

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Responsibility for Warning and Evolution of a "Warning System"

FROM: John J. Bird  
NIO/W  
7E47 Hqs.

EXTENSION

NO.

NIC #06248-85

DATE

24 December 1985

STAT

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #06248-85  
24 December 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John J. Bird  
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT: Responsibility for Warning and Evolution of a  
"Warning System"

1. In response to your request of a couple of weeks ago, you will find attached a brief discussion of the duties and authorities of the DCI with respect to warning and a history of how the "warning system" has evolved to the present date. The attached history contains a few judgments on my part about what has been right and wrong in the various editions of the warning system. Also attached a collection of key documents, many of which are referred to in the discussion on the DCI's statutory authority with respect to warning.

2. You will probably note as you read the attached a strong feeling on my part that the specific organizational structure for warning has been and is less important than the command interest in the subject and the quality of analysis available. Reenforcing my opinion I would quote from Ernest May's book Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars: "The type of organization appears to have had little effect on the quality of assessment....The success stories have in common not organizational form but organizational continuity....What the less successful systems had in common was organizational change."

3. The attached papers were produced through the efforts of the National Warning Staff, especially [redacted] with contributions from [redacted] and Harry Cochran.

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*John J. Bird*  
John J. Bird



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## The DCI's Duty and Authority to Warn

### Summary

The legislative history and language of the National Security Act of 1947, the terms of the successive Executive Orders on intelligence, and the understanding of the Directors of Central Intelligence since 1950 leave no doubt that the Director of Central Intelligence alone has the statutory duty to warn the President and the National Security Council and has the authority to marshal all the resources of the US Intelligence Community to fulfill this duty. Nonetheless, neither Congress nor the President have used the word warning in their statements of the duties, powers and functions of the National Security Council, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

### Statutory Authority

1. The duty and authority of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency support those of the National Security Council, in the National Security Act of 1947. Subject to the President, the Council has large discretionary authority to guide the Central Intelligence Agency as to how and with what resources the Council should satisfy its charges. The Council duty, in which lies the warning function, is "to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of the national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith;...."

50 USC 403(a)

50 USC 402(b)

2. The responsibility of the National Security Council to direct the Central Intelligence Agency in carrying out the Congressional intent is explicit. The duties are assigned to the Agency. "For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council:

- (1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments as relate to the national security;
- (2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;
- (3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security and provide for the appropriate

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dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities (and to protect sources and methods);

- (4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more effectively accomplished centrally;
- (5) to perform such other functions and duties as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

50 USC 403(1)-(5)

3. The warning function is a derivative of subparagraph (3). It is under the direction of the National Security Council, but the language permits the Central Intelligence Agency to decide how best to accomplish this duty. Time and more recent usage have dimmed the meaning of the terms intelligence relating to the national security. The legislative history and Congressional debate of the National Security Act clarify that these terms covered the crises and threats so recently endured in 1947. In this respect, the meaning of the Act's language is almost exclusively warning as we now understand the term.

1946 USCCS 1127  
Cong Rec July, 1946

4. The National Security Act is explicit in directing the departments and other agencies of the government to make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such intelligence relating to national security as they possess. The Director is given discretionary authority to correlate, evaluate and disseminate such intelligence. This paragraph distinguishes a role for the Director independent of the duties assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency generally. The duty of the other intelligence agencies to warn the Director of Central Intelligence is a derivative of this paragraph, as is the statutory basis for an autonomous Director of Central Intelligence.

50 USC 403(e)

The Executive Orders

5. President Nixon in November 1971 reorganized US intelligence so as to strengthen its management by enhancing the leadership role of the Director of Central Intelligence. This represented a refinement of the National Security Act assignment of duties to the Central Intelligence Agency, making the Director of Central Intelligence a position distinguishable from the head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

This arrangement was expanded and institutionalized by Presidents Ford and Carter, and, most recently, President Reagan through Executive Order 12333, 4 December 1981.

6. "The Director of Cental Intelligence" shall be responsible directly to the President and the National Security Council...".

E.O. 12333, p. 1.5

This subordination to the President was first stated in an Executive Order by President Ford in 1976 and affords access not provided in the National Security Act to either the Central Intelligence Agency or the Director of Central Intelligence.

7. The Director of Central Intelligence's mandate to warn is contained in two subparagraphs, derivatively, as including the "responsibility for production and dissemination of national foreign intelligence" and "to insure the timely exploitation and dissemination of data gathered by national foreign intelligence collection means and insure that the resulting intelligence is disseminated immediately to appropriate government entities and military commands."

E.O. 12333 p. 1.5  
(k) and (1)

8. Five sections of the Executive Order specify the duty of other members of the Intelligence Community to provide intelligence and other forms of support to the Director of Central Intelligence:

- 1.3 National Foreign Intelligence Advisory Groups
- 1.5 Director of Central Intelligence
- 1.6 Duties and Responsibilities of the Heads of Executive Branch Departments and Agencies
- 1.7 Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community
- 1.11 The Department of Defense
- 3.2 Implementation

9. Generally, in the Executive Orders, the Director of Central Intelligence independently has duties that were assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency by the National Security Act. The Director of Central Intelligence and his staff elements are specifically denoted as a part of the Intelligence Community for the first time in Executive Order 12036, 26 January 1978, by President Carter. This practice is continued in Executive Order 12333.

National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID)

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10. Between 1947 and 1972, National Security Council Directives contained the clearest formulation of the Director's and the Agency's warning responsibilities. Generally, these have been superseded by Executive Order, though not entirely. The prevailing concept of warning through 1972 is contained in NSCID No. 1, Basic Duties and Responsibilities, 17 February 1972. "Whenever any member of the United States Intelligence Board (now NFIB) obtains information that indicates an impending crisis situation that affects the security of the United States to such an extent that immediate action or decision by the President or the National Security Council may be required, he shall immediately transmit the information to the Director of Central Intelligence and the other members of the United States Intelligence Board, as well as to the National Indications Center (now NIO/W and the National Warning Staff, DCID 6/1, 1982) and to other officials or agencies as may be indicated by the circumstances. The Director of Central

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Intelligence shall immediately prepare and disseminate, as appropriate, the national intelligence estimate of the situation." This paragraph summarizes the Director's responsibility to the National Security Council as well as the duty of the other intelligence agencies to the Director.

NSCID No. 1(6)(e)

11. NSCID No. 1 and NSC Directive 162/2 (1953) were cited to justify establishment of the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board and its supporting National Indications Center. These constituted a 24-hour full-time warning and threat analysis capability directly under the National Security Council, via the Director of Central Intelligence. The National Warning Staff of the National Intelligence Officer for Warning is the last institutional remnant of this arrangement and is no longer a 24-hour watch.

Understanding of the DCIs

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12. The tradition that the Director of Central Intelligence is the top warner to the National Security Council can be traced to General W. B. Smith. In a meeting on 7 December 1950 of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (predecessor of the National Foreign Intelligence Board), General Smith asserted "... his was the responsibility to see there is an arrangement in the government to carry out the functions of a Watch Committee." No DCI has controverted that understanding of his duty. More importantly the weight of precedent and legal authority is such that only the DCI has this responsibility.

Item 7, M-10 IAC

Responsibilities of the Intelligence Community and CIA to Warn the DCI

To implement the DCI's statutory warning responsibilities to the president and the NSC, Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/1 (1982) identifies procedures to organize and marshal the resources of the Intelligence Community, [redacted] (1980) implements the strategic warning mission within the CIA itself.

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A. Within the Intelligence Community, DCID 6/1 creates a National Intelligence Warning System to provide the DCI with strategic warning of "those activities undertaken and the intelligence information produced by the Intelligence Community to avoid surprise...by foreign events of major importance to the security of the US". Formally excluded from the DCI's Warning System is any responsibility for tactical warning (e.g. notification that an enemy has initiated hostilities). This responsibility rests with DoD and the military commands.

DCID 6/1, para 1

The DDCI is assigned authority to oversee the activities of the National Intelligence Warning System "with the advice and assistance of NFIB". Formal responsibilities assigned within that system include:

DCID 6/1, para 2

- The NIOs are charged with substantive responsibility for warning in their respective areas, through conducting Community-wide reviews of potential warning situations at least monthly. The DCI and NIO/Warning are apprised of the results of the warning meetings.
- The NIO/Warning is responsible for advising and assisting the DCI, DDCI, and C/NIC on all matters pertaining to warning, and recommending to the DCI and DDCI the issuance of warning to the president and NSC. An Alert Memorandum is a formal written interagency warning vehicle specified by NFIB 28.5/16 (1980). An Alert Memorandum is issued by the DCI on behalf of the Intelligence Community "to warn explicitly of impending potential developments abroad that have serious implications for US interests". The decision to issue an Alert Memorandum rests solely with the DCI, but any senior official in the Intelligence Community may initiate a request for issuance.
- Among other responsibilities of NIO/Warning, the DCI has delegated to NIO/W--via DCID 6/1--partial responsibility for reviewing and assessing alternative intelligence judgments with warning implications. This supports the DCI's statutory obligation in Executive Order 12333 to ensure that "diverse points of view are considered fully and differences of judgments within the Intelligence Community are brought to the attention of national policymakers".

E.O. 12333, para  
1.5k; DCID 6/1,  
para 2c

All intelligence community components are responsible for warning intelligence "through established channels".

DCID 6/1, para 3

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[redacted] to [redacted]

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Warning and the Warning System

The National Intelligence Warning System as defined and described in the foregoing is more an intricate web of explicit warning responsibility by all NFIB members than it is an organizational entity with a life of its own. As elaborated later in this document, the present system differs radically with the organization developed in the early 1950's which had duties and responsibilities generally outside those of the regular intelligence-producing components.

The American experience with warning intelligence in the past four decades strongly suggests that deficiencies reside not in organizational forms but in the process of analysis and assessment. Post-mortems of warning failures have generally concluded that most were not caused by a dearth of information but by incorrect evaluations of available information, particularly in the area of an adversary's intentions. Flawed evaluations, in turn, were usually caused by faulty assumptions or preconceptions that led both analysts and policy-makers to rely on only one interpretation of the evidence.

[redacted] Israel's failure to anticipate the Egyptian and Syrian attacks in October 1973 are applicable to most intelligence and policy failures: "No lack of reliable information caused this situation. The IDF had all the information about the enemy's power, his deployment and the advanced weapons in his possession. The mistake lay in the evaluation of the intelligence data and not in the absence of accurate and reliable information."

Harry Cochran, drawing on more than two decades experience, notes that past warning deficiencies and failures have often been due to the reluctance of senior officers—office directors and above—to become personally and directly involved in the process of defining the potential threat and framing a succinct and cogent warning assessment. Although analysts normally have a more complete command of the full range of reporting on their areas of responsibility, the nature of their assignments often makes it difficult for them to apply the broader perspective and insight that effective warning requires. The analyst's grasp of detail, therefore, must be balanced and supplemented by the experience and savvy of senior managers who are presumed to have a better understanding of both the "big picture" and of the views and assumptions of senior consumers. The present organizational arrangement for warning by focusing on the intelligence producers themselves and not on an external National Indications Center should be redressing this problem of the past.

The management and production of cogent and credible warning assessments at least theoretically fall within the competence and authority of senior managers, but a second requirement—acceptance of warning by policy-makers—is a much more ambiguous and elusive problem. The long record of surprise in the 20th century, beginning with Japan's attack on the Russians at Port Arthur in 1904,

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demonstrates that with few exceptions intelligence services reported significant indications of hostile intent by an adversary; the failures were generally not caused by intelligence deficiencies but by the unwillingness of senior policy-makers and military commanders to accept warning and act on it. In most cases when warning based on tactical indications conflicted with the entrenched strategic-political assumptions of senior policy-makers, the latter prevailed, e.g., Pearl Harbor, the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Korean War and Chinese military intervention, the Yom Kippur War of 1973. As Ernest May observes about the periods before the two world wars, "widely accepted presumptions were often quite wrong. Though they rested on flimsy foundations, they were extraordinarily resistant even to question, let alone to serious challenge. Every case here shows analysts or decision-makers gripped by beliefs which turned out to be baseless. In retrospect, the hardness and omnipresence of some of these beliefs seems almost incomprehensible."

The problem seems one of not only discovering or predicting that some significant event of dire consequences is likely to happen but in the face of entrenched opinion to be persuasive in doing so.

Our Experience with Warning and the Development of the SystemA Bad Start (1946 - November 1950)

From the exhaustive Congressional investigation in 1946 of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, three mandates were delivered to the national security community:

- US intelligence activities/ clandestine operations require more coordination;
- The President as Chairman of the National Security Council requires a single channel to advise him about the intelligence affecting the national security;
- The US must never be caught so unprepared for war again.

Application of these principles in some efficient fashion has proven much more difficult than their articulation.

Concerning the idea that the US should never be surprised again, pursuit of that goal has been diligent but fruitless. Even before passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the heads of US intelligence agencies met informally to exchange a growing body of alarming data on Soviet post-war reconstruction and subjugation of Eastern Europe. This Central Intelligence Group was served by a small staff later to become the core group of the Central Intelligence Agency.

[redacted] as catalyst for distilling a "warning" analytical technique different from conventional analysis. Worried about Soviet intentions in Czechoslovakia and Germany [redacted]

[redacted] a "check list" of likely Soviet preparations and readiness measures to watch in advance of a military move to seize Berlin. Thus was born the US use of "indicators lists" and the conventional notion of indications analysis as a military subject. An informal group of researchers in CIA and a more organized group in Army G-2 readily embraced the analytical innovation. These would be followed by the Air Defense Command a few years later and in a much more elaborate manner.

The CIA and Army analysts formed themselves into a "watch committee" and were joined by Navy, Air and State analysts in a weekly meeting to compare notes and "indications." A report of the meeting was sent to the Director of Central Intelligence and the parent agency heads for information.

