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
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Afghanistan Situation Report

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15 April 1986

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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT [Redacted] 25X1

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Heavy fighting in southern Paktia Province-- probably a prelude to major offensives this spring--occurred last week as Afghan forces intensified their assault on insurgent strongholds. Combined Soviet-Afghan forces conducted operations in Ghazni Province and in the vicinity of Khowst, Jalalabad, and Kabul. [Redacted]

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KARMAL BERATES POOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE [Redacted] 2 25X1

Babrak Karmal's speech on 2 April to the Revolutionary Council was unusually critical of the government's economic performance. [Redacted]

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The Soviets are fitting more tracked artillery tractors in Afghanistan with new mortars. [Redacted]

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IN BRIEF 3

PERSPECTIVE

THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT IN PAKISTAN LOOKS AT AFGHANISTAN [Redacted] 6 25X1

[Redacted]

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President Zia probably will not alter Pakistan's policy on Afghanistan, despite pressure from the Cabinet of Prime Minister Junejo, but, Pakistan probably would adopt a more accommodating position if the Pakistan People's Party gained power. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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AFGHAN INCIDENT DATA BASE: JANUARY 1986



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A graphic portrayal of incidents of fighting in Afghanistan in January 1986 from a new data base will seek to identify general trends in the war.



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
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FIGHTING IN SOUTHERN PAKTIA RAGES [redacted]


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Fighting in eastern Afghanistan probably is the prelude to heavier fighting this spring. Last week, Afghan forces intensified and expanded their assault against insurgent strongholds in southern Paktia Province that began on 4 April, according to [redacted] press sources. Although Soviet forces evidently have not directly participated in these operations, concurrent sweeps near Khowst possibly are supporting the Afghan operation farther south. Thus far, regime troops have failed in attempts to capture a large insurgent mountain base at Zhawar Killi and strongholds at Manne Narai and Lalizar, [redacted]

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[redacted] The guerrillas say Afghan air and artillery units have bombarded Zhawar Killi, nearby base camps at Moghol Gi as well as three insurgent strongholds in Pakistan. Press reports indicate that Jalaluddin Haqqani--the top insurgent commander in the Province--was badly wounded in a napalm attack and that other insurgent casualties include at least 80 dead. More than 250 Afghan soldiers are said to have defected or been captured. [redacted]

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[redacted] Soviet and Afghan troops in the Moqor area of Ghazni Province preparing to leave their garrisons, possibly to support sweeps in neighboring Paktika Province. According to the US Embassy, activity in Kabul increased sharply last week; 10 bomb explosions occurred and at least 20 other bombs were discovered and defused. [redacted]

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KARMAL BERATES POOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE [redacted]

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Babrak Karmal's speech before the Revolutionary Council on 2 April gave an unusually bleak assessment of Afghanistan's recent economic performance. While reiterating claims of great strides in economic development made since the April Revolution (1978), Karmal criticized Ministries and Departments for falling short of their goals because of "...laziness, lack of proper organization, and a lack of



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discipline..." He chastized government farms for achieving only 60 percent of expected production owing to mismanagement. Damage caused by insurgents was mentioned several times as an impediment to economic progress.

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Comment: Previous official statements concerning economic activity in Afghanistan have largely been devoted to announcing the successful completion of development goals, with only fleeting reference to the disruptions caused by insurgents. By identifying laggard ministries and departments publicly, the regime is following recent practice in Moscow and probably is putting officials on notice that they will be replaced unless their performance improves. At the same time, giving heightened prominence to disruptions caused by insurgents may be an attempt to shift blame to them for shortages of goods and services.

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NEW MORTAR CARRIERS

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[redacted] the Soviets are fitting more MT-LB tracked artillery tractors in Afghanistan with Vasilek-like mortars. A total of five of these mounted mortars have been identified in two mortar batteries [redacted] at Konduz.

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Comment: This is the fourth such deployment in Afghanistan [redacted] similar batteries at Kabul, Herat, and at Rohka in the Panjsher Valley. The use of the MT-LB chassis provides increased mobility for mortar batteries.

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IN BRIEF

-- On 17 April 1986, the Bonn Antihijacking Declaration Group (BAHD) will lift sanctions imposed nearly five years ago against Afghanistan's Ariana Airlines. The seven member countries (Federal Republic of Germany, France, Canada, Italy, Japan, UK, and US) revoked the airline's landing rights after Kabul backed hijackers of a Pakistani aircraft, that killed a Pakistani diplomat on board. To get the sanctions removed, Kabul has agreed to observe the Hague antihijacking convention.

