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# Argentina: Alfonsín and Emerging UCR Leaders Redirect the Party

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A Research Paper

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# Argentina: Alfonsín and Emerging UCR Leaders Redirect the Party

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**A Research Paper**

This paper was prepared by [Redacted] the  
Office of Leadership Analysis. [Redacted]  
[Redacted] Comments and  
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,  
South America Branch, [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

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**Scope Note**

This paper discusses the role of President Raúl Alfonsín and a younger group of like-minded emerging party leaders in moving the Radical Civic Union (UCR) from a faction-ridden, ideologically bound party to one more practical and forward leaning, with broad popular support. The paper also speculates on the future role of these emerging leaders. Although a variety of serious economic and political issues face the Alfonsín government and put it in some jeopardy, this subject is beyond the scope of the present paper, which focuses on the dynamics within the UCR. 

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## Argentina: Alfonsín and Emerging UCR Leaders Redirect the Party

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### Summary

*Information available  
as of 26 June 1986  
was used in this report.*

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Argentina's Radical Civic Union (UCR), which played a subordinate role to the Peronist party for over 40 years, has come to the forefront since the election of its leader, Raúl Alfonsín, as President in 1983. Taking advantage of Peronist disarray, Alfonsín has taken a tradition-bound and faction-ridden party and forged it into the nation's major political force.

A group of younger, emerging UCR leaders—more practical, action oriented, and flexible than many of their elders—have supported Alfonsín in his efforts to shift the party's traditional focus in several important ways. Specifically, Alfonsín and the younger leaders have:

- Broadened the party's base by appealing to sectors beyond its urban middle-class core—particularly to labor, a traditional Peronist stronghold, and the university student population, often susceptible to far-leftist appeals.
- Abandoned traditional party tenets—particularly in the economic field, where they have implemented a plan emphasizing austerity and privatization, and in the appointment of nonparty members to key posts.
- Strengthened the party's infrastructure and mobilized its membership and resources to support Alfonsín's policies by putting the UCR in touch with the man in the street.
- Taken steps toward alleviating longstanding factionalism by striking compromises on electoral lineups and strategy and by taking a conciliatory attitude regarding differences within the party.

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Although exact membership figures are not available for the UCR, we estimate that younger leaders make up about a quarter of the party's top echelon. A majority of them appear to support Alfonsín's policies, and they have been rewarded with key party, government, and legislative posts, including five seats on the party's 23-member governing board, numerous second-level posts in the government, and about a third of the committee chairmanships in the Chamber of Deputies. They are now well positioned both to implement the President's moderate policies and to inherit his leadership mantle. (Alfonsín's term ends in 1989, and he cannot legally succeed himself.)

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There is some limited opposition to Alfonsín in his party. A vocal leftist minority of the younger leaders, primarily resident in the Junta Coordinadora Nacional faction, endorses his leadership but not some of his policy choices. Old-guard UCR members are also skeptical about the party's new direction. 


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Added to disagreements among various UCR elements are other challenges facing Alfonsín and his proponents. These include an uncertain future for the economy, despite some progress by Alfonsín in that area, and continuing tension between the government and the military services. 


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In our view, if Alfonsín enjoys some success over the next three years, it will be due in part to the support of the emerging UCR leaders. Their increasing experience, influence, and skill in negotiation should help keep the party united and strong for the 1989 election. 

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A revitalized UCR augurs well for the future of democracy in Argentina. As a successful democratic institution, it dominates the center of the political spectrum, where most Argentines now find themselves, and thus limits the audience for issues put forth at the extremes. The success that the moderate UCR approach demonstrates could also encourage reformers among the Peronists to seek a similar road to political rehabilitation of their party—a first step toward the development of a responsible Peronist opposition. 

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The pro-Alfonsín emerging leaders may disagree with some areas of US policy—for example, US actions in Central America and attempts to regulate the development and proliferation of nuclear technology. Their moderate statements, however, on such matters as IMF and debt negotiations and narcotics control—plus their generally friendly attitude toward this country—promise enhanced cooperation in those areas. 

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


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**Argentina: Alfonsín and Emerging UCR Leaders Redirect the Party**



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**Introduction**

Argentina's Radical Civic Union (UCR), accustomed to playing second fiddle to the Peronist party for over 40 years, has been revitalized in recent years by Raúl Alfonsín, who has been President since 1983, and by some of the party's emerging younger leaders. With the UCR's unexpected victory in the 1983 election—Alfonsín won 52 percent of the vote, and party members running on his coattails won 147 of 300 seats in Congress—and the subsequent crumbling of the Peronist party, Alfonsín has forged the UCR into the nation's major political force.<sup>1</sup>

Although today Alfonsín dominates his party and has successfully addressed several critical issues, notably raging inflation, most observers agree that he faces three more difficult years and then an uncertain future for his party (he cannot legally succeed himself). This paper will describe how Alfonsín, with the help of younger proteges, has launched the UCR on a new course in the hope of establishing its lasting influence.