This mechanism was reasonably effective in what it did, which was watch the USSR in central Europe. It was a product of analysts' concerns: informal, low-level, and merely advisory. No analytical group was dedicated to support the Director of Central Intelligence in discharging his warning responsibilities, though the Army G-2 and other departmental groups served their own constituencies.

The Chinese Drive a Point (November 1950 - 1953)

The records of "watch committee" meetings in mid-1950 are dominated by concern with Soviet intentions. Although there was mention of potential hostilities in Korea, they were viewed through the filter of monolithic Communism as a feint for another European war to finish the conquest. China's entry into the Korean War laid bare the raw nerve of US obsession with surprise. For the second time in a decade the US was at war under conditions of surprise with an Asian power.

The Korean War emerged just as the Central Intelligence Agency was attempting to shake down a reorganization. The only watch or warning mechanism, the informal "watch committee", was focused towards Europe but continued to meet. On 7 December 1950 the Director of Central Intelligence, General Walter Bedell Smith directed the formal establishment of a "Watch Committee" under the Intelligence Advisory Committee (later the United States Intelligence Board). This first formal measure basically promoted the informal committee. More than a well-conceived remedy, this seems to have been a reflexive reaction to a deep-seated need to "do something" and a growing recognition that a more rationally coordinated intelligence warning effort might have avoided the surprise of 1950.

In the midst of war, the Watch Committee was directed:

"to collect, evaluate, analyze and report indications of Soviet-Communist intentions of hostile action."

Army G-2 chaired the Committee during the Korean War and provided staff support, along with CIA, Navy and Air Force. Membership on the Committee consisted of representatives from State/INR, CIA, the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army, Navy and Air Force, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Atomic Energy Commission.

The Committee met weekly to discuss a "tentative check list of indicators" whose informality of preparation was matched only by the casualness of the meetings themselves. Debates were forceful, long and generally useless. No product was required but G-2 prepared a sense of the meeting report, accomplished its coordination and distributed it to the parent agencies of the Watch Committee members, the Intelligence Advisory Committee (now the NFIB) and through them to other interested agencies. By the end of 1953, the report's distribution reached 225 copies.

The general position of the Committee as a supplicant for intelligence information and other support from the agencies, with little direction to its effort and no competence to report with authority led to a post-war review. In short, the Committee simply could not get intelligence to do its job from the member agencies.

The Sheldon Report (October 1953-1954)

Following the Korean War and the election of a new Republican administration, a new Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen Dulles, and his Intelligence Advisory Committee directed a review of the warning process to try to strengthen it. This was the first and perhaps the best of many subsequent reviews. Most of the main issues governing the ensuing 20 years were discussed, but little was actually accomplished towards making a better warning system.

CIA's Huntington Sheldon headed the group which investigated

- whether the warning mission of the Watch Committee should cover only war by the USSR and the Communist nations or all kinds of war threats;
- what represented the appropriate interval for warning relative to current and estimates intelligence;
- whether warning was a specialty separate from other analysis;
- the staffing arrangements for the Watch Committee.

The one issue resolved by the Sheldon Committee was staffing: it recommended establishment of a world-wide indications center modeled after that at Colorado Springs in the Air Defense Command which had been visited by members of the Watch Committee before the Sheldon Group was assembled. Thus was born the National Indications Center, the first 24-hour all-source center of its kind dedicated exclusively to warning of war.

Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/2, 11 May 1954 directed a renewed Watch Committee:

"to provide earliest possible warning to the United States Government of hostile action by the USSR, or its allies, which endangers the security of the United States."

The same Directive laid out the hierarchical and formal warning structure, including a diagram. At the top was the Intelligence Advisory Committee, presumably chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence. Throughout the US experience in warning after World War II no source has ever challenged or controverted that warning is a primary duty of the Director of Central Intelligence.

Below the IAC came the Watch Committee and below that the National Indications Center consisting of a 30-member watch plus a standing staff who were ordered to "continuously screen all pertinent information and intelligence received from all IAC agencies for indications relating to the Watch Committee mission; develop promptly an early evaluation and analysis of each indication...coordinate with individual members of the Watch Committee...prepare materials...coordinate and disseminate...maintain the closest liaison with parent agencies...."

The membership of both Watch Committee and Indications Center was drawn from and depended on the agencies of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. The operation of the Watch Committee and The Center institutionalized the weekly Watch Committee meetings into a cycle, involving a large staff and considerable energy. The Center was fully engaged with preparing for a Wednesday meeting of the Watch Committee, and it in turn prepared for a Thursday IAC meeting. The Agenda was drawn up by the Center staff, which also produced a draft report. This was debated and edited by the Committee and sent for approval to the Board, in whose name the Combined Watch Report was published.

This mechanism worked to the satisfaction of its participants for about the first eight years; it lasted for 20. The satisfaction resulted from Mr. Dulles' insistence that his Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Lt. Gen. Cabell, chair the meetings of the Watch Committee. This insured a higher level and caliber of representation than later times witnessed and resulted in closer rapport with policymakers, supplying an essential feedback link to warning. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, Special Assistants for National Security, Ambassadors and many others were audiences for National Indications Center briefings during the early period.

The elegant simplicity of language and the reflected glow of high authority obscures recollection that the system failed to warn about the Hungarian uprising of 1956 and the Cuban missile crisis. In fact, it really had little authority beyond the personal prestige and rank of its top officials. In establishing the National Indications Center, the Intelligence Advisory Committee did what it could do, and avoided the underlying issues of warning doctrine, training, and technique; authority and competence of the warning system; and most of all, the larger warning responsibilities of the intelligence agencies in support of the DCI.

Efforts to revive the watch mechanism followed the Cuban missile crisis. A perception of irrelevance, hostility to competition with line agencies, bureaucratic layering and the coordination processes insured only limp-wristed treatment of issues for the next 12 years. Many were missed or not treated. Only twice in 1,279 meetings of the Watch Committee did the final Watch Report contain alternative views or footnotes, despite an explicit charge to publish them dating from 1954.

When the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 and the subsequent oil crisis took the US by surprise, the fate of this warning mechanism was sealed. There is little evidence that it had made a measurable difference in the security of the United States in coping with the major crises during its twenty year watch.

The analytical staff, the National Indications Center, had no explicit requirement to warn, only to watch continuously. The premier warning organization was the Watch Committee, which degenerated into participation only by action officers rather than serious analysts or high officials. Committee members even objected to the Center

formulating the agenda for the Watch Committee meetings. Yet the Committee failed to warn even the USIB.

### The Colby Reform

Exactly 24 years after Bedell Smith's order to set up a warning system, Mr. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, reported to the United States Intelligence Board on 5 December 1974 that the original system was not doing the job it was set up to do. Colby proposed a new mechanism under the USIB that would be a community effort with a new art form, division of effort, and a new organization. The duty of supporting the Director of Central Intelligence in day-to-day situations was laid squarely on the line production agencies. The work horse of this effort was the new art form, the Alert Memorandum. Issued by the DCI on behalf of the Community, it was expressly not a prediction, estimate, or situation report. Rather its intent was to alert policymakers of a need for action to avert danger. About 60 were produced between 1974 and 1981. Most fell far short of the prod to action envisioned, but simply replicated current intelligence. The vehicle was not well understood or employed.

For general war, Mr. Colby appointed a Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Strategic Warning, and designated DIA's head of current intelligence at the time, Maj Gen Lincoln D. Faurer by name, as the first special assistant. The Special Assistant warned the DCI and had the authority to go directly to the President and the National Security Council when time was of the essence. His vehicle was the Strategic Warning Notice.

The Special Assistant was supported by the Strategic Warning Staff, a small interagency analytical staff, under a senior CIA official, dedicated exclusively to warning of general war. To sustain interest in strategic warning, the Staff published for five years a monthly report covering issues mostly of military concern produced by staff analysts or analysts in the line production agencies. The Staff also published a monthly Alert List and several USIB approved Indicator Lists, carrying on a tradition begun by the National Indications Center.

By the end of the five years the Staff had run out of ideas to publish and lists to compile; its work had degenerated into current intelligence with a few exceptions and the staff was generally unheeded if not disdained.

In the Directive establishing the Staff and the Special Assistant, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence was assigned responsibility for the formation of a working group to review the functioning of the strategic warning process and to report its findings at least annually. This group became the warning working group and interpreted its mandate as riding herd on the Special Assistant and especially the Strategic Warning Staff. A twenty-five year inability by anyone to translate ideas of "strategic warning" into a workable analytical program plus the constant oversight resulted in a dispirited warning staff, and

inconsistent and confused treatment of warning issues. An early guidance to study political and economic indicators of warning went ignored for lack of know-how. The senior warning analyst at the time wrote that warning could not be derived from economic indicators. CIA, State and most DIA analysts considered warning an arcane business of military hocus pocus dealing with "strategic systems" and pseudo-cybernetic responses to lighted display boards. Happily the need to issue a Strategic Warning Notice never emerged.

### Congressional Oversight and Suggestions

In response to a growing list of "warning failures", the House Permanent Subcommittee on Intelligence completed a study of warning that captured many of the longstanding substantive and procedural lessons of the past, but generally treated warning in a sophomoric fashion. The study rightly concluded that new technology development was the normative US response to failure but was no substitute for sound analytical judgment. It noted that failures of warning were almost never failures of collection, but rather analytical shortcomings and bias, both in intelligence and in policymaking. Policymakers expected more of intelligence than intelligence could deliver but that awareness of warning was low in both intelligence and policy chains. Analysts needed more training and more tools. Moreover, the House study noted that a healthy warning system should place a premium on presentation of reasonable alternative analyses to prevent future surprise caused by suppression of minority views. Structurally the study urged the DCI to appoint some senior official to provide leadership and focus on warning. It was an enlightened document for the time, but its suggestions offered no reasonable expectation of improvement beyond what was already in operation.

### The Turner DCID (23 May 1979)

It is a quirk of fate that ADM Turner signed one of the best DCIDs on warning issued because Turner once stated, after a tour of the Strategic Warning Staff and the [redacted] his intention to scrap the whole system as useless. In the summer of 1978, the DCI had ordered CIA's veteran warners, [redacted] and [redacted] among others, to conduct an ad hoc study of the DCI's role in warning and crisis. The conclusions strongly supported those of the House study report. On 11 October 1978, [redacted] senior staff officer for warning matters. The ensuing DCID 1/5, issued 23 May 1979, the tenth directive on warning since 1950, was the first to establish a "national warning system".

The mission of the system was "to advise and assist the DCI in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities with respect to warning intelligence and to coordinate the warning activities of the Intelligence Community." Despite some cumbersome and unhelpful definitions, this directive was also the first to ordain "All Community organizations and personnel have substantive responsibility for the detection of



developments requiring warning and for promptly alerting, through established channels, of such developments."

The national system was set up under the oversight of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. The National Intelligence Officer for Warning was assigned to advise and assist the DCI and DDCI on warning, to coordinate national intelligence warning activities, to serve as the focal point for warning in the community, and oversee the SWS.

A Warning Working Group was established with representation from the NFIB member agencies to assist the NIO for Warning in carrying out his fourteen specified responsibilities and for coordination.

The most important change was the NIO for Warning's and DCI's success in harnessing the other National Intelligence Officers to the warning duty. The National Intelligence Officer for Warning was established as the first among equals with authority to decide what to warn about and when to do it. The NIOs were directed to conduct monthly warning meetings and report to the DCI through the NIO for Warning.

The Strategic Warning Staff was given a new lease on life under the direction of the NIO for Warning and directed to "do something relevant". This included another look at political and economic indicators and more "reasonable alternative analysis", as proposed by the House study report. The net result was no new insights into political and economic indicators, some strongly disputed alternative analysis, and a reservoir of bitterness at the analytical competition by those agencies tasked to support the Warning Staff. CIA withdrew all its personnel by 1982, as did the National Security Agency. DIA permitted its contingent to undergo attrition, with the expectation that all its people would depart. The Army and Air Force followed DIA's lead.

This mechanism essentially has been carried on to the present, despite some basic flaws in the system and the redesignation of the Strategic Warning Staff as the National Warning Staff with renewed CIA participation.

#### The Past Four Years (1982-1985)

The present DCID, 6/1, is the broadest in its description of the community's warning responsibilities and the vaguest...and it seems to work the best. Structures have not changed, but there has been a sweeping redirection and redefinition of the Community warning function. There is also a general sense of health in the warning community.

For the first time, the old exclusivity of the warners has been replaced by a quiet recognition that production analysts have always done warning, and although a diffuse part of the warning system, make the real contribution. Current and other intelligence, per se, are not warning, they become warning when they:

- a) treat threats and
- b) persuade the reader to react to the threat.

This recognition alone has reduced hostility towards warning and helped focus more deliberate attention to the analysis and detection of threats.

For 35 years warning has been considered a subset of political science, or strategic studies or a subdiscipline of current intelligence. Beginning with NIO for Warning McManis, however, this changed. In US national estimates and other doctrinal materials warning was defined as a communications process dealing with danger. This simple change has begun to alter the way the Community approaches its task.

There has also been a new awareness of the role of decisionmakers in warning and of the potential for action contained in information provided early and in usable fashion. This has led to an understanding that the subject matter of warning is not surprise but threat which can be avoided, deterred or prepared for, even when surprise cannot be avoided.

Another effort has been the investigation of new ways to do warning analysis. Indications analysis is hardly unique to warning and should never have become confused with a communications process. In fact analysis of indications has no inherent link to warning, rather it is one of many useful tools for any kind of analysis. The confusion of this one analytical approach with the warning function hobbled past efforts to improve the system. A search for new tools is in full swing and for the first time political and economic warning structures are coming into use in the US and among the Allies. There is a growing sense of a shared and fluid analytical system designed to cope with threat, not just when military violence occurs but long before.

The subject matter for warning is no longer just general war, but runs the gamut of possible threats. This reflects real world demands and justifies a wider range of service for national decisionmakers. Institutional barriers to cooperation have started to collapse. Cooperation in the community in the production of warning intelligence, including presentation of alternative views, is clearly on the rise.

