


Approved For Release 2009/07/09 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001001330005-6
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
 ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI				
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA		X		
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T		X		
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL		X		
14	D/PAO		X		
15	VC/NIC				
16	C/SE/DO		X		
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SUSPENSE _____ Date _____ STAT _____



Remarks

FOR Executive Secretary
 21 Aug 85
 Date

Executive Registry

85- 3214/7

CONFIDENTIAL (Declassify 8/21 after noon press briefing)

PRESS GUIDANCE: KGB USE OF
POTENTIALLY HARMFUL TRACKING SUBSTANCE

Q: Can you confirm that the KGB has been using a cancer-causing agent to track our embassy personnel and their contacts around in Moscow?

A: -- THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN USING POWDERY CHEMICALS FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS APPARENTLY TO TRACE THE CONTACTS OF SOME OF OUR OFFICIALS. OUR TESTS OF ONE OF THE CHEMICALS USED CONFIRMS THAT IT IS POTENTIALLY -- I EMPHASIZE POTENTIALLY -- HARMFUL TO PEOPLE. RESULTS OF BIOLOGICAL SCREENING TESTS INDICATE THAT THE CHEMICAL MAY BE CARCINOGENIC. FURTHER AND LENGTHY STUDIES IN ANIMALS WILL BE REQUIRED TO CONFIRM OR DISPROVE THIS POSSIBILITY.

Q: How long have we known about this?

A: -- "TRACKING" CHEMICALS HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED ON OCCASION BY THE KGB FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS. ONLY LAST YEAR, HOWEVER, DID LABORATORY TESTS REVEAL THAT THE SUBSTANCES USED MIGHT BE HARMFUL. AT THAT TIME, IT WAS NOT BELIEVED THAT THE USE OF THE SUBSTANCES WAS SUFFICIENTLY SYSTEMATIC OR FREQUENT TO POSE A HEALTH HAZARD TO U.S. PERSONNEL. HOWEVER, THERE IS NOW EVIDENCE THAT THE KGB PROGRAM IS MORE WIDESPREAD THAN HAD BEEN THOUGHT. THE USE OF CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES WAS STEPPED UP SIGNIFICANTLY THIS SPRING AND SUMMER.

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Q: What exactly is a "tracking substance"?

A: -- THE KGB HAS AT TIMES USED CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES ON OUR PERSONNEL IN MOSCOW AND ELSEWHERE TO TRACK THEM AND THE PEOPLE WITH WHOM THEY COME INTO CONTACT. CHEMICALS USED DO NOT APPEAR IN NATURE AND CAN THEREFORE BE TRACED EFFECTIVELY. THE SUBSTANCES IN QUESTION, WHICH HAVE BEEN APPLIED INDIRECTLY TO EMBASSY PERSONNEL, LEAVE DEPOSITS ON THE PERSON OR POSSESSIONS OF PEOPLE WITH WHOM THEY HAVE HAD CONTACT.

Q: Why didn't you follow up with further testing to determine potential harmfulness to humans immediately after initial laboratory tests revealed it might be?

A: -- IT WAS ORIGINALLY THOUGHT THAT THE USE OF THE CHEMICALS WAS INFREQUENT AND THE QUANTITIES INVOLVED WERE SUFFICIENTLY MINUTE THAT IT WAS UNNECESSARY TO DO FURTHER EXTENSIVE STUDIES.

Q: How many people in the embassy have been affected?

A: -- SEVERAL EMBASSY OFFICERS HAVE BEEN EXPOSED BUT MORE TESTING IS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE EXACTLY HOW WIDESPREAD THE PROBLEM IS. WE PLAN TO SEND A NIH/EPA TEAM TO MOSCOW TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF CONTAMINATION.

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Q: What about other Americans in Moscow? Other posts abroad? People who served there in past years? Were they also contaminated?

A: -- WE HOPE TO FIND ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS IN THE STUDY BEING CARRIED OUT BY NIH AND EPA. WE HAVE THESE SAME QUESTIONS, BUT FOR NOW THERE ARE MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS.

Q: Have you protested to the Soviets and demanded that they stop?

A: -- YES. WE HAVE PROTESTED STRONGLY BOTH HERE AND IN MOSCOW AND DEMANDED THAT THE USE OF CHEMICALS AGAINST OUR PEOPLE CEASE IMMEDIATELY.

Q: Why are you making this public now?

A: -- ONCE AWARE OF THE PROBLEM AND INFORMED OF THE WEIGHT OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, WE FELT DUTY-BOUND TO INFORM OUR PERSONNEL IN MOSCOW OF THE FINDINGS OPENLY AND ACCURATELY. THE DIPLOMATIC LIFE IS DIFFICULT ENOUGH WITHOUT THE ADDITION OF UNFOUNDED MEDICAL RUMORS. WE, THEREFORE, HAVE ALWAYS SOUGHT TO BE AS CANDID AS POSSIBLE WITH OUR PEOPLE ON THE RISKS INVOLVED WHEREVER AND WHATEVER THEY MAY BE.

