

TWO-HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FOURTH MEETING

Wednesday, 29 May 1985

Room 7D32, Headquarters Building

**SECRET**

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

**Security Committee**

\*SECOM-A-275

15 May 1985

**AGENDA**

Two Hundred and Eighty-fourth Meeting  
Wednesday, 29 May 1985, 10:00 a.m.  
Room 7D32, CIA Headquarters

Preliminary Comments (e.g., 4 May personal security course, leak matters,  
external contracts funded by SECOM)

ITEM 1 Approval of Minutes of 1 May meeting

ITEM 2 Hostile threat to U.S. automated systems (report and briefing by Mr.  
Carl Martz on Navy analysis of collected data on this threat; question  
and answer period will follow)

ITEM 3 New business

ITEM 4 Next meeting (10:00 a.m., Wednesday 26 June 1985, room 7D32, CIA  
Headquarters)



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Comments

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

SECOM-D-126  
18 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECOM Members

FROM:

[Redacted]

Chairman

STAT

SUBJECT:

Avoiding Unauthorized Disclosures

1. Attached is a copy of a message the Air Force member sent Special Security Officers of his department concerning unauthorized disclosures. The security education advice provided by [Redacted] is applicable to the Intelligence Community as a whole. The type of solicitation involved could well appear in a variety of other journals.

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2. Members are requested to consider issuing similar reminders to cleared personnel of their organizations, and, where the means exist through retiree associations, to former personnel. The recipients of such reminders should be cautioned against any discussion of subjects that they dealt with on a classified basis, and advised of their continuing obligations to submit for prepublication review any written material concerning SCI which they contemplate publishing or providing journalists, scholars or any unclassified persons. Members are also requested to advise the SECOM staff of other instances coming to their attention in which magazines contain solicitations for information on past or present intelligence activities.

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[Redacted]

Attachment:

[Redacted]

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INCOMING

FRP: . . . . .

NON-AGENCY

/46/

ACTION: NONE  
SECUR/SSC-3. (B/W)

INFO: RF, FILE, CSFILE, C/SECOM, DDO/SCO, MPB/GG.

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TOR: 151600Z APR 85

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OOOO

FOR SSO OR EQUIVALENT AT EACH LOCATION - KEEP AND PASS/ADVISE ALL AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS/ACTIVITIES/ELEMENTS YOU SUPPORT AS SHOWN IN THE DIA COMPARTMENTED ADDRESS BOOK OR USSID 505: JOINT SERVICE SSO'S HOLD OR PASS TO RESPECTIVE AF ELEMENT AS APPROPRIATE: ADDITIONAL PASSING INSTRUCTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS: 6920ESG PASS TO 6920ESG/SP, DET 422 AND 2114CS; 6931ESS FOR 6931ESS/SP; AFSSO AFCC KEEP AND PASS TO CG; 6912ESG FOR 6912ESG/SPA; SSO DMAAC KEEP AND PASS TO 25AD/DOI; COMFAIRKEF PASS TO AFI/DOI; SSO 15AF HOLD AND PASS TO AFISC/IGTI AND 26AD/DOI; USSOUTHCOM KEEP AND PASS TO 24COMPWG/DOI; ESC/IN KEEP AND PASS TO ATC/TTQI - ATC HOLD FOR AFMPC/ROS4E; SSO ADCOM KEEP AND PASS TO AFAITC/SVA; CIA PASS TO CHAIRMAN, SECOM; DIRNSA PASS TO DOD COMPUTER SECURITY CENTER/C4 (LT COL CRAIG); AFSSO RADC KEEP AND PASS TO 21AD/DOI; AFSSO FTD KEEP AND PASS TO AFLC/INS

SUBJ: JEFFREY RICHELSON REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (ROXAD 22-85)  
REF: AFSSO USAF/INS 271312Z MAR 85, ROXAD 17-85

1. REF ADVISED OF A RECENTLY PUBLISHED BOOK BY JEFFREY RICHELSON TITLED "US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY." THE MARCH 85 EDITION OF AIR FORCE MAGAZINE (PG 21) CONTAINS A LETTER BY RICHELSON SOLICITING INFORMATION ON US INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPERATIONS DIRECTED AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION BETWEEN 1945-60. RICHELSON IS "INTERESTED IN HEARING FROM ANYONE INVOLVED IN AIRBORNE PERIPHERAL PHOTOGRAPHIC OR ELECTRONIC RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS DURING THESE YEARS AS WELL AS FROM ANYONE INVOLVED IN COLLECTION OPERATIONS CONCERNING SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING." THIS SOLICITATION MAY APPEAR IN OTHER PERIODICALS.
2. WHILE WE DO NOT DISCOURAGE ACADEMIC RESEARCH, SUCH SOLICITATIONS MAY BE A VEHICLE FOR UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES. INFORMATION FROM THE PERIOD CITED ABOVE MAY STILL BE CLASSIFIED OR BE SUBJECT TO DOD/AF SECURITY REVIEW PRIOR TO RELEASE. INDIVIDUALS WHO RESPOND TO SUCH SOLICITATIONS LEAVE THEMSELVES OPEN TO EXPANDED QUESTIONING BY THE INTERVIEWER, QUESTIONING WHICH MAY GO BEYOND THE INITIAL SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY INTO SENSITIVE OR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. IT MAY ALSO BE A MEANS FOR AN INTERVIEWER/RESEARCHER TO CONFIRM INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED FROM OTHER SOURCES. IN SHORT, PERSONNEL WHO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS ARE CAUTIONED REGARDING THE IMPLICATIONS OF SOLICITATIONS SUCH AS THAT OUTLINED ABOVE. EXPERIENCE SHOWS THESE HAVE BECOME A CONDUIT FOR UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES.
3. WE ASK THAT YOU CIRCULATE THIS GUIDANCE TO CURRENTLY CLEARED PERSONNEL, PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS, AND TO LOCAL SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS WHICH MAY HAVE RETIRED MILITARY/CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WHO WERE INVOLVED IN US INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS EITHER AS A PARTICIPANT OR USER OF INTELLIGENCE. WE VIEW THIS PRIMARILY AS "IN-HOUSE" EDUCATION EFFORT AT THIS TIME. YOUR ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT IS APPRECIATED.

END OF MESSAGE

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**ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP**

Date

21 Feb 1985

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. ADD/S&T 6E-56 Headquarters		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

**REMARKS**

[Redacted]

I thought you would be interested in seeing the wire sent to contractors pursuant to your suggestion in DDS&T-083-85 (attached).

[Redacted]

Atts

**DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions**

<b>FROM:</b> (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
Director of Security	Phone No.
[Redacted]	[Redacted]

8841-102

\* GPO : 1983 O - 381-529 (301)

**OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)**  
 Prescribed by GSA  
 FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

Distribution:  
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DDS&amp;T-083-85

1 February 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Security Committee

FROM: James V. Hirsch  
Associate Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT: Leaks of Classified Information

1. It seems to me that we in government unwittingly aid one of the major sources of leaks of classified information we suffer from today. The source I refer to is the group of self-proclaimed intelligence pundits associated with specialized study centers or institutes. These individuals openly publish or discuss details of our collection sources and analysis results. The ones who can do the most damage are those who have had prior legitimate access to classified information. This inside knowledge is often used to pick selectively from the media that information that is very close to the truth for use in public unclassified papers or discussions. In this way erroneous data are gradually sifted out of these analysts' treatment a given classified issue. Some of these analysts have been careful to identify prior open sources for their specific studies. I know of one case of a strategic analyst, a foreigner, who managed to associate himself with U.S. think-tanks and, by insinuation of SCI access, managed to elicit classified information in his discussions. Recently, a subpanel on technical collection of intelligence of an unclassified symposium on strategic issues advertised the participation of an individual who used to work with one of our contractors and who held a number of our SCI clearances.

2. The currency of this particular source of intelligence leakage constantly decays without access to inside information. If we could isolate these sources of leaks from so-called unclassified governmental or government contractor interaction, their effectiveness would be significantly diminished. It doesn't make sense for one part of the government to rail against intelligence leakage while other parts cheerfully participate in open forums with individuals who systematically use such exchanges to confirm or deny classified information already in the public domain. It would seem prudent for us to investigate ways in which we can prevent government and government contractor participation in unclassified conferences when there is a risk that by doing so we could aid in verifying the accuracy of intelligence information appearing in unclassified published materials. We gain little or nothing of substance from many of these exchanges, especially when technical collection of intelligence is the topic. Would it be possible

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UBJECT: Leaks of Classified Information

for your committee to develop guidelines to limit the participation of Intelligence Community organizations and their contractors in unclassified symposia, conferences or technical meetings dealing with intelligence when such participation could aid in establishing the credibility of known leakers of classified information?



James V. Hirsch

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**Department of Energy  
Washington, D.C. 20545**

**JUN 5 1984**

[Redacted]

STAT

Chairman, DCI Security Committee  
Room 5E25  
CIA Headquarters  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear [Redacted]

STAT

At the May 16, 1984, Security Committee meeting, you handed out a proposed change in the definition of "Information Controlled by Originator" (ORCON) contained in the Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) "Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information", and requested our comments.

In our opinion, the proposed words do not change the meaning of the paragraph. We believe there is neither a benefit nor a problem with making the change.

