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TREVI GROUP: ATTITUDES TOWARDS LIBYA

22 April 1986


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This paper was prepared for Attorney General Meese by the West European Division, Office of European Analysis. Questions and comments are welcome and may be addressed to Chief, West European Division,

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Belgium1. Attitudes Towards Libya

Belgium has tightened surveillance of Libyans and followed the lead of the EC in instituting political and economic measures against Tripoli. Belgian officials have expressed rising frustration over Middle Eastern- and Libyan-sponsored terrorism and have emphasized that it was Belgium that first called for an early meeting of the EC Foreign Ministers to discuss the Libyan threat. A partial explanation for Belgium's relatively strong stand regarding Tripoli is that Belgian-Libyan economic relations are small and hence Belgium has little to lose materially if relations with Libya deteriorate. Although Belgium, like other EC countries, generally opposed economic sanctions, oil imports from Libya declined last year and Brussels apparently is ready to consider further oil sanctions. Foreign Minister Tindemans, in fact, called for a cessation of European oil purchases from Libya, and [redacted] ordered a study of the costs oil sanctions would impose on the Belgian economy. Even though Brussels acknowledges the need for a greater commitment to fighting Libyan-sponsored terrorism, domestic political problems and the desire for an EC consensus will continue to constrain Belgian actions.

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2. Views on Libya's Connection with International Terrorism

Belgian authorities, according to US Embassy reports, are convinced that Libya was directly involved in the West Berlin bombing. Belgium has few independent means to uncover Libyan involvement in international terrorism, but Brussels has accepted assurances from its larger Allies about Tripoli's role in state-sponsored terrorism. In particular, Belgian officials were reportedly convinced [redacted] that Libya was contemplating future terrorist action at the time of US air strikes.

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25X13. Reactions to US Strikes Against Libya

After initial negative reaction, Belgian public opinion apparently is becoming more supportive of the US air strikes. Nevertheless, some Belgian officials still worry about retaliation by Qadhafi and consider military action an inappropriate means for combatting international terrorism. According to US Embassy reports, there are significant divisions within the cabinet over the US attack. Vice Prime Minister Gol--who also serves as Justice Minister and has general responsibility for counterterrorism policy--reportedly was unhappy with Foreign Minister Tindemans' initial lack of support for Washington. Perhaps to smooth government differences and to better reflect public opinion, the Foreign Ministry at the end of last week issued a communique which was less critical of US actions.

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4. Opportunities for US Influence

Belgian support for potential future measures against Tripoli, we believe, would grow if Washington consulted Brussels in advance. Part of Tindeman's pique with Washington stemmed from the fact that the US air strikes came so soon after an EC meeting on Libya, and took him by surprise. In the past, Brussels repeatedly has expressed resentment at being treated like a "second-rate" ally. Belgium probably also would be more willing to defend US

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actions if Washington provides evidence which could be made public of Libyan complicity in international terrorism. In addition, Brussels may be more supportive of the United States if it believes that West European criticism of US action is causing Americans--particularly Congress--to call for reducing the US military presence in Western Europe. [REDACTED]

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We believe Belgium is willing to support measures within the EC similar to those imposed by Britain in 1984--limitations on Libyans in Belgium, especially diplomatic personnel, a ban on arms sales, and withholding future export credits. Closing the Libyan People's Bureau in Brussels may also be considered. Because Belgium represents US interests in Libya, Brussels presumably would want a definite US statement that any break in diplomatic ties with Tripoli has US approval. [REDACTED]

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Ultimately, Belgian support for measures against Tripoli probably will depend on the political fortunes of Jean Gol. As a party leader Gol is a key player in Belgium's coalition government, and has been a relatively strong supporter of US foreign policy. He has skillfully used the terrorism issue to enhance his domestic political stature. Although Gol has a good relationship with Prime Minister Martens, his efforts to aid Washington on the Libyan issue could be hampered by his rivalry with Tindemans and Interior Minister Northomb. [REDACTED]

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Denmark1. Attitudes Towards Libya

Denmark's political and economic relations with Libya are limited and likely to remain so. The Danes did not support US sanctions against Libya, but Copenhagen has discouraged Danish firms from attempting to fill in behind US firms affected by the sanctions. [redacted]

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[redacted] Finally, the Danes apply to Libya their longstanding policy of not selling arms to actual belligerents or to countries considered near conflict or in a state of internal unrest. [redacted]

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25X12. Views on Libya's Connection with International Terrorism

Copenhagen recognizes that Qadhafi supports terrorism around the world. In fact, the Foreign Ministry specifically acknowledged a Libyan connection to terrorism when it said, in a statement issued after the US attack, that "...it is clear and beyond doubt that Libya stands behind the terrorism which has brought forth tensions in the Mediterranean area." [redacted]

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3. Reactions to US Strikes Against Libya

Despite its recognition of Libyan involvement in terrorism, the Danish government expressed regret over the US military response and dissociated itself from the action. The public and private responses of Danish political leaders have ranged from a strong statement of support from the head of one member party of the ruling center-right coalition to unbridled criticism by the opposition Social Democratic and Socialist Peoples' Party leaders. Prime Minister Poul Schluter said publicly on 16 April that he doubted that the methods used during the previous night's action could solve anything, but he noted that the US "felt itself forced to act."

