EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T		X		
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL				
14	D/PAO				
15	VC/NIC		X		
16	D/SOVA		X		
17	D/OSWR		X		
18	NIO/SP		X		
19	NIO/USSR		X		
20	C/ACIS		X		
21	ES		X		
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	SUSPENSE		Date		

Remarks

RR

STAT

Executive Secretary

31 Oct 85

Date

3637 (10-81)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CABINET AFFAIRS STAFFING MEMORANDUM

Date: 10/30/85 **Number:** 175587CA **Due By:** ----------

Subject: Resource Book on Nuclear Arms Control Issues

	Action	FYI
ALL CABINET MEMBERS	☒	☐
Vice President	☐	☐
State	☐	☐
Treasury	☐	☐
Defense	☐	☐
Justice	☐	☐
Interior	☐	☐
Agriculture	☐	☐
Commerce	☐	☐
Labor	☐	☐
HHS	☐	☐
HUD	☐	☐
Transportation	☐	☐
Energy	☐	☐
Chief of Staff	☐	☐
Education	☐	☐
OMB	☐	☐
CIA	☐	☐
UN	☐	☐
USTR	☐	☐
GSA	☐	☐
EPA	☐	☐
NASA	☐	☐
OPM	☐	☐
VA	☐	☐
SBA	☐	☐

	Action	FYI
CEA	☐	☐
CEQ	☐	☐
OSTP	☐	☐
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McFarlane	☐	☐
Svahn	☐	☐
Chew *(For WH Staffing)*	☐	☐
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REMARKS:

Enclosed is a handbook prepared by the National Security Council containing background information on nuclear arms control issues and the Strategic Defense Initiative. I am forwarding it to you for your use prior to the President's meeting with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev.

RETURN TO:

☒ **Alfred H. Kingon**
Cabinet Secretary
456-2823
(Ground Floor, West Wing)

☐ **Don Clarey**
☐ **Rick Davis**
☐ **Ed Stucky**

Associate Director
Office of Cabinet Affairs
456-2800 (Room 129, OEOB)

1-140

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 30, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

SUBJECT: Resource Book on Nuclear Arms Control Issues

Attached is a handbook of unclassified background information and talking points on nuclear arms control issues and the Strategic Defense Initiative which I believe will be useful to you as we prepare for the President's meeting with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev.

Robert C. McFarlane

Attachment

Tab A Speakers' Book

Nuclear Arms Control Speaker's Resource Book

September 1985

Nuclear Arms Control Speaker's Resource Book - Index

Basic Themes

Overall

The US seeks a serious, constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union in the Geneva negotiations.

- Our immediate goal is to get agreement on deep and verifiable reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals.

- We also seek to redress the erosion of the ABM Treaty that has resulted from Soviet actions, and we are expressing our concerns about Soviet non-compliance with this and other existing agreements. We are trying to get corrective action where there are violations.

- Over the longer term -- should the new defensive technologies being examined in our SDI research program prove feasible -- we hope to make a transition from the current situation, in which deterrence rests on the ultimate threat of devastating nuclear retaliation, to one in which nuclear arms are greatly reduced and greater reliance is placed on defenses which threaten no one. We seek to discuss with the Soviets our ideas about how our two sides might manage this transition.

- Our ultimate objective is the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has long stated this to be its goal as well. We have no illusions that the two sides can quickly or easily agree on the steps necessary to reach this goal, but its importance makes it imperative that we persist. Were nuclear weapons to be eliminated, we would have to devote particular attention to how, together with our Allies, we might counter and diminish the threat posed by conventional arms imbalances, through both arms improvements and arms control efforts.

- Our negotiators in Geneva have been given flexibility to explore various avenues toward agreement. The President has made it clear that we will do our part to bridge differences with the Soviets.

- We will continue to take into account the concerns of our Allies and friends, and to consult closely with them as the negotiations proceed.

- We are realistic about our differences with the Soviet Union. There will be many tough issues to resolve, and the negotiating process will require patience and persistence.

SDI

- SDI is a research program. The aim of SDI is not to seek superiority, but to maintain the strategic balance and thereby assure stable deterrence.

- Research will last for some years. We intend to adhere strictly to ABM Treaty limitations and will insist that the Soviets do so as well.

- We do not have any preconceived notions about the defensive options the research may generate. We will not proceed to development and deployment unless the research indicates that defenses meet strict criteria.

- Within the SDI research program, we will judge defenses to be desirable only if they are survivable and cost-effective at the margin.

- It is too early in our research program to speculate on the kinds of defensive systems -- whether ground-based or space-based and with what capabilities -- that might prove feasible and desirable to develop and deploy.

- The purpose of the defensive options we seek is clear -- to find a means to destroy attacking ballistic missiles before they can reach any of their potential targets.

- U.S. and allied security remains indivisible. The SDI program is designed to enhance allied security as well as U.S. security. We will continue to work closely with our allies to ensure that, as our research progresses, allied views are carefully considered.

- If and when our research criteria are met, and following close consultation with our allies, we intend to consult and negotiate, as appropriate, with the Soviets pursuant to the terms of the ABM Treaty, which provide for such consultations, on how deterrence could be enhanced through a greater reliance by both sides on new defensive systems. This commitment should in no way be interpreted as according the Soviets a veto over possible future defensive deployments. And, in fact, we have already been trying to initiate a discussion of the offense-defense relationship and stability in the Defense and Space Talks underway in Geneva to lay the foundation to support such future possible consultations.

- o It is our intention and our hope that, if new defensive technologies prove feasible, we (in close and continuing consultation with our allies) and the Soviets will jointly manage a transition to a more defense-reliant balance.

- o SDI represents no change in our commitment to deterring war and enhancing stability.

- o For the foreseeable future, offensive nuclear forces and the prospect of nuclear retaliation will remain the key element of deterrence. Therefore, we must maintain modern, flexible, and credible strategic nuclear forces.

- o Our ultimate goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. By necessity, this is a very long-term goal, which requires, as we pursue our SDI research, equally energetic efforts to diminish the threat posed by conventional arms imbalances, both through conventional force improvements, and the negotiation of arms reductions and confidence-building measures.

Strategic Modernization

- o Since, for the forseeable future, offensive nuclear forces and the prospect of nuclear retaliation will remain the key element of deterrence, we must maintain modern, flexible, and credible nuclear forces.

- o Our modernization program is essential to this objective.

- o The US modernization program also provides a crucial incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously for genuine arms reductions.

START

- o Our objective remains an equitable, verifiable agreement on substantial reductions in strategic offensive forces, in a manner that would improve stability.

- o The President has given US negotiators unprecedented flexibility with regard to how we reach that goal. We are less concerned with the method than the outcome.

- o In the past, the Soviet Union has proposed ballistic missile limits that focused on launchers as the primary unit of limitation. Launcher limits alone, however, have

proven ineffective in limiting the growth of strategic forces. The US, on the other hand, focused on warheads, deployed missiles and throwweight as the proper units of limitation. Our negotiators have received guidance that makes possible the bridging of these differences.

- o We are proposing limits on heavy bombers and the number of ALCMs they carry below the levels set in SALT II.

- o We are not trying to dictate the character of the Soviet force structure. We recognize that there are substantial differences between our respective forces. We are prepared to explore with the Soviets trade-offs between areas of US and Soviet advantage and interest. For example, we would consider various provisions that would allow a Soviet advantage in ballistic missile capability in return for a US advantage in bomber capability.

INF

- o Our ultimate objective remains the complete elimination of all US and Soviet land-based LRINF missile systems.

- o As an interim measure, we seek reductions to the lowest possible equal global limits on LRINF missile warheads. We will consider any number between zero and 572 LRINF missile warheads.

- o In order to take account of expressed Soviet concerns, we are also prepared to:

  - consider a commitment not to deploy in Europe all of the LRINF missiles to which we would be entitled under equal global ceilings;

  - apportion reductions to be made in LRINF missiles between Pershing IIs and GLCMs, in an appropriate manner; and

  - discuss LRINF aircraft limitations.

- o We are prepared to explore any number of different approaches leading to a zero global ceiling.

- o We are also willing to consider any serious Soviet proposal that meets US and Allied security concerns.

Defense and Space

- We are providing the Soviets our assessment of the current strategic situation, pointing out sources of instability and the need for our two sides to reduce or eliminate them.

- We are discussing our concern about Soviet actions -- such as their construction of a large phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk -- that are eroding the ABM Treaty. Because of its associated capability, siting, and orientation, the Krasnoyarsk radar violates the ABM Treaty constraints.

- We are trying to explain to the Soviets our view on the relationship between offensive and defensive forces, the potential contribution of defensive forces to our mutual security, and how -- if new defensive technologies prove feasible -- we might manage a stable transition over time toward increased reliance on defense.

- We will attempt to clarify and will assess carefully any Soviet proposals for new limitations in the defense and space area.

- At this time, however, we believe that possibilities for restraints beyond the significant restrictions already established by the ABM Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and other agreements are limited. Foreign Minister Gromyko agreed with us in Geneva that limits on research would not be verifiable. It would be premature to consider additional limits on testing, development, or deployment of defensive technologies until we can assess the results of the research and can better judge the possible contributions of those technologies to enhancing deterrence and strategic stability.

2

Talking Points for TV

US-Soviet Relations

Key Message: WE SINCERELY WANT MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, AND BELIEVE WE CAN WORK OUT SOLUTIONS TO OUR DIFFERENCES. WE WILL KEEP ADDRESSING THE MAJOR PROBLEMS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, REGIONAL ISSUES, AND TRADE, IN ADDITION TO ARMS CONTROL. WE HAVE NO ILLUSIONS THAT PROGRESS WILL COME EASILY, BUT WE REALIZE THAT SERIOUS DIALOGUE IS A PREREQUISITE FOR A STABLE RELATIONSHIP SUSTAINABLE OVER THE LONG TERM.

Additional Points if Time Permits:

- Arms control is an important part of our overall relationship with the Soviet Union--but it is only one of many US-Soviet issues.

- Our differences with the Soviet Union are profound, stemming from fundamentally different values, history, and the amount of freedom we enjoy.

- We believe we can and must work together to reduce the risk of war. But the Soviet Union must recognize that cooperation is a two-way street, and they must be prepared to address our concerns as well.

- The new Soviet leader Gorbachev (phonetic: gorban CHAWF) has expressed his desire for better relations with the United States. We hope that sentiment will be translated into deeds.

- We are prepared to meet the Soviets halfway at the negotiating table. If they show similar flexibility and commitment, the prospects for arms reduction and progress on other issues will be enhanced.

Talking Points for TV

Arms Control and Geneva Negotiations

Key Message: OUR IMMEDIATE GOAL IN GENEVA IS TO GET EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS ON DEEP REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARSENALS, BUT WE ALSO WANT TO DISCUSS HOW WE AND THE SOVIETS MIGHT MANAGE A TRANSITION OVER THE LONG TERM FROM TODAY'S SITUATION, IN WHICH DETERRENCE RESTS ON THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR RETALIATION, TO ONE IN WHICH GREATER RELIANCE IS PLACED ON DEFENSES THAT THREATEN NO ONE. (20-25 secs.)

Additional Points if Time Permits:

- The US is seeking a serious, constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union in Geneva.

- We are focusing on reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals because they are the weapons that exist today and are the source of greatest immediate concern to both sides.

- The President has given our negotiators in Geneva wide latitude to explore various avenues toward agreements radically reducing strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons.

- Our ultimate objective is the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons.

Talking Points for TV

Strategic Modernization

Key Message: WE MUST MAINTAIN MODERN, FLEXIBLE, AND CREDIBLE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES BECAUSE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR FORCES AND THE PROSPECT OF NUCLEAR RETALIATION WILL REMAIN ESSENTIAL TO DETERRENCE. OUR STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO REDRESS SEVERAL CRITICAL INEQUALITIES IN THE US-SOVIET STRATEGIC BALANCE. (20-25 secs.)

Additional Points if Time Permits:

- Critical inequalities have arisen in the strategic balance due to the combination of the massive Soviet arms buildup and relative US restraint over the last fifteen years.

- The bulk of US strategic forces are aging and becoming increasingly vulnerable: all our bombers are over 20 years old; almost all our submarines are over 15 years old. Most of our ICBMs are 10 to 20 years old. We must modernize our forces to maintain a credible and effective deterrent in the face of Soviet strategic force improvements.

- Our strategic modernization program also provides a crucial incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously in Geneva.

- The President's strategic modernization program comprises:

  --improvements in command, control, and communications systems;

  --building the B-1B and eventually the advanced technology "Stealth" bomber;

  --deployment of the Trident submarine and the D-5 missile;

  --improving the survivability of the land-based leg of the Triad, including deployment of 100 MX missiles; and development of a small single-warhead ICBM; and

  --improvements in air defenses and research on strategic defense technologies.

Talking Points for TV

SDI

Key Message: SDI IS A RESEARCH PROGRAM THAT IS DESIGNED TO INVESTIGATE THE FEASIBILITY OF NEW DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES. IT IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE ABM TREATY. IF DEFENSES EVENTUALLY PROVE FEASIBLE, WE WANT TO WORK WITH THE SOVIETS TO MANAGE A STABLE TRANSITION TO A WORLD IN WHICH THERE WOULD BE GREATER RELIANCE ON DEFENSES. WE ARE TRYING TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THE SOVIETS IN GENEVA. SDI IS ALSO A PRUDENT HEDGE AGAINST A MASSIVE SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE EFFORT. (25-30 secs.)

Additional Points if Time Permits:

- Our SDI research is permitted by the ABM Treaty and fully consistent with it.

- The Soviets have been conducting similar research for many years and are ahead of us in certain areas. They have the world's only deployed anti-ballistic missile system and the only operational anti-satellite system in existence today.

- The radar the Soviets are building at Krasnoyarsk is in violation of the ABM Treaty. One of our objectives at the Geneva negotiations is to reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty and get corrective action where there are Soviet violations of that and other treaties.

- It will take many years to reach the point where feasibility of defenses can be determined. We would proceed to develop and deploy defenses only if they were survivable and less costly than the offenses they would offset.

Qs and As on the Geneva Negotiations

Strategic Arms Reductions

1. What is the difference between the current US position on strategic arms reductions and the US position in 1983 when the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) broke off?

A: Our objective in START remains to achieve significant, equitable, and verifiable reductions in strategic offensive forces, in a manner that would improve stability. However, our negotiators have been given new latitude to explore various ways to reach this outcome. For example, they are prepared to explore with the Soviets alternative means of incorporating trade-offs between areas of US and Soviet advantage and interest.

2. How deep are the reductions you are now seeking in START?

A: Our ultimate objective is the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. Our immediate goal in START is to reduce US and Soviet ballistic missile warheads to roughly 5000 on each side, and to reduce the numbers of bombers and ALCMs they carry below the levels set in SALT II. (cf. ACDA Publication, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, p. 242)

3. If you favor deep reductions in offensive systems, why are you building more?

A: For the foreseeable future, offensive nuclear forces and the threat of nuclear retaliation will remain the key element of deterrence. It is therefore essential that we maintain modern, flexible, and credible strategic nuclear forces. Our strategic modernization program will redress several critical inequalities that have arisen in the strategic balance due to the combination of the massive Soviet buildup and relative US restraint over the last fifteen years.

Moreover, our prospects for success in Geneva will depend on our determination, and Soviet recognition of that determination, to maintain an adequate deterrent for ourselves and our Allies with or without arms control. The Soviet strategy is to combine tough bargaining at the negotiating table with a hard-nosed public propaganda campaign designed to undercut support for US and NATO positions and force unilateral concessions. Only when they realize that the propaganda campaign is not working -- that is, that US will not make unilateral concessions -- will the Soviets bargain seriously at the negotiating table.

Interrelationship of Negotiations

4. The Soviets have said they are willing to agree to reductions in offensive systems only if an agreement can also be reached on space arms. What is your view of this interrelationship?

A: We have always believed that there is an interrelationship between offensive and defensive arms. In fact, upon concluding the ABM Treaty in 1972, we made a unilateral statement emphasizing our view that offense and defense were intimately related, and that we should have comprehensive treaties on both.

What the Soviets now appear to be demanding, however, is a rule under which, even if we were to reach agreement in one of the three subject areas, it would not be implemented until agreement was reached in the other areas. We believe that such a precondition makes no sense. If the US and Soviet Union can arrive at an agreement in one or more areas that benefits both sides, then there is no reason why we should not both begin immediately to derive those benefits.

5. Faced with a move on the part of the US toward a defensive strategy, why would the Soviets agree to put limits on their offensive weapons, since such limits might eventually confront them with a situation in which they would not be able to penetrate US defenses?

A: Our SDI program is devoted solely to research. This research is allowed by existing treaty constraints. The Soviets have in the past agreed with us that limitation of research could not be effectively verified. Furthermore, the Soviets have been conducting a comparable research program for years. While both sides continue to conduct strategic defense research in parallel, we see no reason for either side to alter its stated support for deep reductions in offensive weapons.

Many years down the road, when research results are realized, there will be two possible outcomes. If the research indicates that defensive technologies are not feasible, we will continue to rely on the threat of nuclear retaliation to maintain deterrence. In such an event, it should be in both sides' interest to base deterrence on a more stable balance with greatly reduced levels of arms.

If SDI research should indicate that defensive technologies are feasible -- that is, that they are survivable and cost-effective at the margin -- then it would be senseless from an economic standpoint to expand offensive forces. Additional offensive systems would cost more than the

defenses necessary to counter them. Moreover, we believe that we could convince the Soviets that, by joining us in a mutual transition to a more defense-reliant balance, they could shift to a deterrent that would be safer and more stable.

Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF)

6. What is the difference between the current US position in INF and the US position in 1983 when the talks broke off?

A Our goals in the INF talks remain the same. We believe the complete elimination of all US and Soviet land-based LRINF missile systems remains the optimum outcome. We remain willing, however, to agree to equal global limits at the lowest possible levels, as an interim step toward zero. Our negotiators have been given wide latitude to explore various ways to achieve our desired result.

Defense and Space Issues

7. President Reagan has said that everything is on the table in Geneva. Does that mean you are willing to negotiate limits on SDI?

A: The SDI is a research program. The Soviets have in the past agreed with us that it would be impossible to verify compliance with research limitations.

Should our research indicate that it would be desirable to develop and deploy defensive systems, we intend to consult with the Soviets pursuant to provisions of the ABM Treaty and negotiate with them on how we might jointly manage a transition to greater reliance on defenses.

8. Would the US be willing to accept a ban on deployment of strategic defenses in return for Soviet agreement to radical reductions in offensive arms?

A: It is premature to speculate on this deployment issue, since it will be many years before SDI research results are realized and decisions on the feasibility and desirability of actual systems are possible.

9. Doesn't SDI just further complicate what are already very complex negotiations?

A: In attempting to achieve effective arms control agreements, we have always recognized the close relationship of offensive and defensive arms and the need to have comprehensive limits on both. In 1972, when we signed the ABM Treaty, the US made a unilateral statement emphasizing this interrelationship and specifying the need for parallel limits on offensive systems. Accordingly, in addressing in Geneva the full set of issues associated with offensive and defensive systems, we are merely continuing a process that has existed for many years.

As for the immediate effect of the SDI research program, it seems to have been a major factor in getting the Soviets to resume negotiations. In the long run, we hope that successful SDI research will reinforce the prospects for US-Soviet reductions in nuclear weapons and for a shift to a more stable regime of deterrence.

10. By embarking on SDI, isn't the US just initiating a new arms race?

A: The Soviets have had an extensive program to explore similar defensive technologies for years. For example, they were the first to begin particle beam research and the first to conduct high-energy laser research. In addition, they have the only operational ballistic missile defenses and the only operational ASAT system in existence today. Their campaign to block the US SDI research program represents nothing less than an attempt to maintain a Soviet monopoly in this area of technology, a monopoly which could seriously upset the essential East-West military balance.

Further, our SDI research program provides a prudent hedge against the Soviets' obtaining significant unilateral advantages in ballistic missile defenses. In the long run, we hope that it will provide the basis for shifting over time to a more stable deterrent and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons altogether.

11. Wouldn't we be better off by avoiding the "militarization of space"?

A: Space has long been used for military purposes. Both the US and the Soviet Union use space for numerous defense-related activities, including communications, warning, and verification of arms control agreements.

Our SDI research program is exploring defensive technologies -- ground-based as well as space-based -- that would have the beneficial effect of enhancing deterrence and strengthening strategic stability while threatening no one.

12. Aren't space-based defenses really offensive in nature, in that they are capable of being used to attack ground targets?

A: Defenses based on the technologies we are researching could not effectively attack ground-based targets from space. Both particle beams and high-energy lasers would be so diffused upon passing through the atmosphere that they would be ineffective against any targets on the ground. Similarly, kinetic energy weapons would burn up in the atmosphere, as they have no heat shields.

13. Deterrence has worked well for 40 years. Why should we now shift to a new strategy based on SDI?

A: Our strategic concept and our desire to investigate the feasibility of shifting over time to a more defense-reliant balance is designed to strengthen deterrence. Deterrence requires that a potential opponent be convinced that the risks and costs of aggression far outweigh the gains he might hope to achieve. The popular view of deterrence has been that it is a matter of posing to an aggressor high potential costs through the ultimate threat of devastating nuclear retaliation.

But deterrence can also function effectively if one has the ability to deny the attacker the gains he might otherwise have hoped to realize. Our intent, if our research bears out, is to shift the deterrent balance from one based primarily on the ultimate threat of devastating nuclear retaliation to one in which nuclear arms are greatly reduced on both sides and non-nuclear defenses play a greater and greater role. We believe the latter would provide a sound basis for a more stable and reliable strategic relationship.

14. Is there not more deterrence in today's world, in which both sides are threatened with total destruction, than in a defense-reliant posture, in which there would be minimal capacity for destruction?