However, the discussion at the meeting brought up the following two important issues:

1. There is not a good definition or a consistent understanding of what constitutes "Headquarters elements". DOE is a decentralized organization. Our Operations Office Managers are responsible directly to the Secretary of Energy and, while they must operate within Department regulations, they have a high degree of local authority and independence. We interpret the DCID to prohibit our providing them ORCON, which we would like to do. Other organizations appear to treat such elements as an extension of their Headquarters.
2. The ORCON designation is used very extensively. Several of the attendees believe that it is being applied in cases where it is unnecessary. We believe that this is true for both the ORCON and NOCONTRACT markings. Such an overly conservative approach can effectively deny the ability to provide important intelligence or, at the least, create additional work in arranging for such markings to be removed.

Within the general area of NSI the Information Security Oversight Office has the authority to review and check for classification abuses. In the area of intelligence there appears to be no provision for such a review. We believe that SECOM could provide an important community service by:

Continuing to stress the need to mark documents appropriately and establish a review program and periodically survey the various community programs for compliance.

Sincerely,



Martin J. Dowd  
Director  
Division of Security  
Office of Safeguards & Security  
Defense Programs



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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
Security Committee

SECOM-D-079

22 March 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECOM Subcommittee Chairmen

FROM:

[Redacted]

Chairman

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SUBJECT:

SECOM Briefing

1. Attached are copies of the visual aids used in presenting briefings on the Security Committee. These have been in use for almost two years, and should be reviewed and revised to reflect current programs and activities.

2. Please review the entire package, with emphasis on your respective SECOM subelements. I would appreciate your advice on how we can update these vugraphs to best present SECOM to the rest of the Intelligence Community and to brief new members of SECOM and the subcommittees. Your notations directly on the copies or separate notes will be welcome. I would appreciate an early response from you on this, but no later than 25 April 1985. Please call me if you wish to discuss proposals for updating.

[Redacted]

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Attachment: Visual aids

*Subcommittee Chairmen tasking - Members  
may be busy, but we should check. Per [Redacted]*

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ARE REMOVED

*Per [Redacted]  
H.S.*

[Redacted]

*14 May 1985 - not necessary to task*


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[Redacted]

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# DCI Security Committee



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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
Security Committee

CHAIRMAN  
[Redacted]

STATE  
David C. Fields  
Deputy Asst. Secretary of  
State for Security

CIA  
[Redacted]  
Director of Security

1/11  
1/14  
1/16 25X1  
1/19  
1/20 25X1  
1/21

ARMY  
Col. Anthony J. Gallo, Jr.  
Director, Counterintelligence

DIA  
[Redacted]  
Director of Security

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NSA  
[Redacted]  
Director of Security

NAVY  
Robert C. Allen  
Director, Security Policy  
Division

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AIR FORCE  
Col. Robert B. Huey, Jr.  
Director of Security & Commo.  
Management

JUSTICE  
Jerry Rubino  
Director of Security

OSAF  
James Callahan (C)  
Special Asst. for Security

FBI  
Joseph C. Moore  
Security Programs Manager


TREASURY  
Vaughn V. Holcombe  
Deputy Director, Physical  
Security

ENERGY  
Martin C. Dowd  
Director, Div. of Security


DEFENSE  
Maynard Anderson  
Director, Security Plans &  
Programs, OSD

MARINE CORPS  
LTC Bruce Greisen  
Head, Counterintelligence Br.  
Intelligence Div.

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**Mission**

The Security Committee will advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in discharging his responsibilities to:

- a. ensure the establishment by the Intelligence Community of common security and access standards for managing and protecting foreign intelligence systems, information, and products;
- b. ensure that programs are developed which protect intelligence sources, methods, and analytical procedures.

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## **DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE**

### **FUNCTIONS:**

- **Advise** the DCI on **security** policy and procedures
- **Advise** the DCI on **security** and access standards
  - **Personnel, physical, and information security**
  - **Technical countermeasures**
  - **Security education and awareness**
  - **ADP systems**
  - **Techniques and equipment R&D**
- **Advise** the DCI on policies concerning investigation of **unauthorized disclosures of intelligence information and recommend corrective and preventive measures**
- **Establish** common standards for protection of SCI
- **Publish** guidelines and procedures

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# **DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE**

## **THE SUBCOMMITTEES**

*"The Chairman will establish subcommittees  
and other subordinate groups as required."  
DCID - Security Committee*

**Personnel Security**

**Physical Security**

**Compartmentation**

**Computer Security**

**Unauthorized Disclosures  
Investigations**

**Security Awareness  
and Education**

**Technical Surveillance  
Countermeasures**

**Security Advisory Group  
USSR**

**Research and Development**

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**DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE**  
**PERSONNEL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE**  
**(PerSSub)**

**Chairman:**  CIA

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**Oversight:**

- DCID 1/14 - Personnel security standards and procedures for access to SCI
  - Standards
  - Investigative Requirements
  - Continuing Security Program
  - Adjudication Guidelines
  - Appeals

— **Seminars:**

- To familiarize working adjudicators with commonly applied adjudication guidelines in DCID 1/14
- To address the complexities of the adjudicative process in a changing society
- To exchange information on problem areas in SCI investigation and adjudication practices

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## **DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE**

# **COMPARTMENTATION SUBCOMMITTEE**

**Chairman: Col. Robert B. Huey, U. S. Air Force**

### **Oversight:**

- **Control of Dissemination of Intelligence Information (formerly DCID 1/7)**
- **Security Classification Guidance on Liaison Relationships with Foreign Intelligence Organizations and Foreign Security Services (formerly DCID 1/10)**
- **Security Policy for Sensitive Compartmented Information and Security Policy Manual for SCI Control Systems (formerly DCID 1/19)**
- **Security Policy Concerning Travel and Assignment of Personnel with Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (formerly DCID 1/20)**

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**DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE**

**SECURITY AWARENESS AND EDUCATION  
SUBCOMMITTEE (SAES)**

Chairman:

NSA

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**Oversight:**

- DCID 1/14 Annex C - Minimum Standards for SCI Security Awareness Programs
  - Initial Indoctrination
  - Periodic Employee Awareness Enhancement
  - Debriefing
- Studies of Harassments and Provocations

**Functions:**

- Establish lines of communication
- Medium of exchange of information
- Develop ideas and concepts
- Pursue objectives of mutual interest
- Avoid duplication of efforts
- Undertake ad hoc projects of broad application

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**DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE**  
**PHYSICAL SECURITY WORKING**  
**GROUP (PSWG)**

Chairman: Mr. Gerald L. Berkin, U. S. Navy

**Oversight:**

— **NFIB/NFIC-9.1/47:U. S. Intelligence Community Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities**

- |                          |                   |
|--------------------------|-------------------|
| • Perimeter Construction | • Specifications: |
| • Alarms                 | Vaults            |
| • Telephones/Intercoms   | Doors             |
| • Tactical & Combat Ops. | Sound Attenuation |
| • Technical Security     | Window Barring    |
|                          | Secure Areas      |

— **Seminars:**

- Enhance common understanding of policy documents
- Address physical security planning for protection of personnel, classified material, and Government property
- Exchange information of common interest in the physical security discipline

**DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE**

**TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE  
COUNTERMEASURES SUBCOMMITTEE  
(TSCS)**

Chairman:  CIA

*The SECOM will "Advise the DCI on common security and access standards bearing on... "countermeasures against technical surveillance . . . ."*

**Oversight:**

- Procedural Guides 1-2-3
- Export of American-made TSCM equipment

Cont'd.

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## **DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES SUBCOMMITTEE**

### **Functions:**

- **Facilitate development of TSCM equipment and techniques based on assessments of foreign government equipment and capabilities**
- **Develop standard security practices against audio surveillance, including indoctrination of U. S. personnel and training of technical inspectors**
- **Receive prompt notification of discovery or suspected presence of technical surveillance devices in U. S. facilities**
- **Technical evaluation of foreign technical surveillance and countermeasures devices ("finds") and vulnerabilities of U. S. equipment ("hazards")**
- **Advise the Intelligence Community on technical surveillance countermeasures and standards for U. S. facilities abroad**
- **Facilitate the exchange of TSCM information among IC organizations, including preparation and dissemination of reports, notices, and guides**
- **Formulate and recommend to the DCI resource programming for TSCM**
- **Recommend policy on foreign disclosures of TSCM equipment and techniques**

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## DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE

# TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES SUBCOMMITTEE (TSCS) (cont'd.)

Technical Advisory Group  
Ernest Terrazas (FBI)

Audio Countermeasures  
Working Group  
Thomas Foley (USAF)

Interagency Training  
Center Panel  
Douglas L. Caspi  
(U. S. Secret Service)

Survey  
Gerald Wilk

Telephone  
Security  
Panel  
Ernest Terrazas (FBI)



Interagency Telephone Laboratory<sup>25X1</sup>  
Executive Agent: FBI

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## **DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE (R&D)**

**Chairman: Dr. Philip K. Eckman, CIA**

*The SECOM will "advise the DCI on common security and access standards bearing on...research and development of security techniques and equipment..."*  
**DCID - Security Committee**

**Functions:**

- **Conduct aggressive R&D to improve TSCM equipment and techniques**
- **Coordinate R&D programs for TSCM, physical security and computer security, ensuring effective information exchange and avoiding duplication**
- **Promote joint development, interagency evaluation, and procurement of technical security equipment**
- **Identify and evaluate foreign technical threats to U. S. security**
- **Contract for R&D support to develop advanced security equipment**
- **Administer "seed money" contracting from SECOM budget**

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**DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE**

**RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE  
(cont'd.)**

**Armored Protective Systems  
Working Group**

**Mr. David Pisenti, FBI**

**Treasury Department,  
Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms  
U. S. Secret Service  
Air Force  
OSI  
IG (anti-terrorism)  
Army  
Ft. Belvoir R&D Center  
Military Police  
Tank Automotive Command  
Special Operations Command  
CIA  
Defense Nuclear Agency**

**DIA  
Drug Enforcement Adminis.  
FBI  
USMC  
Navy  
NIS  
Surface Weapons Center  
National Automotive Center (GSA)  
State  
Nuclear Regulatory Com.**

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## DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE

# COMPUTER SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE

Chairman  DIA

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*The SECOM will "advise the DCI on common security and access standards bearing on ... automated data processing systems. ..."*

**DDID - Security Committee**

### Oversight:

- DCI security policy statement:  
**Security Policy on Intelligence Information in Automated Systems and Networks (formerly DCID 1/16)**
- DCI Computer Security Manual
  - **Modes of operation and minimum security requirements**
  - **Networks - Security administration, accreditation, and minimum security requirements**

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## **DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE**

# **SECURITY ADVISORY GROUP - USSR**

**Chairman: Mr. Marvin Doig, Department of State**

— **Established January 1979 by SECOM**

**Purpose:**

- **Advise and assist the Intelligence Community and Department of State in developing security policies and procedures to protect U. S. personnel and installations in the U.S.S.R.**

— **Construction Planning**

- **Technical Equipment Development**
- **Construction Surveillance**
- **Ongoing Inspections**

— **Participating Departments and Agencies**  
**State - CIA - FBI - NSA - DIA - SECOM**

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## DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE

# UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE (UDIS)

Chairman  CIA

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*"To advise and assist the Security Committee in discharging its responsibilities to ensure that programs are developed which protect intelligence sources and methods and classified intelligence from unauthorized disclosure."*  
—UDIS Charter

- Advise SECOM on policies and procedures to prevent unauthorized disclosures
- Recommend investigative policy for unauthorized disclosures
- Recommend policy, procedures and standards for referral of cases to the Attorney General
- Determine and recommend corrective security measures
- Recommend security education and awareness materials
- Recommend improved methods for analyzing unauthorized disclosures
- Recommend policies and procedures for coordinating investigations

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

SECOM-D-148  
15 May 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECOM Members

FROM:

Chairman

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SUBJECT: Annual Reports for 1984

Attached for your information and for possible use in briefing your Principals on the activities and accomplishments of SECOM, are copies of the 1984 annual reports for the Compartmentation, Personnel Security, Research and Development, Security Awareness & Education and Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittees; and for the Physical Security Working Group and the Security Advisory Group USSR. Covering them is a brief summary report on SECOM activities for the year.

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Attachments  
As Stated

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## DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE - 1984

THE DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE (SECOM) consists of the directors of security or the senior security policy staff officers of the Intelligence Community and of a Chairman and staff. SECOM provides staff support to the Director of Central Intelligence on the security of intelligence sources, methods and information and serves as a forum for the Intelligence Community to discuss security issues and solutions. SECOM is supported by nine subcommittees, two advisory groups and various working groups, each tasked with responsibility for dealing with a particular security discipline or major area of concern. SECOM meets about 12 times a year including a two-day executive seminar for principals each fall.

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During 1984 SECOM concentrated additional effort on the problem of unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence and on security against the terrorist threat; began a new effort to apply behavioral science to improve the quality of personnel security; expanded capabilities in technical surveillance countermeasures; initiated a series of seminars to train Community physical security officers in construction and maintenance of facilities to protect sensitive intelligence; intensified work in security awareness and education and in research and development on security topics; established a new subcommittee to try to forecast the security environment of the future and to evaluate the quality of SECOM's response; and continued work on computer security and on the security of compartmented and other intelligence source and method information.

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Unauthorized Disclosures

An Unauthorized Disclosure Analysis Center (UDAC) was established in SECOM. The Director of the FBI detailed a senior officer to supervise it. The center will compile automated data on classified intelligence leaks, analyze cases for possible patterns of disclosure, provide the Intelligence Community with current information and help expedite investigations to determine the inside sources of these leaks. SECOM published a two-volume Survey of Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Intelligence, FY 1979-FY 1983, which found 285 publications of such disclosures in a five-year period. The survey showed that the incidence of such disclosures is increasing, that the number of publications and networks engaged in this practice is growing, and that the elapsed time between preparation of intelligence reports and their publication in the news media is decreasing. The UDAC received more than 90 reports of intelligence leaks during 1984.

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Throughout the year, the SECOM staff coordinated investigative and referral actions on a number of intelligence leaks; provided the DCI a series of background and talking papers for his use in addressing the problem at the policy level; urged DCI consideration of a number of anti-leak initiatives; and reinforced efforts to educate cleared individuals about the hazards of discussing classified information with uncleared persons.

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Counter-terrorism

SECOM's Security Awareness and Education Subcommittee prepared and SECOM issued a defensive briefing for persons cleared for access to sensitive intelligence who might encounter terrorist or foreign intelligence activity as a result of visits to, or residence near, the 1984 Summer Olympic Games in Southern California. The briefing was disseminated widely in the Intelligence Community and to California firms holding classified contracts. SECOM completed the first report on security measures taken or planned by the Intelligence Community worldwide to safeguard intelligence facilities and personnel against terrorist attack. SECOM began efforts to restructure its subcommittees to provide for continuing attention to physical security measures to counter the terrorist threat. [REDACTED]

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Personnel Security - Behavioral Science

SECOM organized and held the Intelligence Community's first two symposia on applying the behavioral sciences to personnel security. These interchanges among psychologists, psychiatrists, personnel security specialists and senior security officers provided a basis for projected research efforts to validate and refine tentative conclusions, and to gather data on past personnel security failures to determine if there are common denominators that can be used for predictive purposes. [REDACTED]

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SECOM's Personnel Security Subcommittee compiled, and SECOM endorsed, a report of 49 anecdotal accounts of personnel security cases in which polygraph testing produced data of vital security importance which was not otherwise obtainable through field investigation. The study, showing how this method detected foreign intelligence agents and security risks, was provided Congressional and Government audiences to demonstrate the unique benefits of this personnel security screening tool. [REDACTED]

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SECOM reviewed and proposed needed changes to DCI personnel security policy governing eligibility for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). The DCI approved a SECOM-developed revision to guidelines for the Community to use in evaluating sexual considerations, cohabitation and data on close relatives/associates concerning persons being considered for or holding SCI access. SECOM prepared, and published with policy-level approval, an unclassified statement on the nature of SCI and the security protection it requires for use in litigation concerning a personnel security decision. [REDACTED]

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SECOM conducted three seminars, training a total of 75 persons, for Community officers who adjudicate investigative data to determine eligibility for access to SCI. These seminars are designed to improve the commonality of decisions on comparable issues. [REDACTED]

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Technical Surveillance Countermeasures

Significant improvements in technical security against hostile penetration were achieved through SECOM efforts. The FBI heads a SECOM-supported Intelligence Community effort to help the U.S. Capitol Police

SECRET<sup>2</sup> [REDACTED]

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SECRET [REDACTED]

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improve the security of Congressional facilities, including technical surveys of the House and Senate Chambers conducted at the request of the leadership of both Houses. The Interagency Training Center, the Community's sole facility for technical surveillance countermeasures security training, [REDACTED] was expanded and re-equipped. More than 200 students completed 337 weeks of instruction there in 1984. [REDACTED]

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SECOM's Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee prepared for use by the Department of Defense an analysis of security issues involved in the foreign manufacture, installation and maintenance of computer-aided office telephone systems within U.S. Government or cleared contractor facilities where classified information is discussed or processed. SECOM approved, and sent to intelligence collection management for implementation, a collection guide identifying information requirements on the hostile technical surveillance threat. [REDACTED]

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SECOM-sponsored research and development resulted in a prototype state-of-the-art countermeasures receiver for use by the Intelligence Community in detecting hostile penetration attempts. [REDACTED]

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SECOM's Security Advisory Group USSR, chaired by the Department of State, continued to monitor the security of the new U.S. embassy being constructed in Moscow by the Soviets. Security inspection of Soviet work and materials and analysis of the inspection data is proceeding with full Community support arranged through SECOM. [REDACTED]

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### Physical Security

The first four of a continuing series of seminars for physical security officers from Intelligence Community agencies were held under SECOM auspices. Lecture and workshop exercises are used to build common understanding of and greater homogeneity in applying DCI physical security policies and procedures. One hundred students from a wide range of Community organizations completed these seminars. [REDACTED]

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The SECOM Physical Security Working Group (since reconstituted as the Facilities Protection Subcommittee) began a long-term review of physical security standards for Intelligence Community SCI facilities to identify areas needing revision and to draft agreed upon changes. This SECOM group works with the General Services Administration's Interagency Advisory Committee on Security Equipment to help improve government-wide standards for security equipment. [REDACTED]

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### Security Awareness

SECOM sponsored the Community's first seminar for security educators. Seventy officers participated in a week-long series of presentations on

SECRET, 3 [REDACTED]

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content and techniques useful for briefing cleared audiences on issues of security concern, such as leaks, defense against terrorist attack, technical security hazards and indicators of espionage activity.