In retrospect, past US efforts to improve warning were certainly misdirected until the late 1970's. The burden of warning was carried, in fact, by line production analysts, rather than specialized structures or vehicles which drew down the strength of the production agencies. Still, when the DCI has been a strong personality and demanded better service, the record shows the system was at least perceived to have worked well.

Warning support to the DCI from all the organizations is probably better than ever before. The linkages between intelligence and policy reside more strongly now with the DCI than they have for decades, although the DCI has no real vehicle for registering his warnings, except the force of his personality. That is probably the best way to achieve a warning success—a threat avoided—but it is difficult to document after the fact, when it succeeds.

Warning has heretofore been considered an "intelligence judgment" and a single event climaxed by a document of some sort. The theory now espoused understands warning as a process with various levels of alarm demarcating growth of threat. Warning, in other words, is a repetitive and increasingly persuasively demand for reasonable responses as events and circumstances dictate.

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**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE <sup>1</sup>****NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WARNING**

(Effective 13 October 1982)

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 and Executive Order 12333, policies and procedures are herewith established for a National Intelligence Warning System.

***1. Mission***

The National Intelligence Warning System will advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities with respect to warning intelligence and will be the focal point for coordinating the warning activities of the Intelligence Community.

The Warning Mission includes those activities undertaken and the intelligence information produced by the Intelligence Community to avoid surprise to the President, the National Security Council, and the Armed Forces of the United States by foreign events of major importance to the security of the U.S. The highest priority task will be to provide warning of an attack on the U.S. or its allies.

In addition to supporting the mission of the intelligence warning system in providing strategic warning, the Department of Defense has a specific and unique responsibility for tactical warning, i.e., notification that an enemy has initiated hostilities. The dedicated tactical warning systems within the military command organization are independent of the National Warning System, but the two systems are mutually supportive.

***2. Organization and Responsibilities***

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) is assigned authority to oversee the activities of the National Intelligence Warning System with the advice and assistance of the National Foreign Intelligence Board.

The National Intelligence Officers will continue to be charged with substantive responsibility for warning in their respective areas. They will conduct Community-wide reviews at least monthly of situations which could require the issuance of warning and will keep the DCI and the National Intelligence Officer for Warning apprised of the results of the reviews.

The National Intelligence Officer for Warning shall be appointed by the DCI. As the focal point for warning in the Intelligence Community, his functions will include:

- a. advising and assisting the DCI, DDCI, and Chairman, National Intelligence Council, on all matters pertaining to warning;
- b. recommending to the DCI and DDCI the issuance of warning to the President and the National Security Council and ensuring the appropriate dissemination of such warning;

<sup>1</sup> This directive supersedes DCID No. 1/5, 23 May 1979.

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- c. reviewing the collection and analysis of intelligence from all sources for warning implications and assessing alternative judgments within the Intelligence Community; and
- d. promoting research and training in methodologies and procedures for warning and developing warning consciousness and discipline throughout the Intelligence Community.

The Warning Working Group, chaired by the National Intelligence Officer for Warning and consisting of senior representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense and others as appropriate, will assist the National Intelligence Officer for Warning in carrying out his functions.

A National Warning Staff, with appropriate representation from the Intelligence Community, is established to support the National Intelligence Officer for Warning.

**3. Intelligence Community Responsibilities**

All Intelligence Community components have a responsibility for warning intelligence and for prompt alerting through established channels. Nothing in this directive is intended to inhibit the flow of warning information in any way.

Intelligence Community components will establish the appropriate structure and staffing to support the National Intelligence Warning System.

Intelligence Community components are assigned the following specific responsibilities:

- a. to provide representation and other support, as appropriate, to the National Warning Staff;
- b. on request by the National Intelligence Office for Warning, to provide information, within established security safeguards, pertinent to the warning mission; and
- c. to designate an officer with specific responsibility to support the National Intelligence Warning System.

William J. Casey  
Director of Central Intelligence

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DCID 1/5 HISTORY - NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER - Watch Committee of the USIB

Basic Charter Terms of Reference Watch Committee of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) 11 May 1954\* 1/2

- DCID 1/5 14 Nov 1958
- DCID 1/5 7 Mar 1961
- DCID 1/5 8 Aug 1962
- DCID 1/5 8 Aug 1962 (editorially revised 27 Feb 1963)
- DCID 1/5 23 Apr 1965 (Dept of Army, Navy & Air Force will be represented by observers at WC meetings)
- DCID 1/5 3 Mar 1975 (Strategic Warning Staff Established)
- DCID 1/5 18 May 1976
- DCID 1/5 23 May 1979 (National Intelligence Warning System established) (SWS will be under the supervision of the NIO/W. National Intelligence Officer for Warning is established) [redacted] appointed 11 Oct 1978) 25X1
- Memo 2 Jun 1982 The Strategic Warning Staff is disestablished... DDI # 4535/82 [redacted] will continue as the NIO/W and the Strategic warning Staff will function as an interim National Warning Staff. 25X1
- DCID 1/5 13 Oct 1982 National Warning Staff is established to support the National Intelligence Officer for Warning w/appropriate representation from the Intelligence Community.
- 29 Nov 1982 [redacted] is appointed National Intelligence Officer for Warning, vice [redacted] 25X1  
25X1

\* Early History of Indications Intelligence Committees

- Early Dec 1949 Informal committee, following Berlin Blockade, 1950 Chaired by CIA. (representation from all IAC agencies).
- Early Aug 1949 Indications Intelligence File Committee set up in 1950 G-2, Army (Representation: internal G-2, only).
- Aug 1950 Indications Intelligence File Committee became the Joint Indications Intelligence Committee with participation by Army, Navy, Air with observers from other agencies.

- 7 Dec 1950 The Joint Indications Intelligence Committee (above) elevated to the Watch Committee of the IAC by IAC directive (Official representation from all IAC agencies. Took effect Jan 1951)
  - 6 Oct 1953 IAC appointed an Ad Hoc Committee to Study Watch Committee problems and submit recommendation for changes.
  - 4 May 1954 IAC approved recommendations submitted by Ad Hoc Committee (which held some 30 meetings during 7 months study).
  - 11 May 1954 DCID 1/2 approved by IAC and signed by DCI
  - 11 Jul 1954 National Indications Center established on paper. (NIC)
  - 15 Sep 1954 New Watch Committee organized with DDCI as Chairman.
  - Nov 1954 President approves NSC # 5438
  - Jan 1955 NIC established in new quarters in the Pentagon.
- Watch Reports numbered from August 1950
- 28 Feb 1975 Last Watch Report 1279. Comment at USIB pursuant to the new DCID 1/5 "Strategic Warning Staff" becomes effective on 3 March 1975, the Watch Committee and the National Indications Center would no longer exist.

Prepared Jan 1983 w/supporting documents

Staff Member  
National Warning Staff

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**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE****NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WARNING**

(Effective 13 October 1982)

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 and Executive Order 12333, policies and procedures are herewith established for a National Intelligence Warning System.

***1. Mission***

The National Intelligence Warning System will advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities with respect to warning intelligence and will be the focal point for coordinating the warning activities of the Intelligence Community.

The Warning Mission includes those activities undertaken and the intelligence information produced by the Intelligence Community to avoid surprise to the President, the National Security Council, and the Armed Forces of the United States by foreign events of major importance to the security of the U.S. The highest priority task will be to provide warning of an attack on the U.S. or its allies.

In addition to supporting the mission of the intelligence warning system in providing strategic warning, the Department of Defense has a specific and unique responsibility for tactical warning, i.e., notification that an enemy has initiated hostilities. The dedicated tactical warning systems within the military command organization are independent of the National Warning System, but the two systems are mutually supportive.

***2. Organization and Responsibilities***

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) is assigned authority to oversee the activities of the National Intelligence Warning System with the advice and assistance of the National Foreign Intelligence Board.

The National Intelligence Officers will continue to be charged with substantive responsibility for warning in their respective areas. They will conduct Community-wide reviews at least monthly of situations which could require the issuance of warning and will keep the DCI and the National Intelligence Officer for Warning apprised of the results of the reviews.

The National Intelligence Officer for Warning shall be appointed by the DCI. As the focal point for warning in the Intelligence Community, his functions will include:

- a. advising and assisting the DCI, DDCI, and Chairman, National Intelligence Council, on all matters pertaining to warning;
- b. recommending to the DCI and DDCI the issuance of warning to the President and the National Security Council and ensuring the appropriate dissemination of such warning;

<sup>1</sup> This directive supersedes DCID No. 1/5, 23 May 1979.

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- c. reviewing the collection and analysis of intelligence from all sources for warning implications and assessing alternative judgments within the Intelligence Community; and
- d. promoting research and training in methodologies and procedures for warning and developing warning consciousness and discipline throughout the Intelligence Community.

The Warning Working Group, chaired by the National Intelligence Officer for Warning and consisting of senior representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense and others as appropriate, will assist the National Intelligence Officer for Warning in carrying out his functions.

A National Warning Staff, with appropriate representation from the Intelligence Community, is established to support the National Intelligence Officer for Warning.

### ***3. Intelligence Community Responsibilities***

All Intelligence Community components have a responsibility for warning intelligence and for prompt alerting through established channels. Nothing in this directive is intended to inhibit the flow of warning information in any way.

Intelligence Community components will establish the appropriate structure and staffing to support the National Intelligence Warning System.

Intelligence Community components are assigned the following specific responsibilities:

- a. to provide representation and other support, as appropriate, to the National Warning Staff;
- b. on request by the National Intelligence Office for Warning, to provide information, within established security safeguards, pertinent to the warning mission; and
- c. to designate an officer with specific responsibility to support the National Intelligence Warning System.

William J. Casey  
Director of Central Intelligence

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**THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

DDI #4535/82

2 June 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Warning Working Group

FROM :  for Warning

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
SUBJECT : DCI Decision on Warning

1. The DCI has signed a decision memorandum on the Warning Working Group report. I have attached a copy for your information.

2. The Director looks to the Working Group for the implementation actions, and I have scheduled a meeting for 1315 on Wednesday, 9 June in Room 7E62, CIA Headquarters. Some suggested topics for discussion are:

- a. Nominations for NIO/W
- b. Composition of the National Warning Staff
- c. Revision of DCID 1/5.

3. Pending our decisions on the selection of an NIO/W and the formation of a new staff, I will continue as NIO/W and the Strategic Warning Staff will function as an interim National Warning Staff.



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Attachment

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are Classified SECRET

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: The National Foreign Intelligence Board  
FROM : Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT : Decision on Warning Working Group Report

1. My discussion and consideration of the warning issues has continued in a variety of forums since we reviewed the Working Group Report at the 19 January NFIB. Drawing upon the report for a frame of reference, I have made the following decisions:

- a. We should consider the National Intelligence Warning System as defined in the current DCID to be composed of the separate warning activities in the Intelligence Community components plus the NIO for Warning.
- b. The mission of the system is to advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities with respect to warning intelligence and to coordinate the warning activities of the Intelligence Community.
- c. The basic warning mission will be as defined in DCID 1/5: "to avoid surprise to the President, the NSC, and the Armed Forces of the United States by foreign events of major importance..." That mission and definition will be expanded as appropriate to ensure attention to more slowly developing, longer-term intelligence problems relating to the security of the United States. The warning mission will give highest priority to warning of an attack on the US or its allies.
- d. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence will oversee the National Intelligence Warning System with the advice of the National Foreign Intelligence Board.
- e. The position of National Intelligence Officer for Warning will be a full-time position. His mission is to advise and assist the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on all matters relating to warning, to coordinate national intelligence warning activities, and to serve as a focal point for warning in the Community. He will to the maximum extent rely on existing organizations in carrying out his duties. His responsibilities are:

All Portions of This Memorandum  
are Classified SECRET

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- (1) To oversee analysis of intelligence from all sources which might provide warning. In particular, he should be alert to alternate interpretations within the Community and assess these with a view to the need for issuance of warning. He should encourage consultation and substantive discussion at all levels in the Community.
- (2) To recommend to the Director or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence the issuance of warning to the President and National Security Council, and to ensure the dissemination of such warning within and by the organizations of the Intelligence Community. When time is of the essence, the National Intelligence Officer may issue such warning directly to the President and the National Security Council, with concurrent dissemination to the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and senior officers of the Intelligence Community.
- (3) To advise the Chairman, National Intelligence Council and the DCI Watch Committee on appropriate Community response to developing warning situations.
- (4) To support the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the National Foreign Intelligence Board on warning matters.
- (5) To chair the Warning Working Group.
- (6) To oversee the warning activities of the National Intelligence Officers.
- (7) To supervise the National Warning Staff.
- (8) To arrange for intelligence research and production with respect to strategic warning.
- (9) To develop a warning consciousness and discipline throughout the Community.
- (10) To seek improvements in methodologies and procedures for warning, including communications and dissemination of information.
- (11) To arrange with appropriate organizations of the government for provision to the National Intelligence Officer for Warning and the Warning Staff of the information they need to carry out their mission.

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- (12) To promote improved analyst training in indications and warning techniques and in other analytic techniques that might contribute to improved warning.
- (13) To advise the Director, Intelligence Community Staff and the chairmen of the collection requirements committees, as appropriate, on warning activities that relate to their responsibilities.
- f. The Warning Working Group, chaired by the National Intelligence Officer for Warning, will assist him in carrying out his responsibilities and in coordinating Community warning activities. Its Members shall be senior officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; Central Intelligence Agency; Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; Office of the Secretary of Defense; and the Intelligence Community Staff. The Chairman shall invite representatives of other departments and agencies to attend when matters of concern to them are discussed.
- g. The National Intelligence Officers continue to be charged with substantive responsibility for warning in their respective fields. They will conduct Community-wide reviews at least monthly of situations potentially requiring the issuance of warning, and will keep the Director of Central Intelligence advised of the results, in consultation with the National Intelligence Officer for Warning. They will be continually alert to the need for immediate issuance of warning.
- h. The Strategic Warning Staff is disestablished.
- i. A National Warning Staff is established to support the National Intelligence Officer for Warning. This will be a small staff with appropriate representation from the Intelligence Community.
- j. DCID 1/5 will be revised and reissued to bring it into accord with the decisions described above and with the current structure of the Intelligence Community.
2. The Chairman, National Intelligence Council and the National Intelligence Officer for Warning will work with you to implement these decisions.

