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Authoritarianism and Militarism in Southern Europe

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Research Study

AUTHORITARIANISM AND MILITARISM IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

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AUTHORITARIANISM AND MILITARISM IN
SOUTHERN EUROPE

NOTE: This study was prepared by the Office of Political Research. Other agencies and CIA offices were consulted, but the study has not been formally coordinated and does not represent an official CIA position. The issuing office is aware that the complex and controversial matters discussed lend themselves to other interpretations. Comments on the paper will be welcomed by the author, [REDACTED], code 143, extension 5441.

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FOREWORD

This study, on Authoritarianism and Militarism in Southern Europe, is a relatively new form of intelligence production, which the issuing office has labelled "functional research." The major purpose is to analyze important political phenomena that are so common that there is a tendency to take them for granted—either not to define them at all or to define them in value terms that fit special cases. This series attempts to provide value-free definitions and assessments that cut across borders and regions and that offer intelligence officers and policy-makers alike a framework for a more systematic grasp of subjects they encounter regularly under many different guises.

The object of functional research, then, is to elaborate a useful analytical framework for country and regional specialists as well as for generalists. In this study, [REDACTED] examines the circumstances under which the various forms of authoritarian rule tend to emerge and persist, the characteristic strengths and weaknesses of such regimes, and the constraints on the development of the prerequisites for stable democratic practice. Subsequently, Spain, Yugoslavia, Portugal, Greece, Italy, and Turkey are covered in case studies to indicate how an assessment of authoritarian traditions and practices can serve to complement and place into perspective other ways of examining the complex issues determining the course of events in Southern Europe.

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KEY JUDGMENTS

—Although it takes many different forms, modern day authoritarianism can be viewed as a distinctive political system—one which generally places far less arduous demands on a society than either totalitarianism or representative democracy. For many nations it is, in effect, the only feasible system of rule. For many more, particularly for those with long-standing authoritarian traditions, it offers an easy way out when an attempt at democratic (or, in the case of Yugoslavia, totalitarian) practice runs into trouble.

—The societal characteristics and problems that give rise to military intervention and to prolonged or recurrent authoritarian rule are similar, and these conditions tend to be especially prevalent and pronounced in “developing” countries beset by the disruptive impact of belated modernization.

—Even when civilians are at the helm, the internal dynamics of authoritarian rule tend to keep the military involved in politics in a significant way—whether as an active participant in policy-making councils, an intermittent veto group, or simply the ultimate arbiter of political strife.

—Thus, for most of the world today, authoritarianism and militarism are norms, not aberrations. And if world-wide economic strains continue to exacerbate the problems associated with modernizing change, the chances are that both phenomena will become even more common in the decade ahead.

—Under certain circumstances, authoritarianism can be a fairly stable and effective form of rule over comparatively long periods of time—even in countries which have passed well beyond the initial stages of social and economic development.

—Nevertheless, the key internal balances and trade-offs upon which the successful operation and stability of authoritarian rule depend are easily upset. Hence, most authoritarian regimes are prone to recurrent crisis and political violence. And while such domestic turbulence may trigger movement toward more efficient and possibly more democratic government, it is more likely to result in paralysis and the emergence of still another ineffective authoritarian regime.

—As a long term proposition (i.e., anything over five years), direct military rule has a propensity to suffer from a number of distinct

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and potentially serious weaknesses. But in the short to medium term, it would seem to make little difference *per se* whether soldiers or civilians head up an authoritarian regime.

—To be stable and effective, any non-totalitarian regime—whether authoritarian or democratic—must be in basic consonance with prevailing customs and circumstances. Moreover, a nation's political culture cannot be changed by fiat: although far from immutable, its evolution is a function of overall societal development.

* * * *

—Succession presents a delicate problem for any authoritarian regime. As illustrated by the atmosphere of uncertainty prevailing in Spain and Yugoslavia today, this is particularly true of personalistic dictatorships. At best, both countries are likely to experience fairly lengthy periods of instability once their present supreme leaders leave the scene.

—Efforts to establish representative democracy face formidable obstacles in fragmented societies endowed with strong authoritarian traditions and subject to the destabilizing pressures of rapid social and economic change. Portuguese prospects for a relatively swift and orderly transition to democratic rule—poor from the outset—are now virtually nil. And although Greece is off to a far more promising start, there is at least an even chance that it will revert to some form of authoritarian rule within the next five to ten years.

—In both Italy and Turkey, weakly-rooted democratic institutions are currently being tested by the combined weight of incongruous traditions, pressures associated with modernizing change, and world-wide economic strains. In Turkey, another interlude of direct or indirect military rule is a distinct possibility. And even in Italy, the longer-term outlook for democratic rule is guarded.

—The outlook for Southern Europe as a whole over the next ten years is for considerable turbulence and political experimentation. And while the prospects for the survival or revival of democratic practices vary widely throughout the area, the chances are that the bulk of this experimentation will focus on differing forms of authoritarian rule.

—There is a danger that this situation could result in the emergence of new extremist dictatorships of either the left or the right. Moreover, continued political instability alone might breed xenophobic nationalism.

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THE DISCUSSION

THE PROBLEM, THE APPROACH, AND THE OBJECTIVES

Over the past several decades, authoritarian government and direct military intervention in politics have been either constant or recurrent phenomena in most countries of the world. Some observers, particularly those who perceive the widely disparate manifestations of authoritarian rule as mutant or nascent forms of totalitarianism or democracy, consider this to be an unnatural and therefore transitory state of affairs. This paper, however, is based on the premise that, for all its variants, modern-day authoritarianism is itself a distinctive system of rule—one in essence neither totalitarian nor democratic, and one in which the military establishment generally plays a significant political role.

It is further postulated that the factors favoring authoritarianism and militarism are similar, and that these factors tend to be especially prevalent and potent in "developing" countries beset by the destabilizing effects of belated modernization. To put it directly, for most of the world today, authoritarianism and militarism are norms not aberrations. Indeed, the only practical governmental alternatives for a very large number of nations are between different kinds of authoritarian rule—rather than between authoritarianism on the one hand, and either democracy or totalitarianism on the other. And if world-wide economic strains continue to exacerbate the problems associated with modernization and development, the chances are that both authoritarianism and militarism will become even more common in the decade ahead.

The principal objectives of this research study are (1) to examine the causes, nature, and consequences of authoritarian rule and of the separate but overlapping phenomenon of direct military intervention in political affairs, and (2) to assess the local and international implications of both. Although the observations and judgments concerning authoritarianism and militarism advanced herein are intended to have broad applicability, the geographic focus of the paper is limited to the non-totalitarian states of Southern Europe.

Why Southern Europe? First of all, most recent efforts to explore the sources and effects of authoritarianism and militarism have retained a rather traditional focus on the demonstrably "backward" members of the international community; hence, there is a distinct analytical gap to be filled. Then too, the US has a major strategic stake in the Mediterranean Basin. Although there are other regions that share this distinction, there is no other area where so many unsettling trends and forces—including nationalism, modernization, irredentism, religious and ethnic conflict, great power competition and intervention, and the personal ambitions of the individual leaders—are as openly and as vigorously at play. Because of this, the internal affairs of states which border the Mediterranean or its approaches tend to be particularly likely to spill over onto the international stage.

Moreover, the turbulent course of political developments in Southern Europe over the past century provides ample illustration of the nature, strength, and persistence of authoritarian imperatives in developing countries; the diversity in form and direction of military intervention and authoritarian rule; and authoritarianism's fundamental strengths and weaknesses as a modern-day political system. Within the memory of living man, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey have all experienced recurrent and prolonged periods of authoritarian rule. Three of the six are currently endowed with incontestably authoritarian regimes. Of the remainder, only Italy has clung to a democratic form of government throughout the post-World War II era—setting something of a record for political instability and inefficiency in the process.

There are, of course, innumerable factors that will influence the evolution of domestic and foreign policy in Southern Europe. It is not the purpose of this paper to proffer some sort of quick and easy substitute for painstaking case-by-case analysis. Rather, it is hoped that the generalizations about authoritarianism and militarism and the brief country assessments set forth below will furnish a useful analytical framework for more definitive country studies.

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AUTHORITARIANISM

It is perhaps more difficult today than ever before to group governments into neat categories. Not only are there nearly twice as many independent countries than just a decade or so ago, but in most cases there is little correlation between constitutional pretension and political practice. Although nearly all contemporary regimes claim to be democratic, relatively few can be classified as representative democracies by any meaningful definition of the term. An even smaller number can usefully be considered totalitarian dictatorships. The remainder can be divided up in many ways. It is postulated here, however, that for all their variety the governments of most post-traditional societies fall within the bounds of a third and less demanding system of rule: authoritarianism.¹

The Nature of the Beast

In an authoritarian system, predominant power is exercised by a single leader or narrow autocratic elite neither responsible to the general public nor fully subject to legal restraints. At the same time, however, a limited number of relatively autonomous special interest groups can and do influence the political process. This last-mentioned trait—hereafter subsumed under the rubric of limited political pluralism—requires special emphasis: of all characteristic features of authoritarianism, it is perhaps the most critical to understanding the dynamics and limitations of the system.

Although the leadership of an authoritarian regime effectively stands above the law, its freedom of action is restricted in often predictable ways by the constant need to manage and manipulate interest group pressures and conflict. Control is maintained through a combination of repression of clearly inimical individuals or groups and conscious efforts to play the remaining political actors off against each other in such a way that none becomes strong enough to challenge the existing order or even to appear to offer a viable alternative. This is hardly an easy task at best; and, as will be illustrated in subsequent discus-

¹Professor Juan J. Linz is one of the foremost academic proponents of the concept of a distinctive authoritarian system of rule. Linz's earliest and most complete statement of his model is presented in his "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in *Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Systems*, ed. Erik Allardt and Yrjo Littunen (Helsinki: Westermarck Society, 1964), pp. 291-342.

sion of potential succession problems in Spain and Yugoslavia, its difficulty increases with the number and variety of groups whose interests must be taken into account.

Directly or indirectly, the armed forces play a key role in the establishment of any authoritarian regime. Thereafter, even if power passes to (or remains in) civilian hands, latent instability and the conflict-oriented dynamics of authoritarian rule usually insure that the military establishment continues to play a significant political role—whether as an active participant in policy-making councils, an intermittent veto group, or simply the ultimate arbiter of political strife.

The internal dynamics of authoritarian rule also impose certain practical constraints on ideological rigidity, electoral practices, and even levels of popular political mobilization.² Within these bounds, however, authoritarianism can take many forms—not only with respect to general ideological orientation, but (as illustrated by variations in the number and type of political parties found under authoritarian rule) in terms of organizational structure as well. For example, all political parties were banned during Greece's recent interlude of military rule. Both Spain and Yugoslavia presently have one-party systems, but Franco's National Movement and Tito's League of Communists are poles apart in terms of functional role and institutional strength. There are multi-party authoritarian systems as well: what might be termed the "predominant party" type has long been exemplified by [redacted] political practice, while an officially imposed two-party variant is currently employed in Brazil.

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Although it is generally relatively easy to distinguish a multi-party authoritarian regime from a representative democracy, the dividing line between authoritarianism and totalitarian dictatorship at the other end of the political spectrum is less evident. Indeed, many non-democratic governments seem to

²Even though efforts to rally and organize the population may be required at certain critical points in the evolution of any authoritarian regime, the sort of sustained and extensive politicization of the citizenry found in both representative democracies and totalitarian dictatorships is basically incompatible with the domestic imperatives of limited pluralism. In time, such politicization would simply overtax the system by whetting popular expectations, generating a destabilizing proliferation of groups seeking to influence the political process, and alienating those established elites which were threatened with the loss or diminution of their traditional prerogatives.

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exhibit some or all of the traits generally attributed to totalitarianism.³ But on close examination, only the more rigid Communist regimes seem to fill the bill. For example, in all other possible candidates for this distinction, the monopoly parties lack the cohesion and political clout of their counterparts in the classic Fascist, Nazi, and Soviet models. Political repression is commonplace, but vigorous efforts to employ the full range of totalitarian thought and behavior controls are notably lacking. And while lip service may be paid to the goal of a monolithic society, conflicting interests are both recognized and—within limits—tolerated as essential to the operation of the authoritarian system.⁴

The Why and Wherefore

Under most circumstances, authoritarianism places far less arduous demands on a society than either totalitarianism or representative democracy. In addition, it is adaptable to a wide range of local conditions. For many nations it is, in effect, the only feasible system of rule. For many more—particularly for those with long-standing authoritarian traditions—it offers an easy way out when an attempt at democratic practice runs into trouble.

