

Interagency Group/Countermeasures

Washington, D.C. 20505

*K* D/ICS-83-0760  
24 October 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members and Invitees

FROM:   
Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Minutes of Eighth IG/CM Meeting,  
5 October 1983

Attached are the final minutes of the eighth IG/CM meeting held on 5  
October 1983.

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Attachment:  
a/s

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SUMMARY OF IG/CM MEETING

5 October 1983

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STAT 1. The eighth meeting of the IG/CM was convened at 1400 hours, 5 October 1983, by Chairman (DUSD-Policy) Richard G. Stilwell, General, USA (Ret.). A listing of individuals attending is attached.

STAT 2. The Chairman indicated the primary purpose of this meeting was to receive update status reports on work in progress by the IG. Lead agency representatives were asked to summarize essential points of assigned issue(s), and subsequent discussions established follow-on actions:

STAT a. Civil Overflight NSDD: Mr. Kenneth deGraffenreid, NSC Staff, reported that Judge Clark had endorsed the IG/CM-proposed NSDD but that some changes were made in its content by NSC staffers to preclude the appearance of a policy reaction to the Korean Airline shutdown. Mr. deGraffenreid advised that the proposed NSDD was before the President, but he could not ascertain whether it had been signed prior to his attendance at instant IG/CM meeting.

STAT ACTION: Mr. deGraffenreid will continue follow up. (The Secretariat was advised after the meeting that the President had signed the NSDD on 5 October 1983.)

STAT b. Policy Mechanisms Other Than NSDDs: Mr. deGraffenreid reported on his attempt to identify policy mechanisms other than Presidentially signed NSDDs for promulgating interagency national security policy. Essentially, he advised that Judge Clark is not disposed to sign any type of policy implementation document, believing strongly that this is the province of the President. Based upon this position, Mr. deGraffenreid opined that there would be no more National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs), observing also that by today's standards they would be NSDDs. The Secretary to the IG/CM observed that this position would require readdressing an Industrial Security issue which had been forwarded to the NSC for issuance as a National Security Council Policy Memorandum. Mr. deGraffenreid stated there was really nothing wrong with continuing to use NSDDs, and suggested that the unusually weighty issues in the security arena met the criteria for NSDDs.

STAT ACTION: The Chairman requested Mr. deGraffenreid continue to carry the fight within the NSC as an advocate of the IG/CM's position, e.g., that a mechanism short of NSDDs is needed for the promulgation of policies. Such a mechanism would be signed with the knowledge and by the direction of the President -- a Chief-of-Staff type of function.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

STAT The Secretary to the IG/CM will coordinate to determine the fate of, and any follow up, to the recommended National Security Council Policy Memorandum on the Industrial Security issue. [redacted]

STAT c. NACSI 4000: [redacted] NSA, advised that publication of a revised National Communications Security Instruction (NACSI 4000) should occur by next month. While the revision does not provide the full range of COMSEC freedom originally sought by the Community, it does clarify and facilitate some of the former problems. Follow-on discussions covered, from many angles, the subject of relaxation of restrictions imposed by law. Mr. Cinquegrana, DoJ, finally opined that it would take a constitutional change to accomplish all that was desired. The Chairman concluded that perhaps half a loaf was better than nothing. [redacted]

STAT ACTION: NSA will continue to push for early publication of the revised Instruction. [redacted]

STAT d. National TEMPEST Policy: [redacted] stated that the question of whether a TEMPEST policy was needed had been deferred until completion of the Countermeasures Organization Study. He advised that the National Communications Security Committee and its Subcommittee on Compromising Emanations (SCOCE) were examining the CM Organization Study recommendations. Different sets of TEMPEST criteria are being developed for CONUS and OCONUS. A response is due from NCSC by 4 November 1983. In a somewhat related matter, the Chairman observed that the NSA proposal for a cryptographic access program and a CM Organization Study recommendation for a review of the COMSEC equipment requirements were two issues which the IG/CM had also referred to the NCSC on 3 August 1983. The Chairman suggested that the IG/CM should also examine the need for better articulation and dissemination of TEMPEST threat data requirements. [redacted]

STAT ACTION: The IG/CM will await the results of the NCSC deliberations on IG/CM issues referred to it. NSA will take the lead in presenting these before the IG/CM. NSA will also put together an ad hoc group to examine what, if anything, needs to be done to improve dissemination of TEMPEST threat data requirements. Status reports will be provided to the IG/CM on call. [redacted]

STAT e. Industrial Security Policy: Mr. Britt Snider, OSD, recalled that copies of the DoD proposal for establishing a National Industrial Security Advisory Committee (NISAC) had been distributed to members on 28 September 1983. Mr. Snider introduced the proposal and indicated that although DoE and CIA are invited Committee participants, the basic thrust is to address DoD concerns and issues. [redacted] SECDEF, indicated the proposed charter seemed to overlap areas which are traditional DCI prerogatives. He recommended some kind of limiting language in the

STAT specific areas of concern. The Chairman agreed that SECOM, CIA, and OSD representatives could work out the charter language changes during the initial meetings of the NISAC. Mr. Cinquegrana, DoJ, requested DoJ or the FBI also be invited to participate with the Committee. Mr. Snider will provide each agency a letter extending such invitation. [ ]

STAT **ACTION:** Establishment of the NISAC completes direct IG/CM action on this subject. [ ]

STAT f. **Operations Security Advisory Committee:** Mr. Jack Donnelly, OSD, provided a strawman charter for the establishment of the IG/CM-recommended National OPSEC Advisory Committee. He also provided a list of proposed initial issues to be dealt with and a tentative agenda for the first meeting. [ ]

STAT **ACTION:** Member comments on the proposal are due to the IG/CM Secretariat by 17 October 1983. [ ]