4. Opportunities for US Influence

We believe the Danes are prepared to cooperate more fully in combatting terrorism, but Copenhagen is unlikely to adopt measures on its own or to be aggressive in urging measures on others. The Danes probably would support sanctions against Libya if these were adopted by the EC. In our judgment, the Danes will not undertake active anti-terrorism measures unless persuaded that Copenhagen has a direct stake in countering Qadhafi; so far terrorism has been limited in Denmark and most Danes continue to view Libya as a remote problem. While the US has considerable Danish government sympathy, public opinion, particularly in the younger generation, is marked by a predetermined skepticism regarding US action -- a factor that will inhibit stronger measures than those currently underway. [redacted]

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France1. Attitudes Towards Libya

The French government has been highly reluctant to publicly condemn Libyan involvement in terrorism, but privately French officials show a great deal of hostility toward Qadhafi both for his recent role in fomenting terrorism in France and for his duplicity in Chad where French forces face Libyans across the 16th parallel. France's public attitudes are probably tempered in part by fear of provoking further terrorist attacks in France as well as by concerns about triggering retaliation against French nationals in Libya or a Libyan-backed offensive in Chad. Paris also would prefer to avoid jeopardizing its potentially lucrative commercial relations with Libya. [redacted]

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In the 1970s France reportedly worked out a series of informal agreements with terrorists and their sponsors to grant terrorists safe conduct through France as long as they refrained from terrorist acts on French soil. The agreement with Libya apparently collapsed, however, under the strains of the French-Libyan standoff in Chad. The growing proof of Libyan complicity in recent terrorist acts in West Germany, along with French evidence of recent Libyan attempts at terrorism in France, make it highly unlikely that this cozy relationship can be revived. Paris has recently expelled two Libyan diplomats, four Libyan citizens, and two north Africans who were almost certainly employed by Tripoli to carry out terrorist violence in France. [redacted]

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French companies continue to do business in Libya, and about 850 to 1000 French citizens, most of them technicians, still work in Libya. Paris, however, has banned sales of sophisticated weapons to Libya and significantly scaled back its commercial relationship. As a result of the recent US raid, many of the French workers now in Libya are likely to be withdrawn. [redacted]

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2. Views on Libya's Connection with International Terrorism

France has acknowledged publicly that Libyan diplomats have plotted violence against US citizens in France [redacted]

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Although it almost certainly accepts the validity of US and West German charges that Libya was behind the recent terrorist attacks in West Germany, France has avoided publicly condemning Tripoli and on 14 April went so far as to oppose British and Dutch attempts to promote an EC consensus on closing Libyan Peoples' Bureaus--thus effectively derailing a forceful European response on the eve of the US bombing raid. This reticence may reflect the difficulty of decision making under "cohabitation"--where Gaullist Prime Minister Jacques Chirac has to reach agreement with Socialist President Francois Mitterrand--but we believe it also reflects France's longstanding wariness toward US-led foreign policy initiatives, which the French fear do not adequately take West European interests into account. [redacted]

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3. Reactions to US Strikes Against Libya

The new French government has publicly "deplored" the fact that escalating terrorism has led to US reprisals. Privately, both Mitterrand and Chirac told Ambassador Walters just before the raid that France would support a military

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action aimed at putting an end to the Qadhafi regime, but they argued that "pinprick" operations would only generate more Libyan reprisals in Europe. Chirac's refusal to permit US planes to overfly France aroused significant criticism within his own legislative majority and probably divided his own government. [redacted]

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4. Opportunities for US Influence

Since taking office in late March, Chirac has frequently renewed campaign promises of a get-tough approach to terrorism and domestic violence. These promises may be a sign that the new government will be more willing to cooperate with the US on counterterrorism if that cooperation can be portrayed as being in French and West European interests. Chirac announced a plan during his first speech to the new National Assembly that emphasizes better European coordination and calls for recruiting more informants, increasing electronic eavesdropping, toughening police tactics, and revising the Vienna Convention to allow closer scrutiny of diplomats. Chirac earlier announced that the government will back the police even when their methods seem extreme and promised to create a top-level interministerial committee to coordinate government counterterrorism efforts. He also promised to sponsor legislation to make terrorism--including conspiracy to commit terrorism--a crime in France. Chirac and Mitterrand have also agreed to put terrorism on the agenda at the forthcoming Tokyo summit, where they expect to reach a multilateral agreement to coordinate anti-terrorism policy. [redacted]

