

OLL 85-1501
17 May 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: "Anti-Terrorism Czar" - Foreign Aid Bill:
Conversations with Congressional Staff

1. During the week of May 13, 1985, I had several conversations with various Congressional staffers concerning the "anti-terrorism czar" provisions of the Foreign Aid Bill and the subject of terrorism generally as follows.
2. I discussed the subject with Gary Chase, Chief Counsel, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI). I particularly inquired whether or not it was likely that the "anti-terrorism czar" provision of Section 407 of H.R. 1555, the House version of the Foreign Aid Bill, could be added to S. 960, the Senate Foreign Aid Bill. He indicated that the SSCI was considering holding general hearings on the subject of terrorism. In light of this, the SSCI was not likely to support a quick-fix approach to terrorism such as the "czar" approach of H.R. 1555.
3. This was confirmed in a subsequent conversation with Dan Finn, Minority Counsel, SSCI. Although Senator Leahy, Finn's sponsor, had made several public statements in relation to the recent alleged Lebanese counterterrorism incident, this did not mean that the Senator was interested in taking any precipitous action; it seemed more likely that he would want the SSCI to address the subject fully before any legislative solution was reached.
4. I spoke with Chip Andrea, staff assistant to Senator Lugar in his capacity as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. Andrea had been assisting the Senator in his role as floor manager of S. 960 which was on the Senate floor during the week of May 13. I repeated my statement from some months ago that the Agency objected to anti-terrorism czar provisions and hoped that one would not come in through action on the floor. Mr. Andrea indicated that he did not expect an attempt to insert one, notwithstanding all the publicity on the Lebanese counterterrorism incident. He agreed to contact me, however, if he was facing the possibility of such a provision.

5. I then returned a call to this office from Bob Jenkins, Minority Staff, House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC). He stated that he was a member, with Bob Boyer of the Majority Staff, of a terrorism task force which had been established by the HFAC. The task force's interest in intelligence and terrorism had been stimulated by the Lebanese incident. He and Mr. Boyer, therefore, wanted to meet with someone from the Agency to "chat", not about the particulars of the Lebanese incident, but rather about: how the intelligence community is set up to deal with terrorism; how terrorism intelligence is disseminated; the role of the National Security Counsel; the entities which provide anti-terrorism training; and, how that training is done.

6. I politely noted that the HPSCI was this very week, receiving briefings on the Lebanese incident and, of course, had a jurisdictional interest in the matter. In view of their assertion of interest within an area of jurisdiction, I suggested that he first touch base with HPSCI before proceeding with the Agency. He concurred. I then put him in touch with Steve Berry, Minority Staff Director, HPSCI and subsequently alerted Berry that he would be receiving a call.






Legislative Division
Office of Legislative Liaison

STAT

Distribution:

Original - LEG/Subject - Terrorism
Foreign Aid

- 1 - D/OLL
- 1 - DD/OLL
- 1 - OLL Chrono
- 1 - LD/OLL, 
- 1 - LD/OLL, 
- 1 - LD/OLL, 
- 1 - PS Signer

STAT

LEG/OLL  (17 May 1985)

STAT

T. Adams

STATEMENT OF NATHAN M. ADAMS
SENATE JOINT FOREIGN RELATIONS & JUDICIARY COMMITTEE HEARINGS ON
TERRORISM
May 13, 1985

Mr. Chairman, I welcome your invitation to testify before these very important series of hearings. As a Senior Editor of the Reader's Digest, I have been assigned for the past several years to investigate and develop articles which focus upon international terrorism, primarily those state-supported movements and organizations operating in the Middle East.

In my opinion, there is no greater threat to world peace today than terrorism and the potentially deadly sequence of events which can be set in motion by a single incident. The lessons of history should, by now, be abundantly clear. But just as one reminder, allow me to point out that it was the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand by Bosnian-Serb terrorists in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914 which became a trigger for events leading to World War I. Other assassinations and acts of terror have played key roles in shaping the world's history, including our own.

The issues of disarmament and Central America aside, state-supported international terrorism and how best to neutralize the danger it poses to the world community should be second to no other priority for this nation. Yet, despite a gradual awakening, our diplomatic, military, and intelligence-gathering capabilities in dealing with the threat remain in disarray, uncoordinated, unwieldy, and tentative. Most commonly, we

find ourselves in the position of reacting to an incident. Rarely do we seem able to prevent it.

I am a journalist. But I am also a citizen of this nation, as well as of the world. I am alarmed by what I have learned, the extent of terrorism, and its capacity to provoke an East-West confrontation which could result in conflict. I am, too, deeply concerned by our painfully obvious inability to counter the threat. All of which is why, after consideration of my profession, I have agreed to testify before this body.

There are scores of terrorist organizations which operate throughout the world today. The forces which have shaped them range from the purely political -- the conquest or recovery of regional territory -- to goals of ethnic autonomy, and sheer revenge for real or imagined injustices of history. All are different, yet many coordinate to best achieve their respective aims. Each is identical in their disregard of innocence. Given the circumstances, the time, and the place every one of us, our wives, husbands, and children are potential targets.

There is neither space nor time to examine the motives, personnel, and operations of the myriad of terrorist organizations which challenge civilized society today. Undoubtedly, many will be covered by other witnesses in the days ahead. I will limit my testimony to Iran, and the support infrastructure that it provides for terrorist movements and activities throughout the Middle East, Europe, and Asia.

