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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

15 May 1986

Mozambique: RENAMO Today--Profile and Prospects

Summary

The Mozambican insurgent group, known as the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), has grown markedly as a military threat since its inception approximately 10 years ago and has been able to capitalize on a variety of popular grievances against Maputo's Soviet-supported Marxist Government. Aided first by the former white-ruled Rhodesian Government and subsequently by South Africa, the guerrillas now operate throughout much of rural Mozambique and launch occasional raids in urban areas, where the government is the strongest. While the insurgents are militarily impressive against the weak and poorly-led Mozambican Army, [redacted] they lack a strong political wing and a coherent ideology, as well as a seasoned political leader capable of rivaling Mozambican President Samora Machel. [redacted]

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We believe that over the next six months the insurgents will fall short of achieving a military victory [redacted]

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[redacted] our examination of a wide range of US Embassy [redacted] reporting suggests to us that any negotiations would be protracted and, to

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This memorandum was requested by Phillip Rindahl, Director of African Affairs, National Security Council [redacted]

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
The paper was written by [redacted] Office of African and Latin American Analysis. A contribution was provided by [redacted] the Office of Central Reference. This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. Questions and Comments are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA [redacted]

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be started at all, would require both sides to drop conditions currently unaccentable to the other. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] South Africa and the USSR are not likely to become substantially more involved on behalf of their clients in Mozambique in the near term. [Redacted]

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Who's Running the Show--RENAMO's Organization and Leadership

The Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) has serious organizational and leadership shortcomings that we believe would almost certainly become even more pronounced were the group to gain a voice in the Maputo Government or assume power. RENAMO is divided into military and political wings, a legacy of its origins (see Appendix I for a discussion of RENAMO's origins). Our analysis of US Embassy reporting suggests that divisions within the political wing, coupled with irregular communication and a lack of cohesion between the two wings, are key areas of organizational weakness for the insurgents. Other major problems for RENAMO are its narrow ethnic base and its dearth of well-educated and

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experienced personnel in the senior ranks. [Redacted]

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An Effective Military Wing

RENAMO's estimated 15,000 men under arms appear cohesive and highly motivated [Redacted]. South African military assistance in the early 1980s was a key factor in enabling the guerrillas to weather a variety of challenges, including pressure from both Mozambican and Zimbabwean\* forces, and the death of several key military leaders. [Redacted]

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US Embassy reporting indicates that the insurgents operate in varying strength in all of Mozambique's 10 provinces in groups ranging from a handful to several hundred. They attack a wide range of economic targets, and have kidnapped and killed some foreign economic technicians in an effort to disrupt the economy, according to press and Embassy reporting.

[Redacted]

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RENAMO forces generally employ guerrilla-style tactics but have occasionally carried out direct attacks on Army basecamps, according to press and US Embassy reporting. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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In addition to insurgent attacks against economic targets, RENAMO's activity includes some banditry. The guerrillas have looted stores and civilian homes, and they have killed dozens of civilians described by our Embassy in Maputo as innocent bystanders. [Redacted]

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We have more information on how the military wing runs than on who is involved in making it work. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] we deduce that while individual military figures are important to the success of RENAMO's operations, nobody--possibly aside

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\* Zimbabwean soldiers became involved in Mozambique in 1982, when Prime Minister Mugabe decided to protect from RENAMO attacks the rail line and oil pipeline that run between the Mozambican port of Beira and the Zimbabwean city of Mutare. Zimbabwe imports over 90 percent of its oil products through the pipeline. In mid-1985, Zimbabwe expanded its troops inside Mozambique from approximately 3,000 to at least 9,000 and extended their largely defensive military role to include counterinsurgency operations against RENAMO. More recently, the Zimbabweans recaptured for the second time in the last six months RENAMO's headquarters located in the Gorongosa Mountain range. [Redacted]

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## RENAMO LEADERSHIP

Political Wing

President/Commander-in-Chief  
(Afonso Jacama)

Military Wing

### Government in Exile \*

**Includes:**

- Secretary General.
- Secretaries for various functions, such as external affairs, finances, etc.
- Additional members with no specific functions

### Military Council \*\*

**Includes:**


- Senior defense personnel such as Minister of Defense and Chief of General Staff.
- Regional and Provincial Commanders with rank of General.