There are many factors which bear on the establishment and persistence of authoritarian rule—a fact underscored by that phenomenon's seemingly capricious record.⁵ Among these, *cultural and historical heritage* (e.g., the constellation of hierarchical, patronal, and corporatist customs that make up the so-called "Iberian tradition"), *deep-seated societal cleavages and conflicts*, *external inspiration and pressures*, and the *accident of charismatic leadership* frequently play particularly prominent roles. But in recent years at least, the key catalytic factor has most often seemed to be *the disrupt-*

³A particularly comprehensive listing of the characteristic features of totalitarianism is provided in Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, Second Edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 22-23.

Since no totalitarian system has been able to repress all pluralistic tendencies, the difference here is one of degree. Indeed, it can be argued from the slow but steady rise in the influence of professionally-based sub-elites in the USSR that the Soviet system is itself inching toward authoritarianism.

⁴Authoritarian regimes have emerged as the result of breakdowns of colonial rule, of traditional societies, and of existing democracies. At least one (Yugoslavia's) grew out of an infant and ill-starred totalitarian dictatorship. Some have persisted, changing in nature and leadership over time. Others have given way to more democratic forms of government, often only to reemerge in new guise just a few years later.

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*tive impact of social and economic changes associated with modernization.*⁶

Not only does the modernization process itself favor efforts to centralize and expand political authority, but by fostering *political lag* or *political decay*, it can result in a breakdown of domestic order and a consequent imposition (or reimposition) of authoritarian rule. Political lag may be defined simply as the failure of political development (particularly institution-building) to keep pace with socio-economic development. Political decay refers to the actual breakdown of established political institutions which, for one reason or another, are no longer suited to the times.

Although felt everywhere, the destabilizing effects of modernizing change are quite naturally most pronounced—and most widespread—among states that are still in an early or middle stage of social and economic development.⁷ The problems faced by such nations are enormous. Rapid increases in literacy, exposure to mass media, industrialization, urbanization, and per capita income expand the politically relevant segment of the population and generate a sharp rise in expectations. Whether or not such factors as poverty of natural resources or traditional ethnic animosities pose additional complications, the general proliferation of new social forces and requirements places great strains on existing political institutions. And if these prove resistant to or incapable of necessary adaptation, either political lag or political decay ensues.

A society thus afflicted generally enters (or lapses back into) what political scientists now commonly refer to as a *praetorian* phase, i.e., one characterized by the politicization of all significant social groupings and the lack of political institutions strong enough to mediate, refine, and moderate their interaction.⁸ Under these conditions, contending groups in-

⁵A detailed analysis of the political ramifications of socio-economic change will be presented in OPR's forthcoming *The Political Implications of Modernization: The Brazilian Case*.

⁶As a group, these countries might best be characterized as victims of *delayed development*. Whether because of foreign domination, geographic or self-imposed isolation, the strength of traditional customs and institutions, or a combination of these and other factors, all of them were rather late entrants in the modernization game. And to add to the other problems they face in trying to catch up, the destabilizing impact of social and economic change increases with its pace.

⁷A detailed analysis of praetorianism is provided in Samuel P. Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 79-82 and 192-263.

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creasingly resort to various forms of direct action (e.g., bribery, coercion, terrorism, work stoppages, and demonstrations), and the military establishment is inevitably drawn toward the center of the political stage. The overall situation strongly favors the imposition of a law-and-order authoritarian solution, even if only on an interim basis. Indeed, in those countries which by dint of local circumstance habitually seem to suffer from a lack of strong political institutions, military coups and revolving-door authoritarian governments have become characteristic features of the political scene.

Strengths and Weaknesses

Obviously, authoritarianism is far from a sure-fire cure for socio-economic growing pains. Its repeated and sometimes dramatic failures are evidence enough of this. But most of these failures have occurred under circumstances which would have made it very difficult to establish and maintain any sort of effective government. Effectual rule is, in fact, an elusive quality for most of the world; whatever the form of government, the requirements are stringent.

At the minimum, effective political authority—the power to promote and, when necessary, to guide basic societal change—requires (1) the consent (or at least passive acceptance) of most of the governed and (2) the support of those institutions which, individually or collectively, have been entrusted with a virtual monopoly over the means of coercive force. The first is in large part a function of political organization and legitimacy. The second is basically a question of subordinating the armed forces and paramilitary police to government direction. Both are characteristic features of stable democracies and totalitarian dictatorships. By extension, they are critical to the performance and prospects of an authoritarian regime as well.

In practice, the form, general orientation, effectiveness, and stability of any given authoritarian regime are conditioned by the interplay of a host of internal and external variables. But even though the mix of operative factors is different in every case, there are certain general problem areas bearing on the question of effective political authority that are common to all. Hence it is possible to gauge the outlook for a particular authoritarian government on the basis of its

performance with respect to a few basic tasks. Briefly stated, they are:

—*Centralize and expand political power.* Stable authoritarian rule rests on clear-cut hierarchical relationships. Yugoslav experience illustrates how elusive this goal can be in a country where culturally and economically based aspirations for greater regional autonomy are strong.

—*Develop an aura of legitimacy through some combination of traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational considerations.* The shortlived Ioannidis regime in Greece was particularly deficient in this regard.

—*Establish stable political institutions (i.e., organizations and procedures which are both effective and valued in their own right).* The importance of this task is sometimes obscured by the personal skill and stature of leaders like Tito and Franco. Nevertheless, in the absence of political institutions capable of accommodating conflicting societal interests and of mediating inter-elite disputes, a society will retain strong praetorian tendencies. And this, in turn, will increase the chances of popular alienation, more frequent resort to repression and violence, and bitterly contested succession.

—*Rationalize and increase the competency of the governmental bureaucracy.* This is essential because the administrative apparatus not only plays a major role in determining economic performance, itself a key factor affecting domestic harmony, but also substitutes for political action as the primary means for assuring social order and justice. In Spain, for example, bureaucratic shortcomings have undercut efforts to use a combination of social welfare programs, paternalistic labor laws, and elaborate grievance procedures to mute demands for politically independent trade unions.

—*Co-opt or neutralize potential challengers at an early stage—particularly those who are members of, or allied with, dissident factions within the military establishment.* As amply illustrated by the experience of most authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe during the past fifteen years alone, the conflict-oriented dynamics of limited pluralism generate a special need in this regard. They also require development of a parallel capacity to defuse potentially contentious domestic and foreign policy issues through a flexible mix of repression, compromise, and diversion—lest these issues polarize the society and

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thus deprive the regime of much of its room for maneuver and base of support.

Although this list of chores seems formidable, weak performance in one or another field is often at least temporarily offset by such things as rising living standards or charismatic leadership. Indeed, the record shows that under certain circumstances, authoritarianism can be a fairly stable and effective form of rule over comparatively long periods of time—even in states that have reached a complex and demanding middle stage of social and economic development.⁷

Nevertheless, the key internal balances and trade-offs upon which the successful operation and stability of authoritarian rule depend are easily upset. Hence, most authoritarian regimes are prone to recurrent crisis and resort to political violence (both government-sponsored and oppositionist). Sometimes such turbulence serves as a catalyst for evolutionary change toward more efficient and possibly more democratic government. More often it results in paralysis and the emergence of still another ineffective authoritarian regime.

Another clear systemic weakness stems from the fact that, unlike representative democracy, authoritarianism has no built-in mechanism for orderly political succession. Thus each authoritarian regime must devise its own, a requirement which adds urgency to the need to legitimize and institutionalize its rule. Personal dictatorships are particularly vulnerable to succession difficulties. Even if, like Franco and Tito, the supreme ruler makes elaborate arrangements for succession, including constitutional provisions for the division of his offices and powers, the basic components of this new system are likely to lie dormant and untested until after he has actually departed the scene. Then, in the absence of his stabilizing influence, they may prove incapable of functioning as intended.

MILITARISM

Although the fact that both the conditions which favor authoritarian rule and the dynamics of the system itself tend to draw the military into politics in

⁷ For all but the world's major oil producers, the concept of a middle stage of development can be crudely defined as signifying a per capita GNP in current prices of between \$500 and \$2,000.

a major way has been established in previous discussion, some further observations about the causes and consequences of military intervention are clearly in order. Specifically, what seems to be the reason for the increasing incidence of direct military rule? Why are there such marked variations in the form and direction of the political role played by the military in different countries? Are military regimes inherently any better or worse than civilian authoritarian regimes?

The motives which move military men to direct action in the political arena are usually complex. The mix varies according to time and place, but almost always includes three distinct areas of concern—personal, institutional, and societal. Sometimes ambitions, grievances over pay and promotion, or uneasiness over policies or trends which appear to threaten the perquisites and power of the military establishment clearly predominate. But in a growing number of cases, these considerations seem to have been strongly reinforced, if not overshadowed, by fear that economic or political mismanagement was threatening to lead the nation to the brink of disaster.

The process of modernization has, in fact, increasingly affected both military motives and capabilities with respect to direct intervention in political affairs. Proliferation of domestic missions (e.g., counterinsurgency, riot control, and civic action), corresponding changes in the curricula of advanced military schools, and the influence of foreign ideas and developments have combined to increase the level of social awareness within the military establishments of many countries—and to generate a consensus that preservation of national security demands prompt and energetic efforts to resolve pressing economic, social, and political problems. Parallel development, however gradual, of new managerial skills and bureaucratic resources has tended to increase the confidence of military leaders in their "unique" ability to analyze and cope with their country's ills. Not surprisingly, the emergence of this new breed of soldier-technocrat has been accompanied by a distinct trend toward: (1) military interventions which are institutional rather than personalistic in nature, and (2) both longer and more frequent interludes of direct military rule.

Nevertheless, no national military establishment—no matter what its size or degree of professionalization—is a monolithic institution. In

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fact, with few exceptions, each tends to reflect the currents and divisions affecting the country at large. Thus, while it is possible to catalog the conditions which invite military intervention, the form and direction that such intervention takes, in any given case, will depend on which military faction seizes the initiative and which domestic allies it chooses to court or support.

Although the effectiveness of each military regime must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, aggregate data analysis suggests that, in the short to medium term at least, it makes little difference *per se* whether soldiers or civilians hold the reins of power. It seems that military regimes tend to impose more restrictions on political activity, achieve greater success in promoting economic growth in very poor countries, and do less to develop primary education than their authoritarian civilian counterparts. (Contrary to popular belief, non-military authoritarian regimes tend to spend more on defense.) Apart from these findings, the differences in overall economic and political performance appear to be negligible.¹⁰

As a long-term proposition (i.e., anything over five years), however, direct military rule has a propensity to suffer from a number of potentially serious weaknesses, including: (1) inadequate political institutionalization; (2) a lack of compensating charismatic leadership; and (3) increasing factionalism within the military establishment itself. The ill-fated Papadopoulos regime in Greece provides a case in point.

But even though these profession-related shortcomings are in time likely to afflict any predominantly military regime, there is an offsetting tendency for civil-military distinctions to become blurred under authoritarian rule. Most military regimes co-opt a large number of civilians into key posts. Moreover, soldier politicians are soon confronted with a number of problems—including, ironically enough, the need to insure continued subordination of the armed forces to political authority—which both limit their options and tend to have an erosive effect on their old institutional loyalties and ties. Franco Spain provides a clear example of the civilianization of what was initially a military dictatorship.

¹⁰Based on unpublished papers presented at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

THE SCENE IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

Not since the earliest phases of the Cold War has the political future of the whole "soft underbelly" of Europe seemed so uncertain. Authoritarian Spain and Yugoslavia both face potentially serious succession problems. Portuguese efforts to establish democratic rule have already encountered formidable obstacles. Although off to a promising start, Greek efforts to the same end bode well to run into similar difficulties over time. For its part, Italian democracy seems shakier than ever. And given the cumulatively destabilizing impact of recent events on Turkey's political scene, it would seem wise not to bet too heavily on the longevity of that country's latest experiment with democracy.

Just how serious the potential ramifications of such instability are—including the degree and significance of the "leftist threat" to NATO interests—must of course, be determined through case-by-case analysis in which due account is taken of all significant internal and external variables. No such ambitious undertaking is attempted here. Rather, it is the purpose of the brief country assessments in this section to underscore the persistence of authoritarian traditions and imperatives in Southern Europe and to indicate how these are likely to influence the future course of events in the countries concerned.

The Problems of Authoritarian Succession: Spain and Yugoslavia

Franco has been political master of Spain since 1939, Tito of Yugoslavia since 1945. Both preside over fragmented societies with strong authoritarian traditions. Now in their eighties, both have made—and have partially implemented—elaborate arrangements for the passage of political power to their heirs. And both have blithely short-circuited these arrangements whenever some key subordinate or interest group seemed to step out of line.

Spain¹¹

In some ways, Spanish political problems are the easier to isolate and analyze. For one thing, despite

¹¹The brief Spanish country assessment presented here constitutes an abridged and updated version of OPR's *The Spanish Succession: Strains in the Post-Franco Authoritarian System*, November 1974. That paper was followed by a more extensive analysis of the Spanish scene in OPR's *The Politics of Uncertainty: Spain Prepares for the Post-Franco Era*, February 1975.

