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ACIS-1317/85  
 2 July 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence      --EYES ONLY--  
 Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
 Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

25X1 SUBJECT: Contadora Treaty [redacted]

25X1 REFERENCE: Memo for C/ACIS, fm DCI, dtd 27 June 1985, subj Contadora  
 Treaty [redacted]

1. This "fast track" memorandum responds to the reference and is for your information -- although you may want to task more work once you have read this text. [redacted] 25X1

2. You requested my thoughts on the correspondence you had received earlier from NIO/LA, in which he responds to an earlier request of yours in this same topic. [redacted] 25X1

3. My opinion is that more can be done here and, moreover, I think this additional work ought to improve our understanding of the verifiability of the Contadora Treaty, as well as make Senator Durenberger feel more comfortable. [redacted] 25X1

4. My sense is that Senator Durenberger wants more specifics about the US ability to verify any Contadora Treaty. My sense is that what he has in mind is something like the monitoring work we provide the policy community in the arms control arena. I have no idea whether this is in fact so, but my guess is that Senator Durenberger is looking at the Contadora Treaty the same way I would like at the treaty. That is, an arms control accord which deals with non-nuclear, small-sized weapons, and with use of such weaponry in a relatively small, regional arena. [redacted] 25X1

5. The following paragraphs were written by an ACIS analyst [redacted] 25X1  
 [redacted] They describe how the experience in ACIS, in conjunction with the substantive help of Central America analysts, could be applied to any Contadora Treaty. [redacted] 25X1

6. Intelligence Community assessments regarding the monitoring of the prospective Contadora Treaty can be made richer by applying certain procedures and formats already being used in the arms control arena. If this were done, the Intelligence Community work would not only be more complete but more readily recognizable to those policymakers and legislators who are familiar with such products on arms control topics. [redacted] 25X1

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7. In short, a monitoring matrix on the provisions of a Contadora Treaty can be formatted to identify specific monitoring tasks, associated monitoring confidences, plausible cheating scenarios, and the associated Intelligence Community confidences in detecting such cheating. In addition, the matrix can list the active and passive cooperative measures being contemplated and show how each measure enhances or fails to enhance Intelligence Community monitoring confidence. An example of such a matrix is attached. [redacted]

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8. To construct this type of a matrix, the following work would have to be done:

- Identify all monitoring tasks in the treaty;
- Determine the current practices being carried out by the parties to the treaty that are relevant to the monitoring tasks (i.e., how do the parties carry out their operations now?);
- Identify plausible cheating scenarios (i.e., look at realistic ways the parties could act which are not permitted by the treaty provisions);
- Given our current collection capabilities, assess how well US Intelligence thinks it could monitor each treaty task and detect each cheating scenario; and,
- Assess the effectiveness that each cooperative measures has on the IC's monitoring confidence, as appropriate. [redacted]

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9. We have learned in the process of constructing such matrices for arms control topics how important it is to have an appropriate meeting of the minds of intelligence analysts from CIA, DIA, NSA, INR, the IC Staff (and elsewhere, as appropriate) in doing this work. In particular, it is essential that all analysts totally understand what collection systems are available and what definitions and assumptions are being used in the matrix. [redacted]

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10. ACIS, which leads the Intelligence Community coordination process for arms control topics, takes the lead in identifying what the monitoring tasks and cooperative measures are and makes sure all analysts fully understand what collection systems are being considered. All the analysts together agree on what constitutes "current practices," plausible cheating scenarios and the monitoring and detection confidences for the matrix. Background papers sometimes have to be provided which fully describe current practices and cheating scenarios. This entire process involves an iterative sequence of research, writing, coordination drafts, and meetings. [redacted]

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11. ACIS is ready to assist Latin American analysts as they try to determine monitoring confidences relevant to the Contadora Treaty. I do think the matrix approach would be a useful tool in this process. An analyst in ACIS [redacted] has primary responsibility to ensure consistency in our approach to monitoring issues across the board in the arms control arena.

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12. My estimate is that if we were to embark down this road, it would take US intelligence some two to six weeks to:

- Create an ad hoc interagency group and solve the group and human dynamics; and,
- Work out the substance.

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If you want to go down this road, the key question will be: Who is in charge? If you are most interested in the substance of the Treaty itself, the leader should be NIO/LA; if you are most interested in the process and in the creation of this matrix, the leader should be C/ACIS; and if you want both, then assign it jointly.

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13. If I can do more to assist you here, please call.

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Attachment:  
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EXAMPLE OF MONITORING MATRIX APPLICABLE TO CONTADORA TREATY

<u>Monitoring Task</u>	<u>Monitoring Confidence Under Current Practices</u>	<u>Cheating Scenarios</u>	<u>Detection Confidence</u>	<u>Will Treaty-Cited Cooperative Measures Help? (See Comments)</u>		<u>Potential Monitoring Enhancements</u>	<u>Comments</u>
				<u>Current Practices</u>	<u>Cheating</u>		
Count the number of foreign troops participating in international exercises in Nicaragua	L (Guess)	Foreign troops dressed as host country troops	VL (Guess)	Yes	No	Hire two experienced COMINT analysts at NSA	Treaty specified onsite inspection regimes would improve monitoring confidence under current practices to moderate because foreign troops can be identified by personal inspection. OSI would not improve detection confidence for cheating scenario because of the ease with which foreign troops can be disguised.