\* Composed largely of blacks from central Mozambique but includes a small number of Portuguese-speaking whites and mulattoes...  
Supposed to meet every six months but actually meets infrequently...  
Details unknown on total number of members or how they were selected...  
Little real authority as all major decisions are made by Jacama.

\*\* Almost entirely blacks...Met regularly at RENAMO headquarters in Gorongosa Mountains until last August when Zimbabwean troops overran base... Responsible for overall military strategy...Keeps tabs on political leadership and vets all major political decisions...



### Military Chain of Command



\*Boundaries conform largely to these Provinces




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from its President and Commander-in-Chief Afonso Jacama--appears to be irreplaceable. Jacama is widely credited with wise management of the military wing, and is highly respected by his men as a brave and resourceful military leader who inspires personal loyalty.

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Jacama, however, is said to have several limitations.

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Some other RENAMO-watchers likewise describe Jacama as an unsophisticated, largely apolitical individual who lacks charisma and is not well known among Mozambique's population.

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the top decisionmaking body of the military wing is the Military Council, which includes Jacama, senior defense officials such as Minister of Defense and Chief of General Staff, and a small number of military leaders of the rank of general. The Council is responsible for the command and control of military activities and the formulation of training policies.

decisions made by the Council are passed through the ranks down to local-level commanders through a variety of means, ranging from a relatively sophisticated radio communications network that was provided by the South Africans to the use of young, unarmed sympathizers called mujibahs who act as runners.

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RENAMO military forces are generally well-organized and fall into several different categories

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- Most RENAMO troops are guerrillas, who usually operate in groups of 50 or less.
- Some RENAMO soldiers operate mortars and heavy machine guns in support of their less heavily armed colleagues.
- Others have received training as communications and demolition specialists.
- A handful of others serve as handlers of RENAMO's few river boats.

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Poor Political Performance

RENAMO's small, externally based political wing--probably numbering 100 or less--has been disorganized and largely ineffectual since its



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inception. Political exiles are scattered in Portugal, West Germany, Kenya, South Africa, and the United States. The so called policymaking body of RENAMO's political wing, known as the "Government-in-Exile", meets infrequently



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RENAMO's external political wing

is riven by personal frictions.




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Evo Fernandes, Secretary General of RENAMO and technically its number-two official, leads the political wing. Of Indian descent, he became Secretary General in 1983 after the death of Orlando Cristina--a white Mozambican who handled RENAMO's political affairs and worked closely with the South Africans.



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RENAMO's military leaders, who live a dangerous and spartan existence in the countryside, probably resent the politicians for living well abroad. In addition, there are ethnic and racial tensions between the largely black military forces and the whites and mulattoes who dominate the top political positions.




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Political Program

Based on our interpretation of US Embassy reporting [redacted], we conclude that a variety of factors motivate Mozambicans to fight as RENAMO guerrillas. Many of RENAMO's military leaders are staunchly anti-Communist and anti-Machel and are committed to his overthrow. Still others are defectors from the Mozambican military who want to be on what they perceive to be the winning side. In addition, Mozambicans from ethnic groups in the central part of the country are convinced that they failed to receive their fair share of the government's



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
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goods and services under Machel. Finally, those RENAMO guerrillas who were forcibly recruited may fear reprisals if they were to desert.



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By all accounts, however, RENAMO purports to support pro-Western, democratic ideals. Our reading of RENAMO documents indicates that its political ideology is simplistic, undeveloped, and once carried beyond the "ouster of Machel and his Communist government," fairly vague.



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According to a RENAMO document released in September 1985, RENAMO stands for:

- The "eradication of Communism".
- The establishment in Maputo of a government of national unity, "to introduce and stabilize a democratic order."
- Free elections.
- A mixed economy with government responsibility for health and educational services.
- Full cooperation with its neighbors, especially those like Zimbabwe that rely on Mozambican ports.

