ER-3911-85

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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3637 (10-81)

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

ROUTING SLIP

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Date

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STAT

Executive Secretary

9 Oct 85

Date

3637 (10-81)

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 2, 1985

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

In the past we have written to you seeking information about the long-standing problem at the Central Intelligence Agency regarding an apparent analytical bias which continuously under-estimates Soviet intentions and capabilities. Some have even characterized this bias as "pro-Soviet." We posed a series of questions, the answers to which would assist us in reviewing this problem, on April 25, 1985; to date no response has been received.

Now the problem has surfaced in public again. According to a recent newspaper article, the CIA's internal publication Studies in Intelligence, recently published a book review of a volume by two distinguished academic scholars on the topic of Soviet Disinformation. Soviet Disinformation is a very serious intelligence and political problem to which you, Mr. President, have personally called world-wide attention. Soviet Disinformation techniques are part of a larger intelligence problem which entails Soviet "Active Measures"--the so-called Maskirovka techniques of Camouflage, Concealment and Deception.

Yet according to the article attached, the review by CIA's publication reads as though it were written in Moscow. Instead of criticizing the analysis of the authors, it attacks the very concept that Maskirovka actually exists. Indeed, according to the information available, the CIA's review reads like a piece of disinformation itself, and appears to serve Soviet foreign policy interests. Of course, we do not have the actual text, so we ask that you supply the text to us. The article we seek is an unclassified review by Avis Boutell in Studies in Intelligence of the book Dezinformatsia by Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson.

It seems strange for the CIA to be attacking the serious analysis of Soviet Disinformation, when the CIA should be taking the lead in unmasking Soviet Disinformation. This appears to be part of the well-documented, much larger problem at CIA--the long-standing habit of the CIA of under-estimating Soviet intentions and military capabilities. America is now faced with the dangerous implications of Soviet military supremacy, as you have confirmed by at least eight statements you have made since 1982, and by the numbers and trends in comparative U.S.-Soviet armaments.

C-134

In the most important measures of military power, the gaps between U.S. and Soviet capabilities are growing larger, not smaller, despite your vigorous Defense Modernization Program. We are still losing ground to the Soviets--and these gaps will continue to widen over the next five years. In fact, we are over 38 billion dollars behind President Carter's Five Year Defense Program, as you pointed out on March 22, 1985. Thus the "correlation of forces" has indeed decisively shifted against the United States, as Soviet political and military leaders frequently assert.

The bias of the CIA for under-estimating Soviet intentions and capabilities over the last 25 years has already had a deleterious effect on U.S. national security. But the recent implications of information [redacted] suggests that we should inquire further into the problem of this bias. Accordingly, we therefore request answers to the following additional questions as soon as possible: STAT

1. Why does the CIA produce single-source analysis of Soviet and Communist Chinese open publications such as is done by Foreign Broadcast Information Service?

2. Is there an internal CIA review process to identify possible pro-Soviet bias in published unclassified or classified analytical products?

3. Was the attached article mentioned above screened to detect its possible pro-Soviet bias? If not, why not? If so, why was it published under the official imprimatur of the CIA?

4. Is there a possible pro-Soviet bias in many CIA products over the past 20 years?

5. Is there any evidence of the influence of possible pro-Soviet penetrations, moles or bias in the preparation, analysis and dissemination of intelligence products on the Soviet Union over the past 20 years?

6. Has any important intelligence analysis or evidence related to the Soviet Union ever been withheld or suppressed within or by the CIA? Did any of this intelligence evidence or analysis reveal Soviet deception? What is the Counterintelligence significance of the suppression of intelligence on Soviet deception?

7. Could a possible pro-Soviet bias have played a role in the prolonged and worsening CIA under-estimates of Soviet strategic forces in the 1960's and 1970's?

8. We have recent reports that the CIA:
   a.) Has further down-graded Soviet Backfire bomber range

estimates;

b.) Is negatively reassessing evidence of Soviet Biological and Chemical Warfare arms control violations;

STAT

e.) Is denying and down-playing evidence of Soviet Camouflage, Concealment and Deception (Maskirovka);

STAT

Are these recent reports correct? Are they best explained by an under-estimative analytical bias, a possible pro-Soviet bias, bureaucratic incompetence, or all of the above?

9. Was John Paisley likely to have been a Soviet KGB mole inside the CIA, who may have been assassinated by the KGB in order to protect other CIA moles? What is the best assessment of Paisley's full career and death? Have traces of other CIA moles ever been detected?

10. Are reports that CIA has regressed into continued under-estimation of Soviet military spending correct?

STAT

13. Has the CIA consistently under-estimated Soviet global objectives and misunderstood Soviet arms control objectives?

14. Can at least five years of the 10 year 1980-1990 U.S. "window of vulnerability" be attributed to under-estimates by CIA of Soviet ICBM accuracies?

In sum, we strongly agree with CIA Director Casey's initial assessment of the CIA's analytical track record made on February 13, 1981:

> "The most frequent criticism is that our [CIA's] interpretations and assessments have shown a tendency to be overly optimistic, to place a benign interpretation on information which could be interpreted as indicating danger. It's our obligation to present conclusions which emphasize hard reality undistorted by preconceptions or by wishful thinking...I found in SALT I, for example, that some of the [CIA] judgements were soft. They leaned toward a kind of benign interpretation rather that a harder interpretation of assessing or viewing a situation as being more dangerous." (Emphasis added.)

We fear, however, that despite Director Casey's best efforts, the CIA's performance has not improved.

Thank you for your prompt response to these important questions. We also again request belated answers to our April 25, 1985 questions (letter attached.)

Sincerely,

Jesse Helms

Copies to:
Director, CIA
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Director CIA Counter-Intelligence
National Intelligence Officer for Deception
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

National Intelligence Officers for U.S.S.R. and Strategic Forces
Director, DIA
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Chairman, Intelligence Oversight Board
Chairman, Senate Intelligence Committee

Attachments:
Washington Times Article "Misinformation on Disinformation" (July 16, 1985)
Unanswered Symms-Wallop-Helms letter to the President of April 25, 1985

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied

PART II -- MAIN EDITION -- 16 JULY 1985

FEATURES/COLUMNISTS

WASHINGTON TIMES 16 July 1985 Pg.1D

Misinformation on disinformation

ARNOLD BEICHMAN

I recently read a review, published in a certain magazine to be identified later, of a book, *Dezinformatsia*, by two respected academics, Professor Richard H. Shultz Jr. of Tufts University's Fletcher School of Diplomacy and Roy Godson of Georgetown University. The review made the following serious charges against this book:

- The book was said to use "specious arguments to prove the obvious."
- It misrepresents reality to prove a simplistic point.
- It is "misguided," exhibits a "total lack of understanding" about Clausewitz, shows "a superficial understanding of current history and the Soviet Union."
- It didn't "fairly report" the content of Soviet journals, it has treated the subject "irresponsibly," it suffers from "extraordinarily naive assumptions" and "erroneous history."
- And the book was said "ultimately" to serve "neither scholarship nor the national interest."

Such harsh language about the published work of academics can be defined as a form of character assassination, since it questions their honor as teachers and researchers. For my part, to be even harsher, I would say that this review could, with little editing, have appeared in a Soviet publication.

Now, then, would you like to guess in what left-wing, pro-Soviet, progressive journal this book review appeared? If you're very smart and sophisticated, you might try and guess, but you'd be wrong. I'll have to tell you:

This book review appeared in an official magazine of the government of the United States, a magazine published by the Central Intelligence Agency — yes, by the CIA under the supervision of the Deputy Director ate for Intelligence that is responsible for all CIA analyses of world affairs.

The publication, a quarterly called *Studies in Intelligence*, is an "in-house" publication. It is not distributed publicly since some articles are classified; others, such as the book review I am discussing, are unclassified. The essay-review, in the magazine's winter 1984 issue, was written by Avis Boutell, a CIA analyst, who works for the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

When I read the Shultz-Godson book some months ago to prepare my own favorable review, I found it a cool, scholarly examination of Soviet propaganda and disinformation strategies. So did a number of other distinguished Sovietologists and publicists, such as Professors Adam Ulam and Uri Ra'anan, Dr. Robert Conquest, and Professor Sidney Hook, who wrote the laudatory introduction.

The book, now in its third edition, included what I regarded as highly informative interviews with defectors who had specialized, while in the service of the KGB in the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia, in "active measures." The Soviet strategy of "active measures" involves, for the most part, covert disinformation as "a non-attributed or falsely attributed communication, written or oral, containing intentionally false, incomplete, or misleading information [frequently combined with true information], which seeks to deceive, misinform, and or mislead the target," according to the Shultz-Godson definition.

In other words, the book describes a panoply of Soviet tactics to manipulate the media in the democracies, the use of "agents of influence," sponsorship of clandestine radio broadcasts, and use of international front organizations. These strategies and tactics are excellently described in this important book.

Not only is *Studies in Intelligence* an official government magazine, but it also is published by a U.S. secret service. It therefore must be assumed that whatever is published therein represents the official view of the CIA or, at the very least, the point of view of CIA analysts. As an analogy, a Voice of America editorial, for example, must be approved by responsible State Department officials before it can be read on the air.

If the CIA book review reflects the political culture of the CIA and the world in which its analysts live, then some of the egregious errors about Soviet intentions made by the CIA over the past 15 or more years, errors which have been publicly discussed in the press and by the two congressional committees on intelligence oversight, become understandable.

One could take apart, paragraph by paragraph, this CIA book review to demonstrate its use of the rhetoric of overkill.

Here I want merely to deal with the political approach of a CIA analyst whose views, no matter what the CIA might say, seem to harmonize with the agency's ethos, which I pray is not that of William J. Casey, CIA director. That this review got past Mr. Casey, I can understand; he has more important problems to deal with. But isn't there somebody in his organization who has the wit, understanding, and common decency to realize that the language used to discuss the Shultz-Godson book might be better suited to a review of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*?

Take this sneering, reductive sentence in the review: "They [the authors] seem less concerned to understand the Soviet Union than to prove that it is irrational and the West totally benign."

Now anyone who has read this book knows that the authors do not seek to prove that the U.S.S.R. is irrational. On the contrary, what they demonstrate is that the Soviet KGB is performing with great skill its assignment to further the Politburo's foreign-policy objectives. The giveaway phrase in that sentence is "to prove . . . the West totally benign."

Of course, the authors nowhere try to show that the West is totally benign. Such a thesis is irrelevant to the book since it is merely attempting to discuss Soviet "active measures," not the good intentions of the West.

But let's face it: couldn't a victim of Soviet totalitarianism, rotting in one of its prison camps — or an Andrei Sakharov or Anatoly Shcharansky — say that, in comparison to the wholly rational tyranny of the U.S.S.R, the West is "totally benign?"

What the author (and in this, I am sure, the reviewer reflects the views

MISINFORMATION . . . Pg.2-F

SDI ON SHUTTLE: The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization has reserved two half bays per year on the Space Shuttle starting in 1987.

•

SDI FUNDING ABROAD: U.S. officials estimate that the U.S. could spend as much as $1 billion on SDI research undertaken by major NATO allies as well as Israel and Japan.

•

COST TO ATTACK: Sen. Albert Gore Jr. (D-Tenn.) says the inference of a Congressional Research Service study on the cost to attack is that a force of 500 Midgetman missiles, on mobile hardened launchers, could indeed be destroyed by the Soviets but the price would be a very large portion of their ICBM force. Gore says the cost to attack U.S. silo-based weapons and Midgetman would approximate the entire inventory of Soviet counterforce weapons. In the aftermath of such an attack, he says, the U.S. would still have a "massive bomber force" and, once the Trident D-5 missile is deployed, "a very large and invulnerable second strike force with counterforce capabilities of its own."

NEW YORK POST 16 July 1985 Pg.10

Beirut moves to try hijackers

BEIRUT — A public prosecutor yesterday ordered authorities to investigate and identify the air pirates who hijacked TWA Flight 847 and killed U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem.

If tried and found guilty, the hijackers could be sentenced to death, said prosecutor Maurice Khawam, whose jurisdiction includes Beirut Airport.

Khawam identified one of the hijackers as Ali Atweh and ordered police and authorities at the airport to identify the others.

The U.S., seeking an international boycott of the airport, has demanded that Lebanon bring Stethem's killers to justice.

State-run Beirut radio last week named Ali Younis and Ahmed Ghorbieh, as well as Atweh, as the principal hijackers.

Legal sources dismissed the investigation as political, saying: "No one seriously believes the air pirates will be arrested or brought to trial."

MISINFORMATION...from Pg.1-F

of the CIA establishment) clearly rejects (and the targets of the review do not) is the meaning of Marxism-Leninism as a permanent constituent of Soviet foreign policy. What that doctine means is that Mikhail Gorbachev cannot regard as legitimate any system of rule other than communism. Marxism-Leninism sees other political systems as doomed to fall because of the "contradictions of capitalism."

Since Marxism-Leninism carries the banner of history and the future, the U.S.S.R. alone has the right to judge who shall live and who shall die. That is why negotiation with the Soviet Union, except on its own terms, is doomed to fail until the Soviet Union accepts — in practice, not in joint communiques — an amendment to the eschatology of Marxism-Leninism.

The CIA reviewer demonstrates — let's call it naivete — a surprising naivete in assuming that the Soviet media, during the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford detente period, out of conviction sincerely ascribed to the West "realistic, positive qualities."

And she attacks the authors for not giving due credit to this thawing of the eternal Soviet winter. Of course, the Soviet media were willing to be kinder and less strident because it was during detente that the U.S.S.R. engaged without Western opposition in the greatest arms-building program of any country in history. The Soviets continue that program to this very day.

But then there came came a time when the kissing had to stop. The Soviet media changed the lovey-dovey, bear-hugging music. What in heaven's name did the West do that forced upon a doting Soviet Union a change of tune, from detente mellowness to cold war harshness? Was the error to accept sadly the destruction of 269 lives on KAL 007? Sadly accept the killing of Major Nicholson? Sadly accept the attempt on the pope's life? Sadly accept martial law for Poland? Sadly accept the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan?

But let us assume that the reviewer is correct in some of her criticisms. Does that call for a savage rhetorical barrage which borders on high-level billingsgate? Does it call for a cannonade of unprovable charges such as the claims that the book "hurts" the profession of intelligence, and the efforts to develop "a rational foreign policy," and that the book serves "neither scholarship nor the national interest?" If anybody has "hurt" the profession of intelligence, it would be Avis Boutell and whoever edits the CIA magazine.

What kind of behavior is that, William Casey? Is someone down there trying to get even with somebody else?

Arnold Beichman, a founding member of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, of which Professor Godson is coordinator, frequently writes about intelligence matters.

Dezinformatsia. By Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson. Pergamon-Brassey's; 1984; 211 pp.

This book sets out to demonstrate that Soviet leaders believe their country is in an adversarial relationship with the United States and that they are committed to using "active measures" to achieve what they perceive to be their national interests. It reviews some examples of Soviet active measures—overt propaganda as well as covert media activities and political influence operations—to prove its point. It concludes that the United States should respond more decisively by countering and emulating Soviet active measures.

Unfortunately, the authors begin with extraordinarily naive assumptions and resort to specious arguments to prove the obvious. Their detailed examination of Soviet overt propaganda misrepresents reality to prove the simplistic point that the Soviets are hostile to the United States. In the process they disregard the complexity of Soviet propaganda and the interests and policies that it reflects.

The authors begin with the assumption that "there is a fundamental difference between the perspective of Soviet and Western leaders on the nature of world politics." (p. 7) The Soviets, they maintain, believe that "world politics remains a continual situation of conflict and war" (p. 9), while "democratic governments . . . make a sharp distinction between war and peace, and do not assume that a continual state of conflict is characteristic of international relations." (p. 7)

The generalization that Moscow sees world politics as an arena of conflict is accurate, although the authors' attempt to support it seems misguided. For example, their references to Soviet affirmations of Clausewitz's formula that "war is a continuation of politics by other means" are essentially irrelevant and exhibit a total lack of understanding of what Clausewitz meant or of the complex arguments that have taken place in the Soviet Union about interpretation of his formulation in a nuclear era.

Far more perplexing is the authors' contention that democracies are so naive as to assume that politics, international or otherwise, do not involve conflict. During almost a quarter century in the intelligence business, I have yet to meet a professional officer who did not assume, in the words of Hans J. Morgenthau, that "international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power." Politics always entails conflict, whether a nation is at war or not. A democratic leader who believes otherwise will ill serve his or her country and democracy.

The authors go to considerable lengths to prove another obvious point: "that propaganda and political influence techniques do in fact constitute significant instruments of Soviet foreign policy and strategy." They justify the effort they expend to reach this conclusion by raising as a straw man "many specialists" who allegedly disagree. I know of no such specialists and the authors provide no examples. Unfortunately, a simplistic effort to defend this truism defines much of the book.

The methodology employed by the authors to examine Soviet overt propaganda reflects, at best, a superficial understanding of current history and the

Soviet Union. They base their conclusions on a textual analysis of articles in the Soviet foreign affairs weekly *New Times* and a statistical analysis of the *Pravda* foreign affairs column "International Review" during selected periods between 1960 and 1980.

This approach has built-in drawbacks since, despite the authors' claims to the contrary, it is limited to propaganda that is almost invariably nonauthoritative and inconsequential.

Far worse, however, was the authors' decision to exclude from their study the entire first half of the 1970s, when detente was in its heyday. Having thus adjusted the documentary record, they were able to offer this simplistic conclusion about the 1960-1980 period: "In sum, whether the Western allies have perceived East-West relations to be in a period of cold war or a period of 'detente,' Soviet overt propaganda has continued to portray the United States and NATO in negative and defamatory terms." (p. 188)

This is simply not true. When it has suited Moscow's purpose, Soviet propaganda has portrayed the United States as a benevolent power whose interests coincide with those of the Soviet state. At times in the early 1970s, for example, Soviet propagandists managed to discuss the war in Vietnam without even mentioning that the United States was a party in the conflict.

The extent to which the authors skewed the record to reach their conclusion can be demonstrated by taking a look at their statistical analysis of *Pravda* references to Western hostility and realism—willingness to cooperate with the communist world. If the period of the early 1970s had been included in their study, their generalization would have been obviously false, as is demonstrated graphically below with the addition to their chart on hostility and realism of a single three-month period representative of the detente era. The addition is highlighted in color. During this sample period (May-July 1973), seventy-five percent of the paragraphs in the *Pravda* International Review column that discussed the West ascribed realistic, positive qualities to it; only five percent were hostile.



It is clear that the defining motivation for Soviet propaganda is not irrational hostility but rather, as with all states, perceived national interests. In order to understand Soviet interests and priorities, a scholar or analyst cannot dismiss changes in the relative degree of hostility toward the West in Soviet propaganda.

The authors' "textual analysis" of *New Times* is also distorted by the arbitrary periods they decided to consider. In addition, an extremely limited review of their summation of commentary turned up instances in which they did not fairly report the journal's content. In at least two cases, for example, they attributed to *New Times* statements which were, in fact, made by Americans and merely quoted by the journal (pp. 74, 75); in another they used the term "the extreme right" in paraphrasing a *New Times reference to "the Republicans." (p. 76)*

In some instances the authors resort to patent sophistry. They use such a technique to try to prove their contention that Soviet leaders do not really feel threatened by the United States: "While the United States persistently was characterized as the major threat to world peace, careful analysis of Soviet propaganda indicates that in reality the Kremlin did not perceive any direct threat to its security interests emanating from alleged US aggressiveness and militarism." (p. 188)

To suggest that the Soviet Union does not really see itself threatened by US "aggressiveness and militarism" is to phrase the issue in terms akin to the old question, "Have you stopped beating your wife?" As the issue is presented, the reader must label the United States either "aggressive" or "militarist" in order to suggest that Moscow might see itself threatened. This begs the question of whether Moscow genuinely believes itself to be threatened by US military and political power and intentions.

The authors' conclusion that Moscow does not perceive itself to be threatened rests on the convoluted argument that fluctuations in Soviet propaganda use of the theme of Western militarism "appear to reflect the stops and starts of US defense spending and strategic developments, rather than Soviet responsiveness to a genuinely perceived, ongoing, and long-term threat to the USSR. In other words, Soviet use of this propaganda line apparently was not a reflection of Moscow's concern regarding actual Western military power per se, but instead was a response to the periodic threat of a serious escalation in Western defense spending." (p. 95)

One wonders why the Soviets would view an escalation in Western defense spending with alarm if there were not a fundamental assumption in the Kremlin that the West represents a threat to the USSR. Even more, one wonders why the authors made their argument in the first place. They seem less concerned to understand the Soviet Union than to prove that it is irrational and the West totally benign.

In sum, the book touches upon important intelligence and policy issues, but they are treated irresponsibly, as though the authors were dedicated more to proving that the Soviet Union is evil than to a realistic effort to understand Moscow's foreign policy objectives and tactics. Ultimately, books such as

Dezinformatsia can only hurt the profession of intelligence and efforts to develop a rational foreign policy. Naive asumptions and erroneous history make good propaganda but bad policy. They serve neither scholarship nor the national interest.

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Secret NOFORN
Vol. 28 No. 4

Studies in Intelligence

Winter 1984

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

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Raison d'etre

ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE IN CIA

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Economic intelligence in CIA has reached maturity; it has become accepted as a central function by all major components of the Agency. But, although CIA established a preeminent position in the US Government as a source of analysis and judgment on foreign economies and international economic issues a decade ago, questions as to the necessity and even legitimacy of aspects of economic intelligence have persisted. Why can't State or Treasury or Commerce do it? Is it a legitimate requirement for CIA? Is it really intelligence?

The Agency's discomfort with aspects of economic intelligence reflects some fundamental characteristics of this discipline that differ substantially from those of military or political intelligence. First, the bulk of basic information on economies is in the public domain, and consequently is unclassified. To a large extent, intelligence agencies use much the same information base to assess economic issues as do international institutions, private firms, and government units doing unclassified research. Even in denied areas such as the USSR, the great bulk of economic information is unclassified. Still, classified sources fill important gaps, especially on communist economies and in certain areas of other economies, and provide judgments as to government intentions. Sometimes they make a critical difference to economic assessments. Thus, clandestine collection is essential.

Another unique characteristic of economic intelligence is that it serves a policy community that is of necessity disparate, generally unstructured, and concerned with both domestic and international issues. International economic issues are important not only to our national security and foreign policy but are also intimately linked with domestic economic policy. For example, any policy decision concerning exports of grain to the USSR must consider not only the impact on Soviet military power and foreign policy and on the interests of other grain exporters, but also the implications for US farmers and consumers. While CIA will focus on the international aspects of a problem, many of its policy customers will try to use CIA's assessments for domestic policy purposes and will angle their questions accordingly. The policy customers of CIA's economic intelligence include not only State, Defense, the National Security Council Staff, and Treasury, but also Commerce, Agriculture, the Special Trade Representative, and sometimes Interior and Labor. All of the latter are primarily concerned with the welfare of domestic constituencies, and in some cases are funded by Congress specifically to protect these constituencies.

These characteristics of economic information and policy inevitably create uncertainties and ambiguities for economic intelligence. They require judgment to define the unique contribution of CIA in cases where unique sources are not a factor. They require careful navigation in dealing with the

complexities of the economic policy community. But in my view they do not detract from the importance of the role CIA's economic intelligence has played and can continue to play in the US Government.

In what follows, I will try first to sketch the phases of development of economic intelligence in CIA since its inception. Then I will discuss how economic intelligence was produced—with people, methods, products, and sources. Finally, I will touch on a few lessons from the past that I believe have useful implications for the future.

Phases of Development

The history of economic intelligence in CIA through 1972 is exceedingly well covered in a three-volume history of the Office of Research and Reports and the Office of Economic Research in its earlier years by [redacted] a former ORR/OER analyst and branch chief and a professional historian, who died in January 1982. Like any good history, this study weaves the influences of people, organizations, outside forces, and internal responses into a dynamic picture of how economic intelligence developed. It is on file in the Office of Global Issues. For the period since 1972, I have relied mainly on my personal knowledge, refreshed by a quick review of key documents. 25X1

The Preliminaries. From the foundation of CIA in 1947 to the creation of ORR in November 1950, economic intelligence was limited to less than [redacted] hundred specialists concentrating on key Soviet industries, commodities, and transport; the most important function of this work was to support export control policy. As the cold war intensified and especially during the Korean War, policy officials turned to CIA for answers to questions on Soviet and Chinese economic vulnerabilities to Western economic warfare or military operations. During the early 1950s, the economic intelligence effort became better integrated, bringing together in ORR a growing number of industrial, agricultural, commodity, and transport specialists, a newly hired staff of professional economists, and what had been a separate group of Soviet area specialists who focused on current intelligence [redacted] By 1953, the ORR economic intelligence effort had been expanded to almost [redacted] professionals. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1

The Assault on the Soviet Bloc Economies. Creation of a single all-source economic intelligence unit and rapid expansion of its personnel enabled CIA to undertake a massive research effort, which at first was focused almost exclusively on the Soviet economy, and by the mid- and late-1950s included a substantial effort on Eastern Europe and China. Although CIA made contributions to current intelligence publications and national estimates, and responded to ad hoc requests from the NSC and other policy-level customers, the great bulk of its work went into basic research. This effort began with what was appropriately called "an inventory of ignorance," in which what little was known about the Soviet economy was put side by side with what needed to be known. The process of building up information was slow, painstaking, and labor-intensive until Moscow in 1957 began publishing annual statistical handbooks and releasing other statistical information. A picture of Soviet economic capabilities—transport system, plant capability, current production, technol-

ogy—had to be pieced together from odds and ends of information,

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Most studies were voluminous and detailed. Although they were of little direct policy relevance, except in the area of export controls, they enabled CIA to develop a unique information base and expertise on the Soviet economy.

