25X1



		FIL	15
DATE	Ē	8/26/86	- i
DOC	NO	NESA M SU - 20132 SOVA M SU - 20037	S J X
OIR	∂	79.80	
Р &	PD	0	

Top Secret	

Afghanistan Situation Report

25X1

26 August 1986

19-81 INC/CB

Top Secret

NESA M 86-20135JX SOVA M 86-20077JX

26 August 1986

Copy 081



Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Releas 25X1	e 2011/11/23 : CIA-RD	P86T01017R0003030	00001-4
20/(1			
AFGHAN I STAN	SITUATION REPORT		25 X 1
CONTENTS			
FIGHTING IN THE WEST AND NOR	TH CONTINUES		,25X1
Soviet and Afghan comba week against guerrillas and insurgent attacks i	entrenched in F	lerat city,	
apparently caused Sovie month.	t counterattacks	earlier this	25X1
DUTCH SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHAN	RES I STANCE		;25X1
The Dutch Government reaid allotment to Afghan Dutch Catholic peace gr	s inside Afghani oup has expresse	stan, and a d interest	
in mobilizing opposition of Afghanistan.	n to the Soviet	occupation	25 X 1
FOOD PROBLEMS IN THE NORTH			<u> </u> 25 X 1
Food shortages in section of the disruption of agreement of the disruption of the control of the	ricultural produ ne <u>north c</u> ould p	ction and a	
the hands of the regime	•		25 X 1
IN BRIEF			5
PERSPECTIVE			
COMPETING DIPLOMATIC OFFENSI	VES		25X1
Kabul, under Moscow's to more aggressive diplomational image in p	tic campaign to	improve its	
Nonaligned Movement (NANthe United Nations Generations fall. We believe to the long-standing Soviet-Afg	1) summit in Zim Pal Assembly ses This campaign re	babwe and sion (UNGA) flects	25X1
	:	26 August 1 NESA M 86-2	0135JX
	i	SOVA M 86-2	UU77JX

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy App	roved for Release 2011/11/23 : Cl	A-RDP86T01017R000303000001-4	
		25)	X 1
Afghan resistance dig Although the insurger and Europe this summ	also concerns about step plomacy in recent months nt alliance's tour of th er fell short of its goa e diplomatic costs of th	s. ne US nls, we	X 1
Near Eastern and Sout Office of Soviet Anal	epared by the Office of th Asian Analysis and th lysis. Questions or com in the publication shou	ments	X 1
		25 X 1	
	N)	25X ² 6 August 1986 ESA M 86-20135JX OVA M 86-20077JX	1

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000303000001-4 25X1



26 August 1986 NESA M 86-20135JX SOVA M 86-20077JX

lassified in	Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23 : CIA-RDP86T01017R00)0303000001-4
		25X ⁻
FIG	HATING IN THE WEST AND NORTH CONTINUES	25X
	Soviet and Afghan combat operations in the Herat area continued last week in an effort to curb insurgent	
	attacks.	25X1
		25/1
		25X 25X1
	post has been deployed to Herat to support combat	
	operations. Elements of a Soviet tank battalion and motorized rifle battalion from Shindand that left	a
	garrison in mid-August-	25 X 1
	-may be moving against guerrillas south of Herat.	∠⊃⊼ I 25X
		25X
		207
	In Lowgar Province, the Soviets began their third driv	<i>r</i> e
	this summer to secure the road, according to the US Embassy in Kabul. During the latest engagements, the	
	insurgents apparently captured a Soviet officer and	
	the Soviets responded with artillery fire and comici	_
	strikes. of an Afghan artillery battalion and at least 200	25X
	additional vehicles were being marchelled on the main	
	road south of Rabul on 21 August. Another Afghan	
	artifiery Dattation from Hesarak was en route to the	0.53
	Lowgar area.	25X
TWINY	TI SUDDODE DOD EVEN A POPULA	
DOIC	TH SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE	25X′
	The Dutch Government recently doubled its modest aid	
	allument to Alghans inside Afghanistan to 1 million	
	guilders annually approximately \$430 000 police	
	efforts were expanded to include educational and	
		25X
	26 August 19	986
	NESA M 86-20 2 SOVA M 86-20	J135JX N077JY
		JUIIJA