**The UCR: A Party of High Principles but an Often Secondary Role**

Founded in 1890, the UCR was the first Argentine party to challenge the political dominance of the traditional elite, composed of estate owners, bankers, and wealthy merchants. The UCR, in contrast, represented the increasing importance of commerce and industry and found support among the growing urban middle class, including immigrants, small businessmen, professionals, and white-collar workers. The party advocated democratic processes, honest government, economic nationalism, and state intervention,

<sup>1</sup> No membership figures for the Radical Party or its factions have been published. The party's relative size and strength can be roughly inferred from the total vote it received in the November 1985 congressional elections: just over 6.5 million votes, or about 43 percent of the vote; Peronists, by contrast, received about 35 percent. (Both totals, of course, include ballots cast by nonparty voters.) In addition, surging UCR membership and shifting and temporary internal alliances make concrete membership estimates extremely difficult.

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**The Making of the President, 1983**

*Campaigning in 1983 against a Peronist party fractured by internal dissension, Alfonsín moved to expand the Radical camp beyond its historical middle-class constituency. His program combined familiar populist economic and social welfare programs with strong advocacy of democratic government, union and military reform, and impassioned defense of human rights. A fiery orator, he led an aggressive media campaign that took his message to every part of Argentina. He battled the Peronists in their own stronghold—the working-class districts ringing Buenos Aires and other major urban areas. According to political preference polls, Alfonsín won with a broad electoral coalition including workers—who saw their Peronist-dominated union leadership as corrupt and too closely tied to the detested military—as well as conservatives and leftists opposed to Peronism.*

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and it eventually grew strong enough to capture the presidency, which it held from 1916 until a military takeover in 1930.

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The party then declined in influence, largely because of its rigid adherence to its principles and its growing factionalism. Deeply committed to establishing democratic government and extremely proud of their stand for universal suffrage, justice, and equality, many Radicals considered their party as much an ethical movement as a political organization and were loath to make political compromises with more authoritarian groups, notably the emerging Peronists. Moreover, despite the Radicals' shared principles, disunity arose over means and methods and severely limited the party's strength. The result was that from 1930 until 1983 the UCR was in power only once, during 1963-66, before again being ousted by a military coup. The

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**The UCR—A Home to Many Factions**

A broad spectrum of ideology finds a home in the UCR, resulting in factional and often intrafactional differences. Moreover, the party grapples with generational differences. The largest and most influential faction is Renovation and Change (RYC); it is Alfonsín's political base and is left of center. Making up over half the UCR membership, it consists of two groups. The larger of these—to which the major portion of faction members belong—the "Historic Line," is close to Alfonsín, from whom it derives its influence. Especially early in his term, the President filled most key national posts from the ranks of the RYC "Historicals," who include most of his longtime political allies. Although in the past year the President has turned to other factions, to technocrats, and even to opposition figures to fill high-level positions, the RYC Historicals maintain their dominant role.

Among the veterans within the Historic Line is a small group (probably no more than 20 percent of the faction) of well-established UCR politicians. Although members of this so-called "Old Guard" occasionally gain Alfonsín's ear, they favor more traditional UCR policies and therefore are largely outside the circle of UCR decisionmaking, according to Embassy reports. Because of their long party service and sometime entree to the President, however, these veterans can demand a voice in party councils.

The other main RYC group is the Junta Coordinadora Nacional (JCN), or Coordinadora, which tends to have younger, more action oriented, and, in some cases, more radical members. It is second only to the Historicals in both size and influence, constituting about a quarter of the total UCR membership.

Although organizationally part of the RYC faction, the JCN tends to operate independently. For example, the RYC and the Coordinadora compete in elections head-to-head in Buenos Aires City and Province and Santa Fe Province, and the issue of whether to formally remain a part of the RYC divides JCN members. Embassy officials say several JCN members strongly favor a split from the RYC. (For convenience, throughout this paper, unless otherwise specified, the term RYC is used to refer only to the Historic Line.)

The great majority of the party's younger leaders belong to the Coordinadora. Most of them follow Alfonsín's leadership and policies and are similar in political orientation to the Historicals. A JCN minority—perhaps 20 percent of the JCN membership—however, has vocally challenged the President's moderate, left-of-center policies, staking out more militant positions.

The other major UCR faction, the Movement for National Integration (MIN), is prominent only in the Buenos Aires region and has fewer members than the JCN, reports the Embassy. The institutional descendant of Alfonsín's conservative rivals in the 1970s, the MIN retains appeal with the middle class and with older and non-Radical voters. At times, the MIN, in alliance with the RYC Historicals, has provided a potent counterweight to the Coordinadora in struggles to formulate party positions.