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In addition, RENAMO officials have stated firmly that they will not negotiate with Machel until the following terms have been met:

- The departure of all foreign troops from Mozambique
- 
- The establishment of a cease-fire.
  - Recognition by the Machel Government of RENAMO as a legitimate political organization.
  - Agreement on plans for popular elections.

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RENAMO's failure to develop a more thorough-going political program and to implement it in practice is a major shortcoming in the eyes of most observers. In particular, the slow pace of the insurgents' movement toward establishing a shadow government in areas under their control in central Mozambique contrasts sharply with Savimbi's accomplishments in Angola and of Machel's Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). Prior to independence from Portugal, FRELIMO had established a rudimentary government structure, including a limited number of schools and medical



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clinics, in the northern part of the country. RENAMO, according to US Embassy reporting, provides only a limited number of civil or social services. [redacted]

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The historical record suggests that several factors contribute to the insurgents' political shortcomings. The longstanding split between the military and political wing, squabbling within the political wing, and President Jacama's reportedly limited interest in politics have no doubt contributed to the organization's slow political development. Moreover, our appraisal of the limited information available on RENAMO in its early days suggests to us that the insurgents' earlier dependence on and direction by the Rhodesians and South Africans has probably inhibited its political growth. [redacted]

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In the event RENAMO were to assume power in Maputo, our review of Mozambique's deeply ingrained problems leads us to conclude that it would be confronted with many of the same challenges the Machel regime currently faces as well as some new ones:

- It would face significant security problems, including resistance from hostile ethnic groups and FRELIMO remnants. Machel loyalists later would probably retreat to the bush and mount insurgent operations with the support of the Frontline states and the Soviets.
- It would have limited expertise and room for maneuver in improving Mozambique's dismal economic performance, although a RENAMO government almost certainly would dismantle the trappings of Marxist-Leninist socialism.
- It would face considerable foreign policy challenges, including finding replacements for Communist bloc technicians it would be likely to expel as well as obtaining diplomatic and other support from black African states, many of which would probably regard a RENAMO government as a South African client.
- It would be unlikely to move toward a more democratic-style government given likely continued resistance among some ethnic groups to RENAMO's rule as well as Mozambique's authoritarian tradition.

### Popular Support

US Embassy reporting suggests that RENAMO enjoys widespread popularity among a number of ethnic groups in central Mozambique, but lacks significant appeal among rural ethnic groups outside this area and among urban dwellers. Its prospects for significantly expanding its base

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


of support seem limited, in view of continued squabbling between its military and political wings and the guerrillas' often brutal tactics.




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The record of RENAMO's military performance suggests that RENAMO's popular support depends heavily on its tribal dimension, especially in the central provinces of Mozambique, where the insurgent group first began operating in the mid-1970s and from where most of its key military leaders hail, including Commander-in-Chief Jacama. Both before and after independence, the various Shona-speaking ethnic groups in the central area experienced frictions with FRELIMO, which includes a large number of Zulu-speakers from southern Mozambique.



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Another factor that has won RENAMO some following in central Mozambique is its reinvigoration of existing traditional systems to administer the civilian population. Many tribal chiefs, whom FRELIMO dismissed shortly after independence in its efforts to consolidate power, have willingly aligned themselves with RENAMO to regain prestige and control over their constituents. RENAMO has given chiefs responsibility for all civil and criminal matters in their regions. In addition, the insurgents have gained support by returning to traditional practices outlawed by the Maputo government, such as dowries for marriages, private ownership of farms, and freedom of movement from village to village.





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RENAMO has also benefitted from Mozambique's economic woes, which many peasants attribute to FRELIMO's misrule.



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
Outside of central Mozambique, however, we believe most Mozambican rural dwellers are politically apathetic and preoccupied with eking out a subsistence living in a harsh environment.




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Moreover, as RENAMO has expanded military operations to the north and south, it has found it more difficult to gain new tribal support, leading to some forced recruiting, according to US Embassy reporting. In the south, groups like the Zulu-speaking Shangaan, heavily represented at senior levels in FRELIMO and the central government, appear hostile to RENAMO. Other groups in the north, such as the independent-minded Makonde, seem similarly unreceptive to RENAMO's overtures.