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Information and Other Security

SECOM's Computer Security Subcommittee initiated a project to gather data on and draft security procedures for use of "personal" size computers in Intelligence Community agencies. The SECOM staff worked with other DCI Committees to clarify the scope of collection requirements to avoid duplication of effort and to ensure adequate coverage of hostile threats.




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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
SECURITY COMMITTEE

Date: 9 January 1985

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE


FROM: The Chairman, Security Awareness and Education  
Subcommittee

SUBJECT: Annual Report

1. Authority and Mission - The Security Awareness and Education Subcommittee (SAES) was established by the DCI Security Committee (SECOM) on 10 June 1982. Prior to its formation the Security Awareness Working Group operated under SECOM apparatus. The SAES Charter is, in effect, the mission statement. A copy of the Charter is attached.


2. Chairman and Staff - The SAES Chairman and support staff are provided by NSA.

3. Subcommittee Members and Participants - During the past year, 14 government departments and agencies were represented on the Subcommittee. Members are as follows:



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4. Meetings - There were 14 Subcommittee meetings during 1984. Subcommittee task groups working on special projects met in eight additional sessions.

5. Major Accomplishments For 1984

a. Intelligence Community Protective Briefing on Terrorism and Espionage - During the latter months of 1983, SAES members became concerned about the possible threat posed by the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles. Although no hard evidence existed of foreign intelligence or terrorist initiatives, SAES members felt a protective briefing on terrorism and espionage should be given to all SCI cleared personnel who planned to attend. On 9 April the SAES completed and forwarded to the SECOM a final draft of a defensive security briefing for the 1984 Summer Games. The SECOM staff made minor modifications to the draft and published it under the title "Intelligence Community Protective Briefing on Terrorism and Espionage." The SECOM modifications broadened the usefulness of the briefing by making it applicable to all internationally attended events in the United States where targeting by foreign intelligence or terrorist groups is a possibility.

b. Catalog of Security Awareness Materials - In 1983 the SAES established a need for a central reference catalog with current listings of security awareness materials and personnel. A Subcommittee task force, appointed in November 1983 and headed by the DSI members, worked for months collecting and assimilating security awareness data from all member departments/agencies into a draft catalog. In September 1984 a final draft package was forwarded to the SECOM for review and approval. Although the document was returned in December for minor revisions, final approval and publication are expected in early 1985. The title of the document will be "Security Awareness and Education Handbook: People and Products."

c. Security Educator's Seminar - The SAES's first "Security Educator's Seminar" was held from 26 to 30 November

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1984 at the Department of Energy, Germantown, MD. Seventy-five security educators from 15 departments and agencies, assigned throughout the United States and overseas, attended the five day program. The 24 speakers who addressed the group included a number of senior security managers from major Intelligence Community departments/agencies. The Seminar focused on the DCI's "Minimum Standards for Security Awareness Programs in the U.S. Intelligence Community." Major topics were directed at helping attendees meet those standards. The Seminar's goal was to enhance security awareness skills, knowledge and "know-how." The program was considered a success and, as a result, additional seminars will be scheduled in the future.

## 6. Work in Progress

a. Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information - During 1984 the Subcommittee spent considerable time dealing with the "leak" problem. The effort, however, has been superficial at best. Several good videotapes dealing directly with the leak issue have been identified and distributed among Subcommittee members. Most noteworthy of these are "Logan's Story" and a PBS Production, "The Constitution: That Delicate Balance." Subcommittee members have also been strongly encouraged to have their respective department/agency invite DCI spokesmen (Messrs. [redacted]) to address the leak problem and present a videotaped discussion by the DCI. The Chairman of the Unauthorized Disclosure Subcommittee (UDIS) was invited to brief the Subcommittee on the UDIS's "Leak Study" and to offer suggestions on how to effectively utilize its findings. And, finally, special attention was given to the unauthorized disclosure issue during the Security Educator's Seminar. Two speakers addressed the problem (one was [redacted]), and the video "The Constitution: That Delicate Balance" was presented and followed with a discussion period.

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In the final analysis, an effective effort to counter the unauthorized disclosure problem has remained elusive. Accordingly, the Subcommittee is planning to make the leak issue its first priority during 1985. A variety of conventional (and some not so conventional) ideas are being discussed and closely examined. A paper setting forth ideas and recommendations will be forwarded to the Chairman, SECOM this Spring.

b. Security Educator's Seminar - A second Security Educator's Seminar will be planned for 1985. Lessons learned

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from the first seminar will obviously get careful attention during both the planning and implementation phases.

c. The updating and reissuance of SECOM D543 will also get priority attention during 1985. A Subcommittee task force has been appointed to expedite the tasking.

7. Current Year Work Plan

a. Identify possible solutions/countermeasures to the unauthorized disclosure problem. Set forth options and specific recommendations in a paper to SECOM.

b. Appoint a four person task force to schedule and plan a second Security Educator's Seminar.

c. Rewrite, per SECOM instruction, selected portions of the security awareness materials catalog and resubmit for final SECOM approval.

d. Expedite the updating and reissuance of SECOM D543.

8. Relevant Outside Activities - Although there are no specific items to report here, it is significant to note that a consistency in security awareness/education programs seems to be developing ever so slowly both within and outside the U.S. Intelligence Community. The DCI's Minimum Standards for Security Awareness initially published in 1979 are becoming more and more the standard, not only at headquarters locations, but at field sites and contractor facilities as well. The addition of Annex C to DCID 1/14 in 1984 will further expedite the standardization process.



Chairman, SAES

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Encl:  
a/s

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

14 September 1983

SECURITY AWARENESS AND EDUCATION SUBCOMMITTEE  
CHARTER

**NAME/AUTHORITY.** By letter dated June 10, 1982, the Chairman of the Director of Central Intelligence's Security Committee (SECOM) advised the members of a new standing subcommittee to be known as the Security Awareness and Education Subcommittee.

**Definition.** Security Awareness and Education supports all activities and programs within the Intelligence Community which are intended to or which tend to enhance the security of classified information. The concept encompasses all steps directed at individuals having authorized access to such information:

1. Awareness - to ensure and strengthen the conviction that there is a serious hostile threat necessitating protection of information which is sensitive and critical to national security.
2. Motivation - to convince those having access that the protective measures are reasonable, necessary and practical under the circumstances, and deserving of their support and strict compliance. Further, to promote full understanding that security breaches can result in irreparable damage to the national security and that effective security requires active participation by all cleared personnel.

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3. Training - to provide those having access with sufficient knowledge of protective security procedures so that they might comply.

4. Education - to provide those having access with sufficient understanding of the rationale behind the mandatory security procedures so that their actions will always be consistent with protective security policies.

#### Functions

1. The Subcommittee will meet regularly in order to:

a. Establish and maintain lines of communication among all interested Security Awareness and Education components of agencies participating in SECOM;

b. Provide a medium to exchange information, materials, ideas, resources and experiences in furtherance of mutual interest;

c. Develop ideas and concepts to enhance all Security Awareness and Education Programs;

d. Provide mutual encouragement and kindle interest in pursuit of objectives of mutual interest;

e. Avoid duplication of effort in the development of programs and materials.

2. The Subcommittee will develop and maintain Minimum Standards for Security Awareness Programs.

3. The Subcommittee will report to SECOM, with recommendations when appropriate, problems in implementing Security Awareness and Education.

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4. The Subcommittee will undertake projects of universal application on an ad hoc basis and provide guidance to participants executing existing projects on the universality of their project.

The Subcommittee will promote and support the development of Security Awareness and Education materials of general benefit to participants.

6. The Subcommittee will prepare and submit to the SECOM an annual program, to include a budget, to support the development of Security Awareness and Education projects and materials.

#### **COMPOSITION AND ORGANIZATION**

1. The Subcommittee Chairman will be appointed by the Chairman of the SECOM.

2. Members will be designated by agencies represented by principals on the SECOM.

3. Observers are invited to participate from any Executive Branch entity interested in protecting national security information, subject to the approval of the Chairman of the SECOM

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**DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE  
PHYSICAL SECURITY WORKING GROUP**

23 January 1985

**SECRET - Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).**

**MEMORANDUM**

**From: Chairman, Physical Security working Group**

**To: Chairman, SECOM**

**Subj: SECOM TASKINGS**

**Ref: (a) SECOM D-290 of 5 Dec 1984  
(b) SECOM D-283 of 28 Nov 1984**

**Encl: (1) Annual Report - 1984  
(2) Proposed Charter of the Facility Protection  
Subcommittee**

1. The Annual Report of the Physical Security Working Group for 1984 is attached at enclosure (1) and is submitted pursuant to reference (a).
2. Attached at enclosure (2) is the proposed charter of the Facility Protection Subcommittee which has been prepared pursuant to reference (b). The Charter has been endorsed by the Physical Security Working Group at its 22 Jan 1985 meeting.

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**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
SECURITY COMMITTEE  
PHYSICAL SECURITY WORKING GROUP**

23 JAN 1985

**SECRET - Unclassified upon removal of enclosure**


**From:** Chairman, Physical Security Working Group  
**To:** Chairman, SECOM

**Subj:** ANNUAL REPORT - 1984

**Ref:** (a) SECOM-D-290 of 5 Dec 1984

**Encl:** (1) Subject Annual Report

1. The Annual Report of the Physical Security Working Group for Calendar Year 1984 is attached at enclosure (1) and is submitted pursuant to reference (a).