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troublesome regional frictions and disparities, Spain's population is culturally and ethnically more homogeneous than Yugoslavia's. For another, Franco's system of rule is conceptually simpler than Titoism. It is neither revolutionary in nature nor burdened by an elaborate guiding ideology. Contrary to Yugoslav practice, it presupposes maintenance of relatively low levels of popular political mobilization and consciousness. Partly for these reasons, and partly because the spectre of foreign pressures and intervention has not—or at least not since 1950—loomed so large in Madrid's domestic policy calculations, the post-World War II evolution of authoritarian rule in Spain has been far less erratic than in Yugoslavia.

For over 30 years, Franco has managed to (1) maintain the unswerving loyalty of the Spanish military establishment, (2) sustain and dominate a governing coalition of basically conservative but otherwise quite disparate elites, (3) neutralize his most dangerous domestic foes, and (4) retain the positive—if passive—acceptance of the majority of his countrymen. Moreover, although political inhibitions born of memories of bloody civil war have faded, Spain's strong economic performance during the 1960's and early 1970's has given more people a genuine—if fragile—stake in Franco's system than ever before.¹²

Nevertheless, Franco has failed to establish the tried and trusted political institutions needed to perpetuate his system once he has left the scene. Of all the institutions he has created, only the cabinet has developed any vitality. The rest have simply lain dormant pending the succession or have been discredited as compliant appendages of dictatorial rule.

In fact, despite Madrid's willingness to countenance a few mildly liberalizing reforms, Spanish political development has simply not kept pace with the changes in social structure and outlook generated by vigorous economic growth and increas-

¹²Despite substantial infusions of US aid during the 1950's, Spanish economic growth had been impeded—and was ultimately halted altogether—by highly autarchic policies born of early Fascist inspiration and hardened by necessity during a decade of isolation. In 1959, however, with Spanish per capita GNP threatening to hover indefinitely below \$500, technocratic elements persuaded Franco to adopt a sweeping and outward-looking program of economic reform. The results were dramatic. Spain quickly achieved (and, with the exception of a temporary slowdown in 1970-1971, has until recently maintained) one of the highest growth rates in Europe. By the beginning of 1974, per capita GNP had soared to \$1,750.

ing exposure to foreign influences. As a result, Franco's once finely tuned system has been thrown out of kilter—as evidenced by mounting labor unrest, increasing polarization of the political scene along liberal and conservative lines, and renewed agitation for Basque and Catalonian autonomy.¹³

By and large, Franco's personal authority and prestige have served to offset this growing imbalance. But now, in a climate further unsettled both by worldwide economic strains and by recent events in Portugal, Spanish politics are threatening to reacquire a *praetorian* character. And while Franco's system is not yet beyond salvation, the ability of his successors to halt its erosion is likely to be significantly impaired by the complexity of the largely untested governmental structure they will inherit.

Not only will the title of *Caudillo* and the extraordinary constitutional powers which render Franco "responsible only to God and history" die with him, but the checks and balances he has built into his succession arrangements provide ample ammunition for a multi-faceted power struggle once he is gone. Theoretically, Franco's designee for future King, 37-year old Prince Juan Carlos de Borbon, will occupy the key positions—Chief of State, Generalissimo of the Armed Forces, and Chief of the National Movement (an organization which some years ago superseded the *Falange Espanola Tradicionalista* as Spain's sole legal political "party"). But the Prime Minister will control the government machinery, and either he or the minister concerned will have to approve every decision taken by the King as Chief of State. Moreover, although Juan Carlos will be legally empowered to resolve disputes between the cabinet, the *Cortes* (legislature), and the judiciary, Franco's role of supreme arbiter will have passed elsewhere—to the previously somnolent Council of the Realm.¹⁴

¹³The terms conservative and liberal take on distinctive meanings when applied to Spanish politics. Far from simply evincing a cautious attitude toward change, Spanish conservatives feel uncomfortable with Franco's modest political reforms (*apertura*) and would resist, by force if necessary, any significant shift in the balance of political power toward populism. Thus, the whole political spectrum is skewed to the right, and many Spaniards who might be classified as liberals by outside observers would be considered centrists in a more democratic society.

¹⁴The Council of the Realm has 17 members: 7 *ex officio* (the President of the *Cortes*, the senior prelate among the members of the *Cortes*, the senior military officer on active duty, the Chief of the High General Staff, and the Presidents of the Supreme Court, Council of State, and Institute of Spain) and 10 elected from among the groups represented in the *Cortes*.

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This last is a grave responsibility to place on a collegiate body composed of representatives of disparate groups. In fact, given the growing rift between liberal and conservative forces in Spain, Franco's whole succession scheme could prove close to unworkable. The projected diffusion of effective political power is not only likely to widen existing cracks in Spain's governing coalition, but initially, at least, it promises to lend disproportionate advantage to the political right wing.

Thus, despite the fact that Juan Carlos and Prime Minister Carlos Arias—who is expected to retain his present post for at least a few months after Franco's departure—both favor further social and political reforms, they may simply lack the clout to implement controversial change. Moreover, should the two for any reason come to an early parting of the ways, Juan Carlos could easily end up with a Prime Minister less amenable to reform. Of the half dozen men currently considered to be leading contenders for the job, only one, Manuel Fraga Iribarne, seems to be as interested as the present Prime Minister in liberalizing the system.

Much, of course, will depend on how Spain's principal political actors interpret and execute their new roles once Franco leaves the scene. But unless the increasingly evident failure of Portugal's recently-launched attempt at democratization greatly discourages Spain's evermore numerous proponents of liberalizing change, any prolonged stalemate over the pace of reform will exacerbate the polarization of Spanish society. In the absence of healthy political institutions, Franco's successors will then be hard pressed to contain either inter-elite disputes or growing popular discontent. Most importantly, perhaps, they will lack a strong and broadly based supportive political party capable of co-opting moderate opposition leaders and of giving their views some representation in the *Cortes* and top advisory councils. (In their present configuration, neither the introverted and elitist National Movement nor any of Spain's newly-authorized and still embryonic "political associations" are equipped for this role.) Currently threatening economic problems could easily compound these woes.¹⁵ And if domestic turbulence

¹⁵ Even under the best of conditions, Madrid might find it difficult to satisfy popular appetites whetted by a decade of rising living standards. As it is, Spain's economic prospects have recently been clouded by inflationary pressures, the increased cost of petroleum, and the general deterioration of the economic picture in Europe. The last has already found reflection in shrinking earnings from Spain's important tourist industry and in a decline in job opportunities for—and hard currency remittances from—nearly one million Spanish emigrant workers.

reaches serious proportions, one or another faction of Spain's long quiescent military establishment can be expected to emerge from the political shadows and attempt to impose its own solution.

In such an event, no duplication of recent events in Portugal would be likely—at least not over the next several years. Although a few younger officers undoubtedly secretly sympathize with the goals and behavior of their militant contemporaries in Lisbon, the Spanish military establishment—untroubled by frustrations born of seemingly pointless and endless colonial wars—remains, on balance, fundamentally loyal to Franco and his system. It is, however, divided over how much political reform is desirable in the post-Franco era. It is also divided over the question of what political role the armed forces should play.

A small but growing liberal minority, incorporating officers of all ages and ranks, favors faster and more meaningful political and social reforms—an objective these officers recognize might at some point oblige the military to inject itself directly into the policy-making process. At the other end of the spectrum, a somewhat more outspoken group opposes any relaxation of authoritarian rule and vigorously maintains that the military should and must assume active responsibility for Spain's political future. The rest of the Spanish officer corps, including a majority of its ambitious but economically insecure junior members, would seem to prefer to avoid a more active political role and would probably support any regime in Madrid as long as it seemed reasonably capable of maintaining order, preserved the essential features of Franco's system, and did not threaten military prerogatives.

But whatever their other differences, it is clear that most Spanish officers agree that the military has the right and duty to intervene in the event of a serious and prolonged breakdown of domestic order. And since the direction and duration of such intervention would depend on which factional grouping seized the initiative and the sources of its civilian support, a relatively small shift in the current balance of forces within the military establishment could significantly affect Spanish political fortunes in the decade ahead.

All told, Spanish circumstances and traditions still favor some form of authoritarian rule. But while Spanish society has yet to develop the preconditions for stable democracy, it has just clearly outgrown the limits of the sort of rigid dictatorship that hardline conservative elements might seek to impose. In any event, the outlook is for a lengthy period of instability

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caused by contention not only between the forces for and against liberalizing change, but among the different power elements in Franco's succession scheme as well.

This potential for long term instability is a matter for legitimate concern for the West. At worst, chronic domestic turbulence could in time give rise to a radical dictatorship of either the left or right—eventualities which, each in its own way, would pose serious problems for NATO. Short of this, the insecurity of its domestic position might prompt an otherwise moderate and instinctively pro-Western government in Madrid to adopt an assertive nationalism which might prejudice U.S. interests with respect to basing rights, trade promotion, private investment, and the whole issue of Gibraltar and the Gibraltar Straits.

Yugoslavia

Spain's troubles pale beside those of Yugoslavia. The latter's survival as a multinational state has, in fact, been one of the minor miracles of our times. Ever since 1918, when their country was established on the ruins of the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires, the Yugoslavs have been struggling to modernize their economy, to protect themselves against the hegemonistic or irredentist aspirations of outside powers, and most importantly, to forge a united nation out of peoples previously separated and set against each other by geography, historical circumstance, and cultural influence. In none of these endeavors, particularly the last, have they been wholly successful.

Indeed, the havoc wrought by the deep-seated antagonisms which divide Yugoslavia's constituent nationalities has been formidable.¹⁶ They doomed

¹⁶ Many of these antagonisms have their roots in the ages-old division of the Balkans between the Latin Catholic West and the Greek Orthodox East. Others grew out of the five centuries of Turkish rule suffered by the forebears of the citizens of southern and central Yugoslavia following the defeat of the Serbs at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. Indeed, despite the common Slavic origin of most of its citizens, Yugoslavia's ethnic terrain is unquestionably the most varied and complex in Europe.

- Five official languages are employed in the conduct of the country's domestic and foreign affairs.
- A third of its people are Roman Catholics. Slightly more are of Serbian Orthodox persuasion. One in eight is a Muslim.
- Approximately 40 percent of its 21 million inhabitants are Serbs, 22 percent are Croats, 9 percent are Slovenes, 6 percent are Macedonians, 2.5 percent are Montenegrins, 6.5 percent are of Albanian origin, and 3 percent are ethnically Hungarian. Bosnian Muslims (about 8.5 percent) and numerous lesser nationality groups make up the remainder.

Belgrade's initial experiment with democracy, undermined subsequent efforts at centralized authoritarian rule, and facilitated the easy victory scored by German invasion forces in early 1941. A few months later they flared into a bloody civil war which sometimes obscured an otherwise magnificent resistance effort, took over 700,000 lives, and paved the way for the establishment of a post-war Stalinist-style Communist regime under Josip Broz Tito. Today, reinforced by growing disparities in regional levels of well-being, these antagonisms still lie at the heart of most of Yugoslavia's political and social problems—and not a few of the economic ones as well.

Faced with the need to develop wider domestic and international support in the wake of Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Soviet Bloc, Tito cast aside Stalinist practices in 1950 and launched his country onto an uncharted course toward what might be termed pluralistic socialism—a highly sophisticated variant of authoritarian rule expressly tailored to local circumstances. Within limits, Tito's answer to the question of how best to deal with regional urges for greater autonomy and other particularistic interests has been to accommodate them. For example, he has made the regular and active participation of a wide variety of regional organs, federal bodies, and special interest groups (e.g., youth, labor, professional, and economic) in the process of government an indispensable feature of his political system. He has vigorously applied the principle of proportional ethnic representation to all key institutions, including, as far as possible, the military establishment. And until recently, at least, he has presided over a gradual decentralization of authority—not only to Yugoslavia's eight constituent republics and provinces, but beyond as well to the communes (*opstinas*) which now constitute the nation's basic socio-political units.

Although Yugoslavia's post-1950 evolution has been troubled, it demonstrates that authoritarian rule can be (1) very flexible and innovative and (2) reasonably effective and popular in an extraordinarily complex and turbulent environment. It also underscores many of the systemic vulnerabilities of authoritarianism, particularly those associated with personalistic rule and the inevitable problems of succession.

Tito's pragmatic innovations—including the introduction of what has been termed, for lack of precedent, "market socialism"—have made Yugoslav society the most open and dynamic in Eastern

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Europe, But, as he recently learned to his dismay, too much decentralization of authority and too much politicization of the citizenry can be dangerous in such a potentially explosive environment. As Belgrade eased its grip, ethnic enmities and jealousies became inextricably intertwined in a growing power struggle between the proponents of further liberalization and well-entrenched conservative elements.

