

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP *ER*

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI	X			
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL				
14	D/PAO				
15	VC/NIC				
16					
17					
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					
		SUSPENSE	24 Sept 85		
			Date		

Remarks
To #5: Please have comments on the attached prepared for the DCI.

[Signature Box]

Executive Secretary
18 Sept 85
Date

STAT

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 12, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Article on the Nuclear
Freeze Movement

The President has asked that we provide
Director Casey with the attached for
hsi review.



William F. Martin
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Article on the Nuclear Freeze Movement

Rec'd
18 85
DCI
EXEC

STAT

The Nuclear Freeze Movement: Conflicting Moral and Political Perspectives on War and Its Relation to Peace

P. 785

Adda B. Bozeman
Sarah Lawrence College
Bronxville, New York

Introduction

Nuclear weapons are modern weapons, but the nuclear freeze movement which has swept the land in recent times has overtones reminiscent of earlier American movements to outlaw war, bring about general disarmament, assure the peaceful settlement of all international disputes, and institute a lasting worldwide peace. The main themes discernible then as now are the belief that war is abhorred by men everywhere and the confidence that war-making can be controlled effectively by declaratory commitments phrased in the language of Western law. These assumptions were nullified by contrary experiences in the decades

The "Make Peace Conference," convened by the National Episcopal Church, was held in Denver, Colorado, April 29, 1983. The author was invited to speak in opposition to the Freeze Resolution the conference sponsored; this paper was written after the author's participation in the conference.

Conflict, Volume 5, Number 4
0149-9417/85/010271-00\$02.00/0
Copyright © 1985 Crane, Russak & Company, Inc.



C-128

272

Adda B. Bozeman

immediately preceding the advent of the nuclear age. However, today they are reasserting themselves vigorously in public and private mindsets throughout the United States and Europe. Two aspects of this phenomenon are noteworthy. First, the reasoning behind most nuclear freeze resolutions is far more simplistic and emotional than that which informed earlier campaigns for peace and disarmament. And second, the supporting arguments are decidedly ethnocentric or isolationist in inception even though the rhetoric is focused on concern for the survival of mankind.

No allowance is thus being made for the indisputable fact that mankind is not all of one kind but rather a manifold of nations that are not held together by a common language, a common religion, and a common history; that do not share the same social customs and traditions of political association; and that have not brought forth identical ideals of life. Guiding norms of what is right, what wrong, can therefore not be presumed to be alike. In short, a world-spanning value system is not fathomable, at least not if one takes values and ideas seriously. True, some of the nations face similar problems, but they perceive and manage them differently, if only because ways of thinking are aspects of different speech communities and moral orders. For example, if "law" is imbedded in religion as it is in Islam, and if a language provides a word for "state" that also covers "power" and "dynasty" as it does in Arabic, it is unsafe to assume that Western ideas of secular constitutional rule, international law, or individuated political liberties can ever become congenial with such concepts.

Likewise, it would be imprudent, even irrational, to believe that laws and conventions in restraint either of war-making or the use of available weaponry would be respected if war is deemed the peak of religion or ideology, the supreme test of the masculine life, or the absolute requirement for besting hated enemies, safeguarding the homeland, or realizing designs for empire.

Neither of these perspectives on war has been examined in the ranks of the Nuclear Freeze movement. One looks in vain for evidence that the drafting of position papers and resolutions on the freeze theme was preceded by careful studies either of U.S.

The Nuclear Freeze Movement

273

national security interests or of non-Western and Communist perspectives on war and nuclear weapons. Nor does it appear that serious attention is being paid to the circumstances in which earlier, closely related international accords on the control of war-making have become dead letters. The threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of any state—and this continues to be the fundamental issue in the nuclear age—is, after all, solemnly proscribed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter. Also on the books since July 1, 1968, is the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in which the United States and the Soviet Union commit themselves

to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Forgotten too is the fact that the United States had unilaterally frozen its nuclear program in the late 1960s—a policy of restraint to which the Soviet Union responded with a greatly accelerated buildup.

Shaped by an ahistorical and near-isolationist disposition, the freeze movement has come perilously close to a position advocating unilateral moral and military disarmament. This explains why few in the movement's leadership or rank and file are prepared today to rethink their positions along the lines suggested by Pope John Paul II's New Year (1983) homily which reminded us that the problem of peace in the world can never be resolved in a unilateral manner; it requires the participation and concrete commitments of all nations and governments.

The takeoff point for this analysis is the recognition, eloquently rendered by the Charter of UNESCO, that war begins in the minds of men, not in the weaponry men possess. Only after one discovers how war and peace are conceptualized in the nations with which we coexist in the modern interdependent world, can foreign policies and military programs—including those relative to nuclear armaments—be appreciated and criticized on their merits.

War and Peace in the Belief Systems of the Orient and Africa

No one wishing to understand the mental processes of India's thinkers and leaders can avoid studying the *Bhagavad Gita*, a compendium of Vedic doctrine composed sometime between the fifth and second century B.C. This sacred text, the focus of Hindu religion and the most popular Hindu epic, has profoundly influenced Indian spiritual, intellectual, and political life for centuries and continues to do so. Its dominant theme is the moral task to come to terms with war.

The *Bhagavad Gita* recounts the story of two rival armies gathered for battle on a sacred field. Prince Arjuna, leader of one army, is sorrow-struck when he sees close kinsmen among the foe. He pleads with Lord Krishna, knower of all things, to allow him to throw away his weapons and abandon his cause by default so that he may rejoice in the survival of his cousins. But Lord Krishna sternly denies his plea. He reminds Arjuna that his cause is just and that his sacred caste duty as warrior and king requires him to fight and to do so without sentimental attachment.

This metaphysical view of warfare inhabits all of India's literature, notably the arthasastras which are manuals for dealing with the realm of artha—namely with economics, government, and foreign relations—where only winning must count. Every king, by definition a member of the warrior caste, was obligated to discipline his subjects with the aid of danda, the rod of punishment, and to fight aggressively against adjoining kingdoms. Wars were not declared, no weapon was disallowed, and ruses were de rigueur. An effective foreign and domestic spy network was indispensable as were stratagems for conducting cold wars of nerves, all designed to destabilize enemy morale in war and peace. Indeed, peace emerges from India's literature and history either as stagnation, or as a time for plotting military action, or as a ruse of war meant to induce somnolence and moral disarmament in enemy ranks.

Buddhism, which arose in protest to the Hindu caste system, did not dislodge existing orientations toward peace and war. The

Buddha taught that all life is sorrowful and that the human being should exert himself in shedding—not developing—his ego so as to gain release from life. In this great religious tradition, war was just another life situation in which man, by doing his duty without attachment, could come closer to Nirvana. Different sects projected different paths toward this goal, but they viewed warfare neither as immoral nor abnormal. Tibet, a Buddhist theocracy in the Tantric tradition, had been historically renowned for its steadfastness in warding off foreign—mainly Chinese—invaders until it succumbed to the totalitarian onslaught of Maoist statecraft in the mid-twentieth century. In Japan meanwhile, Zen Buddhism combined with Shinto to establish a solid martial tradition of mental and moral disciplines as the core of that country's cultural identity, a fusion of religion and politics that Americans have had a hard time understanding.