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


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In addition, recent US Embassy reporting notes that RENAMO's heavy-handed tactics often undercut its efforts to gain popular support, and cites a large number of well-documented incidents where RENAMO guerrillas, in addition to attacking economic targets, have killed, kidnapped, or maimed civilians. Several Christian church groups in Mozambique have publicly criticized the guerrillas for excesses. Most brutality probably occurs in areas where RENAMO has the least popular support. We have no evidence to suggest that mistreatment of the population is deliberate RENAMO policy.

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Urban areas remain largely FRELIMO strongholds, according to US Embassy reporting. Some sympathy for RENAMO almost certainly exists, however, given the harsh living conditions under the FRELIMO government described in US Embassy reporting.

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External Backing

In our view, RENAMO presently gets little outside help, and probably has scored most of its recent military successes largely on its own. Pretoria, however, has been RENAMO's principal backer since 1980 and its assistance to RENAMO up to 1984 included organizational and tactical direction, training, communications equipment, medical and other nonlethal supplies, small arms and ammunition, and intelligence support.

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the signing of the Nkom . . . on aggression pact in March 1984 led to a reduction in South African aid to the RENAMO guerrillas (as well as to Pretoria's public denial of any relations with them) in exchange for Maputo's expulsion of the anti-Pretoria African National Congress (ANC). The Mozambicans' subsequent capture of RENAMO records--which detailed allegations of post-Nkomati South African assistance, albeit at considerably lower levels--served to undercut Pretoria's claims that it severed its relations with the insurgents.

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Our reading of the current military situation in Mozambique, together with US Embassy reporting on persistent, credible allegations of continued South African aid to RENAMO, leads us to believe that South African military officers continue to extend limited quantities of assistance to RENAMO despite public protestations to the contrary.

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- US Embassy reports that RENAMO was forewarned of Zimbabwe's attack in April on its headquarters in the Gorongosa Mountains suggest to us that South Africa may continue to provide intelligence support.




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- Pretoria probably continues to deliver occasional shipments of arms and ammunition to RENAMO by sea or air. 


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Nonetheless, our assessment of  US Embassy reporting leads us to deduce that Pretoria has cut off or sharply reduced many of its ties with RENAMO. As far as we can tell:



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- South Africa no longer supports RENAMO's clandestine radio station, "Voice of Free Africa," which broadcast throughout Mozambique until the Nkomati Accord was signed.
- Based on our reading of the current military situation, we suspect that Pretoria no longer makes regular deliveries of arms and supplies to RENAMO.
- We have no information to indicate that South Africa provides extensive training for RENAMO insurgents at South African military facilities. 

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In addition to South Africa, RENAMO is rumored to have received assistance from a wide range of other official and non-official sources, including conservative individuals and private organizations in Malawi, Kenya, Zimbabwe, West Germany, France, Portugal, several moderate Arab states, Brazil, and the Comoros. 


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 we suspect, based on suggestions in US Embassy reporting, that a number of private businessmen have granted assistance to RENAMO 

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Outlook


Our evaluation of the current military situation leads us to conclude that Maputo has been largely ineffective in responding to RENAMO. The Mozambican Army continues to mount sporadic offensives in the countryside, but generally remains in the cities and along a few key transportation routes. Most troops are conscripts and morale is poor. Moreover, because it lacks equipment and supplies, the Army often avoids combat, according to US Embassy reporting. 

Were it not for Zimbabwe's timely military assistance, Maputo's military position today would be even weaker. Our interpretation of recent US Embassy reports from Harare leads us to believe that Zimbabwe will maintain a force in Mozambique to guard its oil pipeline and several transport links. Our analysis of the record of Zimbabwe's involvement suggests that a reduction in the frequency of its counterinsurgency operations appears likely, damaging Maputo's military capabilities and the Army's morale. 

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The charismatic, wily President Samora Machel remains the most powerful political figure in Maputo. Nonetheless, he has had to weather a number of challenges within his own government and military during the past year. Frictions within the regime over RENAMO have surfaced, with pragmatists like Minister of Cooperation Veloso promoting talks with RENAMO and Minister of Security Vieira strongly opposing them. 