Matters finally came to a head in late 1971. By then, the power of federal authorities to develop and enforce the controversial programs needed to stabilize the nation's chronically troubled economy and to reverse growing regional economic inequities had all but evaporated. No longer held in check by fears of a Czechoslovakia-style Soviet invasion, resurgent ethnic rivalries were disrupting the work of almost all of the country's top political bodies. This included the 23-man Collective Presidency and 8-man Party Executive Bureau that Tito—determined to insure that no one man or ethnic group would dominate the political scene after his departure—had recently established as the key elements in his blueprint for succession. The Croats were behaving in a particularly obstreperous fashion. For its part, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), long relegated to a guiding rather than a commanding role, had degenerated into something approaching a confederation of nine virtually autonomous party organizations (eight of them regionally-based, the ninth geared to the military establishment). In short, Yugoslavia was in the throes of its worst political crisis since Tito came to power.

Tito had simply let too much authority slip away from Belgrade. Like Franco, he had failed to establish tried and trusted political institutions that could function effectively without his intercession—albeit his failure on this score was attributable to too much change and innovation rather than too little. Moreover, he had misjudged in his belief that he could tame maverick regional leaders by co-opting them into the collective bodies destined to inherit his enormous powers.

Tito had not, however, made the mistake of underestimating the potential importance of the military factor in Yugoslavia's domestic equation. In fact, he had begun to revamp the country's traditionally aloof military establishment and to draw it into the mainstream of domestic politics as a unifying force some three years before the crisis finally broke.

Although far from untouched by the centrifugal forces affecting the society at large, the Yugoslav military establishment (unlike the LCY) was still a genuinely national institution in 1971. Moreover, Yugoslavia's military leaders were not only apprehensive about what they perceived as anarchical trends but fearful that the fact that the country's recently-established paramilitary defense forces had been placed under local civilian control might presage a potentially disastrous decentralization of the regular armed forces as well. Thus they were, for the most part, more than ready to back any corrective action that Tito chose to take.

Confronted with the continuing inability of central Party and government organs to rein in the blatantly chauvinistic leadership of Croatia, Tito's patience finally ran out in December 1971. With the active and explicit support of senior military leaders, he short-circuited the political superstructure he had created and moved to set things straight in a manner reminiscent of earlier times.

Although bloodless, the shake-up was Draconian by post-war Yugoslav standards. It took nearly three years for the dust to settle. When it did, hundreds of functionaries throughout the country had lost their jobs. Some ten percent of those individuals who had been carried on LCY membership rolls in 1971 had been expelled or otherwise "selected out." The Party itself had been recentralized, and its leading role had at least in theory been restored. The nation's paramilitary defense forces had been placed under firm federal control. The military had been given a greater voice in national policy-making councils, and active duty generals had been assigned to two key federal internal security posts. The cumbersome Collective Presidency had been pared from twenty-three to nine members. And most of Tito's revised political ground rules had been formalized in new Party statutes and a new constitution.

On balance, Titoism has emerged the stronger for its ordeal. Although the changes that Tito has made since 1971 have not altered the pluralistic—or even, in many areas, the basically decentralized—nature of his system, they have corrected or attenuated many of the flaws and imbalances that had threatened to overwhelm it before he even left the scene. Hierarchical lines of authority and responsibility have been restored and clarified. The nation's ideological and ethnic extremists have at least temporarily been

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routed. Changes in electoral procedures have narrowed direct (and potentially highly chauvinistic) popular participation in the governmental process to the local level. And most importantly, perhaps, the LCY seems to be at least part way along the road toward resurrection as a national and relatively disciplined institution—without sacrifice of its original (and basically healthy) nature as a broadly-based coalition of differing interests.

Tito's heirs will, in fact, start off in a somewhat stronger position than Franco's. The legitimacy of their positions—and of their system of rule—will be less in doubt, the loyalty and political role of their military colleagues less ambiguous.¹⁷ Moreover, renewed uneasiness over Soviet intentions may at least temporarily evoke a spirit of unity and cooperation that is likely to be lacking in Madrid.

But despite these advantages, the political outlook for post-Tito Yugoslavia is even more uncertain than that for post-Franco Spain. For one thing, Yugoslavia's economic problems are more serious and more sensitive to adverse global trends and developments.¹⁸ Its ethnic rivalries promise to persist,

¹⁷ Although it is difficult to judge just how successful Tito has been in extending the loyalty of the military establishment beyond his person to his system, Yugoslavia's military leaders appear to be satisfied with the present situation. While they have willingly assumed a more conspicuous guardianship role, they have so far shown little sign of independent political ambitions. Thus, unless the LCY again succumbs to ethnic or leadership rivalries, Tito's successors are likely to encounter little difficulty in subordinating Yugoslavia's armed forces to civilian control. A comprehensive analysis of civil-military relations in Yugoslavia is presented in OPR's *The Political Role of the Yugoslav Military*, March 1975.

¹⁸ Rising world prices and the economic slowdown in the West have magnified Yugoslavia's chronic inflation, balance-of-payments, and unemployment problems. Partly because of rising import prices—and partly because of the huge wage increases secured by Yugoslavia's politically powerful workers—the cost of living index climbed nearly 30 percent in 1974, compared to 20 percent in 1973. Shrinking export markets, heavy dependence on high-priced Western raw materials, and a decline in both tourism earnings and remittances from the country's nearly 900,000 emigrant workers combined to yield a record year-end current account deficit of around \$700 million. At the same time, a growing influx of workers returning home after losing their jobs abroad (some 75,000 in 1974 alone) has driven the level of officially registered unemployment to about 9 percent of the nonagricultural workforce for the country as a whole—and to more than double that figure in some traditionally backward regions. If the austerity program introduced by Belgrade in late 1974 (which is already under fire from various Republican capitals) fails to alleviate these problems before Tito passes from the scene, his successors are likely to find it very difficult to impose needed new sacrifices on recalcitrant regional and economic factions.

providing, *inter alia*, fertile ground for domestic and foreign intrigue. Its revamped political institutions are still weakly rooted. And its overall governmental system is enormously complex.

To complicate matters, Yugoslavia—like Spain—will experience a triple succession. Tito's role as Head of State will be assumed by the Collective Presidency, with the title and functions of President of the Republic rotating annually among its eight regionally-based members. (Upon Tito's departure, the ninth member—*ex officio* the President of the LCY—will be ineligible to hold the top governmental job.) But preponderant power will pass to the LCY where it will be shared jointly by Tito's successor as Party President (as yet to be designated but quite possibly Stane Dolanc who, as a Slovene, would be acceptable to most other ethnic groups) and the newly-renamed Executive Committee. The latter body, recently expanded to 15 members and broadened by the addition of a military representative, is evidently intended to serve as the country's supreme political watchdog and arbiter. Obviously, the successful functioning of such a system in the absence of a clearly dominant leader will depend upon maintenance of a much higher degree of consensus than has been attainable in the past.

All told, therefore, the room for mischance and miscalculation is great. At best, a lengthy period of considerable instability appears inevitable. At worst, deepening political crisis might result in the fragmentation of Yugoslavia—with the attendant risk of renewed East-West confrontation.¹⁹ However, given the prospect that Yugoslavia's armed forces would probably step in before domestic turmoil got completely out of hand, the latter contingency appears relatively unlikely.

¹⁹ In one way or another, the Yugoslav succession will impact on Washington's now muted adversary relationship to Moscow. The West has a considerable stake in Yugoslavia's survival as a relatively cohesive and fully independent state. For its part, the Kremlin has never reconciled itself either to the loss of its one-time client or to Tito's seemingly heretical domestic and foreign policies. The USSR's response to developments in Belgrade is likely to continue to be largely reactive (and, for a while, at least, relatively restrained). Nonetheless, the disclosure of Soviet links to the recent efforts of die-hard Yugoslav Stalinists to form a rival underground Communist party demonstrates that Moscow has left few stones unturned in its search for ways to improve its ability to influence what happens in Yugoslavia once Tito departs the scene. Under most circumstances, then, the greater the difficulties that Tito's heirs encounter, the greater the temptation will be for the Kremlin to meddle actively in Yugoslavia's internal affairs—and the greater the chance of serious strains in East-West relations.

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In any event, the pressures (both internal and, quite possibly, from Moscow) on Tito's heirs to move toward a more restrictive form of authoritarian rule will undoubtedly be strong. Just how much tightening up may actually ensue is open to question. But even if Yugoslavia's new leaders succeed in fending off these pressures, it will probably be some time before they feel secure enough to risk a new round of political liberalization. And the same defensive considerations are likely to dictate retention of the essential features (but not necessarily the flamboyancy) of Yugoslavia's current foreign policy course.

Opening Pandora's Box: Portugal and Greece

With the collapse of the Caetano and Ioannidis regimes—the former from an audacious nudge administered by a handful of disgruntled junior officers in April 1974, the latter of its own weight some three months later—Lisbon and Athens have set about the difficult and potentially risky task of establishing democratic rule. For reasons which will be elaborated below, Portuguese prospects for success are clearly the poorer. But if past experience is any guide, the chances that representative government will finally take firm root on the rocky shores of the Aegean are not so good either. Ever since they won their independence from Turkey in 1829, the Greeks have been alternating between anarchical binges and authoritarian cures. And there is little reason to believe that the cycle has now been broken.

Portugal

Twentieth century authoritarianism emerged in Portugal in much the same way that it did in Spain—except that the Portuguese were spared Spain's chaotic and bloody interregnum between floundering military dictatorship and stable civilian rule. Not that the military leaders who put an end to Portugal's brief stab at democracy in 1926 proved any more capable of coping with the problems associated with modernizing change in a backward society than the Spanish officers who had seized power in Madrid some three years earlier. But Portugal's generals found someone who was up to this task, a strong-willed professor of economics named Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, and they more or less gratefully shifted the burden of rule to his shoulders before disaster struck.

Salazar, who was named Prime Minister in 1932, fashioned his country into a corporatist, single-party, authoritarian state—a solution compatible with its prevailing circumstances and traditions. Although theoretically subordinate to the President of his *Estado Novo* (New State), he thoroughly dominated the Portuguese political scene until incapacitated by a stroke in 1968. Like Franco, he brought his country political stability and, initially at least, economic advance.²⁰ But unlike Franco, his strategy and tactics changed little over time. As a result, his domestic institutions and policies—and his approach to Portugal's colonial problems—became increasingly anachronistic.

Salazar's successor as Prime Minister, Marcello Caetano, sought to rectify this situation. But he lacked either the personal or constitutional authority to overcome the opposition of President Americo Thomaz (an admiral who had been Portugal's nominal Head of State since 1958) and other ultra-conservative elements. Thus, far from serving their intended purpose, Caetano's halting efforts at political and economic reform and at introducing some flexibility into Lisbon's colonial stance helped to surface long-extant undercurrents of discontent within almost all politically relevant sectors of Portuguese society—including the military establishment.

Given what seemed to be the balance of forces in Portugal in early 1974, Caetano's downfall would have been less surprising had it been at the hands of either ultra-conservatives or disillusioned moderates. That it was not, that it was in fact engineered by a few youthful proponents of radical societal reforms, illustrates how critical a role a numerically small but determined group of officers can play within a divided and relatively apathetic military establishment. Within months, what apparently began in mid-1973 as an extemporaneous secret conclave focused on irksome professional grievances had developed into a full-fledged conspiratorial organization—the Armed Forces Movement (AFM)—dedicated to an early political settlement of Portugal's colonial wars abroad and to the establishment of "democratic" rule at home.

²⁰Salazar's conservative economic policies brought Portugal unprecedented fiscal stability but only a modest, and in the end declining, rate of growth. It has been said that in his fear that he might run the economy onto the rocks, he ran it onto the sands instead. Although Caetano did what he could to get things moving again, Portugal's per capita GNP in early 1974 (\$1,140) was still the lowest in Western Europe.

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Relatively little is known about the internal dynamics of the AFM—either before or after the essentially bloodless coup of April 1974. At the time, the Movement probably numbered no more than two or three hundred officers, a tiny fraction of the tri-service officer corps. (However, most other officers readily accepted the overthrow of the Cactano regime, and apparently many of these have since been co-opted into the AFM.) As is still the case today, the organization's membership spanned the political spectrum from moderates to radical leftists—with individuals of the latter persuasion in the definite minority. But since the radicals had been the prime movers behind the conspiracy, they emerged from the coup with disproportionately strong representation in the AFM's original top leadership council (the Political Coordinating Commission).

