

**CONFIDENTIAL**SECURITY POLICY CONCERNING TRAVEL AND ASSIGNMENT OF  
PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED  
INFORMATION (SCI)<sup>1</sup>

(Effective \_\_\_\_\_ 1982)

Pursuant to the provisions of the Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) on the Security Committee, minimum security policy is herewith established for assignment and travel of U.S. Government civilian and military personnel, government consultants and employees of government contractors who have, or who have had, access to SCI.

## 1. Purpose

This policy is based upon the need to protect SCI from possible compromise resulting from the capture, interrogation, exploitation, or entrapment of personnel (stipulated above) by hostile nations or groups.

## 2. Definitions

a. Defensive Security Briefings--formal advisories which alert traveling personnel to the potential for harassment, provocation, or entrapment. These briefings are based on actual experience when available, and include information on courses of action helpful in mitigating adverse security and personal consequences.

b. Hazardous Activities--include assignments or visits to, and travel through, countries listed in the attached Appendix. Hazardous activities also include assignment or travel in combat zones or other areas where hostilities are taking place, duties behind hostile lines, and duties or travel in isolated or exposed areas where individuals cannot reasonably be protected against hostile action. *The use of any form of propaganda aimed or controlled by an activity within a country listed in the attached Appendix is also included.*

c. Risk of Capture Briefings--formal advisories which alert personnel as to what may be expected in the way of attempts to force or trick them to divulge classified information if captured or detained and of suggested courses of action they should follow to avoid or limit such divulgence. These advisories include instructions/advice for advance preparation of innocuous, alternate explanations of duties and background.

<sup>1</sup> This policy statement supersedes DCID No. 1/20, effective 6 June 1978.

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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d. Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community (SOIC)--for the purposes of this policy statement, SOICs are defined as the heads of organizations within the Intelligence Community, as defined by Executive Order 12333, or their designated representatives.

e. Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)--all information and materials requiring special community controls indicating restricted handling within present and future community intelligence collection programs and their end products. These special Community controls are formal systems of restricted access established to protect the sensitive aspects of sources, methods and analytical procedures of foreign intelligence programs. The term does not include Restricted Data as defined in Section II, Public Law 585, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

### 3. Policy

a. Unofficial Travel. Persons granted authorization for access to certain categories of extremely sensitive information on foreign intelligence sources or methods of SCI incur a special security obligation and are to be alerted by their SOIC to risks associated with unofficial visits to, or travel through, the countries listed in the Appendix hereto. The SOIC concerned should advise that unofficial travel in the listed countries without official approval may result in the withdrawal of approval for continued access to SCI for persons with specific and extensive knowledge of the following categories of extremely sensitive information on foreign intelligence sources or methods:

- Technological structure, function, and techniques of sensitive intelligence collection or exploitation system/methods.
- Designated system targets or sources.
- Method and purpose of target selection.
- Degree of success of collection or exploitation system/method.
- Collection or exploitation system/method capabilities and vulnerabilities.

b. All persons having access to SCI who plan unofficial travel to or through countries listed in the Appendix hereto must:

- (1) Give advance notice of such planned travel.

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(2) Obtain a defensive security briefing from a specified official before traveling to such countries.

(3) Contact immediately the nearest U.S. consular, attache, or Embassy official if they are detained or subjected to significant harassment or provocation while traveling.

(4) Report upon return from travel to their SOIC any incidents of potential security concern which befell them.

(5) Be reminded annually of the foregoing obligations through security education programs.

Failure to comply with the provisions of (1) and (4) above may be cause for withdrawal of SCI access authorization.

c. Official Assignment/Travel. No person with access to SCI will be assigned to or directed to participate in hazardous activities until he or she has been afforded a defensive security briefing and/or risk of capture briefing as applicable. (Due consideration will be given to the relative protection enjoyed by U.S. officials having diplomatic status.)

d. Individuals with Previous SCI Access. Persons whose access to SCI is being terminated will be officially reminded of the risks associated with hazardous activities as defined herein and of their obligation to ensure continued protection of SCI.

#### 4. Responsibilities

a. The DCI will cause to be prepared and disseminated to the SOICs a list of countries identified as posing a security risk bearing on this policy (see Appendix). The Security Committee will coordinate required support including source material concerning these risks.

b. SOICs will issue implementing directives concerning travel and assignment of personnel of their departments or agencies. Such directives will include the overall policy, definitions, and criteria set forth herein and will provide for:

(1) Preparation and provision of defensive security briefings or risk of capture briefings to personnel of their departments or agencies.

(2) Institution of positive programs for the collection of information reported under the provisions of paragraph 3b(4), above.

(3) Ensuring that new information obtained by their departments or agencies on harassments or provocations, or on risk

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of capture situations, is provided to the DCI and to other interested NFIB agencies. (Where warranted by new information, changes to the Appendix hereto will be made. Recommendations with supporting justification may be made for either addition or deletion of countries.)

5. Classification. As this directive sets forth security policy for persons with access to SCI, it merits and warrants the overall classification of CONFIDENTIAL in its totality. Selected paragraphs may be excerpted for use at the FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY level by SOICs, their designees, or SCI Special Security/Control Officers, when considered appropriate.

Appendix:

Countries and Areas in Which Visits, Travel, and Assignment are Considered to be a Hazardous Activity

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APPENDIX

COUNTRIES AND AREAS IN WHICH VISITS, TRAVEL, AND ASSIGNMENT  
ARE CONSIDERED TO BE A HAZARDOUS ACTIVITY

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**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Revision of DCIDs 1/7 and 1/20

FROM: [Redacted] C/PPG	EXTENSION	NO.
	DATE 9 November 1982	

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		

1.	DD/P&M	NOV 9 1982	11/9	D	Attached are the draft versions of DCIDs 1/7 and 1/20. Vote sheet action before 12 November 1982 has been requested by the Chairman, SECOM. Office of Security elements have reviewed both documents.
2.	DD/SEC	10 NOV 1982	11/10/82	Q	
3.	D/SEC	10 NOV 1982	15 NOV 1982	X	

[Redacted] *Forward to SECOM*

Concerning DCID 1/7, PSD/PTAS commented that what constitutes an "original form" document is left open to question. The Special Security Center does not share this concern and PSD has, as a result, withdrawn their comment.

PSI comments regarding DCID 1/20, that EAB/OS conducts Defensive Area Travel Briefings to include information about hazardous areas. Risk of Capture Briefings as such have not been given for at least three years. Since DCID 1/20 allows either type of briefing, we consider the Agency to be in compliance.

It is recommended that the Director of Security concur and that he sign the vote sheet.

*2-3 - Concur. Recommended you sign. Q*

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