*WJ*  
William J. Casey

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DCID No. 1/5

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/5<sup>1</sup>

## NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WARNING

(Effective 23 May 1979)

Pursuant to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 and Executive Order 12036, there is established a National Intelligence Warning System, individual components and responsibilities of which are established in Paragraph 3. The mission of the System is to advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities with respect to warning intelligence, and to coordinate the warning activities of the Intelligence Community.

1. *Definitions*

a. *Warning* as used herein encompasses those measures taken, and the intelligence information produced, by the Intelligence Community to avoid surprise to the President, the NSC, and the Armed Forces of the United States by foreign events of major importance to the security of the United States. It includes strategic, but not tactical warning.

b. *Strategic Warning* is intelligence information or intelligence regarding the threat of the initiation of hostilities against the US or in which US forces may become involved; it may be received at any time prior to the initiation of hostilities. It does not include tactical warning.

c. *Tactical warning* is notification that the enemy has initiated hostilities. Such warning may be received at any time from the launching of the attack until it reaches its target.


2. *Policy*

a. All Community organizations and personnel have substantive responsibility for the detection of developments requiring warning, especially strategic warning, and for prompt alerting, through established channels, of such developments. Nothing in this directive is intended to inhibit the flow of warning in any way. Specifically, the measures contained in this directive do not require coordination or consultation when immediate warning is required.

b. The Department of Defense has unique and specific responsibilities for warning of attack by hostile forces. To carry out that specialized function, the DoD operates dedicated tactical warning systems within the military command organization and independent from the National Intelligence Warning System. These separate systems are mutually supportive, however.

<sup>1</sup> This directive supersedes DCID 1/5 effective 18 May 1976.

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3. *Assignment of Responsibilities*

a. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence is assigned oversight of the National Intelligence Warning System and will exercise his authority with the advice of members of the National Foreign Intelligence Board.

b. There is established the position of National Intelligence Officer for Warning. His mission is to advise and assist the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on all matters relating to warning, to coordinate national intelligence warning activities, and to serve as a focal point for warning in the Community. For organizational purposes, he will be located in the National Foreign Assessment Center. He will to the maximum extent rely on existing organizations in carrying out his duties. The responsibilities of the National Intelligence Officer for Warning are:

i. To oversee analysis of intelligence from all sources which might provide warning. In particular, he should be alert to alternate interpretations within the Community and assess these with a view to the need for issuance of warning. He should encourage consultation and substantive discussion at all levels in the Community.

ii. To recommend to the Director or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence the issuance of warning to the President and National Security Council, and to ensure the dissemination of such warning within and by the organizations of the Intelligence Community. When time is of the essence, the National Intelligence Officer may issue such warning directly to the President and the National Security Council, with concurrent dissemination to the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and senior officers of the Intelligence Community.

iii. To advise the Deputy Director for Collection Tasking and Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment on appropriate Community response to developing warning situations.

iv. To develop plans and procedures for support of the Director of Central Intelligence in crisis situations.

v. To support the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the National Foreign Intelligence Board on warning matters.

vi. To chair the Warning Working Group (Paragraph 3c).

vii. To oversee the warning activities of the National Intelligence Officers (Paragraph 3d).

viii. To supervise the Strategic Warning Staff (Paragraph 3e).

ix. To arrange for intelligence research and production with respect to strategic warning.

x. To develop a warning consciousness and discipline throughout the Community.

xi. To seek improvements in methodologies and procedures for warning, including communications and dissemination of information.

xii. To arrange with appropriate organizations of the government for provision to the National Intelligence Officer for Warning and the Strategic Warning Staff of the information they need to carry out their mission.

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xiii. To promote improved analyst training in indications and warning techniques and in other analytic techniques that might contribute to improved warning.

xiv. To advise the Deputy for Collection Tasking and the Deputy for Resource Management, as appropriate, on warning activities that relate to their responsibilities.

c. There is established a *Warning Working Group*, chaired by the National Intelligence Officer for Warning, to assist him in carrying out his responsibilities and in coordinating Community warning activities. Its Members shall be senior officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; Central Intelligence Agency; Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; Office of the Secretary of Defense; and Collection Tasking Staff. The Chairman shall invite representatives of other departments and agencies to attend when matters of concern to them are discussed.

d. The *National Intelligence Officers* are specifically charged with substantive responsibility for warning in their respective fields. They will conduct Community-wide reviews at least monthly of situations potentially requiring the issuance of warning, and will keep the Director of Central Intelligence advised of the results, in consultation with the National Intelligence Officer for Warning. They will be continually alert to the need for immediate issuance of warning.

e. The *Strategic Warning Staff* will be under the supervision of the National Intelligence Officer for Warning. Its principal functions are to assist him in his responsibilities with respect to strategic warning and to conduct research with respect thereto. It may also engage in other warning-related activities within the Intelligence Community with the concurrence of the National Intelligence Officer.

#### 4. *Community Responsibilities*

a. Each agency of the Community will establish the necessary structure and manning to carry out its warning mission and to support the National Intelligence Warning System.

b. Specific responsibilities of the Community in support of the National Intelligence Warning System are:

i. To provide full-time, highly qualified professional intelligence personnel and other support to the Strategic Warning Staff in consultation with the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the National Intelligence Officer for Warning.

ii. To provide to the Strategic Warning Staff on a timely basis all information from every source pertinent to the strategic warning mission. Information of exceptional sensitivity may, with the approval of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, be provided only to the National Intelligence Officer for Warning.

iii. To provide appropriate representation on the Warning Working Group, and to designate an officer in each agency specifically responsible for warning matters and charged with support of the National Intelligence Warning System.

#### 5. *Composition and Organization*

a. The National Intelligence Officer for Warning shall be appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with the Director, DIA.



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b. There shall be an Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Warning. Either the National Intelligence Officer or his Assistant shall be drawn from the Department of Defense. The National Intelligence Officer may also be assisted by such staff as the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence deems appropriate.

c. The Director, Strategic Warning Staff, shall be appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with the Director, DIA. He shall be directly responsible to the National Intelligence Officer for Warning.

d. The Strategic Warning Staff shall be co-located with the National Military Intelligence Center.

**STANSFIELD TURNER**  
Director of Central Intelligence

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# Notes from the Director



11 October 1978

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## **NIO FOR WARNING**

One of the major reasons why this Agency and my office were created was the determination of the Executive and of Congress that this country not have another Pearl Harbor. Obviously, strategic warning must be my highest priority. Every one of us in fact, no matter what his job, is responsible in some way for ensuring that the nation never again suffers a surprise attack. No less important is warning in the broader sense—warning of any development serious enough to concern the President and the National Security Council.

It is apparent that we need a stronger national structure for warning than that which now exists. I have therefore asked [redacted] to step aside from his position as Associate Director of NFAC to devote himself exclusively to establishing new national warning procedures as a matter of highest priority. I am establishing for him a special position as National Intelligence Officer for Warning.

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In this capacity as NIO/Warning, he will be my senior staff officer for all warning matters. On the policy and management side, he will chair an interagency "Warning Working Group," and will serve as Executive Secretary of an NFIB-level warning committee chaired by the DDCI. On the substantive side, that is, in deciding of what to warn and when to do it, he will work through and direct the other National Intelligence Officers, among whom he will be first among equals. He will also be my "ombudsman for warning" in the Community, available, should anyone believe a serious threat is being overlooked, to listen and if necessary to take action in my name.

In the establishment of new warning procedures and disciplines, we will be asking many of you to give greater attention to warning matters. This will not be just another bureaucratic exercise; it is a serious effort to meet a critical requirement. The NIO/Warning will have my strong personal backing.

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DCID No. 1/5

## DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/5<sup>1</sup>

### STRATEGIC WARNING

(Effective 18 May 1976)

Pursuant to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 11905 and National Security Council Intelligence Directives, the position of Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Strategic Warning and a Strategic Warning Staff are hereby established.

#### 1. *Mission*

The mission of the Special Assistant, with the support of the Strategic Warning Staff, is to advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities with respect to the provision of strategic warning intelligence.

#### 2. *Definition*

Strategic warning is defined as the earliest possible warning that the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, the People's Republic of China or North Korea is considering military action by its armed forces beyond its borders, or is employing its military capabilities beyond its borders in ways that might threaten military confrontation with the United States.

#### 3. *Functions*

The functions of the Special Assistant and the Strategic Warning Staff are:

a. To carry on a continuing analysis of information and intelligence from all sources which might provide strategic warning.

b. When the situation warrants it, to issue strategic warning notices to the Director of Central Intelligence, who will notify the President and National Security Council or take such other action as he deems necessary. The Director of Central Intelligence will also transmit the strategic warning notices to the National Foreign Intelligence Board principals for further dissemination within their organizations. When time is of the essence, the Special Assistant may issue such notices directly to the President and National Security Council with concurrent dissemination to the Director of Central Intelligence and National Foreign Intelligence Board principals.

c. To make to the Director of Central Intelligence (and in time-critical situations laterally to other National Foreign Intelligence Board principals) such other reports on the status of strategic warning as the Special Assistant may direct.

<sup>1</sup> This directive supersedes DCID 1/5 effective 3 March 1975.

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DCID No. 1/5

**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/5<sup>1</sup>**

**STRATEGIC WARNING**

(Effective 3 March 1975)

Pursuant to provisions of NSCID No. 1, the position of Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Strategic Warning and a Strategic Warning Staff are hereby established.

**1. Mission**

The mission of the Special Assistant, with the support of the Strategic Warning Staff, is to advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities with respect to the provision of strategic warning intelligence.

**2. Definition**

Strategic warning is defined as the earliest possible warning that the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, the PRC, or North Korea is considering military action by its armed forces beyond its borders, or is employing its military capabilities beyond its borders in ways that might threaten military confrontation with the U.S.

**3. Functions**

The functions of the Special Assistant and the Strategic Warning Staff are:

a. To carry on a continuing analysis of information and intelligence from all sources which might provide strategic warning.

b. When the situation warrants it, to issue strategic warning notices to the DCI, who will notify the President and National Security Council or take such other action as he deems necessary. The DCI will also transmit the strategic warning notices to the USIB Principals for further dissemination within their departments and agencies. When time is of the essence, the Special Assistant may issue such notices directly to the President and NSC with concurrent dissemination to the DCI and USIB Principals.

c. To make to the DCI (and in time critical situations laterally to other USIB Principals) such other reports on the status of strategic warning as the Special Assistant may direct.

d. To conduct and submit to DCI and USIB Principals studies and analyses with a view to improving the capabilities of the Intelligence Community to provide strategic warning and with due consideration for related work being done elsewhere in the community.

<sup>1</sup> This directive supersedes DCID 1/5, effective 23 April 1965.



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In accordance with the revised Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/5, the Watch Committee and the National Indications Center will be superseded by the Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Strategic Warning and the Strategic Warning Staff. This change will take effect on 3 March 1975. The last issue of the Watch Report will appear on 27 February 1975. The Strategic Warning Staff will produce a monthly report as well as spot items pertinent to the warning problem. These reports will be disseminated to the recipients of the Watch Report and other interested consumers.

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Correspondence and messages formerly addressed to the NIC should be sent to the SWS. Courier delivery should be made to SSO/DIA.

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**USIB  
WATCH COMMITTEE  
MEETING  
26 FEBRUARY 1975  
Meeting No. 1279**

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**Navy  
Air Force**

**Army**

**Mr. Wagoner FBI**

**AEC Col. Crampton**

**NPIC**

[Redacted]

**Observers**

**NIC Staff**

[Redacted]  
DIA  
DIA  
CIA  
CIA

NSA  
NSA  
STATE  
STATE Mr. Crocker

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**WATCH COMMITTEE  
CHAIRMAN  
Mr. Lehman**

**NIC  
DIRECTOR**

[Redacted]

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USIB-M-680  
5 December 1974

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~~JH~~  
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD


MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Draft Minutes of the 5 December  
Intelligence Board Meeting

1. The attached draft minutes of the 5 December Intelligence Board meeting are submitted herewith for USIB consideration.

USIB ACTION REQUESTED

2. USIB members are requested to advise the Secretariat by close of business 16 December 1974 of their approval or other views on the attached minutes as well as the record of Board action and discussion contained in USIB-D-4.1/5, 5 December 1974.



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Attachment

Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652  
exemption category 5B(1),(2),(3)  
Automatically declassified on  
Date Impossible to Determine

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USIB-M-680  
5 December 1974

**UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD**

Minutes of  
Six-hundred-eightieth Meeting  
United States Intelligence Board  
DCI Conference Room (7D64)  
Central Intelligence Agency, at 1030 hours, 5 December 1974

Director of Central Intelligence  
Mr. W. E. Colby  
Presiding

**MEMBERS PRESENT**

- Dr. Edward W. Proctor, acting for Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
- Mr. William G. Hyland, Director of Intelligence and Research,  
Department of State
- Lieutenant General Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., USAF, Acting Director,  
Defense Intelligence Agency
- Lieutenant General Lew Allen, Jr., USAF, Director, National Security  
Agency
- Mr. J. Foster Collins, acting for Department of Treasury Representative  
to USIB
- Mr. James G. Poor, acting for Atomic Energy Commission Representative  
to USIB
- Mr. William O. Cregar, acting for Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Representative to USIB

**SERVICE OBSERVERS PRESENT**

- Brigadier General John A. Smith, Jr., USA, acting for Assistant Chief  
of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
- \*Rear Admiral Bobby R. Inman, USN, Director of Intelligence,  
Department of the Navy
- \*Captain Donald S. Jones, USN, acting for Director of Intelligence,  
Department of the Navy
- Major General George J. Keegan, Jr., USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff  
Intelligence, United States Air Force

\*Part of Meeting

Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652  
exemption category 58(1), (2), (3)  
Automatically declassified on  
Date Impossible to Determine

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USIB-M-680

5 December 1974

Prior to addressing the regular agenda items, the Chairman commented on several subjects:

a. Mr. Colby announced that a series of strategy reports on the FY 1975 KIQs would be circulated in the near future to the USIB Principals. He said that the strategy reports were the result of a great deal of community consultation at the staff level. The reports include major problem areas in the KIQs which the various agencies are expected to contribute information. This vehicle is being used to assure that proper attention is given to collection and processing needs in support of the KIQs. To ensure that USIB Principals are aware of the needs involved in these strategies, the Chairman suggested that the Board discuss them in broad terms at a meeting in the near future. He hoped to avoid a cumbersome detailed review at the USIB, but welcomed comments on major issues either before the USIB meeting or during the Board's discussion.