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Q: Are the Soviets giving our people cancer on purpose? Isn't this chemical warfare against civilians?:

A: -- WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THE SOVIETS CONSCIOUSLY SOUGHT TO IMPAIR THE HEALTH OF OUR EMPLOYEES. OUR ASSUMPTION IS THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT TEST THESE CHEMICALS THOROUGHLY BEFORE USING THEM: IF THEY DID TEST THEM, THEY CANNOT HAVE PUT THEM THROUGH THE AMES TEST. THIS, OF COURSE, DOES NOT IN ANY WAY ABSOLVE THEM OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR USING CHEMICALS OF ANY KIND AGAINST OUR PEOPLE. THIS IS A TOTALLY INAPPROPRIATE AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS ACTION BY THE RGB. WE HAVE DEMANDED THEY STOP IMMEDIATELY.

Q: Does that mean you are letting Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership off the hook?

A: -- NOT AT ALL. THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BEARS ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTIONS OF ITS SECURITY SERVICES. WE HAVE MADE THAT POINT REPEATEDLY TO THE SOVIETS.

Q: Will this affect the Shevardnadze meetings here or the meeting between the President and Gorbachev in Geneva in November?

A: -- WE HAVE RAISED BEFORE AND WILL NO DOUBT AGAIN DISCUSS THE SERIOUS DANGERS TO THE RELATIONSHIP CAUSED BY ACTIONS OF THE SOVIET MILITARY AND SECURITY SERVICES WHICH SEEM TO ACT AS IF THEY ARE UNDER NO CONTROL BY THE POLITICAL AUTHORITIES. THIS IS A SERIOUS MATTER AND WE WILL TREAT IT AS SUCH IN OUR MEETINGS.

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Q: A Soviet told me this is all a fantasy cooked up to worsen relations. Is that true?

A: -- WE WISH THAT IT WERE A FANTASY. UNFORTUNATELY, WE ARE DEALING WITH SOME VERY UNSAVORY FACTS. AS THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR, WE DO NOT WANT TO WORSEN RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, WE WANT TO IMPROVE THEM. BUT WE MUST BE REALISTIC. IT IS THE KGB WHICH IS CARRYING OUT THESE OPERATIONS. THE QUESTION SHOULD BE ASKED IF THEY ARE ATTEMPTING TO SABOTAGE OUR RELATIONS WITH SUCH RECKLESS ACTIONS AGAINST OUR PERSONNEL.

Q: Are you letting people leave Moscow because of the danger?

A: -- AS OUR STATEMENT INDICATES, WE ARE PREPARED TO DO WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE SAFETY AND WELL-BEING OF OUR EMPLOYEES AND THEIR FAMILIES. IT WOULD BE PREMATURE AT THIS TIME TO SPECULATE ON SPECIFIC STEPS WHICH MAY BE TAKEN. AT THIS POINT, THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE A NEED FOR EVACUATION.

Q: When was this NIH/EPA task force set up? Are they going to Moscow?

A: -- IT WAS ESTABLISHED EARLY THIS WEEK AS PART OF OUR EFFORT TO GET A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEM WE FACE. SOME MEMBERS OF THE GROUP WILL TRAVEL TO MOSCOW IN THE NEAR FUTURE FOR INVESTIGATION OF THE PROBLEM ON THE SPOT.

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Q: Whatever happened on the microwaves issue? Have the Soviets stopped beaming them at our people in the embassy in Moscow?

A: -- WE HAVE ON OCCASION DETECTED MICROWAVE SIGNALS BEAMED AT THE EMBASSY IN MOSCOW. AS LATE AS 1983, WE PROTESTED STRONGLY TO THE SOVIETS ABOUT A BEAM WHICH OPERATED FOR A PERIOD OF SEVERAL MONTHS. YOU SHOULD BE AWARE OF A MAJOR STUDY ON THIS ISSUE BY THE JOHN HOPKINS UNIVERSITY IN THE SEVENTIES, WHICH CONCLUDED THAT THE LEVEL OF SIGNALS DID NOT PRESENT A HEALTH HAZARD. WE HAVE TAKEN PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES IN THE CHANCEKY BUILDING, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT THE MICROWAVES OR OTHER MEASURES DIRECTED AGAINST OUR PEOPLE IN MOSCOW REMAIN STOPPED.

Q: Can you give us some more details on what the Soviets were doing with the powder?

A: -- I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER FOR YOU ON THIS AT THIS TIME.

Q: [if asked only] Is NPPD being used by the Soviets in the US?

A: -- WE ARE LOOKING INTO THAT POSSIBILITY.

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Executive Registry
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MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 7

FROM: MMBOVA S/S 3126
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRESS GUIDANCE: KGB USE OF POTENTIALLY HARMFUL TRACKING SUBSTANCE

TO: (Agency) CIA DELIVER TO: _____ Extension _____ Room No. 7E12 HDØTRS

STAT

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: URGENT. PLS CALL FOR PICK UP

S/S Officer: MMB/ed J. Andrea