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**PHYSICAL SECURITY WORKING GROUP**  
**ANNUAL REPORT (U)**  
**1984**

1. (U) **Authority and Mission Statement.** The Physical Security Working Group (PSWG) was conceived at the October 1982 SECOM Seminar to provide oversight to NFIB/NFIC-9.1/47, conduct physical security seminars, and to address other physical security issues which it may develop or which may be addressed to the Working Group. This genesis was outlined to the PSWG by the Chairman of the SECOM at the Working Group's initial (organizational) meeting on 11 May 1983. The Physical Security Working Group has been formally established pursuant to the authority granted the SECOM by DCID-1/11 of 18 May 1976. On 14 Nov 1984, the SECOM approved the reconstitution of the Physical Security Working Group as the SECOM Facility Protection Subcommittee and by letter of 28 Nov 1984, the Chairman of the SECOM requested preparation of an expanded charter for the new subcommittee.
2. (U) **Identity of Agency Providing Chairman and Staff Support.** The Chairman, Mr. Gerald L. Berkin, is employed by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Staff support for the Working Group is provided by the SECOM. Additional staff support is provided by Mr. Berkin's office.
3. (FOUO) **Identities of Members/Participants and Their Parent Agencies.** The Members of the Physical Security Working Group are:

Chairman	Mr. G. L. Berkin Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	
Air Force	Mrs. Elizabeth Hall AFIS/INSC	
Alternate	Maj. Vickie A. Young (Same Office)	
Army	Mr. Frederick B. Wirth HQDA (DAMI-CIS)	
CIA	<input type="text"/> Central Intelligence Agency	25X1
DIA	<input type="text"/> OS2, DIAC	25X1
Alternate	<input type="text"/> (Same Office)	25X1
DOE	Mr. Stephen F. Slaughter Office of Safeguards and Security (DP-343.2)	

Classified by: Multiple Sources  
 Declassify on: OADR

Enclosure (1)

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FBI	Mr. Richard D. Davidson FBI HQ
Justice	Mr. Bernard Gattozzi DOJ Emergency Program Center
Alternate	Mr. Chuck Trombetta (Same Office)
Navy	Mr. Richard R. Schmeltz Naval Intelligence Command (NIC-43)
Alternate	Ms. Barbara Sheckells (Same Office)
NSA	Mr. John Docherty NSA M513
OSD	Ms. Rebecca A. Long ODUSD(P)
Alternate	Mr. Anthony Mitchell (Same Office)
State	Mr. Thomas Thounhurst Department of State INR/EX/SB
Alternate	Mr. Richard A. Feltault Department of State (A/SY/OPS)
SECOM Staff Advisor	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 200px; height: 20px; margin: 0 auto;"></div> SECOM

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4. (U) **Number of Meetings Held.** The Physical Security Working Group held twelve meetings in Calendar Year 1984.

5. (U) **Brief Description of Major Accomplishments.** Calendar Year 1984 was primarily devoted to fine-tuning the physical security seminar series and to revising NFIB/NFIC-9.1/47. Four physical security seminars were successfully conducted during CY-84 which were well received by the attendees. The seminar curriculum was adjusted during this first year of seminar activity and has now been finalized. A list of Recommended Reference Materials was developed and is used as a seminar handout. Workshop materials were also developed and have become a permanent part of the seminar curriculum. SECOM approval was obtained in 1984 for contractor participation in the seminar series and the first all-contractor seminar has been scheduled for mid 1985. Formal liaison was established with Industry's Industrial Security Working Group (ISWG) to provide a forum for IC/Industry dialogue on matters of mutual concern in the physical security area. The PSWG resolved several community problems which were brought before it, such as the matter of the over-broad circulation of lock by-passing techniques, and the furnishing of advice on the security of magnetic media to the SECOM's Computer

Security Subcommittee. The revision of NFIB/NFIC-9.1/47 was initiated and several portions were re-drafted before the end of the year and circulated for Member comment. Other portions were still being re-written by the end of the year and are scheduled for completion early in 1985. Representatives of the PSWG attended vendor demonstrations of security devices in behalf of the Community and disseminated copies of pertinent literature to interested agencies. The Chairman of the PSWG attended all 1984 meetings of the Interagency Advisory Committee on Security Equipment (IACSE) and ensured that matters of interest to the Intelligence Community were appropriately addressed. The Chairman of the PSWG assisted IACSE staff in developing a new IACSE charter and charters for the IACSE subcommittees.

6. (U) Highlights of Work in Progress. Sections of NFIB/NFIC-9.1/47, to be re-designated DCID 1/21, are being redrafted and a proposed SCIF accreditation checklist is being staffed for Agency comment. Specifically, Section II (Perimeter Construction Criteria for SCI Facilities), and an Annex covering Field or Tactical Operations are being re-written and the SECOM Telephone Security Panel was formally asked to re-write the section on Telephones and Intercommunications Equipment. Of particular note, it appears that the new DCID will not require individual agency implementation and that for the first time, the Community and associated contractors will be able to work with a single policy document in the SCI physical security area. Preliminary planning has begun for the reconstitution of the Working Group as the SECOM's Facility Protection Subcommittee and the drafting of a new charter was initiated. The subject of Terrorism was proposed for Working group consideration in 1984 but was provisionally tabled pending SECOM review of the subject matter; the drafting of the successor Subcommittee charter will, however, accommodate a capability for compiling data on threats to intelligence facilities and for assessing the effectiveness of countermeasures to these threats. Efforts were begun in 1984 to identify for procurement materials for use at Working Group seminars in support of and to enhance seminar presentations and workshops.

7. (U) General Work Plan for the Current Year. Three physical security seminars will be conducted in Calendar Year 1985 for IC personnel, and one will be conducted for associated contractor personnel. The Working Group will endeavor to obtain funding for the purchase of certain materials for use at the seminars to enhance seminar productivity.

Planning will be initiated to undertake an R&D project (by contract) to develop a detailed IDS high line security specification if SECOM approval and funding are forthcoming.

NFIB/NFIC-9.1/47 will be completely revised and promulgated as DCID 1/21 in 1985.

The Working Group will be reconstituted as the SECOM's Facility Protection Subcommittee (FPS) and will address issues pertinent to its new charter.

As the IACSE program evolves, the FPS will address IACSE initiatives pertinent to the Subcommittee's charter. Absent IACSE progress in developing detailed specifications for physical security equipment, the FPS will develop a means to ensure Community development of such specifications.

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**8. (U) Activities Relevant to Subcommittee Mission Going On Outside the SECOM Structure.**

a. (U) The Interagency Advisory Committee on Security Equipment (IACSE) has formally established five subcommittees to deal with functional areas of physical security concern. These are Locks and Locking Devices, Barriers, Intrusion Detection, Law Enforcement Patrol/Guard Equipment, and Destruct Systems. The Chairman of the PSWG regularly attends IACSE meetings and keeps the PSWG apprised of IACSE initiatives and operations. The IACSE, in cooperation with the American Defense Preparedness Association (ADPA), will sponsor a joint Physical Security Symposium at Eglin AFB in April 1985.

b. (S) The Overseas Security Policy Group of the Department of State includes representation from State, CIA, USIA, DIA, USAID, NSA, DOJ, and Treasury and is working on problems dealing with the security of US diplomatic facilities abroad. The Group's goals include detailed objectives in overseas facility procedural matters, physical controls/safeguards, communications capabilities, information systems security, TSCM matters, and personal/residential security. This group provides input to the Secretary of State's Advisory Panel on Overseas Security.

c. (U) The Department of Defense (DOD) has several committees, panels or working groups which are involved in matters of PSWG interest. These are:

- The Physical Security Review Board which meets quarterly and includes representation at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level.
- The Coordination Group on Protection of Personnel Against Terrorist Acts, chaired by DOD's Special Planning Office (a part of International Security Affairs).
- Physical Security Equipment Action Group, which coordinates DOD's R&D efforts in the physical security area.
- Physical Security Tri-Service Requirements Working Group, which is concerned with DOD user-agency (security police) activity. This group explores areas of mutual interest to identify operational or R&D requirements which are staffed for action within the Services or for joint requirements by OSD.

The Chairman, PSWG, receives reports on these DOD entities via the OSD Member of the PSWG in order to be kept apprised of their activities.

S E C R E T

ORD-0068-85

31 January 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Security Committee

FROM :

[Redacted]

Executive Secretary, R&D Subcommittee, SECOM

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SUBJECT :

Research and Development Subcommittee Annual Report

1. Authority and Mission Statement

The Security Committee is a standing committee for the Director of Central Intelligence pursuant to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 11905 and National Security Council Intelligence Directives. One of the missions of the Security Committee is to establish and direct an aggressive and imaginative program of research and development leading to improved security equipment and techniques. The mission is supported by a permanent subcommittee dedicated to security research and development. The Chairman of the Research and Development (R&D) Subcommittee is Dr. Philip K. Eckman, Director of the Office of Research and Development (ORD) for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and is designated by the Committee Chairman with the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).

2. Identity of Agency Providing Chairman and Staff Support

The Central Intelligence Agency provides the Chairman, Executive Secretary, and Recording Secretary to the Research and Development Subcommittee.