The collection strategies are to be reviewed next summer to determine how well we did against each KIQ and to provide a baseline to see which agency did or did not contribute. He hoped that this vehicle would help provide indications of how much the community spent on each KIQ so that we can determine what resources are required to get a particular product.

b. Mr. Colby advised the USIB Principals that he was sending forward the "National Foreign Intelligence Program Recommendation--FY 1976-80" this date. He noted that it had been staffed through appropriate agencies with review by the IRAC. He said that he was providing the President with some very significant issues for consideration. The report will be circulated to the USIB soon. Mr. Colby also pointed out that it was going to the Secretary of Defense and the Director, OMB for comment. He said he wished to thank everyone who had contributed to it, noting that it was a complex and difficult job which was well done as the result of extremely good staff work.

c. The DCI announced the impending retirement of Dr. Herbert Jenne who has been the Chairman of the Human Sources Committee since its inception. He noted that this Committee had operated on a trial basis for more than a year and, at the suggestion of the PFIAB,

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5 December 1974

had been established as a permanent committee of the USIB last June. He commended Dr. Jenne for launching this effort and for the good progress which has been made. Mr. Colby announced that, until a permanent chairman is selected, [redacted] Deputy to STAT the DCI for the Intelligence Community, will serve as the Acting Chairman providing his personal guidance to this important Committee. He noted [redacted] extensive background in the area of human sources. STAT Mr. Colby reported that he would have a nomination for a permanent chairman to discuss with the USIB at an early date.

d. Mr. Colby, noting the recent agreement with the Soviet Union on strategic weapons, invited Mr. Hyland to comment on the role of intelligence during those negotiations. Mr. Hyland provided a brief description of the usefulness of intelligence (which included data from NIE 11-3/8-74) to the President during his discussions with Mr. Brezhnev.

1. Watch Report No. 1267

Approved as circulated.

2. Discussion of Strategic Warning

Process

(Refs: a. USIB-D-29.1/9,  
27 August 1974; b. USIB-M-677,  
12 September 1974, Item 5 and  
Secretary's Note No. 5)

The Chairman noted that the subject has been under review by an ad hoc committee. One aspect of the review includes a proposal for an Alerting Memorandum the intent of which is to provide the policymakers with indications of possible crises. Mr. Colby said that this vehicle should help alleviate questions of whether there had been lack of intelligence indications of crises. The other aspect of the review was the overall subject of Strategic Warning. Mr. Colby said he believed that the Strategic Warning process should deal with possible military attack against the U.S., its allies, or major interests, rather than dealing with every conflict or potential conflict around the world. The current Watch Committee mechanism

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had become much broader in its treatment of warning subjects. Mr. Colby said that he proposed to set up a new mechanism which would be an appendage of the USIB; it would be a community effort which would be tied closely to, and situated within, DoD. He believed this was the most practical approach in that the DoD has available the service machinery and has more immediate access to information on the operations of our own forces. Mr. Colby's proposal would establish a Special Assistant to the DCI for Strategic Warning. He proposed to appoint [redacted] 25X1 of DIA to this position and noted that [redacted] Directorate includes the [redacted] will be [redacted] of CIA who will have a small analysis staff supported by the [redacted] 25X1 He believed this combination would be able to develop Strategic Warning with appropriate analytical inputs on political and economic factors. Mr. Colby said that it was also his intention to have the analytical staff representatives located in the Pentagon. In addition, the Chairman stated he would ask [redacted] Deputy to the DCI 25X1 for the Intelligence Community, to establish an interagency group to review the new process periodically and report to USIB as appropriate.

Mr. Colby reported that the ad hoc group which has been reviewing this subject has prepared a draft DCID to replace the current DCID No. 1/5. This will be submitted to USIB for review. Mr. Colby said he would also ask General Faurer to commence planning for implementation of the new procedures.

Mr. Hyland expressed considerable concern regarding the new mechanism as well as the proposed definition for Strategic Warning. He believed that the definition was too fuzzy and did not provide for treatment of subject matters of great interest to the policymakers, e. g., Yugoslavia is not an ally and yet would be the subject of major attention should the Soviets attack that country. The definition does not properly cover friendly countries who are not allies. Mr. Hyland requested that the definition be carefully formulated to ensure that those subject areas of importance are not omitted from the warning process. Mr. Colby indicated that Mr. Hyland's point was well taken and asked the ad hoc group to clarify this matter, although he expressed doubt that a really precise overall definition could be achieved because the

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middle ground was so difficult to define. He said we needed to be pragmatic and the real need was to eliminate the vast subject matter which might otherwise have to be addressed by the relatively small staff involved. The Air Force Observer commented that he shared State's concerns about the need for a more precise definition of responsibilities. He stressed the importance of having the new process incorporate economic and political as well as the military indicators. Mr. Colby noted that part of the rationale of putting Agency representatives on the staff would be to look across the board at those factors which would apply to Strategic Warning.

Mr. Hyland asked if the NIC Watch Officers Notes would continue. He said these Notes proved very useful for assessing events which had taken place the night before. Mr. Lehman (Acting Chairman of the Watch Committee) commented that these Notes tended to be produced in isolation without the benefit of analysis or review. If there were a real need for something along these lines he believed it could be worked out, noting that several organizations have watch officers who produce Notes on overnight events.

Mr. Hyland expressed concern that, under the proposed set up, he might not be advised of indicators until the situation had become really serious. Mr. Lehman responded that the daily publications provided these indicators. Mr. Colby said that the genesis of this review and subsequent proposal was the feeling that the Watch Committee is not doing what it was set up to do. That is, not looking at the really major issues because of the focus on small problems. The new group he said should be concentrating on the big questions and the daily publications would handle events of lesser significance. As part of the overall system the Alert Memorandum would be issued when a situation seemed serious enough to warrant a special warning to our policy customers.

Mr. Hyland said that while the Watch Committee mechanism had its deficiencies it was the last mechanism which brought the community together on a regular basis to treat the broad overall subject of warning. Mr. Colby suggested that the purpose of General Wilson's interagency group would be to review the process and perhaps come to USIB once a month or so to report on the significant situations in the world which may be developing.

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**SECRET**DCID No. 1/5  
(New Series)**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/5<sup>1</sup>****TERMS OF REFERENCE, WATCH COMMITTEE OF THE USIB**

(Effective 23 April 1965)

**A. Name**

Watch Committee of the USIB.

**B. Mission**

To provide the United States Intelligence Board with the earliest possible intelligence warning of, and a continuing judgment on, Sino-Soviet Bloc intentions to engage in aggressive action by regular or irregular armed forces.

**C. Functions**

1. To obtain from all USIB members and from other departments as appropriate the information and intelligence required by the mission of the Watch Committee, formulating intelligence collection requirements and recommending priorities as necessary.

2. To carry on a continuing analysis of information and intelligence from all sources to identify developments, patterns and trends in Sino-Soviet Bloc activities which could provide indications of intentions to engage in aggressive action.

3. Based on the foregoing, to develop conclusions or provisional estimative judgments as necessary as to Sino-Soviet intentions to engage in aggressive action; to consider current and prospective situations and developments which could lead to aggressive action by the Bloc; and to report promptly to the USIB the Committee's findings in these matters including such divergent views as may be recorded; and, following USIB action to provide for dissemination to other recipients as appropriate.

**D. Composition and Organization**

The Watch Committee will be composed of a Senior Officer representing each USIB member and a Chairman who will be designated by the Director of Central Intelligence after consultation with the USIB.<sup>2</sup> The Committee will be supported in its duties and responsibilities by its operational and administrative staff, the National Indications Center (NIC). The Center will be headed by a Director to be provided by CIA and staffed with professional intelligence and administrative personnel furnished by participating agencies.

<sup>1</sup> This Directive supersedes DCID No. 1/5 (New Series) of 27 February 1963.

<sup>2</sup> The Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force will be represented by observers at Watch Committee meetings.

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***E. Duties and Responsibilities***

The Watch Committee, or the National Indications Center, as appropriate, shall:

1. Arrange through the USIB or its members for the exploitation of every domestic and foreign source for intelligence information pertinent to the Watch Committee mission and for the prompt forwarding of such information to the NIC.

2. Arrange with appropriate departments and agencies of the Government for the prompt forwarding to the Watch Committee or the NIC that information required to be made available by the terms of NSAM No. 226.

3. Develop and maintain continuing analyses of developments, patterns and trends in Sino-Soviet Bloc activities pertinent to the Watch Committee mission, working in liaison and coordination with concerned USIB agencies to evaluate significant indications.

4. Maintain a 24-hour watch function to analyze incoming information, obtain from USIB agencies additional information and evaluations of significant developments and alert members of the Watch Committee and NIC as required.

5. Develop and maintain intelligence support materials and systems, including automatic data processing systems, as may be required to support the mission of the Watch Committee.

6. Review periodically USIB-approved lists of indicators of hostilities, other guidance for intelligence analysis and collection, and the capability of the intelligence community to provide warning information pertinent to the mission of the Committee, recommending improvements in substantive analysis and techniques and calling on USIB agencies for assistance where appropriate.

7. Perform such additional tasks as shall be required by the USIB in the discharge of the Watch Committee mission.

**JOHN A. McCONE**  
Director of Central Intelligence

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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February 27, 1963

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 226

TO:           The Secretary of State  
              The Secretary of the Treasury  
              The Secretary of Defense  
              The Attorney General  
              The Secretary of Commerce  
              The Director, Office of Emergency Planning  
              The Director, Bureau of the Budget  
              The Director, United States Information Agency  
              The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission  
              The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
              The Director of Central Intelligence  
              The Administrator, National Aeronautics and  
                  Space Administration  
              The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT:     Directive Relating to Transmittal of Information  
                  to the Watch Committee of the United States In-  
                  telligence Board

I hereby approve the attached directive relating to the transmittal of information by appropriate departments and agencies of the Government to the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board.

*/s/ J.F. Kennedy*

Attachment  
Above-referenced directive

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Directive Relating to Transmittal of Information to the  
Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board

1. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(e) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and for the purpose of providing necessary support to the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) in the accomplishment of its mission, all appropriate departments and agencies of the Government are authorized and directed by the President:

a. To make fully available to the Watch Committee of the USIB all information and intelligence of reasonable credibility pertinent to its mission and functions (as defined in DCID 1/5 (new series), attached hereto), without restriction because of source, policy or operational sensitivity.

b. To keep the Watch Committee of the USIB informed concerning significant diplomatic, political, military, or other courses of action by the U. S., approved for immediate implementation or in process of execution, which might bring about military reaction or early hostile action by the USSR, or its allies, thus endangering the security of the U.S. This information is for the explicit and express use of the Watch Committee and those members of the National Indications Center who need to know of it in order to perform their functions.

2. When, in the opinion of a department or agency, overriding considerations affecting the national security exist which justify an exception to a. or b. above, the decision as to withholding or delaying the transmission of the information to the Watch Committee shall be taken up with the Director of Central Intelligence and, if there is disagreement, referred to the President. In the case of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the matter shall be taken up by the Director thereof with the Attorney General who shall consult with the Director of Central Intelligence, and if there is disagreement the matter shall be referred to the President.

3. Under normal circumstances such data should be sent to the Director of the National Indications Center, Pentagon Building. When an item is considered of exceptional sensitivity, it should be addressed to the Chairman of the Watch Committee, in care of the Director, National Indications Center.

Attachment      Copy of Director of Central  
Intelligence Directive (DCID)  
No. 1/5 (New Series).

Copy furnished:    Each member of the United States  
Intelligence Board.

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SECRETDCID No. 1/5  
(New Series)DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/5<sup>1</sup>

## TERMS OF REFERENCE, WATCH COMMITTEE OF THE USIB

(Effective 8 August 1962; editorially revised 27 February 1963)

**A. Name**

Watch Committee of the USIB.

**B. Mission**

To provide the United States Intelligence Board with the earliest possible intelligence warning of, and a continuing judgment on, Sino-Soviet Bloc intentions to engage in aggressive action by regular or irregular armed forces.

**C. Functions**

1. To obtain from all USIB members and from other departments as appropriate the information and intelligence required by the mission of the Watch Committee, formulating intelligence collection requirements and recommending priorities as necessary.

2. To carry on a continuing analysis of information and intelligence from all sources to identify developments, patterns and trends in Sino-Soviet Bloc activities which could provide indications of intentions to engage in aggressive action.

3. Based on the foregoing, to develop conclusions or provisional estimative judgments as necessary as to Sino-Soviet intentions to engage in aggressive action; to consider current and prospective situations and developments which could lead to aggressive action by the Bloc; and to report promptly to the USIB the Committee's findings in these matters including such divergent views as may be recorded; and, following USIB action to provide for dissemination to other recipients as appropriate.

**D. Composition and Organization**

The Watch Committee will be composed of a Senior Officer representing each USIB member and a Chairman who will be designated by the Director of Central Intelligence after consultation with the USIB.<sup>2</sup> The Committee will be supported in its duties and responsibilities by its operational and administrative staff, the National Indications Center (NIC). The Center will be headed by a Director to be provided by CIA and staffed with professional intelligence and administrative personnel furnished by the USIB members.