There are other, minor UCR factions (see figure page 3), which contain some party leaders and have provincial strength. They have lacked national clout, however, since Alfonsín's election.

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
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**UCR Factions and Governing Board**

**UCR Factions**

Relative strength



Renovation and Change



Historic Line

Closest of Alfonsín; derives its influence from the President; present in all provinces.



National Coordinating Board (JCN)

Majority of younger party leaders; strongest in Buenos Aires City and Province.



National Integration Movement (MIN)

Influence comes from importance of its members; strongest in Buenos Aires region.



National Line (NL)

Formerly the dominant force in UCR; declining national influence since Alfonsín's election.



Córdoba Line

Based in Córdoba province moderating force in party; close to RYC.



Yrigoyen Affirmation Movement (MAY)

Based in Chaco Province; declining influence since Alfonsín's election.

**UCR Governing Board, 1985-87**

President

Raúl Alfonsín

Acting President

Edison Otero

1st Vice President

César Jaroslavsky

2nd Vice President

Ricardo Barrios Arrechea

3rd Vice President

Aníbal Reynaldo<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Young emerging leaders.

Secretaries

Ernesto Alderete Salas

Oswaldo Alvarez Guerrero

Antonio Berhongaray<sup>a</sup>

Rubén Chebaia<sup>a</sup>

Esther Crespo de Riera

Ramon Dussol

Arturo González Martín

Edgardo Grosso

Norberto Marini

Miguel Martínez Saravía

Sergio Montiel

Próspero Nieva

Rodolfo Quesada<sup>a</sup>

Jesús Rodríguez<sup>a</sup>

Angel Roig

Hipólito Solari Yrigoyen

Federico Storani<sup>a</sup>

Marcelo Stubrin<sup>a</sup>

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Radicals provided the only opposition throughout the rule of Juan Domingo Perón (1946-55). Today, under Alfonsín's direction, the UCR has for the first time since early in the century begun to resolve some of its internal differences and build bridges between its factions (see figure) [redacted]

**Redirecting the UCR**

**Alfonsín Takes the Lead.** Alfonsín first won recognition as a leader within the UCR in the early 1970s, when he became discontented with the generally conservative leadership of longtime party caudillo Ricardo Balbín. As his speeches of that time indicate, Alfonsín believed that the party leaders had lost touch with the masses, whose thinking had moved to the left. He therefore formed his own left-of-center faction, Renovation and Change (RYC). During the next decade, his influence within the party grew, a development widely attributed to his courageous support of human rights and his condemnation of abuses committed by the military regime. [redacted]

Alfonsín, more progressive and pragmatic than his rivals in the UCR, achieved prominence by reaching beyond the party's traditional constituency to the working class and to students and other young people. He also broke precedent by seeking the support of disillusioned Peronists and independents rather than clinging to the traditional Radical disdain for collaboration with other political groups. By mid-1983 Alfonsín had formed a pact with other non-Balbín factions in the UCR, launched a well-organized and well-financed campaign, and captured the party's presidential nomination. [redacted]

As President, Alfonsín has been the first democratically oriented Argentine leader in almost 70 years to exercise genuine political control. [redacted] the axis of power in both the government and the UCR passes through Alfonsín's hands. Despite the extensive factionalism within the party, press and Embassy reporting indicates that he has sizable support, enjoying the backing of a majority of members of all the principal factions—the RYC, Coordinadora (JCN), and Movement for National Integration (MIN). [redacted]

**Raúl Alfonsín**



Jeanette Harris ©

Alfonsín [redacted]

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*Age 59 . . . popular and principled leader in both party and government . . . respected for his evenhanded effort to deal with abuses committed by the military during the 1970s "dirty war" on terrorism and for his honesty and moral leadership . . . has learned important economic and political lessons from his first two and a half years in power . . . seeks to maintain good relations with the United States . . . was provincial and national legislator in the 1950s and 1960s.* [redacted]

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A questioning of the President's policies by a vocal minority of hardline Coordinadora members, as well as by a limited number of old-guard RYC members, presents a continuing challenge to Alfonsín's leadership. At this time, however, the differences in policy orientation in the party appear to represent no serious threat to his authority. He has so far successfully isolated the dissenters and consolidated his mainstream support, and he is rarely attacked personally, according to Embassy officials. As a human rights activist with strong moral leadership qualities, he is extremely popular with the people—over the past two years he has consistently received at least 60 percent approval ratings in a wide variety of polls. We believe that his popularity, the power of his office, and his

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role as undisputed arbiter within the UCR give him tremendous power over the party's future. That power, which he has so far used constructively, constitutes a substantial step forward in the UCR's long quest for unity and enduring influence. [redacted]