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000303000001-4

25X1

25X1



		25 X 1
	Comment: A reduction in food supplies caused by fighting and drought could play into Kabul's hands by enabling the regime to use food to win popular support. It may also further strain insurgent logistics by forcing resistance groups to devote a larger portion of caravan loads to food. Northern agriculture is particularly dependent on adequate amounts of precipitation because much of it is non-irrigated.	25X
	Balkh Provinces, and possibly other areas in northern Afghanistan, also may be experiencing drought conditions. Food shortages are resulting in rising prices.	25X
	the vicinity of Mazar-e Sharif and in the areas surrounding Konduz Konduz and northern	25×1
X1	Heavy fighting has disrupted agricultural activity in	25X 25X1
	medical service programs as well as donations of food and medical commodities, and the Dutch Development Cooperation Minister expressed interest in the McCollum patient airlift program. In addition, the leader of a leading Dutch Catholic peace group promised, after a recent trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan, to organize opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, according to the US Embassy at the Hague. Comment: Official Dutch humanitarian aid to the Afghan resistance has been modest and low-keyin part because of limited public interest in the issue. The aid programs have also been complicated in the past by rivalries between the two main private organizations involved"Committee for a Free Afghanistan" and "Help Afghanistan", according to the US Embassy at the Hague. Criticism of the Soviets' occupation of Afghanistan by the Dutch Peace Movementwhich has "impeccable leftist credentials," according to the US Embassy at the Haguecould potentially have a positive impact on Dutch public awareness of and support for the Afghan resistance.	· °25)

			5	26 August 198 NESA M 86-201 SOVA M 86-200	35JX
		Shaikh met in V 26-27 August to	Washington with o discuss Afghan	itional Secretary US officials on istan and other The meetings are	25X1
		Jowzjan Province last week for a work," according dismissals occurated as revealed as	ces were relieve alleged "weaknes ng to Afghan med urred at a Polit	ia reports. The buro meeting that cies in eco <u>nomi</u> c	25 25
		Indian Friendsh 21 August. Afg said he conside in expanding bi Delhi has yet to probably will a Kabul, but not Afghan refugee	shan General Sec ered the society lateral relation to confirm its pagree to society in India. New community almos	radio broadcast on retary Najibullah an important step ns. Although New articipation, it activity in	25
		the Ministry of downplayed Isla with the Soviet He said no back since the Genev August. Source will use the vi	ts on broadening a-channel talks va negotiations es of the US Embisit of a Soviet v September to p	s, Arif Ayub, t in private talks the Kabul regime. have occurred ended on 8 assy say Pakistan South Asian	25
II	N BRIEF				

Declassified in F	Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000303000001-4	25X1
	preliminary to US-Soviet experts' talks on Afghanistan, scheduled for 2-3 September in Moscow.	25X1 25X1
	According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, some 500 to 600 insurgents were observed near Chitral in mid-August waiting for weapons and transportation. Guerrilla leader Rabbani recently estimated that logistic problems had backed up "thousands" of resistance fighters at the northern Pakistani staging area for insurgents in Badakhshan Province and the Panjsher Valley.	25X1
	26 August 1986 NESA M 86-20135JX	25X1