A: Deterrence is achieved by convincing a potential opponent that the risks and costs of aggression far outweigh the gains he might hope to achieve. There are two interrelated components of deterrence. One involves creating a situation whereby aggression entails huge risks and costs, such as we and the Soviets do today by maintaining the capability for devastating nuclear retaliation. The other consists of maintaining the capability to deny any

aggressor the ability to achieve his desired military gains. Effective defensive systems could do the latter, and without threatening anyone. New technologies may make it possible to strengthen deterrence by shifting increasingly to reliance on such systems. This is what our SDI research program is designed to find out.

15. Won't a strategy of deterrence based increasingly on defense require, if not perfect defenses, at least near-perfect systems and a very high level of confidence in that high level of effectiveness?

A: Even an imperfect defense could create excessive complications for an aggressor contemplating a first strike, thereby strengthening deterrence. In the ultimate phase, when all nuclear weapons would have been eliminated, we could reasonably expect a very high level of defense effectiveness against the sort of nuclear arsenal that might be clandestinely maintained.

16. If both sides have both offensive and defensive weapons, a situation might exist that favors the side striking first. This would be very destabilizing. How do you propose to avoid such a situation during your transition phase?

A: We would ensure that the transition period -- if defensive technologies prove feasible and we decide to move in that direction -- would be effected witnout jeopardizing stability. We would have to bring about a mix of survivable offensive and defensive systems that, over time, would steadily reduce incentives in a crisis for a first strike. That is why we would seek to make the transition a jointly managed endeavor with the Soviets, and have offered now to begin talking with them about the issues that would have to be addressed.

17. Would you envision the US moving to deploy defensive systems unilaterally?

A: Should our research indicate that it would be desirable to develop and deploy defensive systems, we intend to consult and negotiate with the Soviets pursuant to provisions of the ABM Treaty on how we might jointly manage a transition to greater reliance on defenses. We will seek to proceed in a stable fashion with the Soviet Union.

18. If we were to deploy defenses, wouldn't the Soviets be willing to spend what it takes to overcome them?

A: We would deploy defenses only if they were cost-effective at the margin -- that is, if it would cost the Soviets more to deploy additional offensive systems than it would cost us to deploy the additional defensive capability required to counter those systems. There would thus be a strong economic incentive against deploying more offensive systems.

19. Why are we spending large sums to develop and deploy new ballistic missiles, such as MX and Trident II, while at the same time pursuing a program to make ballistic missiles obsolete?

A: For the foreseeable future -- even in the first stages of a possible transition to a more defense-reliant balance -- offensive nuclear forces and the threat of nuclear retaliation will remain the key element of deterrence. It is therefore essential that we maintain modern, flexible, and credible nuclear forces. Our force modernization program will redress several critical inequalities that have arisen in the strategic and INF balances, due to the combination of the massive Soviet buildup and relative US restraint over the last fifteen years.

20. Does the President stick by his promise to share defensive technology with the Soviets?

A: In conducting our SDI research program, the US seeks no unilateral advantage over the Soviet Union. If defensive technologies prove feasible, we intend to manage jointly with the Soviets a transition to a more defense-reliant balance. As part of this endeavor, we would consider sharing defensive technology. It is too early in the research effort at this time, however, to know exactly what could and should be shared.

21. If you develop and deploy SDI, won't you then need a defense against strategic bombers and cruise missiles? Then against satchel bombs? Then against chemical and biological weapons? Won't the arms race always shift to some other area, and thus isn't the cheapest, most effective deterrent large nuclear weapons?

A: We cannot create a risk-free world. However, it is important to deal with the most dangerous threats. If we can do that, we will greatly reduce the overall level of risk we face. Ballistic missiles are the most threatening weapons in the existing military arsenals. If we can find a way to defend against, and ultimately eliminate, these missiles, we will take a large step toward a safer existence. At the same time, however, we will be working to lessen the threat of other kinds of aggression, including conventional.

22. Doesn't SDI decouple the US from its Allies?

A: No. Our commitment to the defense of our allies remains intact. We will ensure that any defensive system which we might develop in the future would strengthen the security of our allies as well as of the United States. We are examining technologies for defense not just against ballistic missiles that can reach the US, but also against the shorter-range ballistic missiles that can strike our allies. We are consulting closely with our allies and other nations on the Strategic Defense Initiative and will continue to do so as the program progresses.

23. How can the Allies participate in SDI research?

A: We have invited those Allies who wish to do so to work out with us bilateral programs of cooperation in SDI research.

Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASATs)

24. Is the US unwilling to accept any new limits on anti-satellite weapons?

A: In an arms control sense space is already heavily regulated, perhaps more so than earth. The Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placing of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, in space. The Limited Test Ban Treaty forbids the testing of nuclear arms in space. Additionally, all systems -- whether nuclear or otherwise -- which have a capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their warheads at any point in their trajectory are subject to the ABM Treaty. That agreement prohibits the deployment of ABM systems in space or on earth, except for precisely limited, fixed, land-based systems. Its provisions also cover testing and engineering development of systems or their major components.

Therefore, the only space activity that remains outside of such regulation is certain anti-satellite or ASAT systems.

The principal ASAT capabilities not covered by existing limitations are non-nuclear systems capable of attacking satellites but incapable of countering ICBM reentry vehicles. This restricted class of systems includes the operational Soviet co-orbital ASAT and the aircraft-launched miniature vehicle now under development by the US.

Devising effective ASAT limitations is extremely difficult, and the more comprehensive the limitations, the greater the difficulties. These difficulties include definition, verification, and dealing with the targeting and reconnaissance capabilities of Soviet satellites which could affect US deterrent forces.

We are prepared to consider any proposal which would be consistent with our security, and to study carefully any serious Soviet proposals.

25. Didn't President Reagan authorize an ASAT moratorium in fall 1984?

A: The President stated that the US would consider what measures of restraint both sides might take while negotiations proceed. Since then, we have continued to study all aspects of possible ASAT limits very carefully, in order to find militarily significant and verifiable limits on ASAT capability. We are prepared to study any Soviet proposals carefully.

Geneva Negotiations - General

26. How are the Geneva negotiations proceeding? How will we know whether progress is being made?

A: We have agreed with the Soviets to keep details of the negotiations confidential, based on our belief that publicizing our exchanges in Geneva would be counter-productive to serious give-and-take. However, I can say that during the first round of negotiations the Soviets proposed nothing new and posed as a precondition for progress in the strategic arms area the resolution of the space arms issue -- on their terms. They also back tracked from previous proposals. In the second round, which concluded in mid-July, there was little movement, but the Soviets were marginally less polemical than in the first round, and, in some areas, they began to respond to our efforts to engage them in serious dialogue. Thus, as the negotiations proceed, many tough issues remain to be resolved, and the process will require patience and persistence. We are convinced that we have formulated a sound approach, advanced by an excellent negotiating team, which could lay the groundwork for equitable and verifiable agreements that would be in the interest of both sides.

27. Do you have some sort of timetable in mind for getting agreements?

A: The most important requirement is that we get good agreements. We are prepared to negotiate as long as is

necessary for such an outcome. The process will require patience, persistence, and Allied solidarity.

28. Are you pessimistic or optimistic?

A: Although the issues in Geneva are many and complex, we are convinced that we have formulated a good approach that provides a sound basis for mutually beneficial agreements. We have assembled a delegation comprising three excellent negotiating teams. Accordingly, despite our realization of the difficulties ahead, we are hopeful that beneficial agreements will ultimately be obtained.

29. What are our fallback positions?

A: We are convinced that our current positions would deal with the issues of the negotiations equitably and effectively.

30. How do you respond to Soviet charges that the US is reneging on its January commitment to seek to prevent an arms race in space?

A: The US does indeed seek to prevent an arms race in space. We will continue to abide by the Outer Space Treaty and those provisions of other agreements that limit space weapons. If our SDI research program indicates that defensive technologies are feasible, we would seek to jointly manage with the Soviets a transition to a more defense-reliant balance, including the deployment of any space-based defenses that might prove desirable. Such an approach would be designed to provide an agreed program for the introduction of defenses on both sides concurrent with an agreed program to reduce destabilizing offensive nuclear arms. This would be the opposite of an arms race; it would increase the confidence both sides could have in effective deterrence and a diminution in the risk of war. We are even now trying to engage the Soviets in discussions on these issues.

31. If all nuclear weapons were eliminated, wouldn't conventional war become more likely?

A: In such a situation, the need for a stable conventional balance would become even more important than it is today. We would have to devote particular attention to how, together with our Allies, we might counter and diminish the threat posed by conventional arms imbalances, through both conventional arms improvements and arms control efforts. Were we able to move with the Soviets in a jointly managed transition toward a nuclear-free world, we should be able to establish a more cooperative relationship with them in general -- one in which efforts to establish a conventional balance at lower levels might be more fruitful.

32. What is your view of the morality of deterrence based on mutual assured destruction?

A: Our basic aim is to live in peace with freedom. To maintain peace it is necessary to deter those who would wish to gain by war or the threat of war. Deterrence requires that the potential aggressors be faced with the prospect of effective resistance and the risk of unacceptable damage. Deterrence and defense are moral. Otherwise the prospect of maintaining freedom would be extinguished. The defender should, however, strive to deter and defend with the minimum level of violence consistent with that purpose. If there is no available alternative other than the threat of nuclear retaliation, then this is the necessary and moral course. If, through adequate defenses, one can deny the potential aggressor any hope of military success and thus deter him from aggression, that then becomes the preferable and the moral course.

33. What is your view of Soviet leader Gorbachev's moratorium proposal?

The proposal outlined by General Secretary Gorbachev in his interview with Pravda is essentially a repackaging of previous Soviet freeze proposals, and would not be in the US interest. Specifically:

-- It would lock in the advantages the Soviets have gained in both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms as a result of their deployment of many modern systems during a period in which the US has exercised restraint.

-- It would also directly undercut the prospects for achieving reductions, instead giving the Soviets incentives to preserve their advantages by perpetuating the freeze.

-- The proposed ban on strategic defense research could not be verified, as the Soviets have in the past conceded.

-- Moreover, SDI research holds open the possibility of providing the means for a move to a more defense-reliant relationship, one that would be more stable and reliable for both sides. Such a possibility should not be foreclosed.

-- The ban on testing and deployment of "space-strike arms" would perpetuate a situation in which the Soviet Union has the world's only operational anti-satellite system. Once a system of this type has reached operational status, monitoring its deployment is most difficult.

In sum, this proposal does not appear to provide a useful basis for progress in the Geneva talks.

Basic Qs and As

1. Don't we already have enough nuclear weapons? Why do we need more?

A. The ultimate U.S. long-term objective is the eventual complete elimination of nuclear weapons. As a step in that direction, we are negotiating with the Soviet Union in Geneva for substantial, stabilizing and verifiable reductions in both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces, and we hope the Soviet Union will negotiate seriously toward this objective.

At the same time, it is important that we maintain an adequate nuclear deterrent. Many of our current nuclear weapons are aging and becoming increasingly vulnerable as a result of the massive Soviet buildup and relative US restraint during the last fifteen years. Our objective, embodied in the President's strategic modernization program, is not to increase the number of weapons, but to replace aging weapons systems with newer ones that can continue to deter effectively. If we do not take these steps to modernize now, the Soviet Union will have little incentive to negotiate for the the significant reductions we are proposing in Geneva. (Cf TAB 4 for details of the US modernization program, and TAB 5 for US-Soviet force comparisons.)

2. Why won't the U.S. agree to a mutual US-Soviet pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons?

A. We and our NATO partners have stated that we will not be the first to use any weapons except in response to aggression. A nuclear no-first-use pledge by itself would be no guarantee that no nuclear weapons would be used. Moreover, such a pledge would make war more rather than less likely by making Europe seem safe for conventional aggression. It could tempt Moscow to hope that it could take conventional military action against our European allies at relatively low cost to itself, or make West European governments more vulnerable to Soviet political pressure.

3. Isn't this Administration preparing to fight a limited nuclear war? Doesn't the existence of many small accurate battlefield nuclear weapons make nuclear war more thinkable?

A. No, we do not seek to fight any type of war. The existence of tactical nuclear weapons does not make the decision to use nuclear weapons of any kind any more thinkable or likely. Such weapons are necessary to ensure that we have credible and effective forces to be able to respond flexibly to all levels of Soviet aggression. Only through such a capability can we maintain a credible deterrent posture. Given the massive and varied forces we face and the range of possible Soviet actions, deterrence requires a spectrum of

capabilities whose use would seem credible to Moscow in different situations. It would be militarily, politically, and morally unsound to have only two options -- massive retaliation or capitulation to Soviet demands.

4. Why is the Administration deploying first strike weapons like the MX and the Pershing II?

A. We do not have a first strike strategy, and, as a result, we do not possess, nor will we build in the future, a first strike capability.

Neither the MX nor the Pershing II are first-strike threats. Such a capability presupposes a combination of numerical superiority, speed, accuracy, and range.

The planned force of 100 MX missiles is clearly insufficient to pose a first strike threat to the 1400 Soviet ICBM silos, let alone to the additional hundreds -- and perhaps thousands -- of other key hardened Soviet assets. Similarly, even with the full deployment of 108 Pershing II missiles, they are not sufficient for a first-strike attack against the USSR's intermediate-range, much less its strategic forces. Moreover, the Pershing II's range is only 1800 km, which puts Moscow, and 80% of Soviet strategic forces, well outside its range.

In reality, it is the USSR, with over 400 multiple warhead, highly accurate LRINF missiles and over 600 heavy MIRVed ICBMS, which is now much closer to a first-strike capability. U.S. arms reduction proposals and planned force improvements address the Soviet ability to destroy U.S. ICBMs in their silos as well as NATO assets.

5. How can the U.S. claim to be for nuclear arms reductions when we are building and will be deploying thousands of new weapons? Haven't both sides' nuclear arsenals grown out of all proportion to defensive needs?

A. We are for mutual and verifiable arms reductions to achieve balance at the lowest possible level and are committed to retaining only the minimum number of nuclear weapons necessary for deterrence. The U.S. nuclear stockpile today is actually lower than it was in the mid-1960's: we had 1/3 more nuclear weapons in 1967 than we have now, and the total yield (megatonnage) of our stockpile was 75% greater in the 1960's. Moreover, in 1983, NATO decided to withdraw 1,400 warheads over the next five or six years. Taken together with the withdrawal of the 1,000 warheads following the 1979 dual-track decision, the total number of warheads removed from Europe since 1979 will be 2,400, resulting in the lowest NATO stockpile level in 20 years. In addition, since one further warhead is being removed from the stockpile for

each Pershing II or ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) deployed, the NATO stockpile level will not be affected by deployment of these LRINF weapons.

6. Do you think a nuclear war could be limited or won?

A. As the President said many times, nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. This is why our efforts are directed at preventing war between the nuclear powers from occuring. As part of this effort, the U.S. has proposed a number of initiatives -- including substantial reductions in the number of strategic and intermediate range nuclear weapons, decreasing conventional forces in Europe and reducing the risk of war by accident or miscalculation -- which are designed to enhance strategic stability and security. But even in a world with far fewer and less destabilizing nuclear weapons we would still need to be able to deter potential aggressors.

7. The President said that the Soviets have superiority in nuclear weapons. Don't experts say there is parity or rough parity now?

A. At his March 31, 1983 Press Conference, the President said that the Soviets have a "definite margin of superiority, enough so there is risk . . ." He was referring to our concern about:

-- the vulnerability of our land-based ICBMs;

-- Soviet superiority in intermediate-range nuclear missiles;

-- the Soviet lead in strategic ballistic missile launchers, warheads and throwweight; and

-- the momemtum of Soviet nuclear weapons programs.

Although there is some disagreement among experts on the relative significance of some measures of nuclear capability, there is no disagreement that in the overall strategic balance the U.S. has until recently experienced a long downward trend relative to the Soviet Union since the mid-1960's. It is thus necessary for the US to continue to redress the balance to maintain deterrence and provide incentives for the Soviets to negotiate seriously for genuine and verifiable arms reductions. This is what our modernization programs are all about.

8. If our SLBMs can destroy all Soviet cities in a retaliatory strike, and our B-52s and bomber weapons still have some advantage over the Soviets, why do we need a land-based ICBM?

A. It is not our purpose to destroy Soviet cities. Our task is to prevent nuclear war by deterring Soviet aggression. Over the years, we have learned that a triad of ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers provides the strongest possible deterrent. Each system has unique capabilities which makes the whole of the triad more than the sum of its individual parts. This range of capabilities represented in the U.S. strategic triad makes it more difficult for a potential aggressor to cripple our deterrent forces. Maintaining all three legs of the triad substantially complicates Soviet strategic planning. To rely on bombers and SLBMs exclusively would undercut U.S. force flexibility, and reduce hedges against failure of one or more legs of the triad, or the possibility of sudden Soviet technological breakthroughs. Moreover, to rely solely on these two legs of the triad would limit U.S. retaliatory capability against hardened Soviet military targets since bombers are slow-flying and face heavy Soviet air defenses, while SLBMs cannot destroy hardened targets such as missile silos.

9. What is U.S. nuclear targeting policy and how can you prevent harm to innocent civilians?

A. For moral, political and military reasons, it is not U.S. policy to target Soviet civilian populations as such. Rather, our policy is to deter aggression by making it clear that we have the capability to hold at risk those things the Soviets value, e.g. Soviet military forces, both nuclear and conventional, and its industrial capability to sustain war.

10. Why is the U.S. planning to spend millions on civil defense when we know that there are no winners in a nuclear war? How can our civil defense efforts make any difference?

A. We have no illusions: any war -- conventional or nuclear -- would take a terrible toll of human life. But, as a democratic government, we are morally bound to do what we can

to mitigate the effects of such a conflict, and provide for some protection during conflict. It is the responsibility of the government to be prepared for such contingencies, however remote.

11. How do you perceive the Soviet threat?

A. The Soviet threat to Western security and freedom, and more generally to international peace, derives from the Soviet military build-up and Soviet international interventionism. Over the past 10-15 years, the Soviets have undertaken a massive build-up of virtually all aspects of their arsenal -- conventional and nuclear -- that has clearly gone far beyond any rational definition of what the Soviets might need for legitimate defensive purposes.

As their build-up has proceeded, the Soviets have demonstrated an increasing tendency to intervene in other countries through direct or proxy military force. Their December 1979 invasion and their continuing occupation of Afghanistan against the opposition of the overwhelming majority of that country's people is but one example. Their constant pressures on Poland from the start of that country's reform efforts in August 1980, through the tragic repression of that process in December 1981, is another. Their massive shipments of arms and their intervention either directly or through proxies like Cuba in such places as Angola, the Horn of Africa, Central America, Indochina and the Caribbean provide further illustration. If we are to live in a stable and peaceful world we must convince the Soviets to follow more responsible policies.

12. Isn't the prospect of nuclear war so horrible as to make irrelevant any national or other differences between the U.S. and the Soviet Union?

A. We do not believe that the choice is between failing to defend our interests or risking war. Maintaining a stable military balance, and trying to resolve our differences peacefully has worked to prevent major war for forty years, and we believe it can continue to do so. The record shows that the Soviets, while quick to take advantage of opportunities to increase their influence in trouble spots, are more cautious when faced with states willing and able to defend themselves and their interests. Our maintenance of strong deterrent forces is designed to discourage the Soviets from contemplating any aggression or coercion of the U.S. and our allies. It is therefore the best way to prevent the horrors of a nuclear war.

3

DETERRENCE: THE POLICY & THE CHALLENGE

Nineteen eighty-five marks the fortieth anniversary of the end of World War II and the use of atomic weapons to bring that conflict to a close. During the past four decades, there has been no armed conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, or between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Unlike the first 45 years of the twentieth century -- in which we witnessed two global conflagrations -- there has been peace among the major powers during the past 40 years. These years also represent the longest continuous period of peace Europe has known since the early nineteenth century. This is no accident. It is, in large measure, a result of the policy of deterrence adopted by the United States and the Western democracies in the wake of World War II, a policy designed to deter any aggression, either conventional or nuclear, against ourselves or our allies.

The awesome destructiveness of modern warfare, coupled with the introduction of nuclear weapons, has made the prevention of major conflict imperative. US policy is based on this principle. But this recognition on our part alone is not sufficient to prevent the outbreak of war; it is essential that the Soviet leadership understand it as well. As the Scowcroft Commission's first report stated so succinctly:

> Deterrence is not an abstract notion amenable to simple quantification. Still less is it a mirror-image of what would deter ourselves. Deterrence is the set of beliefs in the minds of the Soviet leaders, given their own values and attitudes, about our capabilities and our will. It requires us to determine, as best we can, what would deter them from considering aggression, even in a crisis -- not to determine what would deter us.

We are under no illusions about the dangers of nuclear conflict. I can think of no clearer or better statement of US policy than that which President Reagan has made on numerous occasions: "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." Even a cursory glance at our nuclear force structure and modernization plans makes clear that this in fact is our policy: we do not have, nor do we seek, a first-strike capability; we do not have a "nuclear warfighting" posture; all of our exercises and doctrine are defensive in nature.

Unfortunately, we face an adversary whose collective leadership has, through its strategic force deployments and exercises, given clear indications that it believes that, under certain circumstances, nuclear wars may be fought and won. The Soviets' development of a potential first-strike force of SS-18s and SS-19s, their plans to reload ICBM silos, the refire missiles associated with systems such as the SS-20, the extensive hardening of key assets, and the amounts they spend on civil defense are all indicators of such an attitude. As a

result, it is our task to ensure that the Soviet leadership, in calculating the risks of aggression, recognizes that because of our retaliatory capability, there are no circumstances in which it would benefit them to attack us or our allies at any level.

In the final analysis, effective deterrence requires not only that we have the capability to respond adequately to any aggression but also that we be perceived by potential adversaries as having that capability. If Soviet leaders understand that a nuclear conflict could lead to the destruction of those military, political and economic assets they value most highly, Soviet plans for aggression lose whatever attractiveness they might otherwise hold, and the risk of war is diminished. Accordingly, we must have sufficient forces to make certain that the Soviets understand clearly that we can and will deny them their objectives at any level of conflict they might contemplate.