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We believe that over the next six months Mozambique most likely will experience a continued gradual deterioration of its security situation, with little progress toward a negotiated settlement. Barring dramatic changes in the battlefield situation, shifts in the magnitude of each side's external support, or a coup, we believe that the short-term military dynamics will probably look much the same as during 1985--with RENAMO strong in the rural areas while launching occasional spectacular attacks in urban areas, and Machel's government clinging onto major cities and larger towns. 

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However, were a RENAMO government to emerge in Maputo, it would be challenged by many of the same problems that Machel currently faces. It would encounter opposition from key ethnic groups, likely insurgent operations by Machel loyalists in the bush, and dismal economic prospects. In addition, most neighboring black states would be hostile, seeing a RENAMO government as a creation of South Africa. 

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On the negotiating front, US Embassy reports indicate that both sides are talking about talking, but we believe neither shows signs of engaging in serious negotiations anytime soon. RENAMO's leaders probably believe that time is on their side and that continued military pressure will force Maputo to the bargaining table on their terms. Machel, for his part, requested additional military aid from the Soviets during a visit last April to Moscow, according to our Embassy there. Our reading of several US Embassy reports on this trip leads us to conclude that Machel seems unwilling to give up the fight even though Soviet leader Gorbachev's statements during Machel's visit implied that Moscow will not increase aid substantially. Our review of Maputo's attitudes toward negotiations leads us to suspect that Machel's recent feelers to RENAMO are probably intended to pave the way for a last-resort option of reaching a settlement, but only much later on and only if there is no alternative.

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Key external players--Pretoria and Moscow--could ultimately decide Mozambique's fate. Our evaluation of both the South Africans' and the Soviets' interests in the region lead us to estimate that they are not likely to become substantially more involved in the near term. Fighting at present levels serves Pretoria's longstanding goal of keeping Machel off balance--unable openly to support the anti-South Africa guerrillas of the African National Congress (ANC) or to make full use of Mozambican transport routes to Zimbabwe--but without the costs for Pretoria of maintaining RENAMO should it come to power. Continued fighting also serves Moscow's interests in reinforcing Machel's military dependence on the USSR, retaining a lever to pressure Maputo against overly close dealings with South Africa and the West, and maintaining the Soviets' low-cost military access to Mozambican ports.

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Though less likely in the near term, both South Africa and the Soviet Union retain the option of upping the ante in Mozambique. South Africa, in pursuing its often stated objective to US officials of fostering negotiations leading to a government of national unity in Maputo, could decide to increase its aid to RENAMO. More direct South African aid would enable the guerrillas to step up their urban sabotage campaign, which we believe must begin to hurt before Machel decides to negotiate. Based on past experience, we estimate that direct South African military pressure in the form of dramatic commando attacks--say, in retaliation for alleged Mozambican back-sliding on promises not to aid the ANC--would probably serve the same purpose.

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Another less likely scenario would be the introduction of enough Soviet and Cuban military aid to prop up Machel indefinitely. At this point, however, Moscow does not appear to be overly concerned that Machel's tenure is threatened or ready to make the massive investment that could quickly improve his military fortunes. Moreover, both Havana and Moscow almost certainly must take into account recent repeated warnings from the South Africans to keep Communist troops out of Maputo.

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Appendix I


History of RENAMO

After Portugal granted Mozambique independence in 1975 and turned power over to Samora Machel's Marxist FRELIMO guerrilla movement, several anti-FRELIMO groups and individuals banded together to form what later emerged as the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO).\*



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
RENAMO united a wide variety of anti-FRELIMO groups with disparate outlooks and included:

- Small political parties like the pro-Chinese Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique (COREMO) and the Lisbon-based United Democratic Front of Mozambique (FUMO) that refused to merge with the larger, more powerful FRELIMO.
- Both black and white former Mozambican colonial army officers and secret police who had aided the Portuguese against FRELIMO.
- White landowners and businessmen of Portuguese descent who had lived for generations in Mozambique and were being forced to abandon their properties.
- Various tribal leaders from northern and central Mozambique who had experienced frictions before independence with the southern-led FRELIMO.