Apart from the AFM's general and vaguely defined commitment to democracy and socio-economic reform, there was little initial consensus on longer term objectives. Moreover, most of the country's new leaders were political neophytes. One of their first mistakes, perhaps, was establishing a definite 12-18 month timetable for the transition process—a step which showed little appreciation of formidable societal obstacles to stable and effective representative government (e.g., strong authoritarian and patronal traditions, the sharp dichotomy between the urban and rural sectors of the population, and the absence of a large middle class).

In any event, the determination of the predominantly left-wing AFM leadership to force a hasty and indiscriminate dismantling of the old order—and to dictate the shape of the new—augured ill for any early and reasonably orderly passage to democratic rule. On one hand, the radicals naive and cavalier approach to political and societal change sparked an unnecessarily sharp and destabilizing escalation of popular demands and expectations. On the other, it made an intense and potentially lengthy post-coup power struggle with numerically superior moderate and conservative forces inevitable.

Over the past ten months, this struggle has passed through a series of distinct phases. Successive crises have brought marked shifts in actors, alignments, and issues. In the process, the effective balance of forces in Lisbon has become progressively less representative of

the nation at large. The political and economic chaos born of the sudden collapse of old institutions has been compounded by ambiguous, inconsistent, and constantly changing new ground rules.¹¹ And the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) has been afforded repeated opportunities to strengthen and consolidate its position.

At first, AFM leaders sought to control things from behind the scenes, refusing—in disregard of Portugal's hierarchical traditions—to institutionalize their position in either the political or military pecking order. However, the abnormality of their role, and the pressure they brought to bear for rapid decolonization, soon brought them into conflict with General Spinoza, the highly popular but basically conservative critic of the old regime whom the AFM itself had tapped to serve as Provisional President and head of the seven-man "Junta of National Salvation."

The advantage seemed to lie with Spinoza. His supporters held sway in the Junta. The composition of the other two top governmental bodies, the Council of State (a partly civilian executive organ with the Junta as its nucleus) and the coalition style cabinet (Council of Ministers), was relatively balanced between centrists and leftists. The civilian Prime Minister was in general sympathy with Spinoza's views. And while Spinoza's old friend, Armed Forces Chief of Staff Costa Gomes, chose to play the role of mediator, his reputation as a political moderate suggested that the President could count on his support in a crunch.

Nevertheless, Spinoza overplayed his hand in mid-July by attempting to alter the AFM's electoral timetable to his advantage. The move was actively opposed not only by the AFM *en masse*, but by virtually

¹¹Since the coup, the Portuguese economy has been shaken by labor militancy, popular unrest, and general uncertainty. These woes have been compounded by the worsening economic picture in Europe as a whole. As a result, industrial production, retail sales, and private investment have declined and receipts from tourism and worker's remittances are down. Moreover, the country's alarming pre-coup inflation rate (25 percent) has edged upward, and returning soldiers and settlers from Africa (as well as emigre laborers from Western Europe) have swelled the ranks of the unemployed. These difficulties have been particularly unsettling because, in their initial enthusiasm, Portugal's new leaders promised almost everything from higher wages and expanded social security benefits to reduced inflation and lower unemployment. And ever since, these men have been faced with the difficult and politically sensitive task of choosing between their conflicting commitments.

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the entire political left as well. When the dust settled, AFM leaders held four cabinet posts (including that of Prime Minister), command of the Lisbon Military District, and operational control of a new military internal security force—the Continental Operations Command (COPCON).

Among other things, the final stages of this skirmish underscored the basic contradiction between the AFM radicals' professed commitment to democracy and their more revolutionary political, social, and economic objectives. Afterwards, the AFM's strengthened grip on the levers of power simply reinforced the radicals' propensity to ignore any vaunted new democratic rights and safeguards that might benefit their adversaries. Thus, in late September, when Spínola sought to recoup his losses by staging a massive rally of moderates and conservatives, the worried AFM leadership joined forces with the Communists to thwart this move by extralegal means. Deserted at the height of the crisis by Costa Gomes, Spínola resigned two days later with a bitter speech warning that Portugal was heading toward chaos and "new forms of slavery."

Spínola's departure marked a major watershed in the post-coup course of Portuguese domestic affairs. The relatively compliant Costa Gomes was promptly elevated to the post of Provisional President; and, following a number of other top-level personnel changes designed to make the Junta, Council of State, and cabinet more responsive to AFM direction, the key arena of conflict between radicals and moderates shifted to the AFM itself. The principal issues were (1) the direction and pace of further reforms, and (2) the nature and duration of the AFM's political role. Both generated renewed interest in institutionalizing the still amorphous Movement. On one hand, Portugal's young military Jacobins now saw creation of a formal elitist revolutionary organization as a prerequisite for expansion and perpetuation of their political power. On the other, many moderates undoubtedly hoped that institutionalization would provide them with the organizational and procedural tools they needed to neutralize the radicals.

The institutional entity that rather swiftly emerged bore more than a passing resemblance to classical Communist organizational practice—albeit the ground rules allowed for freer debate than is generally

associated with Marxist "democratic centralism."²² Thus, although the broadening of the AFM's command structure and the proliferation of lower level advisory bodies brought the rift between the leftist-dominated leadership and the predominantly moderate rank and file into sharper relief (and thereby fueled growing divisions within the leadership itself), they did not significantly weaken the radicals' position. The radicals were forced to move slowly, to compromise, and occasionally to accept defeat. But overall, they succeeded in gradually moving Portugal in the direction they desired.

Indeed, the primal trend in Portuguese politics since Spínola's departure has been the growing subordination of democracy to revolutionary change in the official guiding ethos. As a result, Portuguese society has become increasingly polarized. An open rift has developed in the cabinet between the PCP and its sympathizers on the one hand, and the Socialists and center-left Popular Democrats on the other. And political tolerance—never a prominent Portuguese characteristic—has dwindled rapidly.²³

Incremental movement toward revolutionary military rule gave way to a potential quantum jump in mid-February 1975 when AFM radicals succeeded in securing organizational approval of a scheme whereby

²²From mid-October 1974 until mid-March 1975, a 20-man Superior Council chaired by Costa Gomes (and including strong radical representation) operated something like a politburo and served as the primary official channel for bringing AFM influence to bear on every facet of the domestic scene. The Political Coordinating Commission exercised the functions of a powerful secretariat, and a consultative 200-member General Assembly performed the role of a central committee. Moving downward, council-assembly organizations were established at all levels of command within each of the armed services. In addition, agitprop groups were assigned to most units—and similar teams were dispatched to the countryside to "educate" the peasantry as well.

²³For example, one of the Portuguese Government's first moves after Spínola resigned was to establish a Commission for the Extinction of Fascism headed by the distinctly radical operational boss of COPCON. Since then, official hostility toward virtually the entire political right has, with the enthusiastic cooperation of the PCP, found more and more frequent reflection in the public media. Moreover, as demonstrated by the repeated failure of forewarned COPCON forces to prevent groups of leftist militants from disrupting the activities of Portugal's few "non-revolutionary" (i.e., centrist) parties, political violence has been tolerated so long as it has been directed against potential enemies of the AFM's envisaged new order. On the other side of the coin, traditional fears of the left have resurfaced and hardened. Faith in the establishment and in its promises of genuinely representative elections has waned. And in this increasingly charged atmosphere, one counter-coup has already been attempted.

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the AFM would continue to guide the Portuguese political processes for an indefinite period.²⁴ The official opening date for campaigning for the scheduled 12 April constituent assembly elections was then postponed until mid-March in order to give AFM "negotiating teams" time to jawbone any recalcitrant political parties into accepting the projected new ground rules. These developments were applauded by the Communists, and no wonder. It was just the sort of scenario that PCP Chairman Cunhal—faced with the likelihood that his party would garner no more than 10-20 percent of the vote in any freely-held elections—had been advocating all along.

The PCP has taken full advantage of political disarray—and of its cordial ties with some AFM leaders—to bolster its domestic position. But it is still far from strong enough to mount a successful takeover on its own. Moreover, Party Chairman Cunhal, whose grasp of Portuguese realities (including the strength of rural conservatism) seems to be considerably firmer than that of some AFM militants, clearly favors a cautious and basically evolutionary route to power—an attitude which apparently enjoys Moscow's blessing. Thus a prolonged period of revolutionary military rule during which the Communists could build their power and influence with the assistance (whether calculated or unintentional) of friendly AFM radicals offers the PCP the best of all possible worlds.

For their part, however, Portugal's four democratic parties of the moderate left and right dug in their heels and tried to secure significant revisions in the AFM's plan through hard bargaining. For a moment in early March, it seemed that they might succeed. Indeed, the sweeping victories scored at that juncture by moderate officers in secret balloting for seats on two AFM service-level advisory councils raised the possibility that the radicals' hold on the AFM command structure might soon be broken as well. But on

²⁴In brief, this plan specified that prior AFM approval of all presidential candidates was to be mandatory. The AFM was to have the right to name the ministers of defense and economy (and possibly the Prime Minister) in any future constitutionally-formed government. The country's new constitution would have to conform to the AFM program that was published shortly after the April 1974 coup. Continued military control of the Council of State was to be assured, and that body was to be granted legislative powers (presumably against the day when the Junta of National Salvation ceased to exist). And no "conservative" changes in a newly decreed three-year economic plan were to be permitted.

11 March, an abortive and incredibly inept coup attempt involving a number of Spinola's sympathizers changed matters abruptly.

Whatever the true story behind it may ultimately prove to be, the attempted coup provided the radicals with just the boost they needed. They lost no time in overriding the AFM's now dazed and demoralized moderates and in securing a virtual *carte blanche*. Under the radicals' direction, the AFM promptly assumed full control of Portuguese political affairs. The "February plan" was cast aside, and the next two weeks were highlighted by the following developments:

—The Council of State, the Junta of National Salvation, and the AFM's existing top council were abolished and were replaced by a single, radical-dominated military ruling body endowed with broad executive and legislative powers (the 28-member Superior Council of the Revolution);

—Communists and crypto-Communists were given greater representation in the cabinet in order to make it more "responsive" to the AFM's reform program;

—Portuguese banks and insurance companies were nationalized, and prompt extension of state control to other "basic" sectors of the economy was promised;

—The constituent assembly elections were postponed until 25 April and three officially registered parties (two ultra left groups hostile to the PCP plus the center-right Christian Democratic Party) were barred from participation—thus reducing the field to six radical fringe parties (two of them subject to PCP influence), the Communist-dominated Portuguese Democratic Movement, the PCP, the Socialists, the center-left Popular Democrats and Monarchists, and the center-right Social Democratic Center Party.

It would appear that the major elements in the radicals' emerging blueprint for the future are no longer open to serious negotiation. Moreover, one of the AFM's most prominent (and most outspoken) radical leaders already has publicly declared that the party that manages to get the most votes does not necessarily represent the best interests of the people. Under these circumstances—and given the unrepresentative range of party choices to be offered to

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the voters—constituent assembly elections (if held at all) will be virtually meaningless. Unless things change greatly in the interim, so will any general elections that might follow. Portugal is, in fact, well on the way toward establishment of something akin to the radical Velasco military regime in Peru.²⁵ And in the Portuguese context, that spells continued, and quite possibly growing instability.

By their latest actions, the AFM radicals have placed themselves more squarely than ever on a collision course with the centrists and conservatives who still make up the bulk of the population and the armed forces. Thus, despite the dampening effect of the 11 March events, organized conspiratorial activity is likely to resume before too long. Moreover, if political and economic conditions continue to deteriorate at their present rate, an increasing number of politically moderate Portuguese will probably join in.

Of course, the line of march that has now been laid down is not irreversible. In fact, the new ground rules specify that the recently expanded 240 man assembly of the Armed Forces Movement may expel any member of the Superior Council of the Revolution by as yet undefined voting margins and procedures. But just how meaningful this will prove to be in practice is open to serious question. Open critics of "revolutionary change" now risk purge or worse. For their part, the radicals have demonstrated that they will not be banished to the political sidelines without a fight. And in the event of a showdown, they can probably count on the PCP to come to their aid again in any way it can. Thus, the chances that AFM moderates will be able to gain political control without staging a virtual counter-coup appear to be relatively poor.

Moreover, even if it involved little or no bloodshed, any successful attempt by either moderate or conservative forces to wrest predominant power away from the radicals would more than likely result in the imposition of another authoritarian regime—at least on an interim basis. There would seem to be no feasible alternative. For one thing, in an environment where the concept of a loyal opposition enjoys so little currency, stringent internal security measures would

²⁵ A comprehensive analysis of the Velasco regime is presented in OPR's *Peru's Stalled Revolution: Implications and Prospects*, January 1975.

be required for quite some time. But more important, perhaps, Portugal's growing economic problems and the divisive impact of much of what has happened since April 1974 have created a whole series of new and potentially intractable obstacles to stable and effectual representative government.

