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Memorandum for:

The attached is talking points/background paper for the Naval War College, in preparation for his meeting in late February with West German Navy Staff.

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BACKGROUND PAPER ON EXPANDED MISSIONS FOR WEST GERMAN NAVY

Bundesmarine missions are to contribute to 1) defense of FRG coast, 2) control of the Baltic Approaches, and 3) protection of the Northern Flank's maritime lines of communication for reinforcement and resupply. In 1984 the West German MOD revised the navy's mission statement, expanding the Bundesmarine's operational area to include the southern Norwegian Sea. There the Bundesmarine envisions participation in barrier operations and offensive patrols forward of the barriers.

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- Beginning in the late 1970s the Bundesmarine began development of proposals for expanded missions in the Eastern Atlantic or Norwegian Sea as a hedge against the coming manpower and budget crunch. The Bundesmarine also saw growing threat to Northern Flank as rationale for additional resources.
- Several allies opposed expanded missions for the Bundesmarine. Norway was concerned about any steps increasing forces in the Norwegian Sea in peacetime (but had agreed to let the Bundesmarine preposition materiel in Norway as early as 1964). The UK, probably anxious to preserve its special relationship with the US, cited complications in command and control among other objections. The Royal Navy may also see an expanded German naval presence as weakening its arguments to maintain its current force structure. Denmark was concerned that the new German naval mission might divert FRG attention and resources from the Baltic. Prolonged British resistance led the FRG in 1981 to drop its proposals for the Eastern Atlantic in favor of Norwegian Sea missions.
- SACLANT has supported an expanded role for the Bundesmarine. However, tripartite agreement by the major NATO commanders is still required before the appropriate Bundesmarine elements can be incorporated into the SACLANT force structure. That is a politically sensitive issue between SACEUR, CINCHAN, and SACLANT. Pending such agreement, the FRG takes the position that deployment of German naval forces into the Norwegian Sea can be made on the basis of the Tri-MNC coordinating agreements currently in effect. The Bundesmarine would, however, still like to become involved in the planning process with SACLANT and wants a flag officer billet in the policy division of SHAPE (DACOS), to better balance a perceived lack of maritime influence on the SHAPE policy making process.

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This typescript was prepared by [redacted] the Office of European Analysis for [redacted] the Naval War College. Questions and comments may be directed to [redacted] Chief, European Issues Division, [redacted]

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The new German maritime strategy is not seen as initially representing a major departure or a large difference to NATO capabilities until new Bundesmarine assets come on stream in the early 1990s. The Bundesmarine's destroyers and frigates currently operate in the North Sea. Most West German DDGs, DDs and FFs are now based on the FRG's North Sea coast. German naval fuel, mines and torpedos are already prepositioned [redacted] Capabilities for accomplishment of the expanded mission are being acquired in three phases: [redacted]

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- Phase One involves completion and deployment of the new Type-122 Bremen Class Frigates, each with two Sea Lynx ASW helicopters aboard. The sixth frigate of this class was commissioned in 1984. Two additional Bremen Class frigates and five additional Sea Lynxes were funded in 1985 and will come into service in 1988 & 1989.
- Phase Two might involve development of missions outside the Baltic for the two wings of the German naval air arm which are currently replacing their F-104s with the naval strike version of the Tornado. The naval air arm is scheduled to complete its acquisition of 111 Tornados by 1989.
- Phase Three is expected to be deployment of the initial six of the new class of larger Type 211 diesel attack submarines beginning in 1991. These have been designed for deep-water ASW, will have a minelaying capability, and may carry a torpedo tube-launched anti-ship missile. [redacted]

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The primary issue raised by the Bundesmarine's adoption of an expanded mission in the Norwegian Sea is the future adequacy of forces allocated to the Baltic. The new Type 211 submarines may be too large to operate effectively in the shallow waters of the Baltic. They are planned to replace obsolescent smaller Type 205 submarines that are committed to the Baltic with minelaying, ASW and coastal defense anti-ship missions there. The Tornados of the naval air arm are a potent major portion of the total Bundesmarine resources committed to the Baltic. The expected development of missions for these aircraft outside the Baltic potentially double-tasks these Bundesmarine assets that might not then in all scenarios be available to meet a threat in the Baltic. Moreover, procurement of the new Bremen class Type 122 frigates is a commitment of resources to assets that would be too vulnerable to air attack to operate in the Baltic. The Bremen class funding could alternatively have been allocated to assets optimized for effective wartime employment in the Baltic or its approaches. There is a possibility that the navy's share of the defense budget may improve once Admiral Wellershof replaces General Altenburg as Inspector General of the Bundeswehr in October 1986. The Bundesmarine, however, will still face hard choices on allocation of future funds between missions in the Norwegian Sea and the Baltic. [redacted]

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The FRG is sensitive to the concern of its allies that adequate resources be allocated to the Baltic. Replacement of the Baltic-deployed Type 205 submarines by larger Type 211s would not result in as great a loss for the Baltic if Denmark would buy the Type 205s and also commit to keep some of its older subs in service there as well. That is why the FRG pushed Denmark so hard on that option. It now appears, however, that Denmark will not purchase the German Type 205s, and even if it purchases older subs from Norway there will still be a net reduction in submarines committed to the Baltic. [REDACTED]

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The impact of the the Bundesmarine's expanded mission on its Baltic operations needs to be evaluated in light of a possible growing strategic significance for the Baltic. The Soviets are currently procuring and deploying in the Baltic new rail-ferry capacity which will give them a partial alternative to deployment by land routes across Poland. This new strategic option for the Soviets may justify or require allocation of additional force to the Baltic. The Bundesmarine has programmed upgrade of its 22 search-and-rescue helicopters (Sea King MK41s) with the Sea Squa antiship missile between 1987 and 1989. This additional combat capability might free some of the navy's Tornados for longer-range missions in either the Eastern Baltic or the North Sea. [REDACTED]

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The uncertain future size and force structure of the Royal Navy is another key factor to consider in evaluating the Bundesmarine's expanded mission. Even though NATO's Baltic defenses remain a concern, German procurement of Bremen-class frigates and Type 211 submarines for operations in the Norwegian Sea could benefit NATO if the UK's funding for conventional naval forces declines in the 1990s. The Royal Navy will be particularly vulnerable to budget cuts in the late 1980s and early 1990s because of the high volume of planned warship construction, including a new class of diesel attack subs, more frigates, and a new class of minehunters. [REDACTED]

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