**Emerging Leaders.** [redacted] Embassy, and press reporting indicates that in his bid for political power and the presidency—and as President—Alfonsín has been helped by a new generation of party leaders, highly influenced by his own rise to power and style. These leaders first became active in politics at the university level, and most held prominent posts in UCR youth organizations. Today they are linked by ties dating back to their student days—even though they sometimes belong to different party factions. [redacted]

The young leaders, now in their thirties and forties, were students when the last Radical administration was overthrown by the military in 1966. They publicly say that that government fell so easily because the UCR had lost touch with the people and had become a group of thinkers rather than doers. They also say that their entry into politics was motivated in part by a desire to remedy that weakness. Affected by the violence of the military war on terrorism in the 1970s, they stress dialogue with opponents rather than confrontation or coercion, according to the Embassy and the press. [redacted]

Throughout the 1970s these UCR activists were establishing themselves as upcoming leaders through their party and youth organization activities. They gravitated to Alfonsín during those years, and many of them performed key organizational and mobilization work during his 1983 campaign. At present, these younger leaders undoubtedly recognize that Alfonsín has brought the party greater influence than it has enjoyed for decades and that by attaching themselves to his coattails they can obtain increased power within the party and the government. [redacted]

The emerging leaders are also motivated, in our view, by a political environment that is ideal for the young and ambitious. Embassy [redacted] and press reporting describes Alfonsín as a leader who generally

seeks consensus and party harmony, even at the cost of indecisive or conflictive policies. He often overlooks overeagerness or occasional mistakes by the younger leaders in return for their unswerving loyalty. [redacted] 25X1

Except for a minority—the vocal militants within the JCN—the younger leaders appear to be completely loyal to Alfonsín, to respect his authority within the party, and to be eager to implement his programs. In our estimation, emerging leaders represent roughly 25 percent of the party's top leadership. Limited evidence from Embassy [redacted] reporting, as well as the press, suggests that the younger, pro-Alfonsín leaders hold at least one-third of the committee chairmanships in the Chamber of Deputies; numerous second-echelon positions in the government, including those of secretary general of the presidency, vice minister of foreign affairs, under secretary of foreign affairs and of interior, and key Central Bank posts; and five seats on the party's 23-member national executive board (for factional affiliations, see figure page 3). [redacted] 25X1

**Prescription for Change**

Alfonsín's number-one priority is to complete his term and turn the government over to an elected UCR successor, report US diplomats. They say he has not pressed vigorously to solve such endemic problems as statism, inefficiency, and corruption because pushing too hard in these areas could cause a backlash from entrenched interests that might threaten his government. He believes his remaining time in office is too short to address deep-seated problems. He therefore strongly supports the idea of long-term democracy as the only way to resolve these problems, as well as the longstanding economic and class divisions within Argentine society. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] Alfonsín, with the help of his proteges, has taken four tactical approaches, derived from his campaign for the presidency, to reshape his party, help ensure its dominance, and thus help attain his goals. These approaches are:

- Extending the party's appeal beyond its traditional boundaries. 25X1

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- Abandoning some traditional positions and precepts.
- Mobilizing resources and renewing grassroots support.
- Moderating internal dissension.

**Extending Appeal.** The contributions by the younger leaders to widening the party's appeal fall into two main areas: winning working-class supporters away from the Peronists and youth away from the left.

**Making Inroads in Peronist Strongholds.** Younger UCR politicians have been a driving force behind efforts to strengthen the party infrastructure, especially in the provinces, where the Peronists have long held sway, notes the Embassy. According to press reports, the young leaders have also enthusiastically backed recent party rule changes that permit non-UCR candidates to run on Radical tickets in the provinces—a move designed to win votes away from the Peronists and to attract Peronists to the UCR.

The main attack on Peronist support, however, is through appeals to labor. While most older Radicals have no links whatsoever to the Peronist-dominated working class, some of the younger UCR leaders are quite attuned to the labor sector. For example, 44-year-old **Juan Manuel Casella**, a leading RYC member (his father played a role in founding the faction), is from the working-class Buenos Aires suburb of Avellaneda, where he has a strong political base. A widely respected and astute politician who had served since 1983 in the Chamber of Deputies (where he chaired the Defense Committee), he was named Labor Minister in 1984. During a six-month stint in that post—he had agreed to serve only in an interim, troubleshooting role—he demonstrated both an understanding of workers' problems and keen negotiating skills. He succeeded, say US diplomats, in reducing tension between organized labor and the government that other officials, including some old-guard UCR politicians, had generated. Casella went on to become chairman of the Buenos Aires Province UCR committee.