[Redacted]

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SUBJECT: Research and Development Subcommittee Annual Report

3. Identities of Members/Participants and Their Parent Agencies

Members :

Dr. P. K. Eckman, CIA, Chairman, R&D Subcommittee  
Captain B. Baxley, Air Force, Chairman, Advanced  
Countermeasures Receiver Working Group  
Mr. G. Sumner, Army

[redacted], DIA  
Mr. R. Wingfield, DOE, Chairman, Telephone Security  
Working Group

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Mr. B. Middleton, Navy  
Mr. J. Lechevet, State  
Mr. R. Solan, Treasury, Chairman, Threat Assessment  
Working Group

[redacted], NSA, Chariman, Power Line Working Group  
Mr. E. Terrazas, FBI

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Alternates and Observers

Mr. M. Dameron, Air Force  
Mr. M. Gullo, Air Force  
Mr. P. Von Stein, Army, Chairman, Document Destruction  
Working Group  
Mr. D. Modracek, Army

[redacted], CIA  
[redacted] CIA, Chairman, Secure Conference Room  
Working Group

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[redacted] CIA  
[redacted] CIA  
[redacted] CIA  
[redacted] CIA  
[redacted] CIA  
[redacted] DIA

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Mr. W. Witter, DNA  
Mr. D. Pisenti, FBI, Chairman, Armor & Protective  
Systems Working Group

Mr. D. Koger, FBI

[redacted] NSA  
[redacted] NSA  
[redacted] NSA

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Mr. B. Given, Navy  
Mr. A. Petit, SECOM  
Mr. R. Bryan, State  
Mr. K. Crosher, State  
Mr. E. Morthimer, Treasury  
Capt. D. White, USMC

S E C R E T




**SUBJECT: Research and Development Subcommittee Annual Report**

**4. Number of Meetings Held**

There were eight scheduled R&D Subcommittee meetings held during 1984.


**5. Brief Description of Major Accomplishments**

A. Acoustic/Shielded Enclosure (A/SE): Completed design and fabricated engineering model of the A/SE.



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B. Document Destruction Standards: Initiated an effort to explore the feasibility/practicality of setting uniform Destruction Standards for Classified Documents to be implemented through GSA. Such standards would eliminate "overkill" in document destruction criteria and thereby increase thruput of documents to be destroyed. If concurrence is reached by the R&D Subcommittee, the recommended changes will be forwarded to the SECOM in 1985.



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E. Advanced Countermeasures Receiver (ACMR): Work is progressing in this important project but, some technical and contractor problems have resulted in an approximate 8 month slip in the anticipated delivery dates to June 1985 for the engineering development model and Feb. 1986 for prototypes.



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
**SUBJECT: Research and Development Subcommittee Annual Report**

**6. Highlights of Work in Progress**

Because the projects mentioned in the previous section are continuing efforts, they should also be included in this section.

**7. General Work Plan for Current Year**


Continuation of efforts listed in paragraph 5 above, as appropriate. Additionally it is anticipated that SECOM seed money will be used to initiate work in the following areas in 1985.



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**8. Activities relevant to the R&D Subcommittee mission going on outside the SECOM structure**

Ongoing and planned activities related to but not under the aegis of the SECOM include development of systems




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S E C R E T

SUBJECT: Research and Development Subcommittee Annual Report

9. I consider this a productive year for the R&D Subcommittee and look forward to the Committee's starting the research submitted in its Prioritized R&D Candidates list.



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S E C R E T

5 March 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, SECOM

FROM:

[Redacted]

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Chairman, Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee (TSCS)

SUBJECT:

Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee (TSCS) Annual Report

1. This last year has once again been very busy for the TSCS and its membership. All Agencies seem to be suffering shortages of resources including senior Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) personnel. Members are finding it difficult, under these circumstances, in making a meaningful commitment to Community support. We have had a difficult time in getting volunteers to chair the working group and panels making up the TSCS structure. At the same time, we found ourselves besieged with requirements across the board.

2. Some of the activities we have been working on over the last year or so are spelled out in the report. The Technical Advisory Group (TAG) has been one of our more active elements, handling requirements on Capitol Hill ranging from security surveys, support of training for the Capitol Hill police, and overseeing the In-Place Monitoring System contract. We have also been very active in keeping up with export licenses for the Department of Commerce.

3. I would also like to take this opportunity to point out the fine work being done by [Redacted]

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[Redacted] I believe it would be in the best interests of the Intelligence Community (IC) to program some SECOM R&D money into this effort.

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[Redacted]

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
**SUBJECT: Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee  
(TSCS) Annual Report**

4. It continues to be a pleasure serving as Chairman of this Interagency body and working on so many varied problems in which we all have a keen interest. As in the past, without the services of [redacted] we would not have accomplished nearly as much as we did. Should you have any questions regarding the report or its attachments, please feel free to call me [redacted]

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TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES SUBCOMMITTEE  
AUDIO COUNTERMEASURES WORKING GROUP  
TELEPHONE SECURITY PANEL

MEMORANDUM

TO: Chairman, TSCS/Audio Countermeasures  
FROM: Chairman, Telephone Security Panel  
SUBJECT: Information for SECOM Subcommittee Annual Report  25X1

The following information provides the Telephone Security Panel (TSP) component for the TSCS annual report.  25X1

1. Authority and mission statement

The TSP was established by TSCS as an advisory body for ACWG on matters pertaining to:

- a. The security problems associated with administrative telephone systems.
- b. The evaluation of identified (and possible) telephone based audio surveillance attacks against the U. S. Government's defense and security establishment.
- c. The development and evaluation of prevention and detection countermeasures against hostile audio surveillance techniques involving telephones and telephone systems.  25X1

2. Identity of agency providing chairman and staff support

TSP is chaired by the FBI member. The FBI also serves as Executive Agent for the Interagency Telephone Laboratory (ITL) whose purpose is to provide technical support for TSP. The current staffing of ITL is two electronics engineers and one electronics technician. Active recruitment is underway to obtain an additional qualified electronics technician.  25X1

3. Identities of members/participants and their parent agencies

FBI:

Ernest Terrazas, member  
Charles W. Wilmore, alternate member  
Andrew L. Gelfand, ITL staff  
Dale Koger, ITL staff  
Herbert Wong, ITL staff  25X1

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Department of State:

John Bagnal, member

25X1

Defense Intelligence Agency:

member

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alternate member

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CIA:

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NSA:

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Air Force:

Gerald Wilson, member

Elizabeth Hall, observer

25X1

Army:

Jackie Cowden, member

Robert Gleeson, alternate member

25X1

Navy: Harold Aaron, member

William Coti, alternate member

25X1

Secret Service:

John Robey, member

Bruce Meermans, alternate member

25X1

Department of Energy:

Robert Wingfield, member

25X1

4. Number of meetings held

TSP met ten times during calendar year 1984.

5. Brief description of major accomplishments

a. ITL reports

25X1

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25X1

6. Highlights of work in progress

25X1

8. Activities relevant to subcommittee mission going on outside the SECOM structure

None

25X1

**CONFIDENTIAL**

7 February 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[Redacted]  
Chairman, TSCS

25X1

FROM:

[Redacted]  
Chairman, ACWG

25X1

SUBJECT:

1984 Annual Interagency Training Center Report

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SECURITY COMMITTEE

COMPARTMENTATION SUBCOMMITTEE

29 JAN 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DCI Security Committee

SUBJECT: Annual Report of the Compartmentation Subcommittee  
(Your Memorandum, SECOM-D-290, 5 Dec 84)

1. Attachment 1 is the 1984 annual report of the Compartmentation Subcommittee. Appended to attachment 2 are copies of pertinent documentation, as requested by above referenced memorandum.

2. I wish to take this opportunity to advise you of the outstanding interest and support evinced by all subcommittee members. The attached annual report is clearly indicative of their meaningful contributions. Also, please let me express my gratitude for the superb assistance [redacted] of the SECOM staff rendered during the past year. I am certain all subcommittee members equally appreciate his wise counsel and untiring efforts.

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3. This memorandum is Unclassified.

[redacted]

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Chairman, Compartmentation Subcommittee

2 Atch

- 1. Annual Report (FOUO)
- 2. Listing of Documents (U) w/Atch [redacted]

25X1

cc: Subcommittee Members  
(w/o Atch 2)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI)

SECURITY COMMITTEE (SECOM)

COMPARTMENTATION SUBCOMMITTEE

FOR THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1984

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. The basic mission of the Compartmentation Subcommittee is to provide technical guidance and recommendations on Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) physical and information security matters. Subcommittee efforts during the period of this report were primarily devoted to developing and providing recommendations to change DCIDs 1/19 and 1/20, reviewing contractor industrial security policies and addressing issues concerning the terrorist phenomenon and its threat to US SCI indoctrinated personnel and facilities.

1. Authority and Mission of the Compartmentation Subcommittee. The DCI SECOM Compartmentation Subcommittee functions according to DCID, Security Committee, effective 15 July 1982. Its basic mission is to:

a. Develop and recommend technical guidance for the establishment, maintenance and improvement of coordinated SCI systems.

b. Formulate, coordinate, maintain and promulgate technical guidance for use in the administration of SCI controls at all echelons of Intelligence Community (IC) organizations, both domestic and overseas, including consultants and contractor support activities to include: access approval criteria and employment in hazardous duty areas; physical security; document identification, handling, accountability and destruction; and automated data processing and associated materials.

c. Furnish technical guidance and assistance to the COMIREX and SIGINT Committees and to the Executive Agents of other SCI programs in connection with their sanitization, downgrading, declassification and decontrol responsibilities.

d. Review and survey the security standards, practices and procedures IC organizations and their contractors use in relation to approved SCI policies, procedures and controls; and make recommendations for practical improvements.

e. Recommend security policy relative to foreign government participation in US SCI activities.

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f. Recommend security policies governing the release or disclosure of SCI to the public, foreign governments or international organizations in which the US participates.