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By 1977, RENAMO guerrillas--based at an abandoned tobacco farm in eastern Rhodesia and receiving Rhodesian equipment and other support--had begun reconnaissance and sabotage operations in the central Mozambican



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provinces of Sofala and Manica against ZANU. In addition, RENAMO claimed responsibility for attacks by Rhodesian security forces on a wide variety of high-visibility targets--such as the oil depot at Beira. Meanwhile, the largely white and mulatto members of RENAMO's political wing were canvassing for aid in Portugal, other parts of Western Europe, and South Africa, where a sizable community of recently resettled Portuguese were sympathetic to RENAMO's cause. [redacted]

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In 1978, RENAMO began conducting occasional small-scale hit-and-run attacks against Mozambican economic targets. The guerrillas soon began attacking a broader range of transportation and communications targets--the same ones that FRELIMO chose during its war against the Portuguese--and was also responsible for freeing hundreds of political prisoners held in government "reeducation" camps. Not surprisingly, many detainees joined RENAMO forces. [redacted]

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South African officials [redacted] disclaimed any connection with RENAMO through 1980, but had held discussions with RENAMO political leaders as early as 1979 about the possibility of South African covert material and financial aid to the group. Shortly after plans for Zimbabwe's independence under black rule were completed at the UK-sponsored Lancaster House Conference in December 1979, Pretoria airlifted RENAMO's leadership, as well as a small number of Rhodesian military and intelligence officers, to South Africa. Many of the Rhodesians were subsequently incorporated into counterpart organizations in South Africa, and some continued to serve as advisors to RENAMO. Other RENAMO forces traveled to South Africa by foot. [redacted]

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South Africa assumed sponsorship of RENAMO, which in 1980 claimed to have at least 2,000 men under arms, for several reasons. Pretoria was eager to maintain pressure on hostile Mozambique, which allowed guerrillas of the African National Congress (ANC) to launch cross-border attacks against South Africa. In addition, South Africa wanted to disrupt independent Zimbabwe's use of transportation routes and ports in Mozambique that once accommodated 90 percent of Rhodesia's overseas trade and provided Maputo with a sizable amount of hard currency in transport fees. Pretoria hoped to force Zimbabwe to continue using transportation routes through South Africa that would provide leverage over Harare. [redacted]

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RENAMO members were resettled on South African military bases and South African military advisers subsequently established a headquarters and training base for RENAMO in the northern Transvaal. In addition, Pretoria quickly set up a communications network between Mozambique and South Africa as well as a logistics infrastructure for resupply and troop rotation. Shortly after Zimbabwe's independence in April 1980, RENAMO's clandestine radio station "The Voice of Free Africa" resumed broadcasting into Mozambique--this time from South Africa instead of Rhodesia. [redacted]

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SUBJECT: RENAMO Today--Profile and Prospects

Original--Phillip Ringdahl, Director of African Affairs, NSC  
1--Donald Gregg, Office of the Vice President  
1--Stephen Sestanovich, Director, Political-Military  
Affairs, National Security Council  
1--Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa  
1--Charles Freeman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,  
Bureau of African Affairs  
1--Robert Cabelly, Special Assistant to the Assistant  
Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs  
1--Jeffrey S. Davidow, Director, Office of Southern  
African Affairs, Department of State  
1--Raymond F. Smith, Deputy Director, Office of Southern  
African Affairs, Department of State  
1--Allen Harris, Deputy Director, Office of Southern  
African Affairs, Department of State  
1--Douglas Holladay, Working Group on South Africa  
and Southern Africa, Department of State.  
1--Anthony S. Dalsimer, Director, Office of Analysis  
for Africa, INR, Department of State  
1--Leo Cecchini, Desk Officer for Mozambique,  
Department of State  
1--James Wood, Assistant Secretary of Defense for  
Africa, International Security Affairs, Office of the  
Secretary of Defense.  
1--William Thom, Acting Defense Intelligence  
Officer for Africa, Defense Intelligence Agency.  
1--Walter Barrows, Assistant to the Director, International  
Security Agency.  
1--DCI  
1--DDI  
1--NIO for Africa  
1--NIO for USSR  
1--NIC  
1--DDO/Africa  
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1--ALA Research Director  
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