Support of export control policy was a major CIA economic intelligence function from the beginning and reached a large scale in the early 1950s as ORR's expertise on the Soviet economy developed. CIA analysts prepared assessments of Soviet industrial and technological capabilities and deficiencies and of the availability of selected products and technologies from other Western countries for use in the implementation of domestic export control legislation and in multilateral negotiations on export controls in COCOM. These functions have continued through the present.

As the flow of officially released economic information expanded, it became possible to spend less time on plant-by-plant studies and more time on analysis of the growth and structure of the Soviet economy and of Soviet economic policy. National estimates on the Soviet economy, which were produced annually beginning in the mid-1950s, became the instruments for integrating the entire economic research effort, since they required contributions on each industry and sector, which were combined into assessments of overall economic growth and the allocation of resources. Policy interest in these studies was enhanced not only by the traditional questions about effectiveness of economic warfare but also by Nikita Khrushchev's declaration of an economic race with the United States and his boast that the USSR would catch up economically by 1985.

On a smaller scale, systematic work was also launched on the East European economies, especially after the Polish and Hungarian crises of 1956. Interest in the Chinese economy surged during the Korean War, especially in assessments of Chinese economic vulnerabilities and of the potential impact of a US blockade. Exploitation in the mid-1950s of what was then relatively good Chinese data established a sound analytical base which made it much easier to assess Chinese developments in what proved to be a long period of information drought during the 1960s and early 1970s.

This was also a period during which CIA was given formal authority for producing economic intelligence on Soviet Bloc countries. NSCID 15 (June 1951) directed CIA to "conduct, as a service of common concern, such foreign economic research and produce such foreign economic intelligence as may be required: (a) to supplement that produced by other agencies . . .; (b) to fulfill requests of the Intelligence Advisory Committee." Then on 14 September 1954, DCID 15/1 on the production and coordination of economic intelligence assigned "all economic intelligence on the Soviet Bloc" to CIA, with several exceptions. Defense took the main responsibility for military-economic intelligence; State remained primarily responsible for economic doctrines, the political and social aspects of economic institutions, and the relationships between political and economic policies. It was recognized that some overlapping work would be necessary.

Entering the Free World. Having established a preeminent position for research on the Soviet Bloc economies, in the early 1960s ORR became involved on a substantial scale in research on free world economies. From the beginning, CIA had done some work on non-communist economies, mostly in response to specific requests from policy levels. During the mid and late 1950s, ORR closely followed the early phases of Khrushchev's efforts to use Soviet economic aid as an instrument of penetration in less developed countries. In addition, there was a continuing demand for comparative analyses of the size and growth of the Soviet Bloc and Western economies. In the early 1960s world events and bureaucratic changes involving the State Department and CIA gave a major boost to CIA's role on free world economic issues, putting in motion a process of expansion in this area that would continue at least through the 1970s.

US Government concern about the stability of third world countries, and especially about US-Soviet competition in the third world, grew rapidly as the Soviet economic penetration program mushroomed during the late 1950s and early 1960s. It came to a head during the Cuban missile crisis, which helped to trigger an activist approach to the third world by the Kennedy Administration. Policy support requests on ORR multiplied, first on Cuba and then on all of Latin America and many other third world countries. In response to these requests, first a Cuba branch and later a Latin America branch were formed.

The critical bureaucratic change which propelled CIA into free world economic research was the decision by the State Department to relinquish to CIA the responsibility for producing the economic sections of the National Intelligence Surveys. In 1961, the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Roger Hillsman, decided that producing NISs detracted from what he considered to be INR's principal role, which was to provide research and analysis in support of the Secretary of State and his top aides. Hillsman apparently hoped to compensate for part of the loss of NIS positions by obtaining some new positions from the department which would be used to hire sophisticated professionals to perform the policy support functions. But these hopes were disappointed. INR did not receive new positions. Moreover, because NIS funds represented about half of INR's budget, while the resources used to produce the NISs were far less than half of the total, INR lost not only the NIS function, but also a substantial capability to do other things. Faced with the necessity to cut its personnel from seven hundred to three hundred-fifty, INR took the deepest cuts in economic research in order to protect a reasonable capability for political research. Many INR economic units were cut by three quarters or even more and, as a result, coverage of free world and even Soviet Bloc economies became thin or nonexistent. The NIS functions and a few analysts were initially transferred to CIA's Office of Basic Intelligence, which managed the NIS program. Subsequently, the responsibility for producing the economic and political/social sections was shifted to ORR and the Office of Current Intelligence, respectively, together with a small number of positions.

These shifts in NIS functions had a major impact on ORR, which over the next few years had to develop a research capability on every country in the world, including some forty new African states, in order to fulfill NIS commit-

ments. At the same time, with State's capabilities for economic research and analysis greatly weakened, the Office of National Estimates began relying on ORR as the principal source of economic inputs for National Estimates. Policymakers in the NSC and the various government departments also began to seek research assistance from CIA, especially on third world countries. As experience with NISs and NIEs grew, ORR became bolder, initiating its own research projects on free world economies. Most of the effort was focused on the less developed countries; CIA's role on the industrial economies and on core issues such as economic growth, inflation, finance, and trade remained peripheral, with some notable exceptions mentioned below.

To cope with the growing effort on free world countries an International Division in ORR was established in 1964. This expansion, together with the rapid parallel growth of military and military-economic research, led to the division of ORR into three separate offices. An Office of Geographic Research was broken out in 1965 and the remainder of ORR split in 1967 into an Office of Strategic Research and an Office of Economic Research.

The new CIA economic functions were accepted implicitly but not formally sanctioned. In a letter to the Secretary of State in March 1963, DCI McCone stated that CIA needed to produce economic intelligence on free world countries for both departmental and national purposes. Although State's silence could be taken as implying tacit agreement to what amounted to a major expansion of CIA responsibility, the formal existing authorities under the NSCID of 1951 and the DCID of 1954, which gave State primary responsibility for national intelligence on free world economic issues, was not changed. This apparent conflict between reality and authority proved almost immaterial; it never limited the demands on CIA for work on free world economies and had little effect on CIA's willingness to undertake such work.

The Vietnam War Period. Development of the Vietnam problem into a major US war during the mid- and late-1960s placed heavy new demands on OER which temporarily slowed the development of free world economic research and forced a substantial reduction in research on the Soviet economy. The decision to take on detailed analysis in OER (rather than in OSR or OCI) not only of the economic aspects of the war in Indochina, but also of military logistics and, after the Tet offensive, of military manpower and operations, required a major diversion of personnel from other functions, especially from work on Soviet industry and transportation, and on international shipping and communications. At peak, about [redacted] OER professionals worked on aspects of the Indochina war while only about [redacted] new positions were provided for this purpose. 25X1 25X1

From the early 1960s to the early 1970s, there was a steady erosion of the research effort on the Soviet economy, particularly the coverage of Soviet industries, energy, and agriculture. For example, by the early 1970s, coverage of Soviet energy had been reduced from more than a [redacted] analysts; of Soviet agriculture from [redacted]; of Soviet chemicals from [redacted] of Soviet metals from a [redacted], and of Soviet machinery from perhaps [redacted] who dealt mostly with high technol- 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1

ogy sectors and with export control issues. At the same time, the free world effort continued to expand slowly.

Into the Mainstream of International Economics. Just as growing Soviet-US competition in less developed countries had pulled CIA into free world economic research, so the loss of US predominance in world finance and trade during the late 1960s and the two severe oil shocks of the 1970s drew CIA into the mainstream issues of economic analysis and policy. The fundamental change was the transformation of the US global economic role from one in which economic policy could be largely subordinated to foreign policy and security objectives, to one in which the growing importance of US commercial and financial interests had to be balanced with foreign policy and national security concerns. The forces underlying this fundamental change include: two decades arapid economic growth in most other industrial countries than in the US; the emergence of Japan as an economic superpower; a large increase in the role of foreign trade (both imports and exports) in the US economy, from less than five percent of GNP in the 1950s to over ten percent by the late 1970s and nearly fifteen percent recently; large-scale penetration of the US market by imports of major products, such as automobiles, steel, textiles, and consumer electronics; a US shift from self-sufficiency in crude oil to a large net import position; and, for almost a decade prior to the abandonment in 1971 of fixed exchange rates based on the US dollar, a growing erosion of the US international competitive position and of the willingness of foreign central banks to increase their dollar holdings. Because of these fundamental trends, the State Department, which had successfully taken the leading role in formulating and managing US and foreign economic policy since the start of the Marshall Plan, found its positions increasingly questioned by Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, and executive agencies such as the Council of Economic Advisers, which were concerned less with foreign policy than with domestic economic problems and constituencies. For most of the 1970s, attempts to reconcile these often divergent points of view were made through the staff of the Council for International Economic Policy (CIEP) which was headed by a Special Assistant to the President. Inevitably, these diverse economic policy departments and CIEP came to CIA for analysis that did not suffer from a departmental bias, was all-source, and took a broad perspective. By the mid-1970s, CIA had become the most important source of analysis in the government on such key questions as economic growth, inflation, trade, international finance, and energy.

The process of expansion into these core economic areas began in the late 1960s as a result of recurring international financial crises and growing concern about the stability of the international financial system. During the sterling crisis of 1967, which forced the devaluation of that currency and created serious concern that a general assault on the dollar might follow, OER became aware that [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] 25X1
[redacted] Dur- 25X1
ing 1967-69, various types of [redacted] provided the raw material for a 25X1
regular series of reports on gold markets and on South African gold policies and activities, which had become important because of US Government efforts

to make a new international agreement on the official price of gold stick in the face of growing market pressures and South African manipulation. Treasury was the principal customer for this analysis. Other early OER work on core economic issues included assessments of foreign reactions to the US decision to suspend gold convertibility (November 1971), and major studies of US trade relations with Japan, Japanese formal and informal import restrictions, and the Japanese steel industry. At the same time, major briefing books were prepared in 1970-71 for the Secretary of Commerce on US relations with Japan, Western Europe, and Canada. In response to these growing demands for policy support, OER created new branches to better cover [redacted] the European Community, and international energy, fortunately a year or more in advance of the big international crises of 1973 and subsequent years. 25X1

The growing CIA role in free world economic intelligence was recognized and strongly supported by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in its report to the President on economic intelligence in December 1971. PFIAB noted that State had not carried out its assigned responsibilities for collection and analysis on free world economic activity; noted that OER was the only US Government unit capable of doing the needed production; and recommended that resources be added for production of economic intelligence, that requirements be reexamined, and that the community served by intelligence producers be expanded to include the entire economic policy community. In effect, the concept of economic intelligence was once again broadened to include not only US foreign policy considerations, but also considerations of US economic power and international competitiveness. Even so, it was not until the Executive Order of 1978 that CIA was formally given the responsibility (not exclusive) to produce economic intelligence on the entire world.

By the time of the Arab oil embargo and subsequent tripling of oil prices in 1973, OER had established the organization and some of the expertise needed to respond effectively to demands for intelligence support from the policy levels and had the support of top Agency management, the President, and key economic policy officials. The oil shock created economic problems of a different nature and magnitude from those to which policy officials had become accustomed. During the oil embargo there was of course an enormous demand for information on how much oil was being produced, where it was being shipped, and what was happening in world markets. Although there was only a limited amount of information [redacted] CIA was the only agency capable of putting all available information together into a coherent, up-to-date picture useful to policy officials at the NSC, State, Treasury, and elsewhere. What became an OER—indeed a CIA—best seller, the weekly *International Oil Developments (IOD)*, later renamed *International Energy Weekly (IEW)*, was born in December 1973 in response to a request from the NSC staff. At the same time, OER greatly increased its energy effort, which evolved, as the crisis eased, from monitoring the embargo to assessing the short-term oil market, and then to projecting longer-term energy trends. Before long CIA had become a dominant source of information and analysis in the US Government on international oil issues. 25X1

The energy crisis in turn created great uncertainties for the world economy, throwing the US and other industrial countries into a severe economic recession in 1974-75 which appeared for a while as if it would be deep and lasting. There were great uncertainties about how the oil price increases would work themselves through the world economy; about their impact on overall economic activity and inflation; about whether the massive increase in the financial assets of the OPEC countries would be "recycled" by the banks or by the OPEC governments to less developed oil importing countries which were running big deficits as a result of higher oil import costs. Because of the magnitude of the shock and the resulting uncertainties, what had traditionally been the principal sources of routine judgment and projections on the world economy—OECD and the Treasury Department—no longer seemed adequate. In this situation, OER was able to leap into the breach. OER began to produce regular estimates of economic growth, inflation, trade, energy, and economic policies on all the major industrial countries, as well as on key LDCs. Regular reports were also produced on OPEC assets (their size, location, and currency); LDC debt problems; world commodity prices; trends in world trade; and troubled industries such as steel, textiles, and automobiles. By the latter part of the Ford Administration, CIA estimates and forecasts of the principal world macroeconomic trends were being used as a basis for discussion at Cabinet-level meetings, such as the Economic Policy Board. Economic intelligence had indeed come to encompass not only the economic sinews of our enemies' military power but also the economic activities and policies of neutrals and allies which affected US foreign policy and economic interests.

This new, large expansion of OER functions was funded entirely through internal reallocation of OER personnel—in effect, the [redacted] positions [redacted] professionals) which had been shifted mainly from Soviet analysis to the Vietnam War were in turn transferred to free world research, especially on energy, trade and finance, and industrial countries as the effort on Vietnam was phased out. There were some small additional cuts in aspects of Soviet economic work. The effort on China remained about constant as CIA continued to piece together information from a wide variety of sources, much as it had done on the Soviet economy in the early 1950s. This painstaking all-source process was necessary because the Chinese released virtually no economic data between the late 1950s and the late 1970s. Indeed, OER studies, many of which could be sanitized and published in unclassified form, became essential inputs into private sector research on China. 25X1.1

As to Soviet work, the period of East-West detente shifted policy demands from economic warfare to trade promotion possibilities. At the same time, the disappearance of US surplus grain stocks left the world grain market and US consumer prices highly vulnerable to big increases in Soviet grain imports in years when Soviet crops were bad, notably 1972 and 1975. There was great interest in CIA crop estimates not only in the NSC staff and State, concerned with foreign policy implications and leverage, but also in the Council of Economic Advisers, Agriculture, and Commerce concerned with the impact on US farmers and on the US cost of living.

CIA Goes Public. In April 1977, President Carter at a press conference made reference to an OER report in response to a question on the outlook for the oil market. In effect, he used a CIA estimate to help explain why he considered the energy problem to be "the moral equivalent of war." The President's statement thrust CIA into the public eye and started a period of fairly open CIA participation in public discussion of major economic issues that lasted until 1981. This openness had mixed effects, some good and some bad, on CIA's economic intelligence.

Publication of unclassified studies on economic topics by CIA was far from new. CIA analysts began to prepare articles for publications of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress on the Soviet, Chinese, and East European economies beginning in 1962, and these contributions continue through the present. Although the JEC contributions are reviewed within CIA, they are attributed to the author, not to the Agency. Unclassified publications under CIA imprimatur also began in the 1960s. Most of these dealt with unclassified statistics on communist economies or with technical or methodological topics of interest primarily to academics and other experts—for example, Soviet GNP by sector of origin and use; indexes of Soviet industrial and agricultural production; Chinese foreign trade data. These specialized publications were useful to CIA in establishing contacts and developing dialogue with academics and other private sector specialists; as a means of building CIA's reputation for work of high quality; and as an aid to recruitment of economists. These studies never caused problems because they were not estimative, forward-looking, or politically controversial.

Estimative studies were another matter, especially on politically sensitive topics. Prior to President Carter's press conference, there had been two intentional and one unintentional CIA incursions into unclassified estimates. In April 1958, DCI Allen Dulles publicly presented ORR estimates that Soviet GNP was growing at annual rates of six to seven percent, double that of the US, and might reach fifty percent of the US GNP by 1962. This rapid Soviet growth presented, he said, "the most serious challenge this country has faced in time of peace." This public statement was widely criticized as a blatant attempt to justify increases in US military budgets, even though CIA officials defended their estimates in public testimony before the Joint Economic Committee. CIA then moved out of the limelight on economic issues until January 1964 when DCI John McCone, at the suggestion of the President, gave a press conference on the Soviet economy at which he revealed that Soviet economic growth had slowed to a one and one-half percent rate in 1963, that the USSR faced a difficult hard currency situation, and that gold stocks had fallen to low levels. The initial CIA plan had been to release this information in an unclassified State Department paper, but the press found out that CIA was the source. The public reaction was mostly negative, focusing on motives rather than facts. Specifically, CIA was accused of trying to justify controls over exports and credits to the USSR and the press gleefully collected adverse reactions of all kinds from real or self-appointed experts. The fact that most outside experts eventually recognized that CIA was correct never received much publicity. This unfortunate experience led to a new, temporary embargo on CIA unclassified publications. A third flare-up over unclassified publications

occurred in the spring of 1967 when CIA unintentionally became involved in political controversy in Congress over licensing of US equipment for the Soviet automobile plant for which Fiat was the prime contractor. At that time CIA provided State with some unattributed material for use in congressional testimony and also published an unclassified paper on the Soviet automobile industry. This paper, although basically descriptive and straightforward, was used by Senators and Representatives on both sides of the controversy, and the flap led to another temporary embargo on unclassified CIA publications.

The return of CIA to public controversy on economic issues in 1977 involved some totally new dimensions. CIA did not seek the publicity President Carter had forced on it but, once pushed into the public eye, tried to resolve problems by participating in public debates as much as security considerations permitted. Indeed, DCI Turner generally sought to promote this openness both to enhance the reputation of CIA as a source of high-quality, objective analysis, and to divert attention from clandestine operations.

As a result of the President's press conference, two OER papers were released in unclassified form. One of these predicted a decline in Soviet oil production and a potential shift in the USSR's oil trade from a large net export to a net import position. The other paper incorporated the Soviet forecasts into a projection of global oil supply and demand which predicted another massive oil price increase within a very few years. The message that came through clearly to Secretary of Energy Schlesinger and to President Carter was that oil prospects were even worse than they had thought. The new Soviet oil estimates in turn had a major impact on a comprehensive study of the prospects for the Soviet economy, which was also published in unclassified form in 1978. Reduced rates of GNP growth to a range of two to three percent were projected for the 1980s, partly because of a growing energy constraint. The OER estimate on Soviet oil identified some fundamental problems which will probably cause oil production to decline this decade. But it underestimated Moscow's willingness to pour added resources into oil development as a result of which the decline was postponed and a severe crisis was averted.

OER began to back off from its Soviet oil estimate as early as 1978, recognizing that Moscow could not afford to become an oil importer because of its heavy reliance on oil as a source of hard currency earnings. Although the 1977 projection should have been interpreted as a notional gap between demand and supply that would not necessarily be eliminated through foreign trade, the wording was ambiguous. But then, OER discovered another serious cause for pessimism as to prospects for the world oil market. It had become apparent that oil company plans for expanding oil production in the Persian Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, through the 1980s were pipe dreams. The planned capacity increases were not taking place; indeed, Saudi Arabia and other countries were cutting the investments necessary even to sustain the then current rates of production in the longer term. In 1978, OER predicted another big jump in oil prices at some time during the 1979-81 period (an unclassified version was released in July 1979). OER was right but in part for the wrong reasons. It was of course the Iranian revolution that triggered the price rise although many other forces to set up the rise were in place. The 1979-80

price shock set off a new series of studies on global economic impact—industrial countries, the developing countries, OPEC countries, and communist countries. By 1981, the world economy was again in recession, and energy conservation and substitution of other energy sources for oil was building rapidly. Consequently, the oil market turned soft and it has remained soft.

OER's incursion into controversial economic, especially energy, public estimates on balance probably enhanced CIA's reputation for high quality analysis. Although the initial public reaction was mainly negative—reflecting both CIA's departure from conventional wisdom and the readiness of the press to attribute political motives—public comments later turned generally favorable, especially in 1979-80 when the new oil crisis CIA had predicted did occur (if partly for different reasons). In the process of explaining their estimates, OER analysts participated in numerous meetings and conferences where they often gave presentations as well as engaged in discussions with experts from the oil industry, academia, state governments, and even foreign countries. In the process, CIA analysts became accepted members of the expert community, especially on energy, macroeconomics, and econometric modeling. Recruitment of well-trained economists became easier and some of the top economists in the country became interested in at least informal consulting. But there were negative effects as well. Participation in public discussion took too much time away from intelligence work. The need to explain and defend estimates in public reinforced the tendency to look harder for corroborating than for contrary evidence. If CIA's Soviet oil production estimates had not been constantly under public attack, they probably would have been changed more promptly than they were. Finally, the fact that classified sources were used in the estimates prevented full documentation, and even several years of partial openness could not eliminate the ambiguities inherent in a public CIA role.

Economic Intelligence Becomes Everybody's Business. Throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and much of the 1970s, economic intelligence production in CIA was the almost exclusive domain of the Economic Research Area of ORR and then of OER. OCI produced some current economic intelligence on the free world and the geographic intelligence units worked on some specialized economic topics, such as transportation. As economic issues grew in importance, it was inevitable that they would become of concern to all the main intelligence production units in CIA. The Office of Geographic and Societal Research, working with the Office of Research and Development, developed methodologies for estimating the Soviet grain crop that required specialized expertise (agronomists, photo interpreters, statisticians, and linguists, as well as economists) and inputs of highly specific information on weather and status of crops. Use of this methodology was expensive—requiring several times more people and contract money than the traditional methodology used by OER—but proved substantially more accurate, at least in the years when the main problem was drought. In 1979-80, elaborate methodologies were also developed to estimate likely production in major Soviet oil fields and likely reserves in major oil regions.

These intensive analyses also required inputs of detailed data that were collectible by technical means. Previously, the very thin OER coverage of major Soviet sectors and industries made it necessary to rely heavily on published information and on simpler techniques, since collectors were generally unable to obtain critical unpublished information at a relatively high level of aggregation. [redacted] 25X1
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[redacted]

Economic intelligence also expanded into the field of science and technology. In addition to a major increase in the long-standing effort on transfer of technology to the USSR, CIA developed a substantial capability to assess technological developments in free world countries and their impact on industrial trends and competitiveness. Beginning in the late 1960s with what was mainly a series of externally contracted OSI studies on high technology in free world, [redacted] industries, the effort developed into a division-sized unit in the Office of Global Issues doing systematic analysis of free world industries, especially high technology industries. Consequently, what had been a major gap in CIA's coverage of free world economies has been partly filled. 25X1

At the same time, economic intelligence has become a more fully integrated part of intelligence analyses and assessments on individual foreign countries. This process began well before the reorganization of the Directorate of Intelligence in 1981, especially with an increasing number of joint OER/Office of Political Analysis studies. With a reorganization primarily along geographic lines, it became inevitable that political analysts would become more aware of economic issues and vice versa.

There have also been some changes in economic intelligence priorities in recent years. With an oil glut taking the place of severe oil shortages, the absence of any major global economic shocks, and the expansion of global macroeconomic analysis in other government agencies and the private sector, the need for independent macroeconomic estimates from CIA has declined. Moreover, the Reagan Administration has given an increased priority to issues of economic structure and efficiency and a smaller one to macroeconomic policy. Most important, East-West detente has given way to a renewed cold war which once again gave prominence to economic warfare issues such as export controls, technology transfer, Soviet dependence on imports from the West, and Western economic leverage on the USSR. The Carter Administration decision to impose economic sanctions on the USSR in response to its invasion of Afghanistan led to innumerable requests for intelligence support from CIA. The Iranian hostage crisis and the resulting US economic sanctions against Iran had a similar impact. The imposition of martial law in Poland caused a tightening of US restrictions on import of oil and gas equipment to the USSR and led eventually to the Reagan Administration's attempt to prevent construction of the West Siberia to Western Europe pipeline. All of these economic issues involved major demands on CIA's economic intelligence units.

