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	Afghan	istan Situation Report	25X1
	7 October 1986		
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7 October 1986


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AFCHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT		25X1
CONTENTS		
FIGHTING IN PAGHMAN AND NANGARHAR	2	25 X 1
Last week Soviet and Afghan forces continued trying to rout insurgent groups from Paghman, where such operations have been under way for well		05.74
over a month.		25X1 25X1
In late September Afghan insurgents, using Stinger air defense missiles in combat for the first time,	2	25 X 1
shot down <u>at least two Soviet helicop</u> ters near Jalalabad.		25 X 1
	3	25X1
	3	25 X 1
7 October 19	86	
i October 136 NESA M 86-20 i SOVA M 86-20	156CX	25 X 1

PERSP	ecti	VE										
NAZ I A	N:	VALL	EY OF	DISAPPO	INTMENT	FOR THE	E AFGHAN	REGIM	B		9	25 X 1
	by t cont Nang	he A rol arha	fghan of the r Prov	Army, t strate	o estab gic Naz h <u>e regi</u>	lish lor ian Vall	predomin ng-lastin ey in peen able	g				25X1
	Near Offi	Eas ce o	tern a f Sovi	ind Sout et Anal	h Asian ysis. (Questior	fice of s and the s or come ion shou	ments				25X1
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PAKISTAN

[⊙]Qandahàr

Lashkar Gáh[⊙]

Zábel .

800353 (545424) 4-85

Zāhedān

Afghanistan

Railroad Road

100 150 200 Kilometers 100

International boundary Province boundary National capital Province capital

150

200 Miles

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			25 X 1
FIGHTING IN PAGHMAN AND NAM	JCARHAR	•	25 X 1
			•
Soviet and Afghan force last week in Paghman, effort to contain the capital. Following a October, a Soviet heli 32 Mi-8s and Mi-24swe positions in the hills Embassy sources. Jet small valley south of two days, Afghan regiments	west of Kabul, in insurgent threat pre-dawn artiller borne assaultem was directed agains near Paghman, ac fighters subseque Paghman city. Dune soldiers restri	the continuing to the y barrage on 3 aploying at least est insurgent ecording to US ently bombed a aring the next cted northward-	
bound civilian traffic nearby	trom Kabul becau	ise of fighting	25X1 25X1
Soviet and Afghan combin Nangarhar Province.	oat operations are	also under wav	25 X 1 25 X 1
motorized rifle, airbo departed garrison	orne, and artiller	y assets	25X1 2 \ 25X1
			25 X 1
INSURGENTS SCORE FIRST SUCC	ESS WITH STINGERS		25 X 1
down at least two MI-8 week using Stinger mis hit but may have been Stinger failed to hit activity is continuing	the Afghan helicopters near siles. Another hable to land safe its target. Mili	resistance shot Jalalabad last elicopter was ly. A fourth tary flight	25X1
civilian flights were	canceled.	licopters	25X1 25X1
crashed near the airpo helicopters was equipp	rt, and that at 1	east one of the	25X1 25X1
COMMENT: These are th Afghanistan. We do no	e first Stinger "I t know whether the	kills" in e heliborne	
	2	7 October 1986 NESA M 86-20156CX SOVA M 86-20099CX	25X1

7 October 1986 NESA M 86-20156CX 25X1 SOVA M 86-20099CX 3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000303160001-7

	SECRET			25 X 1
				25
PAKI	only 25 percent McCollum Program Embassy in Islam	f Pakistan recent of the commodition are useful, accombad. Pakistani	tly complained that es received through the	
		0 - 1- 10 20	7 October 19	
			7 Cha. 4 - 1 4 /	