Flexible Response

By 1961, Soviet nuclear capabilities had grown to the point that the inflexible US strategy of massive retaliation was no longer credible. Consequently, the Kennedy Administration formulated a strategy of flexible response that combined a wide range of conventional and nuclear capabilities to enforce deterrence. Today, some 24 years later, US policy remains one of deterrence through flexible response. To be sure, as the Soviet threat has evolved, so too has our strategy of flexible response. Additional response options and capabilities were built into our nuclear plans and our forces in order to maintain deterrence in the face of Soviet developments. Each of the changes under succeeding administrations had been designed to ensure that the US possesses the capability to meet aggression at any level an adversary might contemplate -- and thus prevent it.

Unfortunately, many who have chosen to criticize the evolution of US nuclear strategy seem to measure our current deterrent requirements against some threat of days past, thereby wishing away the reality of emerging imbalances. For example, in 1974, Secretary Schlesinger's nuclear policy modifications were met with concern and misunderstanding. Yet his important step, which increased the flexibility with which a President might respond to an attack (and therefore our ability to deter one) was denounced by some as a move toward "nuclear warfighting." The same thing occurred in 1980 to Secretary Brown. The Reagan Administration has not been spared similar criticism and misrepresentation. The fact remains, however, that deterrence through flexible response continues to be our policy and strategy today, and it will remain so throughout the President's second term. The fact also remains that any discussion of the nuclear strategies needed to deter Soviet attacks always brings forth denunciations of those who discuss or have to deal with these matters.

In order to ensure deterrence, we need to think about and plan against possible failures of deterrence. While we cannot predict how a conflict would escalate should deterrence fail, the credibility of our deterrent forces increases as we demonstrate flexibility in our response options and in our forces. That flexibility offers the possibility of terminating a conflict and reestablishing deterrence at the lowest level of violence possible, avoiding further destruction. Although there is no guarantee that we would be successful in creating such limits, there is every guarantee such limitations would not be achievable if we do not attempt to create them. Flexible response does not, however, imply that we seek to fight a limited nuclear war or, for that matter, to fight a nuclear war under any conditions. It does imply our profound belief that, if we have the capability to present the Soviet leadership with unacceptable consequences at any level of aggression of which they are capable, then that aggression will not occur in the first place.

Coupling: The Conventional-Nuclear Linkage

To enhance deterrence in NATO, we have for many years stationed nuclear forces in Europe. Many of those delivery systems are "dual capable," meaning they can use both conventional and -- with proper authorization from the President and in consultation with our allies -- nuclear weapons. These nonstrategic nuclear forces, along with conventional forces provided by the US and other NATO nations, constitute the front line of defense against any Warsaw Pact aggression. All of our nuclear forces are governed by a single coherent policy that governs the linkage among our conventional, nonstrategic nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces. Therefore, the Soviets must understand that an attack on NATO constitutes an attack on the US and risks the engagement of US nuclear forces.

It is important to note that, in addition to providing a range of nuclear options for deterrence, the adoption of the flexible response strategy in the 1960s also had as a goal improving NATO's conventional capabilities so as to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons to deter or cope with a nonnuclear attack. Unfortunately, neither we nor our allies ever fully met this goal. Thus, with our present effort to increase our conventional strength, NATO is essentially seeking to secure a long-established but elusive goal. The greater urgency with which we have approached this task stems from the fact that, over the past decade, the Warsaw Pact has strengthened its nonnuclear as well as its nuclear forces to a far greater extent than has NATO.

The very purpose of our effort to strengthen conventional forces is to lessen NATO's reliance on the threat to use nuclear weapons to stop a conventional attack. If it is clear to the Soviets that a conventional assault cannot produce a victory, either through a quick campaign or by outlasting NATO in conventional combat, then no rational Soviet planner would launch such an assault in the first place. But we cannot allow our security to rest entirely on the calculations of a Soviet planner as to whether he can successfully attack and invade NATO Europe with his conventional military power. As a result, in addition to our conventional modernization and sustainability programs, our nuclear forces remain an important element in deterring a Soviet attack, especially one supported by nuclear weapons. If the Soviet leadership is aware that NATO will respond to an attack with all the means necessary to defend itself and prevent the USSR from achieving its war aims, then deterrence is strengthened, and the chances of both conventional and nuclear war are reduced.

Deterrence at Sea

The US also deploys dual-capable weapons systems aboard a wide variety of ships. In addition to deterring Soviet first use of similar nuclear weapons at sea, US nuclear antiair and antisubmarine weapons provide unique capabilities that serve as a hedge against a massive and catastrophic failure of our conventional systems. Nuclear-capable carrier-based aircraft and nuclear Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles have three vital roles: contributing to our nuclear reserve force; providing a worldwide deterrent presence; and deterring attacks on our naval forces by Soviet nuclear antiship missiles (especially those aboard Backfire and Badger bombers). US sea-based nuclear forces, along with our land-based forces, support our policy of confronting the Soviet leadership with uncertainty and risk should they contemplate a nuclear war at sea.

(The preceding is an excerpt from the Secretary of Defense's Annual Posture Statement.)

U.S. STRATEGIC FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

Soviet Force Expansion

- Over the last fifteen years, the Soviet Union has undertaken an unprecedented expansion and modernization of its strategic nuclear forces.

  -- Since 1970, the USSR has deployed at least three new MIRVed Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) types (the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19) (with at least nine modifications of new or previously existing ICBM types) and has developed two new types -- the SS-X-24 and SS-X-25 in violation of the SALT II agreement. The SS-18 and SS-19 in particular are highly accurate and powerful missiles with significant hard-target-kill capability.

  -- During the same period, the USSR has also introduced five new Submrine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) types (SS-N-8, SS-N-17, SS-N-18, SS-N-20, and SS-N-23), five variants of new or existing SLBM types, and six new or improved Ballistic Missile-Carrying Submarine (SSBN) types, including the TYPHOON, the world's largest submarine.

  -- The USSR is also producing new long-range BACKFIRE bombers at a rate of at least 30 a year, and a new variant of the BEAR bomber designed specifically to carry cruise missiles. It began deploying long-range air-launched cruise missiles in 1984.

- The increase in Soviet strategic forces continues unabated. The USSR is flight-testing two new ICBMs (the SS-X-24 and SS-X-25) and a new SLBM (the SS-NX-23), and has several other modified or new ICBMs in various stages of development. Testing of the SS-X-25 violates the SALT II prohibition on a second new type of ICBM. The USSR is also developing a new strategic bomber (the BLACKJACK), flight-testing new long-range sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles (the SS-NX-21 and SSC-X-4), and developing a larger sea-launched cruise missile (the SS-NX-24). A ground-based variant of this missile may also be in development.

- Moreover, the Soviets have increased the numbers and capabilities of their air defense systems--the most extensive and sophisticated in the world--whose purpose is to prevent bombers from penetrating their airspace, and have hardened their ICBM silos and other facilities to render a large portion of our retaliatory capability ineffective against them.

- The Soviet Union is also upgrading the world's only anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system and is actively engaged in research on advanced defenses against ballistic missiles. In addition, several Soviet actions--including violations and potential violations of the ABM Treaty--in the aggregate suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

  Deployment of such a defense is prohibited by the ABM Treaty and could have significant impact on the effectiveness of U.S. strategic forces.

U.S. Restraint

- In contrast, the United States carried out only a limited number of force improvements in the 1970s. We MIRVed our MINUTEMAN III ICBMs, hardened our MINUTEMAN silos, deployed the Poseidon C-3 SLBM, and began deploying the TRIDENT C-4 SLBM. We also added short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) to our B-52s to help them penetrate heavy Soviet air defenses.

- During this period, the United States greatly reduced its number of nuclear weapons. We had one-third more nuclear weapons in 1967 than we have now. We have not increased the number of our deployed ICBMs since 1967. Our SSBN fleet fell from 41 boats to 31 between 1966 and 1981. We built no B-52s after 1962.

U.S. Strategic Modernization Program

- Those years of Soviet growth and relative U.S. restraint created serious imbalances in the capability and age of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. President Reagan's strategic force modernization program is designed to correct those imbalances and thereby to maintain our deterrent, strengthen stability, and provide incentives for substantial, equitable, and verifiable nuclear arms reductions.

- The President's plan covers five major elements of our strategic forces:

  -- To enhance the survivability of our command and control network, we are improving our early warning and communications systems, and continuing development of more robust C^3 systems.

  -- We are deploying air-launched cruise missiles on selected B-52 bombers to ensure our near-term ability to penetrate Soviet air defenses. To ensure continued bomber penetration capability in the future, we have begun production of the B-1 bomber and are developing an advanced technology bomber for deployment in the early 1990s.

-- We have begun deploying new TRIDENT submarines at the rate of about one a year to replace our aging SSBNs, and are developing the TRIDENT II SLBM, which will have better accuracy and a greater payload than its predecessors. We will begin deploying the TRIDENT II SLBM at the end of this decade. For the near-term, we began in 1984 to deploy TOMAHAWK sea-launched cruise missiles aboard selected Navy combatants.

-- To improve the effectiveness of our land-based ICBMs, we plan to deploy a force of 100 PEACEKEEPER (MX) missiles. We have also begun developing a new small single-warhead ICBM, as recommended by the Scowcroft commission.

-- To revitalize our strategic defensive forces, we are replacing obsolete F-106 interceptors with modern F-15 and F-16 aircraft. We are also deploying modern early-warning radars on the DEW line and our coastal approaches--although it is not a part of the Strategic Modernization Program, under the President's Strategic Defense Initiative we are researching technologies which hold promise for developing in the future reliable, survivable, and cost effective defenses against ballistic missiles that could protect our allies as well as the United States. If successful, the results of this effort would allow us to move from exclusive reliance on the threat of retaliation for deterrence toward greater reliance on defensive systems.

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FY 1986 DEFENSE BUDGET

Overview

- The FY 1986 Department of Defense budget calls for spending authority of $313.7 billion (an increase over 1985 of 29 billion; of which 12 billion or 4.2% is due to inflation, plus 17 billion, or 5.9% is real growth), and outlays of $277.5 billion.

- Defense spending declined in real terms during most of the 1970s; it has experienced sustained growth only since 1979.

  -- The defense share of federal outlays, which was more than 50 percent in FY 1955 will be less than 30 percent in FY 1986.

  -- The defense share of U.S. Gross National Product (GNP), based on current estimates for defense outlays and economic growth, will average only slightly more than seven percent over the next five years. This is well below the level of the peacetime years in the 1950s and 1960s.

- Defense outlays in FY 1986 will be primarily for current year operations (7 percent), pay and pay-related items (43 percent), and proir year investment requirements (38 percent). Only 12 percent will be spent on new investment programs.

Strategic Forces

- The FY 1986 budget proposal continues to implement the President's strategic modernization program.

  -- It calls for the continued production of PEACEKEEPER (MX) missiles.

  -- Funds are requested for the continued development of a small single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and mobile launcher.

  -- We are also requesting funds for the purchase of the thirteenth TRIDENT ballistic-missile-carrying submarine and development and production funding for the TRIDENT II sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

  -- The budget completes a procurement of 100 B-1B strategic bombers, and further development of the Advanced Technology Bomber.

  -- Funds are also requested to improve our space surveillance and defensive capabilities, including the anti-satellite program, and to upgrade and protect the

-- survivability of our command, control, communications, and intelligence program.

- Coming after long years of U.S. restraint in weapons programs and an incessant Soviet build-up, the President's strategic modernization program is essential to maintain the continued effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent and to persuade the USSR to negotiate genuine nuclear arms reductions.

  -- Our MINUTEMAN ICBMs cannot hold at risk Soviet hard targets and are vulnerable to attack from hundreds of modern Soviet heavy ICBMs. Our B-52s are increasingly unable to penetrate Soviet air defenses. Most of our submarine force faces block obsolescence in the 1990s.

  -- We must therefore modernize all three legs of the strategic triad at once.

  -- Yet our strategic nuclear forces take up less than 15 percent of tne FY 1986 defense budget, only about 4 percent of the federal budget, and about one percent of GNP.

Strategic Defense Initiative

- The Strategic Defense Inititive research program is exploring technologies which hold promise for developing reliable, survivable and cost effective defenses against ballistic missiles that could protect our allies as well as the United States.

- We hope that the research undertaken in the SDI will eventually allow us to move from exclusive dependence on the threat of nuclear retaliation for deterrence toward greater reliance on defensive systems which threaten no one.

- In FY 1986, the major emphasis of SDI research will be on directed-energy weapons, surveillance and target acquisition technologies, and identifying how defensive systems could be made survivable against a determined attack.

- The budget request also emphasizes less developed technologies that have high potential for very large gains in cost-effectiveness and ability to overcome potential Soviet countermeasures.

- The promise of the SDI--of a world in which the threat of ballistic missiles has been substantially reduced--is great.

- Yet the FY 1986 budget request for SDI research amounts to only slightly more than 1 percent of the defense budget, and about one-third of 1 percent of the overall federal budget.

CURRENT STRATEGIC BALANCE
OPERATIONAL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
AS OF APRIL 1985

U.S.		SOVIETS
	ICBMs	
30 TITAN II		520 SS-11
450 MINUTEMAN II		60 SS-13
550 MINUTEMAN III		150 SS-17
1030		308 SS-18
		360 SS-19
		1398
	SLBMs	
304 POSEIDON (C-3)		42 SS-N-5
312 TRIDENT (C-4)		336 SS-N-6
616		292 SS-N-8
		12 SS-N-17
		224 SS-N-18
		16 SS-N-20
		982
	BOMBERS	
		125 BEAR
167 B-52G		48 BISON
96 B-52H		250 BACKFIRE
263		423
	TOTAL DELIVERY VEHICLES	
1909		2751
	BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS	
7700		8800
	BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT	
4.4 MILLION POUNDS		11.9 MILLION POUNDS

CAPABILITY AGAINST HARDENED TARGETS—USSR HAS 2:1 ADVANTAGE

A FREEZE TODAY WOULD LOCK IN POTENT SOVIET MILITARY ADVANTAGES.

955-4

U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES

INTRODUCTION OF SYSTEMS BY YEAR



* AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON THE SS-16 IS INCONCLUSIVE, BUT INDICATES PROBABLE DEPLOYMENT.

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SINCE SALT I, SOVIETS HAVE DEPLOYED MANY NEW SYSTEMS AND REPLACED OLDER ONES FAR FASTER THAN U.S.

U.S.

- 5 NEW TRIDENT SUBMARINES, THE FIRST SSBNs BUILT SINCE 1967
- 1 NEW TYPE OF SLBM INTRODUCED SINCE SALT I
- NO NEW TYPES OF ICBMs DEPLOYED SINCE 1970; ONLY MINUTEMAN III MODIFIED
- NEWEST B-52 BOMBER WAS BUILT OVER 20 YEARS AGO

U.S.S.R.

- SINCE SALT I, MORE THAN 50 SSBNs DEPLOYED IN 6 NEW OR IMPROVED CLASSES
- SINCE SALT I, 4 NEW SLBM TYPES (+8 "MODS) HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED AND USED TO REPLACE 1/2 OF OLDER SLBMs; YET ANOTHER NEW SLBM ABOUT TO BE DEPLOYED
- 3 NEW ICBMs IN 10 VARIANTS HAVE REPLACED OVER HALF OF SOVIET ICBMs SINCE SALT I. IN ALL A TOTAL OF 800 NEW ICBMs HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED. TWO NEW ICBMs ARE CURRENTLY BEING TESTED
- SINCE SALT I, 250 BACKFIRE BOMBERS WITH INHERENT INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE DEPLOYED. NEW BEARS STILL BEING PRODUCED.

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COMPARING U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC ARSENALS

U.S. WEAPONS

- ABOUT 20% OF OUR WEAPONS ARE ON ICBMs. OF THESE, 20% ARE ON SYSTEMS OVER 15 YEARS OLD
- ABOUT 50% ARE ON SUBMARINES; OF THESE, 85% ARE ON SUBMARINES THAT ARE OVER 15 YEARS OLD
- ABOUT 30% ARE ON BOMBERS; ALL OF THESE AIRCRAFT ARE OVER 20 YEARS OLD
- ABOUT THREE-QUARTERS OF U.S. WEAPONS ARE ON LAUNCH SYSTEMS OVER 15 YEARS OLD

SOVIET WEAPONS

- ABOUT 65% OF SOVIET WEAPONS ARE ON ICBMs. OF THESE, ABOUT 50% ARE ON SYSTEMS WITH AN AGE OF 5 YEARS OR LESS AND OVER 90% ARE ON SYSTEMS 10 YEARS OLD OR LESS
- ABOUT 25% ARE ON SUBMARINES. OF THESE 85% ARE ON SUBMARINES THAT ARE 10 YEARS OLD OR LESS
- ABOUT 10% ARE ON BOMBERS. OF THESE, ABOUT HALF ARE ON AIRCRAFT WHICH ARE 5 YEARS OLD OR LESS
- OVER ONE HALF OF TOTAL SOVIET WEAPONS ARE ON LAUNCH SYSTEMS WHICH ARE 5 YEARS OLD OR LESS; ONLY 4% ARE ON SYSTEMS OVER 15 YEARS OLD

THE AGING U.S. ARSENAL MAKES MODIFICATIONS MANDATORY IF WE ARE TO CONTINUE TO FIELD A CREDIBLE DETERRENT FORCE. THE NEWER SOVIET ARSENAL ALLOWS THE SOVIETS THE LUXURY TO FREEZE NOW

NOTE: WEAPONS ARE DEFINED AS WARHEADS ON MISSILES OR BOMBERS. ICBM SYSTEMS ARE DISTINGUISHED WHERE SIGNIFICANT MODIFICATIONS HAVE RESULTED IN DIFFE[illegible]T YIELDS AND ACCURACIES.

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INVENTORY WARHEADS BY AGE OF LAUNCH SYSTEMS 1984





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WHY SYSTEM AGE IS IMPORTANT

SSBMs/SLBMs

- **PROBLEM:**
  - 31 POSEIDON SSBNs FACE BLOCK OBSOLESCENCE IN MID 1990s
  - OLDEST POSEIDON SUBMARINES ARE 20 YEARS OLD AND OLDEST POSEIDON MISSILES ARE 14 YEARS OLD
  - SURVIVABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS COMPONENT OF OUR DETERRENT MUST BE MAINTAINED AT THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVEL
- **RESPONSE:**
  - TRIDENT SUBMARINE AND D-5 MISSILE WILL INCREASE SSBN OPERATING AREAS AND HENCE SURVIVABILITY OF SUBMARINES; TRIDENT SUBS WILL REPLACE AGING POSEIDON SSBNS

ICBMs

- **PROBLEM:**
  - MINUTEMAN IS AGING, AND INCAPABLE OF HOLDING AT RISK SOVIET HARD TARGETS TO MAINTAIN DETERRENCE
  - TITANS BEING RETIRED
- **RESPONSE:**
  - PEACEKEEPER NEEDED TO IMPROVE RELIABILITY AND ENSURE CONTINUED EFFECTIVENESS OF ICBM FORCE AND, THEREBY, DETERRENCE
  - NEW SMALL ICBM NEEDED TO ENHANCE STABILITY

BOMBERS

- **PROBLEM:**
  - B-52s ARE ALL OVER 20 YEARS OLD ; HARD TO SUPPORT AND INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE TO SOVIET DEFENSES
  - NUMBER OF OPERATIONAL B-52s IS DECLINING; OLDER MODELS ARE CLEARLY UNABLE TO PERFORM IN A DETERRENT ROLE
- **RESPONSE:**
  - ALCM AND ACM NEEDED AS STANDOFF WEAPON TO GUARANTEE B-52 TARGET COVERAGE
  - B-1B AND ATB NEEDED TO PENETRATE SOVIET DEFENSES

COMPARISON OF U.S. AND SOVIET LONGER-RANGE INF WEAPONS

HOW TODAY'S LRINF IMBALANCE DEVELOPED AND SOVIET PUBLIC DESCRIPTIONS OF US-USSR FORCE POSTURE



*THIS DECISION CALLED FOR LRINF DEPLOYMENTS AT END OF 1983 UNLESS AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT WERE REACHED WHICH MADE THEM UNNECESSARY

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TARGET COVERAGE OF SOVIET SS-20 AND NATO PERSHING II AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES





SOVIET SS-20 WARHEADS

NATO GLCM AND PERSHING II WARHEADS

* AS OF DECEMBER 1984, THE USSR ALSO HAD 148 SS-4 LRINF MISSILES DEPLOYED

COMPARISON OF FORCES DEDICATED TO STRATEGIC DEFENSE



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STATUS OF U.S. WEAPON STOCKPILE OVER TIME



NATO-WARSAW PACT FORCE COMPARISON



NOTE: WARSAW PACT DIVISIONS NORMALLY CONSIST OF FEWER PERSONNEL THAN MANY NATO DIVISIONS BUT CONTAIN MORE TANKS AND ARTILLERY, THEREBY OBTAINING SIMILAR COMBAT POWER

*RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE FORCES—INCLUDE THOSE U.S. FORCES WHOSE EQUIPMENT IS STORED IN EUROPE AND HIGH-READINESS SOVIET FORCES LOCATED IN THE BALTIC, BELORUSSIAN, CARPATHIAN, ODESSA, KIEV AND NORTH CAUCASUS MILITARY DISTRICTS

**FULLY REINFORCED FORCES—INCLUDE NORTH AMERICAN REINFORCEMENTS AND ALL WARSAW PACT FORCES LOCATED WEST OF THE URAL MOUNTAINS

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS

Background

Between 1969 and 1979, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Although that process yielded some benefits, it failed to meet the hope of the early 1970s. Specifically, SALT II allowed for growth in some elements of nuclear arsenals, inequalities with respect to certain types of weapons systems, and ambiguities in verification provisions. For these reasons, the U.S., after extensive interagency review, adopted a new approach to what were called the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). That approach emphasized achieving significant reductions in the most important elements of strategic capability, equality of similar forces, promoting greater stability by reducing the incentives for a first strike, and ensuring effective verification of any agreement signed.