Resources and Processes

The enormous changes over the past thirty-five years in the functions of economic intelligence in CIA have occurred with a fairly constant overall level of staffing but with frequent, often massive shifts in the distribution of effort, in the types of intelligence products, and in analytic methodologies. In turn, these shifts had a major impact on collection requirements for economic intelligence.

People. Personnel costs have always been the predominant part of the economic intelligence budget. External contracting was quite small until the late 1970s and early 1980s when in-depth analysis of oil facilities requiring very specialized methodologies and expertise became both important and feasible. Although precise comparisons are impossible because of changing functions, some of which can be classified in a number of ways, it is clear that the total number of people engaged in economic intelligence reached a peak in the 1950s, reflecting the high labor-intensive requirements of the nuts and bolts approach to the Soviet economy; the number declined slightly during the 1960s to about [redacted] professionals, and again in the 1970s to about [redacted] professionals, and then rose somewhat in the early 1980s as part of the general expansion of the DDI. These ups and downs are far less important than the massive shifts that occurred within the economic intelligence effort: in the 1960s from the USSR to the developing countries and then to Vietnam; in the 1970s from Vietnam to the industrial nations to global economic trends such as energy, economic growth, and trade; and in the 1980s to international finance and to free world high technology industries. During the same time span, State INR's effort in economic intelligence declined precipitously from about [redacted] people in the 1950s to [redacted] in the 1970s. 25X1 25X1 25X1

Maintaining even a constant personnel strength required a large, continuous recruitment effort because of a very high rate of professional turnover, which reflected the substantial opportunities available to economists in the private sector. During the 1960s, when government salaries were generally not competitive with the private sector, the professional turnover rate in ORR was between one and one-half and two percent a month, or some twenty percent annually. In the 1970s, with a more competitive salary scale, the turnover rate fell and then stabilized at about one percent a month. Even so, this meant that OER had to hire at least [redacted] economists each year just to stay even. And, largely because most applicants had other irons in the fire and often could not wait until CIA personnel processing and clearance were completed, we had to put [redacted] applicants in process each year to offset anticipated turnover. To reinforce the efforts of the Office of Personnel, ORR, and then OER, sent senior economists to recruit graduate students in universities and took advantage of those trips to develop and strengthen contacts with faculty members and generally to try to enhance the image of CIA as a good place for economists to work. Fortunately, this recruitment effort has been continued since the DDI reorganization. 25X1 25X1

The majority of new hires had the equivalent of a master's degree in economics or related fields, with perhaps twenty percent in recent years en-

tering with a Ph.D. degree or having completed the course requirements for a Ph.D., and another twenty to twenty-five percent with a bachelor's degree and perhaps a little graduate work. Only a small number came into economic intelligence through the Career Trainee program, although some of these have been among the most successful analysts. Changing functions also changed the mix of skills that was sought. During the 1970s, econometricians, economists with experience in the analysis of international trade and finance, and energy experts were much in demand.

To handle changing functions, it was necessary not only to recruit different kinds of experts, but also to retrain those already on board. The change during the 1950s from specific industrial studies to macroeconomic analysis of the USSR, Eastern Europe, and China, required more sophisticated handling of economic issues. Since many of the commodity and industrial analysts and branch chiefs in ORR had received little if any formal training in economics, it became office policy to upgrade all professionals to an equivalent of a master's degree in economics, with the help of in-house courses taught by CIA economists under the auspices of local universities. A broad training program in the use of automated data processing and various analytic methodologies was introduced in the late 1960s and later broadened so that all OER analysts had at least a basic ADP capability.

But the principal means of tackling new functions was to identify individuals who were among the brightest and the most dynamic and creative professionals in the office and to put them in charge of new issues. Although the general thrust of economic intelligence priorities was apparent, the particular development of the effort could not be foreseen. It was necessary to give creative leaders considerable flexibility to take initiatives, react to customer requests, and carve out a role for CIA. Frequently, new functional units were created to tackle new problems—for example, on international trade and finance, energy, and analytic methodologies. Since these units were concerned with issues that were also central to the geographic units [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] conflicts of responsibilities often occurred which were 25X1
sometimes exacerbated by personal conflicts. Although this forced interaction was wasteful at times, on the whole it was creative in that it caused the major economic issues to be approached from more than one perspective.

Methodologies. In economic intelligence as in other types of intelligence, methodologies have become more and more sophisticated. ORR and OER relied mainly on the traditional tools of economists, which themselves evolved considerably over the years. The simplest tools—national accounting and balance of payments analysis—are of course regularly used to facilitate orderly analysis of economic trends and structure. [redacted]

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Some preliminary ADP programs were developed early in the 1960s for special purposes such as calculating an index of Soviet industrial production and obtaining reports on communist economic and military assistance to LDCs. But it was not until an OER Systems Development Staff was established in

1969 that a systematic effort to provide analysts with high quality ADP and methodological support was launched. This effort included training, research and development, and service—with the emphasis initially on training and research and development. As the service function developed—to include construction of data bases of common concern, methodological problem-solving, and development of models on issues of central concern to the office, the Systems Development Staff was expanded into a Development and Analysis center. By the late 1970s, OER had one of the most sophisticated econometric efforts in the world. Beginning with some adaptations of existing econometric models of foreign economies, OER built its own model of the world economy which linked the principal countries through foreign trade flows and which could approximate and simulate the global impact of changes in national economic policies or of major shocks to the world economy. This Link model, as well as the individual country models, proved extremely useful in answering "what if" questions from policymakers throughout the government. For example: What would be the economic impact of a doubling of oil prices on economic growth, inflation, trade? Or what would be the economic impact of a one-percent increase in US government expenditures? As energy problems worsened, the energy sector of the Link model was greatly elaborated to address more complex questions on energy, price, and use. The development of econometric models and of related macroeconomic methodologies required both some first class econometricians and methodologists in OER and access to the talent in academia and elsewhere. OER used a series of annual conferences with some of the best economists and econometricians in the country to help give direction and focus to the development of its methodological effort on macroeconomics and energy. These conferences were also helpful in strengthening CIA's reputation and contacts in the top ranks of the economic profession.

By the late 1970s, a large proportion of OER analysts had some familiarity with ADP techniques and were using and manipulating data banks (for example, on trade statistics) and a substantial number were using econometric models as tools of analysis. CIA models were available on the major OECD countries, on several LDCs, and on the USSR. In addition, CIA steadily broadened its access to commercially available data banks and models [redacted] 25X1
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As mentioned earlier, economic intelligence in recent years has used not only the techniques of economic and econometric analysis, but also engineering and agronomic simulations. A model which simulates the phases of plant growth and the impact of shortfalls of moisture and of other weather conditions on plant yields has been the central element of the methodology for estimating Soviet grain crops. Engineering models of major oil fields of a type in general use in the oil industry are being used to estimate oil reserves and production potential. Engineering models also are being used to assess the potential impact of damage to oil facilities in various countries.

This broad expansion of analytical methodologies has required not only larger in-house expertise but also much greater use of external contracts, some

of which are quite costly. These expenditures can be justified only on issues that require in-depth analysis.

Sources. As mentioned earlier, the most important sources of economic information are unclassified. They include the official statistical publications of foreign countries and international institutions, newspapers, journal articles, and radio broadcasts. Unclassified sources generally constitute the foundation of any economic analysis, even on the USSR and other communist countries, and provide an essential context to interpret classified material and how it fits into the overall picture. Second in importance is reporting from State and Treasury attaches who provide interpretation and color, as well as up-to-date information. Over the years, information obtained from private US citizens and organizations has probably been the third most important source of economic intelligence. 25X1

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The role of clandestine collection of economic intelligence was quite limited so long as CIA concentrated on the communist countries and covered free world countries only lightly. Clandestine collection on Soviet internal economic issues has generally been weak 25X1

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Clandestine sources have been consistently more important on Eastern Europe than on the USSR, and have been of great importance for nearly twenty years on Soviet and East European trade, arms shipments and sales, and financial activities in the third world. 25X1

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Products. The change in the mix of economic intelligence products reflected the evolution of ORR and OER from a primary orientation to basic research to a focus on short- to medium-term policy support. During the 1950s and early 1960s, most OER products were large research reports or NISs. Contributions to current intelligence publications were written by a small, specialized staff. There were few papers prepared in a response to direct requests from policymakers. By the early 1970s, as OER developed research capabilities across the entire gamut of international economics, responses to policy requests averaged nearly three per work day and were largely driving the office's work. Indeed, this large expansion of policy support work made it impossible for several years to pursue any sort of coherent production planning; in the late 1960s, annual production planning was abandoned because the majority of planned projects were not done and most projects that were done were not planned.

During the early and late 1970s, the principal mechanism for maintaining some coherence in OER's research and production was the weekly publications. There were two: one on energy (the *International Oil Developments*, later called the *International Energy Weekly)* and one on other economic developments (the *Economic Intelligence Weekly* or *EIW).* Although these publications, especially the *IEW*, covered some current developments, their primary function was to provide relevant background, analysis, and perspective on issues of current policy interest, and on those to which greater policy attention should have been given. Important policy support memorandums were revised and rerun in the publications to reach a wider audience. Articles were planned in anticipation of major international economic policy decisions or meetings. Others were written to warn of potential problems, to explain those that had occurred, or to estimate their impact. The results or partial results of OER basic research that appeared to provide new perspectives on important issues were included. In sum, the publications covered practically all OER had to say that was of interest to the policy levels. And they were a success. Both publications and the combined publication, the *International Economic and Energy Weekly,* that followed them were, and are, regularly read at the top and middle levels of the economic policy community.

Economic inputs to current intelligence publications also increased, especially once the *President's Daily Brief* became established as the principal means of communicating intelligence to the President. Less attention was paid to the *National Intelligence Daily* because OER's own publications were serving the principal economic policymakers.

Longer studies in the form of intelligence memoranda or reports continued to be published if they represented research building blocks or if assessments needed elaboration. Most of the work on the Chinese economy and a substantial part of that on the Soviet economy, for example, continued to take the form of these larger studies which are read mainly by specialists.

A serious attempt was made to distinguish clearly between research studies and other forms of intelligence production. Research projects were planned well in advance and sometimes stretched over several years. For example, a systematic study of the growth and structure of the Soviet economy was planned in the early 1970s and took more than five years to complete, resulting in a number of classified and unclassified publications.

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Some of the most elaborate products were never formally published. Briefing books for top-level policymakers had been prepared since the late 1960s. Beginning with the Tokyo economic summit of 1979, CIA has either written most of the background sections of the presidential briefing books or provided substantial inputs in their preparation.

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Relations with Policymakers. The complexity and diversity of the economic policy community make it necessary for CIA economic intelligence producers to work hard to ascertain the needs of policymakers, the priority of these needs, and the proper role of CIA in meeting these needs. Relations with policy officials were relatively easy in the 1950s when CIA's economic intelligence was largely limited to communist countries. But when this role came to encompass the entire gamut of international economic issues, and requests for intelligence multiplied, it became necessary to gain an understanding of the requester's purpose and his role in the national policy process. Although few high- or medium-level requests were turned down, many were modified to better reflect our interpretation of priorities and the legitimate role and capabilities of CIA. This meant a process of frequent interaction with policymakers rather than a passive acceptance of their tasking. It also meant that economic intelligence producers generally dealt directly with policy officials at the NSC, CEA, State, Treasury, and Commerce. In addition, a senior OER analyst was detailed to Treasury beginning in the early 1970s to prepare daily or weekly briefings for economic officials at the Cabinet, sub-Cabinet and senior staff levels, and to obtain feedback—a function that was eventually incorporated into more formal intelligence liaison units in policy departments. There was relatively little indirect tasking through the Directorate of Intelligence, the National Intelligence Officers (except on national estimates), or the intelligence liaison units in other agencies.

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Issues and Lessons

Although economic intelligence has become one of the central areas of concentration for both producers and collectors in CIA, a number of questions continue to be raised concerning the scope and uses of economic intelligence. In the concluding section of this article, I will raise the most important of these issues and indicate what I believe to be the lessons experience has taught us on each of them.

To What Extent is Economic Intelligence CIA's Job? The narrowest view of CIA's economic intelligence function has been that it should be limited to collecting information that cannot be obtained by overt means and to analyses and estimates based to a substantial extent on such information. This definition was always too narrow, even when economic intelligence was limited largely to communist countries. The fact is that CIA provides several ingredients, in addition to special sources, which make for a unique contribution. These ingredients include: the ability to bring a wide variety of skills and perspectives to bear on a problem (economic, technical, political, and military); and, perhaps most important, a mission and organization designed to serve the needs of the national policy community rather than those of a single department. The particular mix of ingredients that yields a unique contribution varies from subject to subject. In assessments of damage to oil facilities during the Iran-Iraq War and its impact, for example, special sources and the ability to use them are critical. In estimates of the future oil market, it is the ability to combine an understanding of the determinants of the demand for oil and of oil market behavior with assessments of political, economic, and military factors which affect oil production in major OPEC countries that constitute a unique contribution. In the case of briefing papers for the Economic Summit, it is simply CIA's broad scope and organizational ability that justifies taking on the work. Moreover, CIA must give some coverage to all major global economic issues and to all foreign countries in order to understand the way events work their way through the world economy. But it is not necessary to give all countries or issues equal treatment. Not only are some more important than others, but some topics are treated much more fully by other government agencies or in the private sector than others. For example, free world agriculture is covered fairly thoroughly by the research unit of the Department of Agriculture, as are world minerals by the Department of the Interior. CIA makes the largest contribution on agriculture and minerals in communist countries, but its coverage on the rest of the world is appropriately thin. CIA also puts in a relatively greater effort on countries which constitute a major security threat to the United States, notably the USSR, [redacted] In conclusion, there are no international economic issues that CIA should ignore, but it is appropriate that the degree of coverage by other agencies be taken into account in determining the distribution of the CIA effort. 25X1

With regard to clandestine collection of economic information, there should be no issue of principle. At bottom economic intelligence is no different from political intelligence. Indeed, economic issues are the everyday meat of national politics in every country. The reluctance of clandestine collectors to try to obtain material that could be collected by regular State, Treasury, and

Commerce officials is understandable, but should not become an excuse for inaction. The important thing is to identify those governments, other institutions, and issues that deserve a systematic clandestine collection effort in the longer term so that well-placed sources can be developed. This approach must be selective, aimed at a few key countries such as the USSR, [redacted] and such definable issues as arms sales, nuclear power, or sales of civil aircraft. Development of sources must be based not on detailed requirements, which cannot be projected two or three years ahead, but rather on a judgment that the country or issue is of sufficient importance that requirements for clandestine collection are certain to develop and probably to continue over a period of time. Once sources are in place, the requirements must be as specific as possible and must take into account the capabilities of overt collectors [redacted]

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Should There Be Unclassified CIA Publications in the Economic Area? I believe that building block research which does not reveal classified sources and methods and is of interest to experts in the private sector should be published unclassified. Such publications are important to sustain the generally high reputation CIA economic research has enjoyed in academia and elsewhere in the private sector. These publications help recruitment and make it easier to make effective use of consultants, some of whom do not want to go through clearance procedures. With the exercise of reasonable care and control, the odds on such publications triggering adverse publicity or political flaps are minimal.

I believe that the historical record gives ample reason to *avoid* unclassified publications on estimative, forward-looking topics. There is no doubt that selective CIA attempts to publicize certain research findings have backfired. Selective unclassified publications, especially if publicized at the top levels of the Agency, are bound to be interpreted as attempts to influence policy and public opinion. Unclassified publication of estimative intelligence on a broader scale, such as was attempted in the late 1970s, would make sense only if the DDI were separated from the rest of CIA and became viewed as a kind of research service of common concern to the US Government. This appeared to be the trend in the early years of the Carter Administration, but it never got very far and has obviously been reversed since. Moreover, with the far more intensive use of special sources in the past few years, any separation of the analytical function from the collection function would severely reduce the usefulness of the product. I conclude that any thought of publishing unclassified estimative economic intelligence material by CIA should be abandoned.

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Should the Organization of Economic Intelligence Be Mainly Geographic or Mainly Functional? It should be both geographic and functional. I believe that OER's experience shows clearly the importance of approaching any important issue with more than one perspective. It is extremely dangerous in any bureaucracy, especially a large one like CIA's, to assign the entire responsibility for important issues to a single unit with a particular form of organization. It is too easy for the point of view of an analyst or branch to become the party line for an office, or even for CIA, unless it can be challenged or approached from a different point of view as well. This does not require a formal matrix organization, but it does mean that two or more units will have to share the responsibility for producing intelligence on major issues. In OER's free world work, for example, the basic organization was geographic, but functional units were formed to deal with major issues such as economic growth and development, trade and finance, energy, agriculture and materials, which were also of central concern to each of the geographic units. This is quite different from creating functional units to work in specialized areas, such as international shipping or arms sales, which generally are not of major concern to the country analyst. Joint responsibility creates frictions and conflicts, some of which are time-consuming. But in my opinion it also fosters creativity and makes it far easier to use dynamic people effectively in a bureaucratic environment. The DI reorganization has similar elements both in economic and political areas. For example, responsibility for LDC debt problems is shared by OGI and the regional offices, and I believe that this joint effort on the whole has been productive and creative, with one group stimulating the other to doing better work. I only hope that the process of building functional units not to supplant but rather to interact with geographic units will continue as it has during the past two years. And even in a primarily geographic organization, it is important to sustain a home base for analysts who want to retain their identity as professional economists, rather than develop into area experts. Such economists should be rotated within the DI, and perhaps elsewhere. They should probably keep their home base in a functional economic unit.

The Future of Economic Intelligence in CIA

Economic intelligence in CIA has become too useful to other parts of the US Government and too well established to be vulnerable to drastic cuts in the future, but it is difficult to imagine any major future expansion of its functions, since these already encompass virtually all important international economic topics. To foster high quality work in the longer term, CIA needs to:

- Anticipate new demands by clearly reading the changing world forces and the changing role of the US Government and take the initiative accordingly to reallocate resources. As ORR and OER history clearly shows, new directions must be taken if possible before policy customers demand them and certainly far in advance of any funding or personnel allocations.
- Continue to develop new ways of using classified information to improve economic estimates.
- Provide an environment conducive to high quality research and analysis and to attracting and retaining first-class economists by establishing or strengthening functional units dealing with the critical analytic issues in international economics.
- Make certain that important issues are approached from more than one perspective by forcing regional and functional units to share the responsibility for all important economic issues.
- Adapt the bureaucratic system to give particularly energetic and creative people an opportunity to make a mark and to develop new research directions and functions.

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THE APOSTLE IN SEAT 4-F

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I was looking forward to the flight home from Denver and did not mind the 7 a.m. departure because it was Saturday and I had an interesting book to finish. I had read the review in the *Washington Post* and heard Tom Braden and Pat Buchanan interview the author, Michael Straight, on their evening talk show. Each had asked him the same question: Why did he wait until 1963 to tell the Federal Bureau of Investigation that his Cambridge University friends, Guy Burgess and Anthony Blunt, were Soviet spies? He had known about Burgess since at least 1940 and had himself been recruited for service to the COMINTERN by Blunt at Cambridge in 1937. Straight responded that he had written the book to answer that question.

I was assigned to an aisle seat. The middle seat was empty and as I placed my book in it before buckling up the man in the window seat looked over, smiled, and asked what I thought of it. I realized that his was the same face that peered at me from the back dust cover. I would spend the next four hours chatting with Michael Straight, former Cambridge communist and member of the elite secret Apostles society, bomber pilot, magazine editor, deputy chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts under President Nixon, and author of *After Long Silence.*[1] The picture had been retouched; the original in seat 4-F revealed a few more wrinkles. Michael Straight proved to be a friendly, articulate conversationalist and a man of many interests. He was reading a book by Solzhenitsen's editor and he described the great emotional difficulties the experience had caused her. It was a situation he could understand.

Straight had been editor of the *New Republic* after World War II and during the McCarthy era. His mother Dorothy was a Whitney heiress, his father Willard, an international businessman who helped introduce the railroad to China. Together, they founded the *New Republic* magazine in 1914, two years before Michael's birth on 1 September 1916. Willard Straight died of pneumonia at the end of World War I while serving in the Army in Europe. When Dorothy Straight later married an Englishman she decided to leave her Long Island home and settle in England. So it was that young Michael, his older brother (later to head Rolls Royce and British Overseas Aircraft Company) and his older sister (who would become an actress) grew up at Dartington Hall, South Devon.

[1] Michael Straight, *After Long Silence* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1983) 351 pp. Early in the conversation Straight asked what I did. I said I was with the CIA; he responded, "Oh, I see," and then we continued talking about his book. He answered all my questions with apparent candor; I detected no evasiveness. The conversation led me to a review of the incidents discussed and ultimately this article.

In November 1934, during his first year reading economics at Cambridge, Straight joined the University Socialist Society and then, in early 1935, a communist cell. It was at Cambridge that he met Guy Burgess and became friends with Anthony Blunt as well as a number of others who would serve the Soviet Union in one way or another. In 1936 he was accepted in the secret Cambridge Conversazione Society, which had been founded by Alfred Lord Tennyson. In addition to Burgess and Blunt, others in this elite group included John Maynard Keynes, E. M. Forester, and Victor Rothschild; members were called *Apostles*. After graduation in 1937 Straight followed the instructions from the COMINTERN and returned to America, eventually establishing contact with his case officer. He was to hold several government and private positions before entering the Air Corps in 1942. He did not see any of his Apostle friends again until after the war when he was editor of the *New Republic*. Then he met several times with Guy Burgess, once in Washington during the Korean war, when Burgess was a second secretary at the British Embassy. And though Burgess reaffirmed his continuing links to the Soviets, Straight said nothing. When Burgess defected to Russia two months later with his Cambridge classmate, fellow spy and diplomat Donald Maclean, Straight remained silent. When H. A. R. (Kim) Philby went over to the Soviets in January 1963 and there was talk of still other moles in the British Secret Intelligence Service, Straight remained silent. Then in June 1963 he learned that President Kennedy was to nominate him as chairman of the newly formed Advisory Council on the Arts. The only credential that stood in the way was the FBI security approval, a necessity for presidential appointments. Assuming the worst from an investigation, Straight talked. First he talked to the FBI in 1963 and then, in 1964 he spent many hours with MI-5 detailing his knowledge of communist activity at Cambridge in the 1930s. His role was kept from the public until 1981 when it leaked in England. Subsequently, nearly twenty years after his initial unburdening, he wrote *After Long Silence*.

These events bound an unusual and fascinating life much of which is revealed in his memoir. As we talked, several questions which he answers but does not fully explain in the book, at least from an intelligence viewpoint, recurred in various forms. They are summarized as follows: Was Michael Straight, as many journalists and others suggest, a Soviet spy (he says no)? Why did he wait so long to reveal those he knew to be Soviet spies? Was he a traitor (again he says no)? And finally, why did he really write the book? Michael Straight's responses to these and related questions are both provocative and not completely satisfying even to him, as our conversation and the book made clear. But they are worth considering; he is the last of the publicly identified former communists from Cambridge—the only American in the group. Thus he provides a unique opportunity to acquire insight about this period in the history of intelligence.

Was Straight a Soviet Spy?

> . . . in the early 1930s, the NKVD . . . concentrated . . . on recruitment of young men of influential families. The political climate . . . was very favorable . . . the young generation was receptive . . . to the sublime ideas of making the world safe from the menace of fas-

> cism and of abolishing exploitation of man by man. This was the theme on which the NKVD based their appeal to young men who were tired of a tedious life in the stifling atmosphere of the privileged class . . . they were told they could be much more useful if they concealed their political views . . . and entered the revolutionary underground. The idea of joining a "secret society" held a strong appeal . . . [2]

At Cambridge, Michael Straight " . . . felt ashamed of the privileges that the students took for granted." (p. 59, *ALS*•) It was a problem he would continue to live with without effective resolution. He was shocked when he discovered waiters in the dining hall pocketing food to take home for their children. Paradoxically, he chose to deal with his relatively excessive affluence by increasing his own austerity and dismissing his gentleman's gentleman, apparently not realizing the difficulty he imposed on the gentleman concerned. As a solution for the immediate world problems of fascism and famine, he turned to the Cambridge communist cell and the Socialist Society. He was "interested in ideas, (he) wanted to believe."