It is a fact, accept it or not, that Iran's present government considers that a state of war exists between it and the United States. If we choose to ignore this reality, we do so at our peril. Iran's ruling Ayatollahs are simply waging this war with the most effective weapon in a limited arsenal -- terrorism. Their goal: to rid first the

Gulf, then all of Islam from the envisioned corruption of western influence as personified by the United States. Only then, under the guidance of the Ayatollahs in Teheran, can Islam purify itself and return to its most fundamental state -- clerical rule; government by Shari'a, canon law of the Holy Koran.

While this may appear somewhat metaphysical to those of us in the west who are unfamiliar with Iran and the violent forces which have shaped its dominant religion -- the Shia sect of Islam -- I can assure you that it is as real as the concussion of a ton of exploding hexogen. To accomplish their goal of Islamic purity, the Ayatollahs have embarked on a no-quarter crusade of martyrdom and terror.

Not long ago, a high official of the U.S. Department of State with a long, working knowledge of Middle East affairs told me that "Khomeini is the most dangerous threat to world peace since the rise of Adolf Hitler."

Events have shown that he may not have been far off the mark. Indeed, there are similarities. Like Hitler's "crusade", initial victories have been impressive.

On April 18, 1983 a suicide bomber -- he had been recruited from the ranks of Iranian Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guard) forces based in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley -- detonated a truck-full of enhanced hexogen explosives against the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. The toll: 57 dead, 120 injured.

Six months later, on October 23, yet another Shi'ite kamikaze -- also Iranian-trained and indoctrinated -- exploded a truck packed with similar explosives in the ground floor of the U.S. Marine headquarters at Beirut's international airport. Nearly simultaneously, yet another suicide truck bomb destroyed command post Drakkar of the

French peacekeeping contingent. The casualties were 296 dead, 84 wounded. Among them were 241 U.S. Marines.

It was the most savage and successful terrorist attack in recent history. After this, the second suicide bombing of its installations in Beirut, the U.S. lost its kidney for further involvement and abandoned Lebanon to its fate. Still traumatized by the Vietnam experience, the Nation preferred to sacrifice its ability to influence events in this critical region rather than risk any further military involvement. Privately, U.S. supporters throughout the Gulf were aghast at yet another display of American incompetence and loss of will.

Amongst fundamentalist movements throughout the Middle East -- and not a few nations -- Khomeini's stock shot up. And so did the belief of many that terrorism is a valid and credible weapon with which to achieve political, racial, and religious goals. The frequency of Iranian-aided and abetted terrorist attacks against the U.S., its assets and interests, increased dramatically.

On December 12, 1983, a suicide bomber partially destroyed the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait. Attacks also took place against the French Embassy and other locations. Five died, 28 were injured. Predictably, the plot was traced first to Baalbek, Lebanon, finally to Teheran. On December 21, French headquarters in Beirut were again bombed with the loss of ten dead, 125 injured. Nor was this to be all.

On December 23, a bomb of plastic explosives disguised within a Marlboro cigarette carton and wired to a video timer was discovered at Istanbul's international airport hidden in a gym bag. While the incident was quickly hushed up by Turkish authorities, the bag had been ticketed first to Rome, then to New York on a Pan Am 747. The timer, set at 11 hours was to have been activated in Rome at an interline

baggage area, set to explode somewhere over the Atlantic. Shortly before Christmas, the Pan Am flight was packed. More than 350 would have died. Investigation has revealed that the group suspected of the plot has strong links to Teheran.

By the year's end, 271 Americans had died as a result of terrorist attacks, 40 percent of the total worldwide. Nearly all these lives were taken by Iranian-supported, financed, and trained terrorists. But more lay in stock for 1984: the brutal assassination of Beirut's American University president Malcolm Kerr in January; five kidnappings of U.S. citizens between January and May of whom four are still held. One, including an early kidnapping victim who was later released, is believed to have been taken to Teheran for "interrogation".

Throughout last year, Iranian-supported or linked terrorist attacks continued, not only in the Middle East, but in Europe as well. In April of that year, an Iranian-supported hijacking team using the "Islamic Jihad" nom de guerre was traced from Lebanon to Bombay, India where they planned to hijack either a Pan Am or Kuwait Airlines jet. Spotting Indian surveillance, they fled. Others, however, were more successful on December 4 when they pirated a Kuwait Airlines A-310 Airbus en route to Karachi from Dubai. The Airbus was diverted to Teheran where it remained for five days before being "assaulted" by an Iranian rescue team. Two American hostages were murdered in cold blood, others were subjected to torture.

We are presently completing an investigation of this hijacking which will reveal the full extent the involvement of elements in the Iranian government in the planning and coordination of this incident. They were extensive and reached up to the highest levels of government.

Finally, in the first week of March, this year, the U.S. delivered a clear warning to Teheran via Swiss representatives. If the Iranian-

allied groups which still hold American kidnap victims subject them to threatened trials, or harm them in any way, Iran must suffer the "consequences".

Perhaps.

President Reagan and Secretary of State George P. Shultz have repeatedly warned of preemptive and/or retaliatory U.S. action against such terrorist groups in the past. However, when there was no follow-through, Khomeini's credibility -- and that of terrorism, itself -- only increased further. Indeed, a seemingly appropriate catechism is now so commonplace among Khomeini's supporters that it is part of their daily language:

"America is the Great Satan.