<sup>1</sup> This Directive, which was editorially revised on 27 February 1963, supersedes DCID No. 1/5 (New Series), effective 8 August 1962.

<sup>2</sup> The Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force will be represented by observers at Watch Committee meetings.

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***E. Duties and Responsibilities***

The Watch Committee, or the National Indications Center, as appropriate, shall:

1. Arrange through the USIB or its members for the exploitation of every domestic and foreign source for intelligence information pertinent to the Watch Committee mission and for the prompt forwarding of such information to the NIC.

2. Arrange with appropriate departments and agencies of the Government for the prompt forwarding to the Watch Committee or the NIC that information required to be made available by the terms of NSAM No. 226.

3. Develop and maintain continuing analyses of developments, patterns and trends in Sino-Soviet Bloc activities pertinent to the Watch Committee mission, working in liaison and coordination with concerned USIB agencies to evaluate significant indications.

4. Maintain a 24-hour watch function to analyze incoming information, obtain from USIB agencies additional information and evaluations of significant developments and alert members of the Watch Committee and NIC as required.

5. Develop and maintain intelligence support materials and systems, including automatic data processing systems, as may be required to support the mission of the Watch Committee.

6. Review periodically USIB-approved lists of indicators of hostilities, other guidance for intelligence analysis and collection, and the capability of the intelligence community to provide warning information pertinent to the mission of the Committee, recommending improvements in substantive analysis and techniques and calling on USIB agencies for assistance where appropriate.

7. Perform such additional tasks as shall be required by the USIB in the discharge of the Watch Committee mission.

**JOHN A. McCONE**  
Director of Central Intelligence

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**SECRET**DCID No. 1/5  
(New Series)**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/5<sup>1</sup>****TERMS OF REFERENCE, WATCH COMMITTEE OF THE USIB**

(Effective 8 August 1962)

**A. Name**

Watch Committee of the USIB.

**B. Mission**

To provide the United States Intelligence Board with the earliest possible intelligence warning of, and a continuing judgment on, Sino-Soviet Bloc intentions to engage in aggressive action by regular or irregular armed forces.

**C. Functions**

1. To obtain from all USIB members and from other departments as appropriate the information and intelligence required by the mission of the Watch Committee, formulating intelligence collection requirements and recommending priorities as necessary.

2. To carry on a continuing analysis of information and intelligence from all sources to identify developments, patterns and trends in Sino-Soviet Bloc activities which could provide indications of intentions to engage in aggressive action.

3. Based on the foregoing, to develop conclusions or provisional estimative judgments as necessary as to Sino-Soviet intentions to engage in aggressive action; to consider current and prospective situations and developments which could lead to aggressive action by the Bloc; and to report promptly to the USIB the Committee's findings in these matters including such divergent views as may be recorded; and, following USIB action to provide for dissemination to other recipients as appropriate.


**D. Composition and Organization**

The Watch Committee will be composed of a Senior Officer representing each USIB member and a Chairman who will be designated by the Director of Central Intelligence after consultation with the USIB.<sup>2</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> This Directive supersedes DCID No. 1/5, effective 7 March 1961.

<sup>2</sup> The Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force will be represented by observers at Watch Committee meetings.

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Committee will be supported in its duties and responsibilities by its operational and administrative staff, the National Indications Center (NIC). The Center will be headed by a Director to be provided by CIA and staffed with professional intelligence and administrative personnel furnished by the USIB members.

**E. Duties and Responsibilities**

The Watch Committee, or the National Indications Center, as appropriate, shall:

1. Arrange through the USIB or its members for the exploitation of every domestic and foreign source for intelligence information pertinent to the Watch Committee mission and for the prompt forwarding of such information to the NIC.
2. Arrange with appropriate departments and agencies of the Government for the prompt forwarding to the Watch Committee or the NIC that information required to be made available by the terms of NSC 5438.
3. Develop and maintain continuing analyses of developments, patterns and trends in Sino-Soviet Bloc activities pertinent to the Watch Committee mission, working in liaison and coordination with concerned USIB agencies to evaluate significant indications.
4. Maintain a 24-hour watch function to analyze incoming information, obtain from USIB agencies additional information and evaluations of significant developments and alert members of the Watch Committee and NIC as required.
5. Develop and maintain intelligence support materials and systems, including automatic data processing systems, as may be required to support the mission of the Watch Committee.
6. Review periodically USIB-approved lists of indicators of hostilities, other guidance for intelligence analysis and collection, and the capability of the intelligence community to provide warning information pertinent to the mission of the Committee, recommending improvements in substantive analysis and techniques and calling on USIB agencies for assistance where appropriate.
7. Perform such additional tasks as shall be required by the USIB in the discharge of the Watch Committee mission.

**JOHN A. McCONE**  
Director of Central Intelligence

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DCID No. 1/5  
(New Series)DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/5<sup>1</sup>TERMS OF REFERENCE, WATCH COMMITTEE OF THE USIB  
(Effective 7 March 1961)

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 4e, NSCID No. 1, and paragraph 61, a and b, of NSC 5906/1 (approved by the President on 3 December 1959), the following terms of reference for the Watch Committee of the USIB are hereby established:

*Preamble*

The Sino-Soviet bloc, as a potential aggressor, has the capability to initiate, suddenly at any time and in a place and by methods of its own choosing hostile action<sup>2</sup> in such strength as to threaten gravely the security of the United States. The mission of providing earliest possible warning of hostile action or of impending developments that could eventuate in hostile action will be undertaken by the USIB agencies, within the scope of their responsibilities, as of the highest priority. The proper discharge of this mission depends upon the carrying out of complementary watch and estimating functions. It is recognized that, beginning with evidence of an attack having been launched, there are also complementary responsibilities for reporting and analysis by the intelligence mechanism and operational elements which report directly.

**A. Name**

Watch Committee of the USIB.

**B. Mission**

To provide the earliest possible warning to the United States Government of hostile action, or of impending developments that could eventuate in hostile action, by the Sino-Soviet bloc, which endangers the security of the United States.

**C. Functions**

1. To develop and operate on a current and continuing basis an intelligence plan for obtaining from USIB member departments and agencies, and from other U.S. departments and agencies through appropriate channels, the intelligence necessary to discharge the mission and for recommending collection priorities therefor.

<sup>1</sup>This Directive supersedes DCID No. 1/5, effective 14 November 1958, which in turn had superseded DCID No. 1/2 of 11 May 1954.

<sup>2</sup>Aggressive action by regular or irregular armed forces.

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2. To analyze and evaluate information and intelligence, both current and cumulative, on an all-source basis, received or produced by all agencies to determine whether it may relate to the imminence of hostile action, and to develop therefrom the conclusions as to indications of Sino-Soviet bloc intentions:

a. to initiate hostile action against

- (1) the United States, U.S. possessions, or U.S. forces abroad,
- (2) U.S. allies or their forces,
- (3) other areas and forces outside the Sino-Soviet bloc.

b. to initiate hostile action in reaction to or in exploitation of any other development, actual or potential.

3. To draw conclusions regarding or to draw attention to, as appropriate, current and prospective developments involving the Sino-Soviet bloc which could eventuate in hostile action.

4. When necessary in developing its conclusions, to make provisional estimative judgments but to avoid duplicating USIB estimating functions.

5. To report promptly its conclusions, together with significant indications, to the principals of the USIB and, following their action, to make dissemination to other recipients as appropriate.

6. To make recommendations to the USIB, or member agencies thereof, on any matters appropriate to its mission, including such divergent views as may be recorded.

**D. *Composition and Organization***

The Watch Committee will be composed of a Senior Officer representing each USIB member and a Chairman who will be designated by the Director of Central Intelligence after consultation with the USIB. The Committee will be assisted in its duties and responsibilities by the National Indications Center (NIC), headed by a Director to be provided by CIA and staffed with professional intelligence and administrative personnel to be furnished by the USIB members.

**E. *Duties and Responsibilities***

The Watch Committee shall discharge, or direct the National Indications Center in the discharge of, the below-listed duties and responsibilities:

1. Meet on a regular schedule as determined by the Committee and on special occasions when requested by one or more of its members or their principals.

2. Arrange through the USIB or appropriate members thereof for the exploitation of every domestic and foreign source of information and intelligence pertinent to the Watch Committee mission and for the prompt reporting of such information.

3. Arrange with USIB agencies for the systematic screening and forwarding to the National Indications Center of all pertinent informa-

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tion and intelligence, especially that required by NSC 5438. An agency evaluation, where appropriate, will be forwarded as soon as possible.

4. Maintain liaison with USIB agencies to ensure that all pertinent information and intelligence is made available to the National Indications Center.

5. Screen all pertinent information received from USIB agencies for indications relating to the Watch Committee mission and develop evaluations thereof in coordination with concerned USIB agencies.

6. Maintain a 24-hour watch function in order to carry out a continuous study of incoming information, alert members of the Watch Committee and NIC as required and obtain from USIB agencies evaluations of significant indications.

7. Review periodically any USIB-approved General Indicator List and recommend changes to it as appropriate.

8. Maintain files, graphic displays, charts and other devices to support and develop the interpretation of indications information. Study on a continuing basis the application of electronic data processing systems to the work of the NIC with a view to making appropriate recommendations to the USIB.

9. Study improvements in substantive analysis and analytical techniques in the field of responsibility of the Watch Committee, calling on USIB agencies for assistance when appropriate.

10. Perform such additional tasks as shall be required by the USIB in the discharge of the Watch Committee mission.

**ALLEN W. DULLES**  
Director of Central Intelligence

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DCID No. 1/5  
(New Series)

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/5<sup>1</sup>

TERMS OF REFERENCE, WATCH COMMITTEE OF THE USIB  
(Effective 14 November 1958)

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 4e, NSCID No. 1, and paragraph 10,a,(1) of NSC 162/2, approved by the President on 30 October 1953, the following terms of reference for the Watch Committee of the USIB are hereby established:

Preamble

*Superseded*

The Soviet/Communist bloc, as a potential aggressor, has the capability to initiate suddenly at any time and in a place and by methods of its own choosing, hostile action<sup>2</sup> in such strength as to threaten gravely the security of the United States. The mission of providing earliest possible warning of hostile action will be undertaken by the USIB agencies, within the scope of their responsibilities, as of the highest priority. The proper discharge of this mission depends upon the carrying out of complementary watch and estimating functions.

A. Name

Watch Committee of the USIB.

B. Mission

To provide earliest possible warning to the United States Government of hostile action by the USSR, or its allies, which endangers the security of the United States.

C. Functions

1. To develop and operate on a current and continuing basis an intelligence plan for the levying upon USIB members, and the requesting from other U.S. agencies through appropriate channels, of the intelligence requirements necessary to provide the maximum degree of advance warning and for recommending the collection priorities of these requirements.

2. To analyze and evaluate information and intelligence, both current and cumulative, on an all-source basis, furnished by the USIB agencies relating to the imminence of hostilities, and to develop therefrom the conclusions as to indications of:

- a. Soviet/Communist intentions to initiate hostilities against
  - 1 the continental United States, U.S. possessions, or U.S. forces abroad,

<sup>1</sup> This Directive supersedes DCID No. 1/2 of 11 May 1954.

<sup>2</sup> Aggressive action by armed forces, or by organizations or individuals in support of military strategy.

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- 2 U.S. allies or their forces,
- 3 areas peripheral to the Soviet Orbit.

b. any other development, actual or potential, susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which would jeopardize the security of the United States.

3. To report promptly their conclusions, together with significant indications, to the principals of the USIB and other appropriate recipients. In the event of an impending critical situation, USIB principals will be immediately advised after which the provisions of paragraph 4e, NSCID No. 1, will apply.

4. To make recommendations to the USIB, or member agencies thereof, including such divergent views as may be recorded.

5. The Watch Committee shall avoid duplicating USIB estimative functions.

**D. Composition and Organization**

1. The Watch Committee will be composed of a Senior Officer representing each USIB member organization, one of whom will be designated by the DCI, after consultation with the USIB, as Chairman for a specified period. The Committee will be supported by the National Indications Center, headed by a Director to be provided by CIA and consisting of an administrative Secretariat and an Indications Group.

2. The Watch Committee will meet on a regular schedule as determined by the Committee and on special occasions when requested by one or more of its members or their principals.

**E. Duties and Responsibilities**

The Watch Committee shall discharge, or direct the National Indications Center in the discharge of, the below-listed duties and responsibilities.

1. Develop and operate on a current and continuing basis the Watch Committee Intelligence Plan for systematizing, energizing, and coordinating through appropriate channels the world-wide collection by U.S. agencies of information and intelligence pertinent to the Watch Committee mission.

2. Arrange through the USIB or the appropriate member thereof for exploitation of every domestic and foreign source of information and intelligence pertinent to the Watch Committee mission; and, among other actions, arrange, at appropriate times, that representatives of USIB field intelligence activities confer with the USIB and the Watch Committee in order effectively to coordinate, but not direct, field intelligence activities with the activities of the Watch Committee.

3. Arrange with the USIB agencies for a systematic screening of all information and intelligence received by them by any means for the purpose of immediately extracting and forwarding to the National Indications Center all items which may contain indications of Soviet/Communist intentions as set forth in C, 2 above (this procedure is in addition

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to the action called for in paragraph 4e of NSCID No. 1); an agency evaluation, where appropriate, will be forwarded as soon as possible.

4. Members will maintain close and intimate liaison with their respective parent agencies to assist them in ensuring that all pertinent information and intelligence is being made available to the National Indications Center.

5. Continuously screen all pertinent information and intelligence received from all USIB agencies for indications relating to the Watch Committee mission.

6. Develop promptly an early evaluation and analysis of each indication in coordination with the intelligence agency or agencies best qualified to deal with the field of intelligence to which the indication belongs.

7. Coordinate with the individual members of the Watch Committee the selection of indications for consideration by the Committee in regular and special meetings.