Other syncretic belief systems of far-reaching significance for a cross-cultural study of war arose in South-East Asia, where Buddhism mingled with a caste-less Hinduism, complex local cults, and, in several instances, with Confucianism and Islam to supply sturdy cultural infrastructures for a multiplicity of states and several distinct state systems, all renowned for their longevity. In this vast region—specifically perhaps in Indochina where American notions of the stakes and demands of war were to prove so tragically out of place—conflict has been traditionally accepted as a natural expression of the metaphysical order that underlies religion as well as politics.

The pivotal principle here is the recognition, first, that political power emanates not from concrete material possessions, secure state frontiers, or a unifying Western-type legal system but from the God-King and the magical symbols of his office, which include the royal capital;¹ and second, that the *devaraja* cannot be presumed to do wrong in exercising his powers as long as he complies with the cosmic "constitution" and succeeds in his undertakings. The convergence of pre-Communist regional histories on a heavy incidence of princely rivalries, royalist rebellions, monk-led violence, plots to unseat rulers, subversions across boundaries, and interstate wars should therefore be analyzed in the context of this comprehensive norm-setting world

view rather than in that of Occidental values. For peace in the Western meaning of the term simply could not have evolved in South-East Asia as a dominant ideal in the conduct of foreign relations. War, by contrast, was condoned, even exalted—a truth persuasively relayed to successive generations by shadow plays, epic literature, architecture, and above all by the stunning friezes of the time-transcendent temple worlds of Angkor in Khmer-Cambodia and Borobudur in Java.

Nowhere, with the possible exception of classical Greece, have war and peace been subjected to such keen and sustained analysis as in China. And nowhere have theorists influenced statesmen and generals more decisively throughout the ages than here.

Today everyone talks about methods of government and there is not a family that does not possess a copy of the laws of Shang Tzu and Kuan Tzu. But despite this the land grows poorer and poorer. . . . Everyone talks about the art of warfare and there is not a family that does not possess a copy of Sun Tzu and Wu Tzu [treatises on the art of war], but our armies grow weaker and weaker. . . .

This is one of Han Fei Tzu's succinct commentaries on the social mood in China during the third century B.C. The author, who had first been aligned with Taoism and Confucianism, made his decisive mark on Chinese history as a renowned representative of the "Realists" (also known as the "Amoralists" and the "Legalists"), a school of thought called into being by the sages to whose texts he refers. Chief among them are Sun Tzu, author of the martial classic *The Art of War* (date: between 400 and 320 B.C.), and Lord Shang whose manual on government (*Shang Tzu, The Book of Lord Shang*) revolutionized statecraft in the fourth century B.C. Taken together, the Realist theoreticians—and they included precursors as early as the seventh and sixth centuries B.C.—may be said to have shaped China's identity during the long eventful period of The Warring States. This witnessed the methodical expansion of the Ch'in state, the concomitant extinction of all other states, the cessation of interstate war, and the unification of China in 221 B.C. under an emperor who was himself a pupil of the Realist philosophers.

The major norms of China's Realist statecraft issue from the recognition that government must be based on knowledge of the actual facts of the world as it exists in a given moment, not on trust in tradition, supernatural powers, and public ethics; that the state has to be monolithically in control of all thought and action in society; that the Middle Kingdom must be superior to all other states; and that its survival requires expansion. The chief agencies for installing and maintaining these norms were a centralized bureaucracy, different policing units, a comprehensive code of penal law, and the armed forces. All administrative services were conditioned to accomplish their tasks by manipulating human nature, instilling insecurity and fear among the people, inflicting severe punishment for infractions of law, and, above all, by mobilizing the entire countryside for war. The following guidelines from the martial classics are illustrative of standing Chinese orientations toward war and peace.

A country that devotes itself to ploughing and warfare will not have to wait long before it establishes hegemony or even complete mastery over all other states.

Concentrate the people upon warfare, and they will be brave. . . . A ruler who can make the people delight in war will become king of kings. . . .

The sole aim of the state is to maintain and if possible expand its frontiers.

It is a misfortune for a prosperous country not to be at war; for in peacetime it will breed "the Six Maggots," among them, Rites and Music, The Songs, and the Book; the cultivation of goodness, filial piety and respect for elders, detraction of warfare and shame at taking part in it. In a country which has these things, the ruler will not promote agriculture and warfare, with the result that he will become impoverished and his territory diminished.

War, then, is an all-encompassing reference here. This may explain why Sun Tzu could conceptualize it so skillfully twenty-three hundred years ago in philosophical, scientific, and artistic terms of timeless significance. War is introduced in his masterwork as the road to survival or ruin which should not be traveled

recklessly. Indeed, since war is presented here as a recurrent act rather than as a transitory aberration, it is to be fought consciously and continuously on nonmilitary ground. Sun Tzu thus advises that costly battles may be avoided and the enemy state taken over intact if generals remember that all warfare is based on deception. Therefore, it is the commander's task to anger and confuse the adversary in peacetime as well as in war; to manipulate the adversary's basic values and perception of reality while dissimulating his own intentions; to cover enemy terrain with networks of spies and agents, all engaged in sowing dissension and subverting morale. In short, the mission is to encircle the enemy's mind so that he will contribute to his own destruction.

Realism was officially replaced by Confucianism after China had been successfully unified. However, there has never been an age in which the works of Sun Tzu and Han Fei Tzu have not been read. Further, the records of ensuing dynasties show, first, that Realist and Confucian guidelines were not found to be incongruous when war and its relation to peace were in issue, and second, that Chinese governments returned deliberately to Realist wisdom whenever they felt uneasy about their nation's destiny. The last instance of such a turn backwards came with Mao Tse-tung, for as students of his writings and of Maoist China's history know well, Communist China is cradled securely in the traditions of Realism.

Judaism and Islam are closest to Christianity in the sense that all three religions issued from "The Book" (the Old Testament). Yet in their perspectives on war and peace, Judaism and Islam are greatly distanced from the Christian faith. In the vast Islamic realm, war is idealized and institutionalized, notably when it is fought as a jihad (holy war) which one tradition defines as the peak of religion. Koranic sacred law—and no secular law of equivalent importance exists—instructs believers that they must prepare their way to paradise by exerting all their powers, including that of the sword, in the service of Allah and the faith. In this way, a Muslim's entire life becomes a continuous process of warfare, psychological and political if not strictly military. Peace, by contrast, is conceptualized in international relations as a truce, or as de-

peace remains an ideal, albeit one that will be realized only when all mankind is encompassed by Islam.

The political histories of the Islamic peoples reflect the force of this belief system. Wars with unbelievers and within the Dar al-Islam have been and continue to be common occurrences. Indeed, as illustrated by the recent fiercely violent conflict between Iraq and Iran, martyrdom and death are passionately sought in the service of the cause. Human suffering, whether of soldiers or civilians, is overlooked in such a constellation of beliefs and so are arguments that national resources ought to be spent in behalf of economic development, social welfare, or education, rather than for the cause of besting a brother-enemy.

The Old Testament, which has been venerated by all generations of orthodox Jews as their sacred history and as a time-transcendent divine mandate for the establishment of an exclusively Jewish state, is more outspoken in its belligerence than other sacred texts including the Koran. Sections in Deuteronomy, Joshua, Judges, Kings, and Isaiah are thus found to give overwhelming prominence to the subject of righteous offensive warfare. The thesis here, in contrast to that underlying the Koran and the New Testament, is that only Jews are God's Chosen People. Since all others are expressly identified as subservient breeds, subject if necessary to extermination in obedience to divine instructions, war simply had to be accepted as both a value and a norm.