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
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-- The prospect of being posted to Afghanistan is of growing concern for Soviet conscript-age youths, according to [redacted] who were recently in the Soviet Union. Press reports and stories from veterans have raised public awareness about the war. [redacted]


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-- The airfield perimeter at Konduz airfield has been extended some 3500 meters since early February, [redacted] About 15 outposts are now in place along the perimeter. The extension will hinder insurgent sabotage attempts and mortar attacks. [redacted]

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PERSPECTIVE**THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT IN PAKISTAN LOOKS AT AFGHANISTAN**

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President Zia and the Army are unlikely to relinquish control over Pakistan's Afghanistan policy or give in to pressures on Afghanistan from the Cabinet of Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo. A more open debate on Afghanistan will now characterize Pakistan's politics. But so long as Zia remains in control, a change in policy will occur only if the generals decide that international or domestic events require a modified approach. [redacted]

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Pakistan would adopt a more accommodating position on Afghanistan if the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) gained power. The most popular party in the country, the PPP, and its leader, Benazir Bhutto, have recently demonstrated its substantial popular support in Lahore, capital of the key province of Punjab. [redacted]

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Zia and His Army

Zia and senior Pakistani generals have devised a system they believe will restrict the new Cabinet's room for maneuver on key defense and foreign relations policies. Although Junejo and his Cabinet probably will gain a free hand in foreign policy issues of lesser consequence to the country, we believe Zia and his inner circle, including Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan, will continue to make the final decisions on Pakistan's relations with its most important enemies-- India, the Soviet Union, and Afghanistan. [redacted]

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President Zia and the military have taken a calculated risk they can control Pakistan's politics during a post-martial law era that could well see an outpouring of pent-up political demands. This could be particularly dangerous for Zia in a period of slower economic growth. We believe Zia's own political skills, the support of the Army, and a careful courting of key interest groups will enable the Pakistani President to succeed over the short term (six to twelve months). We do not rule out a significant and possibly rapid deterioration of Zia's position in the longer term. [redacted]

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Zia and the generals are strongly committed to the present political arrangement and probably will act to restrict the main opposition group--the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy. They could also sacrifice Prime Minister Junejo, although this would severely damage Zia's credibility if such a change occurred too soon. Although the President has kept his position as Chief of the Army Staff, we believe the Army might try to persuade Zia to step down should an antigovernment movement mushroom. [redacted]

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Afghanistan and the Politicians

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has created a difficult dilemma for Pakistan's politicians. On the one hand, they are painfully aware of the long-term consequences for Pakistan of a permanent Soviet presence in Afghanistan and support the need for Pakistan to be strong enough to resist pressures from both Moscow and New Delhi. On the other hand, they resent the fact that the Afghan crisis has strengthened Zia and the Army's command of the state and their access to the country's resources. The politicians are also concerned about the eventual disposition of the roughly 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. [redacted]

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In the more moderate opposition, as well as among the centrists around Prime Minister Junejo, there is a recognition that Zia and the Army so far have deftly preserved Pakistan's interests. In this regard, we believe the debate on Afghanistan in the National Assembly last December probably helped more than it hurt Zia. Although the moderates are concerned that Zia will identify Pakistan too closely with the United States on Afghanistan and expose the country to Soviet reprisals, they are more concerned about the overall stability of the country and probably will refrain from open agitation on Afghanistan. [redacted]

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Zia and Junejo

Prime Minister Junejo has to demonstrate some independence from Zia if he is to gain any credibility for his Cabinet, party, or the current National Assembly. Zia and the Army understand this and have compromised on several constitutional issues--without relinquishing the levers of control. The Army prefers

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[REDACTED]

to be out of sight in Pakistan's politics but still the ultimate source of political authority. Both Zia and Junejo are committed to "civilianization" and realize there is broad public support for a responsible National Assembly. Moreover, both know that only the opposition outside the Assembly would benefit if the experiment broke down. [REDACTED]

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Nevertheless, Junejo clearly plans to be more than a cipher for Zia. He and his supporters in the Muslim League will cautiously attempt to enlarge their power but without confrontations with the President. This means greater control over patronage and the development funds needed to satisfy supporters and keep the extra-parliamentary opposition at bay. For Junejo to emerge as a real rival to Zia for power would require considerably more political capacity and personal support than he has so far shown. To build a broader, independent political base, Junejo would have to adopt a populist program, including land reform, which would alienate his landlord allies in the Muslim League. In a major domestic crisis, we think Junejo's real problem would be to avoid either being jettisoned by Zia or being crushed between the Army and a resurgent opposition. [REDACTED]