Straight admits to having been spotted and assessed while attending the London School of Economics the year prior to Cambridge. He was recruited and if not trained at least instructed by Anthony Blunt while at Cambridge. Just before graduation Blunt informed him that it was his duty on behalf of the COMINTERN to fake a rejection of communism and show symptoms of a nervous breakdown over the death in the Spanish Civil war of his closest friend, John Cornford. This behavior would lay the groundwork for his return to the United States to seek a position on Wall Street where he could be of service to the COMINTERN. Straight objected to the whole idea; his plans were to become a British citizen and stand for parliament. Blunt sought guidance from his COMINTERN masters and they were unyielding. He was directed by his control in London to reiterate the instructions and tell Straight that the issue had been decided by Stalin himself! Since he had not elaborated this point in the book I asked Straight whether Blunt had actually used Stalin's name. He declared that "Blunt had indeed, it is not something one forgets." Then he added that he wondered at the time whether using Stalin's name was "pure fabrication to encourage me." [3]

Ultimately Straight did as he was ordered, implicitly accepting COMINTERN control, and went home to Washington not Wall Street, a change to which the COMINTERN agreed. Before Straight left for the States, Blunt asked him for a "highly personal document." He provided a small drawing. Blunt tore it in half, giving one part to his recruit and telling him that he

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[2] Alexander Orlov, *Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare* (Michigan, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963), pp. 108-109.

• This abbreviation of *After Long Silence* will appear throughout the article.

[3] Victor Suvorov, *Soviet Military Intelligence* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1984), pp. 19-21. Suvorov relates an incident which suggests that the use of Stalin's name to induce cooperation was not unusual. He tells the story of potential German GRU agents who demanded CPSU membership before they would cooperate. The GRU just issued the cards, adding gratuitously they had been written out by Stalin himself; the agents were very productive.

would be contacted in America by someone with the other half. Straight left Cambridge for Washington in the fall of 1937, having graduated with first class honors. After visiting the President "in his White House study" and with the help of Mrs. Roosevelt, he accepted (in late 1937) a position as an unpaid volunteer in the Office of the Economic Advisor in the State Department. He found rooms in the same town house as Joseph Alsop with whom he became friends, went to dinner with Charles Beard, met Dean Acheson, wrote a column for a congressman which was published in the *New York Times*, and began a study of Hitler's ability to wage war.

In late April 1938, Straight received a phone call from someone with a European accent who said " . . . I bring greetings from your friends in Cambridge University . . . " and promptly went to meet the stranger in a nearby restaurant. This was his first contact with his case officer, Michael Green, who said he had "mislaid" the other half of the drawing; Straight did not press the point. When Green suggested he take home and study any interesting documents that crossed his desk, Straight said no documents were routed to him. Green replied they would be in time and he was right. (p. 129, *ALS*)

In early 1939 Straight left State to take a paying job with presidential advisor Tom Corcoran writing speeches for the President and Democrats in Congress. In late 1940 he returned briefly to State in a paid position in the European Division. At that time he mentions (p. 156, *ALS*) handling a report on Britain's chances for survival prepared by then Ambassador to the Court of St. James, Joseph Kennedy, and stamped "STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL," which he told me he did not give to Green. But there would be other sensitive documents coming his way and since his return to State Green's "interest in (him) was renewed." Thus, he tells us, he resigned for good in early 1941 and appointed himself Washington editor of the *New Republic*. Nevertheless, Straight continued to meet with Green and provided at least one more document (a personal memorandum urging the Soviets to give up their revolutionary ideology) at their last meeting "early in 1942," when he terminated the relationship to join the Army. (p. 168, *ALS*) Straight stressed to me that the documents he passed were "not classified . . . my own opinions . . . relatively harmless . . . and all critical of the Soviet Union. . . ." Still, he admits they included the one on Hitler's war making ability,[4] on which Secretary of State Hull had written "splendid," and for which Acheson had praised him, and about which Alger Hiss (who was a Soviet spy at the time—Straight said he did not know it) had called him to his office to discuss various points. More on this later.

In summary, in the opinion of many reviewers and journalists,[5] the events in Michael Straight's life from Cambridge to his final meeting with Green amount to spying for the Soviet Union, a charge Straight strongly denies.

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[4] William Rusher, "Judiciary Committee Should Probe Michael Straight," *Human Events*, 12 February 1983, p. 7. Rusher argues that in the late 1930s to say that because he had no access to classified documents the information passed was harmless is "pure nonsense as anyone knows who has ever worked in Washington. Classified documents were a dime a dozen in FDR's administration."

[5] See for example: Rusher, op. cit., fn #4; Godfrey Hodgson, "Moles and Old School Spies," *Washington Post*, 23 January 1983, p. 1, Bookworld; Barrie Penrose and Simon Freeman, "Inside story of an older traitors circle," *The London Sunday Times*, 14 November 1982.

The distinction is in part semantic: a spy, says Webster, is any person who is employed by a government to clandestinely obtain secret or otherwise unobtainable material from or information about another country. In one sense of the word "employ," as in employee, Michael Straight is correct; he was not a Soviet spy. On the other hand, in the sense of "employ" which suggests to use or make use of, there is a more apt descriptor—agent. A definition of agent is provided by Hans Moses,[6]—a tested source, usually witting, who has accepted a continuing relationship with a secret service, often on a contractual basis, and who may receive financial compensation. Moses makes a further distinction by describing a source under consideration for agent status as a "contact." In our conversation and in the interview with the *Washington Post* [7] this subject was raised directly and Straight applied a different different definition of agent. He said he was not a Soviet agent because "I never took any orders." When it was pointed out that he met with Green when asked to do so, Straight said, "I just acknowledged his presence and didn't repudiate him. He was aware from the very start that he couldn't give me orders. The meetings were very irregular and it was just a matter of getting out of a very awkward situation." He agreed that when Green asked for documents he provided some but, he said, the document that was praised by Acheson and Hull (Secretary of State) "was not information;" it just contained his opinions. When asked why he did not simply stop meeting with Green, Straight replied that it would have been the equivalent of desertion on the field of battle . . . "cutting all my ties." However comforting, even understandable, this rationale, it does not change the facts. By his own description of events, allowing for his reluctant cooperation, and regardless of whether the documents provided were classified, one is obliged to say Michael Straight was once at least a developing Soviet agent and contact.

There is yet another category of clandestinity into which Straight's relationship with Soviet intelligence fits rather well as Ernest Cuneo points out in his review.[8] It is not surprising, considering the track record of the KGB in this regard (not only in Britain but in the United States as well), that Straight's actions also qualify him as an agent of influence; i.e., a person in a position to sway opinion and/or influence behavior as directed by the case officer. By this definition, the quality and classification of the initial documents could be as innocuous as Straight claims, their primary purpose being to cement the relationship. More important, because of his many contacts with the affluent and powerful, which included the President, the Secretary of State, Supreme Court

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[6] Hans Moses, "The Clandestine Service of the Central Intelligence Agency," p. 7, a monograph published by the *Association of Former Intelligence Officers*, McLean, VA, 1983. Moses also defines an "occasional source" as one who rarely reports information.

[7] Curt Suplee, "Setting the Record Straight," *Washington Post*, Style section, 24 January 1983, p. B-1. See also: Duncan Campbell, "Coming Cleanish," *New Statesman*, March 1983; Campbell takes the opposite view, "Straight was not a Russian agent (he says; no one has disputed it) . . . Nonetheless considering the amount of blood that appears near the author's hands throughout, he does not emerge in a pleasant light."

[8] Ernest Cuneo, "After Long Silence: An Appraisal From An Intelligence Standpoint," unpublished manuscript provided by the author. A sharply edited version of the review appeared as, "The Fatal Silence" in the *Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene*, Vol. 2, No. 3, June 1983, pp. 5-6. Mr. Cuneo served as wartime liaison between the Office of Strategic Services, British Intelligence in the US, and the FBI. In the complete version Mr. Cuneo discusses at length his views on Straight as an agent of influence.

Justice Frankfurter, members of the press and Congress, a cousin in the CIA, a list which would surely grow, Straight was very likely to have been viewed by Green as a most valuable potential agent of influence.

It should be noted, as Straight explained to me, he was not content with the situation regarding Green and wanted to extricate himself. He assumed he was succeeding because there was little pressure and Green was not upset with the product, even when Straight's memos were critical of the Soviet Union and he asked that they be sent to Stalin.[9] But from Green's position, there is a more probable explanation for this situation. He was very likely trying to bring Straight along without losing him. When we remember that the COMINTERN/NKVD/GRU during that period were very demanding of the many other agents in Washington and consider what possible pressures might have been brought to bear on Straight, it is reasonable to assume that the Soviets were either waiting for the right moment, or that they applied pressure and Straight did not mention it. To a counterintelligence officer this is a loose end that requires investigation.[10]

As a last bit relative to Straight as an agent, I asked him whether he had been used as a spotter, a point not mentioned in his book. He replied that he had been asked only once, at the last meeting with Green, and then it was to recommend a replacement.[11] He said he gave Green only one name, Michael Greenberg (subsequently named by self-confessed Soviet spy Elizabeth Bentley as one of her agents), at one time an aide to presidential assistant Lauchlin Currie (who was named by both Bentley and Chambers as a Soviet agent). Straight said that he suspected Greenberg's sympathies were what Green was looking for.[12]

In sum, from an intelligence officer's point of view, whether he realized it or not, Michael Straight was at minimum a contact or developing Soviet agent and a potential agent of influence—in everyday terms, a spy.

Why The Long Silence?

There is no summary answer to this question. The book leads the reader to this conclusion through carefully crafted, frequently eloquent, always interesting vignettes of the author's life. One answer, not articulated but strongly implied, is that he did not think being silent made much difference except to

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[9] See: Suplee, op. cit., fn #7. Straight told Suplee essentially the same thing.

[10] See: Allen Weinstein, *Perjury* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978). Although focusing primarily on the Hiss-Chambers affair, Weinstein recounts the state of espionage in the US from the interwar to the postwar period of McCarthy. He discusses most of the names mentioned in this article. His source notes and his bibliography provide a good start for the scholar. Recently released Chambers documents reveal some of the information he kept from the FBI and did not include in his book, *Witness* (see fn #12), as insurance against the Soviets; he knew Walter Krivitsky, see fn #35.

[11] The likelihood of this happening only once is small viewed from a case officer's perspective in light of what is known about Soviet intelligence operations. Experience suggests that Straight was either unaware of the realities or Green was more professional and subtle than Straight realized.

[12] See: Whittaker Chambers, *Witness* (New York: Random House, 1954); Elizabeth Bentley, *Out of Bondage* (New York: The Devin-Adair Co., 1951); Weinstein, op. cit., fn #10. There is some doubt as to whether Currie was a member of the CPSU, but these sources document that he was at least a fellow traveler. Straight said he was unaware of this at the time; apparently Greenberg's links to Currie did not suggest a similarity of views.

himself and his friends. That this was his decision to make no one argues. That he should have acted sooner is a message clearly communicated; why he did not is worth examining.

When British diplomats Burgess and Maclean defected in 1951, Straight says, "I was ready at that moment to tell the authorities all I knew." He went to see "the British official (he) knew best in Washington," and told him he had information about Burgess. His friend replied, "My dear fellow, you will have to take your place at the end of the line. And I should warn you, the line runs all the way around the block." (p. 252, *ALS)* After arguing the toss with himself, he decided that if he talked, Blunt's role was sure to come out. And since he believed Blunt had "given up the world of espionage" after World War II for the world of art history (he then taught at Cambridge, and was Surveyor of the Queen's Pictures), he rationalized that talking would do little good because Blunt would, "I was certain, refuse to admit his role." Still, he concludes this anecdote by saying, "I should have gone to the end of the line and waited there; I know that. Instead I told myself that Guy was gone forever, and that Anthony had been rendered harmless. With mixed feelings and uneasiness, I went back to my own work."

At about the same time a similar experience occurred with Straight's cousin, "a high official of the Central Intelligence Agency." [13] When this point came up in the conversation he said that he had been going to tell his story to Tracey Barnes (at that time a senior operations officer) during lunch at the Metropolitan club: "I did say I was fearful about infiltration of the British secret service (in the book he said "Intelligence services"), but he didn't provide the needed word or gesture of encouragement, he didn't show any interest in what I was trying to say. I let it drop." In his book he was more direct, " . . . I lacked the resolution to carry my impulse through." Aside from the character implications, the curious thing about these comments is that Burgess was a diplomat. Why then was Straight talking about intelligence services? Perhaps he thought that Burgess was really in the secret service.

Sidney Hook, himself a former Marxist and fellow-traveler, challenges Straight on his resolution with the conviction of the converted, seeing his silence as dedication to the communist cause. Hook states, ". . . he had enough will to decline, he just wanted to serve the Soviet Union and the world international communist movement . . . a dedicated neophyte." [14] Straight disputes Hook's point candidly in the *Washington Post* interview, saying, "I lacked the will, I lacked the sense of self." But he in turn is challenged by his longtime liberal friend, Gus Tyler, in an open letter. "Why did it take you so long, then, to break the long silence?" Tyler asked. "You say to inform runs counter to the determination that we all share—not to inflict pain on others." Tyler concludes

[13] Straight, op. cit., p. 313. I asked Straight whether Green knew about Tracey Barnes and if so if he had told him. He replied that he certainly had not told him, it "would have been the last thing I would have done, I was trying to get out of the relationship." He did not know if Green knew; "If he did he never mentioned it."

[14] Sidney Hook, "The Incredible Story of Michael Straight," *Encounter*, December 1983, Vol. LXI No. 4, p. 68. Hook's article should be read with caution. He argues that not every communist is a potential espionage agent and gives the example that someone "with a stutter would be ruled out." How unfortunate that he was not the one who interviewed Philby (whose stammer was a trademark) for his MI-6 position.

that this explanation is "so human and rational" that he likens it to the street code where one does not tell on friends.[15]

But there were other more practical even more persuasive reasons for Michael Straight's silence. If he had talked in the late 1940s or early 1950s about communists in Britain, he risked being called before Senator McCarthy to talk about himself in Washington. His magazine, his family, his political ambitions, his friends, would be jeopardized. As he put it, "These were not easy prospects to face." The social and psychological pressures experienced by the self-confessed former Soviet agents of the late 1940s, when forced to reveal the involvement of their friends, certainly inhibited Straight as well.[16] For all these reasons Straight contented himself with remaining silent and attacking Senator McCarthy in the *New Republic*.[17]

Having survived the McCarthy era and built a reputation as a liberal Democrat, Straight was offered a position as head of President Kennedy's new art council. This created a dilemma which he could not evade. He concluded the FBI investigation prerequisite to the job would certainly have turned up his communist past. Thus his acceptance and silence would risk embarrassing the administration and jeopardizing the long sought arts program. In the end he reluctantly asked that his name be withdrawn from consideration. I asked him why he thought his links to communism would surface if he remained silent. He replied that on two occasions, one in the United States and one in Britain, these links had become known to others, though so far overlooked generally. When he decided to run for Congress from New York City just after the war, the local Democratic committee was told he had been a communist in England (he never knew who originated the story). He withdrew and went back to the *New Republic*. In Britain, a short biography, which he did not mention in the book, appeared in the Cambridge magazine *GRANTA* (1937) in which he was identified as, inter alia, a communist. Although he could have given some other reason for not accepting, he chose to end his silence at this point (June 1963) and give the real reason. Why then? Timing was probably

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[15] Gus Tyler, "An Open Letter to Michael Straight: The Communist Who Wasn't," the *New Leader*, 21 February 1983, pp. 12-13. Tyler makes the argument that Straight was not really a communist in the true sense of the word. He was more interested in close friends and helping mankind than in Marxist-Leninist ideology, and did not know how to deal with the professionals. He points out that Straight was a Keynesian, not a Marxist economist, that he did not have a party card, or belong to the British Communist Party. Straight was candid when I mentioned these latter points. He said he was prohibited by law from joining the British Communist Party until 21 (although he said the really dedicated did so anyway), so rather than join the Communist Youth League he joined the Cambridge cell which did not issue cards.

[16] Weinstein, op. cit., fn #10. During the spy revelations of the late 1940s and early 1950s, most of those who came forward voluntarily expressed great reluctance to involve others with whom they had worked. But like Straight they eventually had no choice.

[17] Straight had many overt links to known communists and fellow travelers as did those attacked by McCarthy, but for whatever reasons his name was never mentioned in that connection. He had joined the American Veterans Committee (AVC) after World War II along with Cord Meyer. Both worked to prevent a communist takeover of the AVC and both describe the same incidents in their books without mentioning the other directly. Meyer does allude to one AVC member as having " . . . been a controlled secret agent of the KGB." Straight told me he was concerned that Meyer meant him, which he said would have been an error. He wrote Meyer asking for clarification but never received a reply. Ironically, it was Meyer who was investigated (and cleared) by the Agency for allegedly having had communist friends and associations (though not involving the AVC). See: Cord Meyer, *Facing Reality* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1980), pp. 51-55.

the main factor. McCarthyism was a bad memory, the Kennedy administration was likely to be more understanding, and there can be little doubt that he had long had a troubled conscience. In the event, it was suggested by Arthur Schlesinger at the White House that he go to the FBI, which he did; Blunt's days were numbered.

Straight summed up the morality of his position when he told the *Washington Post:* "The center of the argument against me so far is that I failed to do anything with the information I had for twenty-five years, and essentially that's true. I'm not looking for praise—or justified condemnation. I'm perfectly happy for people to say I was wrong and weak." [18]. Only Gus Tyler saw it differently.

Was Michael Straight a Traitor?

While he judged the center of the argument against him to be focused on his long silence, others asked what that silence meant in terms of loyalty to the United States. These inquiries arose out of his relationship with Guy Burgess, whom he met at least four times after leaving Cambridge. The first meeting was at Straight's Olde Towne Alexandria home in 1940; Burgess was in town, called Straight, and invited himself to dinner. They spoke of their Apostle days and Burgess asked if Straight could put him in touch with their "friends." He told Burgess he could not and would not if he could. (p. 142-143, *ALS*) It is doubtful either was telling the truth. Burgess did not have to ask Straight, and Straight knew the emergency number Green had given him. Perhaps a little sparring; Straight learned Burgess was still associated with Soviet intelligence; Burgess left not feeling threatened.

It is worth considering what might have happened had Straight reported his knowledge to the FBI at that time (1940). Walter Krivitsky (who defected from the GRU in 1937) had told the British of a Soviet agent who was a British citizen working for the *Times* in Spain during the civil war, and of two other Soviet agents who were in the British Foreign Service. Krivitsky did not know the agents' names and the British did not put it together, although they had the facts. Had MI-5 been alerted by Straight and reacted with an investigation of Burgess, Blunt, and Klugman, this would have led to others like Maclean and Alan Nunn May (Cambridge University scientist and one of the atom-bomb spies caught after the war), and in the process to Philby particularly in light of his service as a *Times* correspondent in Spain. In that case, Philby could not have passed to the Soviets the MI-6 organizational material during the war. And more important, neither Philby nor Blunt could have informed the

[18] Suplee, op. cit., fn #7.

Soviets of the ULTRA intercept intelligence from Bletchley Park.[19] When Straight finally did tell the British in 1964 they told him that it was the first hard evidence they had obtained on Blunt and the others he named, although many had been under suspicion, including Blunt. Whether the FBI would have taken action in 1940 is open to conjecture. There is precedent to indicate a slow reaction. In 1939 former Soviet spymaster Whittaker Chambers first told his story (implicating Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, and more than twenty other highly placed administration officials as known communists) to Assistant Secretary of State Adolph Berle in the presence of journalist Isaac Don Levine. It was four years before Berle turned the report over to the FBI and another three before the FBI did anything.[20]

The second Straight-Burgess meeting occurred in London in 1947 when Straight was accompanying Vice President Henry Wallace on his trip to Europe and Burgess showed up "uninvited" at a party. Again they talked of intelligence but this time more specifically espionage involving former colleagues; Burgess said he was "about to leave the government for good." (p. 209. *ALS*) If Straight had talked at this point it could still have reduced the peacetime intelligence damage inflicted by Burgess, et. al. As to personal risk, conceivably MI-5 would have kept his role quiet, especially when the significance of his contribution became apparent. Both the Americans and the British knew there was a serious leak in the British Embassy in Washington, but they knew little else. They did not suspect that Burgess had blackmailed Maclean (in 1944), with pictures, into taking the post as first secretary at the British Embassy in Washington where he also served until 1948 as secretary of the Joint Nuclear Commission with a no-escort badge to the Atomic Energy Comission; Maclean was the leak. Furthermore, had Straight acted then Philby's role would very likely have been revealed; then he could not have betrayed the agents in Albania and Eastern Europe, among others. And of course Blunt would have been burned, too, and as he later did in return for immunity, give evidence against the others. But it does not appear that Straight long contem-

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[19] Andrew Boyle, *Climate of Treason* (London: Coronet Books, 1980), pp. 279-281. Boyle discusses how strongly Philby felt that the Soviets should be given the "Bletchley intercepts." What Boyle did not know, and what Cambridge Professor F. H. Hinsley told me during a discussion in 1981, was that Anthony Blunt had formal knowledge of ULTRA and presumably he informed the Soviets. Hinsley thinks Philby had formal knowledge of the Abwehr intercepts only, but probably put "two and two together" regarding an expanded capability at Bletchley, giving the Soviets another source. Hinsley served as liaison officer between Bletchley Park and Whitehall during the war, one of very few who had knowledge of the collection and use of ULTRA. Note: this edition of Boyle's book contains data about Blunt that was censored in the hardbound English and American versions; the latter was titled, *The Fourth Man*. Chapman Pincher, in *Too Secret Too Long* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984) states that British scientist R. V. Jones "assured" him that Philby had "complete details" of the ULTRA decrypts and told the Soviets "everything'." p. 297.

[20] Weinstein, op. cit., p. 64, 328-9. Berle told the President promptly, but he (the President) dismissed it as unfounded rumor. Note: Until the end of World War II the FBI was mainly interested in bank robbers and Germans. By the time Straight went to the FBI (1963), communists were more important and Hoover did not tell MI-5 about Straight's knowledge although he did convey the impression he was well informed about British spies. They found out informally from a Hoover antagonist, William Sullivan, about seven months after the fact and then made a formal request. See: Straight, op. cit., p. 324; Sanford J. Unger, *FBI* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1976), pp. 100-106.

plated this alternative. Did he accept E. M. Forster's precept that, "betraying one's friend is worse than betraying one's country?" [21]

In 1949 when Straight was in London again, he "happened" to meet Burgess for the third time, on the street near Whitehall. Burgess asked him to attend an Apostle reunion later that night; he accepted.[22] Blunt was also at the reunion and he asked Straight to meet with him and Burgess the next day. At this meeting, again the subject was in part espionage with the primary purpose of determining whether they could rely on Straight to remain silent. Blunt said that he had left the government for art history. Burgess left the impression he "was still engaged in espionage," although he again suggested he would leave the foreign office shortly. At one point Burgess asked him, "Are you still with us?" Straight says he replied, "You know that I am not," but he did acknowledge that he was "not totally unfriendly" as demonstrated by his presence. Upon reflection, Straight concluded that "it was a weak, evasive answer; the sort I habitually gave when I faced a confrontation of some kind. It reflected my continuing inability to force an issue, to resolve a conflict, to make an enemy of another individual, and in this instance, to break completely with my own past." (p. 229-230, *ALS*) It should be noted that Straight was least likely to speak out at this time when anti-communist fever was peaking in the US.[23]

The critical (to this discussion) fourth meeting occurred in Washington in March 1951, when Straight again encountered Burgess "accidentially," this time outside the British Embassy. Burgess said he had been working at the embassy in Washington on "Far Eastern affairs" since October 1950, a few months after the Korean War started. Straight says he realized that Burgess would have told the Soviets about US plans to advance into North Korea, and his spying " . . . could have caused the deaths of many American soldiers." He said to Burgess, "You must have known about our plans." Yes, Burgess said. "Everyone knew about them . . . including the Chinese." He added that the Chinese tried to warn the US not to get too close to the Yalu, but MacArthur, Acheson, and the CIA said it was a bluff. Then Straight reminded Burgess that he had said he was leaving the government in 1949; Burgess replied that "they" insisted that he accept this posting. Straight responded that being at war, " . . . if you aren't out of the government within a month from now, I swear to you, I'll turn you in." (pp. 249-251) This exchange, when revealed in the book, was taken to mean that if the Chinese had not known our plans in

[21] Boyle, op. cit., pp. 252-334.

[22] I asked Mr. Straight if he had known about the reunion prior to meeting Burgess. He said he had probably received an invitation several months previously, but had forgotten about it because he had not then thought he would be in Britain. He said he was reluctant to go even then because he was not anxious to see either Burgess or Blunt. He added that the Apostles still exist and have annual meetings. The current president is an Oxford man. Straight said he has not been to a reunion since the one in 1949.

