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## TALKING POINTS - SOUTHERN AFRICA DEVELOPMENTS

o South Africa: As the dominant regional power, South African developments most profoundly affect the southern Africa region.

-- Domestic violence:

- Black expectations, raised by government reforms and talk of more far-reaching changes were not met by the South African Government's (SAG) new actions. Expansion of franchise to coloreds and Indians but not blacks in late 1983 was a trigger event in mobilizing activist blacks to organize and confront the government.
- SAG overconfidence allowed black activists to form a national organization, the United Democratic Front (UDF), which was quickly dominated by radicals promoting confrontation rather than negotiation with government. The UDF in its year and one-half before being largely dismantled by recent SAG security measures gained an international audience and influenced both urban black and international opinion in favor of confrontation. The recent SAG suppression of UDF largely precludes national orchestration or organization of violence beyond local manifestations.
- Episodes of violence began in 1984, arising from local economic grievances largely caused by the recession and government deflationary policies. Leadership of violence was assumed by young unemployed and students and was largely directed against "system blacks"--shopowners and government workers. While egged on by UDF and African National Congress (ANC) leaders, the ringleaders appear not part of any national organization and the violence is primarily anarchic. Increased state security measures are containing and suppressing violence but, , episodes of localized violence will reoccur over the next year and beyond.

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-- Economic stresses:

- In 1984, the SAG, in order to reduce inflation and restore a positive trade balance, pursued severe deflationary policies. These policies increased black unemployment, reduced revenues available for spending on services to blacks, and encouraged greatly increased private sector borrowing from abroad where interest was lower.

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- In 1985, while a positive (\$2 billion) trade balance was restored, a major overhang in short-term debt (\$12 billion due in 12 months or less) was created. In July, motivated by domestic US pressures plus concern over black violence, three US and one British bank publicly refused to roll over short-term South African debt and began calling in loans. This precipitated a minipanic among small banks and private investors, causing a severe outflow of hard currency from South Africa and heavy downward pressure on the rand.
  - On 1 September 1985, the SAG declared a four-month moratorium on principal repayments of private sector debt, reestablished a two-tier currency, and increased efforts to get European banks to roll over existing short-term debt and extend new loans. While the results of these moves are not yet conclusive, they will likely be successful in accomplishing both goals, but at the probable cost of delaying the expected 1986 economic recovery and sacrificing future GNP growth.
- o Regional violence: The Nkomati and Lusaka Accords in 1984 sparked hopes that regional violence could be reduced. However, 1985 has seen a surge in such violence and additional increases are likely. There are two principal types--insurgencies and quasi-insurgencies, and cross-border attacks.
- Insurgencies: In Angola, Jonas Savimbi's UNITA has doubled the size of his force (to 40,000) since 1983 and expanded operations to cover the entire country. In Mozambique, Alfonso Jaccama's RENAMO also expanded operations to all 10 provinces and expanded his forces to 15,000. Both insurgencies currently are facing major government offensives, but both are expected to weather these offensives and expand operations.
  - Quasi-insurgencies: Activities of both the ZAPU dissidents in Zimbabwe and the Lesotho dissidents have temporarily abated, but could quickly pick up should the SAG choose to support them--a real possibility.
  - Cross-border operations: The largest of these is on the Namibia-Angola border, where significant numbers of SWAPO insurgents periodically infiltrate into Namibia, and SAG combat forces also periodically cross into Angola in pursuit or on preemptive strikes. This violence abated in 1984 as the SAG withdrew from its salient in southern Angola pursuant to the Lusaka Accord, but is slowly picking up again and will likely resume in December if not earlier. Also in this category are SAG paramilitary strikes against ANC guerrilla sites and personnel in neighboring states. These have continued regularly in the past few years and more appear to be in the cards. ANC guerrilla incursions

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into South Africa were temporarily stymied by the Nkomati Accord, but have resumed through Botswana and Lesotho as the ANC develops new infiltration routes. Additionally, Zimbabwe in the last few weeks has increased its armed forces in Mozambique to 9,000 men and begun serious operations against RENAMO. Zimbabwe will have difficulty extracting its forces from this involvement in the Mozambique insurgency, and the Zimbabwean intervention by itself will not prove decisive. It opens the door to RENAMO retaliation into Zimbabwe and invites a flareup of the ZAPU dissidency in western Zimbabwe. Both Angola and Zimbabwe seem to be less inclined to negotiate with Pretoria recently, curiously misassessing domestic developments in South Africa as a sign of weakness. If continued, this could lead to provocative developments inviting South African retaliation.

- o Soviet activities in southern Africa: In 1983 and early 1984, the Soviets clearly appeared on the defensive. Their two principal client regimes, the MPLA in Angola and FRELIMO in Mozambique, were reeling before increasingly successful anticommunist insurgencies despite Soviet military assistance. The Angolan and Mozambican leaders, Dos Santos and Machel, intimidated by South African policies, had in early 1984 signed accords with the SAG without consulting Moscow. Machel, facing not only insurgency but economic bankruptcy, also began reestablishing a modus vivendi with the West in return for economic aid. The principal Soviet long-term vehicle of influence on South Africa--the ANC--lost its prime operating base when Machel agreed to the Nkomati Accord with South Africa in March 1984. Since that time, the Soviets have recouped some ground by pursuing time-honored tactics: increased military assistance, restrengthened political ties, a modicum of economic aid, and an active measures program.
  - Increased military assistance: In 1984, the Soviets sent \$1 billion in military hardware and the Cubans dispatched an additional 5,000 combat soldiers to reinforce the MPLA regime. Soviet assistance, including new-to-theater hardware such as SU-22 aircraft and MI-24 helicopters, helped both regimes to undertake current offensives. While the military situations will not necessarily improve, the rate of deterioration has been slowed.
  - Restrengthened political ties: High-level visits and massive training of cadres continues, and the pro-Soviet factions in both the MPLA and FRELIMO have weathered their leaders' policy shifts. Their position was helped by a change in party "line" espoused by Karen Brutents of the International Department of the CPSU, who developed an ideological rationale permitting Western economic aid as long as "the commanding heights" of the economy are kept under party control--which is the case in both Angola and Mozambique.

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- Economic aid: Soviet niggardliness in granting meaningful economic assistance continues, but constant client pressures have driven the Soviets to provide POL to Mozambique and promise over \$2 billion in economic aid to Angola.
  
- Active measures: The Soviets have pursued a determined active measures campaign designed to discredit the US by linking it with negative South African policies and actions and to promote the ANC and SWAPO as sole representatives of their peoples. A major target of this disinformation seems to be the leaderships in black southern Africa.

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