In short, religions and ideologies in the great literate civilizations of the non-Western world converge on the proposition that there is nothing morally or politically wrong with war. Peace, by contrast, is an essentially metaphysical concern. It does not emerge from the records as a paramount public value.

Since traditional Africa has not produced an organizational form comparable to the Occidental state, "foreign relations" have consisted in interaction among a number of differently organized but self-sufficient units: tribes, clans, villages, and other sub-groups or divisions. To the extent that so-called empires, hieratic chiefdoms, and kingdoms were merely conglomerates of these communities, they were also the scenes of "foreign relations" in which each socially cohesive group was apt to pit itself

against the other, even though the "other" would appear to have been part of the "self" from the non-African point of view. This state of affairs, along with the absence of writing and other reliable communications, explains why the radius of intercommunity relations has always been very limited. Furthermore, no widely shared, regionally valid Pan-African institutions for conducting intercommunity relations along the lines of the modern European states system, could develop here, for each small community projected its own social order onto the stage of what we call foreign relations. Black Africa, however, is unified by its culture and a mode of thinking not found elsewhere in the world, and it should therefore not be surprising that we can identify certain uniquely African dispositions with regard to war and peace.

Ethnographers have found that warfare was endemic in all regions of sub-Saharan Africa and that it did not elicit moral qualms. In fact, resort to warfare was logical and necessary in terms of certain deeply held beliefs. War, and organization for war, assured the continuous identity of the group as it had coalesced around its own ancestors, origin myths, customs, and rites. Moreover, warfare contributed to continual displacements and migrations, resulting in a lack of interest in strictly territorial jurisdiction and thus inhibiting the evolution of a reliable political structure on the order of the European state. War and martial activities embodied the meaning of manhood in tribal life and symbolized the workings of the universe, which was envisioned throughout the continent as the abode of constantly contending, essentially malevolent forces.

Next, the records of Africa's multiple societies reveal a common pattern of institutionalized hostilities and internal wars. For example, since it was rare in Africa to find rules that indicated a single heir, ruling circles were rent by succession quarrels that were expected to erupt in dynastic or civil wars. Likewise, war was waged regularly by the central governments of most imperial domains in order to quell unruly behavior on the part of subordinate regimes, just as it was common also between component units of communities. Peace, then, was not regarded as necessary for the maintenance

tioned by value and belief systems, violence provided, in one form or another, the structural principles for the education of men and the administration of society.

Relations between traditional states or other politically united societies naturally reflected the same fundamental dispositions. War has thus been ongoing in Africa throughout recorded time—a history which may explain why coups d'état, revolutions, guerrilla operations, and interstate wars are common also in our times.³

These orientations toward war and its relation to peace explain why non-Western societies have not been associated with determined movements to outlaw war, disband armies, and freeze weapons; why their peoples are not known to suffer from guilt complexes about the wars they fight; and why war goes on raging in farther Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Black Africa.

War and Peace in the Occident

The moral and political orders that have arisen in Europe and North America differ from non-Western systems in certain fundamental respects. Having been shaped decisively on one hand by the Classical civilizations of Greece and Rome and on the other by Christianity, they accentuate the principle of individuation—quite in contrast to the Orient, Africa, and the American Indian world where family, ethnicity, caste, or some other group has traditionally been the decisive unit. The measure of the West's deviation from the norm is this: where the individual is recognized as the primary active element in life, developments are not easily predictable, and freezes in thought are discouraged. Here, therefore, it is harder to maintain constancy in public systems than in cultures in which human beings are programmed to play the roles assigned them in virtue of the stations they occupy in society.

The other but related measure of the West's distinctiveness in world history is the quality of its cultural heritage. Most of our basic political norms and values—and they include, specifically, institutional law, individual rights,

war and peace—derive from our Classical heritage. Our moral and religious frame of reference, by contrast, issues mainly from Christianity. The noteworthy principle here is that the New Testament speaks to man the individual and to his search for inner peace and salvation. Contrary, for example, to the sacred teachings of Islam and Judaism, no claim is made to regulate domestic politics and direct foreign policies in respect of peace and war. The argument, stridently proclaimed in today's Marxist pseudoteology of liberation, that Christ was actually a revolutionary guerrilla who cared for the poor and was rightly committed to class hatred and warfare, is therefore a capricious fabrication.

In short, the moral-religious and the political-secular spheres in society do not coincide in the Christian West as they do in the non-Western realms of the world. With us the jurisdictions of God and Caesar are meant to be distinct, and Christians are therefore expected to know what they owe to one authority, what, by contrast, to the other. It goes without saying, then, that relations between state and church have not always been smooth, and that moral and political commitments are frequently conflicted in the minds of men.

No people know this better than Americans. After all, the United States was formed by streams of immigrants from Christian Europe who chose to escape the political pressures of state religions. Further, the federal Constitution insists upon the separation of church and state so as to secure on one hand the citizen's right to the faith of his choice, and on the other the citizen's obligation to maintain the public constitutional order of the state. It is in this context that the leaders of our churches are going too far today in compromising the integrity of the faith when they presume to instruct those who are rightfully in charge of the nation's defense, security, and survival as to just what nuclear force levels should be; in which fashion the Administration should negotiate arms control arrangements with the Soviet Union; and how it ought to cope with Communist revolutionary warfare in Central America.

War does not present such dilemmas in Asia and Africa. Indeed, it has not confused earlier generations of Europeans and

Americans. Rather, history teaches clearly that ecclesiastical and secular authorities were usually at one in affirming the propriety of war for a variety of circumstances. For example, in the morally and politically unified medieval world, Christian armies were called upon as a matter of course to defend as well as extend the realm of Christendom so as to cope with Mongol invasions and ceaseless Muslim challenges from the East and the South. Christian Europe was dislodged from its possessions in the Near East and North Africa by force of arms, and the armies of Christian (Greek Orthodox) Byzantium were unable to prevent the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453. However, resolute warfare kept the Islamic adversaries from sweeping into the continent's heartland north of the Pyrenees. Indeed, there would have been no Christian Western civilization and therefore no United States had it been otherwise. What is perhaps even more relevant to some of the problems we face today, the Islamic intruders could eventually be expelled from the Iberian peninsula because generations of nationalist Christian Spaniards knew how to engage in a determined, albeit greatly protracted war of nerves.

The reference here is to a contest which a thirteenth-century Spanish scholar called the *guerra fria*, an ongoing cold war between adversary belief systems—in this instance Christianity and Islam—which was being waged for the minds of men in the Iberian peninsula from the eighth to the fifteenth century. Had Christians in those trying times not kept their cool in opposing the conqueror's religion and defending the integrity of their own, the reconquista of Spain could not possibly have occurred. Now this "cold war" was very different in conception and practice from the conflicts espoused by the Hindus in the context of artha politics and by the Chinese in that of Realist/Legalist statecraft. However, its affinities with the ongoing Cold War between the Soviet Union and the West are undeniable indeed. They would be as instructive as they are striking were it not for the fact that Americans today simply cannot understand the cold war phenomenon in international relations and therefore find it just too irksome to endure.