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Interior Minister Pasqua, moreover, assured the US Ambassador recently that he intends to promote a pro-police, no-holds-barred run at terrorists operating in France and confided that he has told the police bluntly that the "only good terrorist is a dead terrorist." He promised tougher visa and hotel registration checks--which Embassy officials have noticed are already in effect--and allowed that French laws would have to be changed in order to grant immunity to witnesses who can help convict terrorists. Like other government officials, he seemed open to revising the existing extradition treaty between the US and France to facilitate the transfer of terrorists. [redacted]

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The new government's tough line is focused on domestic counterterrorism, and we suspect that Paris will continue to shy away from international initiatives where the French role could be portrayed as subservient to the US and where it would have no veto over actions that could threaten French interests. France is far more likely to speak out forcefully against international sponsors of terrorism, such as Libya and Iran, in forums where it can present itself as a leader and molder of West European opinion and where it feels it has some measure of control over decisionmaking. [redacted]

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US and allied encouragement might persuade Paris to reduce sharply Libya's official presence in France--already apparently agreed to at the 21 April EC ministerials. But Chirac is unlikely to close the Peoples' Bureau because France wants to retain a line of communication with Libya. [redacted]

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Our sense is that the new French government is moving in the right direction on terrorism.

[Redacted] Particularly with the new government still in a transitional phase, we think Paris is likely to respond more positively to applause for anti-terrorist efforts than to pressure.

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Greece

1. Attitudes Toward Libya

Greece maintains friendly relations with Libya as part of its general policy of expanding ties with the Arab world. Athens' guarded friendship toward Libya flows from four factors:

- Libya supplies about 20 percent of Greece's oil imports -- 25 percent of consumption -- and is willing to accept Greek goods in partial payment. While trade with Libya has been declining -- accounting for only an estimated 1.2 percent of Greek exports in 1985, down from 5.2 percent in 1981 -- the Greeks continue to hope that their friendship with Libya will pay off.
- Greece and Turkey compete for Arab and Libyan support on Aegean disputes and on the Cyprus issue. Greece hopes, for example, that by supporting Libya they can help counter Turkish and Turkish Cypriot calls for Islamic solidarity.
- Prime Minister Papandreu, like his predecessors, sees Greece as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East. There is also sympathy in Greece for the Arab viewpoint on the Middle East conflict -- a sympathy that transcends party politics.



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2. Views on Libya's Connection with International Terrorism

The government has been and continues to be reluctant to acknowledge publicly Libyan involvement in terrorism. Instead, its public reaction has ranged from silence to studied skepticism.

- During the specially scheduled EC Foreign Ministers' meeting on 17 April, Deputy Foreign Minister Pangalos reportedly said that Greece's implementation of agreed EC measures against Libya (i.e., reducing the size of the Libyan Peoples' Bureaus and embargoing arms sales to Libya) would depend on proof of Libya's involvement in terrorism.
- Alternate Minister for Public Order Tsouras echoed this position when he reportedly said that Greek security services had "absolutely no information" that Libya or Libyans were involved in terrorist attacks.




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Athens' stance against terrorism in general has improved markedly since the hijacking of a TWA airliner from Athens airport and the subsequent issuance of a travel advisory for Greece last summer. The government has upgraded airport security, begun participating in US counter-terrorism training programs,

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[Redacted] The shift is primarily the result of the loss of tourist revenues due to the increase in Middle Eastern terrorism in Southern Europe and the fact that Greek citizens have become the victims of terrorist violence. [Redacted]

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3. Reactions to US Strikes Against Libya

Shortly after the US action against Libya, Foreign Minister Papoulias expressed Greek "disapproval" of the US operation, which he said "undermines international legal order" and "will not put an end to terrorism." The government's public reaction to the US strike--relatively restrained by Greek standards--reflects its desire not to reverse the trend toward improving Greek-US relations as well as to find cover under the EC umbrella given the risks involved. [Redacted]

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Privately, the government has underscored to the US Ambassador its belief that a US-Libyan military confrontation will only serve to destabilize the region and push Qadhafi closer to the Soviets. Athens is also concerned about any involvement of US bases in Greece in the crisis. Such involvement would create complications for Papandreou at a time when he is trying to prepare his public for a continued US presence in Greece. Over the weekend, Foreign Minister Papoulias told our Ambassador that Libyan Deputy Foreign Minister Shahati had issued a thinly veiled threat against US bases in Greece in the event of further US military action. According to Papoulias, the government warned Shahati in return that it would not tolerate violent acts against Greek territory and would defend the bases. [Redacted]

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4. Opportunities for US Influence

In general, the Greeks have displayed a mixture of concern and caution about events in the Mediterranean. They have modified their positions to minimize risks from any direction. Thus, they went along with recent EC restrictions on Libya when the evidence against Libya began to mount and when it became clear that the US was seriously considering military action. This suggests that there are some opportunities for influencing Greek views and behavior.