6

SOVA M 86-20077JX

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000303000001-4	1
PERSPECTIVE	051/4
AFGHANISTAN: COMPETING DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVES by NESA	25X1
by	25 X 1
Kabul, under Moscow's tutelage, has embarked on a more aggressive diplomatic campaign to improve its	
international image at the Nonaligned Movement (NAM)	
summit in Zimbabwe in September, and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) session next month. We believe	
this campaign reflects long-standing Soviet-Afghan	
sensitivities to world public opinion, but also	
concerns about stepped-up Afghan resistance diplomacy in recent months. Although the insurgent alliance's	
tour of the US and Europe fell short of its goals, we	
believe it did succeed in raising the diplomatic costs of the war for Moscow.	25 X 1
	20/(1
Kabul Promises Diplomatic Campaign	
In his July address to the People's Democratic Party of	
Afghanistan, General Secretary Najibullah urged that "propaganda and counterpropaganda" be further	
activated. Saying that "this task has special	
importance on the eve of the conference of the heads of states and governments of the nonaligned countries in	
Harare and with regard to the next session of the UN	
General Assembly," Najibullah asserted that Afghan ministries and respective departments had been	
instructed to "broadcast facts about the revolution and	
establish and develop relations between Afghanistan and the developingcountries" as soon as possible.	25 X 1
	20/(1
As part of this diplomatic initiative, a delegation led by Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister Sarwar Yurish	
traveled in July to Zimbabwethe NAM chairman for the	
next three yearsto establish diplomatic relations. Yurish obtained Prime Minister Mugabe's agreement in	
principlea development Kabul media immediately	
announced with great fanfare. According to the US	
Embassy in Islamabad, however, Zimbabwean officials told the Pakistanis that they have no intention of	
opening an embassy in Kabul, will not allow Kabul to	
open one in Zimbabwe soon, and will delay diplomatic relations until a political solution to the Afghan	
conflict is reached. The Zimbabweans promised no	
change in support for the proposed NAM summit or UNGA language on Afghanistan.	25X1
26 August 1986	
NESA M 86-20135JX 7 SOVA M 86-20077JX	
25X1	

