

SECURITY POLICY CONCERNING TRAVEL AND ASSIGNMENT OF PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (SCI)¹

(Effective 8 April 1983)

Pursuant to the provisions of the Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) on the Security Committee, minimum security policy is herewith established for assignment and travel of U.S. Government civilian and military personnel, government consultants and employees of government contractors who have, or who have had, access to SCI.

1. Purpose

This policy is based upon the need to protect SCI from possible compromise resulting from the capture, interrogation, exploitation, or entrapment of personnel (stipulated above) by hostile nations or groups.

2. Definitions

- a. **Defensive Security Briefings**—formal advisories which alert traveling personnel to the potential for harassment, provocation, or entrapment. These briefings are based on actual experience when available, and include information on courses of action helpful in mitigating adverse security and personal consequences.
- b. **Hazardous Activities**—assignments or visits to, and travel through, countries listed in the attached Appendix. Hazardous activities also include assignment or travel in combat zones or other areas where hostilities are taking place, duties behind hostile lines, and duties or travel in isolated or exposed areas where individuals cannot reasonably be protected against hostile action. The use of vessels owned or controlled by a country listed in the attached Appendix is also included.
- c. **Risk of Capture Briefings**—formal advisories which alert personnel as to what may be expected in the way of attempts to force or trick them to divulge classified information if captured or detained and of suggested courses of action they should follow to avoid or limit such divulgence. These advisories include instructions/advice for advance preparation of innocuous, alternate explanations of duties and background.
- d. **Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community (SOICs)**—for the purposes of this policy statement, SOICs are defined as the heads of organizations within the Intelligence Community, as defined by Executive Order 12333, or their designated representatives.
- e. **Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)**—all information and materials requiring special Community controls indicating restricted handling within present and future Community intelligence collection programs and their end products. These special Community controls are formal systems of

¹ This policy statement supersedes DCID No. 1/20, effective 6 June 1978.

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restricted access established to protect the sensitive aspects of sources, methods, and analytical procedures of foreign intelligence programs. The term does not include Restricted Data as defined in Section II, Public Law 585, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

3. Policy

Persons granted access to information about the sensitive aspects of sources, methods, and analytical procedures of foreign intelligence incur a special security obligation and are to be alerted to the risks associated with travel to, through, or within, or with other activities involving, the countries listed in the attached Appendix.

- a. *Official Travel.* No person with access to SCI will be assigned or directed to participate in a hazardous activity, as defined herein, until he or she has been afforded a defensive security briefing and/or risk of capture briefing by an official specified by the cognizant SOIC. Consideration will be given to the relative protection enjoyed by U.S. personnel having diplomatic status.
- b. *Unofficial Travel.* All persons having access to SCI who plan unofficial travel to, through, or within countries listed in the attached Appendix must:
 - (1) give advance notice of such planned travel;
 - (2) obtain a defensive security briefing from the specified official prior to performing such travel;
 - (3) contact immediately the nearest U.S. Consul, Attache, or Embassy Regional Security Officer or Post Duty Officer if detained or subjected to significant harassment or provocation while traveling; and
 - (4) report to the specified official upon return from travel any unusual incidents, including incidents of potential security concern, encountered during such travel.

Failure to comply with the above provisions may result in the withdrawal of approval for continued access to SCI:

- c. *Specific and Extensive Knowledge.* Persons with specific and extensive knowledge of the following aspects of foreign intelligence shall be advised that unofficial travel without the approval of the cognizant SOIC may result in the withdrawal of approval for continued access to SCI:
 - (1) technological structure, function, and techniques of sensitive intelligence collection or exploitation system/methods;
 - (2) designated system targets or sources;
 - (3) method and purpose of target selection;
 - (4) degree of success of collection or exploitation system/method; or,
 - (5) collection of exploitation system/method capabilities and vulnerabilities.
- d. *Previous Access.* Persons whose access to SCI is being terminated will be officially reminded of their continuing obligation to protect SCI and will be afforded advisories on the risks associated with participation in hazardous activities.

4. Responsibilities

- a. The DCI will cause to be prepared and disseminated to the SOICs a list of countries identified as posing a security risk bearing on this policy (see Appendix). The Security Committee will coordinate required support including source material concerning these risks.
- b. SOICs will issue implementing directives concerning travel and assignment of personnel of their departments or agencies. Such directives will include the overall policy, definitions, and criteria set forth herein and will provide for:
 - (1) an annual reminder of the policy set forth in paragraph 3, above;
 - (2) defensive security briefings or risk of capture briefings to personnel of their departments or agencies;
 - (3) institution of positive programs for the collection of information reported under the provisions of paragraph 3b(4), above; and
 - (4) ensuring that new information obtained by their departments or agencies on harassments or provocations, or on risk of capture situations, is provided to the DCI and to other interested NFIB agencies. (Where warranted by new information, changes to the Appendix hereto will be made. Recommendations with supporting justification may be made for either addition or deletion of countries.)

5. Classification.

As this directive sets forth security policy for persons with access to SCI, it merits and warrants the overall classification of CONFIDENTIAL in its totality. Selected paragraphs may be excerpted for use at the FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY level by SOICs, their designees, or SCI Special Security/Control officers, when considered appropriate. The identification of any country in the Appendix as having been designated as a hazardous area by the DCI is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

Attachment:

Countries and Areas in Which Visits, Travel, and Assignment are Considered to be a Hazardous Activity.

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APPENDIX

COUNTRIES AND AREAS IN WHICH VISITS, TRAVEL, AND
ASSIGNMENT ARE CONSIDERED TO BE A
HAZARDOUS ACTIVITY

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