Next, it should never be forgotten that the legitimacy and

morality of war was firmly institutionalized in Christian Europe after Hugo Grotius, a Dutch Protestant, lawyer, poet, and diplomat, had brought forth *The Rights of War and Peace* in 1625, a volume that has ever since been viewed as the West's basic source in international law.

Grotius admonishes his fellow Christians that "war is not the worst of destinies," for nothing is worse than loss of liberty and the fatal weakening or destruction of the state, which he views as the indispensable shield of individual life. Enduring international peace, by contrast, is presented by "the father of international law" as a remote condition. The prophesy of Isaiah that the time shall come "when nations shall beat their swords into plowshares and turn their spears into pruning hooks," when nations shall not "learn war any more," is in Grotius' view irrelevant in so far as the justice of war is concerned. It merely describes the state of the world that would come about if all nations would submit to the law of Christ. Temporary peace is attainable but it is always limited; it can be maintained only when the state's armed forces are in readiness.

Grotius also notes that wars are often interrupted by truces, and that truces may go on for as long as one hundred years. In other words, the state of belligerency may at times be muted into a state of "cold war" that one may just as well call "peace." These passages contribute greatly to a clarification of that "no war, no peace" syndrome with which modern Americans evidently cannot come to terms.

Basic Western, perhaps specifically European, understandings of war were thus not wholly irreconcilable with those dominant in the non-Western, non-Communist world. However, Occidental thought has always deviated from the norms subscribed to by the majority of nations in that it has been marked up to this very moment by a determined search for "a lasting peace" and by equally resolute attempts to subject war and conflicts short of war to rules of Western international law and ethics. Yet, and making full allowance for the strength of this bent of mind, Clausewitz concluded rightly that "peace seldom reigned over all Europe and never in all quarters of the world."

War and Peace in Marxism-Leninism

A new epoch began in international and intercultural relations when all existing civilizations and all political and moral orders were called into question by Marxism-Leninism, mankind's first totalitarian ideology. The creed is well known, having been set out clearly by generations of protagonists, beginning in the nineteenth century. According to Yuri V. Andropov, the late general secretary of the Communist Party in Moscow, "Marxism-Leninism is the textbook for achieving Socialist world revolution and the building of a new society in every country of the world." Next, as stated authoritatively by Marshal A. A. Grechko, the Soviet Union's Minister of Defense from 1967 to 1976, "No compromise is possible between the Communist and bourgeois ideologies, and conflict between the two is inevitable."

The aspects of the ideology that chiefly affect established Western norms of war and peace are these. First, Communism is a combat doctrine rooted in uncompromising enmity toward all that exists outside its own firmly set context. And second, under the standing auspices of economic determinism, scientific materialism, and the theory of class warfare it denies the validity of religion, morality, and law on the ground that these normative systems are mere tools of oppression in the service today of bourgeois capitalism.

The mandate to free people from their religion so as to enable them to come over to the Communist camp is thus being carried out methodically by each Communist regime. This is evidenced year in, year out by scores of Communist-led coups d'état, revolutions, and wars, as well as by the practices of established Marxist-Leninist systems, chief among them the empires of the Soviet Union, mainland China, and North Vietnam. In regions such as Central America and the Caribbean where Catholicism is deeply ensconced, the task calls first for softening the mental terrain by propagating "Liberation Theology" and "Dependency Theory"—the latter a new mask for the politically bankrupt old Leninist precept that imperialism is an evil associated exclu-

sively with Western capitalism. Elsewhere, the commitment to Marxism-Leninism calls for discrediting Western constitutional and criminal law so as to undermine the indispensable substratum for democracy and individuated liberties. True, each Communist state is dressed up in Western-type "constitutions" and codes of law, but as a reading of these texts shows convincingly, each is just a paper cover carefully designed to camouflage the reality of lawless despotism.

Leninist government is conceived as a monolithic power structure, heavily dependent on political police contingents and the military. Leadership rests in a small elite of the Communist Party whose members are distributed over several select committees where deliberation and decision-making take place in conditions of strict secrecy. The regime is nominally representative of "the state." However, a Marxist-Leninist state has essentially tactical significance, and that mainly in the context of diplomacy, international organizations, and relations with non-Communist states. Actually, the state is outranked in ideology as well as in practice by the apparatus of the Communist Party in its local and international dimensions.

No value is attributed either in theory or in actuality to the individual as such. He is not viewed as an autonomous thinking person; he has no rights as a citizen in relation to the state; and he does not even count for much as a consumer. In fact, if he is not totally compliant in thought and deed he is recognized officially as the political system's major enemy. These implications of totalitarianism were projected poignantly in the 1920s by the great Russian writer Zamiatin in his novel *WE* where human beings slave and die as numbers only, and they have ever since been borne out in the Soviet Union by countless autobiographies, biographies, and uncontested records from gulags, slave labor camps, criminal trials, and psychiatric detention wards.

The mindset responsible for the well-documented ongoing program of physical, mental, and psychological coercion within Soviet society is also in control of foreign relations, for in doctrine and in logic the latter are perceived as extensions of the former. Here as there, the

commitment to expand and consolidate the belief system as well as the power of the Soviet motherland of socialism. Likewise we should recognize the carefully crafted long-range designs for the attainment of victory—the ultimate strategic aim. What is striking in this system—especially when contrasted with that of the United States—is the continuity and stability of foreign policy-making and the lucidity with which it is openly set forth. Further, no one is left to doubt that Soviet doctrine and strategy put a premium on military power, and that military thought and policy issue unequivocally from the ideology as administered by the Party-State. Soviet perspectives on war and peace are therefore radically different from those commonly accepted in the United States, as the following statements by authoritative sources quoted in *War and Peace: Soviet Russia Speaks* illustrate:

Any war waged by the imperialists on the USSR or other Socialist states will be unjust and reactionary. When waged by the USSR or other Socialist states against imperialism, any war is just and progressive, for it would be the continuation of revolutionary policy. —Marshal A. A. Grechko, 1974

Violence in itself is not an evil. It depends on what its purpose is. In the hands of Socialists, it is a progressive force. —Communist Party Secretary Boris N. Ponomarev, 1977

We seek to paralyze the forces of imperialism in Europe and to smash their aggressive plans. This means not only to contract the radius of activity of imperialism but to inflict on it such defeat that it will be felt everywhere throughout the world. —Leonid I. Brezhnev, 1970

In the present era, the struggle for peace and for gaining time presumes, above all, the steady strengthening of the military might of the Soviet Union and of the entire Socialist camp. —Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, Chief of the Soviet General Staff (1952–1961), 1964

Détente in no way, however, means the freezing of the objective processes of historical development. In no way does it eliminate the existence of class antagonisms within capitalist states, between the people's interests and those of world imperialism, and between the two social systems, nor does it reduce the ideological confrontation.