We believe Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev's announcement in July that Moscow is prepared by yearend to remove six regiments from Afghanistan in Harare. We believe Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev's announcement in July that Moscow is prepared by yearend to remove six regiments from Afghanistan is partly designed to support Kabul's diplomatic initiative by deflecting international attention from the stalled Unsponsored peace talks. Gorbachev may also be hoping that Moscow's overtures toward China will raise concern in Islamabad about China's long-term steadfastness on the Afghan issue. According to the US Mission to the UN, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen-Moscow's client-proposed, in a surprise move in June, that the UNGA's Asian Group endorse Afghanistan's candidacy for one of the vice-presidencies of the 41st UNGA. The US Mission to the UN believes its candidacy has virtually no chance of success, however. The Resistance's Grand Tour The Soviet-Afghan diplomatic offensive may be an overreaction to the more active diplomacy of the Afghan	stan's candidacy for one of e 41st UNGA. The US Mission idacy has virtually no c offensive may be an	
worried that Afghanistan would be one of the main topics discussed at the summit. According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, the Soviets told the Pakistanis that Moscow wants a "calm deliberation" of Afghanistan in Harare. We believe Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev's announcement in July that Moscow is prepared by yearend to remove six regiments from Afghanistan is partly designed to support Kabul's diplomatic initiative by deflecting international attention from the stalled UN-sponsored peace talks. Gorbachev may also be hoping that Moscow's overtures toward China will raise concern in Islamabad about China's long-term steadfastness on the Afghan issue. According to the US Mission to the UN, the People's Democratic Republic of YemenMoscow's clientproposed, in a surprise move in June, that the UNGA's Asian Group endorse Afghanistan's candidacy for one of the vice-presidencies of the 41st UNGA. The US Mission to the UN believes its candidacy has virtually no chance of success, however.	stan's candidacy for one of e 41st UNGA. The US Mission	
worried that Afghanistan would be one of the main topics discussed at the summit. According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, the Soviets told the Pakistanis that Moscow wants a "calm deliberation" of Afghanistan in Harare. We believe Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev's announcement in July that Moscow is prepared by yearend to remove six regiments from Afghanistan is partly designed to support Kabul's diplomatic initiative by deflecting international attention from the stalled UN-sponsored peace talks. Gorbachev may also be hoping that Moscow's overtures toward China will raise concern in Islamabad about China's long-term steadfastness on the Afghan issue. According to the US Mission to the UN, the People's Democratic Republic of YemenMoscow's client proposed, in a surprise move in June, that the UNGA's Asian Group endorse Afghanistan's candidacy for one of the vice-presidencies of the 41st UNGA. The US Mission to the UN believes its candidacy has virtually no	stan's candidacy for one of e 41st UNGA. The US Mission	
worried that Afghanistan would be one of the main topics discussed at the summit. According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, the Soviets told the Pakistanis that Moscow wants a "calm deliberation" of Afghanistan in Harare. We believe Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev's announcement in July that Moscow is prepared by yearend to remove six regiments from Afghanistan is partly designed to support Kabul's diplomatic initiative by deflecting international attention from the stalled UN-sponsored peace talks. Gorbachev may also be hoping that Moscow's overtures toward China will raise concern in Islamabad about China's long-term steadfastness on the Afghan issue. According to the US Mission to the UN, the People's Democratic Republic of YemenMoscow's client proposed, in a surprise move in June, that the UNGA's Asian Group endorse Afghanistan's candidacy for one of the vice-presidencies of the 41st UNGA. The US Mission	stan's candidacy for one of e 41st UNGA. The US Mission	
worried that Afghanistan would be one of the main topics discussed at the summit. According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, the Soviets told the Pakistanis that Moscow wants a "calm deliberation" of Afghanistan in Harare. We believe Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev's announcement in July that Moscow is prepared by yearend to remove six regiments from Afghanistan is partly designed to support Kabul's diplomatic initiative by deflecting international attention from the stalled UN-sponsored peace talks. Gorbachev may also be hoping that Moscow's overtures toward China will raise concern in Islamabad about China's long-term steadfastness on the Afghan issue. According to the US Mission to the UN, the People's Democratic Republic of YemenMoscow's clientproposed, in a surprise move in June, that the UNGA's	stan's candidacy for one of	
worried that Afghanistan would be one of the main topics discussed at the summit. According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, the Soviets told the Pakistanis that Moscow wants a "calm deliberation" of Afghanistan in Harare. We believe Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev's announcement in July that Moscow is prepared by yearend to remove six regiments from Afghanistan is partly designed to support Kabul's diplomatic initiative by deflecting international attention from the stalled UN-sponsored peace talks. Gorbachev may also be hoping that Moscow's overtures toward China will raise concern in Islamabad about China's long-term steadfastness on the Afghan issue. According to the US Mission to the UN, the People's Democratic Republic of YemenMoscow's client		
worried that Afghanistan would be one of the main topics discussed at the summit. According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, the Soviets told the Pakistanis that Moscow wants a "calm deliberation" of Afghanistan in Harare. We believe Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev's announcement in July that Moscow is prepared by yearend to remove six regiments from Afghanistan is partly designed to support Kabul's diplomatic initiative by deflecting international attention from the stalled UN-sponsored peace talks. Gorbachev may also be hoping that Moscow's overtures toward China will raise concern in Islamabad about China's long-term steadfastness on the Afghan issue.	nMoscow's client	
worried that Afghanistan would be one of the main topics discussed at the summit. According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, the Soviets told the Pakistanis that Moscow wants a "calm deliberation" of Afghanistan in Harare. We believe Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev's announcement in July that Moscow is prepared by yearend to remove six regiments from Afghanistan is partly designed to support Kabul's diplomatic initiative by deflecting international attention from the stalled UNsponsored peace talks. Gorbachev may also be hoping that Moscow's overtures toward China will raise concern in Islamabad about China's long-term steadfastness on		
worried that Afghanistan would be one of the main topics discussed at the summit. According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, the Soviets told the Pakistanis that Moscow wants a "calm deliberation" of Afghanistan in Harare. We believe Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev's announcement in July that Moscow is prepared by yearend to remove six regiments from Afghanistan is partly designed to support Kabul's diplomatic initiative by deflecting international attention from the stalled UNsponsored peace talks. Gorbachev may also be hoping		
worried that Afghanistan would be one of the main topics discussed at the summit. According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, the Soviets told the Pakistanis that Moscow wants a "calm deliberation" of Afghanistan in Harare. We believe Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev's announcement in July that Moscow is prepared by yearend to remove six regiments from Afghanistan is partly designed to support Kabul's diplomatic initiative by	pachev may also be hoping	
worried that Afghanistan would be one of the main topics discussed at the summit. According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, the Soviets told the Pakistanis that Moscow wants a "calm deliberation" of Afghanistan in Harare. We believe Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev's announcement in July that Moscow is prepared by yearend	diplomatic initiative by	
worried that Afghanistan would be one of the main topics discussed at the summit. According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, the Soviets told the Pakistanis that Moscow wants a "calm deliberation" of Afghanistan in Harare.	oscow is prepared by yearend	
worried that Afghanistan would be one of the main topics discussed at the summit. According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, the Soviets told the Pakistanis that Moscow wants a "calm deliberation" of Afghanistan	General Gorbachev's	
worried that Afghanistan would be one of the main topics discussed at the summit. According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, the Soviets told the Pakistanis that Moscow wants a "calm deliberation" of Afghanistan		
worried that Afghanistan would be one of the main topics discussed at the summit. According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, the Soviets told the Pakistanis	12 12 13 14 15 14 11	
worried that Afghanistan would be one of the main	oviets told the Pakistanis	
Mos cow has been	uld be one of the main	
	Moscow has been	

