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(Purpose: To provide \$2,000,000 for the purpose of conducting research and development programs to improve arms control verification technology and to establish an office at the Argonne National Laboratory to conduct such programs.)

Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I have an amendment that I am offering for myself and Senator Dixon which I send to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The bill clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Illinois (Mr. SIMON) for himself and Mr. DIXON, proposes an amendment numbered 227.

Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I could not hear a word that was said. Whose amendment is it and what is it all about? Could we have some order in this place?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois will suspend until the Senate is in order. Will Senators please take their seats?

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I did not hear the name of the Senator offering the amendment. I have not heard the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is offered by the Senator from Illinois. I will ask the clerk to report the amendment for the second time.

The bill clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Illinois (Mr. SIMON) for himself and Mr. DIXON, proposes an amendment numbered 227.

Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

On page 184, line 24, before the period insert the following: "and of which \$2,000,000 shall be used to conduct research and development programs to improve arms control verification technology and to establish an office in the Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Illinois, to conduct such programs."

Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, today Senator Dixon and I are offering an amendment authorizing the Argonne National Laboratory in Argonne, IL to be one of the resource centers for arms verification for the nation. Funding will come under Division C, Department of Energy National Security Applications, Department of Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1986.

The need for such research efforts has never been greater. Today, there is no one center for developing and refining verification of treaty compliance technologies, nor is there a government reporting or coordinating body

in any formal sense in this area. Equally important, there is no congressional reporting requirement prepared by ACDA or DOE being brought public up to date or where it stands on verification. Apart from periodic reports on Soviet compliance practices—which in themselves speak volumes as to our highly capable monitoring and intelligence methods—not enough attention is paid to the crucial task of verification technology development.

This amendment will help foster creative R&D apart from that now being pursued at DOE's weapons labs. This approach has the double advantage of stimulating renewed competition or verification technologies while also attracting new talent and untraditional methodology by integrating the non-weapons labs' interdisciplinary research (especially in areas not normally pursued at Los Alamos, Livermore, and Sandia) and applying it to the new challenges facing arms control treaty verification.

These challenges are becoming more and more difficult as new weapons systems proliferate, as new countries move to acquire nuclear weapons, and as the strains on current verification of compliance multiply. Much of the new weapons technology is focused on deception and concealment, including increasingly smaller and mobile systems. Argonne can draw upon basic research strengths found at the lab, pulling together the materials, physical, chemical, and computer sciences into a very sophisticated technical sensor and data interpretation base.

Argonne could be involved in identifying promising technologies and developing innovative approaches for the verification of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons treaties. Problem areas long anticipated or now upon us include very low yield nuclear detonations detection, identification of warheads on deployed systems (e.g., nuclear or chemical), chemical and biological testing and production detection, atmospheric radioactivity sampling, nuclear reactor and fuel safeguards/waste disposal/processing. This last activity holds special promise for use in nonproliferation regimes, and has long been an area of Argonne's strength; these applications will serve to renew our commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty which is to be reviewed later this fall. In addition, little basic research has yet to be conducted on chemical weapons verification an area whose technology requirements are analogous to much of the environmental research underway at Argonne. This too is in accord with the Chemical Weapons Treaty tabled by the Reagan administration at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Finally, a host of verification issues continue to surround the tabling of a comprehensive test ban treaty, and it is to be hoped that Argonne can address these concerns as a priority item.

In order to public confidence in arms control negotiations to continue to grow, it is absolutely essential for the scientific community to improve its methods and equipment and for the Congress to stay abreast of the new advances. There is much more to be done on verification, and I intend to seek additional changes in the structure and capabilities of governmental verification work. Argonne will strengthen our verification base and help Congress determine which treaties we can verify with high confidence and which treaties we cannot. This last function is an imperative particularly for the Senate charged with granting advice and consent on treaty ratification. Would it not be better to embark on our ratification duties armed with the best possible scientific results? I am convinced that the answer can only be a resounding "yes."

Mr. President, I see Senator WARNER on the floor. This is the amendment I say to the Senator, that Senator Dixon and I discussed with him. This is the one that seeks greater utilization of the Argonne National Laboratory for verification and research. It does not add any money to the total authorization. I believe it is completely acceptable, at least we have cleared it with staffs on both sides. I have discussed it briefly with Senator GOLDWATER and Senator NUNN.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I concur in the observations of the Senator from Illinois. He is accurate in his presentation. I support his amendment.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, we have looked at the amendment and we support the amendment.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, we will accept the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment (No. 227) was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 228

(Purpose: To require an annual report on research in arms control verification technology.)

Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I have a second amendment that I send to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The bill clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Illinois (Mr. SIMON) proposes an amendment numbered 228.

Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

On page 184, between lines 2 and 3, insert the following:

May 22, 1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 7013

ANNUAL REPORT ON ARMS CONTROL
VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY

SEC. 116. Not later than March 1, 1965, and March 1 of each year thereafter, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, shall transmit to the Congress a report on recent developments in the capabilities of the United States to monitor major weapons (including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons) deployed by the Soviet Union, including the capabilities of such weapons, and to monitor the development of new weapons by the Soviet Union for the purpose of—

(1) determining the level of compliance by the Soviet Union with arms control agreements including agreements which have been executed by representatives of the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union but which have not been ratified by both governments; and

(2) the extent to which, if at all, the Soviet Union has exceeded the limits set out in arms control proposals made by either such government during formal talks with each other.

(b) The report required by subsection (a) shall include—

(1) an evaluation of the capabilities of the United States referred to in such subsection as of the time of the report; and

(2) the research and development objectives of the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy with respect to such capabilities for the ensuing 10 years.

Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I am today offering an amendment to the Defense Authorization Act that will help clarify for the Members of Congress the vexing and complicated issues surrounding the verification of arms control treaty compliance. My amendment calls for an annual report, to be submitted not later than March 1 of each year beginning in 1966, detailing the full range of verification research and monitoring capabilities carried out by the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy's laboratory activities in this important area.

It is imperative that Congress be fully informed, on an annual basis, on verification problems and successes beyond occasional reports detailing Soviet compliance behavior. These reports, while worthwhile, are provided without much context as to where we stand on verification state-of-the-art. Congress needs to know with what level of confidence the DOD assembles its report: how much is based on high, medium, or low confidence in our verification technology. We further need to know about a variety of proposed treaties and treaties signed but unratified, including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons accords.

As weapons systems advance and become increasingly difficult to verify, it is essential that verification technologies keep pace with new weapons productions, testing, and deployment. A number of treaties are pending, are now in the process of being negotiated, or have been proposed by one country or another for consideration. It cannot be stressed enough that Congress can best exercise its defense oversight function if it is fully informed concerning our verification capabilities at

a given moment, and especially our R&D objectives for the next 10 years down the road. In this way we can then judge with higher confidence than is now possible whether our verification efforts are headed in the right direction, and whether we are truly capable of making an informed judgment on the compliance of treaties. We will then be best serving the national security of the United States.

Mr. President, I have discussed this amendment with the minority and majority staffs. This amendment is simply calling for an annual verification report. One of the things I discovered as I was researching the verification problem is that there is no report regularly to Congress on this vital subject.

I know of no controversy on it. I would be happy to answer any questions. I have discussed it with the staffs on both sides.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, we have no quarrel with this amendment. We will accept it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment (No. 328) was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 328

(Purpose: To authorize for appropriation \$21,800,000 for construction of a Brigade Activity Center at the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland.)

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The bill clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD) proposes an amendment numbered 328.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

On page 110, line 17, delete \$1,820,000 and insert in lieu thereof \$23,480,000.

On page 140, line 2, delete \$2,373,403,000 and insert in lieu thereof \$2,345,901,000.

On page 147, line 3, delete \$1,185,880,000 and insert in lieu thereof \$1,217,589,000.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, the U.S. Naval Academy is the only academy of our military services that does not have a brigade activity center. We usually refer to these as multipurpose buildings. The President of the United States has asked for this in his initial budget period. I am proposing that we restore this to the budget. It would authorize the building of this center. We recognize that the curricula have been improved to the point where they now compete with any of the major universities of this country.

In order to continue to attract such young men and women to the Naval Academy, I think it is very important to add this kind of a facility.

Mr. President, this will add \$21 million for such a facility, and authorize

tion. We can determine at a different time if we want to fund it for fiscal year 1966 or whenever we want to fund it. But I would like to see this authorized at this time.