... détente, in fact, creates favorable conditions for the struggle between the two systems and for altering the correlation of forces in favor of Socialism. —Leonid I. Brezhnev, 1970

Neither of these fundamental orientations toward war and peace has been compromised or modified by thought about nuclear arms and nuclear war, as the following pronouncements indicate:

... on the Communist side, nuclear war will be lawful and just ... the natural right and sacred duty of progressive mankind to destroy imperialism. ... It will resolve not specific limited political interests but a crucial historical problem, one that affects the fate of all mankind. —Colonel B. A. Byely et al., eds., *Marxism-Leninism on War and Army*, 1968

... the armed forces, the population, the whole Soviet nation, must be prepared for the eventuality of nuclear rocket war. —S. S. Lototsky, *The Soviet Army*, a 1971 Soviet military text

Marxists have always noted the primacy of the offensive type of military operations over those of defense. ... The idea of vigorous offensive actions acquires decisive importance under present day circumstances. —General-Major A. S. Milovidov et al., eds., *The Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War*, 1972

Marxists-Leninists decisively reject the assertions of certain bourgeois theoreticians who consider nuclear missile war unjust from any point of view. —General-Major A. S. Milovidov and Dr. Y. A. Zhdanov, in *Questions of Philosophy*, a Soviet journal, October 1980

We cannot be intimidated by fables that in the event of a new world war, civilization will perish. —*Pravda*, the Communist Party newspaper, 1955

Under conditions where nuclear rockets are used ... that side which manages during the first days of the war to penetrate more deeply into enemy territory naturally acquires the capability for more effectively using the results of its nuclear attacks and disrupting the mobilization of the enemy. This is especially important with respect to European theaters of operations with the relatively small opera-

tive depth. —Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, *Soviet Military Strategy*, a major military text, 1968 ed.

This self-confidence has informed Soviet projections of victory throughout the last decades. Premier Alexei Kosygin thus announced in 1978 that "Russia and its allies will control the high seas, space, and most of the world's landmass by the early 1980s." Leonid Brezhnev inspired the faithful in 1973 with the following promise:

Trust us, comrades, for by 1985, as a consequence of what we are achieving by means of détente, we will have achieved most of our objectives in Western Europe ... a decisive shift in the correlation of forces will be such that by 1985 we will be able to exert our will whenever we need to.

And Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, proclaimed in 1979 that:

The Soviet Union has military superiority over the United States. Henceforth, the United States will be threatened. It had better get used to it.*

In short, there is no equivalence or symmetry either between Marxist-Leninist and Christian, or between Soviet and American perceptions of peace and war. This truth has been borne out year in, year out even in the lifetime of our younger, so-called "successor" generation by the staggering incidence of aggressive war and "peacetime" terror that has attended the steady expansion of the Soviet empire in the world. In Europe—the prize for which Leninist Russia has been contending from the First World War onward—takeover has followed takeover, usually by the deployment of massive military force and the adjunct apparatus of the KGB and its earlier incarnations. All the once-independent states of Eastern Europe have in this way been either annexed outright or reduced to heavily policed colonial dependencies where government and people must conform to Soviet dictates of what is "correct" in ideology and political

action, and where revolts and manifestations of nonconformist thought are ruthlessly crushed.

Further, and in regard to Asia, we have been polite spectators since 1979 of the Soviet Union's bold military subjugation of Afghanistan. This nation is now disestablished as a sovereign state, its government replaced by Moscow's stooges. Its land has been reduced to ruins and its hercelly independent citizenry is being annihilated or driven into flight and exile.⁹

Rhetoric and conduct provide daily evidence that these Soviet understandings of the function of war and of its interpenetration with what we continue to call peace are fully shared by all other Marxist-Leninist regimes. Ever since the so-called end of the Vietnam War, we have sat by, during the period known as détente, witnessing on one hand the methodical genocide transacted in Cambodia by Pol Pot's Communist regime, a protégé of Maoist China, and on the other the agonies openly inflicted upon South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia by North Vietnam, the Soviet Union's imperialist offspring and main client state in that area.

In the Western Hemisphere, meanwhile, we have spent over two decades watching Cuba, a small island state adjacent to our southern coastline, evolve into a full-fledged Marxist-Leninist society, a powerful, international influential surrogate of the Soviet Union and the chief ideological and military training school for the third world's revolutionary elites. Here, as in Europe and Asia, tactics call for fomenting insurgencies and civil wars in politically weak but sovereign states so as to reduce them, one by one, to captive nations or Communist buffer states. Soviet-Cuban statecraft thus succeeded in transforming Nicaragua into the advance military bastion and nerve center of that ongoing "revolution without frontiers" which is at present closing in on El Salvador and Honduras as well as on Surinam and other small but geopolitically vital base points in the area. The ultimate aim here is to turn Central America and the Caribbean into another Eastern Europe, thus extending the writ of the Brezhnev Doctrine (1968) which stipulates that the Soviet Union's totalitarian control must comprise all nominally indepen-

dent "socialist" states which are deemed vital for the successful completion of the Soviet Union's grand design.¹⁰

Black Africa is encompassed by the same general Soviet perspectives on international relations. As the recent histories of Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, and several other African states show convincingly, the focus here too is decidedly on furthering the twin causes of world socialism and Soviet power through reliance on war diplomacy, rather than on the peaceful settlement of disputes, or on assistance for purposes of economic and social development. Tactics have thus called for exploiting and exacerbating traditional ethnic hatreds as well as modern social conflicts; fashioning repressive single-party regimes; radicalizing revolutionary fervor however violent its manifestations; and supporting "the people's struggle for national liberation" once the "right" people were identified. All-out military support was openly given in this context not only to the Ethiopian Dergue's violent overthrow of the state's ancient imperial regime but also to the mass killings of civilians in all sectors of the population. Indeed it was the success of this final Soviet-type revolution which induced the tightening of interstate and inter-Communist Party relations between Moscow and Addis Ababa. However, here as elsewhere in Black Africa, Cubans are serving successfully as main advisers and tacticians of strife, a record which lends support to the view that Cuba is today the nucleus of an ocean-spanning Communist hegemonic design linking Central America and Africa.

The Nuclear Freeze Movement: Moral, Intellectual, and Political Misperceptions

War, then, is accepted in all Communist and numerous non-Communist, mostly non-Western societies. In light of this incontestable reality, one should expect proponents of nuclear freeze resolutions to answer the following questions:

- Why has there been no resolution to freeze the non-nuclear killing and terror that is being visited deliberately on so much of mankind's civilian population?

Adda B. Bozeman

- Why is it that clergymen, laymen, and scientists, concerned with the mere existence of nuclear weapons, have not protested the well-documented chemical/biological warfare which showered death upon the defenseless Hmong tribes of Laos and the Afghan nation?
- Why does an American "conference to make peace" such as the one convened by the National Episcopal Church in Denver in 1983 not attack the death-dealing foreign policies of the Soviet Union and other Communist states in the same strident tones which it employs in attacks on the defense policies of its own national government?

Answers to such questions have not been forthcoming from those segments of the establishment—churches, universities, scientific communities, and the media—in which the nuclear freeze movement is being nurtured. But in the void thus left by silence or evasiveness, it is permissible for disconcerted fellow citizens to probe other evidence in search of the underlying causes for this strangely irrational, compassionless approach to war.

From their speeches, exhortations, and literature, protagonists of the nuclear freeze leave the impression that they do not know how to cope with the realities. Anesthetized by fear that mankind, the earth, or some other generalized conception of life may come to an end in a nuclear holocaust, they seem no longer able to feel compassion for the suffering, dying millions and the extinction of whole nations, or fear and hostility for those who willed the non-nuclear violence responsible for these destinies. And in such a condition of ignorance and aloofness from reality, they can of course no longer think carefully about the need for foreign policies that would control all types of armament and warfare, assure security and survival for their nation, and induce a greater measure of peace than we have right now. Indeed, such perspectives are openly discouraged, at times even disallowed, as the propagation and agitation in behalf of the freeze complex becomes steadily more absolutist and simplistic. Too many seminars and study groups, not to mention mass meetings, have thus degenerated into open advocacy assemblages where not even

The Nuclear Freeze Movement

293

token opposition is accommodated lest it obstruct the communal consensus of the like-minded and its readiness to be mesmerized by code-word litanies on the horrors of a nuclear war to come.