--The Papandreou government is likely to remain skeptical about "proof" of Libyan complicity. We doubt that Athens will be able to maintain its ostrich-like position, however, if it becomes clear that most of its EC partners acknowledge Libyan involvement.

--The Greeks want to protect their economic interests in Libya, but they also realize that Middle Eastern terrorism has badly damaged tourism and the Greek economy. They are more likely to reconsider their relationship with Qadhafi if convinced that they stand to lose more from terrorism than they will gain from potential Libyan trade and investment.

--The Greeks [Redacted] While it is sometimes risky to include the Greeks in advance consultations, Athens may be more prone to adopt helpful positions if it feels it is being treated as an equal.

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--The government does not want to be isolated; thus, the more consensus there is among the EC countries on what measures to adopt toward Libya, the less contentious the Greeks are likely to be.

--Likewise, the Greeks will be looking closely at the reaction of Arab states. Any indication that the Arabs themselves are willing to adopt a less accomodating stance toward Qadhafi would affect the Greek position.

--Finally, Papandreou is anxious to preserve the progress that has been made in US-Greek relations since last summer. While the government would balk at the US drawing a direct connection between the Libyan issue and US-Greek relations, it is nonetheless likely to be more attuned to US wishes than in the past. [REDACTED]

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Ireland1. Attitudes Towards Libya

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Dublin until recently took little notice of Libya's involvement in international terrorism, and coordinated its overall response to worldwide terrorism with that of its EC partners. [redacted]

[redacted] Prime Minister FitzGerald's government with evidence establishing Libya as a supplier of arms and munitions to the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in early 1986, however, Dublin has begun to take a greater interest in participating in multilateral cooperation against terrorism. [redacted]

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In our opinion, Dublin almost certainly would support an EC consensus that favored stricter diplomatic and even economic sanctions against Libya. There is no Peoples' Bureau in Dublin, and Irish Foreign Ministry officials claim to closely monitor the 500 Libyan students now in the Republic. Irish Foreign Minister Barry, furthermore, recently said that although Ireland values its economic ties with Libya -- which primarily are based on the barter of Irish beef for oil -- his government believes that combating terrorism must take priority over economic consideration. We believe that Dublin will invoke whatever anti-terrorist measures are agreed to by the EC, but will not act on its own or go beyond the EC consensus. [redacted]

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2. Views on Libya's Connection with International Terrorism

Because Prime Minister FitzGerald was aware of the connection between Libya and the PIRA, we think he was predisposed to believe US claims regarding Tripoli's responsibility for the recent Berlin nightclub bombing. [redacted]

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3. Reactions to US Strikes Against Libya

FitzGerald's public statements since the raid indicate that Dublin accepted the validity of US claims regarding Libyan responsibility for the Berlin bombing. The Prime Minister said that Ireland fully understood the reasons behind the US action. [redacted]

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4. Opportunities for US Influence

We believe that Dublin's pro-US pronouncements [redacted] are designed to attract widespread notice and praise in Washington during the final stages of congressional deliberations on the amount of US funding to be committed to the international reconstruction fund established by the recent Anglo-Irish Accord on Northern Ireland. Likewise, FitzGerald's anti-terrorist stand is aimed at persuading some unconvinced right-wing Tory MPs in the United Kingdom that Dublin is indeed serious about cooperating with London to stamp out PIRA activities. [redacted]

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In our opinion, there is little Dublin can do on its own to lend support to Washington. [redacted]

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[redacted] Hints of how highly Washington values Irish support--particularly if delivered in the context of a [redacted]

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discussion of US financial support for the Anglo-Irish Accord--would, in our view, probably steel Dublin to support US Libyan policy in EC deliberations.

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Italy1. Attitudes Towards Libya

Italy's longstanding commercial and cultural links to its former colony, its close physical proximity, and the presence of several important US military facilities within Italian borders have convinced Italian leaders that Italy has more to lose from further escalation of tension in the Mediterranean than any other NATO ally. The size of the Italian expatriate community in Libya--which reportedly has fallen to 4,000 people--has also played a large part in tempering Rome's public responses to Libyan-inspired terrorism, and it is clear that government and public alike fear that following Washington's lead will spur Qadhafi to further atrocities instead of convincing him to abandon terrorism. Nevertheless, Rome has shown grudging willingness to disengage from its ties to Tripoli in the face of growing evidence of Libyan involvement in terrorist activity and pressure from the US for tougher measures to combat Libyan-inspired terrorism. [redacted]

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Prime Minister Bettino Craxi's Cabinet has been seriously divided for several months over foreign policy generally and policy toward Libya in particular. Defense Minister Spadolini has consistently emerged as the strongest advocate of tougher action against Qadhafi and his terrorist allies, and he is clearly unhappy over Rome's condemnation of the US retaliatory raid. [redacted]

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[redacted] His views are sharply at odds with those of Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti who has frequently expressed reservations about Washington's evidence linking Qadhafi to terrorism and argued that little progress will be made until there is progress on the Palestinian question.

