




Directorate of Intelligence

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Afghanistan Situation Report



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11 March 1986

1-file #81

DATE 3/12/86

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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

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SOVIET AND AFGHAN UNITS ON THE OFFENSIVE

[Redacted]

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Antiguerrilla operations by Soviet and Afghan regime forces continued in eastern Afghanistan,

[Redacted]

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AFGHANISTAN IS LOW PRIORITY FOR EUROPEANS

[Redacted]

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A USIA survey in December indicates that few West Europeans are willing to support strong measures against the Soviet Union for its occupation of Afghanistan.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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RESISTANCE FEARS LOSS OF PAKISTANI CIVILIAN SUPPORT

[Redacted]

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Afghan insurgents in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province are concerned about declining support for their cause among local residents.

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IN BRIEF

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
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SOVIET AND AFGHAN UNITS ON THE OFFENSIVE 

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Several Soviet and Afghan operations, begun last month, continued in eastern Afghanistan in early March. 


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AFGHANISTAN IS LOW PRIORITY FOR WEST EUROPEANS 

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A USIA public-opinion survey taken last December in Britain, France, Italy, West Germany, and The Netherlands indicated that most Europeans believe the Soviets are maintaining an oppressive regime in Afghanistan that cannot be considered a legitimate government. Nonetheless, a majority of the Europeans do not favor strong measures, such as economic sanctions, against Moscow. Although there is some support for humanitarian and economic aid to the resistance, no more than one in ten Europeans favors supplying the insurgents with arms and military equipment. With the exception of the Italians, significantly more Europeans had no opinion on how to respond to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan than a year ago. 

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Comment: The poll suggests West Europeans are increasingly less willing to challenge the Soviet Union's actions in Afghanistan. The fading importance of the Afghan issue to most European audiences probably is a welcome development to the Soviets, who have sought to

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
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


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portray events in Afghanistan as of minor consequence for the security interests of Western Europe.



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RESISTANCE FEARS LOSS OF PAKISTANI CIVILIAN SUPPORT




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The guerrillas are considering asking President Zia to implement a propaganda campaign in the NWFP to reassure inhabitants that the Afghan refugee presence is a net gain for the local economy and to warn of Soviet designs there. In late January, the Afghan resistance formulated contingency plans in case public hostility in the NWFP or a diplomatic settlement of the war ends Pakistani support for their cause.



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Comment: The Afghan resistance, concerned that the Soviet destabilization campaign in the NWFP is succeeding, hopes to involve Islamabad in more aggressive countermeasures. In the aftermath of Pakistan's recent successful campaign against dissident tribal leader Wali Khan Kukikhel, however, Islamabad probably would be reluctant to raise the




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
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Recoilless infantry Flamethrowers




RPO (Recoilless Infantry Flamethrower)

- 1. FORESIGHT 2. BARREL 3. LEAF SIGHT 4. FLAMETHROWING ROUND
- 5. STRIKER MECHANISM 6. BIPOD 7. WARHEAD CASE
- 8. CHECK MARK 9. PROPELLANT CHARGE




Working Diagram of RPO

- 1. TRIGGER 2. GENERATOR (MAGNETO) 3. MEMBRANE 4. IGNITER
- 5. CONTAINER OF INCENDIARY MIXTURE 6. PROPELLANT CHARGE
- 7. AMMUNITION CASE



RPO-A

- 1. CONTAINER/LAUNCHER 2. CONTROL ROD/CABLE 3. SLING 4. OPTICAL SIGHT 5. FORESIGHT 6. FORWARD PISTOL GRIP 7. STRIKER MECHANISM
- 8. MOTOR 9. SUPPORTING SLEEVE 10. CHECK MARK 11. WARHEAD CASE



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government's profile there. Pakistan's new civilian government probably also believes an Afghan public relations campaign would be criticized by the opposition coalition, which recently voted to exclude the refugees from Pakistan's political life.

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IN BRIEF

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-- A mid-level official of the Soviet Institute of World Economy and International Relations recently characterized the war in Afghanistan as a partisan war which cannot be won militarily by the Soviets so long as the insurgents want to fight. In a private conversation with an officer of the US Embassy in Moscow, he asserted that not even another 100,000 Soviet troops would make a difference. The official said the Soviet military thinks it can win. In his view, only a political agreement between the Kabul regime and the insurgents--although difficult to imagine--would stop the fighting.

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-- Plantings of opium poppies have risen nearly 300 percent in Afghanistan. [Redacted] Afghan farmers anticipate a harvest of more than 900 tons of raw opium gum in 1986. [Redacted] the Kabul regime has encouraged poppy production by purchasing large quantities of opium and by destroying grain crops while sparing poppy fields.

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
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-- Babrak Karmal returned from Moscow on Saturday, 7 March. He headed the Afghan delegation at the 27th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party.

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
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
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


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Insurgent Activity

Insurgent offensive activity slowed in February. Except for the shutdown of three Soviet helicopters in the Kabul area in mid-February, guerrilla operations were limited in the capital region. US Embassy sources reported several

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Soviet and regime military targets in Kabul were hit by rockets and that there were a few explosions and gunfights. An insurgent rocket attack on Jalalabad airfield on 4 February destroyed one helicopter and damaged the radar site. Guerrilla forces sporadically harassed convoys north of the Salang Pass. 

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Outlook

Soviet and Afghan forces are maintaining pressure on the guerrillas so that the insurgents will have more difficulty initiating offensives this spring. In conjunction with their efforts to curtail resupply from guerrilla rear areas in Pakistan and Iran, the Soviets probably also hope to force the insurgents to draw down supply caches. The Soviets, who would like to have the Afghan Army expand its active combat role against the insurgents, probably see the Afghans' solo operations in February as a promising development. 

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