2. Agency Providing the Chairman and Staff Support. The Department of the Air Force provides the Chairman (Colonel Robert B. Huey, Jr, HQ USAF/INS) and Executive Secretary (Mr Richard D. Semmel, HQ USAF/INSC). Mr Semmel replaced Capt Karen R. Diggs on 14 May 1984 who, in turn, had replaced Mr Roger D. Smith on 1 April 1984.

3. Members and Their Parent Agencies. These persons served as principal members of the Compartmentation Subcommittee during 1984:

Lt Col Robert S. Andrews, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force

[Redacted] National Security Agency STAT

Ms Fran McGowan, Department of the Army

[Redacted] Central Intelligence Agency STAT

Mr Joseph A. Norris, Department of Justice

Mr Gene B. Phillip, Department of the Navy

[Redacted] Defense Intelligence Agency STAT

Mr Donald W. Stigers, Department of State

Mr Marshall G. Westover, Department of Energy

4. Number of Meetings Held. The subcommittee held six meetings in 1984 as follows: 28 February, 13 April, 8 June, 6 July, 4 September and 18 October. Also a subgroup of the subcommittee formed and met 6 September 1984 at the request of the subcommittee chairman. Subcommittee members devoted an estimated 316 hours in support of subcommittee business.

5. Brief Description of Major Accomplishments:

a. Security Policy Concerning Travel and Assignment of Personnel with Access to SCI:

(1) In response to a National Security Agency (NSA) request, the subcommittee reviewed the hazardous area list (DCID 1/20, Appendix 1) on 28 February 1984, to determine if it was current. The subcommittee moved to delete Grenada from the list. The SECOM ratified this action during its 7 March 1984 meeting. The subcommittee also identified several countries where national and or second country intelligence activities posed a threat or where a physical threat

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to US citizens and property existed (see Minutes, Forty First Meeting, 5 March 1984). The subcommittee recommended that security officers within the IC highlight the named nations and the companion threat(s) during their various security awareness training initiatives and promotions.

(2) On 13 April 1984, the subcommittee met to determine if a need existed to develop briefing policies and procedures in consideration of the terrorist threat. The subcommittee initially recommended against such an effort; instead, it suggested that the Security Awareness Subcommittee address terrorism and appropriate countermeasures during the security education and training discussions. Nevertheless, the Air Force independently developed recommended changes to DCID 1/20 regarding the terrorist threat. These were sent to the SECOM on 18 March 1984. The subcommittee approved the Air Force proposals, after the fact, at its 8 June 1984 meeting. On 16 May 1984, the SECOM adopted the Air Force initiated recommendations with some minor modifications.

(3) On 8 June 1984, the subcommittee thoroughly reviewed and discussed DCID 1/20 at the request of the SECOM Chairman. No substantive recommendations were formulated at that time. The subcommittee held that present policy and guidance were adequate. Two purely administrative changes were agreed to and sent to the SECOM as an appendage to the 8 June 1984 meeting minutes, 12 June 1984.

b. SCI Control Systems Policies. The subcommittee addressed several issues involving DCID 1/19. These were:

(1) SCI Marking Requirements. At the request of the SECOM Chairman, the subcommittee sat to decide if SCI marking requirements mandated by DCID 1/19 were adequate and definitive enough to cover Header Sheets. Header Sheets are used in connection with the transmission of SCI traffic over the Long Distance Xerox (LDX) system. The subcommittee first opined on 6 July 1984 that current guidance was sufficient. It recommended and prepared a SECOM security advisory on the subject. One was issued as SECOM letter, SECOM-D-182, 13 August 1984. The subcommittee again deliberated the matter of markings for Header Sheets during its 4 September 1984 session. At this time, it developed a proposed change to DCID 1/19. This entailed a new subparagraph 25c and additional language to the present subparagraph 27d. The proposed changes went to the SECOM on 6 September 1984. The SECOM discussed the proposed changes at its 12 September 1984 meeting. No objections were voiced by attendees.

(2) Couriering SCI Aboard Commercial Aircraft. On 4 September 1984, the subcommittee framed a proposed addition to DCID 1/19, paragraph 33a, concerning couriering SCI aboard commercial aircraft. The proposal went to the SECOM as attachment 2 to the subcommittee meeting minutes,

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6 September 1984. A subgroup of the Compartmentation Subcommittee met 13 September 1984 to review this and other DCID 1/19 issues. The subgroup amplified and expanded paragraph 33a. Its suggestions were forwarded to the SECOM as an attachment to a 20 September 1984 memorandum. Final subcommittee action was taken 18 October 1984 when several modifications to the proposed wording of paragraph 33a were proposed and adapted. The results were sent to the SECOM on 19 October 1984 as an attachment to the 18 October 1984 subcommittee meeting minutes.

(3) The US Army member expressed concern during the 4 September 1984 meeting with DCID 1/19, paragraph 20. The member believed that the terminology was chiefly "hard copy" oriented and did not sufficiently consider current automated dissemination systems. The subgroup formulated a change when it met on 13 September 1984. In session, the subcommittee reviewed the proposal and further refined it on 18 October 1984. The effort was dispatched to the SECOM on 19 October 1984 as an attachment to the minutes of the subcommittee meeting.

(4) Contractor Security Practices. Based on a tasking from the SECOM Chairman, the subcommittee treated with the practices of some contractor firms to advertise for SCI cleared individuals. This was done on 28 February 1984. The subcommittee moved to bring the matter of concern to the attention of a special DOD committee formed to explore ways to improve and strengthen the Industrial Security Program. This was done by letter on 8 March 1984. The subcommittee also fashioned a change to DCID 1/19, paragraph 35d, to clarify the security issue regarding contractor advertisements. By letters of 2 and 11 April 1984, the proposed change went to the SECOM. The SECOM aired the proposal during its 11 April 1984 meeting and offered no objection to it.

(5) Other DCID 1/19 Actions. The subgroup also reviewed DCID 1/19, paragraphs 19, 20, 29, 31 and 36, during its 13 September 1984 meeting. It suggested a change to paragraphs 19 and 31. The former deals with SCI Special Security Office/Control Center functions while the latter governs inventories of SCI materials. The subgroup agreed that no changes to the remaining paragraphs were necessary. The subcommittee concurred with these actions during its 18 October 1984 meeting. Subcommittee meeting minutes, 19 October 1984, relayed these results to the SECOM.

c. Study of Harassments and Provocations. At its 28 February 1984 meeting, the subcommittee reasoned with the need to provide any recent examples of hostile intelligence harassments and provocations for possible inclusion in the SECOM-D-021 study on the subject. The subcommittee concluded that a valid need existed. Individual members were asked to produce appropriate inputs. A letter of 11 April 1984

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transmitted AFOSI and US Army examples to the SECOM. State Department and NSA examples were sent to the SECOM by a 16 April 1984 letter. The subcommittee also held at its 28 February session that the Security Awareness Subcommittee should remain as the lead activity for developing threat briefings involving the 1984 summer Olympics.

6. Highlights of Work in Progress. A review of DCID 1/19, paragraph 36, is underway. It deals with policy on releasing SCI to contractors when foreign ownership, control or influence (FOCI) factors are involved. DOD 5220.22-R, Industrial Security Regulation (ISR), offers detailed guidance; however, it does not uniformly apply to all IC activities. An imminent change to the ISR will leave existing guidance intact. A second strawman proposal will be, therefore, sent to subcommittee members for review and subsequent discussion at the first subcommittee meeting in 1985.

7. General 1985 Work Plan. Other than the FOCI issue (see 6, above), no 1985 work plan, per se, is deemed necessary. The Compartmentation Subcommittee will develop issues on an ad hoc basis and seek resolutions for them. It also welcomes all taskings the SECOM Chairman may wish to levy on it.

8. Activities Outside SECOM Relevant to the Subcommittee Mission. The subcommittee is not aware of any activities of this nature.



Washington, D.C. 20520

February 5, 1985

MEMORANDUM

TO:

[Redacted]  
Chairman, Security Committee  
Central Intelligence Agency

STAT

FROM:

Marvin T. Doig (M)  
Chairman, Security Advisory Group, USSR

SUBJECT:

SAG/USSR 1984 Annual Report

Attached is the SAG/USSR 1984 Annual Report



Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET

Security Advisory Group, USSR

Annual Report - 1984

1. (C) Authority

The Security Advisory Group, USSR (SAG) was established with the endorsement of the members of the Security Committee on January 24, 1979. Security Committee memorandum SECOM-D-436 outlines the charter, which is to advise and assist the Security Committee and the Department of State in developing security policies and procedures to protect U.S. personnel and installations in the Soviet Union.

2. (U) Agency Providing Chairman and Staff Support


U.S. Department of State  
Division of Technical Services  
Office of Security

3. (C) SAG Membership/Participants

Department of State

Marvin T. Doig, Chairman SAG  
Frederick K. Crosher, SAG Executive Secretary  
Stephen Jacobs, A/SY/OPS/T  
Tony Deibler, A/SY/OPS/T  
Maclyn Musser, A/SY/OPS/T  
Ned Arcement, EUR/EX  
Frederick B. Bunke, A/FBO  
Richard J. Shinnick, A  
Nadia Tongour, EUR/SOV  
Don Stigers, INR/IS  
Michael Beckner, SY/SAS  
Lt. Jim McConnell, A/SY/NSU

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SECRET

NSA

:

[Redacted]

:

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FBI

C.W. Saari  
William Johnson

CIA

[Redacted]

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DIA

[Redacted]

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4. (U) Meetings

There were three meetings held during 1984.

