh prospects for new confidence-building measures, called upon to surmount suspicions and to make it harder covertly to prepare for war. Lively debates continue on the proposals of socialist and non-aligned countries on the limitation of the scale of military exercises.

The topicality of these measures is obvious from the examples of NATO's latest exercises, which sometimes are so extensive that they can hardly be distinguished from force deployment for combat operations.

The decision that has been taken and the work that has been initiated on its basis, Grinevskiy said, show that the conference thus has possibilities for an activation of a search for mutually acceptable solutions. Progress, however, is being held back by the USA and some of its allies, which are trying to extend confidence-building measures only to the activities of the land forces, leaving aside the more dangerous services, the air force and the navy. In so doing, they are persistently pushing proposals aimed at disclosing the location and structure of the armed forces of European states and are seeking unilateral advantage.