Precedents for this kind of apocalyptic fear have not been lacking in the West's recent intellectual history. James Finn reminds us in a lucid essay on "Nuclear Terror: Moral Paradox" that Jonathan Schell was preceded by Bertrand Russell, who was so repelled by his private vision of an atomic exchange between the two superpowers that he advocated, before the Soviet Union possessed the new weaponry, a preemptive American strike at Soviet atomic facilities. Moved by the same vision after the Soviets had actually developed atomic bombs, he called, by contrast, for a unilateral nuclear disarmament on the part of the United States. C. P. Snow invoked his scientific expertise to predict a nuclear conflict on such and such a date unless we reduced the world's nuclear forces. That date, Finn adds, has come and gone. Today, educated Americans of pacifist persuasion seek to perpetuate the "Angst" mood possessing them by shaping younger generations of citizens in their likeness so that they too will become anti-nuclear activists, ignorant of life's real challenges.

A new junior high school curriculum recently designed by the Union of Concerned Scientists and the National Education Association, both firm supporters of a freeze on nuclear weapons, is distinctly biased to reflect these views. Youngsters are being impressed with the dangers implicit in the existence of nuclear armaments without knowing much about the nature and incidence of war, past or present, or about foreign policy and the security interests of their nation. Reading assignments include nothing of the rich Soviet literature on these subjects, material with which young Soviet pupils are fully familiar—and which is readily available to us in translation. The sole counter-context to lessons inculcating fear of future superpower nuclear war relates to the need for conflict resolution on the simplistic premise that cooperation is better than war. However, here too the assumption prevails that American norms and values governing peace, cooperation, and negotiation hold sway also in the Soviet Union.

These misperceptions—namely, that foreign affairs are in es-

sence not different from domestic affairs, that interstate or intercultural relations are rightly understood as mere extensions of interpersonal relations, and that American norms and values can therefore be viewed as expositions of universal standards—pervade the teaching of international affairs today. Whether they originate in ignorance, willed blindness, or wishful thinking, they are as illustrative of the general mediocrity that has overtaken education in the United States as the neglect of mathematics, science, and English which has been forcefully addressed by several investigative commissions in recent times. Here as there, then, it is imperative to improve processes of gathering, imparting, and utilizing knowledge if coming generations of this country's politically active citizens are to overcome the fear of life that has been heaped upon them recently and to recover, in its stead, the traditional American will to cope effectively with the multiple challenges of peace and war in their world environment.

U.S. Foreign Policy Versus the Nuclear Freeze Movement: The Meanings of War and Peace Today

As suggested earlier in this paper, the foremost task for U.S. policy today consists in persuading the nation that mankind is *not* of one kind. Rather, it is distributed among diverse moral and political orders. Perspectives on war and its relation to peace should therefore be expected to differ—a truth corroborated daily by chronicles of world events.

By way of apology for the confusion that has become so widespread in respect of war-related realities, one can admit that non-Western perspectives on the conduct of international relations were dimmed in the non-totalitarian and non-nuclear age of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, during which Western orientations toward government and international order gained ascendancy in most of the world. In the last decades, however, de-Westernization has definitely overtaken Westernization under the impact of the following developments: the resuscitation of traditional beliefs and institutions which ensued naturally after non-Western societies evolved into sovereign na-

tions; the decline of Euro-American influence and power; and the rise to prominence of Marxist-Leninist, specifically Soviet, perceptions of peace and its relation to war.

Western views of these two phenomena were thus eclipsed, in some cases even assigned to irrelevance, as a result of these changes in the correlation of conceptual forces.

One reason for this reversal of Western and Eastern prestige roles in the so-called third world is the failure of American policy-makers to come to a close understanding of the cultural infrastructure of non-Western, non-Communist societies and the concomitant disposition to be uncompromising in the expectation that each of these states must "develop" an American-style democracy if it wishes to qualify as a worthy ally deserving of protection and support.¹²

Another, perhaps more significant reason is the undeniable fact that Communist totalitarian regimes and non-Western, non-Communist societies—wholly different as they are from each other in all other respects—are yet at one in the sense that they are conceptually and practically at ease with political conflict and war whereas the modern West is not. Muscovite statecraft knows how to exploit this affinity. Thus it has been successful in activating traditionally latent belligerence in inter-ethnic and interstate relations; training ideological and military cadres in the ranks of local elites that are known to thrive on martial adventures; organizing Communist "vanguard" parties; and shaping single-party despotism in Leninist molds. Numerous regimes in once-independent states have come to serve Soviet causes in this way, usually in return for heavy military assistance, solid protection in local conflicts, and growing prestige in world politics. What we are witnessing here are vivid demonstrations of that new Leninist "dependency theory": conceived ostensibly as an ideologically offensive weapon against "capitalist imperialism," it is actually being used exclusively for promoting Communist imperialism.

These policies and developments provide the general backdrop for an appreciation of several recent tabulations revealing that there is hardly a region in the world which is not convulsed by war. According to The Center for Defense Information's

"World at War" report, 40 violent conflicts were in progress in spring 1983: 10 in Asia, 10 in the Mideast, 10 in Africa, 7 in Latin America, and 3 in Europe. In accordance with standard norms of political science and international law, 5 wars are classified as "conventional wars," 35 as "internal guerrilla struggles" or "civil wars." (Wars within wars, so common in the Middle East and Africa, are not counted here.) Further analysis of available data shows that most of the wars, whatever their official denomination, have been and are being fought with the overt and/or covert participation of the Soviet Union and its allies and that none has been muted or resolved into what the West calls peace. In light of these circumstances, then, it is warranted to recapitulate Pope John Paul II's judgment, namely, that it is difficult to imagine how the problem of peace in the world can be resolved in a unilateral manner—the one so ardently espoused today by proponents of the nuclear freeze in the West.

The further, perhaps ultimate questions are these: Just what is meant today by references to "world peace?" Is it a condition marked by the absence of all war everywhere? By the absence only of nuclear war? Or just by the nonparticipation of the United States in any war? Is world peace a credible and viable political and moral concept when most of the world is caught in webs of war? Can it be defined in objective, globally valid terms when moral and political perspectives on war and its relation to peace are as widely divergent as they are today; or when the connotations of war and peace are reversed in the sense that "we" believe something is "peace," whereas "they" identify that something as "war"; or when war and peace are meant to merge as they are in all Marxist-Leninist political systems?

Forthright answers to questions such as these have been evaded in Occidental societies. But surely it is no longer either possible or rational to continue taking refuge in texts of Western international law which instruct the reader that war exists where war has been legally declared. The callousness of such a copout emerges clearly when one follows the thoughts of Manuel Obando y Bravo, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Managua, Nicaragua.