America is corrupt.

America is a hollow drum.

America cant do a damn thing."

Nowhere have these repeated displays of U.S. impotence had more of an impact than upon members of the Gulf Cooperation Council such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). These nations remain very much at risk from Iranian surrogate terrorists seeking to destabilize their governments, or overthrow them outright. They have good reason for concern.

In December of 1981, the island nation of Bahrain -- 60 percent of its residents are Shi'ites -- uncovered at the last minute an Iranian funded and equipped attempt to take over its government and declare an Islamic Republic similar to that in Teheran. Again, in February of last year, Bahraini security forces uncovered a large cache of Iranian-supplied weapons awaiting use in yet another effort to overthrow the Island's rulers.

In Saudi Arabia, Iranian funding and support played a key role in the fundamentalist takeover of the Grand Mosque at Mecca in November of 1979, the holiest of Islam's shrines. Because of religious considerations, a French counter-terrorist unit was requested and sent to root out the insurgents. Since then, there has been serious unrest -- much of it inspired by Iran -- in the Nation's eastern provinces where the majority of Saudi Arabia's Shi'ite population is centered.

Qatar also had a narrow escape. In the fall of 1983, supporters of the Ayatollah Khomeini attempted to assassinate by explosives and ground-to-air SAM-7 rockets the entire leadership of Gulf Cooperation Council member states who had gathered in Doha to attend a Council meeting. It was discovered that the plot had been financed by a locally prominent, fundamentalist Mullah. But the real paymaster was suspected to be Iran.

Other Iranian-sponsored violence and attempts at destabilization have taken place as close to the Gulf as Kuwait, as far away in the Islamic world as Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Last year, Iran spent at least \$90 million to propogandize its call for fundamentalist revolution world-wide.

In France, for example, Iran earmarked a reported \$12 million for the indoctrination and recruitment of third nation Moslem students. This, then, for 1984 alone. Similar sums were made available to Khomeini's agents in both England and West Germany. The funds were often drawn from secret bank accounts maintained by the Islamic Republic on the Channel island of Jersey.

In the Gulf, meanwhile, Iran has installed an 800 kilowatt radio transmitter on Qeshm Island which broadcasts propoganda and invective

18 hours each day to audiences on the Arabian Peninsula. In the recent past, programming has included calls to listeners to overthrow their corrupt governments, and deliver their nations from "the talons of Satan."

The "Satan", of course, is the United States. But other western nations like England and France routinely appear on the hate list. So does the Soviet Union. But, in this case, the Ayatollahs take great care to limit their threats to rhetoric, alone. There are an estimated 5,500 Soviet technical advisers and personnel presently in Iran, and Soviet armed might lies just across the border. What's more, the experience of neighboring Afghanistan remains a constant lesson.

Infrastructure for Terror. No other nation today has dedicated itself more overtly to the propagation of terror as a political weapon than has Khomeini's Iran. At the present time, Teheran hosts and coordinates the activities of more than 25 terrorist and Islamic liberation movements. Indeed, there is hardly a major ministry in the Islamic Republic that does not contribute to their support in one form or another. The machinery has been functioning smoothly for years.

No secret was ever made of this support. In September, 1981, for example, Teheran publicly announced that it had established a body which it called the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution to plan strategy for surrogate terrorist movements and activities in the Gulf and elsewhere. The Council consists of a series of committees and sub-committees which represent the interests of specific regional groups, and pool resources to mount individual cell operations.

The Council is reportedly chaired by Hojatoleslam Taki Modaresi. But the real power behind the Council and its overall control rests

with Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri. Montazeri is eclipsed in power only by Khomeini himself, and is considered by most to be the Imam's successor upon his death. He reports directly to Khomeini who approves the more significant and high-profile actions by Council members and surrogate groups.

Herewith a partial listing of those organizations whose activities are supported and coordinated by the Supreme Council:

The Islamic Revolutionary Organization in the Arabian Peninsula. This movement comprises dissident elements seeking to overthrow the rule of the royal family in Saudi Arabia.

The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain. This organization, with support and training from Iran -- including on-the-scene assistance provided by the Islamic Republic's Embassy in Manama -- came within an eyelash of successfully toppling Bahrain's government in 1981.

Islamic Da'awa, Islamic Amal, and Mujahidin. These three groups operate under the guidance of the Council's Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. In the past, Da'awa terrorists have coordinated with Shi'ite elements in Baalbek using the nom de guerre of Islamic Jihad. One example of such cooperation was the series of bombings in Kuwait in December of 1983. One leader of Islamic Amal has boasted that he can assemble in one week "500 loyal activists ready to throw themselves into suicide operations".

Takfir wa Hijra (Repudiation & Renunciation), Al-Jihad al-Jadid. These two organizations of Islamic extremists are committed to the overthrow of the Mubarek government in Cairo. And members of both took part in the assassination of President Anwar Sadat. There are unconfirmed reports that Iranian financing played a role. Whatever, the Islamic Republic has since issued a postal stamp commemorating Sadat's murder. The stamp portrays a snarling Lt. Islambuli, one of the plot

leaders, and praises him as "The Revolutionary Executioner of Anwar Sadat."