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The Main Opposition

Those most implacably opposed to Zia have charged that he and the generals have connived with the United States to keep tensions on Afghanistan high in order to preserve the Army's power. They want Islamabad to enter into direct talks with Kabul, thus easing tensions with Moscow and undercutting the Army's reason to maintain its overall control. [REDACTED]

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The Pakistan People's Party is the one group that Zia and the senior generals want to keep out of power. The PPP and its leader, Benazir Bhutto, seek vengeance for the execution by the Zia regime of its founder, former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto--Benazir's father--and a drastic reduction of the Army's role in Pakistani politics. Party leaders believe that only by reordering the Army as an institution and by substantially reducing its size can it be brought to heel. But they also realize that only major errors by the Army and a revolutionary mass movement could achieve this. [REDACTED]

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The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, a center-left alliance of 11 parties, dominated by the PPP, is showing strains as some of its constituent groups react variously to the Political Parties Act of December 1985, which sets the conditions under which parties can resume their activities. Zia and Junejo may be able to exploit these strains and possibly gain support from the more moderate MRD parties. However, we believe the PPP, the smaller leftist parties allied with it, and the main regionalist parties will be nominally united by opposition to Zia, his relations with the United States, and his policy on Afghanistan. [redacted]

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The PPP is currently testing its support in Punjab and the limits the regime will allow for political activity. It probably also is looking for allies in the army and the bureaucracy. Pro-Libyan demonstrations in Lahore in January 1986 were large and quickly turned both against the US and President Zia. It is difficult to judge whether this is a temporary venting of pent-up frustrations or the beginning of a broader movement against Zia. A continuation of demonstrations in Punjab this spring could gain momentum, as moderates and uncommitted elements rush to be on the winning side. In such a volatile situation, a figure like Benazir Bhutto, who retains the loyalty of the party rank-and-file, might be able to turn the movement decisively against Zia. [redacted]

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The Refugee Issue

The problem of the 3 million Afghan refugees on Pakistani soil will remain a key issue in the country's politics but should not become critical to the stability of the regime so long as Islamabad restricts their access to Punjab. Although there is considerable grumbling among Pakistani Pakhtuns allied to Khan Abdul Wali Khan's National Democratic Party and among Baluch associated with the Pakistan National Party of Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo--both pro-Moscow groups--most Pakistanis support Islamabad's policy of giving sanctuary to their Muslim brethren. Further, none of the opposition groups has offered a resolution that is practicable. Most Pakistanis probably would agree that the refugees cannot be expelled and would return voluntarily only under an acceptable political settlement, which must include the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. [redacted]

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The current period of more open politics could well see increased tensions where refugees have settled in large numbers, particularly around Peshawar and Quetta. Opposition politicians are likely to attempt to mobilize support by playing on old Baluch-Pakhtun enmities and strains arising from economic competition. Further, both Moscow and Kabul will continue to use covert means to increase tensions between refugee groups, between refugees and locals, and between Islamabad and the more recalcitrant Pakhtun border tribes.

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We do not, however, foresee a groundswell of anti-refugee sentiments in the North-West Frontier Province sufficiently strong to force Islamabad to alter its Afghanistan policy. The Pakhtun tribal nature of society in the Province has made the area substantially impervious to mass movements. Although the refugees pose an unprecedented problem, we believe Islamabad still would be able to mobilize centrists and Islamic rightists to neutralize any anti-refugee, pro-Moscow thrust from the left in provincial politics.

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The Border Tribes

The Pakhtun tribes along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border have long resisted central authority and have sought to play Kabul and Islamabad off against each other to preserve their own interests. The Soviet invasion and the war in Afghanistan generally have made the border tribes more reluctant to deal with Kabul. Islamabad also has been able to strengthen its influence in the border areas by mediating disputes between local tribes and powerful resistance groups. Islamabad has acted rapidly to suppress clashes between the two, using regular troops--as in the Kurram clashes in 1984--where paramilitary militias were either insufficient or loyal to one side.

