

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI				
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
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8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL				
15	D/PAO				
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS				
19	NIO/SP		X		
20	D/SOVA		X		
21	C/ACIS		X		
22					

SUSPENSE _____

Date

Remarks

STAT

Executive Secretary

23 May 85

Date

3637 (10-81)

Program on Information Resources Policy

Anthony G. Oettinger
John C. LeGates
John F. McLaughlin
Benjamin M. Compaine
Oswald H. Ganley

Executive Registry

85- 2107

May 17, 1985

Mr. William J. Casey
The Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505


Dear Mr. Casey:

In your letter of October 19, 1984 to Mr. Oettinger, commenting on Major Rowell's draft report "Arms Control Verification: A Guide to Policy Issues for the 1980s" you asked that we send you several copies once the report has been printed.

Enclosed are five copies. Please let us know if you need more copies and we shall be glad to make appropriate arrangements.

Thank you again for reviewing the draft.

Sincerely,



Oswald H. Ganley
Executive Director

OHG/cms
Enclosures

DCI
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C-134



Harvard University




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**Arms Control Verification:
A Guide to Policy Issues
for the 1980s**
William F. Rowell

***Program on
Information Resources
Policy***



 **Center for Information Policy Research**

 **Harvard University**

**Arms Control Verification;
A Guide to Policy Issues
for the 1980s**

William F. Rowell

Program on Information Resources Policy

Harvard University

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Policy Research

Cambridge, Massachusetts

I-1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Addressing Congress after signing the SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) Treaty in June 1979, President Carter discussed the overriding need to avoid nuclear war:

In any age, such a rivalry risks degenerating into war, but our age is unique, for the terrible power of nuclear weapons has created an incentive for avoiding war that transcends even very deep differences of politics and philosophy. In the age of the hydrogen bomb, there is no longer any meaningful distinction between global war and global suicide.

In a similar fashion, President Reagan in his May 1982 commencement address to his alma mater, Eureka College, vividly sketched the horrors of nuclear war and his own responsibility to prevent it:

The fourth point is arms reductions. I know that this weighs heavily on many of your minds. In our 1931 "Prism," we quoted Carl Sandburg, who in his own beautiful way quoted the Mother Prairie, saying, "Have you seen a red sunset drip over one of my cornfields, the shore of night stars, the wave lines of dawn up a wheat valley?" What an idyllic scene that paints in our minds -- and what a nightmarish prospect that a huge mushroom cloud might someday destroy such beauty. My duty as President is to ensure that the ultimate nightmare never occurs, that the prairies and the cities and the people who inhabit them remain free and untouched by nuclear conflict.

Since World War II, the United States has placed considerable emphasis on arms control, especially upon negotiated arms control agreements, to enhance national security and reduce the likelihood of war. However, because of the critical importance of America's military relationship with the Soviet Union and an unwillingness, stemming from a profound distrust, to rely on Soviet promises alone, American leadership has continually sought assurances of Soviet compliance. From President Truman's 1950 call for "disarmament to be policed continuously" using

"foolproof" measures³ to President Reagan's 1983 speech to the United Nations General Assembly reaffirming the unwillingness of the United States to "compromise on the necessity of effective verification,"⁴ American presidents have repeatedly emphasized a firm policy of no arms control without the necessary verification measures. Congress, recognizing the central role of verification in arms control, in 1977 formally resolved that "adequate verification of compliance should be an indispensable part of any international arms control agreement."⁵ A further indication of the importance that Americans place upon verification is the virtually universal agreement by nuclear freeze proponents on the need for a "verifiable" freeze.⁶

BRIEF HISTORY OF VERIFICATION

This section provides a simplified history of arms control verification efforts. The purpose here is not to provide a detailed, authoritative account but rather to describe the broad evolution of arms control verification in order to provide a context for examining current and future policy issues.

Despite the fact that arms control agreements date from antiquity, the phenomenon of verification as a major issue in arms control negotiations did not surface until the advent of nuclear weapons. Until these times, the tremendous difficulty in making significant changes to a country's military potential without highly visible force changes reduced the need for explicit assurances of compliance. For example, although the post-WW I naval treaties among the big powers (Washington and London Naval Treaties) contained detailed provisions requiring exchange of data among the parties, there were no explicit provisions for verification such as inspection of ships under