Party Islam. The opposition party in Malaysia, its spokesmen have issued calls for a total Islamic state patterned along Teheran lines. In October of 1983, Malaysian security forces uncovered a plot by Party Islam-linked terrorists to overthrow the legal government. Also in 1983, a number of Malaysian pilgrims to Mecca were expelled from Saudi Arabia for exhibiting placards bearing the photograph of the Ayatollah Khomeini. It is known that significant numbers of Malay fundamentalists have been trained in terrorist camps in the Islamic Republic.

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). There are more than two million Moslems in the Philippines, and the fundamentalists among them are represented by the MNLF. The organization -- it maintains representatives in Teheran -- has recently formed alliances with the Communist Party's New People's Army in the Philippines. Meanwhile, in a show of solidarity, the Islamic Republic has cut off all oil shipments to Manila. The goal of the MNLF and its armed units, the Bangsa Moro Army, is Islamic autonomy.

While these are only a handful of the many groups and movements sheltering or headquartering in Teheran, their scope and capacity for terror and destabilization should be cause for great alarm in the U.S. as well as the west as a whole.

The best example of support and coordination provided by the Islamic Republic is best found in the operations of what has become known as Islamic Jihad in Lebanon (not to be confused with the Iraqi group of the same name). It is the spearhead of Teheran's campaign to intimidate the west and, if possible, force a total U.S. withdrawal

-11-

from the region -- a goal which they have nearly accomplished, at least in Lebanon.

To begin with, there is no Islamic Jihad. It is only a nom de guerre used to establish an identity and communality of attacks undertaken by terrorists based in Iran and the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon, usually against American and Gulf targets. The structure is fluid, and changes with each operation. Personnel vary. For example, the bombings in Kuwait in 1983 were largely the work of Da'awa terrorist cells directed by the Islamic Republic through its representatives in Damascus, Baalbek, and Beirut.

Oftentimes, key operatives are selected from among the trained ranks of Iran's Revolutionary Guard units based near Baalbek. This is believed to be the case with the first U.S. Embassy bombing in Beirut, the subsequent attacks upon the U.S. Marine and French para units. There are, within Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guard) forces small groups of individuals who have been indoctrinated and trained as suicide volunteers in camps set up for this purpose in Iran.

Each action, therefore, is undertaken by an Ad Hoc group assembled for the specific attack -- whether it be a bombing, a kidnapping, an assassination, or an air hijacking. There are two principal groups in Lebanon which supply personnel.

The first is known as Hisballah (The Party of God), a pro-Khomeini organization of Shi'ite fundamentalists with headquarters in Baalbek, Beirut, and South Lebanon. The Baalbek group is headed by Shiek Sobhi Tofailli who founded the Baalbek "chapter" in 1982. The Beirut branch is controlled by Sheik Mohammed Hossein Fadlallah. The Hisballah elements in South Lebanon are led by Ibrahim Al-Amin. While there have been conflicts -- some armed -- between followers of the three leaders

over dogma and territory, each cooperates in providing security, intelligence, and personnel for operations claimed by Jihad. Estimates of the numbers of followers vary widely. A conservative figure would be 8,000. A third of Lebanon's population is Shi'ite, the largest single minority.

It has been claimed that Sheik Fadlallah personally provided a certificate for "entry into Paradise" to the suicide drivers who attacked the U.S. Marine headquarters and the French command post Drakkar.

Support for Jihad operations is also provided by elements of Islamic Amal (again, not to be confused with the Iraqi group of the same name.) Islamic Amal is led by Hossein Mousavi. It is radically pro-Khomeini, and split off from the mainstream Shi'ite group, Amal, controlled by the more moderate Nabih Berri.

Hossein Mousavi and his Islamic Amal played a direct support role in the Beirut bombings of the U.S. Embassy and the Multi-National Peacekeeping Forces in 1983. Both he and his organization are based in Baalbek, thus interphase most closely with the local Hisballah branch controlled by Sheik Tofailli. This is not to say that Mousavi plays a role in every Jihad action. For example, during one recent meeting in which a terrorist action was planned in Baalbek, he was not even present.

These diverse elements, in addition to providing Jihad fodder, are also the key groups through which Teheran hopes to control the final outcome in war-torn Lebanon -- the establishment of an Islamic state identical to Iran's own. Thus, the mission of Jihad's patrons is multi-faceted.

One element remains constant: Islamic Republic sponsorship of Jihad operations. In Beirut, they are coordinated by Iran's Charge

-13-

D'affaires at the Embassy of the Islamic Republic, Mahmoud Nourani. Nourani is in charge of coordinating support locally. But he takes his orders from Iran's Ambassador to Syria, Ayatollah Mohtashami. Mohtashami, in turn, is in close contact with the leadership of the Supreme Council in Teheran which approves and often plans terrorist operations undertaken in the name of Islamic Jihad. Mohtashami's superior, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Valayati, is also a key figure in the chain of command and is consulted on operations which involve Foreign Ministry support.

Another Foreign Ministry link to Islamic Republic-supported terrorist operations in Lebanon and elsewhere is Deputy Foreign Minister Sheik Oleslam who often relays orders by hand from Teheran rather than risk western interception of telephonic and telex communications. Sheik Oleslam is also Teheran's principal liaison with Libyan terrorist networks which have supplied support for Iranian operations in the past. And the reverse.