Nowadays everybody talks about peace. But false forms of peace are very much in vogue. It is common to impose peace, to "pacify" a country with a formidable army, with executions, persecutions. But peace can never be imposed by anyone. Peace should create joy, not fear. . . . Peace is also often confused with a certain order some regimes claim to maintain. Opposing the established order of such regimes is considered either seditious or reactionary. In short, delinquent. This is the typical peace in countries ruled by a minority trying to pass off its own interests as those of the nation's, but in a sense more deadly, because it is under the guise of law and order."

As matters stand today, then, and in light of the overwhelmingly concrete reality of war, world peace must be judged as an abstraction which should not control the making of foreign policy anywhere. Unless we in the west resolve to rethink the relation of peace to war in the context, first, of our nation's security, and second, of a desirable and possible world order, we cannot avoid agreeing with Oswald Spengler who had this to say on the subject in the first half of the twentieth century:

World Peace involves the private renunciation of war on the part of the immense majority, but along with this it involves an unavowed readiness to submit to being the booty of others who do not renounce it. It begins with the state-destroying wish for a universal reconciliation, and it ends in nobody's moving a finger so long as misfortune only touches his neighbor."

It cannot be denied that the Occidental system of peace-and-law-related norms and values is eclipsed today by the neo-Oriental *artha* order where only winning counts. However, peace and law continue to be strategically vital concepts and commitments in Euro-American politics and culture. Therefore it is imperative to review and rethink these principles in the present context of the multi-cultural world in which we must intend to survive by retaining our cultural integrity.

The challenge is not unprecedented, as preceding references to the Grotian revolution illustrate. As then, so also today: peace cannot be projected persuasively until one has come to terms

with war, and this has not been done as responsibly by our political and intellectual elites as it was in the seventeenth century. At that time, Hugo Grotius recognized that war has its legal and moral rights as does peace; that peace and war are not always the stark opposites they appear to be; that states were the units of interaction, and that Europe was the spatial orbit.

It was as legitimate as it was revolutionary in the seventeenth century to recognize the sovereign independent state as the norm of political organization in the West. Being sovereign, the state was expected to determine its form of government and its national interest. Therefore it was generally presumed free to decide when to resort to war. It was thus the conduct of war with which the European law of nations was chiefly concerned. In our century, by contrast, it should have been evident to Western scholars and statesmen long ago that the arena of international politics is the world, not the Euro-American Atlantic community, and that the state as conceived in the West is no longer the generally accepted norm in international decision-making, having been effectively challenged by contra-state traditions, ideologies, and command structures. The original premise for the modern European states system—still officially the core concept of the United Nations—and for the international law of peace and war was thus imperceptibly undermined, indeed invalidated, quite some time ago.

This is true specifically of the law which consists officially of commitments by territorially defined states to observe the rules of conduct in international or interstate wars. Today, however, it is hardly ever possible to set such wars apart from internal war, revolution, coup d'état, insurgency, counterinsurgency, and that vast conglomerate of different species of guerrilla warfare in which recent generations of men in all provinces of the world seem to find political, professional, and ideological fulfillment.

Some of these allegedly internal wars are actually conceived and conducted as organic aspects of an international war strategy aimed at the destruction of a state. As a U.S. inter-agency task force noted recently in connection with its analysis of the Central American situation:

The essential strategy of Cuban/Soviet surrogates is to use terrorism and economic destruction to polarize the target countries, encourage repression from the violent right and governments, and then use propaganda/political action to isolate the target regimes from their populations and from the regional and democratic community of nations."

Others, among them many of Black Africa's coup d'état wars and some of the sub-wars between religious sects fought in Lebanon under the umbrella of interstate wars, are primarily private wars between power-seeking personages and their ethnic or religious retinues. All are irregular and formless by comparison with traditional interstate wars. Neither can be analyzed or controlled effectively by reference to rules of international law which stand in counterpoint to the moral and military code implicit in guerrilla and other irregular warfare.

Warfare, then, is fluid today. It does not commence with declarations of war or with an act of aggression that can be pinpointed in terms of time and space. Studies of modern internationally relevant wars as planned and executed by Marxist-Leninist regimes in Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, North-east Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America show rather that such wars are meant to begin as a series of interconnected covert actions within targeted societies. Dissimulated as "internal wars," they can then be trusted to remain outside the bounds of the traditional international law of war as well as outside the bounds of political concern set by influential groups of policy analysts in the present-day U.S.A.

Such expectations have been borne out in large measure, most recently by well-publicized commentaries on the war situation in Central America. After indicting the U.S. government for waging war against Nicaragua without having previously declared war, Saul Landau of the Institute for Policy Studies advises:

Congress should declare war on the Government of Nicaragua and thereby preserve the Constitution. . . . The warmaking power is the most important power Congress has. It is still not too late to call for a declaration of war. If a majority of members decide that Nicaragua

300

Adda B. Bozeman

has not provided a *casus belli*, they will vote against declaring war. Perhaps then and only then will they exert their constitutional power and stop the covert war.¹⁶

The intent here is to punish the American (not the Nicaraguan) government and frustrate or defeat American (not Marxist-Leninist) foreign policies by playing wantonly with the separation-of-powers provisions in the federal Constitution of the United States. Similar objectives are sought by Morton H. Halperin, a former official in the Defense Department and the National Security Council, who inveighed against the American President in the following terms:

Stop the illegal war in Nicaragua. . . . The covert operation that the C.I.A. launched at the direction of the President is also a clear violation of international law and of numerous American treaty obligations. . . . We may not overthrow governments. . . . The way to promote respect for international law is to obey the rules ourselves, seek to punish those who violate the law and, at the least, try to counter the effects of their illegal acts.¹⁷

No such strictures are leveled against those whose covert war actions brought about the fall of numerous non-Communist governments—some democratic, others authoritarian—and conduced to the swift installation of law-defying Communist regimes. In fact, the impression deepens, as one goes on reading commentaries of the kind referred to, that too many Americans in positions of political authority and intellectual leadership, and they include Congressional representatives of the nation, have simply chosen to disregard the new complexities of WAR writ large with which this nation is confronted.

One set of disconcerting new realities includes the substitution throughout the world of protracted military operations for the "regular" norm of an all-out war that has a beginning and an end. In this new context, covert political and military action is of the essence. The greatly varied forms of masking intentions, movements, and other realities that are comprehended by this term, are most highly developed today in the statecraft of our totalitarian adversaries; for in their closed despotisms where dissimu-

The Nuclear Freeze Movement

301

lation, disinformation, and secrecy combine to supply the name of the game, all policy-making must proceed covertly. And yet, it is important to point out that covertness is a pronounced feature also of non-Communist non-Western societies. Here the traditionally preferred style of communication, including that projecting conflict and hostility, calls not for openness but rather for indirection, allusiveness, and coded signals—in short, for covering the truth that is conveyed. Indeed, there could not have been and there cannot be a successful anti-Communist or anti-government guerrilla war or counterinsurgency if it were otherwise.¹⁸

The United States, by contrast, has always prided itself on being an open society. True, the artful feign or dissimulation of intended moves is fully accepted in games like poker or chess, on athletic playing fields, and in business circles. In international politics, however, different norms are said to prevail. Here ruses and dissimulations are allowed only as war stratagems on the battlefield; in peacetime commerce and diplomatic relations, they are considered unethical and in practical terms counterproductive. Everything, then, depends upon how one answers the questions: What is peace? What is war? In the absence of authoritative advice to the contrary, the view is being pressed by representatives of Congress, academe, the churches, and the media that the United States is at peace since it has not declared any war. Therefore, the argument continues, the government is forbidden by international law to give covert military aid, however legitimate its concern with the destinies of friendly or allied nations which are unable to contest takeovers by military forces under international Communist command without receiving outside assistance.