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Most observers have assumed that Craxi's views on the Middle East are closer to Andreotti's. [redacted]

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Craxi is first and foremost a political animal, however, and he will tailor his position to the prevailing political winds. Over the weekend he threatened to use military force in response to further Libyan attacks against Italy. This toughening may have been prompted in part by Spadolini's threat to resign, Craxi may also be responding to hints of considerable discontent among Andreotti's Christian Democrats with the

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[redacted]

Foreign Minister's line. Moreover, Craxi seems genuinely concerned that the gap developing between the US and Western Europe over Libya could portend serious consequences for the future of the NATO alliance. [redacted]

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2. Views on Libya's Connection with International Terrorism

We believe that both Craxi and Spadolini accept our evidence of Libyan complicity in and support for terrorism, but like Andreotti, they continue to harbor misgivings about the utility of using force against Qadhafi.

3. Reactions to US Strike Against Libya

Craxi's original statement on the US raid disassociated Italy from the attack and condemned Washington's decision. In subsequent remarks to Parliament and the press, Craxi has continued to criticize the US use of force, but he has emphasized that Washington reacted to Libyan provocation.

[redacted] Craxi is walking a political tightrope domestically, and he will craft any public statements with an eye to public opinion. According to press reports, nearly 400,000 Italians demonstrated in cities across the country against the raid last week. Spadolini, for his part, has adhered to the government line on the raid in his formal statements but has been more "understanding" of US action in his remarks to the press. [redacted]

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4. Opportunities for US Influence

Rome is already considering additional steps against Libya in conjunction with its EC partners. Craxi's diplomatic counselor told our Embassy late last week that the Cabinet was weighing a formal evacuation of Italian citizens, a reduction in the size of the Peoples' Bureau in Rome, and additional restrictions on trade. Spadolini and Interior Minister Scalfaro both tend to favor stronger action against Libya. The more Andreotti's softer position is undermined by public revelations of Qadhafi's plots against Italian and West European interests, the more likely Spadolini and Scalfaro are to prevail in tilting Craxi toward action. [redacted]

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Should Craxi decide that some form of military response can no longer be avoided, he is almost certain to insist that it must take place within a NATO framework. The problem, in short, lies not in convincing Craxi that the Libyans are guilty but in persuading him to take in finding a way to assure him that support in actions will not jeopardize Italian security or the stability of the government. [redacted]

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Luxembourg1. Attitudes Towards Libya

Luxembourg has minimal diplomatic dealings with Libya; relations are conducted through Belgium. [redacted]

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[redacted] Luxembourg follows the lead of its EC partners. In a recent meeting with US diplomats, Foreign Minister Poos expressed understanding of US feelings about Libyan-sponsored terrorism, but emphasized that it would be wrong to hold Qadhafi responsible for all acts of international terrorism. Nevertheless, Luxembourg probably would agree to any sanctions recommended by the EC, short of military actions. [redacted]

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2. Views On Libya's Connection with International Terrorism

Since last year, Luxembourg has been plagued by several bombings, which apparently have no link to Libyan or Middle Eastern groups. The government of Luxembourg has accepted without question [redacted] evidence of Tripoli's role in both the Berlin bombings and broader support for terrorism. Recently the Luxembourg armed forces have been used to assist the police in counterterrorist operations--a move the US Defense attache reports irritates some officers transferred from other assignments. [redacted]

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3. Reactions to US Strikes Against Libya

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Compared with statements from other West European capitals, Luxembourg's public and private reactions to the US air strikes were relatively supportive. In a recent meeting with US diplomats, Foreign Minister Poos expressed understanding for US actions, but said military action against Tripoli would aggravate the terrorist problem. He told US officials that international terrorism will only be eliminated if its underlying cause, the Palestinian issue, is removed. [redacted]

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4. Opportunities for US Influence

Luxembourg will likely support initiatives to combat Libyan terrorism, including restricting the Libyan diplomatic presence in Western Europe. Luxembourg can do little, however, beyond what its EC partners accept. Given the small size of its security services, Luxembourg would welcome intelligence cooperation with its Allies and probably go along with their recommendations. Luxembourg is especially concerned with NATO disunity and probably will urge the smaller Trevi members to prevent this. Evidence of Libyan complicity in terrorism could induce Luxembourg to call on its Benelux partners to close--or at least restrict--the Libyan Peoples' Bureau in Brussels. [redacted]

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Netherlands1. Attitudes Towards Libya