The Naval Academy must be competitive with other major universities and service academies if we are going to continue to attract the bright, competitive young leaders we need.

The Brigade Activity Center is essential to allow the seating of the brigade to provide the academic, professional and cultural programs needed to ensure a well-rounded education for our future Navy leaders.

A unique plus for our service academies is the ability to frequently provide truly distinguished speakers with a wide variety of experiences for the entire brigade. The Naval Academy, unlike the other service academies, has no facility adequate to seat the entire brigade under reasonable acoustic or environmental circumstances; therefore a great opportunity is lost.

The design of the facility permits it to be divided into smaller segments which will be used simultaneously on a daily basis to support lectures and debate groups, seminars, briefings, and various clubs and informal assemblies. Larger sections will accommodate band and glee club rehearsals as well as large gathering for indoctrination programs and seminars.

The facility will also support sporting events such as basketball, tennis, volleyball, boxing and other sports actively pursued at our service academies.

I would like to yield to the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have discussed this matter with the distinguished Senator from Oregon, and perhaps the Senate is not aware that he is a trustee of this institution, and a former sailor of great distinction during World War II. I think he looked into the matter carefully. I have urged the distinguished chairman of the Military Construction Committee to hopefully agree with this amendment.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, this item was not approved in the Senate Armed Services Committee. It was not considered such a high-priority item. There is a need for it. But since then, the Superintendent of the Naval Academy has expressed in strong terms a need for it. I understand there does not currently exist a facility to assemble the entire brigade of midshipmen under one roof, and this is a badly needed item. In view of the fact that all of the other academies have such a building, the need is expressed by the Superintendent, and expressed by these Senators, I am willing to recommend that to our able chairman.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, thank the Senator from South Carolina. I have checked this with the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. BENNETT).

June 5 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE

S 7549

increase the levels of exchange services activities.

(F) The process by which a military installation is selected for new or increased levels of activities of the exchange services.

(G) the process by which a military installation is selected for new or increased levels of activities of the exchange services.

(H) the consideration given to the impact that the addition of a new activity or an increase in an existing activity of an exchange service at a military installation will have on private commercial business operations available in the vicinity of the installations and

(I) the economic impact which the addition of a new activity or increases in an existing activity of the exchange services on military installations will have on private commercial businesses operating in the vicinity of the installations.

(c) The Department of Defense, the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, and the Navy Exchange Service may not operate or authorize the operation of more than one commercial franchise food vending business or a military installation. The foregoing sentence shall not be construed as an exception to the limitations provided in subsection (a).

MANAGEMENT OF MILITARY RECORDS MAINTAINED BY THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

Sec. 945. (a) The Congress finds that the National Archives and Records Administration has received a substantial number of military records and that, by reason of the manner in which the records are maintained, many of such records are not readily accessible to the public.

(b) It is the sense of the Congress that the Archivist of the United States should appoint an advisory committee—

(1) to study the manner in which military records received by the National Archives and Records Administration are maintained; and

(2) to make recommendations to the Archivist on appropriate ways to manage and maintain such records to enhance public access to the records.

(c) Not later than March 31, 1966, the Archivist shall transmit to the Congress a report outlining a 5-year plan, a 10-year plan, and a 20-year plan for improving the management, maintenance, storage and preservation of military records and for improving public access to such records. In preparing the report, the Archivist shall consider any recommendations received from any advisory committee appointed as recommended in subsection (b).

MONITORING AND VERIFICATION OF SOVIET MOBILE ICBMS

Sec. 946. (a) The Senate finds that: (1) Verification, and our ability to monitor Soviet forces, are major national security considerations.

(2) Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union are entering an era of greater intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) mobility.

(3) Any mobile ICBMs deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union should be verifiable.

(4) The Soviet Union is on the threshold of deploying two kinds of mobile ICBMs that could pose monitoring and verification difficulties for the United States.

(5) The President has reported to the Congress that increased burdens on monitoring capabilities resulting from strategic developments such as deployment of mobile ICBMs can be reduced if cooperative verification measures are adopted.

(b) In view of these findings—

(1) The Senate directs the Administration to address the monitoring and verification issues associated with the United States' small ICBM and Soviet mobile ICBMs, with particular attention to the Soviet deployment of a single warhead ICBM in either a hardened, soft, or deceptive mobile basing mode, in a classified report, with an unclassified summary, to Congress by January 15, 1966.