In short, the real question now is not whether Portugal will end up under some form of authoritarian rule in the years just ahead, but what kind of authoritarian rule it will be. If it turns out to be a regime dominated by either the far left or the far right, Portuguese participation in NATO and bilateral military arrangements with the US will be adversely affected. Quite apart from the other problems it would pose for Washington, a far-leftist regime would in all likelihood seek to weaken or break these ties. And however much an ultra-conservative regime might wish to preserve Portugal's existing alliances, it would probably prove as divisive to NATO and generate as much popular disapproval within the US as the late military dictatorship in Greece.

Greece

Just as Iberian traditions and circumstances have favored the persistence of authoritarian rule in Portugal, geographically induced parochialism and the legacy of nearly 400 years of Turkish domination have, until now at least, posed virtually insuperable obstacles to the establishment of stable and effective democratic government in modern Greece. The turmoil, hardships, and misrule suffered under the Turks produced a people imbued with predominantly egocentric values and reliant for their safety and well-being on close family ties or other narrow and highly personalistic alliances. And ever since independence was achieved, Greek hyper-individualism and patronal traditions have found reflection in the formation of innumerable small, personalistic, and generally short-lived political parties, as well as in a propensity for uninhibited political infighting.

Together with the stresses and strains stemming from modernizing change and various untoward external developments, this state of affairs has resulted in both chronic instability and experimentation with widely differing forms of rule. In the past 65 years alone, Greece has experienced six military coups, three attempted coups, one royal assassination, one civil war, and three dictatorships—not to mention alternating monarchical and republican political

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systems and countless instances of arbitrary royal intervention in parliamentary affairs. The average life of non-dictatorial Greek governments between 1910 and the military coup of April 1967 was less than one year. Some lasted only a few days or weeks.

There was one bright spot in this generally doleful record. In sharp contrast to the strife and chaos which marked the opening years of the post-World War II period, Greece entered into a decade of relative political stability and growing prosperity in 1952 under a series of popularly-elected conservative governments.²⁶ It was a period also notable for the coalescence of most Greek political parties into three broad coalitions: Konstantinos Karamanlis' conservative National Radical Union (formed in 1956), Georgios Papandreou's moderate Center Union (formed in 1961), and the Communist-dominated United Democratic Left (formed in 1951, four years after the Greek Communist Party itself was outlawed).

Nonetheless, electoral victories scored by the moderates in 1963-64 and accompanying gains by the left touched off a period of political turmoil and polarization which ultimately spawned the military coup of 1967. What happened during the ensuing seven years offers scholars a wealth of material for studies of the dynamics and potential shortcomings of prolonged military rule in a relatively sophisticated environment. For the purposes of this paper, however, a summary analysis of the Papadopoulos and Ioannidis regimes will suffice to relate Greek experience to the generalizations about authoritarianism and militarism set forth in earlier discussion and to set the stage for an appraisal of the country's current efforts to restore representative government.

In view of the fact that the military coup of April 1967 was basically an institutional affair, two of the most notable developments that followed were the gradual emergence of Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos as the dominant leader within the ruling junta and the accompanying trend toward personalization and civilianization of the regime. Indeed, Papadopoulos unwittingly foreshadowed events which were to take

²⁶Because of civil war and governmental instability, post-war economic recovery did not really get underway in Greece until 1951. Between 1952 and 1963 the country's output of manufactured goods doubled. Its capacity to generate electric power increased threefold. Overall economic growth averaged over 6 percent a year. And per capit: GNP (calculated in constant 1970 prices) rose from \$360 to \$670.

place in a much freer atmosphere some 18 months later when, following royal involvement in an abortive Navy mutiny, he staged a constitutional plebiscite in July 1973 which made Greece a republic for the second time in 50 years, accorded wide powers to the new presidency, and elevated him from Prime Minister to the office of President for a seven-year term.

Ironically, Papadopoulos' subsequent moves toward restoration of civilian rule—particularly his appointment of a civilian Prime Minister identified with the old order, his gestures signalling possible relaxation of pressures on the political left, and his promise of general elections in 1974—proved to be his undoing. On one hand, they were taken as a sign of weakness by dissident students, workers, and intellectuals (and therefore as offering a golden opportunity to resume traditionally free-swinging protest activities). On the other, they added a sense of "revolution betrayed" to the brief that many conservative military officer:—including the powerful military police chief, Brigadier General Dimitrios Ioannidis—had been building against Papadopoulos ever since his personal ambitions had become evident. The instability generated by these parallel developments erupted in crisis in November 1973 when the Army had to be called in to help subdue rioting students and workers in Athens. Considerable bloodshed resulted, and the incident furnished Ioannidis and his cohorts with a handy excuse to oust Papadopoulos.

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
the relative stability of his regime through 1972 was at least in part attributable to his success in securing and maintaining the qualified but nonetheless effective acceptance of the bulk of the population. For one thing, the respite from governmental paralysis and domestic chaos was, initially at least, welcome in many quarters. For another, suspension of participatory politics was less disruptive of traditional Greek ways of getting things done than is generally conceded. The focus of the deeply-ingrained patronage system simply shifted away from elected representatives to local military commanders and the administrative bureaucracy. Moreover, Greece benefitted from general West European prosperity

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throughout Papadopoulos' tenure, and the steady rise in living standards engendered by continued rapid economic growth, liberal consumer credit, and various measures aimed at improving the lot of the rural population did much to take the sting out of vexing political restrictions.²⁷

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By so doing he alienated the population, deprived his regime of qualified political and administrative talent, weakened the already shaky institutions of the post-1967 political order, forfeited what remained of the aura of legitimacy that the 1967 conspirators had managed to impart to their rule, and aggravated factional divisions within the armed forces. Moreover, Ioannidis was equally inept in his dealings with other nations. Indeed, his adventuristic and highly nationalistic foreign policy course had begun to pose serious problems for the US well before it culminated in the internationally ominous—and for Ioannidis, personally calamitous—Cyprus crisis of July 1974.

Ioannidis' gamble in sponsoring the National Guard coup which deposed Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios and elevated Nikos Sampson—an ardently pro-*enosis* (union of Greece and Cyprus) and anti-Turk rightwinger—to power on 15 July backfired badly. Ankara responded by sending a large military force to Cyprus to protect both the Turkish Cypriot minority and its own interests, a move that threatened war with Greece itself. Stunned by this turn of events, Greece's top military commanders first ousted Ioannidis and then exercised their time-honored option of political withdrawal. They consulted with a variety of former politicians and, in hopes of forming a civilian government of such stature that it would be in a position to secure a favorable negotiated settlement of the crisis, offered

²⁷The Greek economy prospered during the first five years of the Papadopoulos era. Real growth averaged 8.6 percent annually—exceeding the commendable record achieved during the 1962-1966 period by more than a full percentage point and outdistancing the growth of all other West European countries. Domestic prices remained relatively stable. Per capita GNP passed the \$1,000 mark in 1970 and reached \$1,400 in 1972. The economy began to overheat toward the end of that year, however, and while rapid growth continued in 1973, skyrocketing prices resulted in a serious trade deficit and a fateful upsurge of popular discontent.

the post of Prime Minister to the seasoned and conservative Karamanlis.

Before accepting, Karamanlis—who had been living in self-imposed exile in Paris since 1964—demanded and received the promise of a free hand. Sworn in as Prime Minister on 24 July, he formed a so-called "government of national unity" (actually a two-party, center-right coalition of old-line politicians and liberal technocrats) and set about consolidating his position vis-a-vis the understandably nervous and still predominantly anti-democratic military establishment. His strategy included prompt restoration of the country's 1952 constitution (except for those portions pertaining to monarchy), discreet military transfers and retirements, and, most importantly, preparations for early elections.

His need to keep the military at bay and to strengthen Athen's international position were not, however, Karamanlis' only reasons for seeking a prompt popular mandate. His disenchantment with Greece's pre-coup political order was no less profound than that of the military officers who toppled it in 1967, and he had spent his years in Paris devising plans for what he believed would be a more effective and stable form of representative rule. To implement these plans, he needed a firm Parliamentary majority. Hence he had to move before unavoidable domestic or international difficulties eroded his newly-reborn popularity.

The results of the 17 November 1974 elections fulfilled Karamanlis' fondest hopes. His New Democracy Party (essentially a reincarnation of his old National Radical Union) garnered about 55 percent of the vote and, thanks to the intricacies of the country's freshly revised electoral law, 220 out of 300 parliamentary seats. Moreover, in according Georgios Mavros' moderate Center Union-New Forces another 20 percent of their votes (and 60 parliamentary seats), the Greek electorate had firmly rejected the extremes of both left and right.²⁸ (Just three weeks later, Greek voters satisfied another major—albeit unspoken—

²⁸Karamanlis' actions in legalizing Greece's two rival Communist parties and announcing the country's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command had stolen much of the left's old thunder. The Communist-affiliated United Left won only 9 percent of the vote and 8 parliamentary seats. A radical left break-away group from the original Center Union received 13 percent of the vote and 12 seats. For its part, the ultra-conservative National Democratic Union ended up with 2 percent of the vote and no seats at all.

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Karamanlis goal by opting for republican rule by better than a 2 to 1 majority.)

Karamanlis waited to unveil his blueprint for the future until the new Parliament had met and elected a provisional Greek President. Then, on 23 December, he presented a draft constitution based on a strong Gaullist-style presidency for public and Parliamentary debate. In its defense, he argued that "Greek realities" made a powerful executive essential. But given the marked resemblance between the political system that Karamanlis proposed and General Papadopoulos' abortive plan for perpetuating himself in power, it is hardly surprising that left-leaning oppositionists promptly characterized the draft charter as "totalitarian under a parliamentary mantle."²⁹

Karamanlis is, however, in a good position to get his way—either through parliamentary approval or national referendum. Moreover, if he does, his subsequent election as President is virtually assured. In that event, he will take office with solidly democratic credentials, and Greece's period of political transition will have been completed in remarkably short compass. But the prospects for Greek democracy will not be much better than in the past.

For one thing, demoralized right-wing military officers have already attempted to oust Karamanlis once, and they are likely to try again. For another, Greece's principal political coalitions are still loose and personalistic affairs. Unless this situation changes, the death, disability, or precipitous retirement of Karamanlis (now 68 years old) could well result in enough instability and uncertainty to bring even a thoroughly purged Greek Army out of the barracks once more.

Equally important, Karamanlis' political system does, as his critics contend, contain the seeds of authoritarianism. In fact, he clearly intends to use the

²⁹Under Karamanlis' draft charter, Greece's President would be elected by a two-thirds majority of Parliament for a five-year term. His extensive powers would resemble those held by the King under the 1952 Constitution. He would have the authority to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister as well as to appoint and dismiss other cabinet members at the Prime Minister's request. He could also dismiss the entire government and dissolve Parliament after "consulting" the Council of the Republic (a body composed of past Presidents and Prime Ministers). Under certain circumstances, he could convene the cabinet under his chairmanship or suspend articles of the Constitution. He would also have the right to veto draft laws (which would then have to be approved by a three-fifths majority of Parliament) and to proclaim referenda on crucial national issues.

autocratic powers that he has written into his draft constitution whenever he feels that considerations of political efficiency or domestic order so require. And given Greek passions and circumstances, that could be quite often

With their ability to influence policy by parliamentary means so obviously limited, radical elements of both the left and right would be likely to take advantage of periods of political permissiveness to pressure the regime through disruptive direct action. Moreover, there are any number of issues—including serious economic problems, Greece's double-barreled rivalry with Turkey over Cyprus and Aegean resources, and the whole fabric of Greek relations with NATO and Washington—which could generate enough domestic turmoil to justify recourse to extraordinary executive powers.³⁰ In theory, these deviations from democratic norms would be temporary. But history suggests that "emergency" powers are seldom fully relinquished, particularly in countries where the parliamentary and judicial checks on the executive are weak. Thus, authoritarian rule could just as easily return to Greece in increments as via another coup.

In sum, if Greece's projected Presidential government is established under Karamanlis' leadership and ground rules, it will be better equipped to cope with the nation's problems and idiosyncracies than any of its post-war civilian predecessors. But given Greek circumstances and the severity of the destabilizing pressures that the Athens regime is likely to encounter once Karamanlis' current honeymoon with the general populace begins to wane, there will still be at least an even chance that Greece will be back under some form of authoritarian rule within the next 5 to 10 years. The domestic and international implications of such a development would, of course,

³⁰The austerity program inaugurated by Ioannidis shortly after he seized power was showing results by mid-1974. Karamanlis thus inherited an economy marked by an industrial slowdown, a declining but not insignificant inflation rate (12 percent), and an improving though still serious balance of payments situation. Since then, the lingering effects of the Cyprus crisis, the impact of sharply higher outlays for oil imports, and the continued deterioration of the economic scene in Europe as a whole have deepened the Greek recession. These problems will continue to affect the Greek economy in the year ahead, and the knottiest problem facing Athens will be how to stimulate economic recovery without jeopardizing the gains previously made on the inflation and trade fronts.