The Hague has been a consistent critic of state-sponsored terrorism, but has taken few actions directed against Libya beyond those adopted by the EC. [redacted]

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[redacted] Prime Minister Lubbers' government has urged Dutch nationals and companies not to fall in behind US firms leaving Libya as the result of Washington's sanctions. We believe that the Dutch have used their EC presidency to push for will tougher measures against Libya, including closing Peoples' Bureaus, restricting Libyan travel in Western Europe, and banning arms sales. The Hague will readily invoke measures against Libya, if done in conjunction with policies adopted by the EC. [redacted]

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2. Views on Libya's Connection with International Terrorism

[redacted] Prime Minister Lubbers and Foreign Minister Van Den Broek apparently were convinced [redacted]

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[redacted] that Libya is responsible for the recent bombing of a Berlin nightclub. Indeed, Van Den Broek is using the platform provided by the current Dutch presidency of the EC to try to persuade his colleagues to speed up the implementation of the anti-terrorist measures adopted on 14 April, which specifically cite Libyan culpability. Van Den Broek, according to US officials, believes the EC must move quickly to adopt the stricter diplomatic and even economic sanctions against Libya, and defuse an issue that threatens NATO solidarity. [redacted]

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3. Reactions to US Strikes Against Libya

Dutch government and public opinion reacted negatively to the US raid on Libya, with officials expressing disappointment that the United States failed either to consult or forewarn its allies. Likewise, the Dutch media almost universally condemned the attack, arguing that it increased Europe's exposure to terrorism, forced moderate Arab states to rally to the defense of Libya, and failed to address the "root political and economic causes" of terrorism. Privately, however, several Dutch politicians and civil servants have told US counterparts that they understand Washington's reasons for action, and that the EC may have in some ways forced Washington's hand by failing to adopt stronger measures against Libya after the attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports in December. [redacted]

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4. Opportunities for US Influence

We believe that at present the Hague's first priority is to prevent further US military action. Toward that goal the Dutch are likely to work assiduously for more effective EC-US cooperation against Libya, especially in the areas of limiting the Libyan presence in Western Europe, instituting an arms embargo, and even urging the Community to adopt limited economic sanctions. In our opinion, Van Den Broek's personal worry that the terrorism issue has a potential for dividing NATO will lend added urgency to Dutch efforts in the EC.

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[Redacted]

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We believe that Justice Minister Frederik Korthals Altes--who is the Dutch representative to the Trevi Group--and his Liberal Party colleagues in the coalition government are generally more supportive of US policy toward Libya than their Christian Democratic (CDA) partners. In our opinion, they probably acted as a moderating influence on The Hague's post-raid public comments. We believe that Korthals Altes would welcome further evidence of Libyan complicity, especially if it could be publicized and thereby used to prevent a weakening of CDA support for the EC action.

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Although Korthals Altes almost certainly is more supportive of US Libyan policy than Lubbers and Van Den Broek, we do not think he would be willing to go beyond an EC consensus in pushing for stronger anti-Libyan measures in the Cabinet--such as the elimination of the Libyan presence in Western Europe or full economic sanctions. Recent polls show that the current center-right coalition has only a slightly better than 50-percent chance of winning the national election on 21 May, and we do not believe that Korthals Altes would risk precipitating a cabinet split on the eve of the election. If Lubbers' coalition is reelected, however, we believe that Korthals Altes would be more willing to threaten his CDA colleagues with public criticism if they refuse to agree to stronger counterterrorism actions.

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Portugal

1. Attitudes Towards Libya

Portugal has not focused much attention on Libya or the Mediterranean. Trade with Libya is minimal. Some Portuguese diplomats, including Foreign Minister Pires Miranda, would like to expand Portugal's profile and trade in the Middle East, but there is a general wariness about becoming entangled in that region's bitter political conflicts. [redacted]

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2. Views on Libya's Connection with International Terrorism

Portuguese leaders accept a Libyan connection to international terrorism. They mute their criticism, however, because they are afraid of Qadhafi. Their reluctance to antagonize him is increased by their awareness of the shortcomings of their internal security apparatus and the substantial difficulties they would have in monitoring and countering terrorist activity if the Libyan leader decided to target their country. [redacted]

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3. Reactions to US Strikes Against Libya

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva and Deputy Prime Minister Pires Miranda have been circumspect so far in responding to the US strike. Shortly before the attack, the foreign minister had declared that Lisbon would not provide support for US military operations against Tripoli. After the US action, the prime minister and foreign minister expressed their "surprise" that it had taken place and reaffirmed their support for the positions taken by the EC ministers the previous week. Cavaco Silva also declared that "dialogue," not force, is the best method for dealing with international terrorism. [redacted]

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4. Opportunities for US Influence