(For example, shortly before Libyan gunmen and diplomats were expelled from London last year for their role in the machine-gunning of anti-Kadaffi demonstrators -- a woman police constable was killed -- European operatives for the Islamic Republic offered to blow up the Libyan Embassy with a suicide truck bomb, thus destroying any incriminating evidence.)

Significantly, Sheik Oleslam recently visited Nicaragua to discuss Islamic Republic support for Daniel Ortega's Sandanistas. This support included the offer of Islamic Republic terrorist facilities, personnel, and training.

While Syria has itself provided intelligence back-up for Jihad operations which Damascus sees as helping it achieve its own ambitions in Lebanon, President Assad is not always consulted before an operation. In the case of one recent incident supported by elements in

the Islamic Republic's Syrian Embassy, an open clash took place between the two governments because President Assad had not been informed. Partly to avoid such disagreements -- and in return for Syria's solidarity -- the Islamic Republic sends an estimated million free tons of oil to Damascus each year.

Islamic Jihad operations also have the close support of Iranian Pasdaran forces which Syria has permitted to be stationed in the Bekaa Valley. While Assad has since ordered their numbers reduced, there were 5,000 of them at one time. These Revolutionary Guard units provide both personnel, indoctrination, and training for Hisballah and Islamic Amal terrorists, the twin backbones for Jihad operations. A Pasdaran deputy, Hossein Dehghan, serves as coordinator of these services. His dual control is the Islamic Republic's embassies in Beirut and Damascus.

Since 1981, Iran's Ayatollahs have also provided training for Hisballah martyr-terrorists in the Islamic Republic, itself. Most of this schooling takes place at a terrorist training camp located outside Teheran at Manzarieh Park, not far from Khomeini's residence. The camp is directed by Mehdi Hashemi -- a relative of the Republic's powerful Ayatollah Montazeri.

Arguably, the connections between Jihad operations and Islamic Republic officials in Teheran, Lebanon, and Syria have been documented to such an extent that it is inconceivable to absolve Iran's responsibility. In the business of terrorism, there is no such thing as happenstance or coincidence. Operations are too carefully planned.

Take, for example, the twin bombings in December, 1983 of France's crack, high-speed train, the "Tres Grand Vitesse", and the Marseille rail station. The explosions killed five, injured scores. They were

claimed by a group which identified itself as the "Armed Arab Struggle" as retaliation for the bombing by French aircraft of Shi'ite terrorist facilities in the Bekaa Valley.

Within a week of the attack a letter, postmarked East Berlin, was sent to French officials by the notorious "Carlos". The letter included a fingerprint for positive identification and claimed that it was he, "Carlos", who masterminded the attack on behalf of the Armed Arab Struggle. The French took him at his word.

Now "Carlos" is presently suspected of being a Libyan asset, willing to work for anybody if the price and cause is right. Significantly, however, a key Iranian terrorist coordinator -- travelling on a Syrian passport -- had arrived in East Berlin only two days before "Carlos'" letter was postmarked. His name was Mousavi Khoeniah and his name will arise again later in my testimony.

Was Khoeniah's presence in East Berlin a mere coincidence? Or could one simply substitute Islamic Jihad for "Armed Arab Struggle?" Clearly, it had been their personnel who suffered most from the French bombing.

Institutionalized Terrorism. Quite apart from the non-indigenous movements which it supports, the Islamic Republic maintains its own formidable terrorist apparatus ranging from the often-youthful Basij Corps -- they have been indoctrinated to martyr themselves, and many of them already have at the Iraq front -- to the 300,000-strong Pas-daran, or Revolutionary Guards, who operate many of the terrorist training camps.

It is no accident that the use of terror to obtain political ends has become an institution in Iran. The formulative process began in the early 1960's when, in 1963, the Ayatollah Khomeini was sent into exile,

first to Turkey, then to Najaf, Iraq in 1965. Thousands of his followers were to be trained in terrorist camps operated by the PLO in Lebanon, Syria, and South Yemen.

Yassar Arafat once boasted that more than 10,000 Khomeini loyalists had been trained in these camps. Much of the funding for this training was provided by the Soviet Union who reportedly underwrote the expenses of each trainee. But more of this later. Suffice it to say that many terrorist-trained Khomeini supporters now hold important offices in the Islamic Republic.

Sheik Oleslam, Deputy Foreign Minister, is one. Mostafa Mir Salim, an advisor to the Islamic Republic's President Hojatoleslam Ali Khamenei, is another. A former student at Moscow's Patrice Lumumba University, he also attended terrorist training camps in South Yemen. He is connected today to at least one terrorist training facility in Iran. Yet, incongruously, he was the Islamic Republic's chief negotiator with the hijackers of the Kuwaiti Airbus in Teheran last December.

Mousavi Khoeniah, another graduate from Patrice Lumumba -- and the University of Leipsig in East Germany -- also was a terrorist camp trainee. For the past several years he has headed the Islamic Republic's Haj pilgrimage to Mecca. And the Saudi's have twice expelled him for inciting disturbances, leading pro-Khomeini demonstrations. In the mid-1970's, Khoeniah was a Soviet bagman who helped funnel nearly \$400 thousand from Kremlin sources each month to finance Khomeini's revolution. He also delivered propoganda tapes from Khomeini to KGB editors in Moscow who, in turn, would relay them on to Baku for broadcast into Iran over a black radio station called the National Voice of Iran. Khoeniah is today considered one of the most powerful figures in Iran, ranking in importance to Speaker of the Majlis (Parliament) Ali Akbar Rafsanjani.