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depend upon what constellation of forces held predominant power.

Democratic Institutions in Jeopardy: Italy and Turkey

As direct heirs of two great rival spiritual and temporal empires, Italy and Turkey could hardly be more different culturally. Moreover, the contrast is just as sharp in the economic field. With a per capita GNP of over \$2,500 (i.e., nearly as high as that of Great Britain), Italy has passed well beyond the mid-stage of industrial development. In fact, were it not for the vast economic disparity between the northern and southern parts of the country, Italy could properly be classified as an industrially advanced state. Turkey, on the other hand, is still primarily an agrarian nation, and its per capita GNP of about \$600 ranks it with Albania at the bottom of the Southern Europe scale. Yet in one respect, Italy and Turkey are similar. In both, weakly-rooted democratic institutions are currently being tested by the combined weight of incongruous traditions and pressures associated with modernizing change. And in both, the effective survival of these institutions is open to serious question.

Italy

In assessing the prospects for Italian democracy, optimists are wont to stress the proven ability of the country's post-war political system to weather recurrent political and economic crises; the increased capacity to respond to changing domestic imperatives that the system has derived from the dramatic economic boom of 1965-1971; and the gradual transformation of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) into something approaching a party of the democratic left. On the other hand, even the most sanguine observers would probably agree that parliamentary rule has not yet sunk firm roots in Italian soil. Moreover, the old formulas which brought Italy political continuity, if not stability, for the past quarter century show signs of breaking down. And, thanks in part to dislocations occasioned by modernizing change and world-wide economic strains, the problems now facing Italian political leaders are more numerous and more complex than ever before.

Italy has had the shortest experience with unified and fully representative government of the four major

powers of Western Europe.³¹ Hence it is scarcely surprising that the nation's historical and cultural heritage still creates some formidable obstacles to stable and effective parliamentary rule. This heritage includes a distrust of government, strong familial and patronal traditions, and a distinctly casual attitude toward legal and administrative regulations. It also includes deep-seated and cross-cutting cleavages over such issues as class and regional economic inequities and church-state relations.

These divisive factors and forces have found reflection in (1) the number (an average of eight) and diversity of nationally-based political parties that have vied for the support of the Italian electorate since 1948 and (2) the pronounced factionalism within these parties which has prevented most of them from maintaining either strong leadership or a coherent policy line. No post-war Italian party has ever received a majority of the votes cast in a general election, and only once did one come close enough to that mark to win a majority of seats in even one chamber of the country's bicameral legislature (the Christian Democrats in 1948).

Coalition government (formal or tacit) has thus been a necessity. But Italy's disparate and divided parties have been unable to work together for very long—even when their goals are similar. Hence, despite the relative consistency of overall Italian voting patterns since the war (40-45 percent for parties of the left, about the same for parties of the center, and 10-15 percent for parties of the right), the country has established a record for rapid cabinet turnovers surpassed in all of post-war Western Europe only by that of the ill-fated Fourth French Republic. The present Moro government is the 37th since the fall of Fascism in July 1943, and the 30th since the proclamation of the Republic in June 1946.

³¹Modern Italy was born as a constitutional monarchy (complete with a parliament and a cabinet ministry responsible to the parliament) in 1870. But, with the exception of a brief and chaotic period between the end of World War I and Mussolini's seizure of power in 1922, relatively few Italians could vote until after World War II. Moreover, while the Italian electorate was allowed to decide the fate of the monarchy and to choose a broadly representative constituent assembly in 1946, Italy's present republican constitution (which combines some local innovations with elements drawn from both French and British political practice) was promulgated two years later without benefit of popular referendum. Partly because of this, and partly because of continuing disparities between some of its provisions and actual political practice, the Italian Constitution is not as widely revered as might be inferred from public rhetoric.

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In the absence of strong and united governments endowed with both a clear program of action and the security of tenure necessary to realize it, struggles between parties and factions and endless debates on coalition formulae have become substitutes for effective legislative action.³² Not that Italy's fundamental social and economic problems have been totally ignored, but most of the constructive reforms that have managed to get through Parliament have been much weakened in the process. And their effectiveness has been further impaired by a grossly inefficient administrative bureaucracy in which sponsorship still outweighs merit as a criterion for recruitment and promotion.

The popular frustrations generated by government paralysis have led to more frequent recourse to direct political action. Over the past decade, there has been an upward trend in protest demonstrations, trade union agitation, and, more ominously, acts of political violence. At the same time, the corrupting influence of Italy's vast subterranean political and administrative patronage network (popularly known as the *sottogoverno*) has grown more pervasive.

Predictably, these *praetorian* tendencies have—together with an accompanying increase in general lawlessness—swelled the ranks of those favoring a basically authoritarian solution to their country's ills. Although it still commands less than 10 percent of the vote in most parts of the country, the neo-Fascist *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (MSI) has scored

³²Beginning with Prime Minister De Gasperi's espousal of the "reformist center" slogan in the late 1940's, Italian politicians have vainly sought some sort of magic formula for constructing stable and effective coalition governments. Although it was to be revived briefly ten years later, the perennially dominant Christian Democrats' original centrist solution had been pretty well discredited by 1963. At the instigation of Aldo Moro and Amintore Fanfani, it was then replaced by a "center-left" formula which established Italy's third-ranked but faction-ridden Socialist Party as the Christian Democrats' principal coalition partner. Now, in part because of electoral gains scored by both the far left and the far right, and in part because of continued governmental instability, this formula too has come under serious challenge. On one hand, pressures are mounting for the adoption of a new formula that would increase leftist influence (i.e., either the Socialist-sponsored "privileged axis" which would make the Socialists and Christian Democrats *co-equal* senior partners in an otherwise conventional center-left coalition, or the "historic compromise" touted by the Communists—a still vaguely defined proposal for a working alliance with both the Christian Democrats and the Socialists which would bring the PCI, Italy's second largest party, into the national government for the first time since 1947). On the other hand, some of the more ardent opponents of a further opening to the left have suggested systemic change—in the form of establishing a strong Gaullist-type presidency—as a preferable solution.

substantial gains over the past four years in both local and nation-wide elections. The MSI now holds 51 parliamentary seats (i.e., nearly as many as the Socialists), and its growing strength at the polls was probably one of the factors that recently prompted Christian Democratic Party Secretary Fanfani to shift his ground and to make an open bid for the support of the dissatisfied right with strong talk on the need for law and order.³³

At the other end of the political spectrum, the PCI has registered a slight gain in every national election held since the war. Although excluded from participation in the national government since 1947, it polled 27.2 percent of the vote in the 1972 parliamentary elections and now holds 179 of 630 parliamentary seats (i.e., two-thirds the number held by the Christian Democrats and about as many as held by all other parties combined). Moreover, the PCI presently administers—in most cases in collaboration with the Socialists—3 of 20 regions, a dozen (out of 94) provinces, and about 20 percent of all municipal councils. And its behind-the-scenes influence is growing in a number of areas still dominated by the Christian Democrats.

Equally significant, the Christian Democratic Party is itself clearly losing ground—partly because of a natural tendency to blame the principal governing party for the country's current economic problems, and partly because of its continued inability to provide an effective administration.³⁴ Moreover,

³³The political prospects of the MSI are limited, however, by the fact that the latter's Fascist character effectively precludes it from becoming the focal point of a broad groundswell of conservative discontent—or even from formal participation in a governing coalition. Indeed, its very existence runs counter to both the spirit and the letter of the Italian Constitution. And its claim to respectability has been further undermined by the fact that most acts of political terrorism in Italy in recent years have been carried out by right-wing extremists.

³⁴Italy is currently experiencing its most serious economic and financial crisis of the post-war era. By late 1974, economic recession had been added to year-long problems with rampant inflation and oil-aggravated balance-of-payment woes. Thus, when Prime Minister Moro took office, he was faced with:

- A sharp slump in industrial production.
- Rising unemployment.
- The worst inflation rate in recent Italian history (28 percent).
- A current account deficit of nearly \$8 billion—coupled with perilously low foreign exchange reserves and a poor international credit rating.
- Trade union demands (since largely satisfied) for inflationary increases in cost-of-living allowances, pensions, and other fringe benefits.

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Christian Democratic unity (always a tenuous affair considering the fact that the party's factional groupings have traditionally spanned the spectrum from the near-Marxist left to the extreme right) has been severely strained by the rebuff the party suffered in the divorce referendum of May 1974 and by the steady electoral gains scored by both the Communists and neo-Fascists.

All told, the growing polarization of the Italian political scene at the expense of the nebulous center threatens to upset the complex balance of conflicting interests and ideologies that has enabled the country to weather so many seemingly mortal crises over the past 30 years. Granted, it is possible that the PCI may suffer as the result of popular reaction to recent developments in Portugal. But unless the regional elections scheduled for June 1975 reveal a reversal of present Italian political trends, the chances are that the Christian Democrats will fairly soon be unable to forge a viable governmental coalition without reaching a *modus vivendi* with the Communists.¹⁵ And should the formal entry of the PCI into the Italian Government be hastened by political or economic crisis, it could have profoundly destabilizing effects.

For one thing, such a development could provoke serious domestic disorders—and possibly a coup attempt.¹⁶ For another, it could split the Christian Democratic Party down the middle. And if that were to happen, the chances of forming a stable and effective coalition government within the framework of Italy's existing political system would be slimmer than ever. Indeed, in the absence of both a broad-based centrist party and a clear popular mandate for either the right or the left, Italy might rather quickly end up with some form of authoritarian rule.

However, in the more likely event of a gradual accommodation with the PCI, there is a good chance

¹⁵The alternative of trying to breathe new life into the center-left formula by giving a larger slice of the political cake to the Socialists would solve few of the problems that have contributed to the instability of center-left coalitions in the past, and thus would seem to hold little prospect of enduring success.

¹⁶Anti-Communist sentiment is strong in the upper echelons of the Italian military establishment. Thus, in the event of precipitous PCI entry into the government, a coup attempt led or backed by senior officers would be a distinct possibility. But since, under most circumstances, there would be a good chance that neither the Carabinieri (paramilitary police) nor the bulk of the armed forces' middle and lower ranks would support such an effort, the likelihood of failure would be high.

that pragmatic considerations of political advantage might prompt most members of the Christian Democratic right wing to bite the bullet and remain in place. In that case, the Christian Democratic Party would be likely to emerge as the senior partner in the eventual new governing coalition, and the destabilizing impact of formal Communist participation in the government would be less pronounced.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the dangers of rightist plots and disorders would persist. Moreover, despite the overwhelming parliamentary majority it would enjoy, the ideologically multi-hued new coalition would probably be rather fragile for quite some time. And since many Italians would view it as a sort of last resort solution, any signs of poor performance would probably result in mounting pressures for systemic change on both the left and the right. Indeed, unless Christian Democratic-PCI collaboration produced encouraging results—particularly in the economic field—the longer term prospects for Italian parliamentary democracy would still be guarded.

Turkey

In Turkey, just as in Italy, representative government is basically a post-war innovation. To the delight of Western observers, it seemed to evolve naturally out of a highly progressive and increasingly liberal authoritarian system of rule. In fact, however, it was just another "Westernizing" import espoused—for differing reasons and with various degrees of enthusiasm—by most members of the modernizing elite that had dominated the Turkish political scene since 1923. And while multi-party democracy was rather quickly embraced by Turkey's politically untutored and theretofore politically emasculated masses, the record since suggests that the transition was premature.

When Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) seized power and proclaimed the Turkish Republic in 1923, his countrymen were unaccustomed to anything but

¹⁷Given the unique characteristics of the PCI and its doctrinal dedication to a pluralistic political system, there is considerable controversy over just how serious the implications of Communist entry into the Italian Government would be for US strategic and economic interests. Although this issue falls outside the purview of this study, it is addressed at some length in NIE 24-1-74, *Prospects for and Consequences of Increased Communist Influence in Italian Politics*, 18 July 1974, and OPR's forthcoming *The Communist Party of Italy: An Analysis and Some Predictions*.

autocratic rule.¹⁰ Moreover, the sweeping social, political, and economic reforms that he had in mind clearly required strong, centralized government. Kemal reconciled these authoritarian imperatives with his commitment to parliamentary rule by establishing a one-party system. Backed by his enormous personal prestige this arrangement worked fairly smoothly until his death in 1938 (and for a few years thereafter). But Kemal's successor as Turkey's President and leader of the Republican People's Party (RPP), Ismet Inonu, was more liberally inclined, and in 1945 he authorized the formation of opposition parties. Five years later, one of these—Adnan Menderes' Democrat Party—won a massive electoral victory over the RPP and thereupon formed Turkey's first genuinely representative government.