[23] Weinstein, op. cit., pp. 3-69; H. Montgomery Hyde, *The Atom Bomb Spies* (New York: Atheneum, 1980). These citations provide a good start toward an appreciation of the causes and nature of the public and official atmosphere of the period.

advance, American lives would have been saved and this brought forth cries of treason.[24]

William Safire attacked Straight on this point in his column, calling Burgess a "top Soviet agent."[25] But despite his concern about Burgess' spying mentioned above, Straight replied in a letter to the *Times*[26] that "far from being the top Soviet agent, Burgess was a minor and discredited official with no access to highly sensitive material." Straight does not indicate how he knew Burgess' level of access and his assessment is complicated by the fact that while Burgess was indeed considered by most Americans and British as disreputable, he was still selected as Anthony Eden's escort while Eden was in Washington (for which he received a personal note of thanks) and allowed access to classified material.[27] Pat Buchanan, on his radio show (March 1983), said neither Burgess' reputation nor his position in the agent hierarchy makes any difference; Straight should have turned him in as a matter of loyalty and let the FBI worry about the problem, period!

I asked Straight about these articles and several others which appeared at the same time on both sides of the Atlantic, and the apparent contradiction between what he wrote in the book about concern over American lives and what he said to Safire about Burgess being only a discredited official. He explained that his initial estimate of Burgess' role had changed and recently been confirmed by an article in the *London Sunday Telegraph*[28] which quoted "a reliable Soviet source" as stating that Donald Maclean claimed he had revealed to Stalin every significant decision on the war including the one where President Truman told Prime Minister Attlee the US would respect China's borders and not use the A-bomb in the Korean War. At the time of the Truman-Attlee meeting (December 1951) Maclean headed the American desk in the British Foreign Office and would have been privy to the intelligence.[29] From this information, Straight inferred that Burgess was not involved and thus that he (Straight) had not, as he once thought and others now claimed, done damage to the country by keeping silent. But had Straight acted then, he might still have prevented the defection of Burgess, Maclean, and Philby.

Clearly then, Straight's silence was extremely costly insofar as it delayed the breaking up of the Cambridge spy ring. While acknowledging the many

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[24] See for example: P. H. Terzian, "Michael Straight's Listless Ambition," *The American Spectator*, June 1983; Michiko Kakutani, "Books of the Times," the *New York Times*, 15 February 1983, C-13; Curtis Carroll Davis, "Recriminations of a fellow traveler," *Christian Science Monitor*, 30 May 1983.

[25] William Safire, The Straight Story," *New York Times*, 6 January 1983, p. A-27.

[26] Michael Straight, letter to the editor, *New York Times*, dated 7 January 1983.

[27] Boyle, op. cit., p. 379.

[28] John Miller, in Moscow; "Maclean coup in Korea war," *London Sunday Telegraph*, 20 March 1983. Miller reported that Maclean, who had died a few days earlier, boasted to Miller's Soviet source that his spying for Russia dictated the course and outcome of the Korean war. Miller also noted that George Blake, another British spy for the Soviets who defected after escaping from jail, was at Maclean's funeral, but Kim Philby was not.

[29] Boyle, op. cit., pp. 384-5. After Maclean defected a numbered copy of the Prime Minister's account of his meeting with President Truman regarding Korea and the A-bomb was found in his personal files. Curiously, on page 387 Boyle labels Maclean the "prime suspect in mid 1950s" and on page 384 he refers to the "still unsuspected Maclean" in April 1951.

"ifs" involved, he had at least four key opportunities (which he sensed) to break his silence, each of which could have made a tremendous difference to the history of intelligence.

With regard to the impact of any intelligence passed by the ring on the Truman-Attlee meeting, the US decision to cross the 38th parallel, and the Chinese decision to use troops in North Korea, the evidence suggests that it was nil. Joseph Goulden, in his study of the Korean War, documents that the Chinese decision to use troops in North Korea was in effect made by the United States when it crossed the 38th parallel. China had prepared for this contingency and, as Burgess told Straight, had warned the US and Britain what would happen in the event they proceeded. The US decisions to cross the 38th parallel, to limit UN troops near the Yalu to South Koreans (which MacArthur disregarded), and not to invade China were made before Burgess arrived in Washington. If they were reported to Stalin by Philby or Maclean, as they very likely were, this could have made Stalin's support of China's decision to use its troops in North Korea less risky. But, according to Adam Ulam and Dean Acheson,[30] it is doubtful Stalin would have held back the Chinese if he had not known; he did know the UN would not support fighting in China and there was ample evidence the US wanted to avoid it also. As to the Truman-Attlee meeting and Truman's "decision" not to use the A-bomb, the record indicates this was more a gesture to Attlee than a firm policy commitment. The President later moved atomic weapons to Asia; the Chinese knew it at the time and that may have affected truce negotiations. The A-bomb decision could not have affected the Chinese decision to intervene since they did so the month before it was made.[31] If Straight had spoken up any time prior to 1951, it would have had little effect on the Korean War, although he did not know it at the time.

"Can Michael Straight fairly be called a traitor?" asks Safire. "Not really," he says, "because no purpose or passion guided his double life." For a semanticist like Safire, this is a spongy criterion for such a crucial question. Of course, by his definition he is correct. Straight counters, and he too is right by his definition, that he is not a traitor in the sense the Constitution uses the term; he did not give aid and comfort to the enemy, nor did he commit an overt treacherous act in the present of two witnesses.

This brings us to the final two aspects of this issue which remain to be considered; one definitional the other operational. First, the word "traitor" has meaning outside the Constitution—in Webster's dictionary—a kind of everyday definition: "one who betrays another's trust or is false to an obligation or duty." In this context, regardless of the nature of the material passed to Green

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[30] Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 2d. ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 529. See also: Dean Acheson, *Present At the Creation* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969), pp. 443-45.

[31] Joseph C. Goulden, *Korea* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982), pp. 245, 280-285, 416-417. Goulden cites a sensitive CIA report (now declassified) received at the White House less than seventy-two hours after Truman told Attlee he would not use the A-bomb, as an indication that the Soviets knew of the decision (it also indicated there were leaks on both sides). Note: the documents on the Truman-Attlee A-bomb issue and Truman's movement of A-bombs to the Far East were found in the Truman Library by history professor Roger Dingman of the University of Southern California. He is writing a book on Truman and MacArthur which treats this point.

or the informality of his relationship to the State Department, there was an implicit obligation of loyalty which Straight did not honor. But from Straight's point of view, this definition is not helpful for other reasons; i.e., to speak sooner would have betrayed the trust of his friends at Cambridge, been false to his obligation (if he had no obligation he would not have met with Green) to the COMINTERN, and put himself at risk at the height of the cold war. Any way he would lose; he chose the only alternatives to disclosure—delay and procrastination. Nevertheless, even in 1937-42 it was wrong, if not traitorous, to betray the trust of the State Department by dealing secretly with Soviet intelligence.

As to the operational or counterintelligence (CI) context of treason, the concern is not so much with treason itself, but rather its obverse, the agent behavior that is the essential central element in cases which lead to charges of espionage or treason. Thus if we view *After Long Silence* as a exercise in counterintelligence, different questions arise. In the abstract, for example, with whom did the agent associate and what was the nature of the relationship?; are there patterns of activity that cannot be adequately explained?; what is his world view, his background?; what are his objectives and motivations? In the case of Michael Straight, we find most of these topics treated in some length in the book but not from a CI viewpoint. As a consequence some puzzles remain and two will be mentioned here. William Safire noted one:

> Another puzzler: Some time after Michael Straight left his post as editor of the *New Republic* in the mid-50s, the magazine hired H. A. R. Philby to write a series of articles, spanning 28 months, about the Middle East . . . the Soviet spy wrote nine pieces in 1957-58 . . . (Safire finds it interesting) that of all the publications in American journalism, the *New Republic*—founded by Michael Straight's family—was the one that became the outlet of, and cover for, the Soviet spy intimately linked to Mr. Burgess and Mr. Blunt.[32]

At the time of these articles, Philby was not a well known journalist. Yet his name was prominently displayed on the cover of at least three issues of the *New Republic*.[33] In the 9 September 1957 issue, the Philby piece is preceded by a note which says, "The *editors* (emphasis mine) of the *New Republic* addressed some further questions to Mr. Philby . . . " Now, while it is true as Safire indicated that Straight left his post as editor in April 1956 (judging by the masthead), it is also true that he remained as editor-at-large until September 1958, and as a contributing editor from then until January 1963. Thus he could have exerted some influence on the choice of Philby. But since he must have known Philby had been the target of press speculation that he was the "third man" who tipped off Burgess and Maclean in time to defect [34] (although officially denied in 1955), why would Straight help Philby unless obligated to do so? Straight told me he had no contact with nor did he know or even hear

[32] William Safire, "Straight Story (II)," *New York Times*, 17 February 1983, p. A-31

[33] H. A. R. Philby, "Letter from the Middle East," the *New Republic*, 9 September 1957, pp. 14-15; H. A. R. Philby, "Saudi Arabia—A Correspondent's Report," the *New Republic*, 1 April 1957, pp. 7-8; H. A. R. Philby, "What Obsesses the Arab," the *New Republic*, 7 October 1957, pp. 8-9.

[34] 34. Boyle, op. cit., pp. 443-447.

of Philby until after Burgess' defection. Granted the truth of this statement, the reason why the *New Republic* hired Philby remains open. In sum, these facts would stimulate a CI officer to consider Straight as a potential agent of influence in this matter. In the process he would have to deal with the data which follow.

Straight and Philby both went to Cambridge (Philby left in 1933, Straight arrived in 1934), to the same college, Trinity; both read economics and had the same tutor; they had many of the same friends (two in particular besides Burgess; John Cornford and James Klugman were close friends of Straight's and sponsored him to join them in the communist cell there). Straight and Philby both were members of the Cambridge Union Socialist Society (CUSS), of which Philby was treasurer in his final year. In November of 1934 when Straight joined the CUSS he attended the meetings regularly. (p. 60, *ALS*) Philby returned to Cambridge in 1934 to address the CUSS, but I was unable to determine just when. Straight told me he does not remember the event. This of course is possible. He was newly arrived, Cambridge had over a thousand undergraduates and was a club- and group-oriented institution in 1934. Still, these common links should be clarified.

Continuing a similar line of thought, still from the CI point of view, one must ask: Were the three "coincidental" meetings Straight had with Burgess really coincidence or were they planned (perhaps without Straight's knowledge) to pass instructions, make requests, activate a sleeper for a specific task? However outrageous and unjust this might seem to Straight, the question must be addressed. We know the NKVD/GRU/COMINTERN took advantage of people like Straight if they could. They were experts at using agents of influence and they employed sleepers to be activated as required; Burgess, Maclean, Philby, and Blunt had all experienced this status. Moreover they were persistent and capable of pressure to the extent of executing uncooperative agents and even former case officers.[35] It is possible then that the fourth meeting (and perhaps earlier ones) with Burgess was operational and used to designate another contact for Straight since Burgess planned to leave soon; it could have been Philby. Burgess was living with Philby at the time. Is it reasonable to assume that Burgess would not have contacted Straight (a fellow Apostle) socially, as Straight claims, if there had not been an official requirement preventing him? Did Straight not know Burgess was stationed in Washington? They both had acquaintances in common (e.g., Joseph Alsop). After considering these questions the likelihood of Straight's influencing Philby's contract with the *New Republic*, at the behest of the Soviets, Philby, or others, is less remote. While this is just speculation, one precedent for enlisting help of this kind from former agents involved Anthony Blunt, cousin of Britain's queen mother. Blunt resigned from MI-5 and was "allowed" to leave the NKVD by the Soviets after World War II to pursue art history. But when Burgess and Maclean defected he was activated first by the NKVD to draft and help im-

[35] Alexander Orlov, *Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare*. See also Weinstein, *Perjury* and Walter Krivitsky, *In Stalin's Secret Service* (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1939). Krivitsky was found shot to death on 10 February 1941 in the Hotel Bellevue in Washington. The death was ruled a suicide. But Krivitsky had told friends that if he were found dead under conditions which looked like suicide, not to believe it.

plement their escape plan, and then by an "old boy" in MI-5 to help search Burgess' rooms. In the process of the latter cooperation he pocketed letters damaging to himself.[36] Now if Blunt could be called on when needed, why could not Straight?

Overall, there can be little doubt that Michael Straight was false to an obligation and duty to his country. In the process he has left us with many unanswered questions, one more of which will be dealt with here.

Why Did He Write The Book?

He did not have to. He does not need the money. In response to the newspaper articles and telephone calls he could have said nothing, just let the turmoil dissipate. If he wanted to clarify the circumstances for his grandchildren (as he indicated to one author), why not just write them a letter, or talk to them? [37] If he was compelled to go public, why not just an article? Straight knew too that writing the book would subject him to the criticism of the press, and yet he did it, a real self-inflicted wound. But he was not without support. When the book first came out, Straight told me, John Kenneth Galbraith called him to say he was glad he had written it because the 1930s are a period we should know more about today.[38]

To put this question another way, if he had to say anything, would it not have been smarter to have omitted mention of any contact with the COMINTERN and Green? Why did he ever tell the FBI about this aspect in the first place? There is no indication from Straight that anyone else might have told the FBI. His decision to tell as much as he did supports several explanations. First, one could conclude that he told the whole truth, sloppy tradecraft and all, to purge his conscience, knowing it would force upon him an accredited victim status. Second, with his family's support, Straight tells us he was compelled to "write his own epitaph" rather than live with the erroneous interpretations from journalists like Britain's Chapman Pincher and Nigel West who published their own descriptions of these events.[39] Third, as many reviewers have pointed out, there could be complex psychological explanations (suggested by Straight's comments in the book) which may be right but do not provide any way of telling, and therefore tend to be dismissed perhaps unjustly. Finally, some combination of these possibilities may be the answer, but more likely there is no guillotine finality here. In my view, although I confess to a juggler's confidence on this issue, aside from the fact that spy stories sell and that the book is an intensely personal and well written account of recent

[36] Boyle, op. cit., p. 415.

[37] Straight did record an oral history for Columbia University, but it cannot be heard nor can the transcript be read until after his death. Source: Butler Library, Columbia University, New York, oral history collection, Miss Geri Nunn.

[38] Knowing that Galbraith had done graduate work at Cambridge, Straight asked him if he had been tempted by the communists. Galbraith replied that he had indeed and would have joined like everyone else but his studies took too much time. Galbraith added that Arthur Koestler had told him that he should have joined because one tends to diminish the severity of the problem unless one has experienced it.

[39] Chapman Pincher, *Their Trade Is Treachery* (London: Sidgwick & Johnson Ltd., 1981); Nigel West, *The Circus: MI-5 Operations 1945-1972* (New York: Stein & Day/Publishers, 1983). This edition of West's book has a few items that were censored from the British edition, called *A Matter of Trust*.

controversial times, there is another message in *After Long Silence:* while Straight's perspective and perception are unique, what he experienced is not. It could happen again. Clearly the results of the Soviet penetration efforts in the 1930s, particularly those related to foreign policy and the intelligence profession, were catastrophic. Not only in Britain, but in America too. During the period discussed above, twenty-five British subjects and fifty-seven Americans were discovered working for the Soviets.[40] There is adequate precedent for believing the KGB/GRU will continue what has worked well in the past.

Read in this context, *After Long Silence* is a good case study where what is not presented is as important as what is. Whether or not one accepts Straight's interpretation of specific events, the general description of the times he presents can be verified. Knowledge of how the communist movement operated can diminish the likelihood of successful repetition. It provides a basis for analyzing the present while illuminating some of the motivations and events which created it. Furthermore, it makes us appreciate the power of the ideological recruitment of idealists. If this be in part why Straight wrote his book, he has done a service. As to Michael Straight himself, no semantic contrivances can avoid the conclusion to which he guides us; as both man and agent he was too gullible, too idealistic, too self-serving, and too long silent.

[40] Peter Hennesy and Alasdair Palmer, "Good Year for a Mole Mania Revival," the *London Times*, 15 February 1983. Note: not all the British spies came from Cambridge, though most of those caught studied there. In the United States the communists worked hard to recruit members and fellow-travelers at the best universities; publicly identified examples include; Donald and Alger Hiss (the latter took his undergraduate degree at Johns Hopkins), and Lauchlin Currie and Noel Field; Harvard. Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley went to Columbia; Stanford graduated Harry Dexter White (who also attended Harvard).

THE INTELLIGENCE—POLICY RELATIONSHIP*

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> If we in intelligence were one day given three wishes, they would be to know everything, to be believed when we spoke, and in such a way to exercise an influence to the good in the matter of policy. But absent the Good Fairy, we sometimes get the order of our unarticulated wishes mixed. Often we feel the desire to influence policy and perhaps just stop wishing there. This is too bad, because to wish simply for influence can, and upon occasion does, get intelligence to the place where it can have no influence whatever. By striving too hard in this direction, intelligence may come to seem just another policy voice, and an unwanted one at that.
>
> Sherman Kent **

In the catechism of the intelligence officer, the thesis that intelligence is and should be strictly separate from policy is taken as axiomatic. It is as hallowed in the theology of intelligence as the doctrine of the separation of church and state is in the US Constitution. For much of our early history we tended to view intelligence somewhat self-righteously as objective, disinterested, and dispassionate, and to regard policy somewhat disdainfully as slanted, adulterated, and politicized. And we strove mightily to maintain the much-touted arm's length relationship with policy, believing that proximity to policy would corrupt the independence of our intelligence judgments. Indeed, legend has it that members of the Board of National Estimates of the 1950s and 1960s systematically discouraged analysts and estimators from going downtown to have lunch with policymakers, for fear that such exposure would make them policy advocates and tempt them to serve power rather than truth.

Whatever the validity of this legend, such strictures were quite in keeping with the traditional view of a proper intelligence-policy relationship. By enforcing this kind of rigorous separation, the old Board no doubt hoped to protect the policy neutrality of intelligence; what it did, of course, was to impose a splendid isolation upon intelligence that assured its eventual policy irrelevance. The vanishing applause for its product coming from the policy side caused intelligence to reexamine its assumptions, and a new, unconventional wisdom came to be heard. Its message was that our faith in the arm's length relationship was misplaced, that no such relationship really ever existed, and that close ties between intelligence and policy are not only inevitable, but essential if the policymaker's needs are to be served.

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* Adapted from a presentation at the "Conference on Intelligence: Policy and Process" at the United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, June 1984.

** "Estimates and Influence," originally presented in London, September 1966, subsequently published in *Foreign Service Journal*, XLVI, (April 1969).

A new way of thinking about intelligence and policy began to emerge, seeing the two communities as awkwardly entangled and intertwined in what might be described as a competitive and often conflicting symbiotic relationship. Thomas Hughes put it most aptly, when he spoke of the relationship "as a two-way search: of intelligence in search of some policy to influence and of policy in search of some intelligence for support." * Suddenly, *out* is the comforting illusion that intelligence stands outside of and above the policy fray; that it can load its analytic and estimative ammunition on its wagon and let the wagon roll down in the general direction of the battle without worrying where it will come to rest, whether the ammunition is of the right caliber and how it will be used—to say nothing of whether someone might shoot it back. And *in* is the less comfortable notion that intelligence, if it is to be at all relevant to policy, is very much a participant in the battle; that it must be attuned to the strategy and tactics being pursued; and that it is by no means invulnerable to being seesawed and whiplashed in the sociopolitical tug of war known as the policymaking process.

How this process unfolds in the real world and the intricate ways in which intelligence interacts with it have, within the past decade, been the subject of some first-rate analytic writing. Three contributions to this intelligence-foreign policy literature are particularly worthy of note:

1. One is the observation, vividly illustrated by Thomas Hughes,** that the intelligence community is no more a unitary actor than the policy community; that it should be seen, rather, as a hydra-headed agglomoration of competing institutions often at odds with each other, and not necessarily in predictable patterns. Observing the budgetary, organizational, and substantive struggles within this community, Hughes notes that

> the cross-cutting complexities were striking: position disputes within agencies, alliances shifting with issues, personal strayings from organizational loyalties, hierarchical differences between superiors and subordinates, horizontal rather than vertical affinities, and much *ad hoc* reaching for sustenance somewhere outside. Thus, while the struggles within the intelligence community sometimes mirrored simultaneous struggles in the larger policy community, they did so by no means invariably and never symmetrically.

It should not be astonishing, therefore, to find that policymakers perceive the intelligence process with as much ambivalence and suspicion as intelligence makers perceive the policy process and that the interactions among them tend to be contentious and rivalrous. To quote again from Hughes:

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* Tom Hughes deserves great credit for being the first, and surely most articulate iconoclast toppling the old conventional wisdom. His two Farewell Lectures as departing Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State in July 1969 contain the above quotation. The Lectures were subsequently reprinted in Thomas L. Hughes, *The Fate of Facts in a World of Men—Foreign Policy and Intelligence-Making* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series No. 233, December 1976).

** Thomas L. Hughes, "The Power to Speak and the Power to Listen" in Thomas M Frank and others, eds., *Secrecy and Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press 1974), p. 15

> Viewed from above by the ranking policymakers, the intelligence community often seemed cumbersome, expensive, loquatious, probing, querulous, and at times axe-grinding. Viewed from below by the intelligence experts, the policy community often seemed determined to ignore evidence plainly before it—or (even worse) to mistake the intelligence managers for the experts. Viewed from in between at the intelligence-policy interface, it looked like controlled chaos—and not surprisingly, for here was where means and ends were brokered, jurisdictional rivalries compromised, contentious controversies delineated.*

2. Another is the thesis, persuasively argued by Richard Betts,** that intelligence failures, so-called, are more often than not policy failures; or to put it more gently, that it is usually impossible to disentangle intelligence failures from policy failures, since (intelligence) analysis and (policy) decisions are interactive rather than sequential processes. Betts sees the intelligence role as seeking "to extract certainty from uncertainty and to facilitate coherent decision in an incoherent environment." In seeking to reduce uncertainty, intelligence is often forced to extrapolate from evidence that is riddled with ambiguities. Inability to resolve these ambiguities leads to intelligence products that oversimplify reality and fail to alert the policy consumers of these products to the dangers that lurk within the ambiguities. Critical mistakes are consequently made by policymakers who, faced with ambiguities, will substitute wishful thinking and their own premises and preconceptions for the assessments of professional analysts. As Betts puts it:

> Because it is the job of decision-makers to decide, they cannot react to ambiguity by deferring judgment. . . . When a welter of fragmentary evidence offers support to various interpretations, ambiguity is exploited by wishfulness. The greater the ambiguity, the greater the impact of preconceptions.***

3. A third example is the recent revelation by a former Chief of Israeli Military Intelligence and Advisor to the Israeli Prime Minister, Yehoshafat Harkabi,**** that the tensioned and ambivalent relationship between intelligence and policy is not a uniquely American phenomenon.

These dilemmas and foibles of the intelligence-policy interface are hardly novel or startling to seasoned intelligence practitioners, especially those senior officers charged with "brokering" the intelligence-policy relationship—the communicators and interactors who reside in the twilight zone between intelligence and policy. For them, this is familiar terrain. As managers and stimulators of intelligence production, they know with what difficulty a crisp, lucid analytic product is extracted from a dissentious community; as participants in

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* Idem, p.19

** Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable," *World Politics*, XXXI (October 1978)

*** Idem, p. 70

**** Yehoshafat Harkabi, "The Intelligence-Policymaker Tangle," in *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, Number 30, Winter 1984. (The article was reprinted in the Summer 1984 issue of *Studies in Intelligence*, Volume 28, Number 2.)

the interagency policy process, they observe with what ease that product can be selectively utilized, tendentiously summarized, or subtly denigrated. But for these privileged practitioners who move readily from the world of analysis to the world of action, familiarity with policy does not breed contempt. Rather, an appreciation of the murky and frenetic policy environment tends to evoke a certain sympathy for the policymakers' plight.

Such knowledgeable, involved practitioners, however, represent only a very small fraction of the intelligence population. The vast majority of that population—collectors, operators and analysts—is essentially isolated from the hurly-burly of the policy process. The intelligence services at large, therefore, are often mystified and frustrated by the policymakers' perennial unhappiness with their product. Given this puzzlement, it seems worthwhile to try to delve a little more deeply into the reasons for the unhappiness.

The View from the Bridge

It should be clear from what has been said that policy does not speak with a single voice. Policies have multiple authors. The numerous players who take part in policy formulation differ in temperament, education and experience, as well as in personal and institutional loyalties. Their attitudes toward intelligence, therefore, and their propensity to accept or reject its assessments will also vary widely. Nevertheless, although generalizations are always hazardous, we can discern some common attributes and concerns of policymakers, especially the "national security principals" *—the key players at the highest levels of government—that predispose them to react to intelligence offerings in predictable ways.

First, it is well to remember that the key decision makers are political leaders who have risen to their positions by being decisive, aggressive, and self-confident rather than reflective, introspective, and self-doubting. They attribute their success at least in part to their tried and proven ways of thinking, their simplified models and paradigms that explain to them what makes the world go 'round. They often regard themselves as their own best analysts and hence tend to be distrustful of the untested and often counterintuitive judgments of the intelligence professionals.