Upcoming UCR leader **Enrique Nosiglia**, 35, has also reached out to the laboring classes. Polished and soft spoken, he is a cool and calculating pragmatist who is



Casella

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Nosiglia

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prepared to subordinate ideological considerations to concrete political gains, reports the Embassy. As under secretary of health and social action during the first two years of Alfonsín's administration, he launched several social service programs designed to strengthen UCR support among the poor, despite opposition criticism that they were used for partisan purposes. These programs included:

- The National Food Plan, a government-financed program for feeding the poor.
- A campaign to stamp out Chagas disease, an ailment that afflicts primarily the lower class.

Nosiglia has since moved to the Council for Consolidating Democracy, a special committee appointed by Alfonsín. That post should give him even more time to focus on developing party support. The Embassy reports that Nosiglia, a key leader of the JCN, has also promoted rapport between the UCR and the military, traditionally a key actor in Argentine politics.

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**Young UCR Leaders and the Military:  
A Delicate Relationship**

The young Radicals and the armed forces view each other with considerable distrust, but with less apparent hostility today than at the outset of Alfonsín's presidency. [redacted] young UCR leaders, highly influenced by the military's human rights abuses in the 1970s and poor performance in the Falkland Islands crisis, firmly backed the Alfonsín administration's aggressive moves against the military, including funding cutbacks and trials of officers in early 1984. When the Minister of Defense later moderated the government's approach, many young Radicals were angry and [redacted] called him a traitor for conceding too much to the military,

[redacted]

By late 1985, however, the attitudes of younger UCR leaders appeared to have changed significantly, probably because of their growing awareness, heightened by experience in responsible positions, that improved relations with the military might stave off an armed forces intervention that could halt hard-won progress toward democratization. At that time, one young UCR leader (Secretary of Interior Facundo Suárez

Lastra) told Embassy officers that the Coordinadora was carefully tending to its relations with the armed forces. He said, moreover, that he sympathized with military complaints that salaries were too low and that he sensed efforts by the military to improve relations with the political parties. [redacted]

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Despite the signs of a thaw, we believe that relations between the younger Radicals and the military are still cool and likely to remain so. Some younger leaders, notably Coordinadora hardliner Luis Cáceres, continue to call publicly for trials of officers involved in the 1970s "dirty war." Such statements arouse military suspicions, [redacted]

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[redacted] The younger leaders thus have their job cut out in maintaining a delicately balanced relationship with the military that will give civilian government a chance. [redacted]

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**Exploiting University Ties.** The younger UCR leaders maintain strong ties to party groups at universities and to the Radical Youth organization. Coordinadora leader **Jesús Rodríguez** was president of the national committee of the Radical Youth during 1984-85. Rodríguez, who shuns a formal image and often appears before student groups in an open-necked shirt, has encouraged Radical youth to take part in Embassy cultural programs, report US diplomats. He and other young politicians have attracted to the party a wide following from the universities that might otherwise have gravitated to the far left, according to what UCR officials have told the US Embassy. [redacted]



Rodríguez [redacted]

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**Emerging UCR Leaders—Mainstream**

Name/Age	Faction	Position	Comments
Juan Manuel Casella (44)	RYC	Chairman, Buenos Aires Province UCR Committee	Candidate for governor of province . . . possible presidential contender . . . widely respected politician who has good relations with all UCR factions . . . compromiser and key Alfonsín supporter.
Enrique Nosiglia (35)	JCN	Key Coordinadora leader in Buenos Aires	Close to Alfonsín . . . put together campaign slates for Buenos Aires City in 1983 . . . has good rapport with labor, church, and military . . . key UCR contact with non-Radical Alfonsín supporters . . . presidential prospect . . . representative on the Council for Consolidating Democracy . . . favors increased narcotics enforcement coordination with United States.
Leopoldo Moreau (40)	RYC	Chairman, Communications Committee, Chamber of Deputies	RYC activist in Buenos Aires . . . former member JCN.
Jesús Rodríguez (35)	JCN	Chairman, Budget and Finance Committee, Chamber of Deputies	Economist . . . articulate supporter of Austral Plan . . . strong ties to UCR youth organizations.
Marcelo Stubrin (34)	JCN	Vice President, UCR bloc, Chamber of Deputies	Founder and ideological pillar of Coordinadora . . . drafted JCN credo . . . prides self on militant support of UCR . . . close ties to party youth organizations . . . [redacted] has often visited the United States.