STAT g. **Van Cook Study Evaluation:** Mr. Britt Snider, OSD, recapitulated the background leading to DoD consideration of the Van Cook study (see IG/CM minutes 14 April 1983). He advised an action package (which establishes procedures for DoD internal control of sensitive, albeit unclassified, technical data) is presently before the SECDEF for approval. He also indicated that additional assistance toward controlling such sensitive information is contained in paragraph 1217 of the FY84 DoD Authorizations Bill. This paragraph contains authority for DoD to withhold from public disclosure, unclassified technical information on items subject to export controls. He observed that since Defense is the largest sponsor of such sensitive information, these new provisions will greatly assist in alleviating a security problem of concern to the Intelligence Community. He noted that after SECDEF approval of the new internal dissemination controls, there will still be a long way to go before actual implementation is accomplished. [ ]

STAT **ACTION:** OSD will keep IG/CM members apprised of significant developments at subsequent meetings. [ ]

STAT h. **Damage Assessments:** Mr. Snider, OSD, distributed a joint DoD-SECOM proposal to assist in correcting the varying content and quality of damage assessments. Essentially, the proposal strengthens and emphasizes standards to be used. [ ]

STAT **ACTION:** Member comments on the proposed guidelines are due to the IG/CM Secretariat by 5 November 1983. [ ]

STAT i. **Polygraph Policy:** General discussions were held on this issue. Mr. deGraffenreid advised that because of the media and Congressional attacks on use of the polygraph, the Administration

believes a more elaborate statement of Administration policy is needed which will go beyond that stated in NSDD-84. The imminent testimony of [redacted] before the Brooks Committee will make that expanded statement. The statement will take into account that we (CIA, NSA, DoD) have equities involved and must preserve what we now have. It is intended that the testimony be a prologue to a policy which will then become the basis for the policies of individual departments and agencies. The Chairman observed that it will be useful in the Brooks hearing to get away from the narrow NSDD-84 view of polygraph use. [redacted] CIA, indicated that a dual track view of polygraph use, i.e., (1) sensitive sources/methods and SCI arena and (2) the needs of the rest of the Community, may need to be articulated in order not to lose the advantages we now enjoy. Mr. Cinquegrana indicated this was the approach DoJ was attempting to take in their related actions. [redacted]

**ACTION:** None; for information only. [redacted]

**j. Embassy Security:** Mr. Richard Curl, State, advised that the Embassy Security Working Group of the IG/CM will meet again on 13 October 1983. A member of the DoS Office for Combatting Terrorism will participate with the Working Group. Its main task is to prepare a report on Working Group findings and recommendations concerning issues identified in the CM Organization Study. [redacted]

3. The Chairman asked Mr. deGraffenreid to introduce the two additional issues the NSC wanted added as ad hoc agenda items:

**a. Embassy Security--Moscow:** Mr. deGraffenreid indicated recent briefings received by the President's National Security Advisor had raised new concerns. The Chairman elected not to go into this issue in the plenary session. [redacted]

**ACTION:** State is to take the lead, together with other concerned representatives to determine what new developments need addressing and report to the Chairman. [redacted]

**b. Soviet Access to U.S.-Managed Data Bases:** The NSC representative indicated several reports had been received on this subject. The questions were: are we looking at the problem, is damage being done, and what's being done about such access? Mr. Robert P. Gallagher, Commerce, spoke to the issue of the data base of most current concern -- the National Technical Information Service (NTIS). He described what this data base was and how it worked, emphasizing that the data base was intended to contain only unclassified information. He advised that [redacted]

[redacted], and about a month ago the Technology Transfer Assessment Center (TIAC) had

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distributed a paper reflecting the extent of the data base penetration problem. Mr. Gallagher opined that the best course of action was to ensure that what went into the unclassified data bases was in fact unclassified. He suggested that, unchecked, the automatic declassification provision of the information security program may represent a major problem in this regard. He also suggested that increasing Soviet use of cut-outs and the large number of data bases similar to the NTIS would make any other approach to the problem impractical. The Chairman agreed that control on the input side was mandatory. Mr. Snider, OSD, revealed that approximately three-fourths of the information in the NTIS is DoD related. DoD is, therefore, considering the establishment of a review group to ensure data passing through the Defense Technical Information Center (and ultimately destined for NTIS) is checked for classification level. Moreover, he advised that new authority to withhold data subject to export controls will also change the level of information going into the data base. Mr. Gallagher reemphasized that this was obviously a macro problem transcending NTIS and that major agencies needed to get the word out to stop or review the automatic declassification process.

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**ACTION:** The Chairman requested all members determine whether their agency submits data to NTIS, if so how it works, and how the process can be improved. Reports of findings are to be submitted to the Secretariat by 17 October 1983.

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4. The meeting adjourned at 1553 hours.

ATTENDEES

IG/CM Meeting, 5 October 1983

[Redacted]

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NAME

ORGANIZATION

STILWELL, Richard G.  
SNIDER, L. Britt  
DONNELLY, John F.  
CAMPANY, Richard

OSD  
OSD  
OSD  
OSD

PL 86-36

STAT

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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DU HADWAY, Thomas  
deGRAFFENREID, Kenneth  
VINNETT, Peter  
BERKIN, Gerald  
WOMACK, Harold  
GREISEN, Bruce  
KLOS, Arthur  
CURL, Richard E.  
WHARTON, Royal  
CROSER, F. Kenneth  
CINQUEGRANA, A. R.  
ALLAN, Kimberly  
PASCHAL, Donald  
COHEN, Edmund  
GALLAGHER, Robert P.  
CASSETA, Michael

FBI  
NSC  
Army  
Navy  
Air Force  
Marine Corps  
DIA  
State  
State  
State  
DoJ  
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