U.S. Proposal

In June 1982, the United States and Soviet Union opened Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in Geneva. The initial U.S. proposal called for a two-phased approach including:

-- reductions in ballistic missile warheads by about one-third - to 5,000 for each side. No more than one-half the remaining warheads to be on land-based systems;

-- reductions in deployed ballistic missiles of about 50% - to 850 for each side;

-- substantial reductions in ballistic missile destructive capability (throw-weight); and

-- limitations on heavy bombers and cruise missiles that could be carried by bombers.

After several rounds of negotiations, the United States modified its proposal to take account of expressed Soviet concerns and the recommendations of the President's Special Commission on Strategic Forces (Scowcroft Commission). In March 1983, the United States dropped its proposal that no more than 1/2 the warheads be on ICBMs. In June 1983, the United States relaxed its proposal for limits of 850 ballistic missiles, and made other modifications to its position. These were incorporated into a draft treaty which the United States presented to the Soviets in Geneva in July, 1983. In October 1983, after close consultations with the Congress, the United

States added to its position the proposal for a mutual, guaranteed "build-down" of strategic forces. The build-down proposal was designed to channel modernization of strategic forces toward more stabilizing systems, and to ensure regular annual reductions of strategic ballistic missile warheads and heavy bombers. At the same time, the United States expressed willingness to explore with the Soviets trade-offs between areas of U.S. and Soviet advantage.

Soviet Position

In START, the Soviets proposed reductions of 25% in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to 1800 for both sides. They also proposed a combined limit on "nuclear charges" (missile warheads and bomber weapons), a ban on all ground-and sea-launched cruise missiles and a ban, later modified to a limit, on air-launched cruise missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

The U.S. proposal would have substantially reduced or limited the most important elements of strategic forces in a stabilizing manner, while permitting necessary modernization and establishing a basis for future reductions. The Soviet proposal was designed to allow the Soviets to preserve their advantages in important elements of the strategic balance: it provided for some reductions in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, but would have permitted growth in the number of ballistic missile warheads and would not have strengthened strategic stability.

At the end of Round V of START in December 1983, the Soviet Union refused to set a date for resumption of talks, citing "a change in the strategic situation" due to the beginning of limited NATO INF missile deployments in Europe.

New Geneva Negotiations

The U.S. position in the new negotiations in Geneva builds upon the U.S. position of fall 1983, and incorporates new flexibility. Our objective remains the same: to strengthen stability through substantial, equitable and verifiable reductions in offensive nuclear forces, focussing on the most destabilizing elements, e.g. ballistic missiles, their warheads and destructive capacity. Specifically, the U.S. approach features:

-- reductions to 5,000 ballistic missile warheads;

-- limits on heavy bombers and ALCMs below SALT II levels;

-- flexibility to explore trade-offs between areas of U.S. and Soviet advantage which take into account differences in each side's force structure.

Soviet Proposal

During the first round of negotiations (March - April 1985), the Soviets proposed nothing new, and posed as a precondition for progress in the strategic arms area the resolution of the space arms issue -- on their terms. They publicly proposed a vaguely worded call for a moratorium, and even backtracked from several of their previous proposals, including with respect to ALCM limits by calling for a ban on all cruise missiles with a range over 600 KM. In the second round (May-July), the Soviets were somewhat less polemical, although they did not offer a concrete proposal of their own. They surfaced some concepts which could involve possible reductions in existing strategic offensive nuclear arsenals. However, the methods of aggregation poposed in these concepts seems designed to favor preservation of the Soviet Union's primary area of advantage, that is, prompt, hard target kill capability, the most worrisome element in the current strategic equation. Efforts by the U.S. delegation to elicit Soviet answers to our questions about these concepts, with regard to issues such as numbers, ceilings and rates of possible reduction were essentially unanswered.

Points to Make

-- In the strategic offensive arms forum, our goal remains to achieve a verifiable agreement for deep reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals in a way that would enhance stability and reduce the risk of war.

-- We have gone to the negotiations with new flexibility in an effort to build upon the work done in the Strategic Arms Reduction negotiations of 1982-83.

-- Our proposal focuses on achieving reductions in ballistic missiles, their warheads and their destructive capacity. We are also proposing reductions in heavy bombers and the number of ALCMs they carry below the levels set in SALT II.

-- Our negotiators have been given great latitude and flexibility to find common ground, and to probe for Soviet flexibility on issues of concern to the United States. We have also made clear our readiness to explore trade-offs between U.S. and Soviet areas of advantage that take into account the differences in each side's force structure.

-- We are prepared to consider any serious Soviet proposal that addresses our concerns about stability and would result in deep and verifiable reductions.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF)

Background

History. The Soviet Union has long deployed missiles on its territory with sufficient range to strike targets in Europe but not the United States. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the USSR deployed SS-4 and SS-5 missiles targeted against Europe. Some 575 were in place by mid-1977. In contrast, NATO in the early 1960s deployed fewer numbers of roughly equivalent missiles--the Thor and Jupiter--in the United Kingdom, Italy and Turkey. NATO unilaterally withdrew and retired these systems in the 1960s, giving the Soviets a virtual monopoly in this type of missile. The Soviet lead was tolerable when the imbalance in these intermediate-range systems was offset by superior US strategic forces, which provided an adequate deterrent to Soviet aggression or intimidation.

Two critical developments--Soviet achievement of strategic parity with the US and the deployment of the SS-20--came together in the 1970s to alter the situation.

The SS-20. The SS-20 deployments which began in 1977, at the rate of about one a week, represented a qualitative as well as quantitative change in the European security situation. The SS-20 is more accurate than the SS-4 and SS-5. It can strike targets throughout Europe, the Middle East, North Africa and much of Asia and the Pacific. It is mobile and can be redeployed quickly to any part of the USSR. Finally, the SS-20 carries three independently targetable warheads, as opposed to the single warhead of the earlier missiles, and its launchers are capable of firing two, three or more rounds of missiles. As of March 1985, the total force of Soviet SS-20s is 414.

NATO "Dual Track" Decision. As the Soviet SS-20 missile force grew, and with no NATO missiles deployed in Europe which could reach the USSR, European members of NATO raised the concern that Moscow might come to believe--however mistakenly--that US strategic forces could be decoupled from the defense of Europe and stressed the need for a NATO response.

This led to intensive alliance-wide consultations, culminating in the NATO "dual-track" decision of December 1979. One "track" was to redress the imbalance in intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) through deployment in Western Europe, starting in 1983, of 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles over the next five years. Meanwhile, on the other track, the United States would negotiate with the Soviets to restore an INF balance at the lowest possible level.

Negotiations. Formal talks with the Soviet Union began in November 1981, at which time the U.S. proposed to ban or eliminate all U.S. and Soviet LRINF systems, including the Soviet SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5, and U.S. Pershing II and GLCM. Even though the Soviets deployed SS-20 missiles throughout the negotiations, on November 23, 1983, the Soviets walked out of the INF talks, protesting votes in the parliaments of Great Britain, Italy and West Germany that reaffirmed the dual-track decision and the subsequent arrival of US longer range INF missiles in Europe. On March 12, 1985, the US and Soviet Union began a new set of arms control negotiations in Geneva which include intermediate-range forces.

US Position. The US approach to the INF negotiations is based on five principles: 1) equality of rights and limits, 2) an agreement must include US and Soviet systems only, 3) limitations must be applied on a global scale, with no transfer of the threat from Europe to Asia, 4) NATO's conventional defense capability must not be weakened, and 5) any agreement must be effectively verifiable.

The US Zero-Zero Option Proposal which would eliminate all U.S. and Soviet longer-range INF missiles, the Interim Agreement Proposal that would result in equal global limits on LRINF missile warheads between 0-572, and the President's September 1983 Initiatives are based on those criteria.

Soviet Approach. The Soviets initially refused to negotiate, posing the condition that NATO must first renounce the modernization track. The Soviets then proposed a bilateral "moratorium" on deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe that NATO rejected for three reasons: it would have codified the Soviet advantage in INF; would not have halted the SS-20 buildup in the eastern USSR, and by preventing NATO's deployment, a moratorium would have removed any incentive the Soviets had to negotiate genuine reductions.

Only after Moscow recognized that NATO was determined to proceed with deployments in the absence of negotiated limitations, did the Soviets agree to INF negotiations. Moscow proposed at the outset that "NATO"--by which the Soviets meant the US, United Kingdom and France--and the USSR each reduce to 300 "medium range" missiles and aircraft in or "intended for use" in Europe.

The effect of this Soviet proposal--and all the variations of it that followed--would have been to prevent the deployment of a single US Pershing II or cruise missile, while allowing the Soviets to retain a formidable arsenal of SS-20s in Europe and to continue their buildup of SS-20s in Asia. It also would have removed from Europe hundreds of US aircraft capable of carrying both nuclear and conventional weapons, essential to NATO's conventional deterrent.

In addition, Soviet insistence on compensation for the independent strategic nuclear forces of Britain and France is an assertion of the right to match the forces of all other nuclear states combined and thus to codify nuclear superiority over each of them. Moreover, British and French nuclear forces are those nations' strategic deterrents. They are not available for the defense of other European members of NATO in the same way as US forces and they are small compared to the size of the Soviet arsenal.

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's April 1985 public announcement of a unilateral freeze of the number of SS-20s already in place in Europe still leaves the USSR with an advantage in longer-range INF missile warheads of more than eight-to-one. Moreover, it would leave unconstrained the SS-20 force in the Far East, a force which, due to the missile's range and mobility, is capable of reaching targets in Europe in addition to threatening US friends and allies in Asia.

Points To Make

- Deployments of the Soviet SS-20--a triple-warhead, highly accurate, and mobile weapon--changed the nuclear balance in Europe and presented a new and disturbing nuclear threat to NATO and our Asian allies and friends.

- The object of Soviet INF missiles is to pose a regional threat to Europe without directly threatening the US mainland, thereby trying to sever or "decouple" US and European strategic interests.

- In the face of this massive Soviet military build-up, NATO decided to modernize its intermediate-range nuclear forces while offering US-Soviet arms control negotiations on INF. NATO's 1979 "dual track" decision demonstrates that the Soviets cannot engage in such regional threats without provoking a unified Alliance response.

- One "track" was to redress the INF imbalance through deployment in Western Europe, starting in 1983, of 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles. Meanwhile, on the other "track," the US would negotiate with the Soviets to restore an INF balance at the lowest possible level.

- Formal talks with the Soviet Union began in November 1981, at which time the U.S. proposed the complete elimination of an entire class of longer-range land based INF missile systems. In November 1983, the Soviets walked out of the INF talks, protesting the arrival of US longer range INF missiles in Europe--even though the Soviets deployed SS-20 missiles throughout the negotiations. On March 12, 1985,

the US and Soviet Union began a new set of arms control negotiations in Geneva which includes intermediate-range forces.

- The US and NATO would greatly prefer a negotiated solution to the INF problem. At the opening of the talks, the US proposed the elimination of the entire class of US and Soviet longer-range INF missiles and that remains our objective. We are also willing, as an interim measure, to agree to equal global limits on LRINF missile warheads at the lowest possible level. Moreover, in order to take account of expressed Soviet concerns, we have reiterated several additional initiatives first proposed in September 1983.

- However, in the absence of an equitable and verifiable arms control agreement obviating the need for deployments, NATO is determined to proceed with a measured and appropriate modernization of its own forces.

- Negotiating proposals that allow the USSR to maintain a virtual monopoly over NATO in such systems cannot be regarded as serious efforts to address the concerns underlying NATO's 1979 decision. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's April 1985 declared unilateral freeze of the number of SS-20s already in place, even if implemented, still leaves the USSR with an advantage in longer-range INF missile warheads of more than eight-to-one.

- The US is prepared to consider any serious Soviet proposal and is hopeful that the Soviet Union will address Western security concerns in a constructive manner in Geneva.

WALK IN THE WOODS

Q: What is the so-called "walk in the woods"?

A. In July 1982, during the so-called "walk in the woods" US Ambassador Paul Nitze and his Soviet counterpart discussed ideas for an agreement on an informal, exploratory basis. Although the US had several problems with the proposal as it stood we were interested in keeping this informal channel open. Moscow's reaction, on the other hand, was completely negative on the proposal itself and on further use of this informal channel.

INF DEPLOYMENT FREEZE?

Q: Is the US willing to accept a freeze on INF deployments, particularly Pershing II missiles, if the Soviet Union will consider the idea?

A: The United States has never proposed an INF deployment freeze. As we have said on numerous occasions, a freeze would reward the massive Soviet nuclear buildup of recent years in strategic and intermediate-range weapons systems. In the case of longer-range INF missiles, a freeze would preserve an imbalance in favor of the Soviets in the single most destabilizing weapons system in Europe.

A freeze would also remove incentives for the Soviets to negotiate at Geneva a meaningful, verifiable agreement to remove or significantly reduce the threat of SS-20 and other longer-range INF missiles from Europe and Asia.

Finally, negotiating a mutual and verifiable freeze would be at least as difficult and time-consuming a task as negotiating an arms reduction accord which is our objective in Geneva.

U.S. Objectives in the Defense and Space Negotiations

-- We want to discuss emerging technologies and how these could contribute to a more stable framework for deterrence, although our SDI research program is years away from answers on whether it will be technically feasible and economically worthwhile to move toward greater reliance on defenses.

-- In the meantime, we want to explain to the Soviets our view of the relationship between offense and defense, the potential contribution of defense to mutual security, and how we could work together to ensure a stable transition toward increased reliance on defense.

-- We want to discuss our concern about Soviet actions which are eroding the ABM Treaty, and Soviet non-compliance with this and other agreements. We are pressing for corrective action where violations exist.

Soviet Programs and Objectives

-- The Soviets have over the past decade spent about as much on strategic defenses as they have on offensive forces (far more than the U.S.) including research into advanced technologies with ABM applications. The Soviets have and are improving the world's only deployed ABM system, and have the world's only operational ASAT system.

-- Soviet construction of a large radar complex in Krasnoyarsk which violates the ABM Treaty, improvement of its extensive strategic air defenses -- which have some ABM potential, and other actions raise concern that they may be developing a nationwide ABM defense, which is prohibited by the ABM Treaty.

-- Soviet efforts to stop the U.S. SDI research should be seen for what they are -- attempts to preserve Soviet advantages.

Points to Stress on Space Arms Control

Significant limitations on space weapons already exist:

-- Outer Space Treaty bans nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from space.

-- Limited Test Ban Treaty bans nuclear weapons tests in space.

-- ABM Treaty bans development, testing, or deployment of space-based ABM systems or components.

International Treatment of Issue:

-- 1978-79 bilateral U.S.-USSR negotiations: Sides were separated on several issues including verification problems; negotiations were not resumed after invasion of Afghanistan.

-- Ad Hoc CD Committee to discuss outer space has now been formed along lines suggested by the U.S. and its Allies two years ago.

Difficult problems in space arms control discussed in the President's March 1984 Report:

-- Impossible to verify compliance with comprehensive ASAT ban that would ban tests of all methods of countering satellites; no satisfactory ways found for verification of aspects of Soviet proposed ASAT limitations (e.g., elimination of Soviet interceptor).

-- Diverse sources of threats (e.g., certain ABM interceptors have ASAT capability, ballistic missiles capable of lofting a nuclear weapon to orbital altitude have some inherent ASAT capabilities).

-- Threats posed by Soviet targeting and reconnaissance satellites undermine U.S. and Allied conventional and nuclear deterrence, and Soviets have ASAT interceptor operational for over a decade while U.S. interceptor only under development.

U.S. Policy on ASAT arms control:

-- U.S. will consider verifiable and equitable space arms control measures compatible with U.S. security.

-- U.S. MV system represents a deterrent to the Soviet ASAT and complements other measures to counter Soviet satellites designed to provide targeting data on U.S. and Allied forces.

-- U.S. is prepared in the Defense and Space negotiations to listen to Soviet proposals and to respond with ideas of our own.

Special
Report
No. 129

The Strategic Defense Initiative

June 1985

United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

In his speech of March 23, 1983, President Reagan presented his vision of a future in which nations could live secure in the knowledge that their national security did not rest upon the threat of nuclear retaliation but rather on the ability to defend against potential attacks. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program is designed to determine whether and, if so, how advanced defensive technologies could contribute to the realization of this vision.

The Strategic Context

The U.S. SDI research program is wholly compatible with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, is comparable to research permitted by the ABM Treaty which the Soviets have been conducting for many years, and is a prudent hedge against Soviet breakout from ABM Treaty limitations through the deployment of a territorial ballistic missile defense. These important facts deserve emphasis. However, the basic intent behind the Strategic Defense Initiative is best explained and understood in terms of the strategic environment we face for the balance of this century and into the next.

The Challenges We Face. Our nation and those nations allied with us face a number of challenges to our security. Each of these challenges imposes its own demands and presents its own opportunities. Preserving peace and freedom is, and always will be, our fundamental goal. The essential purpose of our military forces, and our nuclear forces in particular, is to deter aggression and coercion based upon the threat of military aggression. The deterrence provided by U.S. and allied military forces has permitted us to enjoy peace and freedom. However, the nature of the military threat has changed and will continue to change in very fundamental ways in the next decade. Unless we adapt our response, deterrence will become much less stable and our susceptibility to coercion will increase dramatically.

Our Assumptions About Deterrence. For the past 20 years, we have based our assumptions on how deterrence can best be assured on the basic idea that if each side were able to maintain the ability to threaten retaliation against any attack and thereby impose on an aggressor costs that were clearly out of balance with any potential gains, this would suffice to prevent conflict. Our idea of what our forces had to hold at risk to deter aggression has changed over time. Nevertheless, our basic reliance on nuclear retaliation provided by offensive nuclear forces, as the essential means of deterring aggression, has not changed over this period.

This basic idea—that if each side maintained roughly equal forces and equal capability to retaliate against attack, stability and deterrence would be maintained—also served as the foundation for the U.S. approach to the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) process of the 1970s. At the time that process began, the United States con-

cluded that deterrence based on the capability of offensive retaliatory forces was not only sensible but necessary, since we believed at the time that neither side could develop the technology for defensive systems which could effectively deter the other side.

Today, however, the situation is fundamentally different. Scientific developments and several emerging technologies now do offer the possibility of defenses that did not exist and could hardly have been conceived earlier. The state of the art of defense has now progressed to the point where it is reasonable to investigate whether new technologies can yield options, especially non-nuclear options, which could permit us to turn to defense not only to enhance deterrence but to allow us to move to a more secure and more stable long-term basis for deterrence.

Of equal importance, the Soviet Union has failed to show the type of restraint, in both strategic offensive and defensive forces, that was hoped for when the SALT process began. The trends in the development of Soviet strategic offensive and defensive forces, as well as the growing pattern of Soviet deception and of noncompliance with existing agreements, if permitted to continue unchecked over the long term, will undermine the essential military balance and the mutuality of vulnerability on which deterrence theory has rested.

Soviet Offensive Improvements. The Soviet Union remains the principal threat to our security and that of our allies. As a part of its wide-ranging effort further to increase its military capabilities, the Soviet Union's improvement of its ballistic missile force, providing increased prompt, hard-target kill capability, has increasingly threatened the survivability of forces we have deployed to deter aggression. It has posed an especially immediate challenge to our land-based retaliatory forces and to the leadership structure that commands them. It equally threatens many critical fixed installations in the United States and in allied nations that support the nuclear retaliatory and conventional forces which provide our collective ability to deter conflict and aggression.

Improvement of Soviet Active Defenses. At the same time, the Soviet Union has continued to pursue strategic advantage through the development and improvement of active defenses. These active defenses provide the Soviet Union a steadily increasing capability to counter U.S. retaliatory forces and those of our allies, especially if our forces were to be degraded by a Soviet first strike. Even today, Soviet active defenses are extensive. For example, the Soviet Union possesses the world's only currently deployed antiballistic missile system, deployed to protect Moscow. The Soviet Union is currently improving all elements of this system. It also has the world's only deployed antisatellite (ASAT) capability. It has an extensive air defense network, and it is aggressively improving the quality of its radars, interceptor aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles. It also has a very extensive network of ballistic missile early warning radars. All of these elements provide them an area of relative advantage in strategic defense today and, with logical evolutionary improvement, could provide the foundation of decisive advantage in the future.

Improvement in Soviet Passive Defenses. The Soviet Union is also spending significant resources on passive defensive measures aimed at improving the survivability of its own forces, military command structure, and national leadership. These efforts range from providing rail and road mobility for its latest generation of ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] to extensive hardening of various critical installations.

Soviet Research and Development on Advanced Defenses. For over two decades, the Soviet Union has pursued a wide range of strategic defensive efforts, integrating both active and passive elements. The resulting trends have shown steady improvement and expansion of Soviet defensive capability. Furthermore, current patterns of Soviet research and development, including a longstanding and intensive research program in many of the same basic technological areas which our SDI program will address, indicate that these trends will continue apace for the foreseeable future. If unanswered, continued Soviet defensive improvements will further erode the effectiveness of our own existing deterrent, based as it is now almost exclusively on the threat of nuclear retaliation by offensive forces. Therefore, this longstanding Soviet program of defensive improvements, in itself, poses a challenge to deterrence which we must address.

Soviet Noncompliance and Verification. Finally, the problem of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements in both the offensive and defensive areas, including the ABM Treaty, is a cause of very serious concern. Soviet activity in constructing either new phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk, in central Siberia, has very immediate and ominous consequences. When operational, this radar, due to its location, will increase the Soviet Union's capability to deploy a territorial ballistic missile defense. Recognizing that such radars would make such a contribution, the ABM Treaty expressly banned the construction of such radars at such locations as one of the primary mechanisms for ensuring the effectiveness of the treaty. The Soviet Union's activity with respect to this radar is in direct violation of the ABM Treaty.