Second, they have a strong vested interest in the success of their policies and will, therefore, be disproportionately receptive to intelligence that "supports" these policies. They bear the burdens of great responsibility and find themselves perpetually embattled with a host of critics, competitors, and opponents, all eagerly looking for chinks in their armor. They thrive on optimists and boosters, but encounter mostly alarmists and carping critics.

Festooned in this way, and operating in so hostile an environment, these highest level consumers of intelligence can hardly be blamed for responding to its product with something less than boundless enthusiasm. In fact, it can be documented that every President since Eisenhower, and virtually every Secretary of State since Acheson, has expressed dissatisfaction and irritation with

* They include, at a minimum, the President, Vice President, National Security Advisor, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense.

intelligence analysis, either in his memoirs or in public or semipublic statements. The best-remembered and widely quoted expostulation was reported to have been delivered by Lyndon Johnson to his Director of Central Intelligence at a White House dinner:

> Policymaking is like milking a fat cow. You see the milk coming out, you press more and the milk bubbles and flows, and just as the bucket is full, the cow with its tail whips the bucket and all is spilled. That's what CIA does to policymaking.*

Is intelligence at fault for creating this unhappiness? Should it alter its ways to court greater popularity? Or is the problem integral and endemic to the intelligence-policy relationship? The answers to these questions may become clearer as we look at some of the concrete ways in which the frictions arise.

Why Policy Resents Intelligence: Five Ways to be Unpopular

Presidents and their senior advisors will be unhappy with intelligence when it is not supportive of their policies. They will feel particularly frustrated when:

1. *Intelligence fails to reduce uncertainty—*

Policymakers operate under a burden of pervasive uncertainty, much of it threatening the viability of their policies. They are forever hopeful that someone will relieve them of some of this uncertainty, and so they look to intelligence for what common sense tells them should be reserved to augury and divination. Forecasting, to be sure, is the life's blood of the intelligence estimator. But there is a world of difference between a forecast (an analytic judgment resting on carefully defined assumptions) and an oracular prophecy (secured by divine inspiration). Unfortunately, much of what is expected of intelligence by policymakers lies in this latter realm.

A good example is the perennial complaint that intelligence failed to predict a coup d'etat—a coercive regime change or palace uprising—but, of course, a coup is typically a conspiratorial act that depends for its success on preservation of absolute secrecy. If intelligence gets wind of such an event, it means that secrecy has been compromised and the coup is almost certain to fail.

Intelligence forecasting is actually done quite respectably by the community, and can be of real value to the thoughtful policy analyst. When it stays within its legitimate bounds of identifying and illuminating alternative outcomes, assigning subjective probabilities to them, and exploring their possible implications for US policy, the decision maker is well served. But he will rarely think so. For such a forecast, rather than narrowing uncertainty, will make him aware of the full range of uncertainty he faces and make his calculations harder rather than easier. Indeed, much intelligence estimation is and must be

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* Henry Brandon, *The Retreat of American Power* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1973), p. 103.

of this nature. Precisely because it seeks to reflect complex reality, its product often renders the harassed decision maker's life more difficult.

2. *Intelligence restricts their options—*

Every new administration comes into office with a national security agenda of its own, bent upon putting its mark on the nation's foreign policy. It believes that a significant shift in that policy is both desirable and possible. It will encounter a foreign policy bureaucracy (including intelligence) that believes it is neither. Intelligence professionals will greet the administration's new policy initiatives with cogent analyses showing how vigorously allies will oppose these new policies, how resolutely neutrals will pervert them to their own ends, and how effectively adversaries will blunt them. At every step, it will appear to the policy leaders that intelligence fights them, seeks to fence them in, and, indeed, helps them fail.

And the pattern persists. As the policy leadership begins to face unexpected foreign challenges, its quick responses will often be met with more intelligence assessments that seem to be saying "it didn't work" or "it will almost certainly not succeed." The decision makers will conclude that intelligence not only constricts their room for maneuver, but also arms their political opponents. Worst of all, it constantly and annoyingly reminds them of their limited capacity to influence events. No matter how well the interaction may serve the interests of sound policy, there is no question that it builds tension between the two sides.

In these encounters, we should acknowledge that intelligence does not always "know better." There are times when intelligence is unaware that stated objectives are not the *real* objectives of policy, and will leave out of its analysis elements of the picture that may be important to the decision makers. Presidents paint upon a canvas far broader than the particular segments on which intelligence tends to focus. Its assessments, therefore, may be quite valid for those segments, but may miss broader considerations that Presidents care about.

A vivid example is provided by the Carter Administration's proposal to impose sanctions—including a grain embargo—on the USSR, in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The stated objective was to penalize the offender by imposing political and economic costs on him. When intelligence was asked to assess the potential impact of the sanctions package, it responded with a judgment, the thrust of which was that the sanctions package would not be an effective instrument. Absent solid participation by our allies, sanctions would do no serious damage to the Soviet economy nor impair the leadership's objectives in any significant way. Not surprisingly, President Carter gave the assessment a rather frigid reception, but its negative judgments turned out not to be a decisive factor in his calculus. From the President's perspective, the sanctions package was just right. He considered a highly visible response to Afghanistan as imperative, but it had to be low-risk. A military undertaking was ruled out as far too hazardous. Inaction was ruled out, because it would be read in the rest of the world as a signal of US irresolution and condonement. The sanctions, though unsatisfying in terms of direct effects, would convey a strong signal of disapprobation and censure, without engendering worrisome

consequences. It would satisfy the popular need to express the nation's sense of outrage and would portray the President as willing to take the political heat of angering an important domestic constituency—the farmers—for the sake of a foreign issue of principle.

It goes almost without saying that intelligence could not then, and cannot ever, be expected to take such considerations into account.

3. *Intelligence undercuts their policies—*

Administrations have often found intelligence analyses appearing at times and in ways unhelpful to the pursuit of policies on which they had embarked. This can happen in two ways: (1) Through a genuine and protracted divergence of intelligence judgments from publicly stated Administration views of a given situation, and (2) Through fortuity or inadvertence. An example of the first phenomenon was provided by the stubborn independence displayed by the intelligence community in the early phases of the Vietnam escalation in 1964-65, when its national estimates consistently offered up a far more pessimistic assessment of North Vietnamese staying power than was reflected in the Johnson Administration's public assertions. While this divergence between intelligence and policy did not become public knowledge until the appearance of the Pentagon Papers in 1971, the mid-1960s intelligence performance evoked considerable disquiet and chagrin among policy insiders at the time.

The days of such protracted differences of view between intelligence and policy are probably over. In the intelligence-policy environment of the 1980s, it seems highly unlikely that a divergence of assessment could be sustained for very long. Congressional oversight and its intimate access to intelligence analysis would bring any significant disparities quickly to the surface and thus cause them to be resolved.

The other cause, policy-undercutting by fortuity and inadvertence, is more likely to survive, as it is a matter of human frailty. Sometimes it is merely a question of miserable timing—as in the classic case of the intelligence reassessment of North Korean military forces that credited them with substantially greater capabilities than had been previously appreciated. The estimate was fine, but it just happened to "hit the street" within a week of President Carter's announcement of his controversial decision to begin withdrawal of US forces from South Korea. A pure coincidence, but it caused understandable consternation.

At other times it is a matter of inattention—as in the so-called discovery of the Soviet brigade in Cuba which, it turned out later, had been there, in one form or another, all along, but had simply been lost sight of. Issues of this kind, seemingly unimportant, can suddenly escalate into heated public controversy and make life difficult for the policy leaders. However minor the transgression, they will regard intelligence less fondly.

4. *Intelligence provokes public controversy—*

From time to time, routine differences within the community over how to interpret ambiguous intelligence evidence turns into heated, and perhaps even acrimonious debate. When the competing interpretations clearly affect impor-

tant policy issues, the internal controversy can easily spill out into the public arena. In the 1950s and 1960s, when what transpired in the world of intelligence remained largely opaque, such disputes could be easily contained within the Executive Branch. In more recent times, with the progressive "opening up" of intelligence through the Congress and the media, and through its more visible involvement with policy, a disputation within the community is soon drawn into and exploited by the public debate, often in ways that make life more difficult for the national security policymaker.

Examples of policy-relevant debates that have been stimulated or intensified by intelligence controversy come quickly to mind:

— Whether the Tupolev Backfire bomber is an intermediate-range or an intercontinental-capable bomber;

— Whether extensive Soviet civil defense preparations add up to enhanced "survivability" for Soviet society;

— How significantly Western technology contributes to the growth of the Soviet economy and its military power;

— Whether Western calculations of Soviet military spending adequately reflect the real size and burden of Soviet defense;

— To what extent the Soviet natural gas pipeline will aggravate Western Europe's dependence on imported energy.

This brief sampling is probably sufficient to suggest that the issues in dispute often bear on strategic, budgetary, arms control, or economic policy decisions important to an Administration's overall strategy. To the extent that intelligence controversy helps arm the opposition in such disputes, its contribution is not exactly appreciated.

5. *Intelligence fails to persuade—*

Ever since John F. Kennedy's *tour de force* in unveiling photographic intelligence on the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba to a hushed UN audience, successive administrations have sought to emulate that feat. Though the results have been mixed at best, hope springs eternal that a release of intelligence findings or a public display of exotic evidence will enlighten an uninformed or misinformed public, win over a cynical journalist, or convince a skeptical congressman. At one time limited to an occasional State Department White Paper and a private briefing here and there, the intelligence product now finds its way into the public domain through more and more channels and in ever greater volume—most of it, of course, at the instigation and under the aegis of the policy community. It moves through such vehicles as press conferences, media briefings and backgrounders, testimony on the Hill, formal Reports to Congress, and official glossy publications.

In a general way, this sea change in public access to intelligence has undoubtedly had its beneficial impact on public understanding of often complex and murky situations. It is far more questionable, however, whether intelligence can be used effectively as an instrument of public persuasion; whether the marshalling of intelligence evidence on one side or another of a

sharply debated issue ever succeeds in gaining solid converts. In a tactical situation, say, when a heated debate moves toward a crucial vote, a well-focused, lucid intelligence briefing can often sway a wavering agnostic and stiffen an irresolute supporter. But the record suggests that the conversion will not stick, that the gnawing doubts soon return.

Reasons for this phenomenon are not hard to find:

— Time was when public disclosure of intelligence was a rare and notable event that summoned up an aura of mystery and miracle, endowing the product with uncommon authority. That is no more. As disclosure became ever more routine, the gloss wore off, and an inevitable "debasement of the currency" set in.

— Intelligence assessments, when lifted out of their context, fuzzed and diluted ("sanitized") to protect sources and methods, lose much of their authenticity. To the intelligence professional who has built his mosaic from a welter of carefully evaluated raw data, often accumulated over years, the evidence may be totally compelling. To a public audience, coming to the issue cold and exposed only to the sanitized version, the evidence will often seem ambiguous and the judgments inadequately supported.

— Intelligence evidence is brought into public play often in situations of deep controversy, where the contention usually is not over observable facts, but over points of principle. The physical things that intelligence is best at recording are often not much help in settling points of principle. Central America offers a good example: Divergent views of that threat center on the conceptual question of whether the revolutionary situation in El Salvador is fundamentally endogenous, i.e., rooted in and fueled by internal, historic forces, or exogenous, i.e., externally stimulated and sustained. That conceptual issue cannot be resolved by displays of intelligence evidence, however persuasive, that Soviet arms do indeed flow through Nicaraguan ports to the Salvadoran rebels.

— The impact that intelligence can have on public perceptions is further constrained by the understandable tendency of people to reject bad news—what social psychologists used to call "cognitive dissonance." Many of the issues on which intelligence is brought to bear publicly do indeed have unhappy implications. Acceptance of the bad news means having to draw costly, risky, or generally unsettling consequences. A classic example is the case of "Yellow Rain," the discovery of lethal toxins being used under Soviet tutelage in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. In spite of the overwhelming weight of confirmatory evidence accumulated over eight years, extensively published, briefed and shared worldwide, the findings continue to be challenged and contested, sometimes with offerings of bizarre scientific counter-explanations that defy common sense. The extreme reluctance to accept the evidence at face value cannot be attributed simply to the fact that intelligence can never meet the rigorous laboratory standards for evidence that scientists like to insist upon. The explanation for the

> continued questioning must surely lie in the unpleasantness of the implications, insofar as they seem to raise doubts about the viability of arms control agreements.

In sum, for all the reasons enumerated above, policy leaders are bound to develop a rather ambivalent view of the support they can hope to get from their intelligence community. From what has been said, it should be clear that the resulting "love-hate" relationship is endemic to the situation and that there is not much that intelligence can do, or should do, to alter it. Indeed, a greater effort to "serve policy well" could lead to even greater ambivalence and discord on the part of those we seek to serve. Which takes us back to Sherman Kent's admonition in the leitmotif at the beginning of this paper:

> By striving too hard in this direction, intelligence may come to seem just another policy voice, and an unwanted one at that.

INTELLIGENCE AND US FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-1954*

Neal H. Petersen

The point has been made that there exists inherent tension between history and intelligence. Historians seek to reveal, to clarify. Intelligence requires secrecy to accomplish its purposes. Until recently, the literature of intelligence has been an unattractive commodity for historians, ranging from pro-CIA institutional advertising to sensational and emotional denunciations. It has been the realm of journalists and theoreticians, often tendentious, and seldom resting on a firm documentary foundation.

On the bright side, historians and intelligence specialists have much in common. Both feel that they are keener than other people, possessed of a unique approach to interpreting human affairs that provides them with the capacity for exceptional understanding. There is additional common ground. Practitioners of both disciplines are frequently successful because they are able to analyze. They have a common thirst for and respect for the facts, and a healthy skepticism that produces a reliability less often found in other disciplines.

Historians have had a preeminent role in US intelligence from OSS to the present, and intelligence specialists have produced great history. One need only think of William Langer, Sherman Kent, Raymond Sontag, Ray Cline, and Everett Gleason.

Diplomatic history has now pushed out the edge of the envelope, as they say in the *Right Stuff*, to approximately 1954. The early postwar statesmen have written their memoirs and passed on. The official record is largely published and the preponderance of archival sources is now open for research at the National Archives, presidential libraries, and in private collections. Interpretation of the origins of the Cold War has experienced traditional, revisionist, and post-revisionist phases. Scores of well-documented monographs have appeared treating subjects of the 1945-54 period.

There remains the task of incorporating an appreciation of the role of intelligence into historical understanding of the period. Important sources are at last available to make this possible. Ray Cline's *The CIA: Reality vs. Myth* and Anne Karalekas' *History of the Central Intelligence Agency* provide excellent overviews. George Constantinides' *Intelligence and Espionage*, an outstanding 1983 analytical bibliography, discusses some fifty books that pertain to 1945-1954. Thomas Troy's *Donovan and the CIA* is a roadmap for intelligence sources for 1945-1947 as well as the wartime period. *Foreign Relations* volumes for the 1950s contain abundant finished intelligence. A new wave of memoirs by former intelligence officials includes works by William Colby,

* This article is adapted from a presentation to the annual conference of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, at George Washington University, Washington, August 1984.

Cord Meyer, Peer De Silva, David Atlee Phillips, Joseph Burckholder Smith, Harry Rositzke, and Kermit Roosevelt.

Some one thousand feet of records of the Office of Strategic Services and successor organizations have been open for some time among the holdings of the National Archives. NARS has now received from CIA an additional three thousand feet of operational records for 1941-1947. The National Security Agency has retired a series of "Special Research Histories," some of which deal in part with the postwar period. Substantial military intelligence for the 1940s is now available, including reports of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Military Information Division. Other pertinent NARS collections include National Security Council records containing some intelligence-related reports, and a vast collection of OSS and State Department intelligence research papers.

The Truman Library may offer the richest source of declassified intelligence material now available, particularly in the President's Secretary's File. The intelligence portion of the PSF offers hundreds of Office of Research and Evaluation reports, CIA Reviews of the World Situation, National Intelligence Estimates, and Korean War intelligence. The PSF also includes records of NSC meetings with intelligence components. Intelligence documentation at the Eisenhower Library is less concentrated and less completely declassified, but constitutes an essential source. Numerous intelligence documents across the government have been released under the Freedom of Information Act since 1974.

Given this substantial body of available material, it is appropriate to consider the relationship of sources to particular topics, develop some general and tentative substantive conclusions, and offer methodological suggestions for relating intelligence to the overall study of US foreign policy in the first decade of the postwar era.

1945-1947

President Truman abolished the Office of Strategic Services less than two months after the end of the war on the recommendation of the Bureau of the Budget. This decision was consistent with the hostility of the military services, the Department of State, and Congress to centralized intelligence. Research and analysis was transferred to State where, as Dean Acheson puts it in his memoirs, the Department muffed its intelligence role. Opposition within State to unified intelligence resulted in fragmentation, even at the Foggy Bottom level. When a Central Intelligence Group was established in early 1946 it operated under the direction and at the pleasure of Army, Navy, and State via a National Intelligence Authority. President Truman received a daily intelligence summary from CIG as well as military reports and a daily from State, but no unified, coordinated product.

During 1946 and 1947 the US Government addressed the intelligence problem in the context of the need for a coherent national security policy mechanism. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal and study groups commissioned by him took the lead in developing plans that led to the National Security Act and establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947. The process

whereby General Donovan's dream of a unified intelligence organization was realized is described in great detail in Thomas Troy's *Donovan and the CIA*. Tom Braden's article on the birth of the CIA in the February 1977 issue of *American Heritage* is an outstanding short treatment.

The paramount historical question of the two years from Tokyo Bay to the creation of the National Security Council is the origins of the Cold War. Until recently, scholarship had little basis upon which to evaluate the intelligence reaching the President and other top policymakers regarding the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union. Melvyn Leffler's meticulously researched article appearing in the April 1984 issue of the *American Historical Review*, reflecting intelligence reports from the President's Secretary's File at the Truman Library and Army and Joint Chiefs of Staff intelligence materials from the National Archives, is evidence that evaluation is underway. It seems likely that Truman found ominous indeed the intelligence that crossed his desk, some of it virtually unprocessed, much of it military, and none of it the result of government-wide coordination. In this sense the inadequacy of the US intelligence system either exacerbated US-Soviet misunderstanding or fortuitously contributed to the President's inclination to take strong and prudent measures, depending on one's estimate of the nature of the Soviet threat that existed at the time. The failure of the Baruch Plan and initial postwar arms control negotiations should also be reappraised in light of new intelligence sources. The lack of US capability to assess Soviet forces or to provide verification of whatever agreements might have been reached certainly was a negative factor.

1947-1950

The creation of the National Security Council structure in 1947 and the establishment of the CIA improved US intelligence, but not as rapidly or completely as one might expect. A series of National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs), now declassified, sought to coordinate the government-wide effort and define responsibilities. However, the Departments dominated the new CIA much as they had CIG. Admiral Hillenkoetter, the first Director of Central Intelligence, lacked the clout to assert the prerogatives of the new organization. The National Security Act specified that CIA should coordinate national intelligence, but instead it produced its own reports through its Office of Research and Evaluation. ORE reports did find their way to the White House and NSC, but were of uneven quality and influence. Admiral Hillenkoetter transmitted intelligence information directly to the President, but it came in a virtually unevaluated form. Ray Cline recalls personally working in 1949 on CIA's "Review of the World Situation" which received high-level distribution but was based exclusively on what could be pieced together from the work of regional analysts, augmented by a reading of the newspapers.

Nor was CIA effectively plugged into the national security structure. Hillenkoetter, and indeed Truman, seldom attended NSC meetings. US intelligence was badly surprised by the Soviet atomic test of 1949. The CIA contribution to the development of NSC 68 was largely confined to the efforts of a single representative. CIA reports provided long-range warning of the attack

on South Korea, but were not pointed enough to gain notice. The US intelligence community fell victim to total surprise in June 1950 in the tactical sense. When the NSC convened to formulate the US response to the North Korean assault, the Director of Central Intelligence was not present, nor did he or other CIA officials play a visible role in the decision-making process.

In the 1947-1950 period, State Department intelligence made considerable progress. Secretary Marshall restored the centralized system under an Assistant Secretary-level Special Assistant for Intelligence. State's intelligence entity produced a significant amount of research and briefed Department officials regularly. It is less clear that it performed an important role in the government-wide process.

As has been established by congressional reports, memoirs of intelligence veterans, and monographs published on the basis of documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, the United States initiated a program of covert operations in 1948 with the objective of countering Soviet subversive activities. Inspired by officials in State and the national military establishment, this program was implemented under the direction of CIA's Office of Policy Coordination. OPC operated with guidance from State and Defense outside of the CIA chain of command. It was not a rogue elephant nor was it subject to direct White House control. Programs were rather limited in scope initially, concentrating on support for democratic elements in Western Europe. While the overall configuration of this activity is now known, operational details are likely to remain classified for an extended period.

1950-1953

The outbreak of the Korean War resulted in massive strengthening of US intelligence comparable to the military rearmament that occurred. President Truman appointed General Walter Bedell Smith Director of Central Intelligence effective October 1950. Smith's tenure began inauspiciously with the failure of the intelligence community to predict Chinese intervention in November and the DCI's statement to top policy makers at the darkest moment of the ensuing crisis that the United States should withdraw from Korea. But Eisenhower's World War II Chief of Staff brought new vigor, prestige, and organizational ability to American intelligence, and was supported by enormous new resources. Seeking to accomplish CIA's original purpose, the preparation of integrated national intelligence, he implemented many of the reform proposals contained in the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report prepared for the NSC, "The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence," 1 January 1949, now declassified. He summoned distinguished historian and OSS veteran William L. Langer from Harvard to establish an Office of National Estimates that would provide National Intelligence Estimates based on information obtained by the entire intelligence community. Although the value of the NIEs and other integrated intelligence reports of the 1950s has been questioned in light of their lowest-common-denominator character wrought by a government-wide clearance process, they were a vast improvement over the previous product.

The Korean War brought the National Security Council system to life. The NSC met far more frequently after June 1950. Truman now presided, and there was always a place at the table for General Smith. CIA participated fully in the NSC committee system and contributed to its numbered reports.

The conduct of special operations and psychological warfare increased during the Korean period on a scale at least comparable to the expansion of intelligence research and analysis. The President established a Psychological Strategy Board in April 1951. CIA-supported foreign broadcasting operations expanded. Covert support for democratic and anti-communist elements in Europe intensified and similar efforts were launched in other parts of the world. Much on the US organization for such activities and knowledge of the existence of particular programs is already in the public domain, but historians are unlikely to have access to operational records in the foreseeable future.

1953-1954

When President Eisenhower took office, US intelligence had already achieved a measure of maturity as the result of the achievements of General Smith. As illustrated in Stephen Ambrose's *Ike's Spies*, the incoming President had great respect for the value of intelligence as the result of his experience as a military commander. His insistence on formal, orderly, and extensive staff work resulted in an unparalleled reliance on the NSC system. With John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, Bedell Smith now Under Secretary, and Allen Dulles Director of Central Intelligence, the intelligence component was fully integrated into foreign policy. Smith's presence gave State new authority and responsibilities in intelligence matters. Intelligence research and analysis continued to improve at CIA with another historian, Sherman Kent, succeeding Langer as Director of the Office of National Estimates. Many NIEs and Special Estimates (SNIEs) of the period appear in the *Foreign Relations* series volumes for 1952-1954, for instance in the recently-released volume on Korea. Debate continues on the utility of these estimates, but not on the effort put into them or the extent to which they were read throughout government. *The Soviet Estimate* by John Prados provides a highly significant analysis based on NIEs and other intelligence materials obtained under FOIA for the period beginning in the 1950s.

It is well known that under Eisenhower the United States vigorously pursued a program of covert activities around the world to counteract Soviet influence and to support governments and forces deemed sympathetic to US interests. As a former OSS operative in the field, Allen Dulles accorded this area of intelligence a high priority. The special operations of the Eisenhower Administration included continuation of the funding of friendly elements abroad, foreign broadcasting, and on occasion the use of force to influence events. These operations were conducted within the national security framework of the US Government. Some documents such as NSC 5412 of 1954 setting forth procedures governing the conduct of covert operations have been declassified.

The two most prominent covert operations of the period were the toppling of regimes in Iran and Guatemala by indigenous opponents with the

support of the CIA. Much valuable material has been made available on both incidents, including scholarly monographs based on FOIA requests, memoirs of participants, and documents released in the *Foreign Relations* series. Definitive judgment on the nature and basis of US involvement, as opposed to the fact of involvement, must await further evidence.

The Eisenhower Administration placed a high value on psychological warfare, which sometimes entered into the field of intelligence. Under Eisen hower, the Operations Coordinating Board assumed the functions of the Psychological Strategy Board. C. D. Jackson conducted psychological strategy planning in the White House.