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**Abandoning Party Precepts.** One of the lessons the more influential young UCR leaders appear to have learned is the need to place political realism ahead of party tradition if they are to be politically successful. Two key areas in which they have apparently opted for realism are economic policy and government appointments. [redacted]

**Economic Policy.** Many of the young UCR politicians do not share the old-guard Radical commitment to economic nationalism and an emphasis on state ownership and opposition to foreign investment. They have vocally supported Alfonsín's Austral Plan—a program emphasizing austerity, private ownership, and attraction of foreign capital, which has significantly reduced the country's rampant inflation (from over 30 percent monthly in mid-1984 to 2 percent monthly today)—and have garnered some of the resulting public approval. [redacted]

Casella has been a particularly staunch and eloquent defender of the plan. He appeared on television shortly after it was announced to discuss the economic situation and call for patience and support for the government. The Embassy reports that his appeal was generally well received. [redacted]

Another articulate spokesman, and a frequent speaker at party rallies, is Rodríguez. The youngest (30) member of Congress and the UCR's most prominent young economist, he chairs the powerful Budget and Finance Committee of the Chamber of Deputies. In that post he works on both budget and foreign debt programs; in doing so, say US diplomats, he has deepened his understanding of his country's economic problems and interests. Once a hardliner on debt issues with a hostile view of the IMF, he now says that

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**Some Views of the Pro-Alfonsin Emerging Leaders**

**The United States.** Younger Radicals recognize the United States as the most powerful nation in the hemisphere but advocate a neutralist Third-World-oriented foreign policy. Most have visited this country and would like to come again, according to what Radicals have told Embassy officials. [redacted]

**Finance.** They want to end the decades of financial speculation that have plagued Argentina and begin rewarding productive investment. [redacted] they have said that the public sector deficit must be reduced. Most would like to continue to lobby the US Government to press the IMF and creditor banks for liberal repayment guidelines and new loan terms. Although they distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate debt, they do not advocate repudiation, say Embassy officials. [redacted]

**Narcotics.** Increased narcotics trafficking through Argentina alarms the younger leaders, who have asked for closer cooperation in law enforcement with the United States. They have also suggested bilateral cooperation in the area of drug education programs as a useful area of future contact. [redacted]

**Central America.** The Embassy reports that, like the great majority of UCR members, the emerging leaders are concerned about the possible emergence of a Soviet surrogate state in Central America. They disagree, however, with the US Government's assessment of the extent of Marxist control within the Government of Nicaragua. The younger leaders have been much more critical in public of US Central American actions than has President Alfonsin. [redacted]

**Nuclear Development.** Several young UCR leaders, with Alfonsin's backing, have spearheaded Argentina's efforts to play a leading role in Third World nuclear development. They see exports of nuclear technology to foreign markets as an important means of supporting their country's own large nuclear industry. As proponents of independent nuclear development, they have resisted US efforts to regulate the use and transfer of nuclear technology. [redacted]

creditor nations, banks, and debtor countries need to share responsibility if the problem is to be solved.

[redacted]

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**Government Appointments.** When the UCR held power in the past, a basic party precept was to rely on its own people to run the government. Today the young UCR leaders who are allied with Alfonsin are helping the President break this pattern and bring in elements from outside the party, including opposition politicians and technocrats, to increase both the base of support and the expertise of his administration. Some young leaders have criticized old party barons and Coordinadora hardliners who they believed were resisting placement of outsiders in key government posts. [redacted]

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In the case of apolitical technocrats who have been brought into the government, the younger Radicals have at times assisted some of them in gaining support within the UCR for policies that go against Radical tradition. For example, before the implementation of the Austral Plan, Economy Minister Juan Sourrouille, a technocrat, met with several young UCR leaders, including Nosiglia, Rodríguez, and Casella, to enlist their aid in implementing the program and selling it to the rest of the UCR, reports the press. [redacted]

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**Mobilizing the Party.** The UCR, which traditionally disdained the mass rallies and other populist devices of Peronism, more recently has taken a page out of the Peronists' mobilization book. Alfonsin, supported by the emerging leaders, has sought to assemble and energize party members for various reasons ranging from his 1983 campaign to postelection demonstrations in support of democracy. [redacted]

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*The Mobilization Committee.* To oversee mobilization activities, Alfonsín formed a committee under the UCR governing board in early 1984. Since then, according to press reports, it has become one of the board's most important committees, marshaling support for administration policies and programs through contacts with all segments of society. Alfonsín has placed three young UCR leaders representing diverse party elements in charge of this Mobilization Committee. [redacted]



Stubrin [redacted]

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Committee cochairman **Marcelo Stubrin**, 35, is vice president of the UCR bloc of deputies in the Chamber and one of the most prominent members of the Coordinadora. A member of the President's circle of intimate associates with strong ties to the UCR youth organizations, he was handpicked for the Mobilization Committee by Alfonsín because of his contacts and political acumen, say US officials. Cerebral and urbane, he performs his duties with skill and commitment, according to US diplomats. He is admired for his political know-how even by conservatives—an indication of the wide esteem he enjoys. At the UCR congress in December 1985, he won a seat on the party governing board. [redacted]

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Moreau [redacted]