Against the backdrop of this Soviet pattern of noncompliance with existing arms control agreements, the Soviet Union is also taking other actions which affect our ability to verify Soviet compliance. Some Soviet actions, like their increased use of encryption during testing, are directly aimed at degrading our ability to monitor treaty compliance. Other Soviet actions, too, contribute to the problems we face in monitoring Soviet compliance. For example, Soviet increases in the number of their mobile ballistic missiles, especially those armed with multiple, independently-targetable reentry vehicles, and other mobile systems, will make verification less and less certain. If we fail to respond to these trends, we could reach a point in the foreseeable future where we would have little confidence in our assessment of the state of the military balance or imbalance, with all that implies for our ability to control escalation during crises.

Responding to the Challenge

In response to this long-term pattern of Soviet offensive and defensive improvements, the United States is compelled to take certain actions designed both to maintain security and stability in the near term and to ensure these conditions in the future. We must act in three main areas.

Retaliatory Force Modernization. First, we must modernize our offensive nuclear retaliatory forces. This is necessary to reestablish and maintain the offensive balance in the near term and to create the strategic conditions that will permit us to pursue complementary actions in the areas of arms reduction negotiations and defensive research. For our part, in 1981 we embarked on our strategic modernization program aimed at reversing a long period of decline. This modernization program was specifically designed to preserve stable deterrence and, at the same time, to provide the incentives necessary to cause the Soviet Union to

join us in negotiating significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides.

In addition to the U.S. strategic modernization program, NATO is modernizing its longer range intermediate-range nuclear forces (LRINF). Our British and French allies also have underway important programs to improve their own national strategic nuclear retaliatory forces. The U.S. SDI research program does not negate the necessity of these U.S. and allied programs. Rather, the SDI research program depends upon our collective and national modernization efforts to maintain peace and freedom today as we explore options for future decision on how we might enhance security and stability over the longer term.

New Deterrent Options. However, over the long run, the trends set in motion by the pattern of Soviet activity, and the Soviets' persistence in that pattern of activity, suggest that continued long-term dependence on offensive forces may not provide a stable basis for deterrence. In fact, should these trends be permitted to continue and the Soviet investment in both offensive and defensive capability proceed unrestrained and unanswered, the resultant condition could destroy the theoretical and empirical foundation on which deterrence has rested for a generation.

Therefore, we must now also take steps to provide future options for ensuring deterrence and stability over the long term, and we must do so in a way that allows us both to negate the destabilizing growth of Soviet offensive forces and to channel longstanding Soviet propensities for defenses toward more stabilizing and mutually beneficial ends. The Strategic Defense Initiative is specifically aimed toward these goals. In the near term, the SDI program also responds directly to the ongoing and extensive Soviet antiballistic missile effort, including the existing Soviet deployments permitted under the ABM Treaty. The SDI research program provides a necessary and powerful deterrent to any near-term Soviet decision to expand rapidly its antiballistic missile capability beyond that contemplated by the ABM Treaty. This, in itself, is a critical task. However, the overriding, long-term importance of SDI is that it offers the possibility of reversing the dangerous military trends cited above by moving to a better, more stable basis for deterrence and by providing new and compelling incentives to the Soviet Union for seriously negotiating reductions in existing offensive nuclear arsenals.

The Soviet Union recognizes the potential of advanced defense concepts—especially those involving boost, postboost, and mid-course defenses—to change the strategic situation. In our investigation of the potential these systems offer, we do not seek superiority or to establish a unilateral advantage. However, if the promise of SDI technologies is proven, the destabilizing Soviet advantage can be redressed. And, in the process, deterrence will be strengthened significantly and placed on a foundation made more stable by reducing the role of ballistic missile weapons and by placing greater reliance on defenses which threaten no one.

Negotiation and Diplomacy. During the next 10 years, the U.S. objective is a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between nuclear offensive and defensive arms, whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon the increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. A world free of the threat of military aggression and free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.

To support these goals, we will continue to pursue vigorously the negotiation of equitable and verifiable agreements leading to significant reductions of existing nuclear arsenals. As we do so, we will continue to exercise flexibility concerning the mechanisms used to achieve reductions but will judge these mechanisms on their ability to enhance the security of the United States and our allies, to strengthen strategic stability, and to reduce the risk of war.

At the same time, the SDI research program is and will be conducted in full compliance with the ABM Treaty. If the research yields positive results, we will consult with our allies about the potential next steps. We would then consult and negotiate, as appropriate, with the Soviet Union, pursuant to the terms of the ABM Treaty, which provide for such consultations, on how deterrence might be strengthened through the phased introduction of defensive systems into the force structures of both sides. This commitment does not mean that we would give the Soviets a veto over the outcome anymore than the Soviets have a veto over our current strategic and intermediate-range programs. Our commitment in this regard reflects our recognition that, if our research yields appropriate results, we should seek to move forward in a stable way. We have already begun the process of bilateral discussion in Geneva needed to lay the foundation for the stable integration of advanced defenses into the forces of both sides at such time as the state of the art and other considerations may make it desirable to do so.

The Soviet Union's View of SDI

As noted above, the U.S.S.R. has long had a vigorous research, development, and deployment program in defensive systems of all kinds. In fact, over the last two decades the Soviet Union has invested as much overall in its strategic defenses as it has in its massive strategic offensive buildup. As a result, today it enjoys certain important advantages in the area of active and passive defenses. The Soviet Union will certainly attempt to protect this massive, long-term investment.

Allied Views Concerning SDI

Our allies understand the military context in which the Strategic Defense Initiative was established and support the SDI research program. Our common understanding was reflected in the statement issued following President Reagan's meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher in December, to the effect that:

First, the U.S. and Western aim was not to achieve superiority but to maintain the balance, taking account of Soviet developments;

Second, that SDI-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiations;

Third, the overall aim is to enhance, and not to undermine, deterrence; and,

Fourth, East-West negotiations should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides.

This common understanding is also reflected in other statements since then—for example, the principles suggested recently by the Federal Republic of Germany that:

- The existing NATO strategy of flexible response must remain fully valid for the alliance as long as there is no more effective alternative for preventing war; and,
- The alliance's political and strategic unity must be safeguarded. There must be no zones of different degrees of security in the alliance, and Europe's security must not be decoupled from that of North America.

SDI Key Points

Following are a dozen key points that capture the direction and scope of the program:

1. The aim of SDI is not to seek superiority but to maintain the strategic balance and thereby assure stable deterrence.

A central theme in Soviet propaganda is the charge that SDI is designed to secure military superiority for the United States. Put in the proper context of the strategic challenge that we and our allies face, our true goals become obvious and clear. Superiority is certainly not our purpose. Nor is the SDI program offensive in nature. The SDI program is a research program aimed at seeking better ways to ensure U.S. and allied security, using the increased contribution of defenses—defenses that threaten no one.

2. Research will last for some years. We intend to adhere strictly to ABM Treaty limitations and will insist that the Soviets do so as well.

We are conducting a broad-based research program in full compliance with the ABM Treaty and with no decision made to proceed beyond research. The SDI research program is a complex one that must be carried out on a broad front of technologies. It is not a program where all resource considerations are secondary to a schedule. Instead, it is a responsible, organized research program that is aggressively seeking cost-effective approaches for defending the United States and our allies against the threat of nuclear-armed and conventionally armed ballistic missiles of all ranges. We expect that the research will proceed so that initial development decisions could be made in the early 1990s.

3. We do not have any preconceived notions about the defensive options the research may generate. We will not proceed to development and deployment unless the research indicates that defenses meet strict criteria.

The United States is pursuing the broadly based SDI research program in an objective manner. We have no preconceived notions about the outcome of the research program. We do not anticipate that we will be in a position to approach any decision to proceed with development or deployment based on the results of this research for a number of years.

We have identified key criteria that will be applied to the results of this research whenever they become available. Some options which could provide interim capabilities may be available earlier than others, and prudent planning demands that we maintain options against a range of contingencies. However, the primary thrust of the SDI research program is not to focus on generating options for the earliest development/deployment decision but options which best meet our identified criteria.

4. Within the SDI research program, we will judge defenses to be desirable only if they are survivable and cost effective at the margin.

Two areas of concern expressed about SDI are that deployment of defensive systems would harm crisis stability and that it would fuel a runaway proliferation of Soviet offensive arms. We have identified specific criteria to address these fears appropriately and directly.

Our survivability criterion responds to the first concern. If a defensive system were not adequately survivable, an adversary could very well have an incentive in a crisis to strike first at vulnerable elements of the defense. Application of this criterion will ensure that such a vulnerable system would not be deployed and, consequently, that the Soviets would have no incentive or prospect of overwhelming it.

Our cost-effectiveness criterion will ensure that any deployed defensive system would create a powerful incentive not to respond with additional offensive arms, since those arms would cost more than the additional defensive capability needed to defeat them. This is much more than an economic argument, although it is couched in economic terms. We intend to consider, in our evaluation of options generated by SDI research, the degree to which certain types of defensive systems, by their nature, encourage an adversary to try simply to overwhelm them with additional offensive capability while other systems can discourage such a counter effort. We seek defensive options which provide clear disincentives to attempts to counter them with additional offensive forces.

In addition, we are pressing to reduce offensive nuclear arms through the negotiation of equitable and verifiable agreements. This effort includes reductions in the number of warheads on ballistic missiles to equal levels significantly lower than exist today.

5. It is too early in our research program to speculate on the kinds of defensive systems—whether ground-based or space-based and with what capabilities—that might prove feasible and desirable to develop and deploy

Discussion of the various technologies under study is certainly needed to give concreteness to the understanding of the research program. However, speculation about various types of defensive systems that might be deployed is inappropriate at this time. The SDI is a broad-based research program investigating many technologies. We currently see real merit in the potential of advanced technologies providing for a layered defense, with the possibility of negating a ballistic missile at various points after launch. We feel that the possibility of a layered defense both enhances confidence in the overall system and compounds the problem of a potential aggressor in trying to defeat such a defense. However, the paths to such a defense are numerous.

Along the same lines, some have asked about the role of nuclear-related research in the context of our ultimate goal of non-nuclear defenses. While our current research program certainly emphasizes non-nuclear technologies, we will continue to explore the promising concepts which use nuclear energy to power devices which could destroy ballistic missiles at great distances. Further, it is useful to study these concepts to determine the feasibility and effectiveness of similar defensive systems that an adversary may develop for use against future U.S. surveillance and defensive or offensive systems.

6. The purpose of the defensive options we seek is clear—to find a means to destroy attacking ballistic missiles before they can reach any of their potential targets.

We ultimately seek a future in which nations can live in peace and freedom, secure in the knowledge that their national security does not rest upon the threat of nuclear retaliation. Therefore, the SDI research program will place its emphasis on options which provide the basis for eliminating the general threat posed by ballistic missiles. Thus, the goal of our research is not, and cannot be, simply to protect our retaliatory forces from attack.

If a future president elects to move toward a general defense against ballistic missiles, the technological options that we explore will certainly also increase the survivability of our retaliatory forces. This will require a stable concept and process to manage the transition to the future we seek.

concept and process must be based upon a realistic treatment of not only U.S. but Soviet forces and out-year programs.

7. U.S. and allied security remains indivisible. The SDI program is designed to enhance allied security as well as U.S. security. We will continue to work closely with our allies to ensure that, as our research progresses, allied views are carefully considered.

This has been a fundamental part of U.S. policy since the inception of the Strategic Defense Initiative. We have made a serious commitment to consult, and such consultations will precede any steps taken relative to the SDI research program which may affect our allies.

8. If and when our research criteria are met, and following close consultation with our allies, we intend to consult and negotiate, as appropriate, with the Soviets pursuant to the terms of the ABM Treaty, which provide for such consultations, on how deterrence could be enhanced through a greater reliance by both sides on new defensive systems. This commitment should in no way be interpreted as according the Soviets a veto over possible future defensive deployments. And, in fact, we have already been trying to initiate a discussion of the offense-defense relationship and stability in the defense and space talks underway in Geneva to lay the foundation to support such future possible consultations.

If, at some future time, the United States, in close consultation with its allies, decides to proceed with deployment of defensive systems, we intend to utilize mechanisms for U.S.-Soviet consultations provided for in the ABM Treaty. Through such mechanisms, and taking full account of the Soviet Union's own expansive defensive system research program, we will seek to proceed in a stable fashion with the Soviet Union.

9. It is our intention and our hope that, if new defensive technologies prove feasible, we (in close and continuing consultation with our allies) and the Soviets will jointly manage a transition to a more defense-reliant balance.

Soviet propagandists have accused the United States of reneging on commitments to prevent an arms race in space. This is clearly not true. What we envision is not an arms race; rather, it is just the opposite—a jointly managed approach designed to maintain, at all times, control over the mix of offensive and defensive systems of both sides and thereby increase the confidence of all nations in the effectiveness and stability of the evolving strategic balance.

10. SDI represents no change in our commitment to deterring war and enhancing stability.

Successful SDI research and development of defense options would not lead to abandonment of deterrence but rather to an enhancement of deterrence and an evolution in the weapons of deterrence through the contribution of defensive systems that threaten no one. *We would deter a potential aggressor by making it clear that we could deny him the gains he might otherwise hope to achieve rather than merely threatening him with costs large enough to outweigh those gains.*

U.S. policy supports the basic principle that our existing method of deterrence and NATO's existing strategy of flexible response remain fully valid, and must be fully supported, as long as there is no more effective alternative for preventing war. It is in clear recognition of this obvious fact that the United States continues to pursue so vigorously its own strategic modernization program and so strongly supports the efforts of its allies to sustain their own commitments to maintain the forces, both nuclear and conventional, that provide today's deterrence.

11. For the foreseeable future, offensive nuclear forces and the prospect of nuclear retaliation will remain the key element of deterrence. Therefore, we must maintain modern, flexible, and credible strategic nuclear forces.

This point reflects the fact that we must simultaneously use a number of tools to achieve our goals today while looking for better ways to achieve our goals over the longer term. It expresses our basic rationale for sustaining the U.S. strategic modernization program and the rationale for the critically needed national modernization programs being conducted by the United Kingdom and France.

12. Our ultimate goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. By necessity, this is a very long-term goal, which requires, as we pursue our SDI research, equally energetic efforts to diminish the threat posed by conventional arms imbalances, both through conventional force improvements and the negotiation of arms reductions and confidence-building measures.

We fully recognize the contribution nuclear weapons make to deterring conventional aggression. We equally recognize the destructiveness of war by conventional and chemical means, and the need both to deter such conflict and to reduce the danger posed by the threat of aggression through such means. ■

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SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL ASPECTS OF SDI

- New technologies hold open the prospect of defenses that would be reliable and cost-effective.

  -- The overall conceptual approach calls for research into methods for destruction of attacking ballistic missiles in all of their flight phases: boost, post-boost, mid-course, and terminal.

  -- By repeatedly attempting to destroy attacking ballistic missiles in each of these phases, such a multi-layered system might provide effective defense capability without requiring perfection from any one of its layers.

  -- Advances in microelectronics, microcomputers, optics, lasers, particle-beam devices, and data processing software have provided the necessary potential technological building blocks. They may make possible systems--such as advanced optical and radar sensors, miniature kinetic kill vehicles, and directed energy weapons--that could enable us to destroy ballistic missiles in all their phases of flight.

- Some scientists believe that the scientific and technical basis of the SDI is weak.

  -- Those critics may not be familiar with recent advances in the relevant technologies. The Fletcher panel and the scientific review group were originally skeptical about the prospects for developing effective defenses against ballistic missiles, but the members changed their minds after examining the technological potential in this area.

  -- Judgments at this stage that defenses are not feasible are reminiscent of mid-1940s arguments about the impossibility of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Decisions about the feasibility of effective defenses can be made only after thorough research. To abandon SDI research because of prejudgments about its outcome would be completely indefensible from both a scientific and a policy standpoint.

- We have defined a research program that will allow us to examine the potential contribution of these technologies to strategic defense.

  -- The initiative is being pursued with discipline and program stability.

  -- The SDI research program is centrally managed and reports directly to the Secretary of Defense.

  -- It uses the expertise and capabilities of the Services, appropriate Defense Agencies, and other government departments.

- Our emphasis is on defense against ballistic missiles, which are the most threatening strategic systems and the most difficult to defend against.

- The SDI is examining the necessary defensive capability in five major areas:

  -- Search, acquisition, tracking, and kill assessment (SATKA)

  -- Directed energy weapons (DEW)

  -- Kinetic energy weapons (KEW)

  -- System concepts, battle management, and command, control and communications

  -- Survivability and supporting technology

- In the SATKA area, we are conducting research in advanced boost-phase surveillance and tracking, long-wavelength infra-red (LWIR) space surveillance and tracking, airborne optical sensors, and radar and optical imaging concepts.

- In DEW, we are pursuing short- and long-wavelength lasers, neutral particle beam concepts, and the appropriate pointing and tracking systems.

- In KEW, we are researching the potential for an advanced non-nuclear endoatmospheric interceptor missile, a miniature homing mid-course interceptor missile, a space-based miniature kill-vehicle system, and advanced hypervelocity launchers. We also plan to examine a new terminal defense system capability using a ground-based radar, an airborne optical sensor, and an endo-atmospheric non-nuclear interceptor.

- We will continue to examine the most appropriate overall system concepts and architectures, as well as sequential approaches to their employment. We are also addressing battle management, command and control approaches, and the supporting data processing hardware and software development techniques. Special emphasis is being given to system survivability (especially of potential space-based components) and to lethality (especially for directed energy weapons).

- The contribution of the U.S. industrial and scientific communities will be vital to the SDI.

ALLIED CONCERNS REGARDING SDI

- The U.S. commitment to the defense of its allies is not in any way changed by the Strategic Defense Initiative.

  -- The US remains committed to the modernization of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces and conventional forces that will be essential to the maintenance of deterrence for the foreseeable future. We will also continue our current efforts to achieve significant, equitable, and verifiable nuclear arms reductions.

  -- The United States will continue to work closely with its allies to ensure that, in the event of a future decision to deploy defensive systems, allied, as well as U.S., security against aggression would be enhanced.

- The SDI seeks to explore the potential of emerging technologies to enhance deterrence through defenses that would significantly reduce the military utility of ballistic missiles. The defensive capability we are seeking would protect against shorter-range ballistic missiles that can strike our allies as well as against intercontinental systems.

- The SDI does not constitute a decision to develop and deploy defenses against ballistic missiles. Rather, it is a research program, fully consistent with US committments under the ABM, Outer Space, and Limited Test Ban Treaties, that is designed to answer a number of technological questions which must be answered before the promise of defensive systems can be fully assessed. Any future decisions concerning whether to proceed to development and deployment of defensive systems would be made in full consultation with our allies.

- Should a decision be made in the future to develop and deploy an advanced defense capability, such defenses would complement U.S. efforts to achieve significant reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms.

  -- By greatly reducing the military value of ballistic missiles, effective defenses would increase the likelihood of negotiated reductions.

- With any decision in the future to deploy defensive systems, arms control could play an important role in managing the transition to a greater reliance on defenses and in enhancing their contribution to deterrence and stability.

SOVIET EFFORTS IN STRATEGIC DEFENSE

- The Soviet Union has always placed great emphasis on developing and maintaining an effective defensive capability. Indeed, it has invested about as much in this area as it has in building up its powerful offensive arsenal. As a result, the USSR has an extensive, multifaceted operational defensive network, and is actively engaged in research and development on both conventional and advanced defenses against ballistic missiles.

- Soviet passive, or "civil", defense efforts dwarf those of the United States. For example, the USSR has built an extensive network of hardened command posts located well away from urban centers--in addition to many deep bunkers and blast shelters in Soviet cities--for more than 175,000 civilian government and party officials.

- For strategic air defense, the USSR has 1200 dedicated interceptor aircraft, 7000 air defense radars, and 10,000 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers. The United States has fewer than 300 interceptor aircraft dedicated to strategic defense, fewer than 100 air defense radars, and no SAM launchers.

- Soviet efforts in ballistic missile defense have also been far more extensive than those of the United States.

  -- The USSR maintains the world's only operational ABM system around Moscow. It is currently modernizing and enlarging that system to the limit allowed by the 1972 ABM Treaty. The United States deactivated its ABM system several years ago.

  -- Several other current Soviet ABM activities raise serious concerns about Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty:

     --- The large phased-array radar which the Soviets are constructing at Krasnoyarsk in Siberia violates the ABM Treaty by virtue of its location and orientation.

     --- The Soviet Union may have violated the ABM treaty by the development of components of a new ABM system, which apparently are designed to be deployable at sites requiring relatively little preparation.

     --- The USSR probably has violated the prohibition on testing SAM components in the ABM mode by conducting tests that have involved SAM air defense radars in ABM-related activities.

     --- The aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions suggest that it may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory, which is prohibited.

-- In the late 1960s, the USSR initiated a substantial research program into advanced technologies for defense against ballistic missiles. That program covers many of the same technologies involved in the U.S. SDI, including laser and neutral particle beam technologies. The USSR, however, apparently has invested much more plant, capital, and manpower than has the United States in this research.

-- The Strategic Defense Initiative is a prudent response to the very extensive Soviet activities in this field. A unilateral Soviet deployment of effective advanced defenses against ballistic missiles, combined with the USSR's massive offensive forces and impressive air and passive defense capabilities, would seriously undermine the deterrent capability on which U.S. and allied security depends.

-- Should it prove possible to develop effective defenses against ballistic missiles, we would envision parallel U.S. and Soviet deployments which would enhance mutual security and international stability.