8. Prepare material for use by the Watch Committee to assist in its deliberations and the formulation of its conclusions.

9. Coordinate the reproduction and dissemination of approved Watch Committee reports.

10. Maintain in readily usable form a complete and integrated file of all available information and intelligence pertinent to the Watch Committee mission. ✓

11. Maintain wall maps, charts and other display material which will most effectively assist in illustrating and interpreting graphically the current and cumulative indications.

12. Concurrently, but not as a substitute for current methods of analysis and evaluation, develop and test (with outside assistance if desirable) the application of mechanical aids and techniques to the problem on an experimental basis with a view to their eventual use in assisting effectively the Watch Committee in the accomplishment of its mission.

13. Perform such additional tasks as shall be required by the USIB in the discharge of the Watch Committee mission.

**ALLEN W. DULLES**  
Director of Central Intelligence

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1 May 1956

7 JUL 1956

**WATCH COMMITTEE**

Organization and Functions

The Watch Committee has the task of providing the earliest possible warning to the U. S. Government of Soviet intentions to initiate hostilities against the US, its allies or areas peripheral to the Soviet Orbit. This is in response to the necessity expressed in NSC 162/2, <sup>F/</sup> of developing and maintaining an intelligence system capable of "collecting and analyzing indications of hostile intentions that would give maximum prior warning of possible aggression or subversion in any area of the world."

For a number of years prior to establishment of the present IAC Watch Committee, various elements of the intelligence community had been interested in the watch problem. At the time of the Berlin airlift during the summer of 1948, for example, CIA staff members experimented with indicator lists and various techniques directed at determining whether the Soviet Union was prepared to interfere with the airlift even at the risk of major war. By the early fall of 1949, this work had advanced to the point where an interagency Watch Committee came into existence under CIA chairmanship to examine weekly available indications of Soviet intentions to launch aggressive war. Conclusions reached in this committee's meetings were forwarded to the DCI and to the heads of other intelligence agencies. In the period immediately following the outbreak of the Korean War, this committee met frequently to provide an interagency evaluation of significant indications developments connected with the Korean War and elsewhere in the Soviet Orbit. The committee under CIA chairmanship was disbanded when the IAC established the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee as the IAC Watch Committee at the IAC meeting of 7 December 1950.

This Joint Intelligence Indications Committee, which was converted into the Watch Committee by the 7 December 1950 action

F/ Approved by the President on 30 October 1953

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of the IAC, <sup>2/</sup> had originated as a G-2 Indications File Committee. Representatives of Navy and Air Force intelligence had been full participants in the activities of the latter committee for several months, when, on 8 August 1950, the Joint Intelligence Committee decided that thereafter the Intelligence Indications File Committee would function as the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee (JIIC). At the same time the JIIC invited representatives of CIA, State and FBI to participate in the meetings, which they did thenceforth.

... of indicators of hostile ... intentions.

Following its decision of 7 December 1950 to convert the JIIC into the IAC Watch Committee, the IAC approved terms of reference for the new Watch Committee on 28 December 1950. <sup>3/</sup> According to these terms of reference, the Watch Committee's mission was to collect, evaluate, analyze and report indications of Soviet-Communist intentions of hostile action. <sup>4/</sup>

In the fall of 1953, some sentiment favored a review of the watch operations in the light of the prevailing situation which had substantially changed since 1950. At the IAC meeting of 6 October 1953 the Director of Central Intelligence, as Chairman of the IAC, proposed that a committee be established "to conduct a thorough and prompt review of the watch processes and prepare recommendations for the IAC and, ultimately, the NSC." <sup>5/</sup> Such a committee was formed and, as the "Ad Hoc IAC Committee (Watch)," held its first meeting on 30 October 1953. This committee presented an interim progress report to the IAC on 26 April 1954 <sup>6/</sup> outlining its activities and recommending IAC approval of "Terms of Reference" for a reorganized and more comprehensive watch effort by the IAC agencies. These recommendations were approved by the IAC at its meeting of 4 May 1954. <sup>7/</sup> DCID 1/2, dated 1 May 1954, which embodied Terms of Reference for the IAC Watch Committee, was issued in implementation of this decision. <sup>8/</sup>

<sup>2/</sup> IAC-M-10, 7 December 1950

<sup>3/</sup> IAC-M-12, 28 December 1950

<sup>4/</sup> IAC-D-6/1

<sup>5/</sup> IAC-M-124, 6 October 1953

<sup>6/</sup> IAC-D-6/1 (Revised), Tab A

<sup>7/</sup> IAC-M-150

<sup>8/</sup> DCID 1/2 states that the terms of reference were established "Pursuant to . . . provisions of paragraph 6, NSCID No. 1, and paragraph 10, 2, (1) of NSC 162/2, approved by the President on 30 October 1953. . . ."

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Perhaps the most significant change in the watch process which resulted from the deliberations and final recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee was the establishment of a National Indications Center (NIC) to support the IAC Watch Committee. The NIC, now located in the Pentagon, has a complement of full-time intelligence officers and administrative personnel which includes representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force, State and CIA. It is thus the focal point in the intelligence community for processing evidence of indicators of hostile Bloc intentions. Aside from preparing material for regular Watch Committee meetings, and Watch Committee Reports, the NIC endeavors to develop indicators of hostile Bloc intentions and continuously to analyze material pertaining to such indications. Agency representatives in the NIC are also in a position to obtain from their respective agencies any additional information needed for analysis. Although the Watch Committee normally meets only once each week, the NIC analysis of indicators continues on a 24 hours-a-day, 7 days-a-week basis.

#### Membership

The Watch Committee is composed of members representing each IAC agency, one of whom is designated by the DCI, after consultation with the IAC, as Chairman for a specified period.<sup>9/</sup> The post of Vice Chairman is rotated among those agencies which have not provided the person in the post of Chairman.<sup>10/</sup> The Indications Center supporting the Watch Committee is headed by a Director provided by CIA and consisting of an administrative Secretariat and an Indications Group.<sup>11/</sup>

The Watch Committee has no subcommittee structure.

#### Reports and Publications

The Committee publishes the Watch Committee Report regularly each week.

No.  
9/ DCID 1/2, 11 May 1954  
10/ IAC-D-6/4, 24 September 1954  
11/ DCID 1/2, 11 May 1954

- 3 -

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**Meetings**

**Regular meetings of the Watch Committee are held weekly, usually on Wednesdays. Special meetings are held as the occasion requires upon the call of the Chairman.**

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON

November 30, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Information to the IAC Watch Committee

REFERENCE: NSC 5438

The President on the recommendation of the National Security Council authorizes and directs all appropriate departments and agencies of the U.S. Government to provide certain information to the IAC Watch Committee, as defined in NSC 5438. Accordingly, the enclosed copy of NSC 5438 is transmitted herewith for appropriate implementation.

Under normal circumstances such data should be sent to the Director of the National Indications Center, Room 2C469, Pentagon Building, Washington 25, D. C., phone: Code 131, extension 55245. Under conditions where an item is exceptionally sensitive it is suggested that the addressee be the Chairman of the Watch Committee in care of the Director, National Indications Center.

*JS*  
JAMES S. LAY, Jr.  
Executive Secretary

- cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
- The Attorney General
- The Secretary of Commerce
- The Director, Bureau of the Budget
- The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
- The Federal Civil Defense Administrator
- The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- The Director of Central Intelligence
- The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
- The Director, United States Information Agency

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TRANSMITTAL OF INFORMATION TO THE IAC WATCH COMMITTEE

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(e) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and for the purpose of providing necessary support to the Watch Committee of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) in the accomplishment of its mission, the President on the recommendation of the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs all appropriate departments and agencies of the Government:

1. To make fully available to the IAC Watch Committee all information and intelligence of reasonable credibility pertinent to its mission and functions (as defined in DCID 1/2, attached hereto), without restriction because of source, policy or operational sensitivity.

2. To keep the IAC Watch Committee informed concerning significant diplomatic, political, military, or other ~~sources~~ Courses of action by the U.S., approved for immediate implementation or in process of execution, which might bring about military reaction or early hostile action by the USSR, or its allies, thus endangering the security of the U.S. This information is for the explicit and express use of the Watch Committee and those members of the National Indications Center who need to know of it in order to perform their functions.

3. When, in the opinion of a department or agency, overriding considerations affecting the national security exist which justify an exception to 1. or 2. above, the decision as to withholding or delaying the transmission of the information to the Watch Committee shall be taken up with the Director of Central Intelligence and, if there is disagreement, referred to the President. In the case of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the matter shall be taken up by the Director thereof with the Attorney General who shall consult with the Director of Central Intelligence, and if there is disagreement the matter shall be referred to the President.

EXTRACT FROM NSC 5438

Approved by The President 30 November 1954

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*Replaced by 115, 14 Nov 58.*

24 May 1954

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** All recipients of DCID's

**SUBJECT:** DCID 1/2, "Terms of Reference,  
Watch Committee of the IAC"

1. The attached DCID was issued by the DCI on 13 May 1954.

2. You will note that this Directive provides for the activation of a National Indications Center (NIC) and a reconstitution of the Watch Committee. These actions are intended to be effected as early as practicable but in no event later than 1 July 1954 (see paragraph 2G, IAC-M-150, 4 May 1954).

**RICHARD D. DRAIN**  
Secretary,  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/2**

**TERMS OF REFERENCE, WATCH COMMITTEE OF THE IAC**  
(11 May 1954; SECRET)

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 6, NSCID No. 1, and paragraph 10,a,(1) of NSC 162/2, approved by the President on 30 October 1953, the following terms of reference for the Watch Committee of the IAC are hereby established:

**Preamble**

The Soviet/Communist bloc, as a potential aggressor, has the capability to initiate suddenly at any time and in a place and by methods of its own choosing, hostile action \* in such strength as to gravely threaten the security of the United States. The mission of providing earliest possible warning of hostile action will be undertaken by the IAC agencies, within the scope of their responsibilities, as of the highest priority. The proper discharge of this mission depends upon the carrying out of complementary watch and estimating functions.

**A. Name**

Watch Committee of the IAC

**B. Mission**

To provide earliest possible warning to the United States Government of hostile action by the USSR, or its allies, which endangers the security of the United States.

**C. Functions**

1. To develop and operate on a current and continuing basis an intelligence plan for the levying upon IAC members, and the requesting from other U.S. agencies through appropriate channels, of the intelligence requirements necessary to provide the maximum degree of advance warning and for recommending the collection priorities of these requirements.

2. To analyze and evaluate information and intelligence, both current and cumulative, on an all-source basis, furnished by the IAC agencies relating to the imminence of hostilities, and to develop therefrom the conclusions as to indications of:

**a. Soviet/Communist intentions to initiate hostilities against**

1 the continental United States, U.S. possessions, or U.S. forces abroad,

2 U.S. allies or their forces,

3 areas peripheral to the Soviet Orbit.

\* Aggressive action by armed forces, or by organizations or individuals in support of military strategy.

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b. any other development, actual or potential, susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which would jeopardize the security of the United States.


3. To report promptly their conclusions, together with significant indications, to the principals of the IAC and other appropriate recipients. In the event of an impending critical situation, IAC principals will be immediately advised after which the provisions of paragraph 6, NSCID No. 1, will apply.

4. To make recommendations to the IAC, or member agencies thereof, including such divergent views as may be recorded.

5. The Watch Committee shall avoid duplicating IAC estimative functions.

**D. Composition and Organization**

1. The Watch Committee will be composed of a Senior Officer representing each IAC member organization, one of whom will be designated by the DCI, after consultation with the IAC, as Chairman for a specified period. The Committee will be supported by an Indications Center, headed by a Director to be provided by CIA and consisting of an administrative Secretariat and an Indications Group.



2. The Watch Committee will meet on a regular schedule as determined by the Committee and on special occasions when requested by one or more of its members or their principals.

**E. Duties and Responsibilities**

The Watch Committee shall discharge, or direct the Indications Center in the discharge of, the below-listed duties and responsibilities.

1. Develop and operate on a current and continuing basis the Watch Committee Intelligence Plan for systematizing, energizing, and coordinating through appropriate channels the world-wide collection by U.S. agencies of information and intelligence pertinent to the Watch Committee mission.

2. Arrange through the IAC or the appropriate member thereof for exploitation of every domestic and foreign source of information and

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intelligence pertinent to the Watch Committee mission; and, among other actions, arrange, at appropriate times, that representatives of IAC field intelligence activities confer with the IAC and the Watch Committee in order effectively to coordinate, but not direct, field intelligence activities with the activities of the Watch Committee.

3. Arrange with the IAC agencies for a systematic screening of all information and intelligence received by them by any means for the purpose of immediately extracting and forwarding to the Indications Center all items which may contain indications of Soviet/Communist intentions as set forth in C, 2 above (this procedure is in addition to the action called for in paragraph 6 of NSCID No. 1); an agency evaluation, where appropriate, will be forwarded as soon as possible.

4. Members will maintain close and intimate liaison with their respective parent agencies to assist them in ensuring that all pertinent information and intelligence is being made available to the Indications Center.

5. Continuously screen all pertinent information and intelligence received from all IAC agencies for indications relating to the Watch Committee mission.

6. Develop promptly an early evaluation and analysis of each indication in coordination with the intelligence agency or agencies best qualified to deal with the field of intelligence to which the indication belongs.

7. Coordinate with the individual members of the Watch Committee the selection of indications for consideration by the Committee in regular and special meetings.

8. Prepare material for use by the Watch Committee to assist in its deliberations and the formulation of its conclusions.

9. Coordinate the reproduction and dissemination of approved Watch Committee reports.

10. Maintain in readily usable form a complete and integrated file of all available information and intelligence pertinent to the Watch Committee mission.

11. Maintain wall maps, charts and other display material which will most effectively assist in illustrating and interpreting graphically the current and cumulative indications.

12. Concurrently, but not as a substitute for current methods of analysis and evaluation, develop and test (with outside assistance if desirable) the application of mechanical aids and techniques to the problem on an experimental basis with a view to their eventual use in assisting effectively the Watch Committee in the accomplishment of its mission.