This bold new experiment began to break down before it was fairly underway. Belying its name, the victorious Democrat Party rather promptly moved to mute its critics—first through a series of legislated restrictions on civil and political rights and then by extralegal means as well. Political recriminations and violence increased apace, culminating in the military "revolution" of May 1960 (the first instance of direct military intervention in Turkish political affairs in over three decades).

The 18 months of avowedly caretaker military rule that followed effectively returned Turkish democracy to square one. The discredited Democrat Party was banned. Menderes and two of his principal associates were hanged. A more liberal constitution (interestingly enough, patterned in good part on the Italian Constitution of 1947) was adopted by popular referendum. New elections were held, and in October 1961, civilian government was restored—albeit under the watchful eye of the military establishment.

But starting over in this way did not help very much. However disruptive in its own right, the high-handed behavior of Democrat Party leaders during the 1950's had only been sympathetic of the root causes for the rapid decline of multi-party democracy.

¹⁰The Turks got a brief exposure to Western democratic practices in 1876 when a group of senior military, political, and religious officials persuaded Sultan Abdul Hamid II (later known as Abdul Hamid the Damned) to accept a constitution providing for a representative parliament. Hamid dumped this experiment less than two years later and ruled as a despot until reformist Army elements forced him to resurrect the constitution and swear fealty to the Turkish Parliament in 1908. What emerged, however, was not crowned parliamentary democracy but *de facto* military dictatorship.

For their part, illiberal constitutional "flaws" had been no more than a secondary contributing factor. The real trouble lay in large part with two interrelated and relatively intractable phenomena: the socially fragmenting impact of forced-draft modernization and the persistence of strong authoritarian traditions. And, ironically, both of these were reinforced by the military's "salvationist" intervention.

The forces at work on the Turkish political scene are complex and changing. In the late 1940's, democratization surfaced the deep cleavages that separated the Atatürkist modernizing elite (with its emphasis on secularization and state control of economic affairs) from the traditionalist peasantry, on the one hand, and from the rising entrepreneurial class on the other. Since then, the task of achieving the degree of consensus needed for stable and effective democratic government has been further complicated by new demands generated by a burgeoning urban proletariat, the growth of extremist ideologies of both the left and the right, and a corresponding increase in fragmentation of the political and intellectual elite. The harsh treatment meted out to Democrat Party leaders added another contentious issue to this brew. At the same time, however, the liberalized political ground rules adopted at military insistence made Turkey's democratic institutions more vulnerable than ever to the divisive currents affecting the general populace.

The 1961 constitution established an elaborate system of checks and balances designed to foreclose any recurrence of the governmental excesses of the 1950's. Together with an accompanying proportional representation electoral law, it created a permissive political climate that resulted in: (1) the potentially unsettling emergence of a direct and widely popular successor to the outlawed Democrat Party (Suleyman Demirel's Justice Party); (2) a proliferation of splinter parties; (3) governmental immobilism; and (4) growing instability highlighted by intra-party factional disputes, student unrest, labor strife, and, by the end of the decade, urban terrorism.

No party won more than 37 percent of the vote in the 1961 elections, and for the next four years, Turkey was governed by a series of weak coalition cabinets (all but one of which were headed by the RPP's aging Ismet Inonu). In 1965, the Justice Party won (and in 1969, it retained) majority control of the government. But the temporary demise of coalition politics did not

result in significantly stronger or more dynamic leadership. Much of Demirel's energy during his first four years in office was devoted to domestic fence-mending and to dealing with the ever-explosive Cyprus issue. Thereafter, he had to contend with a growing rift between Justice Party moderates and conservatives which soon culminated in a purge of the latter and their formation of a party of their own.

In any event, the military became increasingly impatient with Demirel's unwillingness or inability to exert his leadership to maintain law and order or to secure the passage of the new social reforms it desired. Finally, in March 1971, the commanders of Turkey's armed forces jointly forced Demirel's resignation with a memorandum in which they threatened to take direct control of the country unless a new "above party" government was formed which would impose stringent internal security measures and enact "Ataturkist reforms." Thus ended Ankara's second stab at representative democracy.

For the next two and a half years, Turkey operated under indirect military rule. Four successive nonpartisan civilian governments strove to comply with the requirements set forth in the 1971 coup memorandum. Their principal achievement was restoration of public order—a process which required maintenance of martial law in some Turkish provinces throughout most of the period in question. But despite the lack of equivalent progress on the reform front, the military establishment soon became tired of—and increasingly divided by—its demanding political role. In April 1973, it passively accepted the Turkish Parliament's rejection of its preferred candidate for President. And six months later, it took advantage of constitutionally-scheduled general elections to withdraw to the political sidelines and permit restoration of representative government.

The game resumed amid more confusion than ever. Reflecting the trend toward factional infighting, splits, and defections that had marked the past four years, three of the eight parties that competed in the October 1973 elections were new arrivals on the political scene. Moreover, the two principal contenders, the RPP and the Justice Party, had both undergone a considerable change in orientation and appeal since the 1969 elections. Under the leadership of Bulent Ecevit, the reformist and once urban and elitist RPP had moved steadily leftward, and in 1973 it seemingly shucked off its historic reliance on the

nation's military, bureaucratic, and academic elites with a populist campaign aimed at wooing the peasant and slumdweller vote. For its part, the initially conservative Justice Party had taken on an increasingly moderate image since 1969—a shift which won the approval of a number of reformist elements, but which cost the party much of its original support from peasants, rural landholders, and the rising commercial class.

The result was a stand-off. Ecevit's RPP won a plurality with only 33 percent of the vote. The Justice Party, suffering from inroads made by two new right-wing parties, was close behind with 29 percent. For more than three months, neither major party was able to form a viable coalition or minority government. Finally, in early 1974, Ecevit succeeded in forging an unlikely partnership between his secular, left-leaning organization and the Islam-oriented new National Salvation Party that gave him a very slim parliamentary majority. But this marriage of convenience was doomed from the start. Punctuated by recurrent squabbles, it lasted just long enough to see the country through the critical initial phases of the current Cyprus crisis.

In mid-September 1974, Ecevit sought to exploit popular approval of his handling of the Cyprus situation to his own and RPP advantage by resigning his post as Prime Minister and advocating new elections. Far from swiftly achieving the results he desired, however, his actions provoked the longest political crisis in the brief history of Turkish parliamentary democracy. In the absence of a majority consensus in Parliament in favor of early elections, the persistent reluctance of Turkey's disparate political parties to work together simply ushered in a new period of indecisive caretaker government. By mid-March 1975, six months of governmental paralysis had triggered a resurgence of protest activities and political violence. And signs of military restiveness were mounting accordingly.

Indeed, there is more than an outside chance that the Turkish military establishment will not wait to see how things work out on their own. Not that Turkey's senior military commanders seem to be particularly anxious to become embroiled in politics so soon again. But they must reckon with the views of their impatient younger colleagues. And while the opinions of individual officers on appropriate courses of action vary

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widely, there is general agreement on one point: Turkey's current constellation of problems—including the ongoing confrontation with Greece and mounting economic ills—makes strong and effective central government more necessary than ever.³⁹

If the Turkish military establishment does intervene again, the sooner it moves the more likely that its objectives will be limited to forcing new elections. But if Turkey's governmental crisis drags on—or if it culminates in the formation of an obviously ineffective cabinet—the Turkish armed forces will probably become increasingly inclined to opt for another interlude of indirect or direct military rule. And if they do, the interruption in Ankara's experiment with representative government might not be quite so brief as in the past.⁴⁰

Even in 1960 there were elements in the military establishment that strongly favored retaining power, and nothing that has happened since is likely to have increased the level of confidence within the Turkish armed forces in unfettered parliamentary democracy. More important, perhaps, there has been a change in both the internal and external climate. First of all, partly because of the increasing currency of reformist military rule, and partly because of the changing

³⁹Turkey is in the midst of a 15-year development program (1963-77) aimed at modernizing and industrializing its traditional, agriculture-based economy. Despite its political troubles and recurrent bouts with balance-of-payments difficulties and inflation, the country maintained an average economic growth rate of better than 7 percent until mid-1974. Since then, its economic prospects have been clouded by rising oil prices (which, together with sharp wage hikes, food shortages, and increases in the cost of non-petroleum imports, have pushed the annual inflation rate to nearly 35 percent) and the impact of the general economic downturn in Europe. By the close of 1974, Turkey had amassed a record trade deficit (\$2 billion). Worker remittances were declining and returning emigrant workers were aggravating a perennially serious unemployment problem. Moreover, the costly Cyprus operation had thrown the budget out of whack. And the cut-off of US military aid in early 1975 promised further difficulties.

⁴⁰Given the absence of strong leftist influence in Turkey, the thrust of a protracted new military sally into the political arena would be unlikely to depart markedly from that of the 1960 and 1971 interventions. Hence, its domestic and international ramifications would probably be in many ways the same. At the same time, however, a return to authoritarian rule in Ankara would probably not result in a sharp reversal of the current cooling trend in US-Turkish relations. Some improvement could be expected, but in today's environment, nationalistic sentiment in Turkey is likely to continue to run high. Thus, just how significant and durable this improvement might prove to be would probably depend heavily on the ultimate resolution of Turkey's twin disputes with Greece and Ankara's perception of US efforts towards this end.

nature of Turkey's relationships with Washington and Western Europe, the military might feel under less pressure to withdraw than in the past. Moreover, the RPP is no longer the reliable civilian ally that it was under Inonu. And worse still from the standpoint of Turkey's self-appointed guardians of the revolutions of 1923 and 1960, the political fragmentation of Turkish society has now reached a level which threatens to frustrate all constitutionally-based efforts to reestablish a national sense of direction.

In any event, whether or not Turkey weathers its current problems without falling back on an authoritarian solution, the outlook for Turkish democracy in the decade ahead is poor. Not only does the country still lack many of the societal attributes required for stable and effective democratic rule, but it is just now entering a critical midstage of development in which the stresses and strains on its political institutions are likely to be particularly severe.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The foregoing country sketches underscore the fact that to be stable and effective, any non-totalitarian regime—whether authoritarian or democratic—must be in basic consonance with prevailing customs and circumstances. A nation's political culture cannot be changed by fiat; although far from immutable, its evolution is a function of overall societal development. Unfortunately, this relationship is still imperfectly understood. In particular, further research is needed to collate and clarify the prerequisites for—and harbingers of—systemic change.

In any event, a fragmented society endowed with strong authoritarian traditions and subject to the destabilizing pressures of modernization provides marginal soil for representative democracy. For one thing, established clientage relationships and the lack of national consensus on basic issues or experience in the art of practical compromise are quite likely to result in the emergence of a large number of personalistic, ill-disciplined, and highly combative political parties once the restraints of authoritarianism are removed. And if, under these circumstances, the game is played under fully democratic rules, the chances for recurrent governmental instability—and for reversion to authoritarianism—will be high.

Moreover, most nations in the world today have a natural propensity toward authoritarian rule—both because it is easier to establish and maintain than either democracy or totalitarianism and because it is more familiar (i.e., more closely akin to the various kinds of traditional autocracies and oligarchies that they have experienced in the past). At the same time, however, the mounting problems and tensions which promise to perpetuate—and perhaps to spread—both authoritarianism and militarism in the decade ahead will also make any form of rule more difficult.

Some authoritarian governments, both civilian and military, will prove equal to the tasks they will face. But many more will not, and in most cases their demise will not result in the establishment of a significantly different or more effective regime. Predictable increases in pressures on the West for greater assistance and concessions to developing nations are thus likely to be accompanied by greater instability in various countries around the world and a related rise in abrasive nationalistic sentiment.

Popular demands and expectations tend to outpace governmental capabilities by the greatest margin in nations which are at or near a middle stage of social and economic development. Hence, the countries of Southern Europe will probably be subject to a particularly broad range of destabilizing pressures for

some time to come. In fact, world-wide economic strains are likely to make it increasingly difficult for them to develop or maintain the necessary conditions for enduring democratic rule. But given the complexity of their circumstances, relatively stable and effective authoritarian alternatives will also prove to be elusive.

Thus, the outlook for Southern Europe as a whole over the next ten years is for considerable turbulence and political experimentation. And while the prospects for the survival or revival of democratic practices vary widely throughout the area, the chances are that the bulk of this experimentation will focus on differing forms of authoritarian rule.

The problems that US policy-makers will face in attempting to cope with this situation in Southern Europe will be delicate and complex. There is a danger that new extremist dictatorships of either the left or the right might emerge. Then, too, continued political instability alone might breed xenophobic nationalism. Either of these developments would threaten US and NATO interests in the region generally. Moreover, popular distaste for authoritarian regimes of any sort (even those which prove to be relatively enlightened and effective) is likely to continue to run high in both the US and Western Europe.