SDI Program

SDIO Program	FY 85 Appropriation	FY 86 Request	FY 87 Estimate
Surveillance, Acquisition, Tracking and Kill Assessment	$546 Million	$1386 Million	$1875 Million
Directed Energy Technology	$376	$ 966	$1196
Kinetic Energy Technology	$256	$ 860	$1239
Systems Concepts/ Battle Management	$ 99	$ 243	$ 273
Survivability, Lethality, and Key Technologies	$112	$ 258	$ 317
General Management Support	$ 11	$ 9	$ 10
Total	$1400 Million	$3722 Million	$4910 Million

-- In FY 1986, the major emphasis of SDI research will be on directed-energy weapons, surveillance and target acquisition technologies, and identifying how defensive systems could be made survivable against a determined attack.

-- The budget request also emphasizes less developed technologies that have high potential for very large gains in cost-effectiveness and ability to overcome potential Soviet countermeasures.

-- The FY 1986 budget request for SDI research amounts to only slightly more than 1 percent of the defense budget, and about one-third of 1 percent of the overall federal budget.

INTERIM RESTRAINT AND COMPLIANCE

I. U.S. has adopted new policy toward observance of SALT

- o U.S. will continue to refrain from undercutting existing strategic arms agreements, to extent Soviets do the same.
- o U.S. will dismantle a Poseidon SSBN in accordance with agreed procedures when 7th Trident SSBN goes to sea.
- o In interest of securing the stable environment and despite some cases of Soviet noncompliance, President is prepared to go the "extra mile" in trying to establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.
- o U.S. will review Soviet response and adopt appropriate and proportionate response, including military measures to compensate for Soviet noncompliance, to provide for the national security of the U.S. and its Allies.
- o U.S. reserves right to respond to irreversible Soviet violation of SALT II Treaty provision prohibiting more than one new type of ICBM. This could include U.S. deployment of small ICBM.
- o Policy is subject to continuous review.

II. U.S. policy based on several considerations

- o Remains in the interest of U.S. and Allies to maintain an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.
- o Such a framework should be conducive to pursuing significant reductions in existing nuclear arsenals, as well as putting arms control process on more constructive footing.
- o Provides incentives for Soviets to improve compliance since U.S. will take appropriate military steps to counter Soviet noncompliance.
- o Policy reflects the views of Allies and Congress.

III. Continuance of policy requires positive actions by Soviets

- o Must take concrete steps to resolve noncompliance and reverse or substantially reduce their unparalled military build-up.
- o Must demonstrate in Geneva that they are actively pursuing arms reduction agreements.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

U.S. Objectives

--achieve an effective and verifiable global ban on all chemical weapons;

--bring an end to the use of chemical, biological and toxin weapons; and

--maintain a credible and effective CW deterrent/retaliatory capability until the objective of an effective ban is reached.

Background

--Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits use in war of chemical or biological weapons.

--Production and possession of biological and toxin weapons are prohibited by the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). There is at present no similar prohibition on production and possession of chemical weapons.

--There is overwhelming evidence that the Soviets and their allies have used toxin and chemical weapons in Southeast Asia ("Yellow Rain") and Afghanistan, and that Iraq has used chemical weapons against Iran in the Gulf War. However, evidence of CW use in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan has diminished over the past two years.

--Our conclusions about "Yellow Rain" are based on the total body of evidence available. This evidence includes:

(1) eye-witness accounts of attacks by victims and testimony by medical and relief workers, journalists, defectors, private U.S. and foreign citizens and government officials;

(2) data from other samples -- bodily fluids and tissues analyzed following the autopsy of victims have confirmed the presence of tricothecene mycotoxins;

(3) direct interviews with attack victims by medical personnel;

(4) information from sensitive intelligence sources; and

(5) analysis of toxin residues actually found in the area of attacks.

--Theories about bee excrement are contradicted by the wider body of evidence which has long been available to the public.

-- A suspicious outbreak of pulmonary anthrax in Sverdlovsk, in 1979, suggests that the USSR is also maintaining an offensive biological warfare program.

--In 1963, we estimated that only 5 countries had chemical weapons. Now, we estimate that about 16 countries have them and more are trying to get them.

U.S. Initiatives

--For years, the U.S. has tried to achieve an effective chemical arms ban. Since 1969, the U.S. has unilaterally frozen production of such weapons. This approach has not worked. The Soviet Union has continued to expand and modernize its chemical weapons stockpile. It has a huge investment in chemical warfare equipment and personnel with which it regularly conducts large-scale military exercises.

--In April 1984, the U.S. presented a draft treaty for a complete and verifiable chemical weapons ban at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

--In the absence of a ban on chemical weapons, FY 1986 funds have been requested by the Department of Defense to produce binary chemical weapons to offset this dangerous asymmetry. Binary weapons would also be safer to transport and handle than are the unitary chemical weapons in our current, deteriorating stockpile.

--This approach reflects our desire for an arms control solution to the chemical threat and allows an opportunity to achieve a treaty before any weapons are produced. At the same time, it provides an incentive to the Soviets to negotiate seriously by signaling our resolve to take steps necessary to eliminate the current Soviet advantage in the absence of an effective arms control agreement. Until the threat posed by chemical weapons is effectively eliminated by a treaty, the U.S. must have a credible chemical weapons deterrent.

--When the Vice President presented the U.S. draft CW treaty in April 1984, he indicated that the U.S. looked forward to serious negotiations and steady progress. Since multilateral progress is dependent upon US/USSR progress toward agreement, we indicated to the Soviets our willingness to meet bilaterally with a view to facilitating the multilateral treaty negotiations. The Soviets indicated their willingness to conduct bilateral consultations in Geneva, and they have met with our delegation. They have not, however, agreed to our draft treaty text.

Points to Make

--Our main objective with respect to chemical weapons is to achieve an effective and verifiable global ban.

--We have sought to bring an end to the use of toxin and other chemical weapons through diplomatic and other means.

--Evidence of use has declined in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan.

--We are however, concerned about evidence of use elsewhere, and the problem of proliferation. Chemical weapons are relatively cheap and could be produced by many countries. International prohibitions against use are not being universally observed.

--For this reason, we have proposed a verifiable global chemical weapons ban. In April 1984, Vice President Bush presented a draft treaty for such a ban at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

--We hope the Soviet Union will respond seriously and constructively to our proposal which has the support of our Allies and other nations around the world.

--In the absence of an effective and verifiable ban, the U.S. is seeking to produce safer, more modern chemical weapons to offset the existing Soviet CBW capability, and to provide incentives for the Soviets to negotiate seriously for a ban.

--The U.S. must have a credible and effective chemical weapons retaliatory stockpile to deter Soviet use of such weapons.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

-- Confidence-building measures (CBMs) are designed to enhance mutual knowledge and understanding about military forces and activities.

-- Effective CBMs can help reduce the possibility of an accidential East-West confrontation, miscalculation, or failure of communication; to inhibit opportunities for surprise attack; and increase stability.

-- Extensive set of national and international mechanisms already in place.

o U.S.-Soviet "Hot Line" agreement of 1963 to establish direct communiucations link and the 1971 and 1984 agreement to update it;

o U.S./Soviet "Accident Measures" agreements of 1971 to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war through unauthorized or accidential use of nuclear weapons and for advance notification of certain missile launcnes;

o U.S.-Soviet "Incidents at Sea" agreement of 1972 to prohibit acts at sea that could increase the risk of war;

o U.S./Soviet Agreement of 1973 on tne Prevention of Nuclear War which requires both to refrain from acts tnat mignt lead to confrontations between them;

o Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE in 1975 pledged tne U.S., USSR, Canada, and states of East and West Europe to prior notification of large military maneuvers to reduce risk of conflict through misinterpretation.

-- But more needs to be done. We participate in the CDE, which is seeking to negotiate CBMs going well beyond those contained in the Helsinki Final Act, and proposed CBMs in tne START, INF, and MBFR negotiations. Our basic aim is fuller exchange of information about military activities such as exercises, troop movements, and ballistic missil launches.

-- In START and INF, U.S. proposed additional bilateral CBMs. These would require prior notification of ballistic missile launches, major military exercises, and expanded exchanges of forces data. We have indicated to the Soviets our desire to renew discussion of these proposals in the current Geneva negotiations.

-- In 1983, President Reagan proposed adding a high-speed facsimile capability to tne Hotline, establisning a U.S.-USSR Joint Military Communications Link, and improving diplomatic communications links. All would permit faster, more extensive communications to avoid miscalculation and misinterpretation at all levels -- head of state, diplomatic, military.

-- In 1984, we agreed with the USSR to add a high-speed facsimile capability to the Hotline. This capability will enable U.S. and Soviet heads of government to send graphic material over the Hotline for the first time. Written text can now be transmitted more quickly than on the existing teletype system.

-- While Soviets were not willing to discuss most other proposals, U.S. continues efforts to enhance U.S.-Soviet bilateral communications.

-- In session of U.S.-USSR Standing Consultative Commission which concluded in June 1985, the U.S. and the Soviets signed a Common Understanding regarding the use of immediate notifications in connection with the Accident Measures Agreement. This Common Understanding records the parties' understanding of their obligations under that Agreement, but does not change it.

-- In his address before the UNGA in 1984, President Reagan proposed additional bilateral CBMs:

- o Periodic U.S.-Soviet consultations on regional problems;
- o Institutionalized cabinet-level meetings between U.S. and Soviet officials;
- o Exchange of five-year military plans for weapons development and procurement;
- o Reciprocal visits by U.S. and Soviet experts to each side's nuclear test sites to help establish the basis for verification of effective limitations on underground nuclear testing.

-- In his address to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on May 8, 1985, the President offered a four-part proposal for reducing military tensions. He proposed that:

- o The U.S. and USSR exchange observers at military exercises and locations;
- o The U.S. and USSR institute high-level contacts between military leaders to develop better understandings and prevent potential tragedies from occuring;
- o The CDE should promptly agree on the concrete CBMs proposed by NATO; U.S. prepared to discuss no-first use in that context;
- o Permanent military-to-military communications link should be established to exchange notifications and other information regarding military activities.

CDE

Background

On January 17, 1984, the United States, Canada, and 33 European states, including the Soviet Union and its Allies, convened in Stockholm for the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE).

The CDE is an outgrowth of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), otherwise known as the Helsinki process. Specifically, the CDE is mandated to negotiate and adopt confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) designed to reduce the risk of surprise attack in Europe and to strengthen and enlarge upon the limited confidence-building measures of the Helsinki Final Act. Unlike arms reduction provisions, confidence-building measures do not directly affect the size, weaponry, composition, or structure of a state's military forces. Rather they are intended to enhance mutual knowledge and understanding of military activities through means such as exercise notification and observation, information exchange, forecasts of military activities, verification, and communications. Consequently, they reduce the possibility of conflict arising by accident, miscalculation, or misunderstanding.

NATO Position

At the opening of the Stockholm Conference the sixteen members of NATO introduced a set of measures designed to:

- Reduce the risk of surprise attack in Europe by enhancing the openness of military activities;
- Establish greater predictability regarding peaceful military exercises, thereby highlighting any departures from the norm;
- Inhibit military intimidation or coercion against any participating state; and
- Improve crisis communications.

Other Positions

- The Warsaw Pact states have so far introduced measures which are generally unenforceable and designed for propaganda effect, such as Non-First Use of Nuclear Weapons, European Chemical Weapons Ban, Freeze and Reductions of Military

Budgets, and Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones. These measures are non-starters because they are outside of the mandate of the Conference, they are subject to discussion in other fora, and/or they give unilateral advantages to the Warsaw Pact.

- In order to meet stated Soviet concerns about Non-Use of Force, President Reagan stated in June of 1984 that the United States would discuss a reaffirmation of the existing Non-Use of Force pledge if the Soviets would negotiate concrete CSBMs in Stockholm.

- The Neutral and Non-Aligned countries (e.g., Yugoslavia, Austria, Finland, Switzerland) have submitted a set of proposals on concrete CSBMs which are largely similar to the Western package.

Vienna Review Conference

- We would like to see the Stockholm Conference reach agreement on a set of concrete CSBMs which go well beyond the limited measures adopted in Helsinki in 1975.

- The third follow-up CSCE meeting, reviewing implementation of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, including the work of the CDE, will convene in Vienna in November of 1986.

Points to Make

- The CDE is an integral part of the Helsinki process and consequently maintains the appropriate balance between human rights and security concerns;

- The consensus mandate adopted in Madrid in 1983 calls for the CDE to negotiate confidence- and security-building measures;

- According to the Madrid Mandate, the confidence- and security-building measures must be militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable, and applicable to the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals;

- Nuclear issues will not be negotiated in the Stockholm Conference;

- By reducing the risk of war by accident or miscalculation, the CDE complements but does not interfere with existing negotiations, such as the Geneva talks on offensive and defensive systems.

NUCLEAR WINTER

Background

History. "Nuclear winter" refers to the hypothesized long-term consequences of nuclear war on the climate. Evidence used by proponents of the theory suggests that nuclear war might raise an enormous pall of smoke and dust that would cover, darken and cool much of the Earth.

The first rough quantitative estimates of the potential magnitude of the effects of nuclear war on the atmosphere were contained in a paper published in Science in December 1983 generally referred to as "TTAPS"--an acronym derived from the first letter of the names of the five authors (including Dr. Carl Sagan). This study estimated conditions of near-darkness and sub-freezing land temperatures, especially in continental interiors, for up to several months after a nuclear attack--almost independent of the level or type of nuclear exchange scenario used. Results presented in the TTAPS report projected that even a "small" nuclear attack on population centers could trigger massive smoke production and catastrophic climatic effects.

US Approach. The US is firmly committed to a long-term research program to investigate major scientific uncertainties surrounding the nuclear winter hypothesis. The US already has, by far, the best scientific data and capabilities with respect to global circulation models. We embarked on a serious study effort two years ago and initiated an interagency research program (IRP) to coordinate a national effort to reduce the major uncertainties in this hypothesis. The US plan is carefully formulated, and builds upon and enhances existing research. Its purpose is to put the issue on a firmer scientific basis.

Moreover, US arms control and security policies--including unilateral US efforts to reduce the size and explosive power of its nuclear arsenal, its initiatives in stimulating the resumption of nuclear arms control negotiations, US substantive proposals for deep cuts in nuclear weapons with the ultimate objective of completely eliminating nuclear weapons, and the US leading role in non-proliferation--are all ample evidence of the US commitment to reduce the level of nuclear weapons and the risk of nuclear war.

Soviet Approach. Soviet research began in 1983 when a few scientists moved quickly to conduct investigations and enter into the growing debate on the subject. Their findings were widely reported as independent confirmation of the hypothesis that nuclear war would lead to widespread and devastating

climatic changes. On closer examination, however, Soviet research on nuclear winter is not convincing. Neither is it well documented. It is derived almost entirely from US ideas, data, and models.

Early US climate models are being used and run with input data that grossly exaggerates the effects of smoke from burning cities--the key variable in the nuclear winter equation. Not surprisingly, Soviet scientists have consistently reported more severe climatic changes than are usually found in similar research in the West. Furthermore, Soviet reporting tends to stretch conclusions well beyond what the research supports.

The location, nature and findings of Soviet research suggest that the primary interest in nuclear winter thus far is for external political purposes. A large, well-coordinated propaganda campaign has been organized with the international scientific community as the primary target audience. The objective is to use these scientists to convince western publics, and ultimately their political leaders, that the US arsenal is already too large, and that new weapons are not needed. There is no evidence that the Soviet leadership has taken any steps to moderate its nuclear build-up in light of the nuclear winter hypothesis.

Points to Make

- A recent report by the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) on the effects on the atmosphere of a major nuclear exchange states that a clear possibility exists that a major nuclear exchange could inject sufficient amounts of smoke and dust into the atmosphere to block sunlight from reaching the Earth, possibly causing temporary severe temperature drops over at least part of the globe. This NAS report--as well as others--also makes clear that major uncertainties continue to exist concerning the probability and extent of its predicted effects.

- We believe that these uncertainties make imperative a thorough and rigorous scientific investigation of this hypothesis. The US is convinced that the matter is too important to permit judgments to be made on the basis of imprecise or, in some cases, what appear to be politically-motivated research findings.

- The US is committed to a full scientific investigation of "nuclear winter."

- The US government embarked on a study effort of the nuclear winter hypothesis two years ago and has initiated a comprehensive follow-on long-term interagency research program to assess the climatic effects of nuclear war.

- We recognize, however, as should other governments, that even with the benefit of the most advanced modeling techniques and computational capabilities, we may continue, even after completion of this research program, to have significant uncertainties about the range of the collateral effects of nuclear exhanges.

- The limitations of our analytical efforts must not be understated and must be coupled with the inescapable reality that we must do everything possible to reduce the possibility and--failing in that--the effect of a nuclear exchange, including providing a further impetus to our search for effective defenses against nuclear weapons. In this respect, we believe that SDI may be a particularly prudent and effective hedge against and response to the possibility of severe, long-term effects to the global climate.

Nuclear Weapons Testing Limitations

U.S. Objectives

--Improving the verification provisions of the unratified Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties.

A comprehensive test ban (CTB) continues to be a long-term US objective when considered in the context of deep and verifiable arms reductions, improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence-building measures, and the need to maintain an effective deterrent.

Background

--In 1963, the U.S., U.K., and USSR ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) prohibiting nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water. Over 100 other states have also ratified or acceded to this agreement.

--In 1974, the U.S. and USSR signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) prohibiting underground nuclear weapons tests above 150 kilotons, and in 1976, they signed the companion Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET).

--The latter two treaties have not been ratified. However, since neither side has indicated an intention not to ratify, both the US and the Soviet Union are under an obligation under international law to refrain from acts which would "defeat the object and purpose" of the treaties.

--Despite that obligation, a number of Soviet tests have likely violated the TTBT's 150 kiloton testing threshhold.

--In addition, the Soviets have violated the LTBT's prohibition against the "venting" of radioactive debris beyond a state's territorial limits.

--The U.S. has on several occasions proposed to the USSR negotiations to improve verification provisions of the TTBT and PNET. Such improvements would significantly reduce monitoring uncertainties and constitute a solid foundation for further steps in the nuclear testing field. The Soviets have refused such discussions, and urge the ratification of the treaties as they stand.

--On July 29, President Reagan, in a letter to Gorbachev unconditionally invited him to send Soviet experts to the Nevada test site -- with the equipment they deem necessary -- to observe a U.S. nuclear test. The intention was to begin a process of increasing confidence so that verifiable nuclear testing limitations could be agreed.

--In early August 1985, Soviet leader Gorbachev announced a unilateral nuclear testing moratorium to begin August 6 (the anniversary of Hiroshima) and continue until the end of the year. He proposed that if the U.S. joined the moratorium, it could be extended beyond the end of 1985.

Comprehensive Test Ban

From 1977 through 1980, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union sought to negotiate a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), but failed to reach agreement on several major issues, including verification.

Because of serious concerns about the national security implications of a CTB in current circumstances, including problems related to verification, compliance, and deterrence, the U.S. has not resumed the trilateral CTB talks since they recessed in 1980. In the existing environment, the security of the United States and our Allies depends on a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent, and nuclear testing plays an important role in ensuring this deterrent. Furthermore, verification of a comprehensive test ban, and especially any moratorium, remains a major problem. Expert testimony before Congress has indicated that, in the context of the verification procedures discussed (but not agreed) in the CTB trilateral negotiations, there would still be uncertainty about our ability to detect and identify a potentially significant level of clandestine testing.

Points to Make

--Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) remains a long-term U.S. goal, in the context of deep and verifiable arms reductions, improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence building measures, and a secure and credible deterrent capability. At this time the U.S. is not prepared to resume negotiations toward a CTB.

--The danger of failing to provide for effective means of verification was underscored by the fate of an international testing moratorium which was unilaterally implemented by the US, UK, and USSR from 1959 to 1961. During that time, the Soviet Union began preparing clandestinely for the largest series of nuclear explosions ever conducted. On August 1961, the Soviet Union unilaterally announced that it would resume testing, and, on the following day, began the first of 40 atmospheric tests conducted over a two-month period. Commenting on the Soviet breach of faith, President Kennedy remarked, "Now we know enough about broken negotiations, secret preparations, and long test series never again to offer an uninspected moratorium."

--Any consideration of a complete cessation of tests must also be related to the West's ability to maintain credible deterrent forces, for which testing is important.

--A test ban cannot by itself eliminate the risk of war or prevent nuclear proliferation.

--The US has, on several occasions, proposed to the Soviet Union negotiations to improve the verification provisions of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. In September 1984, President Reagan proposed that we find a way for Soviet experts to come to the US nuclear test site and for US experts to go to theirs to measure directly the yields of tests of nuclear weapons. The Soviets have not taken up these offers.

--On July 29, President Reagan unconditionally invited Soviet leader Gorbachev to send a team of Soviet experts -- with the equipment they deem necessary -- to the Nevada nuclear test site.

--The U.S. intention is to begin a process of increasing confidence so that verifiable nuclear testing limitations can be agreed.

--Our experience of Soviet moratorium proposals indicates that they are not a sound or acceptable basis for a genuine agreement on verifiable testing limiations. (CF. Following page)

TALKING POINTS ON US AND SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING INITIATIVES

-- The U.S. proposal announced July 29, 1985 is a very practical one, which builds on the proposal made by the President in his September 24, 1984 speech to the United Nations General Assembly calling for an exchange of U.S. and Soviet experts to each other's nuclear test sites to directly measure test yields. Our new proposal features a substantial new concrete element: an unconditional invitation to the Soviet Union for its experts to visit a U.S. test site -- and to bring the equipment they deem necessary -- to directly measure the yield of a U.S. nuclear test. The objective of this proposal is to take a needed first step in beginning to improve confidence in monitoring capability and compliance with testing limitations, about which both sides have expressed concern.