5. (S) Major Accomplishments

[Redacted]

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- Housing in Moscow for TDY teams at the World Trade Center continues to be available through FBO. No difficulties

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

1.2.3.1

4 February 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[REDACTED]  
Chairman, Security Committee

25X1

FROM:

[REDACTED]  
Chairman, Personnel Security Subcommittee

25X1

SUBJECT: ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1984

I. The function of the Security Committee with respect to Personnel Security is to initiate, coordinate, review and interpret policy, standards and procedures impacting on access to classified intelligence information. To this end, activities of the Security Committee include the following:

1. To develop and coordinate Intelligence Community security policies, standards and procedures with regard to the security investigation of all individuals needing access to intelligence information.

2. To facilitate the formulation, development and application of common standards of adjudication.

3. To foster a coordinated program of Intelligence Community security training and orientation.

4. To advise and assist the DCI, Intelligence Community organizations, DCI committees and other intelligence holders and users on personnel security issues; and to facilitate the resolution of differences that may arise in connection therewith.

5. To advise and assist holders and users of intelligence information in the development of programs concerning continuing reviews and updating of investigations on individuals having access to intelligence information.

6. To document and interpret appropriate policy, standards and procedures to foster widespread understanding, application and commitment within the Intelligence Community regarding personnel security.

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II. The Central Intelligence Agency has provided the Chairman of the Personnel Security Subcommittee. The National Security Committee has provided the Executive Secretary. NSA has provided the Secom Staff Member advisor to the Personnel Security Subcommittee..

III. The following are the identities of the members/participants and their parent agencies:

Chairman	[Redacted]	25X1
	Central Intelligence Agency	
Executive Secretary	[Redacted]	25X1
	National Security Agency	
AIR FORCE Alternate	Mrs. Colleen M. Cornwall Mr. Francis R. Harper	
ARMY Alternate	Mr. Joseph C. Pell Mrs. Frances McGowan	
CIA	[Redacted]	25X1
DIA Alternate	[Redacted]	25X1
DOE Alternate	Mr. Calvin A. Wood Mr. Ernest E. Wagner	
OSD Alternate	Mr. Peter Nelson Mr. William H. Bell	
FBI Alternate	SA Maurice C. Hurst Ms. Catherine I. Fennell	
JUSTICE Alternate	Mr. Joseph A. Norris Mr. Charles Alliman	
NAVY Alternate Alternate	Miss Patricia E. Kiley Mr. George Henriksen Mr. Earl Fleischman	
NSA Alternate	[Redacted]	25X1
STATE	Mr. Kenneth R. Orzell	
TREASURY	Mr. William B. O'Donnell	

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OSAF  
Alternate

Lt. Col. Robert S. Andrews  
Ms. Rita M. Metro

SECOM  
Staff Advisor



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OBSERVERS

COMMERCE

Mr. Greenville L. Wright, Jr.  
Mr. Ronald Van Tuyl

IV. During the calendar year, meetings were held on the following dates:

- 4 January
- 1 February
- 21 March
- 9 May
- 6 June
- 19 July
- 8 August
- 5 September
- 10 October
- 15 November

V. ACCOMPLISHMENTS

1. Intelligence Community SCI Adjudicators Conference - No.14  
5 - 9 November 1984
2. Behavioral Science and Personnel Security Symposium - II  
4 - 5 October 1984 (Discussion-Oriented - summary  
and critiques)
3. Study of retention of security file within intelligence  
community agencies - working group presentation.
4. Behavioral Science and Personnel Security Symposium - I  
28 - 29 June 1984
5. Intelligence Community SCI Adjudicators Conference - No.13  
10 - 14 September 1984

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6. Intelligence Community SCI Adjudicators Conference - No.12  
12 - 16 March 1984
7. Polygraph Utility Study - February 1984
8. Revisions to DCID 1/14 - Annex A - Adjudication Guidelines  
Effective 27 November 1984

CLOSE RELATIVES AND ASSOCIATES  
SEXUAL CONSIDERATION  
COHABITATION

9. Distribution of listing of individuals who serve as  
points of contact within each agency for information  
of SCI denial actions in pursuit of SECOM policy.
10. Considered proposal by U.S. Army to change wording of  
DCID/1/14 regarding U.S. citizenship of family members of  
persons being considered for SCI accesses. The committee  
voted to retain existing language.

VI. Proposed Projects for 1985:

Behavioral Science and Personnel Security Symposium - III  
25 - 26 March

Personnel Security Adjudicators Seminar - No. 15  
1 - 5 April  
(proposed two additional runnings of the seminar No. 16 and  
No. 17 during the year)

VII. General Work Plan for the Year:

In addition to running three Personnel Security Adjudicator  
seminars, the following additional projects are proposed:

1. Behavior Science and Personnel Security Symposium - III  
Determine a viable study to undertake in this field -allocate  
resources.
2. To participate in the NCIC Advisory Board discussions  
relative to access to the Interstate Identification Index III  
of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC).
3. Community Personnel Security Practices for non-SCI Access;  
Catalogue of Standards.

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4. Study of Personnel Security Practices Regarding Off-Duty Activity.

5. Study of Personnel Security Requirements for Access to Secret Level, Non-Compartmented Intelligence (DOD currently undertaken).

6. Update Points of Contact - SCI Denial Information.

7. To undertake any project or task levied by the Chairman, SECOM relative to long range plans of the SECOM for the Personnel Security Subcommittee.

VIII. During the year, the following changes of members/participants were effected:

Department of Treasury	Vaughn V. Holcombe, Jr.	(Reassigned)
Department of Energy	A. Barry Dalinsky	(Resigned)
Department of Energy	Richard J. Hausman	(Retired)
National Security Agency		(Reassigned)
National Security Agency		(Alternate)

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30 April 1985

U-36/05

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE (SECOM) MEMBERS

SUBJECT: New Product Briefing

1. Representatives of Aquidneck Data Corporation have offered to present a technical briefing to interested SECOM members on a currently available image and document management system. The basic system provides for capture and storage of up to 400,000 pages of text, 25,000 images, or any combinations thereof. This system can be upgraded to a full minicomputer network without changes to the user interface, equipment purchased, or database generated. The storage medium is a 12" optical disk which is removeable and easily stored, and has a storage life of over 10 years. A general description of the system and specifications of the basic unit with expansion options is attached.

2. SECOM members interested in this system may contact the undersigned on 695-2780, [redacted] on (401) 847-7260, ext 244.

STAT

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

[Redacted signature box]

STAT

Deputy Chief  
Office of Security

1 Enclosure  
General Description



Aquidneck Data Corporation

## IMAGE AND DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

### General Description

The Image and Document Management System (IDMS) is a turnkey, menu-driven, computer-based system which provides total control over capture, generation, display, editing, indexing, storage, retrieval, manipulation, and communication of drawings and text. The basic system provides for capture and storage of up to 400,000 pages of text, 25,000 images, or any combination thereof, at a cost one-fifth that of the nearest competitor.

Drawings may be scanned in from existing paper copies, or generated with system CAD software. They may then be inserted into text, or conversely, text may be typed over line drawings or forms. Standalone image databases may also be created for engineering, maintenance, mapping, architectural, legal, advertising, or executive paper flow management applications. The system thus provides for complete merger of images into electronic automated information management.

Drawings, photographs, forms - even handwritten notes - may now be electronically filed, retrieved and transmitted, locally or worldwide, with simple, user friendly keystrokes. Yet full application software power is there when needed - all popular application software such as spreadsheets, database, CAD graphics software, telecommunications, and industry standard WANG word processing are available in fully integrated fashion, allowing quick generation, retrieval, analysis, integration and transmission of information, whether in an office or industrial environment.

Step-by-step expansion allows the user to upgrade the basic system to a full minicomputer network without changes to the user interface, equipment purchased, or database generated to that point. Images captured may range in size from postage stamp to 3 foot by 5 foot engineering drawings. The storage medium used is a 12" optical disk which is removeable and easily stored, and has a storage life of over 10 years.

Images and data may also be stored in encrypted fashion - providing secure control over access to data and limiting availability to those with "need to know", yet retrievable in milliseconds by an authorized user.



Aquidneck Data Corporation

Specifications

- Base Unit:

Hardware: Optical 200 dot per inch scanner, system control unit, keyboard and high resolution graphic display, floppy disk and hard disk storage, 1000 megabyte optical disk controller, drive, and platter, thermal high resolution graphic printer, display overarm unit or desktop base, integrated desk and rack unit, and coordinated armchair.

Software: Fully integrated applications package including scan control, image edit, word processing, database, CAD software, spreadsheet, and telecommunications.

- Expansion Options:

Hardware: Engineering drawing 200/400 DPI scanner, batch document or microform feeders, color scanners, optical character readers, laser printers, electrostatic plotters, pen plotters, network interfaces, telecommunications interfaces, multi-user minicomputer hosts, additional optical drives or optical disk jukeboxes, etc.

Software: Image and text compression/decompression software, data encryption/decryption software, OCR batch processing software, and a host of applications packages. Send for additional information.

A wide range of special configurations can be provided for compatibility with existing computer equipment. Scanning services for existing paper documents, database configuration services, and training are also available.

For further information call:

George H. Steele, (401) 847-7260 Ext. 244.

All Specifications are subject to change without notice.