-16-

Other terrorist-trained figures in the Iranian government include Minister for Heavy Industry, Bahzad Nabavi, and Oil Minister Mohammed Gharazi. A former Pasdaran commander, he once ordered the slaughter of an entire Kurdish village.

Frequently under the guidance of Pasdaran officials, the Islamic Republic today maintains a network of at least 8 identifiable terrorist training facilities. Many of the students are foreigners recruited abroad whose patrons are movements included under the umbrella organization of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution. The camps are scattered throughout the Islamic Republic from Bandar Abbas in southern Iran, to Teheran in the north. Each has a specific mission.

For example, Pasdaran suicide pilots are trained on Swiss-supplied PC-7 Pilatus aircraft at a camp near Bushire which is called "The Base of the Soldiers of Imam." North of Teheran is the Manzarieh Park training facility for suicide volunteers where they are indoctrinated and schooled in demolitions and light weapons use. Other camps -- including those solely for women -- exist in Meshed, and the port of Bandar Abbas. The latter facility is used to teach mining techniques in, not only Gulf ports, but also key oil terminals in Europe such as Holland's giant Europort complex.

Last March, yet another camp was spotted some 40 miles from Isfahan where as many as 90 foreign recruits can be trained in explosives and small arms at a time.

Were this all not menacing enough, events have now shown a significant Iranian terrorist capability in Europe where networks are coordinated by Foreign Ministry officials up to the rank of Ambassador. Iranian diplomats have been expelled from England, France, and Spain for their roles in, and links to, terrorist activities. Meanwhile,

there is evidence to suggest that Islamic Republic terrorists and surrogates have become active in Athens, Greece. Indeed, keeping track of potential terrorist activity in the ever-growing numbers of cultural and student religious centers financed by the Islamic Republic is rapidly becoming a security nightmare throughout all of Europe.

But perhaps the most telling example of the institutionalizing of terror in Iran today is a political leaflet we acquired last year before the Majlis elections took place. The leaflet, not unlike those distributed by our own politicians at election time, touted the qualifications of one candidate as follows:

- * Trained as a defender of the revolution in Libyan PLO camps.
- * A fighter for Polosario forces operating in the western Sahara.
- * Former member of Pasdaran, a participant in revolutionary actions.
- * The revolutionary assassin of three officials in the Shah's government. (The names of the victims were then mentioned prominently.)

Like most American politicians -- or those anywhere for that matter, the candidate wore a clear expression of sincerity. He was bearded. And he was wearing a baseball cap when photographed. I do not know if his campaign was successful. Perhaps I should check.

A Grim Future. What does the Islamic Republic's wholesale export of terrorism and revolution hold in store for the United States and its western allies?

Unfortunately, it appears that no one in the previous administration considered this question when the danger signals were first hoisted during the Shah's crumbling rule. If the present administration has addressed this question, they have not shared the

answers. Perhaps they would only echo the reply given me by a senior American diplomat in our embassy in Saudi Arabia last year.

Spreading his arms in helplessness, he said: "Just what the hell does anybody expect us to do about it?"

It was not an answer which inspired confidence in this Nation's ability to influence events, or even control its own destiny, in this, perhaps the most strategic region of the entire world. Like the flu, incompetence, uncertainty, and the total absence of a firm policy is catching. Can a weak Kuwait count on American assistance or intervention if they are threatened by Iranian-sponsored internal disorders, and terrorism? They think not. Can Bahrain? Can Saudi Arabia? How about Qatar?

With Congress' reluctance to commit U.S. forces or meaningful assistance in case a key ally is threatened from within, the future for the United States in the Persian/Arabian Gulf is bleak indeed. Only an outright attack upon a Gulf nation is likely to bring about a response. And the Ayatollahs will never make such a mistake. But let us take the scenario one step further.

Assume, if you will, that an American hostage -- say William Buckley -- is placed on trial and executed by those who now hold him. We have warned Iran of the consequences of this act. But, apparently, there has been little consideration of an often over-looked treaty between the Soviet Union and Iran. Signed in 1921, the treaty legalizes Soviet intervention if Iran is attacked by a foreign power.

I do not mean to suggest that the Kremlin would embark on a military confrontation with us. But the treaty is still in force. How would the Soviet Union react? What about our allies within NATO? High officials in Europe have explained to me that the United States could expect no support from them in the event of a retaliatory attack upon

Iran. Quite the contrary, I was informed that they would condemn such an action. Hisballah and Islamic Amal bases in the Bekaa Valley might be expendable, they suggested. But Iranian targets like the port facilities at Bandar Khomeini, Bushire, or the oil terminals at Kharg Island and the Sirri Islands, never.

The Emperor has appeared naked once too often. And it's every man for himself. Clearly, planners of U.S. policy in the Gulf never anticipated this development once events which toppled the Shah began to unfold. It was a disastrous mistake which generations of Americans may have to suffer from -- to say nothing of the world community as a whole.