-- We have indicated to the Soviets that we believe a number of their tests may have violated the 150 kt threshhold of the unratified Threshhold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and that they have violated the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). The Soviets, in turn, have questioned a number of our tests. Clearly, confidence needs to be enhanced significantly in this area before further steps can be taken.

-- We have several times previously offered to discuss with the Soviets how we could improve the verification provisions of the TTBT and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) which they thus far rejected. Neither have they accepted the President's UN initiative.

-- The new U.S. initiative reflects the President's willingness to "go the extra mile" in the nuclear testing area, just as he did in proposing a new framework for truly mutual interim restraints in regard to strategic arms limitations.

-- Although the new U.S. testing proposal was made without any conditions, it is our hope that such practical steps will get a process going which will enable the two countries to establish the basis for verification of effective limits on underground nuclear testing.

-- In contrast, the Soviet moratorium proposal which was carried in the Soviet press July 29, is similar to those they have made many times over the years. What history has taught us is that such proposals invariably are self-serving, designed to lock in areas of Soviet advantage and, therefore, largely propagandistic. In this same pattern, the present Soviet moratorium proposal is largely designed to divert attention away from their military build-up and their failure to negotiate equitable, verifiable agreements providing for real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals.

-- The historical record shows that the Soviets have in the past used such moratoria to consolidate their advantages: in 1956-61, they used the moratorium to clandestinely prepare for the largest series of tests ever conducted. In the INF area, to take another example, the Soviets declared a unilateral moratorium on LRINF deployments in October 1983, after which they continued to construct new SS-20 bases and to deploy additional missiles. After their declared LRINF moratorium in April of this year, the Soviets continued to deploy additional missiles in Europe and Asia.

-- Moreover, given the scope and scale of Soviet modernization programs and U.S. restriant, U.S. testing is necessary to insure the continued credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

-- In the weeks preceding the Soviet moratorium proposal there was a significant acceleration in the number of Soviet nuclear weapons tests -- including several in the week preceding the proposal. Obviously, this was designed to put the Soviet Union in a position not to need to test over the next five months, and to break out, (as they did in 1961) on an accelerated schedule if they choose, without real cost to Soviet programs.

-- Thus, our experience of Soviet moratorium proposals indicates that they are not a sound or acceptable basis for a genuine agreement on verifiable testing limitations.

NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES

The United States has supported the establishment of regional nuclear weapon free zones under appropriate conditions and when consistent with the following criteria:

-- The initiative for the creation of the zone should come from the states in the region concerned;

-- All states whose participation is deemed important should participate in the zone;

-- The zone arrangement should provide for adequate verification of compliance with its provisions;

-- The establishment of the zone should not disturb existing security arrangements to the detriment of regional and international security;

-- The zone arrangement should effectively prohibit its parties from developing or otherwise possessing any nuclear explosive device for whatever purpose;

-- The establishment of a zone should not affect the existing rights of its parties under international law to grant or deny to other states transit privileges within internal waters, including port calls and overflights; and

-- The zone arrangement should not seek to impose restrictions on the exercise of maritime and aerial navigation rights and freedoms recognized under international law, particularly the freedoms of navigation and overflight of the high seas, archipelagic sea lanes passage, transit through straits used for international navigation, and the right of innocent passage through territorial seas and archipelagic waters.

The Nuclear Freeze

Background

Since 1982, there have been a number of proposals in the U.S. Congress and by citizens, calling upon the U.S. and Soviet Union to agree to a "mutual and verifiable freeze on the production, testing and deployment of all nuclear weapons and their delivery systems." In May 1983, the House of Representatives approved a non-binding version of the freeze resolution, with numerous caveats. The Soviet Union has also proposed a freeze on strategic nuclear arms, a moratorium on deployment of further LRINF missiles in Europe and a ban on research, testing development and deployment of so-called "space-strike" arms at the negotiations on nuclear and space arms in Geneva.

The U.S. Government position is that, while we share the concern of those seeking to reduce the risk of war and end costly competition in nuclear arms, the nuclear freeze is not an effective or realistic way to achieve those objectives. The freeze would preserve existing Soviet military advantages, prevent the needed modernization of US and NATO nuclear weapons, reduce incentives for the Soviets to negotiate seriously for radical and verifiable arms reductions, and many elements of the freeze would not be verifiable, even if the Soviets were to agree to more extensive verification provisions than those they have so far been willing to consider.

Points to Make

1. The freeze would reward and legitimize the Soviet military buildup and would lock in Soviet advantages. The freeze would preserve the existing Soviet military advantages in both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces that have resulted from the massive Soviet arms buildup of the last decade--a period in which the U.S. exercised considerable restraint. About three quarters of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons are on missiles, submarines and bombers over 15 years old. In contrast, over half the total Soviet strategic nuclear weapons are on launch systems 5 years old or less; only 4% are on systems over 15 years old. Thus, a freeze would ensure that U.S. strategic systems would reach obsolescence much sooner than comparable Soviet systems.

2. The freeze would undercut the US commitment to the NATO Alliance's December 1979 decision to deploy LRINF weapons unless the Soviet Union agreed to reduce its existing LRINF forces. A freeze would leave the Soviets with an overwhelming advantage (greater than 8-to-1 as of spring 1985) in LRINF warheads.

3. The freeze would be difficult to negotiate, and even then, many elements would be unverifiable. To be bilateral, as proposed, the freeze could not be implemented automatically. It would require extensive and complex negotiations and agreement on specific systems and numbers of weapons to be frozen and on the specific measures necessary to ensure compliance. Many specific aspects of the proposed freeze, especially those involving production and testing of certain systems, would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to verify. The time and effort would be better spent trying to reach agreement for genuine arms reductions.

4. By preserving Soviet military advantages, the proposed freeze would reduce Soviet incentives to negotiate seriously for deep and verifiable mutual reductions.

POINTS TO MAKE ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

Basic Message

Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is critical to world peace. It is a cause that deserves and receives high priority in U.S. foreign policy.

Policy Elements

-- Supporting nuclear power: Nuclear energy will play a role in providing electric power in the U.S. and abroad.

-- Making rational distinctions: We must make rational distinctions between allies who pose no proliferation risk and areas in which we have concerns about proliferation.

-- Reducing motivation to "go nuclear": We are striving to improve regional and global stability, thereby reducing the motivation of some states to acquire nuclear explosives.

-- Closer cooperation and consultation: U.S. is no longer dominant in nuclear field. Thus, we are trying to implement our policy with a maximum of consultation and agreement with other nations.

-- Reestablishing U.S. as reliable supplier: Our approach is designed to give our closest nuclear trading partners access to energy programs, while maintaining our firm commitment to an effective international non-proliferation regime.

-- Broadening the dialogue: We are working to restore a dialogue on the benefits of a strong non-proliferation regime with nations such as Brazil and Argentina, where our ties in the area of non-proliferation had been all but broken.

-- Improving export controls: We are working hard to update international export controls and are continuing to inhibit, where the danger of proliferation demands, the transfer of sensitive nuclear material, equipment and technology.

-- Strengthening international safeguards: We strongly support the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its efforts to provide for improved international safeguards.

-- Promoting comprehensive safeguards: We are working actively to achieve a common policy among nuclear suppliers to require IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities in recipient non-nuclear-weapons states as a condition for significant new nuclear supply commitments.

-- Sharing benefits of peaceful nuclear technology: We will continue to ensure, bilaterally and through the IAEA, that those benefits are made available on a reliable basis to nations that have good non-proliferation credentials.

-- Promoting adherence to NPT and Treaty Tlatelolco: We will continue to support adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin American (Tlatelolco) by nations that have not accepted those treaties.

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A quick reference aid on U.S. foreign relations
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US and NATO Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Reductions

November 1984

Background: For more than 35 years the NATO alliance has preserved the peace in Europe. Because NATO faces massive Soviet conventional and nuclear forces, the alliance must have the capability to defend itself and deter possible aggression. It must have credible conventional and nuclear forces. At the same time, the allies are committed to maintaining NATO's stockpile of nuclear weapons at the lowest possible level needed for an effective deterrent.

The purpose of US nuclear forces is to deter war. The US nuclear arsenal is designed to provide a strong, militarily effective, and survivable deterrent force, also at the lowest possible level. The US has made proposals to negotiate substantial, equitable, and verifiable reductions in the US and Soviet nuclear arsenals. The US has also reduced the number and megatonnage (yield) of nuclear weapons in its arsenal. Over the years, the number of weapons in the US stockpile has fluctuated, but the number and yield today are sustantially lower than they were 20 years ago, and they are expected to remain well below the peak level of the 1960s.

In contrast, the Soviet Union has consistently increased the size of its nuclear stockpile. The number and total yield of its weapons have exceeded those of the US for some time.

Reductions in the NATO nuclear stockpile: In December 1979, faced with a major and continuing Soviet buildup in intermediate-range land-based nuclear forces (INF), the NATO allies agreed to deploy 572 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing II ballistic missiles beginning in 1983 and, at the same time, to negotiate with the Soviet Union to try to establish an INF balance at the lowest possible level. The 1979 "dual track" decision also called for the removal of 1,000 warheads from the NATO nuclear stockpile and, in addition, stipulated that for each GLCM and Pershing II deployed, one nuclear weapon already in the NATO arsenal would be withdrawn.

The withdrawal of 1,000 warheads was completed in 1980. In addition, NATO agreed to study the alliance's defense needs further to determine whether additional nuclear weapons could be removed without undermining NATO's ability to deter war. This study laid the groundwork for the October 1983 decision in which NATO defense ministers meeting at Montebello, Canada, agreed to withdraw an additional 1,400 warheads from Europe.

Thus, when these latest withdrawals are completed, five nuclear weapons will have been withdrawn from the NATO nuclear stockpile for every GLCM or Pershing II deployed and, as a result of the 1979 dual-track and 1983 Montebello decisions, NATO will have cut its

nuclear arsenal by about one-third, to its lowest level in 20 years. In contrast, the Soviet buildup in intermediate-range and shorter range nuclear weapons continues unabated.

Reductions in the US nuclear stockpile: The number of weapons in the US nuclear stockpile was about one-third higher in 1967 than it is today. Moreover, its total detonation energy, measured in megatons (millions of tons), has declined even more dramatically because the US has withdrawn many large, high-yield weapons. Total US megatonnage today is only one-quarter of what it was in 1960.

Most weapons in the US stockpile were built during the 1960s, and they are now becoming obsolete. It is necessary to modernize our forces in order to improve the safety and security of the weapons and to ensure the continued viability of our nuclear deterrent. Greater safety, survivability, and effectiveness are the goals of our nuclear force modernization program. In some cases, we can achieve those aims with fewer--but more modern--weapons than those we now have. As new weapons are produced, old ones will be disassembled. The US nuclear arsenal will thus remain below the peak level of the 1960s.

Arms control efforts: As an integral part of our national security policy, the US seeks effective and verifiable arms control agreements. Our principal objective is to establish a stable nuclear balance at substantially lower levels of weaponry. We have made proposals for significant reductions in nuclear arsenals to the Soviet Union. We have negotiated flexibly and in good faith and are ready to do so again. We are prepared to engage the Soviet Union in far-reaching discussions for verifiable and substantial reductions in nuclear forces. Such reductions would be in the interests of both sides and would strengthen the foundation of international stability and peace.

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MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION TALKS (MBFR)

Background

History. Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe, involving 12 members of NATO and the 7 Warsaw Pact member states, began in Vienna in 1973. They concern the reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Central Europe.

The primary Western objective in MBFR is to enhance stability and security in Central Europe through a reduction of ground forces and establishment of parity at lower levels in the form of a common ceiling on each side's military manpower. The continuing Eastern superiority in ground forces is a potentially destabilizing factor; its elimination could reduce the risk of war in Europe.

In 1982, the West proposed a draft MBFR treaty embodying a comprehensive proposal for staged reductions to parity along with a full package of associated measures providing for cooperative verification. To provide an objective equal basis for setting the size of reductions needed to reach equal levels, the Western proposal required full agreement in advance on the current size of forces, a condition the East has been unwilling to meet. In April 1984, the West made further concessions by offering to ease initial data requirements in exchange for enhanced verification measures.

The Data Problem. How to deal with the data discrepancy on the number of military ground and air force personnel in Central Europe has been a central unresolved issue of the negotiations. Both sides have agreed in principle that the end result of reductions should be parity at lower levels of military manpower in the reductions area. The Soviet Union and its allies claim that approximate parity already exists, which would mean total Eastern reductions of about the same size as the West's. However, Eastern figures for their ground and air forces are some 170,000 short of Western estimates--a margin of Eastern superiority of about 20%. The East refuses to engage in any detailed discussion to uncover the rationale for their low figures.

April 1984 Western Proposal The most recent Western proposal was presented in Vienna April 19, 1984. It was the result of a thorough US review of MBFR policy and extensive study within the NATO Alliance. This proposal amends the West's 1982 Draft Treaty by reducing previous data demands. The West now proposes a limited data exchange prior to treaty signature to include only ground combat and combat support forces. Additionally, this data may fall within an acceptable range of Western data estimates, as opposed to the previous requirement for agreement on precise numbers.

Under this modification, full data agreement would not be reached until after initial US and Soviet reductions and subsequent verification of the levels of remaining forces had taken place. In return, the West is asking that the East fully address the need for adequate verification measures and their early implementation. Although the East did make some concessions in 1983 on the verification issue, their position still falls short of Western requirements for effective verification to ensure that necessary reductions to achieve parity are carried out.

Recent Developments. The Eastern side presented a new proposal on February 14, 1985. It essentially puts into legally binding form previous Eastern proposals from 1983 calling for initial US and Soviet force reductions of 13,000 and 20,000 respectively and for a subsequent freeze on all forces for two years. This proposal does not represent a major move in MBFR and does not address the central issues of verification and data.

The West has asked a number of questions about the details of the East's February 1985 proposal, which it will have to assess in considering how to respond. The West is fully committed to move the talks forward and seeks an outcome equitable to both sides to enhance security in Europe.

Points to Make

- The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks (MBFR) concern the reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Central Europe.

- 12 NATO and all 7 Warsaw Pact countries participate in the talks, which have been going on in Vienna since 1973.

- The US and Allied goal in these negotiations is to enhance security in Europe through a process of substantial, assymmetrical reductions of conventional forces to parity. Central to this objective is to reach agreement on measures to assure that the East will comply with agreed obligations.

- The Soviet Union and its allies, while agreeing in principle to NATO-Warsaw Pact manpower parity in Central Europe, claim that rough parity in manpower already exists. They therefore have not agreed on the size of reductions we believe necessary to reach parity, or the numerical levels from which such reductions would be taken.

- The problem is that since the East has substantially more forces in Central Europe than the West, it will need to make substantially larger reductions to achieve parity.

- Though the talks have been going on for some 12 years without agreement, progress has been made on some issues. Guiding principles have been established, and better understanding of the two sides' security concerns has evolved, and the bargaining continues.

- The key issues still blocking progress are verification, data and the size of Eastern reductions needed to reach parity.

- In April 1984, the West made a new proposal aimed at breaking the deadlock. The new proposal offers to defer full agreement on the size of Eastern forces until after the first reductions. In return, we asked for Eastern flexibility on verification requirements.

- The East's February 1985 proposal simply puts in legally binding form 1983 Eastern calls for initial US-Soviet reductions and subsequent freeze of forces. It does not address key issues of verification and data.

- Nonetheless, the West is committed to moving the talks forward. The West is prepared to show appropriate flexibility to achieve an agreement; but the East must show real flexibility as well.

Soviet Arms Control Noncompliance

-- Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements is a serious matter. It calls into question the security benefits of arms control and undermines the confidence essential to an effective arms control process.

-- The Reagan Administration is strongly committed to arms control, to strengthening its contribution to our national security and to reducing nuclear weapons. The January 1985 agreement with the Soviets to start the new negotiations illustrates this commitment.

-- In January 1984, at Congress' request, the President reported on seven issues where we believe the Soviet Union has violated or probably violated its arms control obligations or commitments.

-- In October 1984, also at Congress' request, the General Advisory Committee's report on Soviet compliance issues was released. This was an independent study, not formally reviewed or approved by the Government.

-- In February 1985, again at Congress' request, the President provided an unclassified update on the original seven issues and addressed some additional issues. A classified report was also sent to Congress.

   The 1985 report reaffirms the conclusions of a year ago and in some cases strengthens them.

-- Six new issues are covered in the 1985 report. These include findings of one violation, one probable violation, one too ambiguous to call, and two cases where no violations were found.

-- In addition, concern is expressed about Soviet ABM and ABM-related actions which in the aggregate, suggest that the Soviet Union may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. Such a defense is clearly prohibited by the ABM Treaty.

-- The report covers only those areas where questions of Soviet compliance have been raised with the Soviet Union.

-- The U.S. Government has repeatedly raised compliance issues with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels, including at the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), at the

January 1985 Geneva talks between Secretary Shultz and Soviet First Deputy Premier Gromyko, and during the current Geneva Arms Control Talks.

-- The Soviets have not provided satisfactory explanations, or undertaken corrective actions sufficient to alleviate our concerns.

-- The U.S. will continue to press these issues with the Soviets.

-- The Administration will continue to work closely with the Congress in seeking to make progress in resolving compliance issues and in negotiating sound arms control agreements.

-- In its February 1985 unclassified report the United States Government:

  - o Reaffirmed the conclusions of its January 1984 report that the USSR has violated the Helsinki Final Act, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and two provisions of SALT II: telemetry encryption and ICBM modernization;

  - o Reaffirmed its previous conclusions that the USSR has probably violated the SS-16 deployment prohibition of SALT II, and is likely to have violated the nuclear testing yield limit of the unratified Threshold Test Ban Treaty;

  - o Determined that the USSR nas violated the ABM Treaty (through the siting, orientation and capability of the Krasnoyarsk radar), violated the Limited Test Ban Treaty, violated the SALT II provision prohibiting more than one new type of ICBM, and probably violated the ABM Treaty restriction on concurrent testing of SAM and ABM components;

  - o Determined that the evidence regarding the USSR's compliance with the ABM Treaty provision on component mobility was ambiguous;

  - o Expressed concern about Soviet preparations for a prohibited territorial ABM defense; and

  - o Determined that the USSR is currently in compliance with those provisions of the SALT I Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures that deal with re-use of dismantled ICBM sites and with the reconfiguration of dismantled ballistic missile launching submarines.

Soviet Compliance in General

Q. Are the Soviets complying with any arms control agreements?

A. The Soviets appear to be complying with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty. With respect to other major agreements, they appear to be complying with certain significant provisions while violating other provisions.

Military Significance of Soviet Compliance Violations

Q. Are any of these Soviet activities militarily significant?

A. All have some degree of military significance. Prime examples are:

-- The large phased-array radar (LPAR) being constructed at Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia, in combination with other radars and Soviet anti-ballistic missile programs now under way, suggests that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory, an action which would have significant effects on the strategic balance;

-- The SS-X-25 represents further modernization of the Soviet ICBM force, which is already more modern than the U.S. force;

-- Soviet chemical and toxin weapon activities are of potentially great military significance since they have allowed the USSR to enhance chemical and biological warfighting capabilities and preparedness; and,

-- TTBT violations would permit the Soviets military advantages in the testing of nuclear warheads.

In the near term, the U.S. defense modernization program, including strategic, conventional, and chemical programs, if fully funded, is adequate to cope with the military implications of these Soviet actions.

U.S. Policy on Soviet Compliance Violations

Q. What is the U.S. doing about Soviet violations?

A. The U.S. is taking a comprehensive approach to arms control compliance issues involving the following elements:

-- At the request of the Congress, we have provided it with a classified report on these issues and have briefed our Allies;

-- We are monitoring new information and systematically analyzing existing facts, both on new issues and on those about which no final conclusions could be reached at this time;

-- We continue to raise the issues of concern with the Soviets in confidential diplomatic channels, where we are insisting on explanations, clarifications, and corrective actions;

-- We are taking account of Soviet violations in our defense modernization plans; and,

-- Finally, we are making particular efforts to ensure that, in light of the findings about Soviet violations, arms control agreements contain effective verification and compliance provisions.

Effect on U.S.-Soviet Relations

Q. Will the Administration's findings of Soviet violations further exacerbate U.S.-Soviet relations?

A. We cannot ignore the evidence of Soviet violations. Nevertheless, our objective remains to pursue satisfactory resolution of our concerns through diplomatic channels. We continue to believe that effective arms control requires strict compliance as well as effective verification. We have expressed these views to the Soviets many times during the past three years. The extent of Soviet willingness to work with us on compliance questions will determine how compliance issues influence U.S.-Soviet relations.

Why Negotiate New Agreements

Q. Why does the U.S. continue to negotiate new agreements with the Soviet Union when it is violating existing ones?

A. We do this for several reasons:

-- First, new arms control agreements, if soundly formulated and fully adhered to, can serve U.S. interests. We should not abandon efforts to achieve effective and verifiable agreements that can increase U.S. and Allied security and reduce the risk of war.

-- Second, entering new negotiations does not in any way condone or ignore past Soviet behavior.

-- Third, continuing to negotiate can give us leverage and another way for trying to get the Soviets to abide by existing agreements.

THE US RESPONSE TO SOVIET CHARGES OF ARMS CONTROL VIOLATIONS

1. ABM Treaty: Strategic Defense Initiative

Soviet Allegation: The Soviet Union asserts that the US "has embarked on a course of undermining" the 1972 ABM Treaty and that this intention was "proclaimed officially" by President Reagan when he announced his Strategic Defense Initiative, involving the "creation of a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements," which is "explicitly forbidden" by the Treaty.