It is difficult to take this *renvoi* to the law of nations seriously. After all, international law does not, and never did, sum up the national security interests of states. It can therefore not be treated either as a synonym or as an alternative for foreign policy, least of all in times such as ours when there is no transnational or transcultural consensus on the validity or purport of this Occidental legacy of norms. The real reason for the current strenuous objections to their own country's intelligence opera-

tions, specifically to covert action, and for the retreat into the cocoon of what these "contra" spokesmen fathom to be international law, is fear—the same kind that presides over the nuclear freeze movement. Oblivious of the profound changes that have overtaken the states system in this century, unwilling to analyze ideologically new approaches to war and peace, and unable therefore to distinguish friends from enemies in the conduct of foreign affairs, these people long for the dependable situation of yesteryears and simply cling to what they imagine had then been a reliable frame of reference for political decision-making. Fearful of being drawn into any kind of armed undertaking—be it a covert action, a guerrilla war, a conventional war, or a nuclear war—they lack the will and courage to think and act realistically in the interests of their nation's security and future, and on that their counsel should not be heeded. For were it to prevail, the United States would begin to resemble Don Quixote. Like the Knight of the Mournful Countenance, it would be perceived everywhere as fighting windmills and losing its bearings in the real world. Modern Indians would recall the *Mahabharata* and the *arhasastra*, which teach the uncompromising lesson, "If men think thee soft, they will despise thee." Chinese contemporaries would view such weakness as confirmation of Mao Tse-tung's dictum—this one as so many others borrowed from Sun Tzu—that the enemy, whoever or wherever he is, must be moved "to help in his own encirclement."¹⁹ The Soviet Union, meanwhile, would rightfully conclude that it had succeeded in its strategy of subduing the West through psychological warfare.

The way out of the freeze of ignorance and fear into which much of the nation has recently rushed must begin with the acceptance of moral and political asymmetries in mankind's perceptions of war and peace. It should then lead to the realization that war and peace are interpenetrating in most of the world; that war no less than peace has law and justice on its side; and that U.S. foreign policy cannot be effective in shielding the moral and political integrity of the republic if it is arbitrarily restrained by selected abstractions from modern texts on Occidental international law.

In this general international context, we ought to accept the specific challenge of the cold war of nerves, values, and ideas which pits the Soviet Union's totalitarian system against that of the democratic West, and we ought to attempt to win. The contest began with the announcement of the Leninist combat doctrine at the beginning of the century; it was cradled carefully and covertly in Moscow's military strategy and war diplomacy during the Second World War; and it has been waged overtly ever since "peace" was declared following the official end of the war in 1945. In other words, this war between two incompatible mindsets is a protracted war and its end is not in sight. In all these respects then, the cold war can be likened to the medieval *guerra fria* between Christendom and Islam as well as to the indefinite "truce" in combat of which Grotius writes in *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*. To put it differently, what we call cold war may just as well be called cold peace. And this, it is here suggested, may well be the only peace we are likely to have, provided of course that we can hold our own.

The ultimate stage of theater of our conflict with totalitarianism—the one, namely, on which victory and defeat will be decided for centuries to come—is the Western, more particularly the American, mind. The stakes for which we do or should contend in these times of unprecedented peril thus merit the conclusion that we are now engaged in the last phase of what we should openly identify as the Third World War. For if this is won by our adversaries there will be no other war, and the nuclear freeze proponents will have had their way.

Notes

1. It should be noted that the notion of the God-King (*devaraja*) is unknown in Hindu India, which had colonized and Indianized many of the Indochinese and Indonesian kingdoms.
2. Han Fei Tzu, "Basic Writings," trans. Arthur Waley, in *Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1953), p. 228.
3. For a comprehensive analysis of the issues here discussed and for source materials and bibliography, see Adda B. Bozeman, *Conflict in*

Africa: Concepts and Realities (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).

4. The 400th anniversary of Hugo Grotius was celebrated in April 1983.

5. See Adda B. Bozeman, "On the Relevance of Hugo Grotius and *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* for Our Times," *Grotiana* 1(1): 65-124, for an analysis of this work.

6. For these quotations, see Albert L. Weeks and William C. Bodie, eds., *War and Peace: Soviet Russia Speaks* (New York: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1983), pp. 22-32.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 13, 14, 15, 17. For additional Soviet sources on the subject, see Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, eds., *The Soviet Art of War, Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1982); Graham D. Vernon, ed., *Soviet Perceptions of War and Peace* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1981); and John J. Dziak, *Soviet Perceptions of Military Power: The Interaction of Theory and Practice* (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1981).

8. *Ibid.*, p. 18f.

9. It is relevant to note that the Soviet Union used poison gas against local resistance, thus shattering "the grand-daddy of all arms control treaties." For as *The Wall Street Journal*, May 14, 1982, noted in the first of a series of editorials on "Whither Arms Control?", the Geneva Protocol banning use of chemical weapons as negotiated in 1925 has been the most widely observed of all disarmament measures. Even "Hitler went to his pyre without violating it."

10. Mr. Fred C. Iklé, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, noted in March 1983 that, if we close our eyes and deny military aid to those opposing Cuban intervention, and if we force those who wish to build democracy to share power with those bent on destroying it, Soviets and Cubans as assembled in the region are quite adequate to turn Central America into another Eastern Europe. He added that Soviet military advisers in Cuba outnumbered American military advisers in all Latin American countries by a ratio of 25 to 1, and that Soviet arms assistance to Cuba is about ten times the total of American military assistance to all of Latin America. See *The New York Times*, March 15, 1983, "Soviet Imperial Expansion." See the same paper March 20, 1983, to the effect that then-Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., had stated early in 1981 that the Soviet Union and Cuba were sending arms and other aid to guerrillas in El Salvador.

11. Published in *America*, February 19, 1983, p. 126ff.

12. I have developed this theme in "The Roots of the American

Commitment to the Rights of Man," in *Rights and Responsibilities: International, Social and Individual Dimensions*, Proceedings of a Conference Sponsored by the Center for Study of the American Experience (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980), pp. 51-103; "Foreign Policy and the Problem of Understanding 'The Other,'" *Book Forum* (in press); and "Human Rights and National Security," *Yale Journal of World Public Order* 9 (1984): 40-77.

13. *The New York Times*, April 25, 1983, Op-Ed page.

14. Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926-28), vol. 2, p. 434.

15. See *The New York Times*, July 17, 1983.

16. *The New York Times*, March 28, 1983, Op-Ed page.

17. *The New York Times*, July 19, 1983, Op-Ed page.

18. See Adda B. Bozeman, "Covert Action and Foreign Policy," in Roy Godson, ed., *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Covert Action* (Washington, D.C.: National Strategy Information Center, 1981), pp. 15-79, for several case studies of such "covert societies."

19. For an extended analysis of some of the issues in this section, see Adda B. Bozeman, "War and the Clash of Ideas," *Orbis* 20 (Spring 1976, 20th Anniversary Issue): 61-102; also "Intellectuals and the Warfare State," a review essay in *Book Forum* 3 (1977): 345ff.