(2) The Senate further urges the Administration to give the highest priority to the general problem or verification of mobile ICBMs with the Soviet Union in the new negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms or through appropriate diplomatic channels.

ANNUAL REPORT ON ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY

Sec. 947. (a) Not later than March 1, 1966, and March 1 of each year thereafter, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, shall transmit to the Congress a report on recent developments in the capabilities of the United States to monitor major weapons (including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons) deployed by the Soviet Union, including the capabilities of such weapons and to monitor the development of new weapons by the Soviet Union for the purpose of—

(1) determining the level of compliance by the Soviet Union with arms control agreements, including agreements which have been executed by representatives of the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union but which have not been ratified by both governments; and

(2) the extent to which, if at all, the Soviet Union has exceeded the limits set out in arms control proposals made by either such government during formal talks with each other.

(b) The report required by subsection (a) shall include—

(1) an evaluation of the capabilities of the United States referred to in such subsection as of the time of the report; and

(2) the research and development objectives of the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy with respect to such capabilities for the ensuing 10 years.

NATO COOPERATIVE PROJECTS

Sec. 948. (a) Section 7 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 3767) is amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 7. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION COOPERATIVE PROJECTS.—(a) The President may enter into an agreement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or with one or more member countries (other than the United States) of NATO for a cooperative project. Participants other than the United States in a cooperative project are hereinafter in this section referred to as 'other participants'.

(b) For the purposes of this section, a 'cooperative project' is a jointly managed arrangement, described in a written agreement amount the parties, which is undertaken in order to further the objectives of standardization, rationalization, and interoperability of the armed forces of North Atlantic Treaty Organization member countries, and which provides—

(1) for one or more of the other participants to share with the United States the costs of research, development, testing, evaluation, or joint production (including follow-on support) of certain defense articles.

(2) for concurrent production in the United States and in another member country of a defense article jointly developed in accordance with clause (1); or

(3) for procurement by the United States of a defense article or defense service for another member country.

(c) Each such agreement shall provide that the United States and each of the other participants will contribute to the cooperative project its equitable share of the full cost of such cooperative project and will receive an equitable share of the results of such cooperative project. The full costs of such cooperative project shall include, but not be limited to, overhead and administrative costs. The United States and the other participants may contribute their equitable shares of the full cost of such cooperative project in funds or in defense articles or defense services needed for such cooperative project. Military assistance and financing received from the United States Government may not be used by any of the other participants to provide its share of the cost of such cooperative project.

(d) The President may contract or incur other obligations for a cooperative project on behalf of the other participants, without charge to any appropriation or contract authorization if each of the other participants in the cooperative project agrees: (1) to pay its equitable share of the contract or such other obligations; and (2) to make such funds available in such amounts and at such times as may be required by the contract or such other obligations and to pay any damages and costs that may accrue from the performance of or cancellation of such contract or other obligation in advance of the time such payments, damages, or costs are due.

(e) With the approval of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, a cooperative agreement made by the United States before the date of the enactment of this section that otherwise meets the requirements of this section may be treated on and after such date as having been made under this section.

(f)(1) For those cooperative projects entered into on and after the date of the enactment of this section, the President may reduce or waive the charge or charges which would otherwise be considered appropriate under section 21(e) of this Act in connection with sales under sections 21 and 22 of this Act when such sales are made as part of such cooperative project. However, the President may reduce or waive such charge or charges only if the other participants agree to reduce or waive corresponding charges under the same and other cooperative projects in which both they and the United States are participants.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 21(e)(1)(A) and section 49(b) of this Act, administrative surcharges shall not be increased on other sales made under this Act in order to compensate for reductions or waivers of such surcharges under this section. Funds received pursuant to such other sales shall not be available to reimburse the costs incurred by the United States Government for which reduction or waiver is approved by the President under this section.

(g)(1) Not less than fifteen days before a cooperative project agreement is signed on behalf of the United States, the President shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a numbered certification with respect to such proposed agreement, setting forth—

(A) a detailed description of the cooperative project with respect to which the certification is made;

(B) an estimate of the quantity of the defense articles expected to be produced in furtherance of such cooperative project;

(C) an estimate of the full cost of the cooperative project, with an estimate of that part of the full cost to be incurred by the