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Stubrin comes from an active political family. Although he can never become president of Argentina (a Jew, he is legally barred from holding that post), he prides himself on his patriotism and militant support of the Radical party, say US diplomats. [redacted]

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The third coleader, **Federico Storani**, represents the Coordinadora hard line. Although not considered as staunch a supporter of Alfonsín as the other two leaders, Storani has apparently worked effectively with his coleaders. [redacted]

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Another coleader is RYC activist **Leopoldo Moreau**, who is about 40. Moreau headed the Buenos Aires UCR slate in last fall's election and now chairs the Communications Committee in the Chamber of Deputies. Widely regarded as one of the UCR's most capable congressional leaders, he has been deeply involved in government lobbying efforts on several difficult pieces of legislation. In addition, the press reports that he represents the party at factory meetings and ceremonies, visits trade unions and retirement groups, and meets with community leaders. [redacted]

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*Mobilization Activities.* UCR mobilization efforts first began on a large scale during the 1983 presidential campaign. Candidate Alfonsín relied heavily on the Radical Youth organization and young party leaders—such as Nosiglia, who engineered the successful campaign in Buenos Aires City and Province—to gather crowds for his political rallies. [redacted]

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**Coordinadora Hardliners**



Cáceres



Storani

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*Luis Cáceres . . . about 44 years old . . . key UCR leader in Santa Fe Province . . . represents JCN's strongest foothold outside Buenos Aires area . . . often critical of party leadership . . . outspokenness reflects greater independence of party officials outside Buenos Aires . . . not directly critical of President but believes Alfonsín has unwisely bypassed party apparatus in making decisions . . . expected to run for governor of Santa Fe in 1987.*

*Federico Storani . . . age 35 . . . president of Foreign Relations Committee in Chamber of Deputies . . . much backing in old, nationalist left wing of UCR led by his father, a cofounder of RYC and now Minister of Public Health and Social Action . . . last year initiated efforts to remove Alfonsín from party presidency but was unsuccessful . . . coleader of party's Mobilization Committee.*

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Alfonsín and his supporters have also mobilized the party on several occasions since that election, including the 1985 congressional elections. In the 1985 campaign—which prominently linked younger UCR candidates to Alfonsín—Nosiglia again played a major role. Preferring to work behind the scenes, he avoids the press and does not like to have his picture taken, according to Embassy and press reporting. He told Embassy officers at one point during the campaign that he would be unavailable for several weeks because he was tied down with planning a rally in support of the government's economic program. Several other young Radicals—including Rodríguez and Casella—gave key speeches at the final party rally before the congressional voting.

In addition to organizing rallies, the young UCR leaders have reached out to the rank and file in other ways, reports the Embassy. They have:

- Used extensive door-to-door campaigning and other grassroots organizational activities both to activate dormant members and to recruit new ones.
- Implemented skillful publicity campaigns that have attracted new members and renewed the sense of mission of veterans.

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Poster from 1985 congressional campaign [redacted]

**Dealing With Dissension.** Although the UCR's long-standing internal differences have led to conflicting approaches to governing, the disunity has been mitigated by the style of the mainstream young Radicals, who have demonstrated both flexibility and moderation. They have aimed their conciliatory approach particularly at the small doctrinaire group within the JCN, including Storani and National Deputy Luis Cáceres. They and other hardliners have:

- Refused to close ranks behind the President on issues, thus hindering his efforts at party unity.
- Attempted (unsuccessfully) to maneuver him out of the party presidency.
- Prepared an alternative leftist program. [redacted]

**Willingness to Compromise.** Despite the dissent, the tradition of factionalism, and the sometimes aggressive and combative styles of individuals, many of the UCR's emerging leaders have demonstrated the ability to negotiate and compromise with politicians outside their own factions. This flexibility was demonstrated, for example, in negotiations on the composition of UCR candidate lists for the 1985 congressional voting in Buenos Aires Province, discussions involving difficult issues that many observers doubted could be resolved. Although the Embassy reports that the talks between RYC leaders Casella and Moreau and Coordinadora members Nosiglia and Stubrin were indeed rough-and-tumble confrontations, the participants did reach agreement. The

resulting compromise significantly strengthened the UCR's performance in the congressional voting, reports the Embassy. [redacted]

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Another example is the agreement reached in early 1986 on UCR candidates for the 1987 election for governor of Buenos Aires Province. That agreement (proposed by Moreau) forestalls bickering over the ticket between the RYC and the JCN by making Casella the candidate for governor and Coordinadora hardliner Storani the candidate for vice governor. The ticket has strong overall party backing, according to press reports. [redacted]

