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^	The Director of Centra Washington, D.C.	•				
National Intelligence Council		NIC #03116-85 18 June 1985				
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Inte	lligence				
FROM:	Frederick L. Wettering National Intelligence Officer for Africa					
SUBJECT:	Namibia/Angola: Talking Points for Your 20 June Meeting with Mr. McFarlane					
REFERENCE:	Your Memo to NIO/Africa, Southern Africa	dtd 17 June 85, Subject:				
use in your 20 Jur	re talking points on the Na ne meeting with Mr. McFarla gence reports which are ver	amibia/Angola negotiation for ane. Also attached are two ry relevant.				
(in John He attached points ar	ed all recent intelligence elgerson's absence), and the re consistent with that in that they concurred in the	neir staffs and believe the telligence. Both	25X 25X 25X 25X			
torward with a sho	ish to note to Mr. McFarla ort fast-track SNIE on the of US-South African relatio	ne that we are currently going very relevant question of the ons.				
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	Frederick	L. Wettering	·			

Atts:	A. B.[Talking Points		•
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18 June 1985

TALKING POINTS: US PROPOSAL ON ANGOLA/NAMIBIA--SOVIET AND SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONSES

The telegrams on Chet Crocker's discussions with the Soviets and the South African response to US initiatives on Namibia/Angola lead to the same conclusion: all major players—at least for the present—see US sponsored diplomatic efforts to negotiate Cuban troop withdrawal (CTW) from Angola and to attain a full Namibia/Angola settlement as dead in the water.

- -- The Soviets: Vasev's meeting with Crocker contains no surprises. The Soviets remain unwilling to assist our efforts and continue to signal that they have no intention of disengaging from Angola. Moscow's continuing willingness to meet to discuss the issues probably is designed to measure our depth of commitment to seeking a diplomatic solution.
- The South Africans: The South African government's (SAG) reply to the latest US formulation on CTW is a firm rejection of the latest US "synthesis" and strongly reiterates the original SAG position that demands total Cuban troop withdrawal under the UN 435 process. By taking this position, the SAG must realize it is putting the talks on hold. I believe that the SAG sees time working in its favor, and as a consequence, is comfortable with a period of no progress in the negotiations. In particular, it sees a delay as giving Savimbi's UNITA time to increase pressure in Angola as well as allow the SAG to reinforce the new de facto government in Namibia. The SAG installed an "interim" government in Namibia last weekend.
- The MPLA: The MPLA has seized on the recent South African Cabindan raid as an excuse to temporarily suspend participation in the negotiations, demanding a "satisfactory explanation" from the South Africans prior to resuming participation in the negotiation. The MPLA remains factionally divided on CTW and currently is preoccupied with a major offensive against UNITA. State and we both believe that renewed MPLA participation in any substantive way in negotiations is unlikely until after the December MPLA party congress. The one factor that can drive the MPLA into new substantive talks is increased military pressure from Savimbi's UNITA, which is unlikely in the short term.
- -- <u>UNITA</u>: Savimbi has never been completely comfortable with our proposals on CTW--he believes it offers the MPLA an infinite capacity to spin out talks in bad faith. Savimbi has hardened




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his position on US mediation efforts, no doubt with South African encouragement. He prefers to begin negotiations on what he sees as the vital issue--MPLA-UNITA reconciliation. This came through clearly in Savimbi's meeting with Crocker ten days ago. However, State's assessment that national reconciliation lends itself even less to US mediation efforts than the Cuban troop issue is unfortunately correct.

In reality we are in for a lengthy period that lacks even the appearance--let alone substance--of negotiations on Namibia/Angola. The growing strain in US-South African relations underscores the fact that any serious negotiations are unlikely in the near term. (We are preparing a fast-track SNIE on the changing pattern in US-South African relations.)

The consensus view--confirmed in a meeting last Thursday in Chet Crocker's office attended by John, and myself, as well as State and DoD officials--is that a lower US profile on negotiation efforts appears to be called for and that a more relaxed, disengaged US posture will better reflect the on-ground reality. Contacts with major parties will and should revert to a bilateral context rather than as part of an overall regional framework.

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