The Facts: The Soviet assertion is false. The US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is a research program and will be carried out in compliance with all US treaty obligations. The ABM Treaty permits research, and both sides have had research programs since the signing of the Treaty; indeed, the Soviet effort has been far more intensive than that of the US. The Soviet Union maintains and is upgrading the world's only existing antiballistic missile (ABM) system, installed around Moscow, and has for many years been working on advanced technologies for defense against ballistic missiles. Furthermore, as the President stated in his 1985 Report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements, Soviet ABM and ABM-related actions suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. The Soviet Union has violated the ABM Treaty. It is constructing a large phased array radar near Krasnoyarsk in violation of an important ABM Treaty provision that limits such radars to the periphery and oriented outward. This radar is like other early warning radars we fear could lay the base for a nation-wide ABM deployment. The Soviet Union has developed a surface-to-air missile, the SA-X-12, which may have ABM capability. It has probably violated the Treaty provision that prohibits testing SAM Components in an ABM mode.

The President stated in his March 23, 1983, speech that US ABM activities would be consistent with US treaty obligations. We have assured the Soviet Union both publicly and privately that the Strategic Defense Initiative involves only a research effort which will be carried out within the constraints of the ABM Treaty. This research effort will permit an informed decision, perhaps in the early 1990s, on whether to proceed with full-scale engineering development. The US does not and will not violate its Treaty obligations.

2. The ABM Treaty

Soviet Allegations: The Soviet Union asserts that the US is engaged in activity which "clearly contradicts" the provisions of the ABM Treaty. Specifically, the US:

-- is working to create mobile ABM radar stations;

-- is testing Minuteman ICBMs to provide them with ABM capabilities; and

-- is creating multiple warheads for ABM interceptor missiles.

The Facts: Each of these charges is false.

-- The reference to mobile ABM radars refers to an instrumentation radar now dismantled which was tested at the Kwajalein test range. It was not an ABM radar. The Soviets, on the other hand, have developed ABM components that are a potential violation of the treaty provision prohibiting the development, testing, and deployment of mobile ABM radars.

-- Only the first two booster stages of the Minuteman I ICBM, but not the whole missile, were used in a research test conducted in full conformity with the ABM Treaty. The interceptor vehicle in question was observably different from Minuteman I, as were its performance characteristics. The Soviet Union should be able to verify this difference by national technical means of verification. The Minuteman I ICBM no longer exists.

-- The US is not now developing or testing and has never developed or tested or otherwise pursued ABM interceptors with multiple warheads.

3. The ABM Treaty: Pave Paws Radars

Soviet Allegation: The Soviet Union asserts that the deployment in the US of Pave Paws radar stations is part of "Washington's efforts to prepare for creating a large-scale ABM system."

The Facts: There is no merit whatsoever in the charge that US deployment of new Pave Paws large phased-array radars (LPARs) is part of an effort to prepare for creating a large-scale ABM defense. The US has two Pave Paws radars, one in California (Beale AFB) and one in Massachusetts (Otis AFB). Two more are being constructed, one each in Georgia (Robins AFB) and Texas (SW of Goodfellow AFB). All of these radars are for early warning of

strategic ballistic missile attack (BMEW). As required by the ABM Treaty, they are located on the periphery of our national territory and are oriented outward. They are not ABM radars. Furthermore, these radars are much less capable and powerful than Soviet radars which the Soviets claim are for early warning of missile attack, and not for ballistic missile defense.

4. SALT II

Soviet Allegations: The US "never intended to 'refrain from actions'" which would undermine the SALT II Treaty. While the US "pretended" not to object to limits on long-range cruise missiles, it was preparing for the "massive deployment" of this new type of strategic offensive armament. While it was agreeing not to circumvent in any manner the SALT II Treaty, the US already had a plan for the deployment of "several hundred essentially strategic" nuclear missiles in Europe.

The Facts: The Soviet assertions are groundless. First, it should be noted that the Soviet Union's long-range cruise missile program has been intensive; an air-launched version is already deployed and ground- and sea-launched versions are undergoing testing. In 1977, the Soviet Union initiated the deployment of the SS-20, greatly increasing the number of nuclear warheads on its intermediate-range missiles deployed against Western Europe. In 1979, in response to the growing Soviet nuclear threat from weapons such as the SS-20, NATO decided to deploy longer-range INF (LRINF) missiles in Europe, specifically US Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. At the same time, NATO sought an arms control agreement limiting or eliminating LRINF missile systems on both sides.

NATO's Pershing II and GLCM programs do not circumvent the provisions of the SALT II Treaty. Two points pertain. First, the Pershing II ballistic missile falls outside the SALT II Treaty since its range is less than the 5,500 km minimum set for intercontinental ballistic missiles, as defined by SALT II.

Second, the only provision of SALT II which would have applied to LRINF systems was contained in its Protocol which prohibited deployment of ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs and SLCMs) capable of a range in excess of 600 km. The Protocol, however, would have expired on December 31, 1981, by its own terms, and the US made clear at the time SALT II was signed that the Protocol would not be extended beyond that date.

Consequently, deployment of these systems does not constitute circumvention. The Soviet assertion is merely an attempt to provide the Treaty with an interpretation which it clearly has never had on either side.

The total US GLCM and P-II program even in the late 1980s will only be a fraction of the current Soviet SS-20 force.

The U.S. remains committed to the achievement of radical reductions and equitable limitations in LRINF systems. Our recent agreement with the Soviets to begin new negotiations on these systems is a demonstration of that firm commitment.

5. Nuclear Testing: TTBT

Soviet Allegation: The Soviet Union asserts that the US "time and again" tests "nuclear charges" above the 150 kiloton limit established by the unratified Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

The Facts: There is no truth in the Soviet assertion. Since 1976, the year when the threshold provisions of the TTBT would have become effective, the US has conducted no nuclear tests having yield which exceeded the 150 kiloton threshold of this treaty. As the President reported in his February 1985 compliance report, Soviet nuclear testing activities for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligations under the TTBT. These Soviet actions continue despite US requests for corrective measures.

6. Nuclear Testing: LTBT

Soviet Allegation: The Soviet Union asserts that "time and again" US nuclear tests are accompanied by the escape of radioactive substances into the atmosphere in violation of the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty.

The Facts: Both the US and the Soviet Union have encountered some difficulty in totally containing all their underground nuclear tests. Unlike the Soviet Union, however, the United States has adopted extensive safeguards at the Nevada Test Site to prevent the escape of radioactive material from its nuclear tests. These safeguards, although quite costly, have, for more than a decade, ensured that no US test has violated the Limited Test Ban Treaty. In contrast, as the President reported in his February 1985 compliance report, there continue to be Soviet ventings involving traversal of radioactive materials beyond Soviet borders, in violation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and despite US requests for corrective action. Until its similar allegation following release last year of the President's 1984 Report on Soviet Noncompliance, the Soviet Union had not raised its concerns about US venting since 1976.

7. Chemical Weapons

Soviet Allegation: The Soviet Union asserts that "US toxins killed and crippled thousands upon thousands of inhabitants in Indochina," that the US blocks international agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons, supplies chemical weapons to "Afghan bandits," and prepares for a "chemical rearmament" of America.

The Facts: Contrary to the implications contained in the Soviet assertion, the US, in fact, is abiding by all obligations in this regard.

Soviet allegations of US toxic chemical weapons use in Indochina are completely false. Charges that the US killed inhabitants with toxic weapons are completely unfounded. The US never at any time used toxin weapons in the war in Southeast Asia. It is the stated policy of the US that we will never be the first to use chemical weapons in a conflict. The US is widely recognized as making vigorous and constructive efforts to promote progress in the CD and elsewhere. In April 1984, Vice President Bush tabled a comprehensive draft treaty tha sought effectively to ban chemical weapons everywhere in the world. The US remains committed to the elimination of all CW and to the conclusion of a complete, effective, and verifiable global CW ban. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has shown no such willingness to negotiate an effective, verifiable treaty. Bilaterals were initiated between the US and the Soviet Union in an effort to further progress toward a chemical weapons treaty. These bilaterals lapsed in 1980, due to Soviet intransigence on verification issues.

In contrast, the US has found clear evidence that it is the Soviet Union that has aided its surrogates in that region of the world in using chemicals against defenseless tribespeople. The Soviets' use of "Yellow Rain" is well known to the world.

At US initiative, bilateral discussions were undertaken in July and August 1984 and are scheduled to begin again this year. While we continue to seek warp to negotiate, the Soviet Union has failed to comment constructively on our proposals -- the Soviet Ambassador in Geneva rejected them even before he read them. It is the Soviet Union which must take concrete steps to convince the world that it is truly serious about CW arms control by working with the US and the CD to develop effective and mutually acceptable approaches to banning CW worldwide.

US policy concerning chemical weapons is first to negotiate a treaty that will effectively end Chemical Weapons Worldwide. Until that treaty becomes a reality, the US must maintain a credible deterrent against Soviet chemical weapons use. The US

has not produced chemical weapons for 15 years and we find that through deterioration and obsolescence, our diminishing stockpile amounts to unilateral CW disarmament. Extensive Soviet stockpiles give them a clear military superiority in Chemical Weapons and provide them no incentive to negotiate an end to that superiority. In order to redress this imbalance, the President has asked Congress this year to begin modernization of the US Chemical Weapons stockpile. These efforts do not represent the "chemical rearmament of America" as the Soviet Union has charged, but instead will give us a smaller and safer stockpile in the event we should ever have to retaliate against a Soviet chemical attack.

US concern regarding the verification issue and insistence that it be addressed has been amply justified by evidence of illegal use of CW weapons in several conflicts since the late 1970s.

In this regard, Soviet involvement in the use of toxins and chemical warfare agents in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan, in violation of the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, does not inspire confidence that expressed Soviet interest in CW arms control is genuine or sincere, nor does the Soviet failure to respond constructively to the U.S. draft CW treaty.

We are shocked by Soviet allegations that the US has supplied chemical weapons to the Afghan resistance. This charge is completely groundless and a pure fabrication. The US has not, does not, and will not supply chemical weapons to the Afghan resistance. To the contrary, the clear evidence, confirmed by international sources, is that it is the Soviet Union that is using chemical weapons against the Afghan resistance. We find the Soviet charge doubly curious in that it calls attention to the continuing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in violation of the most basic principles of international law, including provisions of the UN Charter.

8. Helsinki Final Act

Soviet Allegation: The Soviet Union asserts that the "contribution" of the US to the Helsinki process has been, inter alia "the heightening of military tension in Europe" and the deployment of "first strike nuclear armaments" in Europe.

The Facts: The Soviet Union is falsely asserting that we have engaged in behavior of which it itself is guilty. The Soviet Union initiated the modernization of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe in 1977 by beginning its deployment of the new triple-warhead SS-20 missile, and it, unlike the US, has greatly increased the number of nuclear warheads maintained there. The NATO allies have responded both belatedly and reluctantly.

The Soviet allegation apparently refers to the deployment of US Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles which began in late 1983. (The 1979 NATO dual-track decision recognized the requirement to redress the imbalance in overall nuclear forces highlighted by the growing Soviet force of triple-warhead SS-20 missiles, either through deployment of US LRINF missiles or through a concrete arms control result.) The US sought during the INF negotiations which began in 1981 to reduce substantially, or, preferably, to eliminate all US and Soviet longer-range INF missiles on a global basis. Pending unilateral Soviet reductions in LRINF deployments or a negotiated solution, NATO counter-deployments strengthen deterrence by helping to block disproportionate Soviet military strength and hence reduce rather than increase the danger of war.

The NATO force modernization programs envisioned for the European theater are completely permissible under the Helsinki Final Act and are in response to an unprecedented buildup and modernization of Soviet conventional and nuclear forces. The deployment of US Pershing IIs and GLCMs is in particular a response to that unprecedented buildup of which the most obvious example is the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles. The Soviet Union began deploying SS-20s in 1977 and to date now has deployed about 400 SS-20 launchers (over 100 during the course of the INF negotiations) with some 1200 warheads, or over twice the potential NATO deployment total of 572.

Moreover, the Soviet charge obviously lacks credibility in light of the large reductions in the total NATO nuclear stockpile in Europe. In addition to the 1,000 warheads already withdrawn as a result of NATO's 1979 decision, the US will withdraw a further 1,400 nuclear warheads in accordance with the Montebello decision. Additionally, for each Pershing II and GLCM which is deployed to Europe, the US is withdrawing one nuclear warhead from its European stockpile.

Finally, it should be noted that we and our Allies notify all exercises which exceed the threshold of 25,000 troops established by the Final Act, and often notify smaller-scale military maneuvers, as a voluntary effort to strengthen mutual confidence. We also invite observers, including Soviet military officers to these exercises. The Soviets unfortunately have not accepted our invitations.

We regret that the Soviet Union has not always reciprocated. Not only have the Warsaw Pact nations generally declined to provide voluntary notification of many exercises which did not reach the 25,000 troop threshold, as the President's Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance indicated, but the Soviet Union, in a clear cut violation of the Final Act, did not adequately notify the exercise Zapad 81, which involved some 100,000 troops.

Themes on Religious and Moral Issues

-- In a pluralistic society such as ours, we respect diversity of views and encourage free expression of different opinions. We welcome open discussion of our policies on national security and arms control issues. This is an area where reasonable men and women can differ.

-- We share the concern of those who wish to reduce the risk of war, and end the costly competition in nuclear and conventional weapons. The President has said he has no nigher objectives.

-- Our basic aim is to live in peace with freedom. Our nuclear and conventional weapons are intended to deter war.

-- Our policy recognizes that, in the imperfect world in which we live, some form of deterrence which relies on a balance of nuclear and conventional forces is necessary to prevent war while we seek a better way, including deterrence at much lower levels of weapons than now exist. As Pope John Paul wrote in June 1982, "In current conditions, 'deterrence' based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself, but as a step on the way toward progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable. Nonetheless, in order to ensure peace, it is indispensable not to be satisfied with this minimum."

-- Our ultimate goal is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

-- As a step toward that long-term goal, we are actively negotiating with the Soviet Union for deep reductions in nuclear arsenals and for new agreements that would reduce the risk of war and lessen the chances of misunderstanding or miscalculation. These negotiations present a real opportunity to reverse the growth in nuclear arsenals and contribute to peace and stability.

-- One of the issues we want to discuss with the Soviets is how we can strengthen deterrence by moving away from relying solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation as the basis for our security, toward a world in which there would be greater reliance on defensive systems -- should they prove feasible -- which threaten no one.

-- The US Strategic Defense Initiative is a long-term research program, which is designed to explore the feasibility of such defenses, emphasizing the non-nuclear. It will be many years before a judgment on their feasibility can be made.

-- In the meantime, to deter war, we must be able to convince a potential adversary that the costs of undertaking aggression against the US or our allies would outweigh any benefits he could hope to gain.

o To do this requires that we have credible and effective military forces, including nuclear weapons, since our potential adversary possesses these weapons.

o It must also be clear that we have the resolve to defend ourselves, our Allies, and the freedoms we value.

-- It has long been the policy of the US and our allies that we will not use weapons -- nuclear or conventional -- except in response to aggression.

-- For moral, political and military reasons, the US does not target civilian populations as such.

-- Governments have the responsibility and duty to protect their citizens from possible aggression. Just how much money should be spent for defense is a matter for public discussion in a democracy. However, the money spent on strategic forces now is less than 1% of our GNP, under 6 % of our total federal budget, and less than 15% of our defense budget. Given the stakes -- the ability of free people to continue to live in peace and freedom -- the funds are not excessive.

FOR USE WITH RELIGIOUS AUDIENCES AS APPROPRIATE

-- Our policy of deterrence is based on moral principles shared by a majority of Americans:

o the principle of individual self - defense, i.e. the right to protect oneself against unjust aggression;

o the principle of collective self - defense, i.e. the obligation of the state to protect its citizens against unjust aggression, and to join with other states to assist them in defending themselves;

o the principle of discrimination, i.e. the immunity of non combatants to direct, intentional attack; and

o the principle of proportionality, i.e. that our response to aggression will be proportionate to the threat and will end the conflict as soon as possible with the least loss of life and destruction of property.

US-Soviet Relations

Background

History. Since the 1917 Russian Revolution, the US-Soviet relationship has evolved through several phases, including a period of minimal contact, a wartime alliance, "containment," and an intense cold war rivalry. In recent years, the high hopes of the 1970s for detente have given way to reassessment of this fundamentally adversarial relationship.

The adversarial nature of US-Soviet relations stems from several factors: the Eurasian location of the USSR, which places it in close proximity to US interests; the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the Soviet regime, which gives its leaders a very different perspective from that of the West; and the absence of political freedoms in the USSR, which permits the Soviet leadership to conduct foreign policy without the domestic constraints known to democratic states. There are, however, strong incentives for US-Soviet cooperation, foremost among them the need to avoid war. The US, therefore, has sought to engage the USSR in constructive dialogue at all levels on the issues affecting our two nations.

Soviet Challenges. Because of the American military deterrent, the USSR has avoided direct aggression against the US and its allies. Nonetheless, the US has been concerned by certain Soviet actions in recent years, including:

- a continuing quest for military superiority;
- the occupation of Afghanistan by 115,000 Soviet troops;
- the unrelenting effort to impose an alien Soviet "model" on nominally independent Soviet clients and allies;
- harsh suppression of human rights within the USSR; and
- violation of certain treaties and agreements, and stretching the letter of others.

US Approach. US policy toward the USSR is based on three principles: realism, strength, and dialogue. Our dealings are grounded in a realistic appraisal of Soviet strengths and objectives: we must not overstate the Soviet challenge, but neither can we overlook the potential dangers. In order to counter Soviet objectives, the US must have the necessary strength--military, economic, and social--to do so. The US, however, strongly prefers to resolve differences through negotiation. Thus we have conducted a broad dialogue designed to develop peaceful solutions to our problems and to encourage the USSR to fulfill its international obligations.

International Environment. The US is committed to maintain the military balance vis a vis the USSR through our own and allied defense programs and, where possible, through mutual and verifiable arms reductions. To counter the use of threats and

of force in Soviet foreign policy, we have made clear that we will resist encroachment on our vital interests and those of our allies and friends. In Europe, the allies are united on the need to counter Soviet missile deployments. The first deployments of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles have proceeded on schedule. We also are continuing to upgrade NATO's conventional forces.

To deter threats to vital interests outside Europe, we are developing the ability, with allied support, to move forces rapidly to key areas of potential instability such as Southwest Asia. In the Western Hemisphere, the US and its friends are firmly resolved to resist destabilization of democratic countries in Central America. The US is also working to restrict Soviet expansion by responding positively to the economic problems of developing nations and by working to strengthen democratic institutions worldwide.

New Arms Negotiations. In January 1985, both countries agreed that a new forum for renewed arms control talks would begin in March in Geneva to address "a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms--both strategic and intermediate-range--with these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship."

It is a useful first step in what probably will be a long and complicated negotiating process. Nevertheless, we hope that through such negotiations we can reach agreements with the USSR to reduce nuclear arsenals, strengthen stability, and increase our security and that of our Allies.

New Leadership. Following the death of Leonid Brezhnev in November 1982, Yuriy Andropov--former KGB Chairman--became the new Soviet leader. He was seriously ill for most of his 15-month tenure and did not live long enough to implement fully his new policies for economic reform and eliminating corruption. East-West relations deteriorated under his brief tenure with the Soviet walkout from the START and INF talks, the tragedy of KAL flight 007, and other harmful developments.

When Andropov died in February 1984, the Politburo selected Konstantin Chernenko to succeed him as General Secretary. Chernenko died after barely a year in office. On March 11, 1985 the Politburo chose Mikhail Gorbachev, 54, to succeed Chernenko, thus beginning the transfer of power to a new generation.

Future US-Soviet Relations. President Reagan wants to develop a more constructive and productive relationship with the USSR and has indicated publicly his hope for an opportunity to meet Mr. Gorbachev in the near future. Prime US policy goals include:

- verifiable reductions in nuclear arms;
- cessation of Soviet interference in the affairs of sovereign states;
- respect for the human rights of Soviet citizens; and
- improvement in people-to-people, economic, and other bilateral relations based on reciprocity and mutual interest.

The development of more constructive relations with the Soviets is a complex process and we have no illusions that a new era of cooperation automatically accompanies a leadership change. We base our policies on US interests; we expect the Soviets to continue to base theirs on their interests. No one expects progress to be quick or easy.

Points to Make

o Historically, American policy towards the Soviet Union has swung from one extreme to the other--from implacable opposition and focus on increasing our strength to seeming detente and pursuing a course of negotiations.

o Throughout this Administration, President Reagan has based his policies toward the Soviet Union on a consistent and solid foundation of realism, strength, and negotiation.

o The US seeks an international environment that enhances the freedom, security, and prosperity of our own people, our allies and friends, and of all mankind. We know that such a promising future depends, above all, on stability and global security.

o To pursue our goals successfully, we must persuade the Soviets of two things: First, there will be no rewards for aggression and we are strong enough and determined enough to resist attempts by the Soviet Union to expand its control by force. And second, we mean no threat to the security of the USSR and are ready and willing--at all times--to discuss and negotiate our differences.

- The experience of negotiations shows that the Soviets recognize reality and that tough, sober bargaining, when backed by American strength, can lead to mutually advantageous results. Negotiation without strength cannot bring benefits, and strength alone will never achieve a durable peace.

- We have been working to establish a more constructive and realistic long-term relationship with the Soviets in a number of areas--i.e. trade, exchanges and communications--and will continue to do so.

- Arms control is an important part of our overall relationship with the Soviet Union, but it is only one of many US-Soviet issues. Part of our effort to improve relations is to address differences we have on human rights, regional issues and a variety of bilateral questions.

- The Soviet human rights record remains deplorable: only 896 Jews were granted exit permits in 1984, compared with 50,000 in 1979. Repression of dissidents continues. We must also look at regional problems, such as the 115,000 Soviet troops that occupy Afghanistan.

- The development of more constructive relations with the Soviets is a complex process and we have no illusions that a new era of cooperation automatically accompanies a leadership change. We should not expect the Soviet system or Soviet goals to change.

- No one expects progress to be quick or easy. Nonetheless, some of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's early remarks are encouraging. The crucial element will be whether Soviet deeds will coincide with these initial positive sentiments.