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The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #03116-85  
18 June 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM: Frederick L. Wettering *[Signature]*  
National Intelligence Officer for Africa  
SUBJECT: Namibia/Angola: Talking Points for Your 20 June Meeting with Mr. McFarlane  
REFERENCE: Your Memo to NIO/Africa, dtd 17 June 85, Subject: Southern Africa

1 Attached are talking points on the Namibia/Angola negotiation for use in your 20 June meeting with Mr. McFarlane. Also attached are two sensitive intelligence reports which are very relevant.

2. I discussed all recent intelligence with [Redacted] (in John Helgerson's absence), and their staffs and believe the attached points are consistent with that intelligence. Both [Redacted] noted to me that they concurred in the talking points.

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3. You may wish to note to Mr. McFarlane that we are currently going forward with a short fast-track SNIE on the very relevant question of the changing pattern of US-South African relations.

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*[Signature: Fred Wettering]*  
Frederick L. Wettering

Atts: A. Talking Points

B. [Redacted]

C. [Redacted]

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TALKING POINTS: US PROPOSAL ON ANGOLA/NAMIBIA--  
SOVIET AND SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONSES

The telegrams on Chet Crocker's discussions with the Soviets and the South African response to US initiatives on Namibia/Angola lead to the same conclusion: all major players--at least for the present--see US sponsored diplomatic efforts to negotiate Cuban troop withdrawal (CTW) from Angola and to attain a full Namibia/Angola settlement as dead in the water.

- The Soviets: Vasev's meeting with Crocker contains no surprises. The Soviets remain unwilling to assist our efforts and continue to signal that they have no intention of disengaging from Angola. Moscow's continuing willingness to meet to discuss the issues probably is designed to measure our depth of commitment to seeking a diplomatic solution.
- The South Africans: The South African government's (SAG) reply to the latest US formulation on CTW is a firm rejection of the latest US "synthesis" and strongly reiterates the original SAG position that demands total Cuban troop withdrawal under the UN 435 process. By taking this position, the SAG must realize it is putting the talks on hold. I believe that the SAG sees time working in its favor, and as a consequence, is comfortable with a period of no progress in the negotiations. In particular, it sees a delay as giving Savimbi's UNITA time to increase pressure in Angola as well as allow the SAG to reinforce the new de facto government in Namibia. The SAG installed an "interim" government in Namibia last weekend.
- The MPLA: The MPLA has seized on the recent South African Cabindan raid as an excuse to temporarily suspend participation in the negotiations, demanding a "satisfactory explanation" from the South Africans prior to resuming participation in the negotiation. The MPLA remains factionally divided on CTW and currently is preoccupied with a major offensive against UNITA. State and we both believe that renewed MPLA participation in any substantive way in negotiations is unlikely until after the December MPLA party congress. The one factor that can drive the MPLA into new substantive talks is increased military pressure from Savimbi's UNITA, which is unlikely in the short term.
- UNITA: Savimbi has never been completely comfortable with our proposals on CTW--he believes it offers the MPLA an infinite capacity to spin out talks in bad faith. Savimbi has hardened

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his position on US mediation efforts, no doubt with South African encouragement. He prefers to begin negotiations on what he sees as the vital issue--MPLA-UNITA reconciliation. This came through clearly in Savimbi's meeting with Crocker ten days ago. However, State's assessment that national reconciliation lends itself even less to US mediation efforts than the Cuban troop issue is unfortunately correct.

In reality we are in for a lengthy period that lacks even the appearance--let alone substance--of negotiations on Namibia/Angola. The growing strain in US-South African relations underscores the fact that any serious negotiations are unlikely in the near term. (We are preparing a fast-track SNIE on the changing pattern in US-South African relations.)

The consensus view--confirmed in a meeting last Thursday in Chet Crocker's office attended by John, [REDACTED] and myself, as well as State and DoD officials--is that a lower US profile on negotiation efforts appears to be called for and that a more relaxed, disengaged US posture will better reflect the on-ground reality. Contacts with major parties will and should revert to a bilateral context rather than as part of an overall regional framework.

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