Public opinion in Portugal is both more pro-American and more apathetic about foreign policy as a whole than in most other West European countries, and those twin circumstances make it easier for Portuguese leaders to support Washington. Nonetheless, politicians of virtually every stripe believe that Portugal has received little in return for being one of Washington's staunchest allies since the end of World War II. An important element in generating support for US policy, accordingly, could be to demonstrate that Washington took Lisbon's views seriously and valued its past contributions to western security arrangements. Portuguese support for US out-of-area operations would also increase if Lisbon could be assured that any future US action would bring a quick end to Libyan sponsored terrorism and thereby reduce the threat of retaliation against Portugal. A final factor that would facilitate Portuguese support would be indications that other allies--especially Spain, France, and Italy--also were on board. [redacted]

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Spain1. Attitudes Towards Libya

The Spanish recognize that Libya exports terrorism and contributes to instability in the Mediterranean. [redacted]

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[redacted] Nonetheless, the Spanish view Qadhafi in the context of Madrid's relations with the Maghreb as a whole. In their eyes, not only Libya, but also Algeria and Morocco, are important and potentially dangerous to Spanish interests in the region. Madrid relies on Libya and Algeria for much of its oil and natural gas, and does not want to alienate either for fear of becoming too dependent on the other. The Spanish worry about Moroccan challenges to the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla and Algerian support for the now somewhat somnolent independence movement in the Canary Islands, as well as the possibility that Qadhafi could step up his support for those causes or other dissident groups. Under these circumstances Gonzalez has walked a diplomatic tightrope--as have previous Spanish leaders--and has tried to maintain good relations with all of the Mahgreb countries. [redacted]

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2. Views on Libya's Connection with International Terrorism

Spanish leaders do not doubt that Libya is an active center of state sponsored terrorism and efforts to persuade them on that score would strike them as gratuitous. The Spanish also believe, however, that Libya is only one component of Middle Eastern terrorism, and that many of the roots of that larger problem lie in the frustration of Palestinian aspirations for a homeland. [redacted]

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3. Reactions to US Strikes Against Libya

Publicly the Spanish have been ambivalent about the US strike against Libya. They have reaffirmed their condemnation of terrorism and denounced Qadhafi's threats to retaliate against US interests in Spain. At the same time, they have expressed "disagreement" with the US raid on the grounds that it would lead to an upsurge in terrorism. They have also indicated--though not yet categorically declared--that they would deny a US request for overflights or other forms of military support. [redacted]

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Privately, however, they have been somewhat more forthcoming. Gonzalez hinted to Ambassador Walters before the raid that if asked, he might "not notice" if US planes overflew Spain, and might sanction use of Spanish-based US tankers for inflight refueling. The US strike has increased public anxiety about terrorism and increased the political costs of cooperation with Washington, but we still believe that Gonzalez has room to maneuver on the issue. [redacted]

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4. Opportunities for US Influence

If Washington asked Gonzalez to support another US strike, the Prime Minister would almost certainly want assurance that the US action would quickly and decisively end the problem. He also might be influenced by indications that US plans enjoyed the support of other allies, particularly--in approximate order of importance--France, West Germany, and Italy. Allied support might not

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[REDACTED]

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be absolutely essential to obtain Spanish support, but it would certainly increase the odds of obtaining it. Playing to Gonzalez's considerable pride with a direct personal appeal from the President--perhaps through a personal emissary--would be a final factor that could help swing Madrid behind US policy. [REDACTED]

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United Kingdom1. Attitudes Towards Libya

Since coming to power in 1979, Prime Minister Thatcher's Conservative government has been outspoken in its denunciation of state-sponsored international terrorism, and Thatcher has in public comments frequently attributed personal responsibility for terrorism to Libyan leader Qadhafi. The death of a British policewoman as the result of gunfire from the Libyan Peoples' Bureau in London in April 1984 added further stridency to London's position, and caused Thatcher to break diplomatic relations and most government-to-government economic dealings with Tripoli and to step-up anti-terrorism cooperation with Britain's allies. Within the EC the British continue to call on members to take steps to break diplomatic relations and restrict new economic deals that London took in 1984. The Thatcher government continues to oppose comprehensive economic sanctions as ineffective and ultimately harmful to British interests. [redacted]

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2. Views on Libya's Connection with International Terrorism

Thatcher and most of her Cabinet reportedly were fully satisfied that the evidence supplied by Washington established an irrefutable link between Libya and the Berlin bombing. Likewise, the Prime Minister had few qualms about allowing the use of UK air bases by US forces despite the anticipated domestic outcry. We also believe that Thatcher displayed a greater degree of willingness to accept Washington's claims regarding Libya than the other NATO allies [redacted]

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[redacted] Thatcher also made a point of publicly linking Libya to the Provisional Irish Republican Army. [redacted]