But here is another scenario which deals with the future of Iran, itself:

Forged and maintained in a climate of violence, martyrdom, and terror, the Islamic Republic is apt to exit the same way upon the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini, now 84. Resistance to the harsh rule of the Ayatollahs is already growing. Even the Mullahs have begun to question the leadership in Teheran. Meanwhile, the military -- never trusted by Khomeini -- is resentful of clerical control and mismanagement of the war against Iraq which has already cost Iran an estimated 150,000 dead.

Within the Islamic Republic, armed resistance is surfacing. Fighting, for example, continues in the Kurdish region on the border with Turkey. Not even 100,000 well-armed Pasdaran have managed to suppress the Kurdish drive for ethnic autonomy. One reason may be that there are over three million Kurds in Iran today.

The regions of Baluchistan to the east, Azerbaidjanistan to the north, also harbor dreams of ethnic autonomy. And Azerbaidjanis represent more than a quarter of Iran's population. In the wake of internal

disorders -- perhaps even civil war -- which may follow Khomeini's death, they will surely seek autonomy from Persian Iran, joining the Kurds in breaking with Teheran. There are those who stand ready to assist them.

If the Soviet Union could co-opt these ethnic forces and regions, the impact on those nations across the Gulf, Turkey, and Pakistan would be catastrophic -- to say nothing of Iran's oil customers like Japan and Europe. In the case of an autonomous and allied Baluchistan, Moscow would enjoy de facto control over the gate to the Persian/Arabian Gulf, the strategic Straits of Hormuz. An ethnically Balkanized Iran would extend Soviet influence to the rear doorstep of Turkey. Pressures which could be brought to bear would be irresistible.

Imagine the possibilities for the Kremlin: a slab of allied territory extending from the Sino-Pakistan border, encompassing Afghanistan, across nearly the northern third of Iran to its frontier with Turkey, then south from the Afghan border to the Gulf of Oman.

I am not waving the banner of the "Red Menace". I am simply describing an opportunity which Moscow would be a fool to overlook. The Soviet Union shares a 2400 kilometer border with Iran. Thus, the region is legitimately within their security concerns, as Mexico is within ours. One thing is for sure: having assisted in the collapse of one pro-western government in Teheran, Moscow will not stand by idly while another is installed. In the same position, given the same priorities, I would do the same. And so, I suspect, would you.

Somebody in this body and in the present administration better consider this possibility. Moscow already has. Over the past decade, the Soviet Union has managed to penetrate these ethnic forces to a significant degree. Indeed, throughout most of World War II and until

1946, Moscow controlled a good chunk of Iran. They called it the Azerbaidjan Democratic Republic. And the Soviet Union has not attempted to hide a desire to return. Speeches given by Soviet officials in Baku, not far from the Iranian border in the Azerbaidjan SSR have continually mentioned this intention.

It is a fact that there are documented links between the Islamic Republic's Azeri ethnic community and Politburo member Gaydar Ali Reza Aliev. For the record, Aliev was head of the KGB in the Azerbaidjan SSR for 17 years. Aliev has also been directly tied to an attempt by a former SAVAK official to overthrow the Shah in 1962. He also enjoys significant standing within the Kurdish independence movement. Increasing numbers of Kurds now identify with Moscow -- the best opportunity, as they see it, to achieve autonomy.

These ethnic movements which seek to split off from the Islamic Republic are not the only elements which have been penetrated. Since the very first days of its clandestine support for Khomeini, Moscow has quietly constructed its own infrastructure within the Islamic Republic's religious community. This, then, in consideration of the day when Iran's clerical regime will fall. Moscow's assets are now believed to include key officials in the Teheran government.

Informed Iranians in exile, as well as many still residing in the Islamic Republic, insist that Mousavi Khoeniah is one such "agent of influence". Another is said to be Deputy Foreign Minister Sheik Oleslam. A third is believed to be Mostafa Mir Salim, an important presidential advisor. And there are many others. Collectively, they have acquired the name "The Red Mullahs". They will be in a position to help swing a post-Khomeini regime towards Moscow's line.

At present, the Soviet Union is content to sit back quietly as

Khomeini's Pasdaran and SAVAMA (the successor to the Shah's SAVAK) winkle out and eliminate the last cells of Iran's overt communist movement, the Tudeh Party. But its most important "agents of influence" remain undetected, literally under Khomeini's nose.

As dissent increases within the Islamic Republic, is there nothing that the United States can do to influence the outcome, and put an end to the wholesale export of terror and revolution? Is there no alternative to the present regime in Teheran except one which would support Moscow and vice-versa?

In a display of ignorance which can only be called appalling at best, over 50 of your colleagues sent messages of support last June to Massoud Rahjavi, leader of the Paris-based Mujaheddin al Kalq. This was in commemoration of the anniversary of his ill-fated attempt to overthrow the Ayatollahs in 1981. Presumably, there must have been some confusiuon between the Afghan Mujaheddin and Rahjavi's organization which is totally committed to Marxist dogma.

The Mujaheddin al Kalq began its existance as a terrorist organization which sought to overthrow the Shah. To this end, it allied itself with forces loyal to the Ayatollah Khomeini, then in exile in Najaf, Iraq. Mujaheddin publications have openly boasted of the assassinations of five U.S. servicemen in Iran during its campaign of destabilization. Rahjavi, himself, is believed to have ordered the murders.

