



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20310

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

10 NOV 1982

DAMI-CIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Policy on Unauthorized Disclosures and on Damage Assessments

Pursuant to your Memorandum, same subject, 28 October 1982, we reviewed the paper prepared by UDIS regarding national policy on damage assessments and offer the following comments:

We do not feel a new national policy is necessary. As a component of the Defense Department our opinion is their implementation of Executive Order 12356 and ISOO Directive Number 1 regarding damage assessment is adequate. We agree that a full damage assessment should be conducted in the situations depicted by UDIS (e.g., loss of classified military or specialized intelligence equipment, jeopardy of a technical collection system or human source, loss of a diplomatic pouch or penetration of a secure facility). The designation of permanent special teams to review assessments for quality control purposes is inappropriate for the military departments but may be appropriate for smaller agencies.

The items mentioned by UDIS to be checked by special teams (e.g., countermeasure recommendations, security/counterintelligence reviews, audits, inspections, etc.) in their review of damage assessments could be accomplished by making them mandatory issues in the governing regulations of each agency. National guidance mandating the sharing of damage assessments should be discouraged. We favor instead the selective sharing of such information using the newsletter method of the Air Force to synopsize those cases considered to have community applicability and interest. The establishment of a broad data base has merit as a diagnostic tool; however, the requirement to submit "all information" for inclusion in the base data which will be available to all agencies, albeit in a controlled manner, is questionable and should be discussed for clarification.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "D. P. Press".

DONALD P. PRESS  
Colonel, GS  
Director of Counterintelligence

Mr. Bjorkman/77520  
Typed by R. Brashears

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE  
WASHINGTON DC 20330

10 NOV 1982

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: INS

SUBJECT Policy on Unauthorized Disclosures and on Damage Assessments  
(Your Memo, SECOM-D-344, 28 Oct 82)

TO Chairman  
DCI Security Committee

1. We have carefully reviewed the UDIS paper on national policy on damage assessments and offer the following comments on the issues addressed in Part II:

a. Investigative Triggers: Concur that a full damage assessment should be required unless the agency head (or appropriate program manager) or designee expressly determines that this is not necessary.

b. Improved Quality Control: Within the Air Force (and DoD, to our knowledge) we believe there are sufficient checks and balances to ensure the timeliness and quality of damage assessments. Any expansion of this mechanism, to include the suggested designation of damage assessment individuals or teams, could not be supported without DoD approval and increased resources.

c. Assessment Implementation: Concur that the chain of command should be responsible for implementing corrective or remedial measures. Within the Air Force (and most DoD elements) the sheer number of incidents make it virtually impossible for the establishment of any central "tickler" or other "review system." We believe that assessment implementation should best be left to chain of command, Inspector General, or similar activities.

d. Sharing of Information: Concur as written. The publication of SECOM or ISOO newsletters, similar to our "INS-IGHT" would be a relatively inexpensive method of sharing summaries of investigations and related actions on cases involving significant compromises.

e. Data Base: The establishment of a data base on unauthorized disclosures would undoubtedly serve a useful purpose. However, such a base would be expensive to collect and maintain and involve jurisdictional problem areas. For example, within the Air Force, I could provide data relative to SCI incidents, but the inclusion of data relative to collateral incidents would require DoD approval and extensive coordination/approval with

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