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**Projecting a Moderate Image.** In addition to negotiating effectively with various members of their own UCR generation, the mainline younger leaders have also used compromise tactics with tradition-bound members of the older generation. Possibly because they believe time is on their side and they will inevitably inherit the party leadership from the older chiefs, many of the younger UCR leaders usually try to work with their older rivals rather than confronting them. According to Embassy officials, influential younger leaders seek to project an image of responsibility and moderation. Moreau, for example, now associated with Casella and the RYC, has moved so far toward the party center from the left that he has broken off his former association with the Coordinadora. "Reality is hard," one Coordinadora member told the US Embassy, when referring to adjustments in thinking during Alfonsín's first two years. [redacted]

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#### Outlook

We believe that attention by Alfonsín and his young supporters to the four areas of party revitalization described above—coupled with relative success in addressing economic, human rights, and other issues—has led to the present, preminent status of the UCR and has provided momentum for the party to look ahead with some confidence to three major milestones:

- Senatorial elections in December 1986.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> It should be noted that the 1986 Senate elections are indirect votes, by provincial legislatures already elected, and thus the party winner, the UCR (though not the individual winners), is already known. Most political observers expect the UCR to gain one or two seats. [redacted]

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- Gubernatorial elections in 1987.
- The presidential election in 1989.

Although Alfonsín has been the catalyst and key figure in the party's political success, the younger leaders have also contributed to the UCR's reemergence, in our judgment, through their flexibility, loyalty, and support. They appear likely to play increasingly important roles. There are reports that Moreau will replace Buenos Aires gubernatorial candidate Casella in his present party post and that Casella, or possibly Nosiglia, will eventually assume the party leadership and run for president. Although none of these younger leaders yet has the popular appeal of the President, they and other pro-Alfonsín emerging leaders have many of the requisites for assuming the direction of the party and maintaining its cohesiveness and strength:

- They have demonstrated their willingness and ability to resolve party disputes.
- They have gained valuable political and administrative experience in party and government posts.
- They generally have bright political futures and are likely to grow in influence.

The challenges to Alfonsín and the UCR, however, are substantial. The outlook for the economy is uncertain; unemployment is on the rise, and growth rates are negative (-4.5 percent in 1985). The tension between the government and the military also remains a crucial area of concern. In addition, violence, which has traditionally simmered just below the surface of Argentine society, could erupt in the form of out-of-control demonstrations like those during the late 1985 visit of US businessman David Rockefeller or terrorist acts—such as the bombings that preceded the 1985 elections—to undermine the regime. Should Alfonsín and his supporters lose control in any of these areas, power could revert—depending on circumstances too complex to predict at present—to the military, the Peronists, or leftists inside or outside the UCR.

Even on the assumption that the President maintains a fair degree of control over economic, political, and social problems, he and his supporters face an ongoing challenge within the UCR, with its extensive history of factionalism. They will have to cope with both the

party's old-line leaders, many of whom only grudgingly support nontraditional approaches, and the JCN's young militant leftist minority.

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If the popular President and his supporters remain as strong as they are today, the UCR dissenters—whether old or young—stand little chance, in our estimation, either of gaining control of the party or of changing its centrist, pragmatic course. Significant problems such as a worsening economic situation, however, could force Alfonsín away from his moderate policies and give rise to renewed factionalism in the party. Thus the political health of Alfonsín and his supporters and, in our view, the future of the party as an effective political force are tied to the economic and political stability of Argentina.

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If Alfonsín gets through the next three years with some success, it will be in part because of the efforts of the emerging UCR leaders who support him, in our judgment. Those leaders will have used their increasing experience, influence, and negotiating skills to help keep the party together and strong for 1989. Whether a leader such as Casella or Nosiglia can carry the party to victory in that election cannot be judged at this time, but an effective UCR could help Alfonsín prepare the way for his successor.

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#### **Implications for the United States.**

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The perpetuation of a revitalized, less tradition-bound Radical party (assuming a relatively stable political and economic environment) bodes well for the future of democracy:

- By demonstrating the success of moderation and responsibility, the party develops a strong position in the center of the political spectrum, where most Argentines are now located, and restricts the potential support for issues advanced at the extremes.
- The success it has enjoyed would encourage reformist elements within the Peronist ranks to try to lead their party on a more moderate course—the first step, in our view, toward the development of a responsible Peronist opposition.

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In addition to the general advantages from the US perspective of strengthened democracy in Argentina—decreased prospect of extremism and increased prospect of stability and of policies and governing approaches compatible with this country's—the emerging UCR leadership may represent other possible benefits to the United States. The generally openminded attitude of most young Radicals toward this country suggests enhanced US-Argentine cooperation in areas such as IMF and debt negotiations and drug trafficking control.

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Nevertheless, these leaders—especially as managers of a more stable country—could become more assertive in pursuing Third-World-oriented positions. Two particular problem areas could be US Central American policy and regulation of nuclear development and proliferation.

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