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damaged, or packaged in a way that p	orecluded useful	
application.		
commun. I allow the descriptions and the mallocations	the amount to the	
COMMENT: Islamabad, which reluctant program, could cite the deficient sh		
excuse for reducing or withdrawing	its support for the	
program and other US-initiated cross	-border assistance	
efforts.		
NG RAISINS AND HEROIN		
	heroin is	
being concealed in cartons of raising		
Afghan Government plants in Kabul, v	vith the knowledge	
of plant administrators. The heroin	1-cum-raisin	
shipments have been sent since the s Netherlands via Moscow and the Sovie	spring to the et port of Riga. In	
May, Dutch authorities seized 220 k	ilograms of heroin	
hidden in a shipment of raisins that		
Afghanistan and crossed through the	Soviet Union.	
COMMENT: It is unclear what role,	if any, the Afghan	
Government has had in this operation		
is known to promote domestic narcot		
may have also been involved in narce Pakistan and Iran. In any case, Af	Than traffickers	
probably believe that routing via t		
suspicions by West European customs		
illicit drugs would be included in	the shipments.	
RIEF		
The first pylons of a 56-kil	ometer nower	
transmission line from the S		
Konduz have been built, acco	rding to press	
reports. The Soviet Union		
supplying electricity to Afg 1985 after completion of a l	nanistan in June ine to Mazar-e	
Sharifplans to extend serv		
in northern Afghanistan and		
Kabul.		
	7 October 1986 NESA M 86-20156CX	
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			25 X 1
			25 X 1
			•
\$100,000 for the according to pro-	n gave the Governmen he support of Afghan ress reports. This	refugees, is Oman's	
first official relief.	contribution to Afg	han refugee	25 X 1
at Dushanbe wh military war do men had died fi of the seventy	aches recently visit ich had tombstones fead clearly indication service in Afghatombstones had inscated eceased were from	or Soviet ng that the nistan. Most riptions	
units.		arroorne	25X1
			25 X 1
	II_ c	hanad airaraft	25 X 1
and Shindand ai	being built at Qand irfields. The revet tion of Afghan comba	ments will	
against blast o	damage.		25 X 1
endorsed the So during a recent stance almost o to obtain more	resident Ratsiraka roviet position on the visit to Moscow. Seertainly was motiva financial assistancer traditionally vo	e Afghan issue His pro-Soviet ted by a wish e from the	
the UN resoluti	ion on Afghanistan.		25X1
peace groups1 Pax Christiwa	group from Dutch chu the Inter-Church Pea as invited to visit I oviet Peace Council.	ce Council and Moscow last	
	6	7 October 1986 NESA M 86-20156CX SOVA M 86-20099CX	25X1



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	activists challenged the Soviets on Afghanist and human rights.	an
	7 October	1986

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ppenp/mivp	
PERSPECTIVE	
AZIAN: VALLEY OF DISAPPOINTMENT FOR THE AFGHAN REGIME	25
As part of a general drive to increase its control of the strategic eastern border provinces, the Afghan egime tried, without much success during the first half of early 1986 to block resistance forces from a sing the Nazian Valley. Besides hindering resistance infiltration and resupply operations, the Government canted to have a secure base to facilitate its support for Afridi tribesmen linked to the Pakistani dissident, Wali Khan Kukikhel.	25
Strategic Valley	
The Nazian Valley in eastern Nangarhar Province is important for insurgent forces in the area, most of which belong to the Hizbi Islami (Khalis) party. Several major supply routes from Pakistan intersect at the town of Nazian. The trails cross the Safed Kohnountain range south of Nazian through five passes that are open only during the summer and fall.	25
This section of Nangarhar Province is also close to an area of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province occupied by the Afridi tribe. The leader of one tractious clan of the tribeWali Khan Kukikhelhas ongstanding ties to the Kabul Government.	25
Objective: Secure the Valley	
In early 1986 Soviet and Afghan regime forces intensified military pressure on guerrilla forces in Vangarhar Province, as part of an overall effort to stem insurgent resupply and infiltration from	
Pakistan.	25 25
7 Octob	
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While the regime had a preponderance of force in th valley, insurgent forces drew back. Starting in la	
	25X1
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	25X1
	25X1
With the aid of new reinforcements, however, the Af regime forces were able to counterattack and seize control of the valley by 21 February,	ghan 25X1
forces were spread thin.	25X1 25X1
additional artillery support and one Soviet motoriz rifle brigade. The outnumbered insurgents responde the offensive by launching diversionary attacks on Afghan Army posts in the border area, where regime	ed to
secure a route for pro-Kabul Pakistani tribesmen, a continue interdiction of resistance convoys, The task force comprised elements of two Afghan infantry divisions with	25X1
On 30 January, Afghan and Soviet forces began a new offensive in the valley to capture guerrilla weapon	, iry,
TOP SECRET	25X1

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		25X1
March, however, when the regime was forced	to use some	
of the forces deployed in Nazian to respon	d to	
insurgent activity in Paktia and Vardak Pr		
insurgents took advantage of the pullout t		
attacks. Over the next two months, the gu		
increased their strength in the valley suf seize five border posts, according to the	IIS Embassy in	
Islamabad. Resistance forces were also ab	le to	
interdict several regime convoys and captu		
ammunition stocks.		25X1
		25X1
Prospects		
The Afghan regime probably will not resume		
operations in the Nazian Valley in the nea	ar future.	
The surge of guerrilla activity throughout	t Aighanistan	
during the summer has strained the Army's	capadificies	
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to respond to a widespread threat, and resistance pressure in other sections of Nangarhar and Paktia Provinces has put regime forces there on the defensive. To undertake another major offensive in the Nazian Valley, the poorly trained and understrength Afghan military will need substantial assistance from Soviet forces. Even then, a large-scale offensive would probably only provide fleeting control of the valley.	25 X 1
Events in the Nazian Valley underscore the Soviet and Afghan Government's inability to pacify permanently important border areas. Insurgent activity can be stifled only in the few instances where the regime can afford to station large units.	25 X 1

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