Espionage and Communications Intelligence

The research and analysis aspects of the intelligence component of US foreign policy in the 1945-1954 period are gradually becoming visible. The historian can also perceive at least the gray outline of covert action and its role in overall strategy. Other critical areas of the intelligence equation are still essentially beyond unclassified reach. Intelligence literature on espionage and counterespionage after the war is substantial, yet fragmentary and unreliable. The works of John Barron and Harry Rositzke have brought together much of what is known about Soviet espionage and the KGB. David Martin's *Wilderness of Mirrors* on espionage and counterintelligence deals in part with 1945-1954. Military intelligence records at the National Archives and operational files of the OSS and its successors to late 1947, now being opened incrementally, may shed some light on the US-Soviet intelligence struggle in devastated Europe.

The Maclean and Philby cases remain a mystery of potentially supreme importance. Maclean participated in the work of the US-UK Combined Policy Committee in 1947 and 1948, thus having access to fundamental information on the dimensions of the US atomic energy program as it related to foreign policy. When Maclean defected in 1951, Dean Acheson is reported to have said "he knew everything." Philby, as British liaison to US intelligence, probably betrayed the Western attempt to overthrow the communist government of Albania and other top secret operations. Despite all that has been written about Burgess, Maclean, and Philby there remains uncertainty of what they actually conveyed to their Soviet superiors, the question of primary significance. *The Philby Conspiracy* by Page, Leitch, and Knightly makes a good effort to address this subject. The inscrutability of espionage does not diminish its importance. Allen Weinstein's treatment of the Hiss-Chambers case is evidence that use of interviews, Freedom of Information Act, and historical method can surmount the most murky and emotion-charged of research problems.

Still further beneath the surface lies the world of technical collection. The ULTRA secret remained intact for thirty years despite the end of the war, which entirely transformed the world situation and eroded the need for secrecy. The reality of the constant and intense communications intelligence battle of the first postwar decade comes to light only episodically as in the discovery of a microphone in the Great Seal plaque of US Ambassador George

Kennan in Moscow in 1952. Evidence indicates that US capabilities in communications intelligence declined after World War II with other intelligence activities, and were similarly revived and strengthened vastly with the outbreak of war in Korea. In early 1952 the Brownell Committee which included Charles Bohlen, General John Magruder, and William H. Jackson drafted a report, now declassified, recommending centralization of COMINT activities. Implementation of the report resulted in the establishment of the National Security Agency. James Bamford's *The Puzzle Palace* sheds some light on NSA's antecedents and initial operations.

Conclusion

Present evidence warrants two interrelated generalizations about US intelligence in the first postwar decade. First, it was essentially inadequate up to the outbreak of the Korean War and only began to assume its modern competence and configuration by about 1953. Second, the Central Intelligence Agency was established as part of the National Security Council system and operated within that structure. US intelligence improved and was more effectively used by policymakers as the NSC structure improved. At no time, even during its early period of disarray, did the CIA or intelligence community operate as an independent entity.

The integration of the intelligence component into the history of the first postwar decade is under way and will continue over an extended period. Much finished intelligence that was considered at the highest levels is now available. The historian's methodology must now be applied to it. One primary objective must be to produce a sort of Cold War sequel to Lewin's *Ultra Goes to War,* in the sense of determining with precision what the intelligence actually said, how policymakers used it, and what difference it made. Care must be taken to avoid assigning excessive importance to a few particular documents, but to consider the entire take before the policymaker.

Intelligence specialists ceaselessly remind us of the biases of consumers. The historian is also well advised to analyze the analysts, much as efforts have been made to assess the values and mentality of the Foreign Service. Was the intelligence professional of the first postwar decade experienced enough and realistic enough to estimate Stalin's intentions competently, as well as to accumulate factual knowledge?

Another consideration governing the study of intelligence and foreign policy is the fact that the documentation is seldom satisfactory. Information will become available incrementally. The interview, as applied by Powers in *The Man Who Kept the Secrets,* may sometimes be the only possible source of evidence. Some instructions or policy statements conveyed orally may never be reconstructed. Other critical information obtained by sensitive means, and operational details of covert activities, are likely to remain classified for the foreseeable future in order to protect vital sources and methods. This must not deter the historian from proceeding with the study of intelligence.

There prevails today a myth of a golden age when historians had early and convenient access to essential documentation including intelligence material. There of course was no such age. The *Foreign Relations* series of World

War II scarcely mentions OSS. The standard treatments of the war were written in ignorance of ULTRA. By contrast, no nation, save as a result of defeat in war, has ever released so much so soon, willingly and otherwise, about its intelligence and intelligence-related operations as has the postwar United States. Tremendous gaps remain, of course, some not soon to be filled.

George Constantinides points out in his recent intelligence bibliography, "experience teaches that in this field secrets spill out, now in droplets, now in gushes, which modify and at times alter entirely our previous comprehension of particular events," and that in view of this process of constant revision great tolerance and humility is needed in dealing with the world of intelligence.

For diplomatic historians, reinterpreting the first postwar decade in light of the intelligence component of policy will be excruciating, fascinating, and obligatory.

SELECTED SOURCES

I. Overviews, Bibliographies, and Finding Aids

Ray S. Cline, *The CIA: Reality vs. Myth* (Washington: Acropolis Books, 1982) is a semi-autobiographical account by a top CIA analyst of the period who later served as Deputy Director of CIA and Director of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. With about 75 pages on 1945-1954, it is an important bridge between history and intelligence studies. Anne Karalekas' *History of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Laguna Hills, Calif.: Aegean Park Press, 1977) is widely regarded as the best short treatment of CIA. Written as part of the Church Committee Report (Book IV), it is based in part on internal CIA documents. It devotes about 50 pages to 1945-1954. Thomas Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA* (New York: Knopf, 1979), contains abundant information on 1945-1954, but it is scattered through the book. *Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire* by William R. Corson (New York: Dial Press, 1977) is, contrary to the impression conveyed by its title, an important book containing about 150 pages on the period in question. Harry Howe Ransom's *The Intelligence Establishment* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970) is a useful survey.

Intelligence and Espionage: An Analytical Bibliography by George C. Constantinides (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1983) permits identification of some 50 entries (of 500) that deal to some degree with 1945-1954. Comments on each item are helpful and reliable. Other important recent bibliographies include Paul W. Blackstock and Frank L. Schaf, Jr., *Intelligence, Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Operations: A Guide to Information Sources* (Detroit: Gale Research, 1978); Defense Intelligence School, *Bibliography of Intelligence Literature*, 7th edition, (Washington, 1981): Marjorie W. Cline, et al., *A Scholar's Guide to Intelligence Literature: Bibliography of the Russell J. Bowen Collection* (Frederick, Md.: University Publications, 1983), which constitutes a catalogue of an important source at Georgetown University; and Myron J. Smith, *The Secret Wars*, Vol. II, "Intelligence, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare, Covert Operations, 1945-1980" (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio, 1981).

Vincent and Nan Buranelli, *Spy-Counterspy: An Encyclopedia of Intelligence* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1982) consists of sketches and suggestions for further reading on numerous prominent individuals and episodes.

The Declassified Documents Reference System, published by Carrollton Press and more recently by Research Publications, provides reference to and microfiche copies of thousands of documents released under the Freedom of Information Act since 1974, including numerous papers relating to intelligence. The system produces quarterly catalogs and retrospective guides. Many libraries have both the guides and microfiche copies of documents. Another finding aid for FOIA material is *Former Secrets: Government Records Made Public Through the Freedom of Information Act*, by Evan Hendricks (Washington: Campaign for Political Rights, 1982). It organizes material by subject, requester-author, and ultimate publication result. The Central Intelligence Agency, and to a lesser degree the Department of State, have the capability to identify and provide copies of documents already released on particular subjects. This enables the researcher to obtain material relatively rapidly without initiating a new FOIA request.

The Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene, edited by Thomas F. Troy (Frederick, Md.: University Publications) is a bimonthly newsletter and book review that provides current information on the study of intelligence and new sources.

II. Memoirs and Monographs

The memoirs of White House, State, and Defense policymakers of the period 1945-1954 are notably unhelpful for study of the intelligence component. President Truman comments on the dismemberment of OSS in *Year of Decision* (New York: Doubleday, 1955). *The Forrestal Diaries*, Walter Millis, ed. (New York: Viking) contain bits and pieces on intelligence organization. Dean Acheson's *Present at the Creation* (New York: Norton, 1969) has a short chapter on organization for intelligence in 1946. George Kennan writes of the 1952 Moscow bugging incident in *Memoirs 1950-1963* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972).

Standard works by intelligence veterans providing theoretical concepts and defense of intelligence as an institution, but little hard factual information, include Allen W. Dulles, *The*

Craft of Intelligence (New York: Harper & Row, 1963); Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1965); and Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. *The Real CIA* (New York: Macmillan, 1968).

An outstanding work on transition from OSS to CIA is Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Frederick, Md.: University Publications, 1981). This notable administrative history was written as an official study within the Agency on a classified basis and subsequently released with minor excisions. Bradley F. Smith, *The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA* (New York: Basic Books, 1983) is a thoughtful and well researched treatment of the subject. The story is told in brief by Tom Braden in "The Birth of the CIA," *American Heritage*, February 1977.

A new wave of memoirs by intelligence veterans has come forth since the mid-1970s providing important information. A review article on this phenomenon appeared in the October 1979 issue of *Washingtonian*, "Old Boys Never Talk Until Now," by David Atlee Phillips. Intelligence memoirs pertinent to study of 1945-1954 include William E. Colby, *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), which sheds light on postwar activities in Western Europe; Cord Meyer, *Facing Reality: From World Federalism to the CIA* (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), containing information on the effect of McCarthyism on intelligence; Peer De Silva, *Sub Rosa: The CIA and the Uses of Intelligence* (New York: Times Books, 1978); Joseph Burckholder Smith, *Portrait of a Cold Warrior* (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1976); David Atlee Phillips, *The Night Watch* (New York: Atheneum, 1977) which includes anecdotal information on intelligence in Latin America in the 1950s; Harry Rositzke, *The CIA's Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Action* (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1977), and *The KGB—The Eyes of Russia* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981) each presenting over 100 pages on the intelligence struggle with the Soviet Union from 1945 to 1954; and Kermit Roosevelt's account of the overthrow of the Mossadegh regime, *Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979). William L. Langer's *In and Out of the Ivory Tower* (New York: Neale Watson Academic Publications, 1978) has disappointingly little on his service as head of the Office of National Estimates.

Secondary sources of special value on particular aspects of the period include John Prados, *The Soviet Estimate* (New York: Dial, 1982) which breaks new ground as an effort to evaluate US estimates of Soviet military strength by actually examining the documents. The study concentrates on the period after 1954, but also deals with earlier years employing NIEs and other declassified material. In *The Puzzle Palace* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), James Bamford uses interviews and FOIA to cast light on the National Security Agency, including its origins and early operations. Stephen Ambrose, *Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981) has about 75 pages on 1945-1954, including chapters on Iran and Guatemala operations. Prominent among treatments of Guatemala based on recently declassified documents are Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982); Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (New York: Doubleday, 1982); and Gordon L. Bowen, "U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Radical Change: Covert Operations in Guatemala, 1950-1954," *Latin American Perspectives*, Winter, 1983, pp. 88-102. Blanche Weisen Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower: A Divided Legacy of Peace and Political Warfare* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981) treats Guatemala and other special operations. *Wilderness of Mirrors* (New York: Harper and Row, 1980) by David C. Martin treats the East-West intelligence counterintelligence struggle over the years. John Barron's *KGB: The Secret Works of Soviet Secret Agents* (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1974) provides information on early postwar agents and a guide to additional study. William Hood, *Mole* (New York: Ballentine, 1982), an account of the Popov case by a former CIA officer, is a useful source on the espionage battle in Europe in the 1950s. *The Climate of Treason: Five Who Spied for Russia* by Andrew Boyle (London: Coronet Books, 1979) and Bruce Page, David Leitch, and Philip Knightley, *The Philby Conspiracy* (New York: Doubleday, 1968) treat the Maclean and Philby cases. Allen Weinstein's *Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case* (New York: Knopf, 1978) is a landmark example of historical method applied to the obscure and emotion-charged world of espionage.

Critiques of US intelligence containing vital information and insights on the 1945-1954 period but which must be read with caution include Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Knopf, 1974); and David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Invisible Government* (New York: Random House, 1964).

III. Government Publications

Foreign Relations of the United States, the Department of State's official history of US foreign affairs, contains little intelligence documentation prior to the volumes for 1950. This is attributable in part to the unavailability of material to the editors, particularly the President's Secretary's File at the Truman Library. An exception was 1948, Vol. V, part 2, The Near East and South Asia, which includes a number of intelligence estimates on the Palestine situation. More finished intelligence appears in 1950 and 1951 volumes, such as 1950, Vol. VII, Korea. The triennial volumes for 1952-1954 contain substantial amounts of finished intelligence, particularly National Intelligence Estimates. For example, see 1952-1954, Vol. XIII, Indochina, and the recently released Vol. XV, Korea. Volume IV, the American Republics, presents extensive documentation on Guatemala, but less than scholars may have liked on US involvement in the overthrow of the Arbenz government.

The Pentagon Papers, U.S. Department of Defense, *U.S. Vietnam Relations, 1940-1968* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971) includes a number of NIEs and SNIEs for 1954 and earlier. The Gravel edition (Boston: Beacon, 1971) contains an after-action report on covert operations in Indochina, 1954-1955.

The 1955 Hoover Commission task force on intelligence, chaired by General Mark Clark, produced a report on the existing status of intelligence activities: Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the government (Hoover Commission "Intelligence Activities: A Report to Congress;" Washington: GPO, 1955).

Jack Zlotnick's *National Intelligence* (Washington: GPO, 1964) prepared under the auspices of the US Industrial College of the Armed Forces, is a concise description of the US intelligence community as it existed in the early 1960s, with some treatment given to its development since 1945.

The report of the Brownell Committee to the Secretaries of State and Defense in 1952 that was instrumental in the establishment of the National Security Agency has been published as George A. Brownell, *The Origin and Development of the National Security Agency* (Laguna Hills, Calif.: Aegean Park Press, 1981).

The report of the *Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy* (Murphy Commission) (Washington: GPO, 1975), Appendices, Vol. VII, Appendix U, Intelligence Functions Analyses, contains information relating to 1945-1954.

Reports of the House Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee), the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence from 1976 to 1980 contain occasional material pertinent to the 1945-1954 period. The same pertains to hearings and reports of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee). The final Report of the Church Committee (Senate Report No. 94-755) was released in November 1975 in six volumes, three of which are of special interest: Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence; Book IV Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence and Military Intelligence, containing the History of the CIA by Anne Karalekas; and Book VI, Supplementary Reports on Intelligence Activities which includes historical material on covert activities.

A judicious and well organized selection of congressional documentation generated by hearings from 1970 to 1976 is presented in Tyrus Fain, et al., eds. *The Intelligence Community: History, Organization, and Issues* (New York: R. R. Bowker, 1977).

IV. Archival Sources

The Modern Military Branch of National Archives (NARS) presently has custody of nearly one thousand feet of OSS records which have been open for some time. This collection includes a small amount of postwar material of successor organizations. NARS is now receiving an additional three thousand feet of OSS operational records from CIA for 1941-1947, which are being processed and opened incrementally.

The National Security Agency has retired considerable World War II material, including intercepts. NSA records at NARS also include a series of "Special Research Histories," some of which deal in part with the postwar period.

Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including some papers of the Joint Intelligence Committee and Joint Intelligence Staff, have been reviewed through 1960, and are open although much has been withheld. Records of the Office of Naval intelligence are open through 1946.

War and Army Department records housed in the Military Field Branch of NARS at Suitland, Maryland include Plans and Operations Division files from 1946 to 1950 which contain some intelligence material. Records of the Army's Military Information Division and Military Intelligence Service are open for research for the early postwar period. Records of US Army theater commands also include intelligence documents.

Over eight thousand intelligence reports prepared by the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS and by the Department of State through 1961 are arranged in a single series in the Legislative and Diplomatic Branch. All the reports through 1947 have been declassified, as have certain later items requested under FOIA. Little significant intelligence documentation is now to be found in State Department decimal files, nor have departmental office files dealing with postwar intelligence been transferred to NARS.

Records of the National Security Council recently obtained by the Judicial, Fiscal, and Social Branch, while now in only the initial stages of declassification review and certainly no substitute for collections at Independence and Abilene, do provide access to intelligence materials such as numbered NSC reports NSC 10, NSC 50, and NSC 5412.

The United States Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pa. has custody of the personal papers of General William Donovan, comprising some three hundred boxes. This collection includes some postwar documents. The Institute also administers the personal papers of many prominent postwar Army officers which contain widely scattered intelligence-related documentation.

The Harry S. Truman Library at Independence, Mo. offers perhaps the richest source of largely unexploited postwar intelligence material now available to historians. The primary pertinent collection is the President's Secretary's File, particularly a fourteen-box intelligence file. The PSF collection contains hundreds of intelligence reports, many of which are stamped "Copy No. 1. President of the United States." Categories of reports include Current Intelligence Bulletins, ORE's (Office of Research and Evaluation of CIG and CIA), CIA Reviews of the World Situation, National Intelligence Estimates, Special National Intelligence Estimates, reports of the Office of Scientific Intelligence, Daily Korean Summaries and other Korean War intelligence, and memos from Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to President Truman on particular issues. The PSF file also contains intelligence records of an organizational and administrative nature. The PSF National Security Council files, including the almost entirely declassified records of NSC meetings, provide a unique window on the role of intelligence in the national security process. The White House Central Files have an important file on General Donovan and the origins of the CIA.

The intelligence sources at the Eisenhower Library are enormously rich, but less concentrated than those of the Truman Library. Despite the release of considerable documentation for the *Foreign Relations* series and under Freedom of Information, including National Intelligence Estimates and information on operations in Iran and Guatemala, much remains unavailable. Intelligence documentation is widespread in the national security-related collections of the Library, including the National Security Council records of the Eisenhower Papers as President (Whitman File), the Files of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and the files of the Office of the Staff Secretary. Intelligence materials are dispersed according to subject through the DDE Diaries, the John Foster Dulles collection, and the White House Central Files. The records of the Operations Coordinating Board and the C. D. Jackson collections are important for psychological strategy matters.

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

Operation Barbarossa: Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941. By Bryan Fugate, Presidio Press, Novato, CA; 1984; 415 pp.

Far from being surprised by the Nazi assault in June 1941, Stalin and Zhukov, the principal architect for the defense, actually were superbly prepared for it and arranged the Soviet forces to suck the Germans into the dreadful Russian killing ground, far to the east. So argues Bryan Fugate in this stunning revisionist interpretation of events surrounding the greatest cataclysm of modern times. Actually, Fugate suggests, Stalin would have preferred the war to come two years later when Soviet forces would have been prepared to take the offensive at the outset, but he was quite satisfied to deal with it in 1941, confident that he could lead the Germans to their deaths deep inside the USSR.

Operation Barbarossa carefully documents a case for a colossal deception perpetrated against Hitler and his staffs—and, incidentally, against the Soviet people themselves—and one which continues to this very day. Contrary to the poor intelligence held by Colonel Kinzel's "Foreign Armies—East" section of the German General Staff, Soviet forces deployed in the border areas in June 1941 were not the cream of the Red Army, and they were deliberately deprived of modern equipment, particularly tanks and aircraft. Much of their artillery was withdrawn before the Nazi assault, nominally "for training" in the rear. The real military strength of the Soviet Union was being concentrated in a second "operational" echelon some five hundred kilometers to the rear and, subsequently, in a third, "strategic" echelon still deeper in the interior. Zhukov's strategy, which he had developed in war games in January 1941, was to lure the German panzer groups beyond the support of foot-mobile infantry and then to unleash the fury of the Soviet combined arms counteroffensive, spearheaded by the new T-34 tanks and supported by new MIG-3 fighter aircraft. The decisive battles would be fought after the German logistic train had been severely stretched, not in the forward areas where everything favored the invader.

Fugate makes a startling case, based largely on German documents, for the extent of the Soviet deception. The Germans thought they faced the flower of Soviet strength in the border area, some ten armies, backed by a fortified belt—the "Stalin Line" two hundred to three hundred kilometers to the rear. They estimated that if they could penetrate these zones in the summer months the Soviet Union would be theirs for the taking. They had not counted upon the Russian principle of surprise operation—dubbed *reflexive control*—involving deception to the point of mind control over the opponent. Unfortunately, the case cannot be fully corroborated on the Soviet side.

So dense was the cloud of secrecy over the defensive plan, argues Fugate, that major aspects cannot be opened up even today. Fugate points out the curiosity of the arrest and execution of the forward area commander, General Pavlov, after his weakened defenses were penetrated (the only front com-

mander to be "liquidated" in World War II). In disgrace and death, Pavlov had to be made to serve the fiction that he had held the single greatest hope for the defense of Mother Russia. Actually, his was a hollow command, designed to deceive the Germans, delay as it could, and then to submit to massacre or capture by the enemy. This first echelon was never intended to halt the attack.

The Soviet regime has yet to say anything about a plan to deliberately entice the German invasion on to Soviet soil, nor does it admit to any strategy other than the mounting of a vigorous defense at the frontier. The official position remains as Khrushchev related it in his de-Stalinization speech in 1956, that Stalin was inept and surprised by the German attack.

Fugate musters persuasive arguments for the deception thesis:

— The Soviet withdrawal of artillery from the forward areas before the invasion.

— The rapid regroupment of the Red Army in the late summer and early fall after sustaining severe losses close to the frontier in June.

— The appearance of T-34 and KV tanks, along with the latest model MIG-3 aircraft in October, after the Germans thought they had destroyed the bulk of Soviet armor and air forces.

— The Soviet counteroffensive of December 1941 around Moscow with a force of seven armies—fifty percent larger than Wehrmacht forces in the area.

But Fugate does not credit all of the Soviet success to the genius of Stalin and Zhukov. Incredible German intelligence blunders, countered with good intelligence on the Soviet side, contributed significantly. In 1940 the German High Command estimated that eighty to one hundred German divisions would be required to execute the campaign in four to six weeks against "fifty to seventy-five good divisions" of the Russians. On 2 July 1941 Colonel Kinzel reported to General Halder, Chief of the General Staff, that the Russians had only between twenty-one and twenty-six divisions remaining facing the German Army Groups North and Center. This prompted Halder to estimate the conclusion of the campaign to be less than two weeks off. The cold realization of Kinzel's errors became obvious to all the following month when *three hundred sixty* Russian divisions had been identified across the eastern front.

On the other hand, the *Rote Kapelle* ("Red Choir") Soviet spy network was functioning in high gear inside Hitler's headquarters, transmitting streams of high-level intelligence to Moscow. F. I. Golikov, the Soviet General Staff intelligence chief, accurately summarized the evolution of the "Barbarossa" plan to Zhukov in March 1941, three months before the attack. On 14 September Richard Sorge, the Soviet spy in Tokyo, notified Moscow Center that the Japanese would make no move against the Soviet Union, facilitating the shift of additional forces from east to west.

Another contributor to Soviet success was the strict control which Stalin enjoyed over his field commanders through the NKVD, while the Germans struggled with a confusing command structure which enabled headstrong field commanders, such as Guderian, to ignore inconvenient orders from higher

authority. It never was very clear on the German side whether Moscow or the Ukraine was top priority. (The only thing that was clear to everyone was that no one should ever try to detach a unit from Guderian's Panzer Group 2.) The strict control on the Russian side ensured a singleness of purpose which the Germans could never attain. Fugate singles out Guderian for special fault, describing his role as pivotal in the survival of the Hitler regime in the period of anti-Nazi plots and virtually decisive in Germany's loss of the war and the ultimate extension of Soviet power into central Europe.

Operation Barbarossa opens an entirely new thesis regarding the greatest military struggle of the century. While it has its technical faults (so-so maps, typographical errors), it will give soldiers, scholars and, most particularly, intelligence officers cause to reexamine their views of the events which have shaped conventional wisdom in the past. This book is "must" reading for everyone concerned with warning, deception, and surprise.

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Dezinformatsia. By Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson. Pergamon-Brassey's; 1984; 211 pp.

This book sets out to demonstrate that Soviet leaders believe their country is in an adversarial relationship with the United States and that they are committed to using "active measures" to achieve what they perceive to be their national interests. It reviews some examples of Soviet active measures—overt propaganda as well as covert media activities and political influence operations—to prove its point. It concludes that the United States should respond more decisively by countering and emulating Soviet active measures.

Unfortunately, the authors begin with extraordinarily naive assumptions and resort to specious arguments to prove the obvious. Their detailed examination of Soviet overt propaganda misrepresents reality to prove the simplistic point that the Soviets are hostile to the United States. In the process they disregard the complexity of Soviet propaganda and the interests and policies that it reflects.