13. Perform such additional tasks as shall be required by the IAC in the discharge of the Watch Committee mission.

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Memorandum of Agreement between the [redacted] for Warning (NIO/W).

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SUBJECT: The Strategic Warning Staff (SWS)

SCOPE: This memorandum serves to formalize previous arrangements made regarding the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Strategic Warning Staff. It amplifies the general responsibilities outlined in Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/5, 23 March 1979, and Defense Intelligence Agency Manual 56-2, 30 December 1975.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- The SWS shall be located within the [redacted] DIA will provide the logistical support required to operate the Staff, including:

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- o Adequate working space, furnishings and office equipment.

[redacted]

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- o Administrative supplies/support and routine maintenance support.
- o Publications and graphics supports as required.

- Budgetary support to the SWS for travel of DIA personnel assigned.

- DIA will provide full-time, highly qualified professional intelligence personnel to the SWS in consultation with the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the NIO/W consisting of the following:

[Large redacted area]

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RESPONSIBILITIES OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR WARNING

- For his part insures SWS compliance with routine administrative requirements associated with occupation of space within the

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- Insures that performance ratings of all DIA personnel attached to the SWS are accomplished per pertinent Service regulations by the Director, SWS, and forwarded to DIA, JS, for review and/or other action as required.

- Will insure the SWS will comply with a separately published security agreement. This agreement shall be developed jointly and approved by the NIO/W and DIA.


JOINT RESPONSIBILITIES

-The authority for implementation of this memorandum is delegated to the Assistant Director for JCS Support for DIA and the Director of the Strategic Warning Staff for the NIO/W.

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**MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT**

DCID 1/2 (SECRET) dated 11 May 1954, established a Watch Committee and a National Indications Center (NIC). The NIC is the full-time staff of the Watch Committee and, as such, its current duties and responsibilities are contained in the "Terms of Reference, Watch of the USIB," DCID 1/5 (SECRET) dated 23 April 1965.



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DIA executive agent responsibilities include logistics and budgetary support for approximately 30 members of the NIC as well as for making future nominations of personnel to fill the billets under DIA cognizance.

NIC management responsibilities and operational channels will continue in response to DCID 1/5 and to the directives of the Chairman of the Watch Committee.

The NIC's contact point for executive agent responsibilities within DIA will be the Comptroller of DIA.

(Sgd) Jammie M. Philpott

JAMMIE M. PHILPOTT  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency  
Dated 3 APR 1972



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BRONSON TWEEDY  
Deputy to the Director of  
Central Intelligence,  
Intelligence Community  
Dated 12 Apr '72

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**GROUP 1**  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and declassification



MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

- 8 Nov 1954 Original one that set up the National Indications Center, Department of the Air Force, Executive Agent
- 12 Apr 1972 Transferred DOD Executive Agent Responsibility for the National Indications Center to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) from the Department of the Air Force.
- 31 Mar 1980 Memorandum of Agreement between the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Intelligence Officer for Warning for the Strategic Warning Staff (SWS).
- 22 Apr 1980 Memorandum of Understanding between the Deputy Assistant Director for Security Services, Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director of Security, Central Intelligence Agency. This established standards for the protection of classified materials which will apply to the Strategic Warning Staff (SWS) ...while these elements are physically located within the

[Redacted]

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Prepared Jan 1983 w/supporting documents

[Redacted]

Staff Member  
National Warning Staff

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22 APR 1980

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE  
DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR SECURITY SERVICES,  
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1. PURPOSE: This Memorandum of Understanding establishes standards for the protection of classified materials which will apply to the Strategic Warning Staff (SWS) and the National Intelligence Tasking Office for Warning and Crisis Management (NITO/W) while these elements are physically located within [redacted] (NMIC). [redacted]

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2. SCOPE: This Memorandum of Understanding provides background, outlines basic security principles and establishes the basis for security support relationships between the DCI and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) relative to security aspects of SWS and NITO/W operations in the [redacted] (U)

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3. BACKGROUND:

a. The SWS is a DCI activity established under the auspices of Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/5. Under the provisions of this Directive, the SWS was collocated with the [redacted]

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[redacted] DCID 1/5 does not establish guidance for the protection of classified material within the SWS. This Memorandum of Understanding is written to clarify the role of the DCI and DIA with regard to the security of SWS operations.

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b. The NITO/W is a DCI activity established under the auspices of Presidential Directive NSC-17 (PD/NSC-17). By agreement between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense, the NITO/W has been collocated with the [redacted] PD/NSC-17 does not establish guidance for the protection of classified material within the NITO/W. This Memorandum of Understanding is written to clarify the role of the DCI and [redacted] with regard to the security of NITO/W operations. [redacted]

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4. SECURITY PRINCIPLES: The following basic principles shall govern the handling of classified materials by the SWS and NITO/W:

[redacted]

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**a. Collateral Classified Material:**

(1) "Blue Border" Material: Blue Border material passing in and out of SWS will be handled in accordance with CIA regulations governing such material. Blue Border material will be forwarded directly from CIA to SWS. A control officer and alternate control officer in each of these elements will be responsible for this material in terms of logging in, receipting, distribution, storage, inventory etc. . . . Yearly inspection of Blue Border material will be conducted by officers appointed for this task by CIA. DOD/DIA personnel will not inspect Blue Border material held within the SWS without specific approval from appropriate CIA authorities in consonance with CIA regulations.

(2) Other Collaterally Classified Material: Within the SWS and NITO/W areas, classification, marking, control, transmission, storage, and declassification of collaterally classified materials fall under the purview of the DCI and will be governed by appropriate CIA regulations. Storage of classified material within these elements will at least meet the standards prescribed by [redacted] tenants. Additional safeguards may be established at the discretion of the respective Directors of NITO/W and SWS in coordination with appropriate CIA authorities.

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**b. Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI):**

All SCI materials within the SWS and NITO/W will be handled and stored in accordance with CIA and DCI directives.

**c. Physical Security:**

Physical security within the SWS and NITO/W will be in accordance with DCI, CIA and NFIB directives and will at a minimum equal the standards established for other [redacted] Any physical modifications of SWS/NITO/W occupied areas for security or other reasons will be coordinated with DIA to insure against adverse impact on other [redacted] Personnel access to SWS and NITO/W areas will be strictly controlled within [redacted] by personnel assigned therein governed

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by need to know, access certifications and individual escort procedures as appropriate. Special procedural safeguards governing personnel access may be established at the discretion of the Directors of the respective offices. SWS and NITO/W will adhere to access regulations for entry and exiting the [redacted]

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d. Personnel Security: All personnel assigned to the SWS and NITO/W will meet DCID 1/14 standards. CIA will certify to DIA that all non-DIA personnel assigned meet DCID 1/14 standards and will provide DIA with a listing of the compartmented accesses that these personnel hold. DIA will be responsible for certifying that DIA personnel assigned meet DCID 1/14 standards and will indoctrinate these personnel for those compartmented accesses required for their positions.

e. Inspections:

(1) Safety Inspections: DIA, as host element responsible for safety of the entire [redacted] will be permitted escorted access to the SWS and NITO/W areas as required for safety inspections and tenants will cooperate in procedures established for safety.

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(2) Security Inspections: SWS and NITO/W will be subject to annual security inspections conducted by CIA Office of Security representatives. Any findings pertinent to the overall security posture of the [redacted] developed during these inspections will be reported to DIA as host, through channels. Upon request, appropriately cleared DIA Security Inspectors will be admitted escorted to these office areas with the understanding that access to tenant materials cannot be granted for purposes of such inspections. The SWS and NITO/W are also subject to special inspections and surveys only at the discretion of the DCI. These offices will not be subject to unannounced, after-hours security inspections by DIA Security Services Staff.

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f. Combinations to Entrance Doors: The combinations to locks on the entrance doors to SWS and NITO/W areas will be provided in sealed envelopes to the DIA Special Intelligence Communications Center or to the Alert Center as designated by the [redacted] Security Officer to permit access in event of special emergency. [redacted]

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5. **SECURITY SUPPORT:** The [ ] Security Officer will provide these tenants with limited administrative support and assistance relative to tenancy within the [ ] Substantive security advice and guidance will be provided by CIA. 25X1
- a. **DIA Badges:** DIA Identification Badges shall be issued by the DIA Security Services Staff to SWS and NITO/W personnel upon certification by the [ ] Security Officer. Badges issued to these personnel will be maintained in accordance with DIAR 50-7, "DIA Identification Badges." 25X1
- b. **Locksmith Support:** The DIA Security Services Staff will provide locksmith support to SWS and NITO/W except for change of security combinations. The Security Services Staff will instruct representatives of the tenant offices on methods for changing combinations.
- c. **SCI Courier Badges:** SWS and NITO/W personnel will be issued SCI courier badges to permit transport of classified material in and out of [ ]. The number of badges and justifications for issuance will be agreed upon between the [ ] Security Services Staff, and the respective tenant office Directors. 25X1  
25X1
- d. **Technical Countermeasures Support:** Technical support to SWS and NITO/W may be provided by the Pentagon Counterintelligence Force (PCF) upon request through the Security Services Staff. It is understood that tenant offices will be subject to normal Technical Security Countermeasures tests and inspections and that pertinent results will be reported through channels to CIA.
- e. **Classified Waste Destruction:** Destruction of classified waste material generated within SWS and NITO/W will be accomplished through use of host DIA facilities in compliance with DIA procedures and regulations. Tenants reserve the option to have some classified waste removed by couriers for destruction at CIA.

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6. **ADMINISTRATION:** The respective Directors of the SWS and NITO/W will develop written office Standing Operating Procedures (SOP's). These SOP's relating to safety and emergency evacuation may be subject to review by the host. Other SOP's will be subject to review by the CIA Office of Security representatives during their inspections. (U)


7. **EXECUTION AND REVIEW:**

a. This Memorandum of Understanding shall become effective upon approving signatures by the DIA Deputy Assistant Director for Security Services and CIA Director of Security and will remain in effect as long as the SWS and NITO/W offices are located within the [ ] area.

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b. This Memorandum of Understanding is subject to review and modification upon request of either of the signatories and/or whenever a change in operational requirements warrants such review. (U)

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Deputy Assistant Director for  
Security Services  
Defense Intelligence Agency

Acting Director of Security  
Central Intelligence Agency

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**SECRET****MEMORANDUM FOR AGREEMENT**

DCID 1/2 (Secret) dated 11 May 1954 established a Watch Committee and a National Indications Center under the Intelligence Advisory Committee. The National Indications Center is the full-time staff of the Committee and performs its day-to-day functions. A detailed description of the functions of both the Committee and the Center are contained in the above-cited directive.

Because of the nature of these activities and relevant technical facilities and services available within the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Advisory Committee recommended that the National Indications Center be located in the Pentagon Building and that the Department of Defense make certain arrangements for its administrative support. In view of its predominant interest in the activities of the Center, the Department of Defense has concurred in these recommendations. Accordingly, the following agreements are hereby established:

1. The Department of the Army will provide space required to house the Center.

2. The Department of the Air Force will arrange for the administrative support, including technical facilities and services, required by the Center in accordance with the terms of this agreement.

3. Initially and for the remainder of fiscal year 1955, funds in the amount of \$57,000 will be required to meet the current needs of the Center. The Central Intelligence Agency will provide \_\_\_\_\_ of the required funds and similar amounts will be made available by each of the Departments of the Army and Navy. The Department of the Air Force will make available \$19,500 of which \$7,000 will be for operating costs. In addition, each of these four agencies will detail military and civilian personnel required to staff the Center in numbers previously agreed to by the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

4. Subsequent to fiscal year 1955 the Department of the Air Force will provide all administrative support, including technical facilities and services, required for the operation of the Center except military and technical and professional civilian personnel. The Central Intelligence Agency and each of the military departments will continue to provide such military and technical and professional civilian personnel as may be required and agreed to by these participating agencies.

APPROVED:

/s/ L. K. White  
Deputy Director for Administration,  
Central Intelligence Agency

/s/ W. J. McNeil  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Comptroller)

8 November 1954

(Date)

13 November 1954

(Date)

**SECRET**



Issued 17 Nov 54  
to 3 Secs of services

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

DCID 1/2 (Secret) dated 11 May 1954 established a Watch Committee and a National Indications Center under the Intelligence Advisory Committee. The National Indications Center is the full-time staff of the Committee and performs its day-to-day functions. A detailed description of the functions of both the Committee and the Center are contained in the above-cited directive.

Because of the nature of these activities and relevant technical facilities and services available within the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Advisory Committee recommended that the National Indications Center be located in the Pentagon Building and that the Department of Defense make certain arrangements for its administrative support. In view of its predominant interest in the activities of the Center, the Department of Defense has concurred in these recommendations. Accordingly, the following agreements are hereby established:

1. The Department of the Army will provide space required to house the Center.
2. The Department of the Air Force will arrange for the administrative support, including technical facilities and services, required by the Center in accordance with the terms of this agreement.
3. Initially and for the remainder of fiscal year 1955, funds in the amount of \$57,000 will be required to meet the support costs of the Center. The Central Intelligence Agency will provide [redacted] of the required funds and similar amounts will be made available by each of the Departments of the Army and Navy. The Department of the Air Force will make available \$19,500 of which \$7,000 will be for operating costs. In addition, each of these four agencies will detail military and civilian personnel required to staff the Center in numbers previously agreed to by the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
4. Subsequent to fiscal year 1955 the Department of the Air Force will provide all administrative support, including technical facilities and services, required for the operation of the Center except military and technical and professional civilian personnel. The Central Intelligence Agency and each of the military departments will continue to provide such military and technical and professional civilian personnel as may be required and agreed to by these participating agencies.

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APPROVED:

[redacted signature]  
 Deputy Director for Administration,  
 Central Intelligence Agency

NOV 8 1954

(Date)

[redacted signature]  
 Assistant Secretary of Defense  
 (Comptroller)

NOV 8 1954

(Date)

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