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The Afridi and Shinwari tribes have been a special problem. Afridi territory fronts directly on populous Peshawar District, unlike other areas where border tribes are screened from settled districts by powerful and largely pro-Pakistan tribes. Both tribes have long engaged in trade, transport, and smuggling, both locally and across the Khyber Pass between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and have adopted a pragmatic approach to the war, selling weapons to the resistance, but cooperating with Kabul to keep the road between Kabul

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and Peshawar open to trade. One of the reasons Jalalabad has been the most secure Afghan city has been the reluctance of the Shinwari to cooperate with the resistance.

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Islamabad's efforts since last December to suppress the production of heroin by the Afridi have given Kabul and Moscow their best opportunity so far to turn the border tribes against Pakistan. Some tribal chiefs refused to comply and their acceptance of arms from Kabul, participation in the Loya Jirga, and disruption of resistance supply lines forced Islamabad to act. It has blockaded the area and forced recalcitrant chiefs to negotiate. Although even the tribe most opposed to the regime will in time negotiate the reopening of the Khyber road and their smuggler's bazaars--the sources of much of their wealth--it could be some time before the situation normalizes.

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Baluchistan

Historic tensions between the Baluch and Pakhtuns make the refugee problem in Baluchistan potentially more destabilizing than in the NWFP. The Baluch are outnumbered by Afghan refugees, most of whom are Pakhtuns with tribal ties to Pakistani Pakhtuns north of Quetta and in the Zhob Valley region. In recent decades, the Baluch have found it difficult to maintain their culture in the face of Pakhtun and Punjabi inroads. Serious Baluch insurgencies occurred in 1968-1969 and 1973-1977, although President Zia has kept the Province quiet by a careful development policy, by paying attention to the interests of the powerful Baluch tribal chiefs, and by keeping central authority from too rapidly intruding into tribal heartlands.

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There are indications in both the Moscow and Kabul media of renewed Soviet interest in anti-Islamabad Baluch groups that took refuge in Afghanistan after the last insurgency. We believe a determined Soviet campaign to subvert the Baluch could result in a marginal deterioration of security conditions in the province, but most Baluch tribal chiefs fear the Soviets more than they do Islamabad.

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Implications for the US

The threat to US interests in Afghanistan is more likely to come from domestic political change in Pakistan than from a modification of policy by the current regime. Zia's policy has been unwavering in its opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and should remain so long as the resistance is active and Pakistan receives strong support from its friends abroad.

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Pakistan's relationship with the United States will continue to be a focus of opposition efforts to discredit the Zia regime. Apart from the military and a thin layer of industrial and landed families, few in Pakistan support the US connection. Intellectuals are either Marxists or Islamists, while Muslim clerics can be vociferous in their denunciation of "Western materialism and immorality." Pakistanis continue to be irritated by US support for Israel. But most importantly, they are convinced that the United States let their country down in Pakistan's two major wars with India and that America is an unreliable ally.

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Zia has been unsuccessful in appearing to be independent of US interests. Opposition pressures could, however, force the government to emphasize Pakistan's more popular connections with the Islamic world, particularly Saudi Arabia, and China. We doubt that the substance of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy will change, but Islamabad might consider it necessary to appear to be more flexible. In this event, it is possible the regime will agree to "direct talks" with Kabul, provided a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops is on the agenda and the talks are expanded to include both the Soviets and the resistance.

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Should a PPP-led opposition movement emerge, and succeed in unseating Zia, it is unlikely that a truly revolutionary situation will emerge in the foreseeable future. More moderate elements seem likely to dominate a future PPP government after a period of factional infighting. Such a regime, in our view, would seek to promote a rapid settlement of the Afghan issue. Moreover, the military almost certainly will continue to be a silent partner in any foreseeable civilian regime, able to assert its will on strategic issues and play the role of kingmaker.

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AFGHAN INCIDENT DATABASE



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The following charts represent some initial results from the compilation of a data base which will be used to indicate general trends on the war in Afghanistan.



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The caveats below apply to the charts on the following pages:



- "Military Activity Initiated" seeks only to portray who initiated incidents. The chart does not measure the type or intensity of the incident or the results.
- "Incidents by Province" does not necessarily reflect combat intensity.
- The "Targets" charts show what was attacked, but does not judge the success, intensity, or method of operation.




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MILITARY ACTIVITY INITIATED JANUARY 1986



INCIDENTS BY PROVINCE JANUARY 1986




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MAJOR TARGETS OF INSURGENTS JANUARY 1986




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JANUARY 1986
INCIDENTS BY SOURCE

MAJOR TARGETS OF SOVIET AND AFGHAN REGIME FORCES JANUARY 1986



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