Upon Khomeini's triumphant return to Teheran, Rahjavi volunteered his cadres to assist in organizing the Islamic regime's security services, and Pasdaran units. In 1980, when Khomeini was weighing the release of American hostages siezed during the Embassy take-over by followers of the so-called "Imam Line" -- incidentally, they were led by

Mousavi Khoeniah -- Rahjavi pleaded with Khomeini to welsch on the deal. There was much more to gain by holding the hostages than releasing them, he insisted. He pointed out, in any event, that the U.S. had already exhibited its inability to rescue the hostages in the disaster at Desert One. Happily, Rahjavi was overruled.

In June of 1981, he finally wore out his welcome by demanding that the Mujaheddin were entitled to share power with the Ayatollahs because of their services and sacrifices for the revolution. When this demand was denied, Rahjavi decided on a test of strength and ordered his loyalists into the streets of Teheran. He lost. Massoud Rahjavi and the irrelevant Bani Sadr then fled together to France. Since then, he has been building an image of legitimacy as a viable goverment-in-exile.

Meanwhile, moderate exile leaders like former Prime Minsters Ali Amini and Shahpour Bahktiar have been all but ignored. They, too, have built significant organizations in both France and the United States. It is true that both men have endorsed in principal the return of the Shah's son, and a limited restoration of the Peacock Throne on a strict, constitutional basis. The allied Amini and Bahktiar forces have advocated stringent neutrality for Iran with favoritism for neither east nor west -- vital if the Soviet Union is not to feel compelled to intervene.

The Amini-Bahktiar coalition is known to have support inside the Islamic Republic, mainly within the disaffected middle class and the military. They also have an insurgent capacity though it is not as active in Iran as that of the Mujaheddin. It occurs that this body might well take under advisement support of these moderate elements so that they may more effectively pursue their campaign against the extremism of the Ayatollahs, the equally hostile alternative of the Mujaheddin.

The point is, can we afford not to? Or, like our committed diplomat in Saudi Arabia across the Gulf, do we just spread our arms and ask: "What the hell does anybody expect us to do about it?"

So much for the grim future. What then about the present and the immediate threat of terrorism?

As a journalist, it is not up to me to recommend or endorse any specific legislation. And I do not intend to. Meanwhile, I realize that these hearings are of an exploratory nature. Thus, I do not feel constrained from sharing observations with you. I am convinced that there are two areas which should be carefully considered by this body. The first is our ability, or assets, to counter terrorist threats against our vital interests. The second is restraints which prevent us from countering the threat.

1. Counter-terrorism has become bureaucratically fashionable. Indeed, federal agencies boast a dizzying array of intelligence units, SWAT capabilities, and inter-agency coordinators. In reality, however, the tradecraft of counter-terrorism has become a career and empire builder for bureaucrats. Now this may be the American way of government, but the habit puts us all at risk.

Count the players in the game. The State Department has its own department of counter-terrorism. So does the FBI. Ditto the DIA. The Pentagon, the Army that is, owns rights to the Delta Force. Not to be outdone, the Navy claims the SEALs. The Airforce is involved. The CIA is also charged with the mission of detecting and neutralizing terrorist threats. It, too, has its own "hard men". The DEA has diverted some assets from its primary mission to assist in developing intelligence. And so has the NSA. And the NSC.

Everyone wants a piece of the action. The confusion, the duplication of effort, the unwieldy -- and often conflicting chains of

command -- structure simply dilutes our efforts. It seems to me that this nation should pool its anti-terrorist talents under one roof, answerable only to the highest levels of government. Its director should be a member of the Cabinet. The Delta Force would be directly controlled by this body, not by a succession of Pentagon brass hats. The result would be a totally integrated effort without outside duplication.

The body should be able to call upon Pentagon assets wherever and whenever needed. It should develop its own intelligence capability with input from those agencies which have relevant access to material which concerns its mission.

Within government, scattered throughout involved agencies, there are individuals with extraordinary insights into the world of terrorism, and demonstrated abilities in penetrating to its core. Apart, these men and women are less than effective. Together, they would be formidable, indeed. Because the threat of terrorism is today greatest abroad, the body's mandate should be international, not domestic. But it would, of course, coordinate with the FBI. The unit could either be a separate body, or it could function under the auspices of the CIA.

2. Prevention is the best cure for terrorism. This depends directly on intelligence capabilities. But developing this capability is nearly impossible under present constraints which, in some cases, strictly forbids the suborning of assets, the funding of counter-terrorist surrogates of a second or third nation.

Fighting terrorism is a dirty game. But, if you lose the game, the consequences can be worse. I am not advocating the Israeli approach, but when was the last time one of their embassies was bombed, or an El Al jet hijacked? If one accepts that terrorism is a form of war -- at least as practiced by the Islamic Republic -- one must meet the challenge, or accept defeat and increasing losses.

I am troubled by a moral dilemma. Does one maintain restraints legally on our counter-terrorist effort, and await the inevitable? If so, we place ourselves in the position of retaliating for an attack with, in some cases, a certain loss of innocent lives -- perhaps scores of them. Or do we assume the preventive role? As for myself, I would prefer to prevent rather than retaliate.

But it means we must play a dirty game.

Thank you for your time. I hope it has not been wasted for it is far more valuable than mine.

#