3. Reactions to US Strikes Against Libya

The reaction of the British opposition parties, media, and public opinion to the US raid has been almost uniformly negative. Polls taken late last week, for example, indicated that at least two-thirds of Britons believed that Thatcher should not have allowed Washington's use of UK bases. In addition, Labor leader Kinnoch and Liberal leader Steel have been quick to stoke latent anti-Americanism by accusing the Prime Minister of playing the role of "Reagan's poodle rather than the British bulldog." In our opinion, however, Thatcher and her cabinet colleagues fully expected a short-term deluge of negative reaction and are prepared to ride it out. Thatcher probably believes--and we agree--that over the long run she will be able to turn her current decisiveness to political advantage by contrasting it with the "limp-wristed" response of other European leaders and the dangers to Britain of the anti-Americanism displayed by her domestic opposition. [redacted]

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4. Opportunities for US Influence

In our opinion, there is little more that Thatcher's government can do to support Washington's Libyan policy. Indeed, we believe that she would be willing to allow a second use of UK bases if the US presents compelling evidence of Libyan complicity in further terrorist attacks, and if some of the evidence can be used both with the other Allies and even with the public. We

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[Redacted]

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Although the United Kingdom has been the staunchest European supporter of US military action, London is the strongest European opponent of economic sanctions against Libya. Thatcher has consistently contended that economic sanctions do not work and has steadfastly refused--despite intense pressure from her domestic opponents, some EC partners, and Commonwealth brethren--to invoke them against South Africa. While Home Secretary Hurd will be willing to push at the Trevi Group meeting for the speedy implementation of the recently drafted EC measures aimed at controlling the Libyan presence in Western Europe--measures which the UK took on its own in 1984--we believe he will balk at agreeing to wide ranging economic sanctions. In our view, Thatcher probably views decisive military action as preferable to either a series of limited raids against Libya or the imposition of full economic sanctions. [Redacted]

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West Germany1. Attitudes Towards Libya

Bonn favors stronger international cooperation against Libyan-backed terrorism and has tightened controls over Libyans in West Germany. The Federal Republic expelled two Libyan officials earlier this month and is keeping the Libyan Peoples' Bureau in Bonn under close surveillance. The West Germans are unlikely, however, to close the Bureau altogether, as Washington has requested. A Foreign Ministry official explained to the US Ambassador that Bonn fears more expulsions would lead to similar action against West German diplomats in Tripoli. The West Germans favor close cooperation among Western security agencies, and they are pushing the idea of a renewed dialogue between the European Community and moderate Arab states to counter terrorism and take political initiatives to remove its causes. [redacted]

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Bonn adamantly opposes economic sanctions against Libya, arguing that they would be ineffective and unenforceable, would jeopardize West German investments, and might trigger reprisals against Westerners resident in Libya. Bonn almost certainly fears harming its trading relationship with Libya, which is its third-largest supplier of crude oil. More generally, the West Germans consistently have rejected all use of economic sanctions to achieve political objectives, and they probably believe that allowing an exception in the case of Libya would make it harder to resist calls for sanctions against other countries such as the Soviet Union and South Africa. [redacted]

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2. Views on Libya's Connection with International Terrorism

[redacted]

[redacted] Chancellor Kohl told the Bundestag last Wednesday that there is clear proof of Libya's leading role in encouraging, supporting, and controlling numerous acts of international terrorism. He added that intelligence findings unequivocally reveal the hand of the East Berlin Libyan Peoples' Bureau in the bombing of the La Belle discotheque in West Berlin. The opposition Social Democrats say that, while Qadhafi certainly has supported terrorism in the past, Washington has not proven his responsibility for the West Berlin attack. [redacted]

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3. Reactions to US Strikes Against Libya

West German public reactions to the air strike have been almost uniformly negative. Christian Democratic Chancellor Kohl says he does not support the US action, although he understands its motivations. Spokesmen for Kohl's junior coalition partner, the Free Democratic Party, have denounced the air strike, as have the opposition Social Democrats and Greens. By contrast, Franz Josef Strauss, chairman of the Christian Social Union -- Kohl's other coalition partner -- has spoken out in support of the US action, noting that inaction by the West Europeans left Washington no alternative. Demonstrations against the air strike are taking place throughout West Germany, although the number of participants is much smaller than in the anti-INF rallies of the early 1980s. [redacted]

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4. Opportunities for US Influence

We believe Bonn would strongly support proposals for closer Western cooperation against Libyan-backed terrorism, including training and intelligence exchanges, joint measures to enhance airport security, and more intensive inter-ministerial consultations on counterterrorism. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] Bonn also might be willing to expel more Libyan officials involved in supporting terrorism, although the Foreign Ministry almost certainly would oppose such action strongly. [Redacted]

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The West Germans would be extremely reluctant to support any future US military action against Libya, in our judgment. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Bonn would be taking a serious political risk. Given the public reaction to the US air strike last week, even such passive cooperation could cause major Christian Democratic losses in a crucial state election in June. [Redacted]

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