The authors begin with the assumption that "there is a fundamental difference between the perspective of Soviet and Western leaders on the nature of world politics." (p. 7) The Soviets, they maintain, believe that "world politics remains a continual situation of conflict and war" (p. 9), while "democratic governments . . . make a sharp distinction between war and peace, and do not assume that a continual state of conflict is characteristic of international relations." (p. 7)

The generalization that Moscow sees world politics as an arena of conflict is accurate, although the authors' attempt to support it seems misguided. For example, their references to Soviet affirmations of Clausewitz's formula that "war is a continuation of politics by other means" are essentially irrelevant and exhibit a total lack of understanding of what Clausewitz meant or of the complex arguments that have taken place in the Soviet Union about interpretation of his formulation in a nuclear era.

Far more perplexing is the authors' contention that democracies are so naive as to assume that politics, international or otherwise, do not involve conflict. During almost a quarter century in the intelligence business, I have yet to meet a professional officer who did not assume, in the words of Hans J. Morgenthau, that "international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power." Politics always entails conflict, whether a nation is at war or not. A democratic leader who believes otherwise will ill serve his or her country and democracy.

The authors go to considerable lengths to prove another obvious point: "that propaganda and political influence techniques do in fact constitute significant instruments of Soviet foreign policy and strategy." They justify the effort they expend to reach this conclusion by raising as a straw man "many specialists" who allegedly disagree. I know of no such specialists and the authors provide no examples. Unfortunately, a simplistic effort to defend this truism defines much of the book.

The methodology employed by the authors to examine Soviet overt propaganda reflects, at best, a superficial understanding of current history and the

Soviet Union. They base their conclusions on a textual analysis of articles in the Soviet foreign affairs weekly *New Times* and a statistical analysis of the *Pravda* foreign affairs column "International Review" during selected periods between 1960 and 1980.

This approach has built-in drawbacks since, despite the authors' claims to the contrary, it is limited to propaganda that is almost invariably nonauthoritative and inconsequential.

Far worse, however, was the authors' decision to exclude from their study the entire first half of the 1970s, when detente was in its heyday. Having thus adjusted the documentary record, they were able to offer this simplistic conclusion about the 1960-1980 period: "In sum, whether the Western allies have perceived East-West relations to be in a period of cold war or a period of 'detente,' Soviet overt propaganda has continued to portray the United States and NATO in negative and defamatory terms." (p. 188)

This is simply not true. When it has suited Moscow's purpose, Soviet propaganda has portrayed the United States as a benevolent power whose interests coincide with those of the Soviet state. At times in the early 1970s, for example, Soviet propagandists managed to discuss the war in Vietnam without even mentioning that the United States was a party in the conflict.

The extent to which the authors skewed the record to reach their conclusion can be demonstrated by taking a look at their statistical analysis of *Pravda* references to Western hostility and realism—willingness to cooperate with the communist world. If the period of the early 1970s had been included in their study, their generalization would have been obviously false, as is demonstrated graphically below with the addition to their chart on hostility and realism of a single three-month period representative of the detente era. The addition is highlighted in color. During this sample period (May-July 1973), seventy-five percent of the paragraphs in the *Pravda* International Review column that discussed the West ascribed realistic, positive qualities to it; only five percent were hostile.



It is clear that the defining motivation for Soviet propaganda is not irrational hostility but rather, as with all states, perceived national interests. In order to understand Soviet interests and priorities, a scholar or analyst cannot dismiss changes in the relative degree of hostility toward the West in Soviet propaganda.

The authors' "textual analysis" of *New Times* is also distorted by the arbitrary periods they decided to consider. In addition, an extremely limited review of their summation of commentary turned up instances in which they did not fairly report the journal's content. In at least two cases, for example, they attributed to *New Times* statements which were, in fact, made by Americans and merely quoted by the journal (pp. 74, 75); in another they used the term "the extreme right" in paraphrasing a *New Times reference to "the Republicans." (p. 76)*

In some instances the authors resort to patent sophistry. They use such a technique to try to prove their contention that Soviet leaders do not really feel threatened by the United States: "While the United States persistently was characterized as the major threat to world peace, careful analysis of Soviet propaganda indicates that in reality the Kremlin did not perceive any direct threat to its security interests emanating from alleged US aggressiveness and militarism." (p. 188)

To suggest that the Soviet Union does not really see itself threatened by US "aggressiveness and militarism" is to phrase the issue in terms akin to the old question, "Have you stopped beating your wife?" As the issue is presented, the reader must label the United States either "aggressive" or "militarist" in order to suggest that Moscow might see itself threatened. This begs the question of whether Moscow genuinely believes itself to be threatened by US military and political power and intentions.

The authors' conclusion that Moscow does not perceive itself to be threatened rests on the convoluted argument that fluctuations in Soviet propaganda use of the theme of Western militarism "appear to reflect the stops and starts of US defense spending and strategic developments, rather than Soviet responsiveness to a genuinely perceived, ongoing, and long-term threat to the USSR. In other words, Soviet use of this propaganda line apparently was not a reflection of Moscow's concern regarding actual Western military power per se, but instead was a response to the periodic threat of a serious escalation in Western defense spending." (p. 95)

One wonders why the Soviets would view an escalation in Western defense spending with alarm if there were not a fundamental assumption in the Kremlin that the West represents a threat to the USSR. Even more, one wonders why the authors made their argument in the first place. They seem less concerned to understand the Soviet Union than to prove that it is irrational and the West totally benign.

In sum, the book touches upon important intelligence and policy issues, but they are treated irresponsibly, as though the authors were dedicated more to proving that the Soviet Union is evil than to a realistic effort to understand Moscow's foreign policy objectives and tactics. Ultimately, books such as

Dezinformatsia can only hurt the profession of intelligence and efforts to develop a rational foreign policy. Naive asumptions and erroneous history make good propaganda but bad policy. They serve neither scholarship nor the national interest.

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Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class, an Insider's Report. By Michael S. Voslensky. Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York; 1984; 455 pp.

This is an updated and expanded version of the original German *Nomenklatura. Die herrschende Klasse der Sowjetunion*, published in Vienna in 1980. The updating takes in events of 1983 and 1984, including Chernenko's election as CPSU General Secretary. The new version has an enthusiastic preface by former Yugoslav party leader Milovan Djilas, who had raised the issue of communist leaders becoming a new "class" of rulers as early as 1957 in his book *The New Class*. Voslensky's book is getting worldwide exposure; it has been translated into Russian, French, Italian, Japanese, Spanish, and a number of other languages, making it a landmark event.

Voslensky's thesis is that the Soviet Union (as well as other communist states) is ruled by a new privileged class institutionalized in the system called the nomenklatura. The nomenklatura basically denotes the list of posts to which appointees must be selected by party bodies at various levels; it also refers to the individuals who hold posts subject to appointment by key party bodies. As Voslensky illustrates in detail, it has come to include in addition a whole system of special rights, benefits, privileges, and powers which set the nomenklatura apart from the rest of society as a privileged class of power holders.

While Voslensky draws a largely valid and realistic picture of the USSR run by a ruling class of "nomenklaturists," he winds up carrying the image to extremes and underestimating the influence of leaders as individuals. In evaluating the role of the top party leader, for example, he writes that the dictatorship of the Secretary General is "the dictatorship not of an individual but of a class that needs consensus at the top level. The collective dictatorship of the Politburo and the Secretariat and the apparently personal dictatorship of the Secretary General are merely the two faces of the dictatorship of the nomenklatura" (p. 261). Elsewhere, referring to Central Committee headquarters, " . . . it is not the omnipotent party secretary who reigns here, but the anonymous class of nomenklaturists that reign through him" (p. 268). Further, "even in his exalted position, Chernenko (as before him Andropov, Brezhnev, Khrushchev) does not make policy personally; that is left to the nomenklatura, the true ruler of the Soviet Union" (p. 384).

Voslensky's picture of rule by a conservative, mindless, corrupt class of bureaucrats would seem to hold out relatively little hope for peaceful evolution in the Soviet Union or perhaps even for fruitful negotiation with a leadership which is unwilling or unable to break out of its rigid mold. The record of the past three decades, however, does suggest that top leaders, with their varying styles and predispositions, can make a difference and have been able to undertake meaningful initiatives in foreign and domestic policy. Hence, the picture may not be as bleak as it appears.

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The book's most valuable sections are those drawn directly from Voslensky's own experience as an insider. Judging by his comments and other available information, he had extensive contacts with prominent members of

the Soviet elite. Unfortunately, the book does not make clear the status he really had, identifying him only in academic posts. In fact, he had more meaningful informal ties which provided him with contacts at a very high level and opened the doors of the nomenklatura's inner sanctums to him.

Voslensky grew up in the privileged class. He studied with children of the elite at Moscow State University's history faculty (for example, with Stalin's daughter in 1943-44; see p. 238) and at the prestigious Institute for International Relations. He joined the elite in the establishment of scholars and officials in international affairs. His public jobs were in the Institute of World Econonics and International Relations (IMEMO) and the USSR History Institute; but more significantly, early on he became an informal consultant to the Central Committee's International Department and a protege of Boris Ponomarev, who has headed the department since the early 1950s and has been a Central Committee secretary since 1961. As a result, Voslensky visited various departments in Central Committee headquarters and had contact with prominent officials. He himself has publicly mentioned contact with Secretary Kapitonov (p. 87), with Ponomarev (in the Swedish paper *Svenska Dagbladet*, 18 December 1983), and even with the then Kazakh First Secretary Brezhnev (p. 357).

In this special position, he was accorded unusual trust and was allowed frequent contact with foreigners and travel abroad.

The circumstances of his defection are not explained in his book or in his other public statements, leaving the reader somewhat mystified at how someone from the Soviet inner sanctum could so quietly pass over to the West and begin writing books like this one. The German edition of his book simply says that he has lived in the West since 1972, teaching at several German and Austrian universities. The Vienna newsmagazine *Profil* (19 April 1982) indicated that he had become an Austrian citizen in 1976. In fact, during one of his visits to West Germany, Voslensky decided to stay. He had high-level Western contacts from his work in the SALT talks (he was secretary of the Academy of Sciences' Disarmament Commission and a participant in East-West prenegotiations) and in Soviet talks with West German leaders (during which he met West German President Heinemann). In defecting, he managed to get the intercession of Heinemann, who worked out a deal with the Soviet Ambassador to West Germany, whereby the Soviets would not bother Voslensky if he refrained from public attacks on the USSR. Eventually, the deal collapsed and Moscow withdrew his Soviet citizenship. Voslensky now is director of the Institute of Contemporary Soviet Research in Munich.

Voslensky never says that he himself was a member of the nomenklatura at any level (although as secretary of the Disarmament Commission, he would have been) or even a party member, but he clearly lived among the privileged class, for thirty years enjoying perquisites not accorded most Soviet citizens. From his portrayal of the nomenklatura system—especially his biting satire of one day in the life of a typical Central Committee official (pp. 411-439)—it is obvious that repulsion against the system of privilege was one of his prime motives for defecting.

Based on his extensive experience, Voslensky provides fascinating descriptions of how the nomenklatura system works in practice, the atmosphere prevailing within the Soviet *apparat,* and the attitudes of those who have made their way into this bastion of privilege and power. He provides noteworthy detailed descriptions of the Soviet official telephone system (pp. 207-13) and of procedures for getting a visa to travel abroad (pp. 302-12). His description of the functioning of the Politburo and Secretariat (pp. 261-68)—obviously not based primarily on personal observation—is perceptive and occasionally supplemented with details drawn from talking with other insiders. For example, on p. 267 he explains that Central Committee resolutions need the approval of only five of the twelve secretaries (including one or two senior secretaries and the secretary responsible for the field involved), rather than of a majority. On the same page, he notes that each senior Central Committee secretary has two assistants and two secretaries and that junior secretaries each have one assistant and two secretaries.

Unfortunately, in this updated version Voslensky could not resist the temptation to explain how and why Andropov succeeded Brezhnev, even though he is no longer privy to extensive insider information. His description of the struggle for power (in Chapter 8) is distressingly weak and filled with tales of intrigue and murder that strain credulity. Moreover, in explaining Andropov's ascension, Voslensky appears to undermine his own central thesis that the nomenklatura is virtually the all powerful ruling elite. He presents Chernenko as the natural candidate of the nomenklatura and Andropov as his challenger and the threat to the nomenklatura. He points out that Andropov launched a campaign against the corruption and abuses so prevalent in the nomenklatura, threatening the nomenklatura's privileges and forcing "nomenklaturists to feel that they, too, were vulnerable" (p. 373). But if the nomenklatura is so powerful and Andropov was threatening its power and privileges, how could he have been elected General Secretary? Voslensky not very convincingly argues that Andropov used KGB force and possibly even murder to intimidate the Politburo and the nomenklatura into accepting him as General Secretary (pp. 371-377).

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The book includes large sections on the nomenklatura's relationship to Marxist theory (pp. 112-177), the concept of a ruling class according to Marx, Lenin, and Stalin (pp. 14-45), as well as such practical aspects as how one joins the nomenklatura (pp. 75-81) and privileges of members (pp. 81-88, 178-242). Noting that Soviet secrecy about the nomenklatura makes even "an approximate estimate" of its size very difficult, Voslensky devotes pp. 92-96 to working out a rough estimate of the number of people on the nomenklatura, suggesting about 75,000 for the "top category" and a total of about 750,000 for all levels. Although references to the nomenklatura in official Soviet publications are indeed extremely rare, there has been some fairly precise official information on the size of the key element, the Central Committee's nomenklatura. A March 1979 *Voprosy istorii KPSS* article by party historian B. A. Abramov, head of a sector in the CPSU History Department of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, specified that as of 1 October 1947 the Central Committee's nomen-

klatura was a little over 40,000. This was the size after the nomenklatura assumed its present form in 1946, when, according to Abramov, a new document outlining the "nomenklatura of positions" was adopted.

This top layer—the Central Committee nomenklatura—is itself broken down into hierarchical sub-groups, based on who they are appointed by. The highest and/or most sensitive posts belong to the Politburo, somewhat lower posts to the Secretariat, while others are filled by individual Central Committee secretaries or even department heads. Voslensky occasionally mentions such distinctions, specifying that appointments to the posts of first deputy head of a Central Committee department, minister, ambassador, or patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church belong to the Politburo, while appointment of deputy heads of departments, deputy ministers, and directors of institutes belong to the Secretariat (pp. 224,75). He does not provide a detailed breakdown and probably never saw a complete list himself; he writes that such lists are "top secret documents" (p. 70). The limited information on this provided by Voslensky generally conforms to the hierarchical breakdown of the Polish Central Committee nomenklatura, which was revealed in two published Polish Politburo decisions.* The Polish documents specify that the Politburo appoints province first secretaries, Central Committee department heads, the premier and deputy premiers, ministers (and deputy ministers for the key foreign affairs, interior, and defense ministries), ambassadors, and the chief editor of Poland's top party paper *Trybuna Ludu*, among others. The secretariat as a body appoints deputy heads of Central Committee departments, most deputy ministers, heads of departments within the interior ministry, and heads of the press agency and radio-television committee. In addition, individual Central Committee secretaries have the power to appoint editors of most papers and journals, directors of industrial associations, commanders of province militia, and various other officials, and Central Committee department heads can name secretaries of party organizations in ministries and directors of various government agencies. In contrast to Voslensky's statement that Soviet institute directors are appointed by the Secretariat, in Poland institute directors are appointed by the head of the appropriate Central Committee department (while the president of the Academy of Sciences is named by the Politburo, his deputies by the Secretariat, and heads of the Academy's divisions by the appropriate Central Committee secretary). Somewhat distinct from other categories are appointments in the sensitive military sphere: They are kept exclusively in the hands of the Politburo (commanders of services and military districts and all general-rank promotions) and Secretariat (deputy chief of staff, deputy commanders for political questions of services and military districts, and head of the defense ministry cadres department).

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Finally, there are at least a few errors in the new English version. In one notable translation error on p. 259, the Party-State Control Committee headed

* The Polish decisions were originally published in Warsaw in booklet form. They were reprinted in French in Thomas Lowit, "Ya-t-il des Etats en Europe de l'Est?," *Revue Francaise de Sociologie*, Vol. 20, 1979, and in German in the special study *Nomenklatura in Polen* by Japanese Professor Takayuki Ito, issued by the Bundesinstitut fuer ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien in Koeln in December 1983.

the state." Another error, perhaps also involving translation, has Central Committee Secretary Ryabov as "deputy vice president" of the Council of Ministers (pp. 263-64)—a nonexistent title.

Regrettably, the value of Voslensky's book as a research tool is marred by the incompleteness of the index. Although the book discusses many individuals, most of them—including such prominent figures as Central Committee Secretary Kapitonov, Politburo member Voznesenskiy, Georgian First Secretary Shevardnadze, Central Committee Administrative Organs Department chairmen Mironov and Savinkin, and USA Institute Director Arbatov—are left out of the index. In other cases, only some of the references are indexed. For example, Voslensky's reference to studying with Stalin's daughter Svetlana Alliluyeva (p. 238) is not included in her entry in the index. Since the author has interesting things to say about many prominent figures, the book *should* be a useful reference source. But this eclectic index is worse than no index at all, misleading the reader into thinking there are no mentions of people who in fact are discussed at length.

Still, the book has much worthwhile information for the student of Soviet politics and leadership, both in specific detail and in descriptions of how the system works.

This review is classified SECRET NOFORN. 25X1

Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class, an Insider's Report. By Michael S. Voslensky. Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York; 1984; 455 pp.

Nomenklatura is a masterful analytical study of the ruling class of the Soviet Union, a ruling class created by Stalin, numbering today around 750,000. Author Michael Voslensky points out that the domestic policy of the nomenklatura class is to consolidate its dictatorial power, and its foreign policy is to extend it to the whole world. The nomenklatura is becoming more and more parasitic. Its contribution to society is nil and its stubborn desire for world domination involves the grave danger of world war.

Dr. Voslensky's representation of the nomenklatura rings with authenticity, for he writes from personal experience inside the system. He is a prominent Soviet historian, a graduate of Moscow University with extensive postgraduate study in the Soviet Union and East Germany. He has been professor in the Academy of Sciences in Moscow, executive secretary of the Disarmament Commission, vice chairman of the Bilateral Historians Commission, member of the Soviet Committee for European Security, and professor at Lumumba University, Moscow. He defected without public notice in West Germany in 1972. He is the author of five books and 450 other publications (most in the USSR before his defection) and is internationally recognized as one of the foremost experts on the internal affairs of the Soviet Union.

The term *nomenklatura* derives from the Latin, meaning a list or index of names. Although it is rarely used in the Soviet Union today, the term was defined in the Soviet publication *Administrative Management* (1964, 1968, 1971 editions) as a "list of positions whose ranks are confirmed by higher authorities." This meager definition conveys little of what the nomenklatura has become.

Voslensky begins with an historical analysis of the antecedents of the nomenklatura. He devotes considerable space to contrasting Lenin and Marx, charging that Lenin, the pragmatist, adapted, revised, and often directly contradicted the work of Marx. Rather than awaiting the spontaneous development of revolution, Lenin said it must be brought to the working class by a corps of professional revolutionaries. Having seized power, Lenin and his professional revolutionaries began to establish a new governing class, a process which soon went out of control. The country was so large that the organization of professional revolutionaries alone was not large enough to govern it, to fill all the responsible positions. Applicants rushed to fill these positions and all that was required was that they not be of noble or bourgeois origin and must be members of the party or komsomol. Thus, the most important selection criterion was political, not professional, a condition which remains to this day.

Stalin succeeded in controlling all appointments to key positions in the country. He created the nomenklatura as we know it today, a ruling class selected by political qualifications, which assures complete devotion to those with the power to hire and fire.

By Voslensky's estimate there are approximately 750,000 nomenklaturists occupying responsible positions in three categories: (1) leaders of the party,

komsomol, trade unions, and other social organizations and their sub-divisions (numbering altogether about 100,000); (2) heads of state administration and their deputies, belonging to the state apparatus, not the party apparatus (150,000); (3) key positions in economy, scientific and learned institutions and education (400,000 to 500,000). Together with their family members they number about three million or one and one-half percent of the population of the Soviet Union.

Every nomenklaturist belongs to the nomenklatura of a definite leading party agency. It is this agency that appointed him, and it alone can dismiss him. For example, ministers and ambassadors as well as the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia belong to the nomenklatura of the Politburo; deputy ministers and directors of institutes belong to that of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. In practice, once on the nomenklatura list, one can expect never to be removed. Every holder of a nomenklatura post is assigned a deputy whose name is entered on a reserve list. When the post becomes vacant, the committee concerned decides whether to appoint the deputy.

The many privileges that come with belonging to the nomenklatura greatly increase the total value of the position's salary, which is considerably above non-nomenklatura salaries to begin with. Vacations for nomenklaturists are twice as long as those for the ordinary Soviet worker, are free, and provide better class accommodations. Nomenklaturists have special government telephone lines. This is important in a country where telephones are status symbols. There are special food stores for nomenklaturists who receive coupons allowing them to get their food there. These kremliovka coupons entitle the bearer to "medical nutrition." Three coupons per day can be exchanged at the Kremlin canteen for meals whose helpings are so generous that a single portion is enough to feed a whole family. Many nomenklaturists prefer to exchange their kremliovka coupons for food baskets full of luxuries normally unobtainable in Moscow.

How does one become a part of the nomenklatura? Today the trend is toward nomenklaturists obtaining nomenklatura posts for their children. An enterprising young man can still work his way into a nomenklatura position by first of all joining the party, then establishing a reputation for ambition and a willingness to do anything to obtain the desired appointment. He cultivates those who can be useful to him, showing a special doglike devotion to the man in his chain of command whose position gives him power to propose new members of the nomenklatura. Voslensky takes us on a journey with just such an aspiring young careerist, the fictional Ivan Ivanovich Ivanov, and we watch him achieving the desired nomenklatura appointment and then always striving to rise to a yet higher position. Although the privileges that come with a nomenklatura position are considerable and make life easier and more enjoyable, what matters most to the nomenklaturist is power.

It is impossible to make one's way in the nomenklatura class without a great deal of support. It is essential to join a faction in which everyone helps everyone while at the same time trying to undermine rival factions. Nowhere is this factional rivalry more visible than in the struggles for power in the Kremlin. Herein lies the weakness of the nomenklatura, the inability to guar-

antee an orderly and routine succession of power. Voslensky shows us the factional struggle with its subtle intrigues that was under way even before Brezhnev's death.

Voslensky tells us that corruption is rampant in the Soviet Union. Even though nomenklaturists are forbidden to accept bribes, they do so frequently, on a large scale, and punishment is rare and mild. The indulgent attitude toward corruption can be attributed to the solidarity among the nomenklaturists, all of whom are equally keen to add to their material wealth. Voslensky contends that Andropov's anti-corruption campaign was designed mainly to exert control over the nomenklaturists, to remind them of their vulnerability and to whom they owe their allegiance.

Nomenklatura is unique in the view it affords the reader of the inner workings of the contemporary Soviet political system. The book provides insights into the workings of the Soviet system as a whole, emphasizing the collective concern of the nomenklatura and its constraints on individual leaders. This is of particular interest as one addresses the issue of the personal strength, power, and authority of Konstantin Chernenko as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as compared to his colleagues in the Politburo and other elements in the Soviet government and party.

According to Voslensky, no single person is in complete control in the Soviet Union. While the Foreign Minister and Defense Minister appear to operate with a certain degree of autonomy in their respective spheres of influence, they, like Chernenko, are operating within the constraints of the nomenklatura collective. Toward the end of his book, Dr. Voslensky addresses the concerns of the nomenklatura in the field of foreign policy. He contends that Soviet leaders genuinely do not want a nuclear war, not from a desire to protect the good citizens of the Soviet Union, but because they know that the destruction brought about by a nuclear confrontation would also mean the end of their power, and probably even their own personal demise. The nomenklaturist as portrayed by Dr. Voslensky is striving to preserve and enhance his power at all costs. What the nomenklatura wants, then, is world domination for the Soviet Union without war, victory over the West without fighting. Dr. Voslensky contends that the Soviet leaders make a show of pugnacity for the purpose of persuading the West that communism is preferable to catastrophe; Voslensky holds that the Soviet threats are nothing but bluff.

Nomenklatura is flawed by an inadequate index which will lessen its value to researchers. The book gets off to a slow start. Many readers will find its emphasis on historical analysis, harking back to Marx and Lenin, sleep inducing. Others will make the same complaint about Voslensky's discussion of the Soviet economy. Of particular interest, however, is Chapter 6, "Dictatorship of the Nomenklatura" in which Voslensky focuses on the most important political bodies in the Soviet Union: the Politburo and the Secretariat.

While the pace of the book is uneven, *Nomenklatura* should be on the reading list of all who aspire to understanding how the Soviet Union is governed.



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