		9	26 August 1986 NESA M 86-20135JX SOVA M 86-20077JX	25 X 1
	The Soviet-Afghan respincreased politicking to the alliance's real in itself, an indicati	is, in our view, di gains internationa	sproportionate lly, but is,	
	The Afghan regime's efsignificantly eroding Afghanistan at the UN view. The language of anodyne, falling short name and calling only interference in Afghan of the dispute. Never will look for opportunits external supporter surprise moves as seek likely to be repeated.	support for the res and the NAM summit, these resolutions of condemning the for an end to forei istan and for peace theless, we believe ities to keep the r s on the defensive. ing a UNGA vice-pre	olutions on in our is in fact Soviets by gn ful resolution the regime esistance and Such	25X1
	Prospects			
	The Soviets may also helevel reception Burham spokesman-received in King Fahd and in France Minister Chirac and Follow the feted the delegation apublicly acknowledged resistance war chest. highest official receptes is tance leader to dehumanitarian aid. The particularly galling the fore French President leader Gorbachev.	nudin Rabbanithen Saudi Arabia, where he met with the Saudis their Embassy in Riyadh's contribution accorded any Alate and also pledge French gestures pro Moscow because the	alliance e he met with h French Prime ond. Washington and on to the received the fghan s of increased obably were ey came just	25X1 25X1 25X1
	resistance alliance the keeping with the regime forts over the last members of the alliance international recognitits legitimacy, and inthe war for the Soviet gain the alliance offithe resistance leaders President Reagan was is and Afghan media, whice "hired killers."	ne's heightened imag year or so. In ear ee began a tour to g ion for the organiz icrease the diplomat is. Although the vi cial US diplomatic y well-publicized m mmediately condemne	e-building ly June, ain ation, enhance ic costs of sit failed to recognition, eeting with d by Soviet	25X1
Declassified i	n Part - Sanitized Copy Approved	l for Release 2011/11/23 : C	IA-RDP86T01017R000303000	001-4 25X1

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000303000001	-4 25X1
didraise the diplomatic costs of the war for the Soviets. Still, the resistance remains hamstrung by internal divisions over its international diplomacy and Pakistani disinterest in pushing stronger language for the resolutions.	25 X 1
26 August 1986 NESA M 86-20135JX 10 SOVA M 86-20077JX	25 X 1

Top Secret

